WHAT SINN FEIN STANDS FOR

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WHAT SINN FEIN : : STANDS FOR : :

THE IRISH REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT; ITS HISTORY, AIMS AND IDEALS, EXAMINED AS TO THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE WORLD

By

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TO

MEN OF GOOD-WILL

IN BRITAIN, AMERICA AND

: THE BRITISH COLONIES :

§ 1.—*The Present Situation*

I BEGAN this book when the War in Ireland was at its height. My aim was to tell readers in Britain, America and the English Colonies what it was that Ireland was suffering for and what ideals the English army was endeavouring to crush with bayonet and bomb. As I close the book, a truce has at length been proclaimed. I hope that, by the time the work is in the reader's hands, the truce will have issued in a just and happy peace. Should that be the case, what I have written will have keener actuality, for the ideals of Sinn Féin go far beyond the adjustment of Ireland's relations with Great Britain.

In the course of the book I have said but

little regarding the actual terms of the settlement which Sinn Féin has been seeking. Anything worth saying on this subject can be said in a few words. What Sinn Féin has been seeking is a place for Ireland in the comity of nations such as is proper to a nation possessing a history and a culture of her own. Ireland cannot accept as a settlement any arrangement which denies her the national status enjoyed by France and Italy. It is inconsistent with her dignity to be reduced to a mere Colony or dominion; and what is more important than any question of dignity, she cannot with any regard to safety cease from her struggle for independence. Sinn Féin's cause, thus, has a two-fold character. In the first place, Sinn Féin requires for Ireland all the means of consummating nationhood, and in the second place it requires safeguards against the violence and exploitation that Ireland has suffered in the past. At the Council of Constance in the 15th century it was pointed out that Ireland was one of the four primal Empires of Europe, the other three being Rome, Constantinople and Spain. Ireland has never surrendered national status, and has never abated her national ambition. Her history proves that she cannot achieve her aspirations while she is subjected to a foreign

empire or commonwealth, for any such institution exists for the furtherance of a nationalism which cannot but clash with her own. Her history proves, too, that the only safeguard against violence under the present State-order is that her position should be internationally guaranteed. Again and again, liberties granted to the Irish people by the English government in moments of weakness have been taken back in times of strength ; nor is this to be wondered at in this age of Pagan politics and unashamed worship of force. The medieval organisation of Christendom has gone. The best we have in its place is the League of Nations, which indeed is little better than another Holy Alliance. But such as it is, the League offers some sort of international Court of Appeal, and it is from such a body that Ireland should receive a charter.

Now, if the settlement arrived at between Ireland and Great Britain should be based on a compromise which reduces Ireland's status ; if Ireland should be denied an international charter, and granted liberties merely within the British Commonwealth, then all who hold to-day the Sinn Féin faith would be forced to adopt the attitude of General Hertzog in South Africa. Any peace patched up on such a settlement would but leave the Irish-Ireland

that we seek a *Hibernia Irredenta.* We would still be rebels ; we would still make our principal aim in politics the severing of the remaining links with Britain. Our mood still would be one of bitterness and resentment. We would feel that Self-determination was a thing still to be won for Ireland and the world. Peace would be but a peace of appearance, and would last only until we were strong for a further bid. Perhaps this would suit English policy, which has bought a temporary Irish peace by bribes at other periods in history when some big objective required a temporary strengthening of Britain's arm. Then, doubtless, we would see the small liberties we had secured snatched from us once again by violence when Britain's present difficulties in the Near East and the Pacific were past. We cannot risk this. This is our hour, we must have a final settlement now or never.

On the other hand, should the peace which England makes with Ireland now be a liberal peace, a daring peace, a just peace, then the situation would be reversed. Were England to withdraw every shred of pretension towards overlordship in Ireland, and to recognise Irish independence as completely as she recognises French, then our attitude towards her would be one of cordial friendship. Instead of watch-

ing for opportunities to injure her, we would seek means for, first, an alliance, and, second, for ever-closer relations with her. But an alliance must be based on equality of partnership. We do believe in close relations with England, given only that foundation; for we are not dreamers blind to our material interest, and again we are of a school of thought which believes in the interdependence of nations.

What, then, is the exact form of relationship which Sinn Féin has sought with England? It is certainly not the relationship which an English colony holds to England, howsoever liberal that colony's constitution may be. In the first place, such a relation may be safe for a colony at the other side of the world, but it would never be safe for Ireland, which is almost within gun-fire of England's arsenals. In the second place, such a relationship would imply Anglicisation in Irish public life—the very thing against which, as Nationalists, we are most in revolt. But we fully recognise England's right to security. We do not wish by our independence to endanger hers. Our president, Mr. de Valera, has repeatedly indicated the lines which Sinn Féin visualises as the ideal ones for a final settlement. He has asked that England recognise the independence of the Irish State—call it Republic or Commonwealth,

or what you will, *our* name for it is Saorstát Eireann—subject only to a guarantee such as Cuba has given the United States. This would mean that while Ireland enjoyed the privileges of liberty, she would not be free to enter alliances hostile to English interests, nor to lend her harbours and strategic position to England's enemies. Mr. de Valera asked that such an agreement between the two nations should be ratified internationally.

That was the aim of Sinn Féin throughout the war. Whatever the immediate future may bring forth—whether renewed war or prolonged truce—it will remain the aim of the Irish people. They will never enter into friendly relations with England if this is withheld, and if it is granted, they will never consent to its whittling-down.

§ 2.—*Sinn Fein's Significance to the World*

We have suggested that the achievement of Irish liberty is only the first item in the Sinn Féin program. This book is to tell readers what the ultimate ideals of Sinn Féin are. It deals with Sinn Féin's cultural, social and

religious aspects. I believe that Sinn Féin, considered in its larger character, is a phenomenon of great importance to the student of modern tendencies, and that the nascent Irish State should be a subject of profound interest for other reasons than its birth as the first fruits of Self-determination. Ireland is historically almost a unique nation. She, almost alone of the modern European nations, was never schooled in the Roman Empire, and cherishes to-day customs, instincts and ideals that come from the pre-feudal world, the world of Merovingian France and Charlemagne. Ireland is the most Catholic nation in the world ; she alone has never produced a heresy ; and the ideals of the Renaissance have never been assimilated in her life. She is, in fact, a medieval nation entering the modern world at a date when that world, weary of the anarchy which false ideals have involved it in, is keenly interested in the Middle Ages, as is proved by the " medieval craze " in art and sociology. In this book, I have shown how in Ireland the old ideals of society are working themselves out in schemes of social and political organisation which run altogether counter to parliamentarianism and capitalism. Did space allow it would be interesting to tell how Irish (Gaelic) literature in its modern revival is displaying

the ideals of the Middle Ages in a modern guise.

§ 3.—*The Plan of this Book*

In the first two chapters of this book I have given a sketch of Irish history as the modern Irish school sees it. Probably the view I have set forth will be strange to many of my readers. I have then given a brief account of the events in Ireland in the past five years. I have purposely abstained from dwelling at length on such matters as the atrocities against which there has been so wide an outcry; because, after all, this deplorable story is neither edifying nor illuminating, and I take it for granted that the reader does not require proof to-day of what Sir Hamar Greenwood was denying yesterday. On the other hand, I have endeavoured to state the truth about Ireland's attitude in the war, and to give an estimate of the value of the new forces (co-operation, labour and the like) which are the real factors in history. For sensational events, the reader can always consult newspaper files, but a book should deal, not with the obvious, but with the important things that are too big to come into the ken of the reporter.

After these historical chapters, necessary to the understanding of Sinn Féin, I go on to describe the tendencies which will, I believe, issue in a constitution in Ireland totally different from the parliamentarianism of the British Commonwealth. I think foreign readers may be interested in seeing how Ireland, a medieval fragment in the modern world, visualises a constitution of a type that the Councils in Germany and the Guilds of Messrs. Orage and Penty feel after.

My suggestions as to a detailed plan for a non-parliamentary constitution will seem to some far-fetched, and I have candidly stated that I have given speculation free rein. But not without reason. After all, an author who should in 1912 have written of a Europe in which Poland was a power and the German Empire a memory, would have been thought a fanatic or a fool. Yet, we have lived to see such a Europe brought about in a few short years. In 1912, Irish Republicans were laughed at as cranks in an attic. To-day they have given England the gravest of her problems. History no longer trudges slowly. So, perhaps, the social ideals which I have described in my long social chapter may be brought to realisation sooner than the sceptic may anticipate.

It will be seen that the culminating thesis of my book is that Sinn Féin Ireland is the world's working model of a modern Catholic State. I have dealt in much detail with the Irish Co-operative movement, and shown that this represents the development of Distributivism in practical working form. If Co-operative Ireland succeeds in its aims, Distributivism will surely have been proved to be that solution which the world requires to its modern socio-economic problem. Socialism came to Ireland as it came to all other countries, in great force, in the year after the Armistice. But whereas it led some countries to anarchy, and others to reaction, in Ireland it was modified by the prevailing Catholic atmosphere until it took the form of vigorous democratic Distributivism.

Much is said in this book of the religious aspect of Sinn Féin, and it is contended that the movement is impregnated with Catholic principles. But this is not to say that Sinn Féin is what is called a "clerical movement." On the contrary, in most of its history the Irish hierarchy was in the other camp, and "Sinn Féin Bishops" have been conspicuous because solitary. Only late in 1920 could the hierarchy be moved to a mild approval of Self-determination, and to this day they have declined to take the attitude of the Polish hierarchy when

Poland was in subjection—the attitude which, by completing the nation's unanimity, might have made Passive Resistance an effective policy as in 1918, and so saved the bloodshed of the past three years.

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CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF IRISH CLAIMS

> Eire and her foundations are
> Built beneath the tide of war—
> Throned on the crystalline sea
> Of thought and its eternity. . . .

At the opening of this book, it must be said yet once again that the vital fact behind the "Irish problem" is Irish Nationality. To ignore Ireland's claim to be a nation is to ignore the essence of the case, and well-meaning friends who do this are little better to Ireland than open enemies. Nationality may be founded in sentiment, may even be pernicious or foolish, but it is none the less real. The Englishman, unlike the citizen of the little states, unlike even the Frenchman and the German, does not know what it is to feel national existence in peril, and to his age-long security the agonies displayed by threatened nationalities must seem strange or fantastic. He himself is a Nationalist, but only unconsciously so.

His cool self-satisfaction and apparent lack of national idealism are, in turn, a puzzle to *nous autres*. He is happy in all the marks and privileges of free nationhood—and he "takes them for granted."

What, then, is a nation? We will seek the answer in an analysis by Prof. Ramsay Muir:

> . . . It is obviously not the same thing as a race, and not the same thing as a state. It may be provisionally defined as a body of people who feel themselves to be naturally linked together by certain affinities which are so strong and real for them that they can live happily together, are dissatisfied when disunited, and cannot tolerate subjection to peoples who do not share these ties. . . . In the last resort we can only say that a nation is a nation because its members passionately and unanimously believe it to be so.

What Professor Muir describes as "the most potent of all nation-moulding factors, the one indispensable factor," is assuredly marked enough in Irish history—

> . . . the possession of a common tradition, a memory of sufferings endured and victories won in common, expressed in song and legend, in the dear names of great personalities that seem to embody in themselves the character and ideals of the nation, in the names also of sacred places wherein the national memory is enshrined.

To the Englishman, our hero-names, Brian, Colum, Ceitinn, Croke, Davis, Emmet, Mitchel, O'Neill, are as Greek, even as the names that are dear to him mean naught to us. His sorrows are not our sorrows, nor

his joys our joys. Only by cutting ourselves individually away from the memories of our fathers and beginning a new life, like emigrants or refugees in a strange new land, could we lose our nationality in England's: a thing that would be impossible, even if it were desirable thus to destroy variety of culture in an all-too-monotone civilisation.

Irish nationality is not a matter of race or blood. Of all Celtic Myths, the Myth of Celtic Ireland is the most fantastic. The stolid Sasanach contrasted with the mercurial Irish Celt is as absurd a picture as the old-time images of the Irish people as a race of *anthropophagi* or sub-human savages. The Irish people are *not* the last guard of some once-great, homogeneous Celtic host; they are, like other European nations, a people of mixed origins and blended bloods. Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic stocks are mixed here in much the same way as in neighbouring countries, though doubtless climate has affected the proportion in which certain physical types have survived. The theory of the most advanced scholarship is this: The Celts (whoever they were) achieving ascendancy in mid-Europe through their command of iron, imposed their rule and language on a numerically superior Nordic (Teutonic) population. Later, pressure of the German-speaking Teutons drove the Celtic-speaking Teutons westward to the sea, and these Celto-Teutons came in wave on wave to Ireland. This was the real "Milesian" invasion; these good barbarians were the historic Gaels. With their superior

weapons, they repeated in Pictish Ireland the ascendancy of the Celts in Europe, and their language became that of the country. But both invaders and invaded were already mixed races, and the Gaelicised Ireland of the first centuries of the Christian era—speaking a second-hand Celtic tongue, which it moulded to its own character—was racially a miniature United States.

From the first waves of the Celtic-speaking invasion (about 250 B.C.) down to the third century A.D. the Irish Nation was in the melting pot; then it was cast in the Gaelic mould that it has since maintained. Modern scholarship shows us a Connacht dynasty beating the tribes into unity, and building up a national monarchy that was firmly established on the setting up of the Ui Neill dynasty (A.D. 483). Thus in the fifth century, Ireland was a true nation, whose unity, despite the civil wars to be expected in barbarous times, was recognised in law, literature, and religion. It was during this century, at the consummation of national unity, that Christianity was adopted with that remarkable mass-enthusiasm which has ever been the admiration of historical students, and the Faith may be said to have been then woven once and for ever into the texture of Irish national life. A notable outcome of the Christianising of Ireland was the fusion of the constituent races that once had produced a huge proletarian upheaval. Racial cleavages between the pre-Celtic sub-strata and the ascendant caste disappeared under S. Patrick's crozier.

Now was realised an effective union of Irish peoples "made one by affiliation to the land that bore them," like the many tribes that went to make the English nation. From this on, Gaelic culture enjoyed an orderly evolution. The luxuriance and refinement of Irish culture in those distant days may be traced in the luxuriance and refinement of the literature which yet survives. It is calculated that the surviving MSS. of old and medieval Irish alone would fill, if printed, about 1,000 octavo volumes—a quantity probably more than twenty times the extant literature of ancient Rome. The most distinctive element in old Irish literature is the unique *urscéal*, or prose-romance, of which scores of choice specimens are extant. The nature of this curious genre may be conveyed by saying that William Morris's *Water of the Wondrous Isles* closely resembles the Irish *urscéal*, save that the latter was infused with drollery. After the prose-romance, Irish literature excelled in the lyric.

As we read old Irish prose and verse to-day, what most impresses us is that they bear exactly the characteristics of modern Irish letters. Just now, when the national sentiment is running high, there is an extraordinary devotion to S. Colmcille. If you wonder why the 20th century Irishman is so interested in an ecclesiastic who lived thirteen hundred years ago, you need but compare Dr. Hyde's or Dr. Sigerson's rendering of S. Colmcille's poems with the lines of some living patriot poet: you will find that exactly the same vision inspires the age-separated

singers. The Irish poet to-day finds satisfaction in the lines:

> Gael, O Gael! O name most dear,
> Wish I've none but that to hear:
> Should a quick death be my bale,
> 'Tis for great love of the Gael:

and it will help the observer to understand Irish nationalism to remember that these fervent words date back to before S. Augustine's mission to England or the rise of Mahomet.

Irish literature displays a blend of heroic imagination and satiric humour. Its weaknesses or shortcomings are in the speculative and analytic spheres. The matter of the national Gaelic romances was drawn from the folk sagas of the pre-Celtic masses. Heroes of the submerged castes enjoyed a sort of glorified after-existence in literature, when their ancient doings were recited in romantic form at Courts where the old racial distinctions were forgotten. In the twelfth or fourteenth centuries, when poets were composing exquisite Wordsworthian songs to illustrate the Fenian sagas:

> Doire-a'-Chairn, that wood there to the west where the Fianna used to be delaying, it is there they put the blackbird, in the beauty of the pleasant trees,

they knew not, nor cared, that they were celebrating heroes of pre-Celtic tribes. Gaelic culture had assimilated all.

From the sixth to the eleventh centuries, Ireland enjoyed what may fitly be called a golden age. The labours of Colmcille in evangelising Scotland, and the illustrious service of S. Columban in Gaul and Italy, were Ireland's rich first fruits. After these two, it has been said that the whole genius and zeal of a race flung itself upon Europe in missionary work, and the tale of the Irish missions has been too often told to bear repetition. Yet 'tis scarcely too much to say that it was the Irish students who lifted Germania, Central Europe, to Christian civilisation; Irish monasteries studded the barbarian lands "from Holland to Tarentum, from Gaul to Bulgaria." Ireland may claim to have been Christianity's torch-bearer in the dark seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries: on this claim we demand for her a high place in the world's esteem. "The Irish missionaries," says Zimmer, "were instructors in every known branch of science and learning of the time, possessors and bearers of a higher culture than was at that period to be found anywhere on the Continent, and can surely claim to have been the pioneers—to have laid the corner-stone of western culture on the Continent, the rich results of which Germany shares and enjoys to-day, in common with all other civilised nations." It is even claimed that "for a time it seemed as if the Celtic, instead of the Roman, form of Christianity would prevail in Europe." [The distinction is of custom and organisation, not creed.] It was these Irish Missions that brought devotion to the Blessed Virgin to its great prominence in Western

religion, and it was the Irish confessors who developed the Western mode of administering the Sacrament of Penance.

The Golden Age of Gaelic culture—years in which Irish civilisation, language and art were elaborated, and kings and queens were finished poets—was interrupted by the Norse incursions, beginning about the year 800 A.D. After intermittent warfare, the Norse settlements round the Irish Coast were absorbed into the nation, and contributed a valuable mercantile element to the national life. These settlements were the *nuclei* of the most important towns of later times, and in the later Middle Ages an extensive Irish commerce owed much to the settlers having taught the seafaring art to such mercantile clans as the O'Driscolls, O'Malleys and O'Cryans.

In the twelfth century, when Irish literature, art and commerce were at their height, and when an exquisite native variation of Romanesque architecture promised means at last for the impress of the Gaelic mind on matter, the Anglo-Norman invasion brought in a disturbing factor that prevented the consummation of national glory. The English flag was raised in Dublin, and was to float there unchallenged until the year 1916. It is true that the adventurers who tried to establish feudal lordships in the country were absorbed like the Norsemen before them, conquered, not conquerors, and that many campaigns designed to plant English law in the Irish provinces melted away, so that in the end of the fifteenth century Gaelic culture and Gaelic law reigned supreme throughout

the isle to the gates of Dublin. But the holding of Dublin prevented the solidification of Ireland into a modern Renaissance state. English power in Ireland during these centuries may be presented by comparing the Pale to the European Settlements along the Coast of China to-day: those trading, diplomatic and military posts do not impair the Chinese nationality, laws or manners over the mass of Chinese territory, and they are potential, but not actual, menaces to Chinese culture and independence.

With Henry VIII.—who, to flout the Holy Roman Emperor, assumed the title of King of Ireland—and Bloody Mary, his daughter, a grave change took place: the *extirpation* of the Irish race was now designed, and in Elizabeth's days war raged in a terrific crescendo. In 1601 the Irish hosts were destroyed at the height of a brilliant rally, and the devastation that followed is best envisaged by recalling that what was previously a luxuriantly-wooded country was reduced to the bare, wet, shelterless island of to-day.

It is extremely interesting to note that in the correspondence dealing with the masterly campaign of Hugh O'Neill against Elizabeth there is a letter by one of The O'Neill's clerical adherents stating that, had the Confederates been victorious, it was their aim to *establish an Irish Commonwealth*. It is a significant phrase. O'Neill, it is clear, realised that to maintain and solidify national unity, his own royal house must forego monarchical aspirations, while Ireland must accept a new order in place of the

hierarchy of clans. The greatest figure of the clan system knew that that system was now an anachronism. But the phrase is particularly significant when we reflect how far England was, at the end of the sixteenth century, from envisaging Republican or Democratic ideals.

Forty years later, when the Old Irish and their Catholic Anglo-Irish allies fought for "free institutions" under a Stewart king, the Confederation of Kilkenny adopted a constitution that amazes us by the precocity of its democratic provisions. The national executive was made answerable to the representative chamber, and this chamber was genuinely representative. ". . . At a time when in no country in the world, whether monarchy or republic, had rulers or people conceived the idea of a responsible representative executive, still less of an elected one, this great principle was embodied in the new Irish constitution." (J. F. Taylor.)

The Confederation was smashed by the Cromwellian armies, and most historical students agree that the outcome would have been different had the Old Irish declared for complete independence and released the truce-bound sword of their invincible Owen Roe. By temporising for a "free" Ireland under the Dual crown, the Confederates lost all.

Followed the Cromwellian régime. Women were slaughtered in churches or shipped as slaves to the Indies, while a clearance of Eastern Ireland into the wastes of Connacht was proclaimed. When James II. landed as the Ally of anti-Papal Louis of France, the

Irish aristocracy rallied to him, but was shrewd enough to extract a Parliament from the autocrat as the price of their support. Enlightened, if necessarily ineffective, were the measures which that legislative body adopted for the revival of Irish prosperity —the subsidising of mining, the encouragement of foreign craftsmen to settle on Ireland's shores. Religious tolerance was manfully adhered to. But William of Orange, champion of the Papal party in Europe and the Protestant party in England, defeated the Stewart wastrel, and Papal joybells rang when Irish Catholics were overthrown. Now followed the Penal Code, and the Irish race was utterly dispossessed and outlawed. Politically and economically the Gael disappeared from history for a hundred years, dwelling in scarce-describable darkness and squalor; denied land, freedom of worship, education, civil rights, he was treated as a mere animal, nay, but the law "did not presume him to exist."

And yet that miserable period saw an unexampled burst of Gaelic song. Among the Irish-speaking cottiers, not one, but a score of lyric poets of the mettle of Burns flourished, and the modern Irish writer goes to their songs as a pure well of language much as the English writer goes to King James's Bible. There was Sean O Neachtain, of Wordsworthian delicacy in nature love. There was O Raihille, Homeric and stark. Carolan sang now. Séan Clarach and Eoghan Rua extorted unconceivable mellifluence and adjectival elaborations from the language. MacConmara composed what is perhaps

the loveliest song of Exile in any tongue. A page could be packed with names alone of notable singers who lived a hunted or pinched life, and yet will be remembered so long as Ireland cares for art. But if the submerged people—learning their letters with chalk on their father's tombstones—preserved some literary and musical culture, they were politically prostrate. Hitherto there had been no generation without an appeal to arms, but now, even the Jacobite risings in Scotland failed to wake a stir on Irish soil. For a century, no blood was spilt for Ireland, save on foreign fields by the Wild Geese.

An odd second-hand nationalism showed itself in the foreign Ascendancy whose feet were on the necks of the Gaels. It rose so high that in 1783 the Protestant Volunteers terrified England into adopting a Renunciation Act which admitted the absolute sovereignty of the Irish Parliament under the dual crown, and declared the Irish State's independence of the English Parliament to be then and for all time unquestionable. The liberated Colonial Parliament adopted many successful measures which advanced the national wealth. But for four reasons the "sovereign" parliament failed to touch the root of discontent: (1) Catholics, *i.e.*, the nation, had no representation. (2) The most of the members were placemen or holders of pocket burghs. (3) The executive was independent of the legislature, unrepresentative as that was. (4) Even the "Patriot Party" were ceaselessly quarrelling amongst themselves, their patriotism being shallower than their

vanity and bigotry. The real nation regarded the men who filled the Parliament with indifference, when not with contempt or hatred, much as the victims of Imperialism in some Asiatic country might regard the members of some council of Europeans presuming to legislate for them. Maria Edgeworth's novels show the modern reader the mind of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy—its utter divorce from the country it lived in and on, the customs and culture of the natives receiving no more notice than the casual observation that the giddy folk at Simla cast upon the rich but contemned life of the mere Indians. It is instructive to compare *Ormond* with *Plain Tales from the Hills*.

To visualise Grattan's Parliament, we have only to imagine the Kildare Street Club transferred from its present *habitat* to the "Old House on College Green." If that society of semi-absentee landlords and "shoot-the-rebels-by-Gad-sir" politicians were openly admitted to be the governing body in Ireland, and given but a slightly freer hand than it enjoyed throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, it would be an exact reproduction of the institution which is sometimes represented as having been the national legislature of Inisfáil. It might adopt some excellent economic measures to increase the national turnover (of which its members and their friends would seize the lion's part)—but it would still be foreign to the nation.

The Parliament, with all its boast that under it Ireland was an independent nation, could not divert

the nation from the dream of liberty, and in 1798 the people broke the sleep of a century and rose. Wolfe Tone's Republican organisation of the Rights of Man School started the revolt, but French help came too late, and the Irish Republic first fought for in Elizabeth's day was for a second time denied its place in the sun. Most of the leaders were Protestants, as was natural to times when Catholics were denied education, but when the appeal to arms came, and the masses found means to express themselves, the insurgent armies were representative of the population—Catholic in Leinster, Protestant in Down and Antrim. The Rising was premature, thanks to the declared efforts of Pitt to explode it. When it was crushed, the Union came, and for bribes the Ascendancy Parliament voted away its own existence, and the members changed their meeting-place to Kildare Street.

In the nineteenth century Irish nationalism was broken into two currents. One was the direct continuance of the United Irishmen's revolutionary policy, seeking a clean cut from England, and a national seizure of property to rectify the expropriation of the masses. The other was non-separatist, meliorative, parliamentary, and owed its prominence to the personality of Daniel O'Connell. Scarcely any Irish figure has made such a mark in history as O'Connell. In his own day, his name rang through Europe as that of a great Catholic champion, and he was able to summon monster demonstrations in Ireland attended by upwards of a million people.

History has not treated O'Connell kindly. To-day, the ecstatic devotion which his personality evoked during his lifetime has passed, and Irishmen are inclined to blame him for introducing sectarianism into national politics. His record as to Labour has been looked into—not to his advantage—and it has been recalled that he turned out in 1803 to hunt the Dublin rebels. His Machiavellian tactics have been rejected by the new school of politics, which attributes the failure of Parliamentarianism to double-dealing and jobbery. Admittedly it was O'Connell's break with the Young Irelanders—the idealists of his day—that caused the abortive rising of 1848. That rising failed because one man who might have made it formidable by giving it a revolutionary objective was away on a convict ship, and the Young Irelanders, only half-way removed from O'Connellism to the United Irishman's ideals, fought in a half-hearted style.

The Great Starvation, brought about, whether by commission or omission, by the English Government, and made effective by the military transhipment of the grain that could easily have saved the population, destroyed a million lives, and the alien landlords were assisted in evicting in 50 years 3,668,000 souls from the homes of their fathers. The population was reduced from $8\frac{1}{4}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions at a time when Poland under the Tsar and the Prussian was, in point of population and wealth, flourishing. In '67 there was a Fenian rising, foiled by informers and want of arms; but this was of a definitely revolu-

tionary character. If Fenianism failed to hold the lead, this was due to the natural difficulties of a secret movement lacking an open program. The personality of Parnell gave the rival policy a prominence it could never otherwise have secured after the fiasco of O'Connell's Repeal movement, for he was in earnest, while the lawyer was not. But the reckless violence of the landlords compelled the masses, by bringing the issue to a struggle for sheer existence, to enter on a guerilla land war that both the Fenians and Parnell deplored. For a spell, the question of self-government was in abeyance. But the achievement of a land settlement by which most of the arable soil of the country passed into the hands of peasant proprietors, was destined to lead to a situation in which Parliamentarianism was completely superseded and the Revolutionary policy profoundly modified—as we shall show. At Parnell's death, Fenianism was wholly obscured, but was still living, and when the Parliamentarians lapsed into an anarchy of personal intrigue and political corruption, it was the Fenians who rekindled the Separatist tradition for a new generation to be fired therewith.

Very remarkable is the recuperative power of the Irish people. In three centuries, Ireland four times saw her population smitten and halved, by the sword or by famine, and repeatedly provinces were strewn with ashes, and the country, as a whole, reduced to a smoking Ypres; and she rose in arms no fewer than eight times—a rising in almost every generation.

This, surely, is a remarkable record, and argues something dauntless, as of a people that "knows not when it is beaten," in a little remnant that to-day has refused to accept the status of the conquered as resolutely as its forefathers in days when Ireland was proportionately so much stronger and the present gigantic Empire was yet undreamed of. It should convince the observer that behind the Irish problem there are moving forces of a kind that parliaments and politicians do not commonly take account of. Behind the stress and the confusion there stands in Ireland an Idea, a dæmon, a vision of national destiny, a thing that no material reverses can subdue: this is the inner reality of the Irish Question yesterday and to-day.

CHAPTER II

THE IRISH-IRELAND MOVEMENT: 1893-1914

> . . . Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full mid-day beam; purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and mocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means.
>
> —AREOPAGITICA.

WHEN Parnell died, Irish nationality sank low, and seemed on the verge of expiring. To-day it is more vigorously assertive than at any time in the last three hundred years, and envisions a more ambitious aim than at any time in history. What is the explanation of this remarkable ascension from the depths? We shall trace it in four factors, which we shall associate with four outstanding individuals.

§ 1.—*Dr. Douglas Hyde*

Pearse used to say that the Irish Revolution began in 1893, when *Connradh na Gaedhilge*—the Gaelic

League—was established. That year was, indeed, the critical turning point; but it is doubtful whether the Gaelic League would have made the mark it did were it not for a group of agencies which came into existence round about the same time. In 1889 the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society was founded by Mr. (now Sir) Horace Plunkett, to set the Irish farmer on the co-operative road; and in 1891 the Congested Districts Board rose to relieve the economic misery of the most backward parts of the country. In 1899 the Department of Agriculture came to undertake on a big scale what the I.A.O.S. had initiated—the modernisation of Irish farming. The Land Acts virtually ended the Land War, and two-thirds of the good soil of Ireland passed into the ownership of those who tilled it.

The result of all this was *that the centre of gravity in Irish affairs passed from Anglo-Ireland to rural or Gaelic Ireland.* The Irish countryman, descendant of the penalised nation submerged by William, was now made his own master. He now had land, with scientific training or guidance, and co-operative organisation, to fit him to conduct his industry on modern scientific lines. The Gaelic League came with intellectual illumination to safeguard practical progress from turning to materialism. It reminded the new generation on the land of the nation's past, inspired them with national pride, and tendered the means of culture and mental wealth. In the space of a generation rural Ireland was transformed. In the nineties, Irish agriculture was barbarous enough

for the Stone Age. To-day, students come from all quarters to study scientific farming at Belfast University, and co-operative organisation in the wilds of Donegal.

The foundations of the new Separatism were laid by men opposed or indifferent to the Separatist aim. This may, some will claim, be taken as proof that Separatism is not an artificial creed, but a natural tendency that springs spontaneously from events. The Land Settlement was admittedly advocated by Unionists with a view to "killing Home Rule with kindness." The Department of Agriculture was of Unionist origin—the work of patriots who failed to see eye-to-eye with the people in politics. The I.A.O.S. was started by a patriot Unionist, assisted by a priest of Scotch birth and blood. And the Gaelic League, which was to infuse national ideals into the work achieved by these material agencies, was itself initiated by men of varied political views, none of them expressed Separatists. It definitely excluded politics from its program, and it received frequent support from Unionists. The present writer, with long years' experience of League work in all corners of Ireland, can declare that only once did he hear politics discussed at a League function—and the occasion in question was a debate on "Should the League become Political," in which Mr. P. S. O'Hegarty, who contended that it should, was defeated by a unanimous vote, participated in by extreme Republicans, as well as mild Home Rulers and Imperialists.

The League's work was educational—substantially the same as that of Bishop Grundtvig's folk schools in Denmark. After the war of 1864, Denmark was materially and spiritually as miserably shipwrecked as Ireland after Parnell's death, but co-operative organisation raised her to the position of Europe's leading agricultural State, and Grundtvig's schools saved her people's traditions, the national memory, folk art, song and history. The Gaelic League was scorned by the politicians when a few young men launched it from a Dublin attic, and a gentle young scholar from Trinity College went preaching through the country towns and at gatherings at grassy ruins—preaching the duty and beauty of loyalty to the culture of the past.

Politicians at first opposed the movement. But the scholars had touched something deeper in the heart of the race than devotion to a political party. Their cause was taken up with amazing enthusiasm. Classes everywhere sprang up for the study of Irish; *feiseanna* were held throughout the summer and flocked to by thousands, for the practice of Gaelic sports, competitions in Irish music and song.

The movement was naturally a young people's movement, for old folk cannot take up difficult studies, and so two important consequences followed. First, despite the alarm it gave the politicians, it had no immediate political effect, for the generation with votes and influence was not affected. Secondly, it progressed on extreme idealistic lines, for it worked with optimistic, enthusiastic, ambitious material, and

the worldly-wise, disillusioned, weary men of years had no influence on its development. Thus an abrupt cleavage was made between the exhausted and Anglicised Ireland of the Parliamentary movement and the whole youth of the country. Hence the suddenness and overwhelming thoroughness of the revolution in our own days, when the balance was tilted from the dying generation to that of rejuvenate Gaeldom.

Scarcely conceivable either to old or young is the gulf between the mentality of the Anglicised Ireland of 1914 and that of the Ireland of to-day, conditioned by the new race. How much harder must the foreigner, acquainted with Ireland only through the malicious descriptions of English writers, or the slavish parodies of Anglo-Irish snobs, find it to comprehend the change that has taken place! To Dr. Douglas Hyde let the greater praise belong for the transformation. If Ireland to-day is not the Ireland of Carleton, Lover and Lever—the stage Ireland of drunkenness and brawling, ignorance and snobbery—but the Ireland of the Gaelic tradition, heroic, imaginative, daring—Dr. Hyde's scholarly labours are the source of the change. His *Literary History of Ireland*, a gigantic, ill-proportioned, overflowing, gossiping, absorbing volume, suggesting the rapid talk of an enthusiast, bubbling over with more news than he can tell of great discoveries—this was the book that revealed a wealth of cultural possessions that nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand Irishmen were as ignorant of as they were of the writings of Krasinski and Mickiewicz. It threw a new light on

Irish history, under which the figures and places of the past seemed to take on a bright and splendid life. His pen was like a wand that turned Ireland from a hovel to a palace of faëry grandeur in her sons' eyes. The Gaelic tongue, subtle, musical, elaborate, yet regarded with a slave's shame since Dan O'Connell decried it, became now a fountain of intellectual life; and Anglo-Irish literature, catching the reflected light of Gaelic inspiration, shone with the names of Yeats, Synge, Gregory, Colum, O'Grady, Russell, Milligan . . . A national drama rose; and Dublin, putting off its down-at-heels gentility, became an artistic centre, and an absorbingly interesting place to live in. So vigorous was the new cultural movement that men of the aristocrat caste or Protestant creed, men who formerly regarded Ireland as a place best out of, men who in earlier years became Bernard Shaws, now found in Ireland their most appreciative audience.

The early passion of the Gaelic revival was almost apostolic, religious, accompanied by signs and wonders, and none of us will ever forget his first *Feis*, marching through the green hills to the skirl of the pipes, or singing the memory-haunted Gaelic songs at the mossy shrines of heroes. Though it was scarce suspected then, we can now all see implicit in those early functions the developments that have since come to pass, and Sinn Féin, Republicanism and Social Gaelicism were inevitable out-flowerings of the seed then sown. All we knew then was that our feet were upon a mounting road with something splendid, though still cloud-shrouded, as the goal.

§ 2.—*Arthur Griffith*

The uprise of a fine rural economy, accompanied by a growth of literary production and an impassioned recourse to rich, forgotten fields of cultural inspiration, could not fail to issue in some energetic political movement, particularly when the existing political order was so repugnant to the new ideals. Unionists had hoped that peasant proprietors would become Conservative voters, and that agitation for self-government would decline when extreme economic misery was ended. But the reality of national sentiment was overlooked. Nationalism is not a mere desire for material betterment; it is an ambition for the realisation of an ideal. Prosperity whets the eagerness for national liberty. Irishmen shivering in the bogs after the clearances wanted first and foremost, not a native legislature, but housing and a hold of the land. When they had acquired these at last, they wanted what Englishmen enjoy—the means to live a national life in harmony with their own natures. They wanted their children taught Irish history and filled with Irish aspirations. They wanted an Irish commerce that would give Ireland free development, and spare Irishmen the sacrifice of their individuality when they traded abroad. They wanted the public life, offices and measures of Ireland, to respond to popular desires. They wanted power to organise industries, develop resources, and make the collective will effective in all matters without the intrusion of

unsympathetic foreign influence. Vaguely and gropingly, they reached after a social order completely different from the capitalism and Parliamentarianism that seemed inseparable from Anglicisation.

The political movement which the impulse of the new generation produced was Sinn Féin. Initially, Sinn Féin was not a party: it was the amorphous propaganda of the Gaelicised young men and women. The principles of this journalistically-united *Intelligentsia* might be well summed up in Bishop Berkeley's famous query: "*Whether it would not be more pertinent to mend our state than to complain of it; and how far this may be in our own power?*" The Gaelic League was a living example of achievement on the basis of self-help: Sinn Féin called for similar endeavour in other fields. Why wait till Home Rule comes; why wait till the Greek Kalends, Sinn Féin asked, to establish or promote Irish industry? Why not begin now and provide work for our own people at home? Mr. Arthur Griffith, the principal Sinn Féin journalist—held by some foreign observers to be among the four or five most brilliant publicists of the age—gave the movement its policy. Describing in articles in the *United Irishman* (1904) the tactics of abstention from the Austrian Parliament which preceded Francis Joseph's recognition of Hungarian independence under the Dual Crown, he urged the adoption of a Hungarian policy in Ireland. Nothing effective had ever been won at Westminster: measures yielded there had always been extracted by agitation at home. Let Ireland's representatives,

then, stay at home, agitate, and work with the people: their empty benches at Westminster would demonstrate to the world Ireland's repudiation of the Imperial Parliament's pretensions to authority in this country. Let the representatives form a National Council in Dublin, and let the people obey its measures voluntarily. A State would thus be built up in opposition to the intruding State: the Imperial Parliament would find its machinery unworkable, and would ultimately be obliged—like Austria—to recognise the *de facto* State created by the nation's self-determination.

The same policy had once been proposed by Daniel O'Connell in a moment of enthusiasm. John Mitchel had hailed the suggestion as the way to freedom, and Lord John Russell had written in alarm that "in six months the power and functions of government will be wrested from our hands, and the Lord Lieutenant will sit powerless in Dublin Castle." But O'Connell's courage gave out, and the plan was called off. It remained for our own generation to see it brought into operation.

That we have seen. We have witnessed this policy —ridiculed at the time of its proposal by Mr. Griffith —carried into actual operation, as also most of the details of constructive policy planned by Sinn Féin in those days in the wilderness. Sinn Féin was formed into a definite organisation in 1905 with the object of "the re-establishment of the independence of Ireland," and the steps by which it proposed to set up a National Government were:—

(1) A protective system for Irish industries and commerce, enforced by the powers held by local authorities, harbour boards and other bodies. (2) An Irish Consular Service. (3) A mercantile marine. (4) The general survey of Ireland, and development of its mineral resources. (5) A national bank and stock exchange. (6) A national civil service, to be instituted by national qualifying and local competitive examination, under the local authorities. (7) National courts of arbitration. (8) A national system of insurance. (9) National control of transit. (10) Development of fisheries. (11) Reform on national lines of education. (12) Non-consumption of objects paying duty to the British Exchequer. (13) Stoppage of enlistment. (14) Non-recognition of the British Parliament and the establishment of a National Assembly. (15) Abolition of the poorhouse system and employment of the able-bodied in reclamation work, afforestation, etc.

Of these activities, numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13 and 14 are all now well in course of operation and Lord John Russell's prognostication is being verified.

In the brilliant pages of Mr. Griffith's weekly paper, contributions appeared from almost all the best Irish writers of our days—essays, reports, tales, plays, poems. Much that has since been ranked as literature was first printed in an organ whose circulation was always small. Sinn Féin was a secret flame in those days. Every aspect of national life was discussed by the best brains of the country. Plans were drawn up for the co-operative purchase of shipping—such as endowed Norway with its vast fleets—for the establishment of beet-sugar manufacture—for national costumes even, and a decimal Irish coinage, of which the

unit was to be a Gael, corresponding to the Franc. At the present date, when the little minority of 1905 is an overwhelming majority, the pages of the *United Irishman* and *Sinn Féin* are like architect's plans, formerly used for building castles in the air, but now for solid structures on the earth. The constructive work with which the country is now agog was all planned out in those days of hard thinking and deep desire.

But the principal merit in the Sinn Féin policy was that no political reverses could leave it, like a defeated political party, at a dead end: its constructive program gave its adherents something to work at through good fortune and ill, popularity or disdain. "Ireland has always been saved by the intelligent minority," was one of Mr. Griffith's favourite dicta, and he was never daunted by his movement's failure to command big numbers of adherents. At one time—when the balance of power was in Mr. Redmond's hands, and Home Rule seemed certain to the superficial—Mr. Griffith's support dwindled to a tiny group of personal adherents, but with a practical policy to work at, they held together and never doubted ultimate vindication. The tactical merits of Sinn Féin as a policy were yet to reveal themselves (as they have done since 1919)—but they were preached incessantly by the few. Mr. O'Hegarty, a Sinn Féin journalist, sums them up well:—

> . . . Its (Sinn Féin's) principles and its policy are applicable at any stage of the struggle for Irish freedom and under any conditions, and cannot be overwhelmed.

> They are based upon ideas rather than rhetoric, and they appeal to the intellect rather than the passions. They emphasise the distinctive nationality of Ireland, not so much by talk'ng about it as by producing and strengthening the evidences of that distinctive nationality: and in the brain of Mr. Griffith they evolved a comprehensive and unconquerable national policy, a policy to which all who believe in Ireland a nation can subscribe without compromising either extreme or moderate degrees of that belief, a policy which, applied by a subject nation, gives the occupying nation three alternatives (*sic*) viz.: (1) *Extermination*; (2) *a permanent army of occupation and the permanent suspension of all pretence at constitutional government;* (3) *evacuation.*

The Parliamentary Party began to lose hold of the country as this virile and activist policy was propagated. But its doom was brought about as much by its own fault as by the criticism and competition of its rival. In all the years, it did nothing constructive. It made no appeal, save an oratorical one, to the imagination or the admiration. Above all, it practised a duplicity that undermined confidence and a place-hunting that roused indignation. At home and in America, the Parliamentary leaders talked in the language of Separatists and evoked the names of the rebels and the martyrs. On English platforms and in Parliament, they talked Imperialism and "loyalty." The politicians silenced criticism of their loyalty-proving by sending round the word through their organisations that 'twas all done "to cod the English." But politicians who would lie to one side would lie to the other, and a party which

gloried in untruthfulness could not be relied on to fight loyally for a poor nation against a rich antagonist. At Westminster, these sons of the soil were seduced by the very pomp and tone of the place. They were proud to point out Asquith or win a nod from Birrell as they took their friends to tea on the Terrace (where they succeeded in getting the price of strawberries and cream reduced), and sitting there among the haughty-toned, surname-using masters of the world, they lost the perspective of the untravelled Irishman. Estranged thus from the soil of Ireland, the party wholly lost touch with Irish realities. The Gaelic movement was to them a fad of some country people in a distant part of the British Isles.

The co-operative movement they regarded with distinct hostility. Themselves supported by the trader, gombeen man, middleman, ruler of the villages, shopkeeping baron of the countryside, they were obliged to attack a movement which was making the farmer independent of the usurer, and teaching him self-help. Sir Horace Plunkett was thrown out of the Department that he had created: his sin being the fact that he was a Unionist, or at least a practical man unwilling to subscribe to a policy machined by ignoramuses and profiteers. Mr. T. W. Russell, hostile to co-operation, and ignorant of agriculture, was foisted into Sir Horace's place. With a subsidised Press, criticism was stifled by calling it factionism.

One man could, in the years immediately following its formulation, have made the abstention policy a success. That man was John Redmond. He com-

manded, nay, controlled, the adhesion of the mass of the population to whatever policy he should resolve on. He could have secured absolute unanimity had he been young, enthusiastic, sincere enough, to call the representatives of Ireland home when in 1906 the Liberals, powerful enough to carry anything, dropped the Home Rule they had promised. On March 5, 1917, in a debate under Coalition auspices, Mr. Redmond did actually take this step; at least, to the point of walking out of the Chamber with a dramatic gesture. But the party did not risk their salaries by abstaining from the House for more than a few hours. The incident shows that Mr. Redmond appreciated the possibilities of abstention; but it needed the extreme insults of the Coalition to sting him to its exercise. More English than Irish in education and influences, he was of the type that alludes to the Irish people as "they," not "we." He was incapable of regarding himself as a rebel (save in a rhetorical flourish); British law and order were as much in his blood as in that of Mr. Balfour. Beginning life as a clerk in the House, he was soaked in Parliamentary tradition. Mr. Asquith himself was not more at home at Westminster or less capable of flouting that political *alma mater*. Redmond regarded Abstentionists exactly as a Front Bench Liberal or Tory would regard Syndicalists—wild, irresponsible, out-of-the-question people.

And the preacher of Abstention preached still in the wilderness. The national Messiah was yet to come. He that preached the new era was not he who

was to bring it about. Sinn Féin, half poetic and idealistic, half mercantilist, constructive, coldly critical, was like one of those mixtures that awaits a spark for its explosion and rendering effective. While Mr. Griffith was surrounded by singers and seers of visions, he himself taught out of List's *National System of Political Economy,* that masterpiece of nationalist economics, urging the need to develop Ireland from the pure agricultural, through the manufacturing-agricultural, to the commercial-manufacturing-agricultural stage. He was described by an American as visualising free Ireland as—a Gaelic-speaking Manchester. This is caricature with a tinge of truth. But Mr. Griffith's insistence on industrial ideals was perhaps governed more by the needs of the case than his own desires. Ireland, which has never been through the *bourgeois* stage of evolution—a circumstance in many ways auspicious, as we shall contend in a later chapter—could only slowly assimilate the Listean enthusiasm for industrial activity, economic expansion, thriving artizanship, busy wharfs, strong, virile material doings: but that is a necessary vision for the country that would rise to freedom and power. The duty of the citizen to the State was a lesson that the Editor of *Sinn Féin* inculcated at all times. "Between each individual and entire humanity stands the *Nation.* As the individual chiefly obtains, by means of the nation and in the nation, mental culture, power of production, security and prosperity, so is the civilisation of the human race only conceivable and possible by means of the civilisation and

development of the individual nations."—(List). Such was the gospel of Irish-Ireland according to Arthur Griffith.

§ 3.—*P. H. Pearse*

We now come to the Messiah of the movement. The Sinn Féin program was not the inevitable form of the reviving Separatist principle. Separatism might well have risen from Gaelic study, song and game, without Mr. Griffith's intellect. Young men, as they marched behind the pipes to hostings—for language competitions—at spots like Tara or Usnagh or Cashel of the Kings, not unnaturally thought in the terms of the fighters who marched on those same white roads long years before them, as they sang Brian O'Higgins' stirring popular songs :—

> Here in the land that is Liberty's altar,
> Here, and here only the battle must be;
> Think of the prize, and your hearts will not falter,
> Think of the future, when Ireland is free.

What wonder that they clenched their hands and braced their shoulders, and listened when Fenianism was preached anew? The Sinn Féin policy saved Ireland from another fiasco, such as a secret physical force movement with no overt activities to keep the people together, must inevitably have resulted in. The physical force men—not all of whom were ad-

herents of the Fenian organisation—collaborated for a time with Sinn Féin; but then a division occurred on the issue of Republicanism. Mr. Griffith would go no further than independence under the Dual Crown—Grattan's Constitution, only reformed. The Fenians repudiated the "Golden Link," and would have naught but the Republicanism of Hugh O'Neill, of '98 and of '67. When they left Sinn Féin, it took on rather the aspect of a Menshevik party, and though its intellectual influence was but little impaired, it lost political driving force. It retained, however, the confidence of the young clergy and others, who could not cast in their lot with an avowedly revolutionary movement. The Physical Force Party now had their own organ, *Irish Freedom* (1911) the spirit of which may be summed up in Mitchel's watchword: "*If any man among you have not a gun, let him sell his garment and buy one.*" Gunsmiths' advertisements were published, and youths began to practise at rifle ranges.

Two sections in Ireland have always had unfailing faith in Irish rebel resiliency: namely, the Physical Force minority and—Dublin Castle. The Castle powers, when friend and foe never dreamed that Separatism lived on, always paid the extremists the compliment of spying on them. From the formation of the Gaelic League on, the most innocent *Feis* was attended by plain-clothes men. The Castle never doubted that rebel Ireland would rise again, never disarmed the Constabulary; yet it is doubtful whether "the authorities" ever guessed how near

the country was to a fresh uprise of armed nationalism when Germany and Britain fell out over Agadir. All knew, when the crisis was over, that an Anglo-German war was certain, and the Fenian element began to work definitely for the re-arming of Ireland. It was at this point that the personality of P. H. Pearse—Pádraic Mac Piarais—began to exert a determining influence on the trend of events. He looked forward to armed insurrection from those boyhood days when, with his brother William, he was overheard praying that he might die for Ireland like the heroes of other ages.

Pearse said that he had three ambitions—to edit a bi-lingual paper, found a bi-lingual school, and start an insurrection. All three he realised. As a very young man, he edited the Gaelic League's weekly organ—contributing thereto accounts of bi-lingual education in Belgium, and tales in Irish, revolutionary in their bold acceptance of modern art forms. S. Enda's School was one of the most striking of educational experiments. Pearse aimed at combining with the most modern education the idealism, the art and hero-tales of the splendid past, imparted through the medium of Irish. His first appearance in politics was earlier than the foundation of S. Enda's. In 1906, when Mr. Redmond was offered a Councils Bill in place of Home Rule, and grasped at it, the nation generally regarded the offer as a preposterous whittling-down of what was believed to be equivalent to independence. So Mr. Redmond and his party, seeing the way the wind set,

abandoned their original course, and the Bill was rejected at a National Convention, so that even the shadow of autonomy faded into the future. Now, Pearse publicly advocated acceptance of the proposed measure. This may seem strange in the destined founder of an Irish Republic; but it was quite consistent. Pearse differed from the Home Rulers in holding that no measure of Home Rule would suffice for independence; hence the Councils Bill to him differed in degree, not kind, from that which the Irish Party sought as a national settlement. Pearse would regard any measure short of separation as a mere stepping-stone to the "real thing." He wanted the Councils Bill because it would give Irishmen increased control of the schools, and that meant means to advance the language movement, or the de-Anglicisation of Ireland.

In 1912 Pearse again appeared in politics. To the puzzlement of many fellow-Gaels, he spoke from one platform with Mr. Joseph Devlin at a great Home Rule demonstration. To Irish-Irelanders, Mr. Devlin was, and is, *anathema marenatha,* being the leading figure in that Hibernian organisation, which, by its practices of job-controlling and wire-pulling, and its adoption of what amounts to a Catholic Freemasonry, retards the union of creeds and classes in the national cause. Pearse, however, while he detested sectarianism, seemed to believe, from the depths of his charity, that Mr. Devlin might yet take the true national line. His own speech, delivered in Irish, was a curious utterance to come from such a rostrum :

> . . . I am of those who never saluted the English king and never will. But it seems to me that Irishmen will be stronger for fight with this Act than without it (the new Home Rule Bill) . . . Let us work together and exact a good measure from the English. But if we are deceived this time, there are those in Ireland, and I am one of them, who will counsel the Gael to have no further dealings with the English forever, but to answer them forthwith with the strong hand and the sword's edge. Let the English understand that if we are betrayed again, there shall be crimson warfare through the length and breadth of Ireland. (Translation).

Here we see Pearse publicly hinting at a Physical Force policy. In the same year, in *An Barr Buadh*, a Gaelic weekly, he advocated in columns side by side acceptance of the Home Rule Bill—and practice of arms. He ridiculed the description of the Bill as "freedom" (*pace* Mr. Redmond), asking would Hugh O'Neill or Wolfe Tone, or any of the heroes, salute it with that high name. But he compared those who would utterly reject it to a fettered slave who should decline the releasing of one hand though it might give him strength to free himself. There was strife ahead, Pearse darkly hinted, doubtless convinced that the Home Rule movement, to which he wished every chance to be given, was doomed to failure.

Ní síocháin go saoirse—no peace till freedom—was his watchword. Every generation had its appointed deed to perform. The Land League had been the work of one generation; the Gaelic League that of

the next: what was to be the work of the present line of Irish youth?

Bristear ór le h-iarann—gold is broken by iron. If the promised Parliament was not rendered, there must be red war throughout Ireland!

Preaching a doctrine of austerity, labour, sacrifice, in days when materialism, sloth, and corruption were stifling national ideals, Pearse became convinced of what he had always tentatively held—that naught but bloodshed could redeem the country. One day, long before the war, he surprised a young man at table with the sudden question: "If MacDonagh and myself and, say, two hundred men, were to rise out, would you be one of us?"

"But—but what on earth could you do?"

"Well, we could seize Dublin Castle, and call to the country to help us."

"But you could not hold out a week. You would be crushed, and every one of you would be shot when you were taken!"

"Yes . . . I know that. But" (speaking with passion) "we'd rouse the country! That sacred thing called Nationality is almost dead in our people, and if a few men were to show they could die for Irish freedom, the country would recover itself. . . ."

This was Pearse's blood-sacrifice faith, which he preached with increasing vehemence when the war came. "Without shedding of blood, there is no remission of sins"—and Ireland could not atone for her disloyalty to the Separatist ideal, nor recover her soul, without sacrifice. In every generation Irish-

men had demonstrated their claim to independence by arms. An enslaved nation that fails to make its protest in blood will lose the right to be free: that was his teaching. This mode of thought harmonised with Pearse's devotion to the old heroic literature. At S. Enda's the sagas were a vital part of his educational scheme. He loved to dwell on the tale of Cuchulain, boy hero of Ulster, withstanding an army at the pass, and on the sacrifices of the boy corps in the romances. His plays—including a Passion Play, acted by his pupils—all centred on the splendour of sacrifice. In one, *An Rí*, a saintly child goes out in the King's place at the army's head, winning the victory by the surrender of his young life; and as he pleads to go, he utters what Pearse himself regarded as one of his finest lines: "*Leig dom an ni beag seo do dheanamh, a Rí*—Let me do this *little* thing, my king." Pearse edited some of the ancient Fenian tales, and his notes here and there burst into admiration for the beauty of comradeship in peril as depicted in the feats of the warriors. When at last he led his little band of singing youths into the fiery ordeal of Easter Week, the thought that they were now of the kindred of the Fenians and Cuchulain was certainly a thrilling belief in his mind.

Pearse seemed a re-incarnation of the stark Columban Ireland. He thought in terms of war and stress and sacrifice; his humour was great and grim; he hated luxury and contemned bodily indulgence—smoking, drinking: yet Mr. Ryan * tells us that he

* *The Man called Pearse,* by Desmond Ryan.

was known to weep over a dead kitten, and stopped gardening for a day because he killed a worm by accident. When common men read Mr. Ryan's biography, with its many quotations from the subject's utterances, we feel almost appalled as in the presence of some saint. The presence of Pearse had just such an effect. It seemed to open the door of the eternal moral realities, and reveal in a flash the dreadful significances of life. It is not surprising so abnormal a personality found no place in a political movement. Pearse admired Mr. Griffith's genius, but was temperamentally unable to participate in a propaganda that dwelt on the advantages of economic independence and the possibilities of an Irish Zollverein. As one of his disciples said a week or two before the Insurrection: "Pearse will have nothing to do with these protests against over-taxation that Griffith writes so well. If Ireland is out for freedom, why should we lower our case to a squabble over ha'pence? If freedom were to impoverish us, we would yet need to seek it." To this mentality, arguments about the suppression of the Irish Exchequer were irrelevant, as if S. John's martyrs beneath the altar should cry out against their persecutors that they had discriminated against them in the income-tax returns.

We have stressed the difference between the two men perhaps a little unduly, and it must be remembered that they were at one in their ideals. There is need of the economist as well as the prophet; and there is prophetic vision behind Mr. Griffith's

labours, while Pearse, in turn, did not despise practical endeavour, as is proved by his activities as an editor and an educationalist. But the difference between the two men was the secret of the Irish revolution, for Pearse's peculiar gift was the spiritual spark needed to fire the train that Arthur Griffith had laid.

The Gaelic League had revived the separate sentiment of nationality; Sinn Féin had planned out the embodiment which nationality must take; but Pearse was needed to inspire his generation to enter the struggle for the realisation of the national ideal. Mr. Griffith might convince the intelligent minority, but Pearse's sacrificial, prophetic spirit was needed to arouse and convince the race. In the last phase, humanity is moved by spiritual, not material, factors, and with Pearse the Irish cause was spiritual—even religious. He wrote of the "Four Evangelists of the Nation"—Tone, Davis, Mitchel, and Lalor. As Tone taught the union of all Irishmen and Mitchel the need for utter independence, so Davis taught that the free nation must be Gaelic, and Lalor that it must be republican and democratic. Pearse was used, in his last addresses, to make his audience stand up, as for the recitation of the Creed in church, and repeat after him: "I believe in One Irish Nation, and that free . . ." He held as firmly as Cardinal Mercier that to betray patriotism is mortal sin. The great patriot writers, he said, were the writers of great literature, "and the reason is that God speaks through them."

> . . . That God spoke to Ireland through Tone and through those who, after Tone, have taken up his testimony, that Tone's teaching and theirs is true and great, and that no other teaching as to Ireland has any truth or worthiness at all, is a thing upon which I stake all my mortal and all my immortal hopes. And I ask the men and women of my generation to stake their mortal and immortal hopes with me [1916].

This is Pearse's clear declaration of his intention to go into action. Never was there a man in direr earnest since the martyrs went to the arena. Ere he gave the signal for the Rising, he hurried out pamphlets stating his hopes and principles, the most notable of which was *The Sovereign People,* in which he dwelt on Lalor's dictum of sixty years before, that the ownership of Ireland, down to the centre and up to the sun, was vested in the people, and that without their sanction no title to property in Ireland was, or could be, valid. "The nation's sovereignty," Pearse said:

> extends not only to all men and women of the nation, but to all the material possessions of the nation, the nation's soil and all its resources, all wealth and all wealth-producing processes within the nation. But the nation is under a moral obligation so to exercise its public right as to secure strictly equal rights and liberties to every man and woman within the nation. . . . To insist upon the sovereign control of the nation over all property within the nation is not to disallow the right to private property. It is for the nation to determine to what extent private property may be held by its mem-

bers, and in what items of the nation's material resources private property may be allowed. . . . The people, that is, the whole people, must remain sovereign not only in theory but in fact. . . . It is, in fact, true that the repositories of the Irish tradition, as well the spiritual tradition of nationality as the kindred tradition of stubborn physical resistance to England, have been the great, faithful, splendid, common people, that dumb multitudinous throng which sorrowed during the penal night, which bled in '98, which starved in the Famine; and which is here still—what is left of it—unbought and unterrified. LET NO MAN BE MISTAKEN AS TO WHO WILL BE LORD IN IRELAND WHEN IRELAND IS FREE. THE PEOPLE WILL BE LORD AND MASTER. The people, who wept in Gethsemane, who trod the sorrowful way, who died naked on a cross, who went down to hell, who will rise again glorious and immortal, who will sit at the right hand of God, and will come in the end to give judgment, a judgment just and terrible.

Did Pearse believe—foreign readers will certainly ask—did he seriously believe that he could cast out English power by force of arms? Undoubtedly he believed that the Insurrection contemplated would result in the final victory of the Gael. This was his almost mystical faith. But he never more than "hoped against hope" that military success would be achieved forthwith. Strong in faith, he was only sure that sooner or later utter freedom, and with it the return of the hero-age, would follow on the raising of the flag of the Republic. Thus did he write:

And so I speak.
Yea, ere my hot youth pass, I speak to my people and say:

Ye shall be foolish as I; ye shall scatter, not save;
Ye shall venture your all, lest ye lose what is more than all;
Ye shall call for a miracle, taking Christ at His word;
And for this I will answer, O people, answer here and hereafter;
O people that I have loved, shall we not answer together?
Lord, I have staked my soul, I have staked the lives of my kin
On the truth of Thy dreadful word. Do not remember my failures;
But remember this my faith.

§ 4.—*James Connolly*

James Connolly, who founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party in the nineties, and may be said to have created the modern Irish Labour movement, which is admitted to be more "advanced" and close-knit than any other outside Russia, was commander of the insurgent forces in Dublin in 1916, and was shot, a wounded man, after the Rising. He has been described as the first Irish Socialist martyr, but this title should be claimed for Sheehy-Skeffington, the pacifist, who was murdered at the beginning of the tragic week.

Connolly's was the brain behind the rapid and amazing organisation of the workers which has spread over the whole of Ireland, until trade unionism is more completely developed in this little and so long backward country than in the industrial countries themselves. *Labour in Irish History* is one of the three or four most enlightening books ever written on

Ireland, and in it Connolly proved, with ample documentation, that the national cause ever since the overthrow of the Gaelic order, had been the cause of the proletariat: a social as well as a political cause. He tore to shreds the cloak of false glory that anglicised historians had cast on Grattan (who disarmed the workers) and O'Connell (who described a Bill to protect child workers as "ridiculous humanity")—and he showed that in every case, the effective rebel had aimed at the seizure of national material for the masses rather than the mere change of flags at Dublin Castle. He was a thorough-going Marxian in his internationalism and his acceptance of the Class War. Yet he was also a staunch Nationalist, and when in America organised Irish workers on national lines, despite the opposition of Daniel de Léon. Literalness is an Irish trait, and when theorists had written volumes about the proletarian revolution of the future, Connolly was the first Socialist in Europe to work definitely and consistently for revolution. He undoubtedly exercised considerable influence on the development of Pearse's opinions; the pamphlet on *The Sovereign People* is Connolly's social passion transmuted in a visionary mind, and perhaps the Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers would not have been found fighting shoulder to shoulder if the Declaration of the Republic had lacked those clauses declaring the sovereignty of the nation over the material resources of the country: "We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland . . . to be sovereign and indefeasible."

Connolly could write of Ireland, distinct from her people, as a "combination of chemical elements" that meant nothing to him, yet he was as devoted in patriotism as any who fought and fell. "The Socialists will never understand why I am here," he said to his daughter on the eve of his execution. "They all forget I am an Irishman." His career, then, bears a message to both patriot and social reformer: reminding the one of nationalism's intimate union with social idealism, and the other of the danger of losing sight of the particular in a cloudy universalism. If Mr. Griffith, quoting List, saw humanity's hope in the *cultivation* of the individual nations, Connolly, analogously, saw it in the individual nation's *liberation*: the Protectionist and the Socialist being of closer accord than labels might suggest. Connolly saw in the Irish Rising the first spark of the Apocalyptic revolution that should free the world, and showed by his action that a good internationalist could be a patriot.

Thus nationalism and internationalism, the love of country and the love of humanity, found their synthesis in the Irish-Ireland movement, a synthesis that was incarnate when, as Mr. Desmond Ryan tells us, James Connolly gripped the hand of Padraic Pearse at the headquarters of the Insurgents on Easter Monday, 1916, and exclaimed: "Thank God, Pearse, we have lived to see this day!"

CHAPTER III

IRELAND AND THE WAR

Courage yet, my brother or my sister!
Keep on—Liberty is to be subserv'd whatever occurs,
That is nothing that is quell'd by one or two failures, or any number of failures,
Or the show of the tushes of power, soldiers, cannons, penal statutes . . .
Then courage, European revolter, revoltress!
For till all ceases neither must you cease . . .
Did we think victory great?
So it is—but now it seems to me, when it cannot be help'd, that defeat is great,
And that death and dismay are great.

—Walt Whitman.
To a foil'd European Revolutionaire.

§ 1.—*Casement, Redmond and the Volunteers*

That Ireland was on the verge of civil war when the Great War broke out is commonly accepted as true by people who believe the newspapers. The accounts of the state of Ireland at that time were, however,

like that other of Mark Twain's death, "greatly exaggerated." It is true that ferocious incitements to rebellion were uttered in Ulster by men who have since risen to some of the highest positions of power in the British Constitution. Their utterances, republished under the title of *A Grammar of Anarchy*, were of so incendiary a character that, while the authors sat on the Woolsack or held military command, the book was seized again and again by police making raids for seditious literature. The mobs whom they roused and drilled were quite capable of making bloody riots, and their proposed provisional government had enough of "direct action" behind it to intimidate a feeble Liberal Premier and win a trick in the rubber for the Tory players in the party game.

The Ulster Volunteer movement was, however, destined to transform Irish history. Mr. John Redmond made the fatal mistake of pooh-poohing it. He described it as "bluff," and treated it as such, and, although the threat to march to war was indeed bluff, yet there was no bluff in the Ulster Party's resolve to smash Home Rule by its militant policy. We can believe with Mr. Redmond that Sir Edward Carson had no intention of fighting the British army. Had there been any likelihood of that army asserting a Liberal Parliament's authority over Unionist rebels, Carson would not have been a Unionist rebel. He and his friends were business men, not martyrs. He calculated that a show of force would be sufficient

to terrorise Liberals and their Press, and that a martial demonstration would evoke expressions from the militarist caste that would reveal to the Whig Parliamentarian his impotence against vested interests. The event proved him right. The Ulster Volunteer movement was triumphantly successful. It defeated the Mother of Parliaments, and it revealed how hollow is the Englishman's belief in British freedom.

Some few months before the war, Sir Roger Casement privately discussed the Home Rule situation with John Redmond in Dublin, and warned him that the Ulster Volunteer movement was a serious fact. Redmond repeated his belief that it was all bluff, and that he and his Liberal allies would be able to assert the will of the House. Casement, trained in *real politics,* knew that Carson's calculations would prove right. Redmond, always misinformed about realities, and piteously trusting towards the Mother of Parliaments, refused to listen to Casement's counsels, and declared his resolve to play the Parliamentary game to its conclusion. Therewith the die was cast. Had Redmond been guided by Casement then, he, too, might have appealed to real politics. He might have thrown himself, as Casement wished, into a serious nationalist volunteer movement, and, with a threat to copy Ulster in a national provisional government, might have won Home Rule or Repeal of the Union. Redmond's weakness was realised and reckoned on by Carson when he played his daring game for Toryism and reaction. That game would

never have been played had a Parnell, with spirit for realisation, led the Irish Party on the war's eve.

Probably it was Redmond's refusal to co-operate in an active policy that determined Casement's action in the war. He seemed convinced that at least semi-revolutionary methods were Ireland's only hope, and in the early months of 1914 did not conceal his belief that the Irish Volunteers, whom he was then busily organising, would be called upon to render account during the approaching Anglo-German war. "If England gets America into the war—as Carnegie hopes she will—and if Germany is thus beaten," Casement used to say in private, "then Ireland will disappear from the map for a hundred years. Ireland may get her freedom out of the war if she can keep out of England's net and Germany is not crushed—but I would like to see the Volunteers fight for it and earn it."

It was in the autumn of 1913 that the Volunteers were founded, the chief movers being far-seeing men who used the circumstances of the moment to achieve an end which they had long had in view. That end was—an armed nation. Pearse and his Fenians had taught in *Irish Freedom* and *An Barr Buadh* that a disarmed people could not but be slaves—that freedom to carry arms was the first mark of a freeman. And now the country was learning this lesson from the drift of events. The people saw the parchments of constitutional liberty ripped by the mere threat of the sword, and realised that sovereignty must be guaranteed by power. Irish liberty or order would

be impossible of maintenance unless by Irish might. So an armed nation rose. The leaders did not contemplate insurrection, but held that only an armed people could bargain for freemen's terms. Professor Eoin MacNeill, Chairman of the Volunteers, favoured non-committal acceptance of the Home Rule Bill. Yet, despite the absence of revolutionary intent in the Volunteer movement, it was denounced by the Irish Parliamentary Party.

Then, in the spring of 1914, the Curragh revolt and the Ulster Volunteers' sensational (but quite safe) landing of arms at Larne, fired the people's emotions, and whatever discouragement the Party leaders had effected was swept aside. Enrolments in the Irish Volunteers rushed up to 150,000—or, according to some English officials' estimates, 180,000. The Party now changed its tactics, and tried to seize control of the Volunteer organisation. This was its most fatal mistake, for the politicians had no intention of running the force as a military body; and in seeking to clip away its militancy and reduce it to a voting machine, they opposed themselves to one of the deepest enthusiasms that had ever stirred a nation. Had Mr. Redmond been a strong man, he would have left the Volunteers a free hand, turning a blind eye on their operations. The militant movement would then have loomed behind him, like the Fenians behind Parnell, or the earlier Volunteers behind the politicians of 1782, and he would have been able to infuse reality into his oratorical demands for freedom. Had he, with a strongly or-

ganised Ireland behind him, said to his opponents: "Yield me the liberties I seek, or I will stand aside and let you deal with that which takes my place," he would have called a stronger bluff than Carson's; for those behind him, unlike those behind Carson, were capable of backing their threats with deeds, and Britain, at that time, would have considered Repeal of the Union a cheap price for Irish peace.

When Mr. Redmond demanded that the Volunteer Committee admit nominees of his Party of a number equal to themselves, the originators of the organisation were inclined to refuse, but Casement, ever guided by zeal for Irish unity, threatened to quit the Volunteer movement if the demand were rejected. So the Provisional Committee yielded. Mr. Redmond introduced his nominees. They proved to be none of them men who could be imagined as associated with sincere Volunteering. Volunteering seemed to be reduced to a farce, and some of those who had voted for their admission actually burst into tears, seeing their hearts' work in the last year, as it were, broken by callousness or frivolity. One of the Party leaders at this time wrote a letter which subsequently became public, revealing the sincerity of the Party's pretences. Ireland, said the letter, wanted arms *out* of the country, not *into* it. When arms actually *were* secured under Party auspices, they proved to be Italian rifles of an out-of-date pattern for which no ammunition was available.

In these circumstances, it is small wonder that the earnest leaders of the Volunteer movement resorted to

secret methods. The original group, after attending rowdy and futile meetings with the nominees, met privately and went ahead with serious business. As a result of their efforts, a big cargo of rifles and ammunition was landed at Howth on July 26th, 1914, and brought into Dublin by 1,000 Volunteers. Soldiers intercepted the column. Happily, the Volunteer leaders had not distributed ammunition, and a bloody episode was thus averted. The column scattered, and got away with the weapons. At Bachelor's Walk, the soldiers fired on a hooting crowd which resented an armed attempt to disarm Nationalist Volunteers while Unionist Volunteers were encouraged. Several innocent people were killed. It was a savage act, and Ireland was electrified. The funeral procession was an amazing demonstration—Dublin was black with people, who cheered the armed Volunteers taking control of the crowded thoroughfares. There was a whiff of Revolution in the air. A week later, the Great War began.

§ 2.—*Was Ireland Pro-German?*

The Bachelor's Walk incident seemed to have been decreed by Fate. The shots fired undid the work of a quarter of a century, and brought Ireland back to the Land League and Coercion days, when Force, the real governing element in Irish politics, stood naked. For now, when the great recruiting propaganda was launched, the irreconcilables pointed to July 26th, saying: "Don't be stampeded. See

how the Government that calls you to defend it regards you. It tolerates your opponents' arming, but it shoots your people in the streets when you seek weapons for your own defence. Force is still your master." It was long years since the relations of England and Ireland had been displayed as founded on violence, and but for this object lesson, the Nationalist population might have been swept off its feet. In the Imperial senate the shootings were treated with flippancy: Mr. Asquith felt quite sure that when the facts were known, the troops would be vindicated, and Mr. Redmond hoped Irish people would not hold England to blame for a regrettable occurrence. Outraged and indignant, the people were braced for a firm stand, and the lethargic Ireland of a few months before had vanished. The nation called for a brave lead. The one man who could give it would not.

Everyone admits now that in August, 1914, John Redmond threw away an opportunity with which a Parnell could have achieved national liberty. More than half the manhood of Nationalist Ireland was drilling in the Volunteer ranks. The Army Reservists notified Redmond of their readiness to refuse the summons to the colours, to stand beside their civil comrades until Ireland's case was righted. The Irish regiments were in a state of mutiny. A strong man could have threatened the Government with disruption of the British Army, and an unfriendly Volunteer force, and at that psychological moment, could have secured the control of Ireland for

Irish hands. In return for Irish neutrality and the defence of the Irish Coast by native forces, the evacuation of Ireland could have been won. Would England have grudged liberty to Ireland had the alternative been reconquest, with a disrupted army needed at the moment to defend Calais? But Mr. Redmond was incapable of action suggesting the rebel. He bade the reservists be loyal, called to the Volunteers to quit their own ranks and rush to the Empire's standard—and got nothing in reply but Sir Edward Grey's relieved declaration that Ireland was "the one bright spot." The brightness in the Irish situation for Sir Edward was that Irish liberty was averted.

Was Ireland pro-German or pro-Ally? At the outbreak of war, the traditional principle that England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity, assisted by the indignation caused by Bachelor's Walk, inclined the masses to the German side. "At last England is faced by a serious rival": that was the thought that ran through the country, accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction. That pro-Germanism was universally felt to be the historically-correct attitude for Nationalists was proved by the apologetic tone with which the Nationalist Press introduced a pro-Ally policy. "Disloyalty" had been winked at during the Boer War, when the economic interests of Britain were less completely involved. But the new war was realised by those "in the know" to be an immeasurably bigger thing than anything in living memory. It was a life and death struggle, and

no playing at sedition could now be allowed. So Ireland was represented as being vehemently pro-Ally, and a propaganda was started to render it so in reality. Mr. Asquith came to Dublin at this time, when not a voice had been raised to deny Irish loyalty to the Allied cause: but he had to be conducted to the Mansion House by a private route, while the streets were guarded by armed Constabulary and the Lancers were mobilised in the Castle Yard. A few streets away, James Larkin, speaking from a lorry amid the bayonets of the Citizen Army, led a mighty crowd in swearing, with uplifted hand, eternal enmity to the British Empire. Within the well-guarded Mansion House—destined within five years to be the scene of the first sessions of the Republican *Dail Eireann*—Mr. Asquith appealed to a ticket-admitted audience for volunteers as "the free gift of a free people," and declared that Britain was fighting for the weak against the strong. The enormous demonstration, it is stated, produced six recruits. It was described by Tom Clarke (the Fenian) as "an earthquake to shake down an apple." All who saw the Dublin streets that night knew that, though the papers might write of Irish loyalty, the Irish Capital at least was seething with hostility to all that Mr. Asquith stood for.

The official attitude of Sinn Féin was not pro-German; it was neutral. Certain words in a leading article in Mr. Griffith's organ became classical, and were learned by heart:

> . . . Germany in herself is nothing to us, but she is not our enemy. Our blood and our miseries are not on *her* head. But who can forbear admiration at the spectacle of the Germanic people whom England has ringed round with enemies, standing alone undaunted and defiant against a world in arms?

And the proclamation of Republican Labour was: "We serve neither King nor Kaiser." The Allied cause, however, was supported by the Parliamentary Party and its agents throughout the local government of the country, by commercial interests, and by the Press. Then came the news of Belgium's sufferings, and the stories of German atrocities. Dublin—at the expense of an agnostic or atheistic government—was plastered with appeals to Irish Catholics to revenge Cardinal Mercier's flock. Belgian priests were sent round Ireland telling the story of the invasion. A wave of indignation against Germany was raised and ran counter to the indignation against Britain. The 50,000 odd Irishmen who enlisted in the first year of the war practically all offered themselves in the sincere belief that they were going to fight for the liberty of an outraged small nation against men who were conducting war in the manner of inhuman savages. Honest and dishonest appeals were made to honest and dishonest motives, and the stream of enlistment was kept up—though at a diminishing rate—until the Conscription crisis in 1918. This can be said with absolute assurance to-day: that had the actual outcome of the war, the actual character of the "Peace," been foreseen, the overwhelming majority

of those Irishmen who enlisted, even the corner-boys and wastrels among them, would have been found vehemently on the pro-German side.

Right up to Easter Week, 1916, Sinn Féin was, despite sullen distrust of English policy and resentment at the repeated insults heaped on pro-Ally Irishmen (such as the refusal of colours to the Irish regiments, suppression of their achievements, etc.), politically ineffective. When the air was literally full of denunciations of the Germans as uprooters of civilisation, when every organ of publicity was loud with tales of atrocities, the few, scattered, press-less intellectuals who opposed the mass propaganda seemed, by their isolation, to be mere cranks. It requires great moral fortitude and self-certainty to champion an unpopular opinion against all the appearances which the established order can muster against it, and it is not remarkable that comparatively few in Ireland, as in England and America, could maintain a critical attitude towards the belligerents, and stand immune amid universal war-fever. Sinn Féin was not left to waste its fragrance on the desert air, however. Extreme Unionism, as we have noted before, never loses its faith in Irish nationality, and the Castle harried the neutralists, suppressing one Sinn Féin paper after another. Most significantly to the observer, a paper called *Scissors-and-Paste,* consisting solely of clippings from English newspapers, was suppressed, showing that Ireland was not even to be allowed to see events as England saw them, or receive war news in any form but one specially

designed for her. The Unionist press kept a standing headline, "Ireland and the War," and never let a week pass without girding at Irishmen for failing to flock in greater numbers to England's defence. This constant nagging made even those who favoured Irish belligerency uncomfortable. It was hard to appeal to the young Irishman to rush chivalrously to Belgium's aid when a crusty Unionist was at the same time trying to browbeat him into going, and telling him that if he didn't, he'd be made to. In short, it was impossible in an unfree Ireland to conduct a recruiting campaign on any lines save those that would be offensive to national self-respect, and by 1916, though Ireland was far from being definitely pro-German, such war enthusiasm as had been worked up was flagging.

Meanwhile, remarkable developments had taken place behind the scenes. In 1914, when Mr. Redmond tried to commit the Volunteers to unconditional support of the Allies' cause, the original organisers expelled his nominees. Such was the power of his political machine, that owing to the personal obscurity of the Volunteer leaders, the bulk of the rank and file adhered to him in the split, and the Irish Volunteers were reduced to a skeleton body; being, in effect, the Irish-Ireland young intelligentsia. As a typical example of what happened, the case of a small South-of-Ireland town may be cited. In the autumn of 1914, at the Emmet anniversary march, there were 120 Redmondite Volunteers and 30 Sinn Féin Volunteers. A year later, at the

annual demonstration, the numbers *were exactly reversed.* Thus in a year the virile youth was won over to a rebel movement. Ireland was not yet Sinn Féin, though it was mightily discontent, but the militant spirit that had called the youth of all Europe to arms had roused Irish youth, too, and with no enthusiasm for the cause of the country that had shelved self-government for Ireland, young Irishmen drilled in the ranks of the one body which stood for Irish patriotism. Conscription for Ireland was threatened, and it was clear that the Irish Volunteers were Ireland's only defence against such an outrage upon her free will. So the Redmondite Volunteers disappeared, and the Irish Volunteers remained—reduced in numbers, it is true, and disorganised over large areas, but still in many districts, and especially Dublin, a disciplined and well-trained body. Insurrection was not yet contemplated.

It is well known that even on the very verge of the Rising there were varied counsels in the Volunteer camp. Professor MacNeill was still Chairman. He saw the Volunteers as a defensive rather than an offensive body, and it is generally understood that he contemplated action only in the event of a physical attack on Ireland, such as an attempt to conscript Irishmen or to partition the country. He wished to push ahead the organisation of the force and its equipment, so that when the war should end, Ireland could confront the Peace Conference with a demand for liberty backed by a strong and effective army. Incidentally, it may here be observed that

when the Peace Conference did come about, Ireland possessed a larger and better equipped Volunteer force than at Easter Week. Mr. MacNeill's views on what action should be taken in the event of a German landing are not on record, but it is certain that the great bulk of Volunteers—probably all—would have been quite favourable to insurrection in the event of sufficient foreign help being available to offer reasonable prospects of success.

This was Casement's position. Neither he nor any Irish Nationalist held a brief for the Kaiser's system of government, though many admired the stout patriotism and Spartan austerity with which Germany rose to and held power: but the Irish patriot, withheld from liberty by one tyranny, is not much concerned with the merits of the case when that tyranny falls foul of another. Irishmen had a quarrel with England; they had none with Germany. The rival virtues of English and German systems of government was a matter to interest Englishmen and Germans: it was absurd to import a debate on so academic a point into the question of—how to get rid of English oppression. Moreover, even if the problem had been apposite, Irishmen might have answered it not just in the same way as Englishmen; for, having no animus against Germany, they could see her side of the case. Familiar with the evils of Imperialism, they had no love for Kaiserism. But they had also that historic sense which appreciates the complexity of the international situation, and realises that to trace a war maturing for long years

to the Invasion of Belgium in 1914, is absurd, and that in modern national conflicts, the fault is usually "six of one and half-a-dozen of the other."

People in the Allied lands, who, having perhaps lost relatives in the war against Germany, resent Young Ireland's willingness to accept liberation at Germany's hands, should consider the case of Poland. Before the collapse of Russia, Polish nationalists were pro-German, and they rejoiced when Germany drove back the Tsarist hosts. Had Tsarist Russia won through to the "peace" with the other Allies, we know there would have been no independent Poland. England and America applaud the liberation of Poland, and overlook that early pro-Germanism in Poles that would have survived had the oppression of Poland at an Ally's hands continued. If it was excusable for Poles to be pro-German until their fatherland was free, why should Irish willingness to accept German aid be condemned by liberty-lovers?

§ 3.—*Easter Week*

Early in 1916 it became clear that a crisis was approaching. It would appear that the Fenian element within the Volunteers was pressing for action. It is generally believed that Casement made vigorous efforts to secure a German expedition to Ireland, and it is known that, at the end, he hurried

to Ireland with the news that German help was presently impossible to obtain, and pleas for the postponement of the now-dated adventure.

The actual sequence of events is still obscure. Perhaps only a handful of living men know the facts. But it is certain that Connolly's influence counted for much in precipitating the appeal to arms. He is known to have said in private that the war would not end without his attempting to bring about an insurrection, and in the spring of 1916 he cried to the Volunteers and the Citizen Army, week after week in his Labour organ, not to let Armageddon pass without a blow for Irish liberty. Pearse, as is well-known, expressed the fear that Ireland would let slip an irretrievable opportunity. It is recorded that, as the war dragged on and action in Ireland delayed, he grew bitterly anxious lest peace should return to a still unfree nation that had made no protest against empire when every other subject people had struck for its rights. As early as the first month of the war he wrote: "A European war has brought about a crisis which may contain as yet hidden within it the moment for which the generations have been waiting. It remains to be seen whether, if that moment reveals itself, we shall have the sight to see and the courage to do, or whether it shall be written of this generation, alone of all the generations of Ireland, that it had none among it who dared to make the ultimate sacrifice."

The tenor of Pearse's utterances early in 1916 warned the discerning that he had resolved on an

early cast. Up and down the country he went, addressing gatherings under the auspices of the uniformed Volunteers. On March 4th, two months to a day before he fell before the firing squad, he was listened to by the present writer, interpreting Robert Emmet to his hearers. He preached the doctrine of blood-sacrifice. Whenever Ireland had been most cruelly betrayed or deserted, some few had risen to prove by the gift of their lives, that the ancient dream was not yet surrendered. The last vestiges of Irish political independence were extinguished in 1801 by the Parliamentary Union, and so it was needful that Emmet should make his sacrifice. Nationality had survived only by such sacrifices in every generation. The passing generation was mean in fame, mean in achievement, mean and bankrupt even in words, because its career had been marked by no offering in blood. The present generation, therefore, must not fail. Ireland would live if men still would die for her. And—O glorious hope!—perhaps this next sacrifice would be the last because the one victorious! "What if it be given to us," Pearse asked, his rugged, plain features lightening with that strange fire of enthusiasm that none who saw can ever forget, so like it was to the light that artists paint round the head of Stephen, first of the martyrs—"what if it be given to us to win that for which our fathers died in vain!" Had not Mitchel dreamed of a day when the flags of the oppressed of all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues should be raised in a great uni-

versal war for liberty, and Ireland's among them? "Mitchel did not live to see that day," Pearse said, "but *we* have done so!" Guardedly, or at least darkly, he alluded to the Irish attitude towards Germany. We are not pro-Germans, he said; we are pro-Irish. Emmet in his day had declared that though he would accept, and actually sought, French aid, he would resist to the last any landing of the French as conquerors or invaders of Ireland. That was the national attitude now towards Germany. Were the Germans to land as conquerors seeking to subject Ireland to German rule, the Volunteers would contest every inch of ground with them. Pearse did not dwell on the alternative case —the coming of German forces as *allies*—but the innuendo was plain. *Is leor nod don eolach*: a nod is enough for the wise.

It can hardly be doubted then that Pearse was resolved on an insurrection with German aid. It is impossible to judge whether he expected that aid in the form of a landing of troops or of arms only. But it is known that the Insurrection was fixed for Easter Sunday morning. News came that Casement was a prisoner and that a shipload of arms had been lost. The loss of the ship of munitions and Casement's capture led to Professor MacNeill's sending out of countermanding orders all over the country, cancelling the Sunday morning mobilisation. Insurrection was definitely "off" when the amazed public read the countermanding order in Sunday's newspaper.

But the thing had gone too far for any return to the *status quo*. For a week the tricolour had flown over Liberty Hall, guarded by armed men, who defied Mr. Birrell's agents to seize the seditious printing-press within; and on Saturday evening the Republican declaration was actually read from the steps of the Labour stronghold. The events on the coast and the frantic distribution of the countermanding orders, could leave no doubt that a rising had been contemplated, and had been averted only by a hair's breadth. So it was decided to arrest the whole Volunteer Executive. Thanks to the efficiency of what is called the "Sinn Féin Secret Service," such a decision could not be made without the knowledge of those threatened, and Pearse and his associates saw themselves faced with the alternatives of immediate insurrection on one hand, and the drastic destruction of their organisation, the definite loss of all their hopes, on the other. There was still division of opinion as to whether insurrection was the right course. But Connolly was resolved on striking, and Pearse, committed to physical force and even a blood-sacrifice, could not allow, say, the Citizen Army to rise without throwing in his lot with the venture. Assuredly he and his friends had small hope of military success, though in war the end is always unforeseeable, and doubtless they hoped aganst hope that events on the larger battlefield would turn in their favour and bring succour ere they were overwhelmed. MacDermott and Thomas Clarke had worked for long years to bring

about another Irish insurrection, and though they could have wished an apter moment for the great cast—such as, say, the moment when the Germans burst the Allies' line in 1918, might have been—they had no choice but to accept the present opportunity, or know that Ireland had failed once again, perhaps for ever, to assert her national claim.

As we look at the situation in which they were placed, their reasoning seems to have been well founded. Had they shrunk from insurrection, the Volunteer organisation would have been smashed, and, in practical certainty, the youth of the country would have been forthwith conscripted. Lacking force or direction to resist Conscription, Ireland would have surrendered the last right of humanity, and her people would have been physically and morally, as well as nationally and politically, enslaved. Nothing is clearer than that a strong national stand would then have been utterly beyond their power: slaves cannot play the part of freemen.

On April 26th, 1916, being Easter Monday, the Irish Republic was declared, and the country was called to arms in its defence. The response, owing to the confusion caused by the "countermanding order," was only sporadic, and over all Ireland not more than about 4,000 men were "out." What happened needs no re-telling. Towards the end of Easter week, when the heart of Dublin was in flames, and cannon were pounding at a vast area of buildings containing many non-combatants, Pearse,

"satisfied that Ireland's honour was saved," and desirous of sparing bloodshed now that the protest had been made, surrendered, and the Republican Army laid down its weapons. In ones and twos fifteen of the leaders of the Rising were shot after a secret trial. On the eve of his execution, Pearse, Commander-in-Chief of the insurgents and first President of the Republic, wrote, in a letter to his mother: "This is the death I should have asked for if God had given me the choice of all deaths—to die a soldier's death for Ireland and freedom. We have done right. People will say hard things of us now, but, later on, they will praise us. Do not grieve for all this, but think of it as a sacrifice which God has asked of me and you."

§ 4.—*National Extermination Averted*

The Rising was over, and Irish poets and dreamers were being shot down in a prison-yard almost before the nation as a whole realised what had come to pass. Over a hundred young Irishmen of idealistic bent and known purity of character were in prison, serving terms running from five years to life; and some two thousand others—many, if not most, having no connection with the insurrection—were dwelling in rat-ridden internment camps. Not a village in Ireland but had seen some respected citizen taken away after, per-

haps, a midnight raid, or a brutal search of the house with the women locked for a day in a room without food. After nigh three months of imprisonment, Casement was tried by his political enemies, before a crowd of vulgar sightseers, and hanged with a mob cheering outside the prison gates. The popular enthusiasm for strafing was turned by "John Bull" from Germania to the weakling rebel forces, and Ireland awoke to the fact that she was regarded as an enemy country.

The Irish-Ireland movement, which so long had piped to heedless ears, now found the whole population turning to it. Indiscriminately, Gaelic Leaguers, Abstentionists, Republicans and Socialists were labelled Sinn Féin, and so England did in a few days what rebels had tried in vain for years to effect—she moulded into a compact Separatist unity the whole Nationalist population. The neo-Sinn-Féin movement held the country's attention. Its books and journals were read with avidity in every corner of the four provinces, and the Rising was at once classed in the national imagination with '98, as was shown by the song, "Who Fears to Speak of Easter Week" that was sung everywhere before Casement died. The men who fell were not cold in their graves before they were ranked with Emmet, Tone and Owen Roe. "They will shoot us," said Séan MacDermott just after the surrender and before his execution, to a comrade who was spared, "and that will be our victory."

It is universally believed by Irishmen that the "Irish Convention" was set up, and the prisoners released in 1917, for the purpose of conciliating America, or at least throwing dust in her eyes. It is tolerably certain, anyway, that it was called for no honest purpose, for every provision that might have made it an honest means to a settlement was carefully ruled out. The terms of reference were so framed that the overwhelming mass of the nation—Sinn Féin, Labour, Independent Nationalist—was tacitly denied representation, and the actual assembly was composed solely of Government nominees drawn from minority groups. Hence, no interest was taken in its proceedings, and it is doubtful whether the average Irishman was even aware that it was sitting. It was significant that when well-known delegates like Redmond and Devlin appeared in the Dublin streets going to and from the sessions, the crowds that in former times would have massed to cheer a popular figure were completely absent, and the great men were no more heeded than nobodies. Mr. Redmond, walking once into the Gresham Hotel with not so much as two newsboys pointing him out one to another, was once observed to cast a wistful look down the busy street: his reflections on vanished popularity must have been bitter. The ultimate break up of the Convention was the theme of some recrimination between actors in it, but to the present day the average Irishman knows as little of what 'twas all about as Old Kaspar in the poem. However, British statesmanship, whatever its moral

character, is rarely stupid, and the Convention that Irishmen laughed at in Dublin, served its turn in America, where it salved President Wilson's conscience with the excuse that Britain was doing *something* to solve the Irish question.

Meanwhile, Sinn Féin was reorganised. The various rebel groups who had been saddled with the name decided to accept it, and so a compact, comprehensive, nation-wide party was formed. Mr. Arthur Griffith resigned his Chairmanship of Sinn Féin to Mr. de Valera, a Commandant who fought brilliantly in 1916, and who leaped into prominence with unexampled suddenness. Mr. Griffith himself commended his young disciple as a leader who was soldier as well as statesman and statesman as well as soldier. The original Sinn Féin policy of Abstention was adhered to, but the new Sinn Féin took its stand, not on the Constitution of 1782 (Independent Irish Kingdom under the Dual Crown), but on the Republic of 1916. Its immediate object now became to secure recognition of Irish Independence by the Peace Conference and the admission thereto of Republican delegates. Republicanism spread fast. When the British Government left Sinn Féin alone, its constructive policy and virile propaganda carried forward the flag; when coercion was resorted to, with round-ups, the killing of a hunger-striker, baton-charges, etc., this had the same effect. It soon became clear that a General Election would result in a Republican majority, though not perhaps a sweeping one, for there were

still waverers. Then in the spring of 1918 it was decided to crush the rebel spirit by conscripting Ireland.

It is impossible to argue intelligently that Conscription for Ireland was passed into law for the honest reason that men were needed at the Front. The number of men who could be taken from Ireland, even were they willing to go, was small—some 50,000 might have been extracted without crippling the so-essential industry of agriculture, and 50,000 would not go far on the Western Front. But it was certain that nothing like 50,000 could be got. To secure even 10,000 an enormous army would be required, seeing that armed resistance was known to be resolved on. Probably some 200,000 Irishmen could take the field in an *à outrance* Irish war: how many trained troops would be tied in Ireland to cope with so large and so diffused a rebel force?

It was unanimously held in Ireland that British statesmen had resolved to seize the opportunity which the world's blood-fury offered, to carry out a huge national pogrom and crush the renascent spirit of the nation in a reign of terror more awful far than that of '98. And resistance was prepared for on a scarce conceivable scale. It was believed that any whom Britain succeeded in conscripting would never return from Flanders—they would be used, like the Irish regiments before them, as shock troops, and crammed into the fiery gorge of destruction. So it was a choice of death in Ireland or on the Continent. Moreover, the moral instinct

revolted against yielding to an unauthorised command to slay one's fellow-beings, and to the Irish mind, whatever opinions might be held as to the justice of the Allied cause, it would be murder to shoot a German because an Englishman threatened one's own skin if one refused. Above all, none save the most abandoned slave could submit to giving over his life, soul and body to the disposal of a foreign government, friendly or hostile. And the government that assumed to tell Irishmen to kill and be killed for it was one that denied them elementary liberties, trampled on their dearest affections, and imprisoned or exiled their leaders on *lettres-de-cachet*. There were, then, all the ingredients of one of the most hideous explosions that ever humanity witnessed.

In the crisis, the Irish Republic came into its own. For the people looked to the Republican leaders as the invaded and menaced French looked to Joffre and Foch. And together leaders and people turned to spiritual sources of consolation and strength that the stranger could scarcely understand. Ireland became a land on whose air prayer was almost audible. There was not a home on which death and devastation had not cast their shadows, and so there was scarce a life but responded to the Episcopal summons to devotion. At the same time, preparation for resistance went urgently on. Up to the very night on which the Order enforcing Conscription was to be tabled, uncertainty reigned. On the last night, people sat up in Dublin waiting for the sound

of the first shots, and in the newspaper offices every "flimsy" was torn open with feverish hands. The clock crept on, and at last the House across-water rose. The Order had not been tabled. Discretion had won. Or was it that the Hand of God had been stretched forth? Had that Order been tabled, that same night would have seen the island one flame. A national uprising, unimaginable in unanimity and in ruthlessness, would have taken place. Not able-bodied men alone, but men, women, and children, whoever could pull a trigger or cast a stone, would have taken part. The defenders foresaw ultimate defeat, but they were resolved that an imperialist victory would only be won at a price beyond calculation, and that not one conscript would be taken. It is not too much to say that, had the Conscription Order been tabled, Ireland would have been destroyed, but Britain would have needed to call up such resources that she would have lost the war on the Continent.

This was Ireland's first escape in many generations. Again and again, aye, ever since the Invasion, her struggles had ended in cataclysmic disaster. Wars had been followed by expulsions, slaughters, starvations, and every national rise had fallen when the clash of strength came. This time, at least, the net had been spread in vain. In the conflict of wills and staying power, Ireland at last had won. In the very shadow of ultimate destruction she had come safe. None doubted that what had happened had been a miracle. It seemed to all

her people that the turning point had at last been passed, and when peace was soon after declared it found the Irish people full of hope and new confidence, though in the war their appeal to arms had been a failure, and their opponent had come forth of Armageddon mightier and richer than ever she had been in history.

CHAPTER IV

IRELAND AND THE PEACE

They will not learn; they have no ears to hearken;
  They turn their faces from the eyes of fate;
Their gaylit halls shut out the skies that darken—
  But lo! this dead man knocking at the gate.

Here lies the sign that we shall break our prison;
  Amidst the storm he won a prisoner's rest;
But in the cloudy dawn the sun arisen
  Brings us our day of work to win the best.
Not one, not one, nor thousands must they slay,
  But one and all if they would dusk the day.

—Morris.

§ 1.—*The Irish Constituent Assembly*

Though gripped in a militaristic *régime*, Ireland emerged more happily from the war than did other nations. The Conscription crisis had brought her an agreeable consciousness of solidarity and power. The rally to Irish-Ireland had been like the saving of her soul. Liberty itself could scarcely be more exhilarating than the sense of spiritual redemption

which pervaded Nationalist thought. Ireland had been spared the horrors of protracted war on her soil, and her losses in man-power had not been so severe as those of the conscript countries. Seeing that in pre-war days emigration took away annually more than the surplus of young lives, actually reducing the population, it is clear that the stoppage of emigration far more than counterbalanced the loss of life on the battlefield. Consequently, Ireland had a larger proportion of young people in her population than at any time since the flow of emigration began after the famine. Irishmen being inured to frugal and sparing conditions, the war wealth due to agricultural prosperity was a greater opulence to them than the larger war fortunes were to the better-to-do industrial workers of England.

The General Election of 1918 saw three-quarters of Ireland declared Republican: it was a Victory election for Sinn Féin as well as for Mr. Lloyd George. The elected Irish members at once proceeded with the policy first planned by O'Connell and later worked for by Mr. Griffith—the summoning of a National Council to act as the *de jure* Government of the country, ignoring Westminster. Mr. de Valera, President of Sinn Féin since 1917, and Mr. Griffith, Vice-President, as well as many other of the elected members, were still in prison in England, having been deported at the time of the Conscription crisis on the plea of a discovered German plot—a plot that was proved to be a clumsy fabrication. However, the thirty Republican members who were at liberty held

the first session of Dáil Eireann—the Irish Constituent Assembly—on January 21st, 1919. The Round Room at the Dublin Mansion House was packed to the pitch of stifling, and the streets outside were dense with disappointed visitors from the country. Proceedings were opened by prayer to the Holy Spirit, offered by Rev. M. O'Flanagan, C.C. Before the Speaker's daïs, a semi-circle of benches offered place to Ireland's 103 members. When the roll was called, each name was called—not omitting Sir Edward Carson's, for all had been summoned to attend—and again and again the reply was: "*Fá ghlas ag Gallaibh*" (imprisoned by the foreigners). The first business of the Assembly then was the adoption of a Declaration of Independence. The proceedings were in Irish, but the Declaration was read also in English and French. About one hundred pressmen, representing Ireland, Britain, America, Belgium, etc., were accommodated.

In the adoption of this Declaration, the Irish Republic was again affirmed, and Irish-Irelanders have since regarded the Dáil as the only legitimate civil authority in Ireland.

Next was adopted a "Message to the free nations of the world," in which the Dáil claimed Irish freedom as being necessary to world freedom. Casement's oft-repeated doctrine that there can be no freedom of the seas until Ireland becomes independent, was implicit. The appeal was against "British Navalism," and indicated what would have been the lines of argument followed by the three delegates—

President de Valera, Count Plunkett, Mr. Griffith—appointed by the Dáil, had they been admitted at Versailles. The international advantages of Irish freedom were dwelt on by Professor Eoin MacNeill in proposing the adoption of the Appeal. "We are not asking the nations to establish the Irish Republic," he said; "that is done already. We are not asking them to put us under an obligation to them, but to put themselves under an obligation to us. We recommend them to do this freely (recognise the Republic)—for if they fail to do so, their own case may yet be as bad as ours has been. For their own good we are asking them to aid the cause of Ireland."

A third document connected with the Session is of such importance to the understanding of Republican policy that it must be quoted here *in extenso*. It is, the Democratic Program adopted by the Dáil in outline of the Republican Assembly's policy:

> "We declare in the words of the Irish Republican Proclamation the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be indefeasible, and in the language of our first President, Padraic Mac Piarais, we declare that the nation's sovereignty extends not only to all men and women of the nation, but to all its material possessions: the nation's soil and all its resources, all the wealth and all the wealth-producing processes within the nation; and with him we re-affirm that all rights to private property must be subordinated to the public right and welfare.
>
> "We declare that we desire our country to be ruled in accordance with the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Justice for all, which alone can secure permanence of government in the willing adhesion of the people.

"We affirm the duty of every man and woman to give allegiance and service to the Commonwealth, and declare it is the duty of the nation to assure that every citizen shall have opportunity to spend his or her strength and faculties in the service of the people. In return for willing service, we, in the name of the Republic, declare the right of every citizen to an adequate share of the produce of the nation's labour.

"It shall be the first duty of the Government of the Republic to make provision for the physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of the children, to secure that no child shall suffer hunger or cold from lack of food, or clothing or shelter, but that all shall be provided with the means and facilities requisite for their proper education and training as citizens of a free and Gaelic Ireland.

"The Irish Republic fully realises the necessity of abolishing the present odious, degrading, and foreign Poor Law system, substituting therefore a sympathetic native scheme for the care of the nation's aged and infirm, who shall no longer be regarded as a burden, but rather entitled to the nation's gratitude and consideration. Likewise it shall be the duty of the Republic to take measures that will safeguard the health of the people and ensure the physical as well as the moral well-being of the nation.

"It shall be our duty to promote the development of the nation's resources, to increase the productivity of the soil, to exploit its mineral deposits, peat bogs, and fisheries, its waterways and harbours, in the interest and for the benefit of the Irish people.

"It shall be the duty of the Republic to adopt all measures necessary for the recreation and invigoration of our industries, and to ensure their being developed on the most beneficial and progressive co-operative industrial lines. With the adoption of an extensive Irish Consular service, trade with foreign nations shall be revived on

terms of mutual advantage and goodwill; while undertaking the organisation of the nation's trade, import and export, it shall be the duty of the Republic to prevent the shipment from Ireland of food and other necessaries until the wants of the Irish people are fully satisfied and the future provided for.

"It shall devolve upon the National Government to seek the co-operation of the Governments of other countries in determining a standard of social and industrial legislation with a view to a general and lasting improvement in the conditions under which the working classes live and labour."

In these documents several influences may be traced. In the Declaration of Independence, we have traditional nationalism in the Republican setting. In the message to the nations, there is some element of what the Socialist might call *bourgeois* philosophy. Apparently the existing State order is completely accepted, and the Peace Conference is recognised as a court having authority. The final paragraph of the Democratic Program amounts to a recognition of existing Governments as on one level with the Irish. Since such Governments as the French, British, American, etc., are regarded by Socialists as class Governments, the Irish Government by innuendo seems to accept that status, too. On the other hand, the opening sentences of the Program are almost susceptible of a socialistic interpretation. The truth is that the fires of patriotism fused into a compound the elements of mercantilism and social revolution, and those who have sought to find a narrow sectionalism in the Republican policy have thus far failed to make good their case.

Apart from the adoption of the Program, there was much significance in the speeches at the reception to the Press after the Session. Speaking on the subject of modern publicity methods, one after another of the Republican delegates voiced resentment at the misrepresentation of Irish news by foreign journals and agencies. "We realise that you, gentlemen of the Press, desire to be fair and truthful, but your proprietors won't let you. We have had to fight the battle of liberty with the world of print corruptly working against us." This was the tenor of one utterance after another, and when Count Plunkett, an anti-socialist, denounced capitalistic Press-control, it was clear that the war had taught all Irishmen a lesson regarding the forces leagued against them. Lenin himself could not have more forcefully condemned the imperialist control of the Press.

There was always some divergence of opinion in Ireland regarding the policy of appealing to the Peace Conference. Had Germany won, or had the war ended in a draw, Ireland's case might conceivably have been heard and made the issue of a discussion mightily injurious to British monopoly of the seas. The Peace Conference was a conference of victors whose subject of debate was not how to establish international peace and justice, but how to divide the plunder after extorting the last ounce of available wealth from the defeated victim, who had surrendered on the promise of a 14-point peace, with no annexations or indemnities. What authority had men like

Clemenceau or Orlando to decide between Ireland and Britain? The Conference that ratified Britain's seizure of Germany's colonies, that gave Germany's coal-fields to her mortal enemy, that acquiesced in the extinction of Egyptian national status, that starved hundreds of thousands of children to death and blighted a generation, that aided and encouraged the White Terror in Russia: was this an impartial and altruistic body? A hundred claims not less unjust than Britain's claim to rule Ireland this Conference recognised: on what but ignoble grounds of expediency would it make an exception in Ireland's favour and do justice?—and expediency dictated to the debtor nations the upholding of powerful Britain, not the crossing of her will. If one's watch is stolen, one does not go seeking justice in a den of thieves; and how should international altruism be sought of a conspiracy of imperialists? Thus objections could be raised on the grounds of principle against the seeking of a hearing at Versailles. There were also tactical objections in the minds of many. How if the powers at Versailles had admitted the Irish delegates, heard their pleas, and then adopted a ruling on the Irish case dictated by Mr. Lloyd George? It cannot be doubted that Clemenceau would back up his English counterpart, and we know from Mr. Keynes, in his *Economic Consequences of the Peace,* how easily these two could mould President Wilson's conscience to their way of thinking or desiring. Had they declared, say, for a partitioned and disarmed Ireland under British protection, with no fiscal independence,

what answer could Ireland have made to so destructive a decision? Could she say: This makes my last case worse than my first, and is an outrage? She could be answered: You brought your case to our court; you must abide by our decision. After offering her case to Versailles, Ireland could not refuse to accept any decision but what best pleased her. And so she had a lucky escape when Mr. Lloyd George for once was not as artful as his reputation, and failed to defeat her by taking her at her word.

Such is one view, favoured by the social revolutionary, and plausible in its appearance. But it must be remembered that the Republican policy has been not to challenge the *status quo* outside of Irish shores. Privately, Republican leaders doubtless held correct estimates of the *bona fides* of the Conference; but officially they could only recognise such representatives of the nations as the nations allowed to represent them. Moreover, they had no right to forejudge any institution or body of men, and their duty was to give the Peace Conference, holding as it did the world's destinies in its hands, the opportunity to do justice and fulfil its own pretensions. Privately—as the utterances regarding the corruption of the Press suggested—they were probably fully enlightened as to the unlikeliness of justice from the imperialist and class Governments of this pagan age. But had the Peace Conference been composed of monarchs, aristocrats, patriarchs or proletarians, had it been held at any stage in social evolution, its *de facto* existence could be ignored by none but doctrinaires. So Dáil

Eireann gave it the chance to do the right thing, safeguarding itself by insisting that its delegates be admitted, if at all, as representatives of the Republic. And while the Versailles assembly refused to recognise the Jugo-Slavia of the West, but under an ally's benevolent imperium, the revived Second International at Berne gave seats to envoys of an independent Ireland. It is true that the Second International was on its last legs, and had to be bullied into the action that it took, lapsing at once (after the departure of the Irish envoys) into its contemptible condition of moral inertia, but the mere formal recognition by a Socialist International of Irish claims served to throw into relief the hopelessness of expecting anything from the imperialist Governments.

New wine needs new bottles, and a free Ireland needed a free world : that was the lesson. There was no place in a force-ruled Europe for a little people demanding right against might. And so belief in the chivalry of nations, in grateful Belgium or gallant France, or liberty-loving Italy, was shattered as green-flaggery went down for ever with the Peace Conference's callous refusal to hear Ireland's case. Irishmen will never again have faith in the moral pretences of the modern State.

§ 2.—*Enter the Red Flag*

Catholic communities are generally hostile to socialism, and so the socialistic enthusiasm which ran over Ireland during 1919 surprised and puzzled many.

But there the fact was. Never was Ireland more devoutly Catholic than to-day after the great spiritual stirrings caused by the words and deeds of Pearse, the crisis of Conscription, the imprisonments and exiles—and yet nowhere was the Bolshevik revolution more sympathetically saluted. Books, pamphlets and letters and essays in the Press debated socialism during the year following the General Election, and labour organisation, directed by avowed out-and-out socialists, went ahead by leaps and bounds. At the end of 1919 Liberty Hall was able to boast that the Transport Workers' Union had now more than one hundred thousand members. This—Connolly's—union is the militant organisation which aims at combining all Irish workers in a strongly centralised One Big Union—and now, observe, it has enrolled more men than Conscription was expected to extract from Irish man-power. Total trade union membership in Ireland to-day exceeds two hundred thousand. In a land of extremes, and of strange readiness to put new-found beliefs swiftly into action, the Labour movement, which stirred Ireland so late, moved rapidly to a pitch of organisation and an ambition of policy that the venerable Labour movement in Britain as yet scarce dreams of. As early as April, 1918, Labour was able to demonstrate most powerfully against Conscription by arresting the nation's economic movements by a one-day general strike—precursor, it is said, of that strike which made Bohemia a free nation. And during 1919 Labour pushed its propaganda so successfully that in 1920 it held the bal-

ance of power over extensive areas. Most remarkable of all, it expanded in the rural areas, and to-day Labour and the Peasant Proprietor, were they to combine, could dominate Irish politics.

Several factors made for the spread of socialistic sympathies. In the first place, the Irish question is largely a class question, seeing that the national tradition is resident chiefly in the proletariat, while the landed aristocracy (what there is of it), the capitalists and the bureaucracy, are predominantly anti-Irish. Since the destruction of native aristocracy, and the submersion of the Gaelic race by the Penal Code, the national struggle has been almost identical with what in other countries is called class war—a fight for access to the sources of production. As the language movement led to a political movement, so Sinn Féin in turn was certain to lead to a social movement. Pearse and Connolly, as we have seen, preached social as well as national regeneration, and when their sacrifice in Easter Week stirred up their own idealism in the masses, their social doctrine demanded expression in mass action. Add to these factors the wave of industrial unrest which war-time profiteering created throughout the world, and the stirring example of the Russian Revolution.

Labour propagandists were not slow to point out that Lenin and other of the leading revolutionaries had been interested in, and even profoundly influenced by James Connolly. His *Labour in Irish History,* translated into Russian, was printed serially in a leading Bolshevik organ. Dublin had been

visited after Easter Week by some of the men who were prominent in bringing about the Bolshevik triumph, and it has even been claimed that Dublin's struggle was the detonator, or courage-giver, that produced the mighty rising in the East. So as Ireland witnessed the uprise of Socialist States on the Continent and the failure of the *emigré* or White armies, with Allied backing, to reduce the Soviet Republic, she recalled all that Connolly had taught touching the world-dominion of capitalism which maintained her subjection, and the international rivalries of the age of violence and fraud. Knowing so well the sorrows of bondage and the sickness of hope deferred, she could not witness those Apocalyptic changes unmoved. You might argue with the subtlety of an Aristotle against the Socialistic cause, but when the Socialist flag was raised against the flag of the old imperialisms, Irish instinct *knew* which side stood for liberty and justice : Irishmen *knew* that it was the Red Flag, and not the Eagles, that was "on the side of the angels." Irish Nationalists know oppression when they see it, and they know, too, the accents of liberty.

Hence it was that the Irish masses saluted the new Republics with joy and a leaping sense of brotherhood; and looking back upon their own struggle, they saw it in a clearer light. They saw how their national war, waged for such long centuries, was directed against exactly the order that was now being overthrown in Europe, and then something like the bitterness of jealousy seized them. Was Ireland that

had fought individualism single-handed, when all the world had surrendered to it, to remain its one captive in the new day? Was the Irish Republic alone to be refused entrance into the new world? The bonds chafed now more sorely than ever before. Hence the enthusiasm that so suddenly ran over the country. Hence the new light in the eye and the strength in the hands of the Irish proletariat. Said an eminent Irish priest: "If St. Patrick were here to-day, I know that he would deal with Socialism by *being* a Socialist; and would go with Socialism as far as Socialism did not part with the law of God."

§ 3.—*The Co-operative Commonwealth*

While the Irish wage-earner was being organised in militant trade unionism, the Irish farmer was being organised, during 1919 and 1920, in the co-operative movement. The rapid spread of co-operation during the past two years has been no less remarkable than the spread of labour doctrine. The social ideology which we have noted to be behind labour organisation undoubtedly played a large part in the swing-over of rural Ireland to the co-operative faith, but the immediate material impulse came from the reckless profiteering of the country shopkeeper. The gombeen man, or Old Trader (as the tender-tongued called him), has been, throughout the countryside, lord and master since the landlord fell, and has ex-

torted a more iniquitous tribute. Standing between the farmer and the outside world, he has sold him seeds and manures—the essentials of his industry—of inferior quality at absurdly high rates. He has bought the farmer's produce cheaply and sold at the best cross-Channel price. The robber barons of the medieval tales were not more rapacious than these ignorant and selfish exploiters. In the most miserable mountainy districts—such as are described in Patrick McGill's great novels—the gombeen man, quite unschooled in all but craftiness, and serving no useful purpose in society, could grow rich to the tune of £100,000. Morally, these parasites were indeed a plague. Ascendancy, when it is based on money and combined with ignorance, debases all under its influence, and the cheap snobbery of the gombeen man went far to corrupt the good taste of a hitherto refined people. It was the gombeen man, who, airing his broken English, made the people ashamed of their own classic Gaelic, and anglicised them; it was he who paid the subscriptions by which the Parliamentary Party lived, and so controlled Irish politics, subordinating all interests to those of the till. Aspiring to an ascendancy hitherto held by the Protestant classes, he made capital of his Catholic origin: his victims were encouraged to rejoice that one of themselves, a Catholic, could at last put J.P. after his name and sit in the seat of the scornful.

Co-operation is an intricate and difficult subject, and the co-operative movement made slow progress in the first two decades after its initiation. It was

preached by Unionists, benevolent Englishmen or Scots, and by some Irish intellectuals. Against it were the political machine, the gombeen man, and the greater part of the Press. It was naturally hard to convince the unlettered Irish farmer of the advantages of a highly complex system of business when all the organised opinion of the Nationalist community warned him against your proposals, and excited his most ignorant prejudices and suspicions. Still, in some districts, strong local personalities broke the wall of conservatism and released the community's enterprise. The classic example, of course, is that of the Templecrone Co-operative Agricultural Society, at Dungloe, Co. Donegal, to which further reference will be made. In 1906, before this Society began operations, the price of flour in The Rosses was 14/- per seven-stone bag, the wholesale price to the gombeen man being only 8/-. It will be agreed that 6/- profit on 8/- outlay was exploitation. The Co-operative Society brought the price of flour down with a slap to 10/6. In 1911 the *wholesale* price had risen to 9/9, but the Co-operative Society had made no change in its *retail* price, and the Old Traders had perforce to sell at the co-operative standard. Again, in 1906 the traders were selling the farmer super-phosphate, 20 per cent. grade (since condemned by the Department of Agriculture), at 12/- a bag. In 1911 the Co-operative was selling 30 per cent. super. at 7/6 a bag! In April, 1906, the farmer's wife took her eggs to the shops and got 5d. per dozen for them. In April, 1911, she got 9d. In 1906 the Society's

turnover was £490. To-day the annual turnover is nearer £100,000.

During the Great War, profiteering was rampant wherever monopoly or power existed. In Ireland, the gombeen man reaped a harvest "beyond the dreams of avarice." Shopkeepers who in 1914 were doing a huckster's business were in 1920 driving in their motors with their wives and daughters arrayed in the latest confections imported from the West End. Owing to rationing of essential commodities, the impossibility of securing new licences, etc., the established shops had it all their own way during the latter and severer part of the war period. The purchaser who was dissatisfied with what he was thrown from the other side of the counter had no alternative but to pay the price demanded; for no new shop could be opened to break the monopoly. But when peace came, and it was possible to open co-operative stores, these stores began to appear everywhere. The war's educational effects were felt even by the older farming generation. The young men who had come into power politically during the revolutionary crisis were indoctrinated with co-operative ideals by reason of their advocacy by James Connolly and many leading thinkers of the Irish-Ireland movement; and, generally speaking, co-operation followed into each district in the wake of Sinn Féin. Enthusiasts pointed out that co-operation offered a means for the realisation of Sinn Féin's principal social (or interior) aims. It could be used to control distribution in Ireland, and thus boycott foreign

goods competing with Irish manufacture. It could be Gaelicised, taking economic activities out of the hands of the Anglicised, and restoring Irish to the position of a commercial medium. It could be made a bridge between creeds and classes, and so might prove the solution of differences in Ulster. It could further furnish the long-sought link between the peasant proprietor and the city worker, the former supplying, through his productive co-operative societies, food to the latter, organised in consumers' societies. The middleman would be cut out, and the huge profits hitherto absorbed by him would be divided, the farmer getting a better price for his produce and the consumer getting his food at a lower cost. Co-operation, finally, was praised as being harmonious to Irish ideals, and representing at the present day that distributive polity which we call the Gaelic State as opposed to Capitalism, the present form of the foreign and usurping feudalism.

Co-operation may be said to have been adopted as a national program. Dáil Eireann, as will be seen by the Democratic Program, gave its blessing to co-operative methods. Alarmed by the growth of socialistic propaganda, Cardinal Logue in his Lenten Pastoral, 1919, recommended co-operation as the safest solution of social and industrial problems. Most Rev. Dr. Fogarty, Bishop of Killaloe, recommended young Ireland to strive after "a mixed Co-operative Commonwealth." Thus the most conservative and the most advanced representatives of the Catholic Hierarchy concurred in advocating the co-

operative movement. The Labour Party repeatedly affirmed its aim of building up a Co-operative Commonwealth. No Unionist or Protestant body or organisation made similar declarations in favour of the movement, for no such body interested in constructive work exists; but co-operation progressed as vigorously in Protestant as in Catholic districts, and it may be said that no group in all the community of Ireland breaks the unanimity with which co-operation is supported, save those traders who conceive their private interests to be menaced. The importance of this wide adhesion to co-operation cannot be exaggerated. Economically, nationally, morally and culturally, it may in a sense be called the greatest fact in the Irish situation. The outer world is as yet scarce conscious of it, and only the far-seeing in Ireland are beginning to realise how vast a change, what strange possibilities are here enwombed in time.

§ 4.—*The Terror*

President de Valera escaped from Lincoln Prison in the spring of 1919, and shortly afterwards the Republican prisoners were released. A public session of Dáil Eireann held in April was attended by all the Republican "members of Parliament," or rather *teachtaí Dála Eireann*, save those who were now in America. Mr. Griffith, sitting on the Ministerial Bench, must, if his unemotional mind were capable of any personal sentiment at all, have been a proud man,

for he saw before him the realisation of that aim to which he had devoted twenty years of propaganda. He had been required to make heavy sacrifices, and for one long spell the scorn heaped upon the champion of a one-man cause. But the policy of Sinn Féin, mocked, deserted, and apparently put to death, had here received glorious resurrection. Nationalist Ireland had now boycotted Westminster and set up its own assembly. And not alone was the abstention feature of Sinn Féin policy here realised: the detailed practical program that the architect-mind had planned out was forthwith taken up for execution.

We have already seen that Sinn Féin in its theoretic days had a platform of fifteen planks, the object of which (if a very mixed metaphor may be excused) was to build up a free Irish State within the shell of the usurping State. It was proposed, amongst other things, to found an Irish consular service and mercantile marine, to set up a national system of insurance and banking, to execute a survey of Ireland, and to develop the Irish fisheries. Powers already held by the Irish people in local government institutions, etc., were to be turned to the fostering of native industry and its protection against foreign competition. This program was taken up by Dáil Eireann, and for its execution a national loan of £1,000,000 was floated. Sinn Féiners hold it significant that the Dáil's adoption of practical constructive policy for the development of Irish industry and prevention of emigration was immediately followed

by a Viceregal proclamation declaring it an illegal assembly, while papers publishing the prospectus of the loan were suppressed.

A severe military régime was launched. Ever since Easter, 1916, Ireland had been treated as a country under military law, repeated round-ups, deportations, long imprisonments without trial, suppressions of meetings, etc., having been kept up with scarcely a week's intermission. Statistics show that during the last year of the war *Belgium, under the German occupation, suffered fewer acts of coercion than Ireland, under British occupation, up to* 1919. But when peace came to Europe, something very different came to Ireland, and the years of war were but as the green leaf to the dry in comparison with the period since. When the Irish statistics for 1920 and 1921 are presented, the effect will be amazing. Thus, in the past two years, there have been some forty thousand raids on private houses.

Occasional shootings of policemen have been quoted as the excuse for the fierce Prussianism of 1919-21. We shall examine this argument later. But be it observed here that the fury of the new régime at first fell almost wholly on that section of the Republican population which was not, and could not, be associated with militant methods. The members of Dáil Eireann were pounced on and deported when they failed to get into safe hiding, and the world was presented with the spectacle of democratic England outlawing the representatives of a nation elected by democratic franchise. There could be no object in

this attack on a nation's representatives but the naked suppression of constructive work. This was further proved by the wholesale arrests of Republican members elected to Corporations and Urban Councils in January, 1920. The most glaring demonstration was the arrest of Alderman Thomas Kelly, T.D., elected Lord Mayor of Dublin. A gentle and lovable soul, well on in years, a favourite with all parties for his tender geniality, Alderman Tom was as incapable of an act of violence as was S. Francis of Assisi. To arrest and deport him was as brutal as similarly to treat an infant. He held himself to be "too old to go on the run" when it was known that the net was to be cast for a fresh haul for Wormwood Scrubbs; and so he, alone of those for whom warrants were out on this particular occasion, was seized. Torn from his home, taken away by night, denied trial, insulted by a sleek Chief Secretary in Parliament, the Lord Mayor of the Irish Capital sat in a convict cell. His highly-strung nature broke down under the trial, and after being released into a nursing home, he has never been able to receive that investiture as chief magistrate with which his fellow-citizens wished to testify their appreciation of his life's work for his city and its poor. . . .

While most of the arrested men were denied a trial, others were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment for speeches advocating the Dáil loan. Circulars were issued regarding subscriptions to the national funds, indicating how the money was to be applied to development of fisheries, upkeep of con-

sulates, expansion of industry, purchase of merchant ships, etc. To be found with such a document on your person, or even in your house, was to be subject to imprisonment. Twenty newspapers were suppressed for publishing the loan prospectus, though no warning had been given that the publishing of so peaceful an advertisement would be regarded as an offence. This was deliberate war on pacific activities. Similarly the Industrial Commission, which heard evidence on economic conditions from men of all parties, but had a well-known Sinn Féiner as its secretary, was suppressed on two occasions with the bayonet, and Irish newspapers were not allowed to print reports of its proceedings, *e.g.*, its investigations on the subject of cow-testing. Industrial exhibitions were suppressed by trench-helmeted soldiers. Mr. Erskine Childers describes these onslaughts on pacific endeavour as "the sabotage of a nation."

The Englishman who should have visited Dublin during the Terror must have wondered, not how his own nation, but how any race could be found to sanction and prosecute the midnight raids that for long went on night after night. When the Curfew Order had hurried the citizens home from theatres and social visits, out came the companies of fully-armed khaki warriors, accompanied by lumbering, house-shaking tanks, that moved about the dark city like some horrible creatures in a nightmare, such as Mr. Sime could picture. Certain private houses marked out for raids would be invested, front and rear, and then the doors

would be battered with rifle-butts until they were opened by inmates in night attire. The man-of-the-house would be seized by a couple of privates, and then the rooms occupied by the women and children would be burst into and ransacked—nominally in search of arms or seditious literature or fugitives. Sometimes an arrest would be made, and a Dáil prospectus or a portrait of P. H. Pearse seized. Sometimes the inhabitants were let off with the alarm, cruelty and indignity of the decency-despising search. A book by Mr. Erskine Childers may be consulted for accounts of women in confinement being brutally treated. The bedroom of the wife of a well-known Gaelic enthusiast and pacifist is searched six days after his baby's birth, "while a policeman stands at the foot of the bed trying to hide his face." In another case, the wife of a literary worker (who is "on the run") is

> alone in the house with three little children, roused by knocking on the night of February 27 last, runs down in her nightdress, asks permission to dress, and gets for answer, "Damn you, open, or we'll smash it in." In they rush, sweeping her aside, bayonets at the charge. An agonising time follows. One soldier is drunk and uses foul language. In spite of passionate supplications to be allowed to go to her children, she is kept apart under guard while their rooms are searched, and the search throughout is conducted with a roughness and insolence worthy of veritable Huns. Nothing found. No apology.

There were thousands of raids, suppressions, arrests, etc., before the I.R.A. military campaign be-

gan. From Easter Week, 1916, till early in 1919, the régime of repression raged against an unresisting people. It was only after Dáil Eireann had, in 1919, adopted the Volunteers as the Irish Republican Army and when demands to admit Ireland to the Peace Conference had failed, that Sinn Féin "cried Havoc and let slip the dogs of war." In 1918—before this came about—there were over 1,100 political arrests, and twelve Irishmen were shot or bayoneted or died in prison. Between January, 1919, and March, 1920, there were 22,279 military raids on homes, 2,332 political arrests, 151 deportations, and 429 suppressions of meetings and newspapers. This was all before the ever-to-be-notorious Black and Tan régime began.

We shall not dwell upon the horrors of the Terror with which it was expected that the nation's spirit would be swiftly broken. In the autumn of 1920 this awful phase began. At this stage the I.R.A. had, in its war on the Constabulary, cleared large areas for Republican law, and Irish courts were functioning. These were declared illegal, and it was made the duty of "the authorities" to break them up by force. Yet it was admitted by Unionists that these courts suppressed crime where they functioned, and effected amicable settlements where without them disputes were bitter and endless. It would be hard to convince an Englishman, living in a country where the courts are normally free from outrageous corruption or violence, how corrupt and violent have been the courts in which British law has been administered in Ireland. Perjury is taken for granted in this country.

It has been habitually practised by the police, whose evidence has always been taken against civilian evidence. The browbeating methods of the Irish Bar, described in every book of legal anecdotes, are a natural outcome of the circumstances. The litigant has entered the petty session or quarter session or assize court in anxious spirit of one who enters an arena. Force, not equity, has been expected there, and the mass of the people have shrunk from the law and its pomps as from naked violence. Hence that unwillingness to co-operate with the law for the detection of ordinary crime that has so often been noted in Ireland. The common citizen hesitated to give evidence to the bullying Constabulary man, who strides through the civilian populace like a Junker, his carbine under his cloak. Again and again murderers have escaped the law through the unwillingness of the people to give them over to the mercies of this intruding force. The poteen-maker, the drunkard, the thief, the rioter, have preyed on a public that hesitated to defend itself by appeals to a tribunal it detested. Moreover, the R.I.C. have shown a small zeal for the detection or prevention of crime; their taste has been for the prosecution of the political offender, and they have chiefly figured as evictors, spies, dragooners, and disturbers.

Few people, however, have a warmer love for impartial justice than the Irish people—that has been admitted by their bitterest traducers. In the days of the Pale, when English and Irish law were divided by a geographic line, it was noted that the planters

of the Pale preferred to seek justice in disputes in the courts set up by the O'Neills across the border; and thus Irish law again and again spread over the planted territory till it was driven out by fresh plantations. A similar phenomenon was witnessed in 1920, when Unionists and landlords gladly accepted the adjudication of the Republican courts. Cheerfully, without the old fear and shiftiness, the people went into the new courts; justice was there administered with that impartiality that native law alone can guarantee, and the decisions reached were respected as no other decrees ever were. To flout Republican law was to betray Ireland, was to oppose her liberties, and was to challenge the terrible anger of an indignant public. Wherever the courts arose—and most of all where the withdrawal of the R.I.C. left native law a free hand—orderliness appeared. Drunkenness, secret distilling and brawling vanished. Crimes of theft were detected and punished. Land disputes were settled—often in favour of that landlord class that was supposed to stand to lose all it possessed were British protection removed. Industrial differences were solved and stoppages averted.

The Black and Tan campaign—the loosing on Ireland of a reckless force under no discipline, urged on to violence by a *Weekly Summary* issued by Government, and defended from exposure by a Chief Secretary who was capable of denying anything whatsoever—brought the war to an issue. The civilian populace was attacked; its factories, creameries and

dwelling houses rased; women and children were not spared. At first the country was appalled, staggered, almost thrown into panic. But a rally took place as soon as Mr. Lloyd George hastily called for unconditional surrender. Then the people, in the spirit of their persecuted forefathers of penal days, prepared to endure to the end rather than surrender the right of self-determination. The I.R.A. grew daily stronger and more successful in its operations against the Auxiliary forces, and by midsummer, 1921, it was clear that the Terror had definitely failed to break the Irish nation's resolve, while it had caused the British flag to be hissed in Belgium and France, and British prestige to be ruined for ever in distant lands where it had stood high. British ambassadors poured in appeals to Whitehall for an end to the Irish scandal; the Colonial Premiers pointed out that the thing must end, or the British Commonwealth would sink like the Prussian before it; English Bishops suffered qualms of conscience—and Mr. Lloyd George sent his sensational offer to Mr. de Valera.

It would have been a glorious thing, and one perhaps in closer harmony with the high idealism of the national cause, if Sinn Féin had succeeded in pressing its cause without the shedding of a drop of blood; if Republicans, saying: "Our Kingdom is not of this world," had worked for freedom without resort to the carnal arm. But those who approved of General Smuts' shootings of German colonists, who approved of the bloody raids on the Soviet Republic, who failed to stop the slaying of 100,000 civilians in

Central Europe *after the Armistice had been declared,* and who see no wrong in the continuance in India of a force that shot down 2,000 innocent folk at Amritzar, have no right to condemn the Irish Republican Army for resorting to arms in the same cause as Kosciusko and Leonidas. No nation in all the world has yet taken its stand on the Sermon on the Mount, and Ireland cannot be singled out for denunciation because her people are men like other men. On the other hand, the atrocities used against the Irish civil population could be defended nowhere but in the English Houses of Parliament. Civilisation must learn that it has no future if an imperialism that is based on the slaying of idealists like Terence MacSwiney, on the burning of cities, on outrage, on Amritzars, continues to exist.

CHAPTER V

THE SINN FEIN CONSTITUTION

. . . Is not this plain and manifest to the thought? Can you think at all and not pronounce heartily that to labour in knowledge is to build up Jerusalem, and to despise knowledge is to despise Jerusalem and her builders? —BLAKE.

§ I.—*International Relations*

JOHN MITCHEL, though he declared that had he the fires of hell in his hand, he would dash them in the face of the British Empire, was also at pains to make it clear that his hate was not of English men and women, but of the English Thing in Ireland. Thomas Davis, P. H. Pearse, and other of the most representative separatists, have emphasised the same doctrine. We strive not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers—dæmons, ideas, evil inspirations that make flesh and blood their instrument. The raids and outrages which have been written of in the last chapter are carried out by well-meaning boys from decent homes in England: the

parents of these tools of conscience-less empire are respectable citizens living honestly according to their lights. The individual, if he doffed his khaki and mixed with the people he is used to oppress, would hail and be hailed as a good fellow, and would have as much in common with them as is usual among men of good-will. The horrible thing is, that the mysterious eidolon or spiritual force behind a nation can make individuals commit acts utterly foreign to their nature. The English boy fresh from school will charge into a private house and terrorise children with naked weapons when the regimental spirit bids him, and the citizen at home, returning from church service, will splutter with anger against the Irish people at the bidding of a controlled paper, crying out for arms and yet more arms against the audacious rebels. It is established as a psychological fact that "national character" as expressed in typical representatives of a nation (*e.g.*, the stolid German, the mercurial Frenchman) is totally different from national character as expressed in the conduct of the nation as a group or collective mind. The group has characteristics of its own that are not those of its typical individuals, a fact that has led to mystic speculations on the existence of the "unconscious soul" behind a people. Ireland's quarrel is with the Impersonal, impalpable Thing which we call the British Empire: not with English individuals.

In point of fact, Englishmen are as popular in Ireland as Irishmen in England. The characteristics of the two races are so different as to invest their

contact with rare piquancy, and the Briton, with his *bonhomie* and technical expertness, is ever a welcome visitor so long as the racial issue is kept in abeyance and he abstains from those expressions of arrogance which would make the citizen of an intruding power intolerable under any circumstances. In the future, Irishmen and Englishmen, meeting on equal terms, will almost certainly become cordial comrades. So when Irishmen say they wish for the dissolution of the British Empire, they do not mean that they wish any single life to be lost or saddened or impoverished. The Empire might end, yet the argosies that sweep down to England's ports need not be lessened, nor the happiness and legitimate prosperity of England's people affected. Rather, Irishmen hold, would the people of England enjoy undreamt-of wealth as, in a freed world, production everywhere, for use, not profit, sprang ahead with an energy hitherto unknown, and trade between the nations became, not the tool of the few, but the busy instrument of humanity's enrichment. Nor must it be thought that Irishmen are impervious to the splendour of material achievement. Pearse, the Messiah of Republicanism, summed up our attitude in one of his earliest essays :

> It is no doubt a glorious thing to rule over many subject peoples, to dictate laws to far-off countries, to receive every day cargoes of rich merchandise from every clime beneath the sun; but if to do these things we must become a soulless, unintellectual, Godless race—and it seems that one is the natural and necessary consequence

> of the other—then let us have none of them. Do the millions that make up the population of modern nations—the millions that toil and sweat from year's end to year's end in the factories and mines of England, the Continent, the United States, live the life intended for man . . . ?
>
> What are the hero-memories of the past to them? Are they one whit better because great men have lived and wrought and died? Were the destiny of the Gael no higher than theirs, better for him would it have been, had he disappeared from the earth centuries ago!

Englishmen take the Empire for granted. They must put themselves in the position of those who do *not* if they wish to understand the Irish people, or any of the subject peoples within the "Commonwealth." The Englishman commonly thinks of India as a place where his cousin has a well-paid job, and South Africa as a place where his money is invested. But India, Egypt, Burma, Ireland, are more than places on the map: they are communities with memories and aspirations. English consciousness is but a small fraction of the total consciousness of the peoples within the Empire, and what bond have these people but the bond of their subjection—the privilege of paying tribute to a common capitalist master? But that each labours to enrich a London investor, the Indian, the Boer, the Fellah, the French Canadian, the Gael, have no more in common with one another than they have with the Yankee, the Russian, the Chinaman, or the Scandinavian. Indeed, many bonds cut across the borders of the Empire. The Canadian has

affinity with the Yankee; the Moslem Indian with the Turk, the French speaker of Quebec with France, and the Catholic Irishman with Europe. The point need not be laboured: the candid and intelligent Englishman who looks at the map and reads Mr. Brailsford's *War of Steel and Gold* will admit that the British Empire is a commercial organism, like an oil trust, having no spiritual homogeneity, as of religion, law, race, language, or manners. It must stand or fall with Materialism and Imperialism. But the idealist, the socialist, the Christian must agree that the proper commonwealth in which the mixed races of the Empire should seek a place, is the commonwealth of a reconciled humanity. Ireland visualises a world-community of this kind. This was the ideal of antiquity; it was the aim of the medieval Church; it was departed from only when the disruptive forces which evolved the recent Great War entered the world. Just as an institution like the British Empire, setting up artificial cleavages against humanity would be impossible in the ages of Catholic Christendom's supremacy, so it will prove impossible in the coming days of a new world solidarity towards which Ireland looks. There are Socialists and Catholics in England who accept the continued existence of the Empire, and Liberals, self-contradicting, all do so; they are as inconsistent as if they accepted the continued reign of violence or feudalism.

Irish Republicans then are Internationalists. They are not cosmopolitans. They believe in a

community of nations, not in the blending of all nations into one. They hold that all nations have equal rights, the small with the great. The freer Ireland is from England, the more benevolent will be her inclinations towards her neighbour. Just as national aggression creates racial hostility and fosters evil passions, so imperialism creates group antagonism. The mercantilist theory is essentially the philosophy of national antagonism, and its dominance in Ireland, as in early nineteenth century Germany, is directly due to British aggression. A Home Rule Ireland would infallibly be a Protectionist Ireland. If control of Customs and Excise were withheld, there would be a struggle for its attainment. Were it granted, it would be exercised towards the expansion of the Irish state on the model of Britain and in antagonism towards Britain. A Home Rule, or Dominion Home Rule Ireland, would be bourgeois and Green-Flag-jingoistic. Only on a basis of complete freedom could the Irish mind find true expression. The free Republic would tend, not towards commercialism, but towards democratic co-operation, and as international attitudes are conditioned by internal politics, she would seek economic relations with other states on a basis of barter rather than competition, and political relations on the basis of world-fraternity instead of sectional alliance.

Ireland's attitude is still that expressed by the United Irishmen in 1792, when, corresponding with English Republicans, they said: "As to any union

between the two islands, believe us when we assert that our union rests upon our mutual independence. We shall love each other if we be left to ourselves. It is the union of mind which ought to bind these nations together."

§ 2.—*The Substitute for Parliament*

No written Constitution of the Irish Republic has been published. In dealing with the probable constitution of the future Ireland, therefore, it is impossible to set down more than a conjectural outline. Materials of this are to be drawn from (1) the tendencies evident in the workings of the suppressed Dáil, and (2) the writings of Irish-Ireland propagandists.

Dáil Eireann was returned on a territorial and parliamentary electoral system: its mandate was for the assertion of Ireland's claim to independence. The General Elections of 1918 and 1921 were regarded as a plebiscite on the issue of Self-Determination, and no other question was considered by the voter as he made his mark for or against the Republican candidate. So clearly were all other considerations submerged, that Labour, after a laborious and effective canvass in 1918, withdrew its candidates and prevented an obscuring of the issue. Hence it is held by some that the Dáil has no mandate either to draw up an Irish Constitution or to deal with in-

ternal issues. Theoretically, these objectors are right. Practically, they are wrong. All parliaments—such is parliamentary democracy—deal with, and have to deal with, issues that are never put before the electorate. This being the custom, the electorate shows no resentment, save when parliament presumes too far. In Ireland, thanks to the popularity of the Dáil and its purity of action, there has as yet been no sign of disagreement with the measures which it has seen fit to adopt.

That parliamentary government, as we have known it, is played out, seems to be agreed by all advanced political thinkers. The multitude of issues, entangled and confused, which are involved when a party goes to a country on a catchcry, the impossibility of checking a party's action in one issue save by overthrowing its whole program, the helplessness of the individual in the great mass action of elections: these have convinced many that a more sensitive instrument than the electoral constituency is needed to effect the people's control of the legislature. Hence the Soviet movement in Russia, the Councils' Revolt in Germany and the advocacy of vocational representation by Italian Catholic reformers. Instead of voting as at present in an artificial group, which has no continuing life of its own, the individual is to make his wishes felt, under the new system, by voting in some existing, natural group—an industrial union or a co-operative society in which he can be in constant touch with his representative. Occupational association is regarded as

the truest medium of group opinion. Has Sinn Féin any affinity with the new conception, or does the Dáil, emboldened by its present popularity, purpose to continue the administration of Ireland on the English parliamentary model?

Whatever the ultimate aims of Irish-Ireland idealists, it must be recognised that in a revolutionary and transitional stage, paternalism or centralised control is necessary. So backward and disorganised a country as Ireland requires an iron Bismarckian phase. Sinn Féin is likely to adopt something of a state-socialistic policy for a time. Irish liberty is revolutionary in that it requires new men, new methods, a clean sweep and a fresh start. But it has a conservative or traditional element in it that other nations rarely associate with revolution. And so we have had for three years the curious situation of a government with conservative objects working in a revolutionary atmosphere and by revolutionary methods. Lenin finds state socialism necessary in the revolutionary stage, though it is his ultimate aim to destroy the state. Russia is now governed by centralised and iron-handed authority. Revolutionary conditions will produce the same phenomenon in Ireland. At the present stage, socialists, individualists, devolutionists, distributivists—all, have to recognise the ascendancy of state or community interest. Much is being done that individuals are inclined to rebel against. Certain movements, societies, groups, unions, etc., find their activities curbed. But this institutes a test of

character. The ability or otherwise to subdue private ends to national needs reveals the fittingness of men for authority and office hereafter. Not political needs alone, but the very constitution of human nature, requires discipline and orderliness as a condition of liberty, and, according as it learns to produce and in turn obey authority, will the nation be safe when freedom is established.

Centralisation is not the Dáil's permanent policy, and it has initiated a system by which its various works would stand by themselves if the central authority were smitten out of existence. Assume, for instance, that it is dealing with the development of fisheries in a certain area. A loan will be required for the provision of improved boats, nets, tackle, etc. The fishermen will be obliged to form themselves into a co-operative society, and to subscribe a certain proportion of the total funds required, so that they are all involved in the responsibility undertaken. Only when every detail of the society's arrangements has satisfied the Ministry of Fisheries will the loan be granted and the money in question placed to the society's credit. The Ministry still has a financial hold of the society, so much so, in fact, that we have all the outlines of state ownership at this stage: but the society stands on its own feet, and by good work can cancel the loan by early repayments. It will be seen, then, that the Dáil is firm with its children only that it may be able to make them their own masters.

State-socialism, which aims at cancelling itself by

creating local organisms, may be accepted as a wise policy for the initiation of industries, but not for their control and co-ordination. Does Republican Ireland aim at Kropotkin's anarchism? No, but the intention is that co-operative societies should be co-ordinated through their own federations; that cultural enterprises (such as Gaelic colleges) should be left to their own unions; that agriculture should be looked after by its own department or institution. The Dáil, it seems, looks to the activities which its ministries stimulate, to build up their own national executives, the relation of which to the national legislature cannot be immediately defined, but may be advisory or consultative. The Dáil has a ministry concerned with the revival of the Irish language. What more natural than that the machinery of the Gaelic League, developed for over a quarter of a century, should become the national executive entrusted with this work, holding its authority from the Dáil, and working, through the minister, in collaboration with its other departments? The reader will be forcibly reminded of Messrs. Orage and Hobson's theories of Guild organisation. But this conception has been longer brewing in Ireland than the Guild propaganda has been known in England. The annual *Ardfheis*, or Gaelic League council, attended by representatives elected from the branches of Ireland and overseas Irish centres, has habitually been described in the Press reports as "The Gaelic Parliament." [One meaning of the word *feis* is parliament, so that this description is

invited by the title.] The *Ardfheis* has planned each year's program of work, elected its executive [the *Coiste Gnotha,* or Business Committee], voted funds, etc., etc., exactly as a national guild or government department would do. Similarly, the meetings of the Council of Agriculture (a purely advisory body) have annually been described as "The Farmers' Parliament." The Trades Union Congress has been named "the Parliament of Labour." The Maynooth Conferences of the Hierarchy must have tempted the sub-editors to set up the headline of "The Parliament of the Church."

To Irish instinct, it seems right that these gatherings of experts in the various phases of national life should all be endowed with executive authority, as is already the Gaelic League in its particular sphere. It must be agreed that wise judgments on agricultural questions are to be sought, not among patriotic people elected on a political ticket, but in those assemblies specifically concerned with the farmers' industry in which men who have made their mark as agricultural experts come to the front by merit and the recognition of fellow-farmers. If a national rule is to be adopted on any agricultural question, is it reasonable that the farmers' council should have to run after politicians' coat-tails or intrigue for the attention of a busy senate? Clearly the council should have power to take whatever action its expert judgment dictates. But to prevent its infringing the interests of other bodies, it must be kept in check

by requiring the sanction of a minister of agriculture to its decrees. The minister's business is to see that no objection will be raised from other quarters to the agricultural executive's action, and this he will do by consultation, if necessary, with the ministers representing other interests. If a deadlock occurs, by the objection of one minister to the proposed action submitted by another, then, and not before, general national authority must be called upon for its decision.

We see, then, adumbrated a group of self-governing colleges linked together by ministers who meet together in the ministry. *Aireacht* is the word adopted for "ministry" by the Dáil. It is the exact equivalent of *curia,* and is used in old Irish legal documents for the "court of assembly," which was a feature of the antique Gaelic constitution.* This plan is hinted at by Mr. Darrell Figgis in his book, *The Gaelic State,* which attempts to trace the influence of Gaelic tradition in present-day evolution, and similar proposals are set forth by Mr. Russell (Æ) in *The National Being*—the Bible of Irish Co-operators.† It cannot be said that such a constitution is officially envisioned by Sinn Féin. But it *can* be said that these are the lines on which those who *have* expressed views on the subject are agreed.

* See MacNeill, *Phases of Irish History,* p. 320.

† See Æ.'s *The National Being,* Chapter XIV. Perhaps I may also refer the reader to my *Towards the Republic,* Chap. VII.

When a constitution is definitely developed, the designers must be influenced by experience, experiment, mass-tendencies and the recommendations of reputed thinkers, and there will be every likelihood of their following the scheme here referred to. We may then expect an independent College of Agriculture, administering that industry, evolved from the Department of Agriculture and the Councils of Agriculture; a College of Education formed by the teachers' unions and learned societies; a college controlling distribution evolved from the Federation of Co-operative Societies; a College protecting the workers formed from the Trade Union Congress and so on. In a Council of the Colleges the men who have won their way in the great national services will meet. The best farmers, the shrewdest educationalists, the ablest industrial captains, the eminent and learned men of the Church, will come together and take counsel—and when the Chamber of Colleges is not in session, will be linked together and their separate bodies co-ordinated by the ministry. The Council will have small coercive powers, its business being to advise rather than to compel the Colleges. Coercive authority will rest in another chamber—to wit, the Dáil.

This scheme is not a fantasy of Irish imagination. It is but a local expression of a universal tendency. Mr. George Young,* an able diplomatic and political writer, traces a similar evolution in Germany.

* *The New Germany* [London, 1920], p. 197.

"The Councils," he writes, referring to the German parallel of Russian Soviets and English Guilds, "are as essential to Germany to-day as the Commons were to us a century ago. . . . The function of the territorially elected Parliament will, in Germany, and probably everywhere, become more and more that of an Upper House; while the industrially elected Congress will be the creative and constructive institution." Could any words more clearly summarise the ideals we have outlined? And nothing is surer than that, apart from the advice of the intelligentsia, Dáil Eireann will tend to entrust administration to authorised professional bodies like the Gaelic League, the Irish Agricultural Wholesale Society, the General Council of County Councils, the Council of Agriculture (or the Department, once captured), the Trades Congress, the Teachers' Organisation (subject to combination with representatives of learned bodies, clerical managers, etc.), and so on.

In this way, the country will be secured the services in a governmental capacity, of those very men that the parliamentary system excludes from office. How often do we hear it said that "such-and-sùch a man is of the sort we want to govern us," but that "his lack of public popularity bars him out." We see men like Mr. Wibberley, of continuous-cropping fame, a pioneer in reformed agriculture and a prophet of beautiful rural life; like Mr. Russell, seer and creator, inspirer of a host of co-operative workers who are digging the foundations of the

Commonwealth that he envisions; "Paddy the Cope," a captain of democratic industry who has shown the way to decentralise and civilise industrialism; Andrew E. Malone, Alfred Rahilly, and many others: these men, in their own circles, are respected as leaders and achievers—in an occupational election they would top the poll—but not one of them could carry a territorial constituency unless a political machine were to rule out popular competitors. Each of them could command throughout Ireland tens of thousands of suffrages from men acquainted with their splendid and undemonstrative work, but in a constituency their supporters would be but a minority, while a local politician, unknown outside the county, would command an overwhelming support. By giving administration over to the organisations in which practical workers have already won their way, the constitution will ensure that administration will automatically rest with men of merit. This is the real disappearance of the bourgeois state felt after by men like Lenin. It is genuine self-government, genuine *democracy* in the original meaning of the word. The state in the past has been a parasite of the community: an external authority, created and maintained by the antagonism of classes. When class conflict passes, the state passes with it, according to Marxian belief. In Ireland, we expect to see the external or central state dissolved, absorbed and assimilated, as the powers engrossed by the parliamentary form of government are assumed by the natural institutions

of society. Administration under the new order will be the natural, reflex action of the healthy organism, not the artificial act of an ascendancy riding that organism.

The Irish ideal, to be understood, must not be taken as Kropotkinesque anarchism, however. While the disappearance of the parliamentary system of government is candidly looked forward to, this is not held to imply the abolition of the state. The Dáil holds centralised powers to-day, like the Bolshevik government, which it is expected to dispose of as the revolutionary phase passes. But whereas the Bolshevik expects the distributed guilds or soviets to eat up the whole state, in Ireland we conceive that central authority cannot and should not be dispensed with. Apart from the fact that the circumstances which make centralisation of power necessary at present are unlikely ever wholly to depart, we believe that the state has an intrinsic and permanent function to fulfil. Although the Dáil will *make the people their own executive,* it will not abdicate its own regnant position. As a second chamber, it will have power of veto over the acts of the Colleges. Its position will be substantially that of the ancient *Ard-Rí,* or High King. In the Dáil will sit the good, the wise and the brave—men chosen, not for their expertness in economic matters, not for their learning or technical skill, but for character for kingliness. Here we shall see a true Republicanism, in the giving of authority to the

well-loved and respected, councillors or elders of the nation taking the place of the ideal King whom practice could never find. This conception is hinted at by Mr. Figgis, who writes:

> . . . Just as in the old [Gaelic] State, each council held authority in its own concerns, leaving to the monarch the co-ordination of the whole, so the modern councils would each rule their own affairs, subject to the control of the Assembly of the Nation. There would thus be two kinds of representation gathered together. There would be the direct representation of the Nation, and there would be the representation of the special interests, the union and pattern of which create the national life. Both would meet in the Government.

This quotation is taken from a book written long before Dáil Eireann came into existence, and no doubt Mr. Figgis would now substitute the name of the Dáil for "the assembly of the Nation." Touching his remark that both kinds of representation would meet in the government, it would be interesting to hear his opinion as to how this would be effected. Are we to suppose that the various Colleges would sit with the Dáil as a rule, or would the Dáil meet the Council of Colleges when disagreements arose, and its ministers failed to harmonise conflicting claims between sections? Would the Dáil, now that administration is handed over to the Colleges, sit in frequent session like a Parliament, or would it dispense with long debates, and meet only at long intervals, like the ancient Triennial Feis of Tara, to revise the constitution, sanction

changes, etc.? Guild Socialists like to remind us that, in medieval times, parliamentary legislation was inconceivable. The "making of laws," save in critical circumstances, was unknown, and Parliament had nothing to do with it. The people made their own rules, through their guilds, and expected neither King nor Parliament to interfere. So, too, Guild-Socialists tell us, under the new conditions there will be no need for eternal making of laws, for the machine of administration will run itself. If we are to conceive the Colleges working harmoniously in the control of different phases of national life, it would indeed appear that there will be little left for the Dáil to do. All are agreed that it is unnatural for a Parliament to concern itself, as it must do under the modern régime, with problems of wages, hours, cattle restrictions, etc., that are the affair of experts. We postulate that the Dáil is not to be a Parliament of the old model. It holds the place of a King: it is the democratic or Republican substitute. A King is not concerned with technical affairs. Those he leaves to his stewards, his captains, his trained administrators. We anticipate, then, that the Dáil will assemble only at intervals, for the periodic exercise of national sovereignty. This, in fact, is a tendency already traceable. The ministry, as we have seen, has thus far acted with excusable arrogation of authority. It has performed duties that should be remitted to the executive machine. But the Dáil, as a whole, has been summoned only at intervals, not to debate and wrangle over the expert

work in hand, but to consider big questions of policy and authorise important national acts like the appointment of ambassadors and consuls, the instruction of the President in his American mission, the allocation of funds, the creation of ministries, etc. Necessarily, our conjectures as to the out-working of the constitution must be vague, for post-revolutionary conditions will bring their own changes, and we cannot, in any case, judge how long even a certain course of evolution will take to develop itself.

It would appear from what has been said that the territorial basis of election to the Dáil is regarded as proper and permanent. It will certainly stand for many years, because although the present constituencies are but rough-and-ready areas, there is no marked dissatisfaction with them evident. Counsels of perfection dictate, of course, that territorial divisions in Ireland should follow natural lines, laid down by geography and history. The old Irish stateships (or "kingdoms"), the outlines of which are preserved in the modern dioceses, are more natural units than the counties which are the artificial product of English law. But sentiment would be the principal motive for altering the electoral map at present—altering the boundaries of the present Co. Donegal to the old ones of Tirconaill, say, and taking Bundoran into a new constituency of Brefní O'Reilly. On the other hand, if our forward-looking thinkers are right, the future is to see a revival of the ancient stateships, as Co-operation

forms agricultural Ireland into communes on the very sites of the antique kingdoms. If this should come to pass—and in our next chapter we shall examine the possibility—then real communities will rise which will become the obvious basis for the election of *teachtaí* to the national assembly.

Now this suggests profoundly interesting possibilities. The objection to a geographical constituency under present conditions is that it is a purely accidental or fortuitous grouping of individuals. Assume, however, that the electors in a certain area are linked together economically by membership of a single distributive institution, which also exercises industrial and social functions. Then we have a real, not a factitious, community. But further, it is no longer necessary to hold an election to discover the most popular and trusted public man. Organically he comes to the top as president of the commune. Here is the very man for the National Assembly! Observe, again, that he holds his presidency just so long as he gives local satisfaction and no longer. If at the Annual General Meeting of the Commune—or at a Special General Meeting called by a certain number of the members—his conduct either locally or in the National Assembly is condemned, then he is immediately replaced by a vote of the delegates present. As he holds office, not under an artificial constituency, but under a living operative association, he is directly and continuously controlled by the electorate. Hence the need for elections to the

National Assembly vanishes. Presidents of the local communes are *ex-officio* the members of the Assembly. A plan like this removes the anomalies of a Member of Parliament's position to-day. Under the modern English system, an M.P. visits his constituency only when he is "nursing" it: once elected, he acts in Parliament practically without reference to his constituents. In the constituency a hundred and one officials are of more import than he, and nothing of the dignity of government accompanies him. When we look at representative institutions from a detached point of view, we marvel at the want of rapport between parliament and its electors, and can explain it only by noting that the men who are supposed to represent certain districts are given no specific duties or privileges in respect of those districts. In ancient times the national council was formed of the princes or governors holding office and power locally: and the well-known evolutionary rule that the final scientific form resembles the primitive may find expression in the members of a Republican Assembly being drawn from the local presidents or chairmen who represent the princes of old.

We look forward, then, to the ultimate disappearance of the present electoral system. This presupposes a disappearance of the *party* system. The latter is the inseparable companion of parliamentarianism, and might well die out as parliament was transformed (or done away with) by the relegation of administration to practical institutions like

the Colleges. If administration ceased to be the prize and plaything of party-rivalry, the need for periodic elections would disappear. This would make for purity in public service by relieving statesmen from the need to "play to the gallery." Immeasurably greater stability would mark political life, and as efficiency would be the test by which administrators were selected in the Colleges, so character would be the test by which statesmen were selected for promotion to the Assembly and continuance there. In each case, so long as a man proved worthy, he would not be subject (as under the electoral system) to arbitrary withdrawal.

It is to be noted that two types of men are here postulated. We have seen the technical expert to whom it is so important to trust administration, but who cannot get to the front under the parliamentary system because he is no politician. On the other hand, there is a need for the type of mind which is Catholic rather than particularist, synthetic rather than expert. The practical men, though so valuable to the nation, are not quite so valuable as the Pearses and Griffiths. The broad, observant, organising, public mind is needed in your national assembly, and at the head of your local communes. In the local councils, co-operative societies, etc., we elect as chairman, not the technical expert who will have to do the practical work, and who rightly asks for a free hand in doing it, but the well-respected public man of known high character, breadth of views, and power to rule. The

chairman's duty is not to understand the details of a borough surveyor's trade or a co-operative store-manager's technique. His part is to rule, modulate, harmonise or inspire. His ideal type is King Arthur. Nationally, the Assembly is the embodiment of Patriotism. It is for patriotism to harmonise competing interests and to keep the ideal of the nation, the hopes of the unborn, before the eyes of all. Patriotism then summarises the qualifications looked for in the Teachta Dála Eireann. The clumsy machinery of the present electoral system might hardly be expected to select the right men with infallibility, but the ordeals of recent years have provided a sound test. The present teachtaí proved themselves in the hard times of Easter Week and after; while since the Election they have all gone practically with their lives in their hands. If the Dáil has proved popular the explanation is that it is made up of men inspired by high ideals and the spirit of sacrifice.

CHAPTER VI

GAELIC SOCIAL IDEALS

O God of Ages help us
Such citizens to be,
That children's chi'dren here shall sing
The songs of liberty.

§ 1.—*Rural Industrialism*

The social element in the neo-Sinn-Féin movement is recognised by all, though it is not always understood. At the time of the Insurrection, writers laid stress on the fact that many of the insurgents in Dublin came from the unhappy slums: the Rising was described as a boiling over of social misery. In this there was only a half-truth. Few, if any, of those who fought did so in the hope of immediately bettering themselves. The Rising was no mere outburst of sans-culottisme. But the social degradation, the economic ugliness disfiguring the beloved land and oppressing the people, were powerful elements in impelling the appeal to arms. "All things unlovely and

broken; all things worn out and old," embittered the revolutionary's heart, and his mood was that of the poet:

> The wrong of unshapely things is a wrong too great to be told,
> I hunger to build them anew. . . .

And we have seen that the great figures of the Rising, Pearse and Connolly, had planned out the re-building before they set their hands to the destruction. Social idealism is latent in all patriotism, and it was driven to expression in Ireland by the social grievances of the national mass. The freedom and happiness of a nation are inseparable from the freedom and happiness of its citizens as individuals, and no idealist could patiently contemplate the idea of an Ireland separated from England, but still inhabited by masses whose lives were made squalid by poverty and narrow by ugly environment and slavish conditions of employment. It was intolerable that men loving Ireland should be chained by the iron law of sweating to dingy city offices, seeing no more of their Ireland than the mountains that beckon over the roofs to the worker in the Dublin streets. How many Dubliners have ever seen the crystal Shannon or the sun setting over gold Lough Derg among the curving hills of Clare? How many have tasted the Atlantic wind or walked knee-deep in the purple heather of Donegal? How many have heard the Gaelic chaffering in a Western market town? The pictures of Irish life presented in the Abbey Theatre drama are to the wage-slave like pictures from Bul-

garia or far Cathay for strangeness. Freedom that did not enrich the life of every Irishman in knowledge of and communion with Mother Eire would be no freedom.

Every Irish social thinker envisages the Gaelic polity as a rural polity. The great crowded industrial cities of Britain or America are regarded in Ireland generally as horrible perversions of the natural order. Partly, of course, the Irish objection of urban concentration is factitious; but when all allowances are made, it is deep-rooted in the Irish mind. The average Irishman is not much attracted to the town. He loves rural sports and rural manners. Given the choice between ownership of a city business and a farm of equal capital value, he would, generally, decide for the farm. He cannot in the least understand that prejudice against the agricultural industry which prevails in England. It should not be supposed, however, that all this is a mark of the temperamental difference between the two nations. Nothing of the sort! The English love of cities and fear of the country are unnatural: the results of unfortunate history. Blighted by feudalism, English rural life has been made dull. Want of spiritual vivacity has killed the intellectual life enjoyed by the masses of Merrie England in earlier days. Personal freedom and decent pay were offered the son of the land who chose to turn his back on the farm life of his sires, the dictatorship of the squire and parson, and the arid atmosphere described in *A Shropshire Lad*. Had rural life been brightened by an undisturbed folk-

culture, had the farmer been a proprietor instead of a tenant, then the lure of the cities would not have prevailed against the magnetism of the country. If these views be correct, then where rural life continues unspoilt by the draining away of ambition and culture, it should be possible to build up rural industries and employ the constructive talent of the people without segregating the craftsmen into cities. Whether or not the rule applies to all countries—as we here suggest—it certainly holds good in Ireland.

The ideal of a rural polity for Ireland is not based, then, on any supposed peculiarity of the Irish temperament. Nor is it based on the popular belief that Ireland is by nature restricted from becoming an industrial country. Agriculture, we are often told, must always be Ireland's chief industry, and the most amiable of our English friends rarely envisions a higher economic destiny for her than to be England's farmyard. It has been Mr. Griffith's principal work in economic propaganda to destroy this conception of Irish resources. He has taught us that under the mercantile philosophy it is ever the policy of imperialist States to keep their subject States or possible rivals as far as possible restricted to the agricultural stage of development. In accordance with this rule, Britain has not merely checked industrial development in Ireland by gripping the Irish railways, buying up Irish lines of ships, permeating the Irish banks, and intimidating Irish capital, but by lowering Irishmen's belief in their own country, using the schools as her means to deceive them as to Ire-

land's natural resources. The presently proceeding Survey of Ireland will probably amaze the world in its revelations as to Ireland's natural wealth. In two particulars—the most important of all in respect to the issue of industrial development—the facts have been long concealed or perverted—viz., mineral and power resources. The mineral wealth of Ireland is more varied and extensive than is supposed; while in point of power she is far from being a poor country.

In S.-E. Ireland there are materials for one of the biggest pottery centres of Europe. The Irish coal mines are strangled by railway difficulties that any but a hostile Government would sweep away in a flash: their potential output is estimated at twenty times their present output. In the peat-bogs Ireland possesses enormous stores of power, while in "White Power," the power of the future, she is opulent. The whole country could be lit by the water-power of the Shannon. Bacon's outburst on the plunderability of Ireland reads with interest still:

> For this Ireland . . . is endowed with so many dowries of nature (considering the Fruitfulness of the Soil, the Ports, the Rivers, the Fisheries, the Quarries, the Wools and other Materials, and specially, the Race and Generation of Men, valiant, hard and active) as it is not easy, no not upon the Continent, to find such Confluence of Commodities, if the Hand of Man did join with the Hand of Nature.

§ 2.—*Ireland's Answer to Marx*

Are we to take it that Ireland must go through the capitalist phase of evolution if her potentialities are

to be realised? Must she become a field for profit-seeking financiers and *entrepreneurs*? The Marxian (as we know him) answers yes. But Irish-Ireland pits its philosophy against this opinion. The disciples out-Marx Marx. The master traced in society a course of development from primitive communism through feudalism and capitalism to definitive scientific communism. But, unlike his followers, he did not assert that this course is universally followed. He held that Russia could escape the vicissitudes of capitalist organisation, and both he and Engels condemned those Russian socialists, like Struve, who surveyed the encroachments of capitalism with equanimity. Writing an introduction to the Russian translation of the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels together pleaded for the preservation of primitive communistic life in Russia, holding that the *mir* (or Russian village commune) might become the starting-point of the new order—provided, however, that the revolution developed simultaneously in the capitalist West. In 1892 Engels deplored a tendency to forsake these principles, and wrote: "I am afraid . . . that in the future we shall have to do with a capitalistic Russia. If so, a splendid chance will unquestionably have been lost."

Irish idealists feel for their country the hopes that Marx felt for Russia, and the social policy of Irish-Irelanders is to be considered in this light. The communal instinct is strong in Ireland, partly through national tradition, partly, perhaps, through religion, and partly through the absence of capitalistic develop-

ment. Feudalism never was adopted by the nation: introduced as the weapon of foreign ascendancy, it was always resented and rebelled against. The communal instinct finds its principal expression in fervent patriotism, in enthusiasm for leagues, associations and societies, and—be it allowed—in a regrettable clannishness and parochialism in the more isolated districts. The idealist believes that the communal instinct, tradition and customs can be given a satisfying and desirable form of expression in the establishment of democratic industry, and the medium relied on is the co-operative movement. Further, it is believed that Ireland has an historic mission to fulfil in hammering out, through co-operation, a social order that shall harmonise the communal or social spirit with the rights of individuals and the preservation of private property.

To the determinist, the hope to avoid that capitalist phase which has been entered by all Western Europe may seem Utopian. Yet nature's work is symmetrical and beautiful, and it is hard to recognise nature in ugly rural concentrations. Is nature's economy obeyed or violated in the system of aggregating immense masses at certain centres dependent for such vital daily necessities as milk on remote and depopulated districts? Is the well-known wastage of human material that urban life involves congenial to nature? Is it natural to debauch the race with feverish and restless living just where intellect and potentiality are gathered, while leaving the healthy countryside to be inhabited by stagnant humanity? Does not the sense

of the fitting dictate that even distribution of population, avoiding overcrowding and transit complications, and preserving intellectual development in the midst of healthy rural life that promises it survival, is the truly natural course? Granted that the mistake of capitalism was necessary to teach humanity wisdom, are those nations which escaped capitalism to be driven along the cruel path of experience instead of being allowed to profit by example? Granting the evolutionary theory of history, may not capitalism be regarded as one of those blind alleys in which species unfit for survival perish, and which are henceforth avoided by healthier organisms?

But in Ireland we do not unreservedly accept evolution. We trace cause and effect in history, but we see the trend of events acted on by will, faith, reason, as well as by immanent impulses. To us the capitalist order is not a mere result of mechanical or naturalistic evolution. We hold it to be unnatural, like the drink curse and many another evil that afflicts fallen humanity, and we believe it to be the outcome of a false philosophy adopted at the date of the Reformation. We repudiate belief in "spiral progresses" and "the inevitable victory of the proletariat." Men, we think, can and do go astray on wrong roads unnecessarily, delaying or reversing true progress, that can only be enjoyed by adhering to the dictates of nature and religion. This is our great divergence from Marxian doctrine. We agree with Mr. A. J. Penty* in his vigorous chapter which

* *A Guildsman's Interpretation of History* (1920).

opens: "It is a commonplace of modern thought to say that 'we cannot put the clock back.' But if recorded history has any one single lesson to teach us more than another, it is precisely . . . that we *can*." In short, our philosophy is the Catholic.

§ 3.—*Communes in Embryo*

We envisage as our aim a rural polity based on distributed property, organised co-operatively. This is actually being approached through that remarkable institution, the Co-operative Agricultural Society —of which there are now some 350 examples at work. [There are over 1,000 co-operative societies of various types in Ireland, but the C.A.S. is to be regarded as the co-operative norm.]

It may be interesting to describe the typical C.A.S. Its usual area of operation is a parish, all the adult inhabitants of which, except those engaged in occupations directly competing with the society's, are admissible to membership. Heads of families subscribe the capital in shares of £1 denomination, the usual minimum per member accepted being five. When a capital of £2,000 or £3,000 is made up, there is every prospect of a good start, although the I.A.O.S. accepts societies for registration (under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893), with as low a capital as £500. The committee appoints a skilled manager, and a general store business is begun.

Formerly, the store traded exclusively in agricultural requisites—seed, manures, machinery—but to-day groceries, draperies and medicines are dealt in from the start.

The chief impulse behind the amazing post-war development of co-operation is the desire "to have a shop of our own," and despite the nominal restriction of the I.A.O.S.'s endeavours to the improvement of the agricultural industry, the movement to-day is running on anti-trader lines. Efforts to confine co-operation to "production" (wherein it would not conflict with vested interests) have thus failed, and the essentially distributive basis of co-operation has been reverted to by sheer force of circumstances. As a productive movement, co-operation was tolerated. The enormous growth of co-operative creameries injured no established interest: indeed, by raising, as they did, the standard of Irish dairying and developing the industry, the co-operative dairies improved the cross-Channel markets on which the proprietary dairies were relying. But co-operative dairying is only nominally co-operative: it fulfils none of the ideals of the founders of the co-operative commonwealth. The dairies work for profits, like any capitalistic institution, and they give no favour to the co-operative consumer. In dairying, co-operation is little more than co-operative exploitation. The distributive movement, on the other hand, fulfils the principles of Rochdale Pioneers, and the establishment of a C.A.S., so far from being welcomed by the local traders, is feared and hated. A traders' association

exists which seeks, by methods of organised underselling, etc., to strangle the new societies as they rise.

It is regrettable that a movement designed to improve the national life is thus doomed to injure the interests of any class and prove, in initial stages at any rate, a source of acrimony. Nevertheless, every improvement injures somebody—the introduction of motors hits the horse-driver; but who proposes that the old method of locomotion should be adhered to?—and it can safely be said that the C.A.S. never injures anyone who cannot afford loss. The little huckster is not hurt by co-operation, for the store draws away no more custom from the tiny shop than do the existing traders. It is the big shopkeepers whose customers go to the new store for their commodities, and the big shopkeepers have long since feathered their nests. Moreover, these worthy folk generally have numerous lucrative sidelines—licensed bars, hotels, farms, etc.—and in addition to this, co-operation brings such an influx of money into a district that often the old traders have more scope after than before the store's establishment, for the acquisition of bank-notes. A well-known Belfast Protestant Gael, visiting the Catholic South, was remonstrated with by the Protestant hotel-keeper and trader for attending Nationalist functions. "You wouldn't do it if you were a scattered Protestant like me." Yet the "scattered Protestant," beside his bar, hotel, and farm, had the post office and the telegraph office, was petty sessions clerk, granted the

fishing licences, was sub-agent for numerous concerns, harbour-master, and caretaker for a Government Board!

It would be feeble, indeed, to abstain from co-operative organisation for fear of breaking the national unity by injuring a class. The proper course is to show that "what is good for the bee-hive cannot be bad for the bee," and to lessen the asperities of the movement by giving the injured every reasonable liberty to compound with it. Nothing is more certain than that while co-operation will weed out from the country the mere usurer and exploiter, it will not close opportunities, but rather open splendid new ones, to all men industrious and adaptable. The hostility roused by co-operative organisation is, therefore, to be regarded as a transient and unimportant accident. Incidentally, it should be observed that the concentration of activities under a single roof which prevails in so many rural districts beside that of the "scattered Protestant" aforementioned, is in a sense evidence of an innate tendency to communal life. One establishment shelters the district's exporter and importer, grocer and draper, money-changer and State official, host and organiser. This establishment has but to pass under the control of the people who use it for a model of communism to be created, the reverse of an order in which the various functions would be executed by disconnected individuals. And this is what is progressively happening. One by one the old trader's functions are being assumed by the parochial co-operative centre.

After supplying the farmers with the best seeds and manures at the lowest possible cost, and the housewives with groceries and clothing requisites, the store sets to improving the marketing of the local produce. Its van brings in all the eggs of the countryside, and these are despatched to overseas markets, in accord with a marketing scheme directed from Dublin for the whole country. The export of potatoes, fish, etc., is being similarly organised. The producer thus secures the best price for his goods without being taxed by the swarm of middlemen who have hitherto levied their big percentages for encumbering services. At the end of the year, there should be a substantial balance on hands as the fruit of this scientific and economic trading. It may then be distributed to the members in proportion to the amount of trading that each has done during the year—which means that each gets back the exact amount paid by him over and above the cost of goods and services, instead of losing it (and a lot more) to a self-appointed tax-master. Or again, the balance on hands can be voted by the members back to the funds of the society, thus building up the capital. The latter course will be adopted where the co-operators are in earnest. To increase the society's capital, members are also encouraged to invest money on loan, usually at 5 per cent., which interest, together with a similar maximum 5 per cent. on share capital, is the first charge on the annual profits. Some rural societies have thus built up capital running into £30,000, even in the midst of bog and rocks. This is not remarkable,

for frugality should be able to achieve as much as exploitation, and we have seen that a gombeen man could die worth £100,000. When capital has been built up, an industry offering healthy employment can be established.

At Dungloe, where the model C.A.S. flourishes, the best example of such a factory may be seen. In this district, home-knitting has long been a supplementary industry practised by the dwellers on the little uneconomic holdings. As long as daylight lasted, women and girls would knit—counting themselves lucky if a week's labour brought as much as 8/- from the trader who accepted the finished socks or gloves or mufflers to sell again at unguessed profits. To-day over one hundred girls work in a bright, airy factory on the brink of the sea, built, owned, equipped, and controlled by their fathers, the co-operators of the district. They use knitting machines for the heavy part of the work, doing the finishing by hand: their produce being pure woollen goods, sports coats, jumpers, sweaters, gloves, etc., all of highly artistic design, as well as sound quality, and finished off with that thoroughness of workmanship that only traditional craft can give. The more dainty articles made thus on the wild Atlantic's verge are exported to stylish shops overseas; other articles are distributed through the Irish co-operatives. Working an eight-hour day, the girls earn piece-money that sounds fabulous.

This is what elimination of the parasite middleman can do for a countryside. Here we have an ideal in-

dustry. It exists in the healthiest and happiest of environments, and is not divorced from agriculture. It is an integral part of associated activities which strengthen one another, just as—to select a homely example—the oil engine that drives the dynamo for the electric lighting of the factory and the great distributive store up the road, drives also the sawmill in the yard, where box-making for the export business is in busy progress. The society which has achieved this has also its own bakery—supplying an extensive area hitherto served from Belfast, one hundred miles away—its own agricultural machines, its own bank, its own nurse for the service of members, its own hall and social life. It may be well imagined that the conception of common working and enjoyment of the moral and intellectual influence of such a society is immense. One of the finest features of co-operation —its calling forth of a new type of public man—is seen in the manager, whose energy is behind all. It was in 1905 that Mr. Patrick Gallagher, now universally known as "Paddy the Cope," came home from the mines and set his hand to the work. They say that at first he did not know a ledger from a pass-book, and when he first attempted egg-packing the receivers got scrambled eggs. But every step of the road was won with dear experience and hardihood, and Paddy—the biggest man in Ulster—won through. If you meet him, you will find him just a plain specimen of the Northern Iron (with the rust-coloured hair of a famous type). He will be oiling his engine or packing boxes, or hustling up the work

of salting fish into barrels, with the angry blue fire in his eyes blazing. The secret of his success is his flaming energy and his democratic hand in every detail. Such are the builders of new Ireland.

The idealist hopes to see the C.A.S. becoming the social and intellectual as well as the economic salvation of the countryside. Beginning in humble matters such as groceries, it may grow to the position of a vital communal organism. Its humbler activities are necessary for the creation of a co-operative sense. The people, discovering in simple instances the power of unity, receive a flood of enlightenment, and begin to speculate on the possibilities open to united effort. Just as a futile mob can be turned by discipline into an orderly and efficient body, so the economic chaos, every man against his neighbour, which is characteristic of the present disorder, may be, and is, changed into organic life. As success fosters confidence, the local co-operatives will attract to themselves the money at present invested in a thousand-and-one places by their members. In any country parish, the people own enough to capitalise the most progressive developments that the district is capable of, were the money but concentrated, instead of resting in joint-stock banks, the post office, foreign bonds, and—old stockings. Ireland needs no capital from abroad? she has ample herself invested in other countries by the fathers of the youths who annually leave Ireland in search of employment. President Wilson reminded the Italians that "a country is owned and dominated by the capital that is invested in it . . .

In proportion as foreign capital comes in and takes its hold, in that proportion does foreign influence come in and take its hold, and therefore the processes of capital are, in a certain sense, the processes of conquest." Applying this lesson to their own case, Irishmen believe that Irish industry will be safest if developed by Irish capital, and least in danger of foreign absorption or native exploitation if the capital be democratically subscribed instead of invested by financiers.

The task, then, is to create confidence in Irish resources, in Irish ability, and in co-operative methods. This, it may be said, is being almost automatically performed. And wonderful is the educational effect of co-operation's first endeavours. No sooner have the people learnt their first lesson—say, from a favourable balance-sheet—in the possibilities of co-operation than they begin to look askance at prospecting capitalists who talk of developing this or that on a wage-basis. "Why should we get only daily wages for hewing these stones," they ask, when a foreign company begins to quarry granite in their parish, "while strangers get all the big profits? Why should not the profits come to us, too?" In this way visions are born of carpet factories, woollen mills, chemical works, mineral developments . . . and the great waterfalls going to waste are looked at with wistful eyes. These visions will breed deeds yet, and so the devolution of industrial life will maintain a diffused intellectual life and maintain a higher average of education. We are to-day but in the

nascent stage of these developments. Scaffolding must be put up before walls are built, and the spread (and co-ordination under the National Wholesale) of the distributive organisation is a necessary preliminary, not only to initiate the people into co-operation, but to create marketing facilities for co-operatively produced goods when the new factories are set up. The fact that proprietary shops would boycott co-operative goods while co-operative stores would favour them shows how untenable is the position of those uninstructed folk who talk of productive without distributive co-operation.

If, as is hoped, the C.A.S. becomes in every rural district a dominating economic organism, the founding of co-operative libraries, halls and theatres (one society already has its picture-house) will lead towards a true communal life. The members will, by united effort, achieve as much in social matters as in economic. They will be able to bring the best lecturers, the best artists, and the best actors to their halls, and they will be able to give local genius every material encouragement. Thus it is not too severe a strain on the imagination to see the co-operative communes of the future re-incarnating the life of the ancient stateships, and producing a modern counterpart of old-time local-devolution. The communes may take over, in time, the reins of local government. National taxation may be levied from the communal funds (thus sparing the unjust incidence of present taxation on the poor), and, as we have suggested in a previous chapter, the president of the com-

mune may become *ex-officio* the local delegate to the National Assembly, Dáil Eireann. Of course, this is a far prospect, and may even appear in details grotesque or Utopian. Yet it would not have seemed so to Hugh O'Neill: nor is it more extravagant than the proposals of our socialist comrades.

A detail that may be questioned rises from the number of the communes into which a co-operative Ireland would be divided. Ancient Ireland was divided into 184 stateships, or *tuatha,* and in some places groups of such *tuatha* combined into *mór-thuatha,* owing to pressure of some local geographical or political unifying force. Certain extended areas today bear such marks of obvious unity, *e.g.*, through prevalence of a single industry, that we may expect the local co-operatives to coalesce. County Wexford has one giant society with numerous branches (not that this has proved itself wise) and Templecrone Society, Dungloe, has expanded over an area commensurate with that of an ancient *tuatha.*

§ 4.—*Distributivism versus Socialism*

Co-operation differs from orthodox socialism in being based on private ownership. It is communal, but not communistic. It encourages the conception of common working and enjoyment of property, but it does not obliterate the individual's independence or right of possession. Its policy is in the formula of William Thompson, the Cork economist, who is now claimed as the founder of

scientific socialism—that "the workers must become their own capitalists." Every man, so far as is practically possible, is to become an owner of productive wealth, and then *voluntary* communism is to be encouraged. Compulsory communalisation of property is feared as destroying the security of the individual. The following quotations from Thompson's *Distribution* (1824) show how this Irish disciple of Robert Owen—claimed by Menger as the inspirer of Marx—envisaged the policy of to-day :—

> . . . It is not meant to say that there would be no permanent class of labourers under the free operation of the natural laws of distribution ; but that mere labourers altogether destitute of capital would be extremely few and very well remunerated. . . . In such a community would there be no capitalists, such as we now see them, engrossing the accumulated products of the labours of thousands? There would be very few such. But in such a community would there be no accumulation of capital? Its accumulation would be immense, and greater than under any forced or fraudulent distribution ; *so that there would be a profusion of capital without capitalists.* How could these things be? *The great body of the productive labourers would be capitalists themselves.* . . . How then could great manufacturers and great enterprises of commerce be carried on without great capitalists? It is great *capitals* that are wanted for some few undertakings, not great *capitalists.* Provided the capital is produced, it signifies not whether it comes out of one or fifty hands. Capital being everywhere diffused by security, a hundred or a thousand shares would be raised for any useful purpose amongst shrewd and active men.

Private property combined with communal opera-

tions is a system parallel to the actual organisation of society. Individuals cannot be moulded together like pieces of putty, but they can act together as a true organic unity. Individual properties should not be utterly coalesced and rendered indivisible, but should be united in operation like their human owners to whom they are co-efficients. As the human race must renew itself—reproduction beginning every twenty years—so property must be renewed, and to this end interest at the nominal rate of 5 per cent. is recognised, by which a sum of money is reproduced in twenty years, and private wealth is maintained parallel to the progress of the race. That every individual should be a proprietor is held to be necessary to the stability of society, not merely because fallen human nature cannot support universally the community of goods practised by devout men in monasteries, but because a stewardship over a certain allotment of natural wealth seems to call forth those husbandly qualities in men that make the earth's development most orderly and gracious. Distributivism is thus a doctrine as austere as aristocracy and as liberal as democracy.

So Gaelicism, as we shall now term Irish idealists' theory, touches Socialism in community of administration, but not in common ownership, as Marxians understand the latter. At the same time, it touches socialism at a second point, to wit, the supremacy of the community in respect to the distribution of property. Though Gaelicism is a system based on private proprietors, the expression "the

rights of property " means nothing to the Irish ear. It is the individual's right *as a man,* to own property : if he then advances claims to rights *as a property-owner,* he is not understood. The latter attitude marks feudalism and capitalism, and in the former phase it was fought against in the Irish land war for centuries, just as it is being fought against in the latter phase to-day. Under the antique Gaelic system of land tenure, every freeman was an owner of land, having a certain *materia signata* or private area of tillage, as well as a share in common rights to grazing, bog and forest. He was independent of the head of the clan—a reverse position to that of the feudal tenant, who could call nor soil, nor house, nor personal freedom of movement his own. At the same time, the Gaelic proprietor had limited rights of ownership. He could not buy up vast areas and make the workers thereon his employés. Nor could he dispose of his property with the same freedom as a modern landlord. When he died, his holding reverted, not indeed to the clan, but to a family group of four generations, called the *deirbh-'ine.* Every youth in that group had the right to be provided for out of the land thus vested in the whole. This was the system called gavelkind (*gabháil-cine*—reversion-to-kin). Here a limited communism existed, the object of which was to secure to every individual a freeman's share of private property, and while ensuring the perpetuation of private ownership, to prevent its inordinate extension or abuse. The balance was thus finely held.

It would appear also that the *altum dominium* was less of a dead letter under the clan system than under capitalism. When the clans, expelled from their ancestral territories by the invaders, swept back and re-conquered the land, the recovered land was undoubtedly distributed on the basis that, as the *deirbh-'ine,* or four-generation-group, had dominion over its allotment, so the clan had supreme dominion over the clan-land. Again, the *altum dominium* of the people was expressed in the oft-repeated repudiation of unauthorised contracts made by the clan-captains. When corrupted chiefs agreed with a soft-tongued deputy to hold their clan-lands by feudal tenure from the Crown, the clans regarded such bargains as totally invalid. Modern Gaelicism remembers the *altum dominium,* and holds that the nation has the right to expropriate any holder of surplus private capital who stands in the way of the public interest. It will have to find a modern substitute for gavel-kind —that is, some expedient by which accumulation of privately-held productive capital shall be checked, and an allotment secured to every legitimate citizen.

In point of fact, the function of Supreme Dominion is to check accumulation and maintain distributed ownership. The great fault of the capitalist order is, that under it the State failed to perform this function, as was to be expected from the fact that the State was captured by the capitalists in the feudal stage and ever after maintained by them as the yoke laid on the propertyless. The legal codes which recognised property rights instead of human rights pre-

vented a reversal of ascendancy. "The capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property," said Marx, "have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of self-earned private property; in other words, the expropriation of the labourer." The aim of social revolution—the theoretic aim of Lenin's temporary Dictatorship of the Proletariat—is to wrest the Supreme Dominion from the capitalist class, to re-invest the community with that power, and then to compel such a re-adjustment of property as shall make for freedom and justice. The collectivist would leave all property in the hands of the State; the distributivist wishes the State to act, if at all, as temporary or transitional trustee only. But in a well-ordered State the authority which regulates property divisions will never sleep. The strong hand must always be ready to check excesses of accumulation and succour the helpless. This was effected in the old Gaelic State by the institution of gavel-kind; in Rome, for a phase, by the Licinian law; in Israel, by the periodic jubilee.

It is difficult to foresee what expedients the new Irish State will resort to in order to maintain a due balance of property without actually adopting collectivism. Heavy death duties and restriction of inheritance are among the proposals of meliorist socialists for the purpose of effecting the same thing, but these are clumsy and easily-cheated means. Perhaps co-operative communes will be invested with some control of property within their areas, and the prin-

ciple of non-transferable shares will prevent individuals from receiving more than a life-interest in the wealth which they owe to the communal operations: the shares reverting at death to the commune, whose duty it will be to invest the sons of members, from the communal funds, with a certain allocation of property at coming-of-age. Should the communes undertake the technical education of members' sons and daughters, the benefits to be derived by the young will reconcile the old to the assumption by the commune of surplus private wealth. Here again, however, we are but "drawing the long bow," since we cannot to-day foresee the detailed circumstances of a distant world.

§ 5.—*Labourers' Colonies*

Thus far we have dealt chiefly with the small farmer and his family, he being the norm of Irish citizenship and the backbone of the C.A.S. What of the agricultural labouring class? Has this no place in the C.A.S.? Its place is an important one. The C.A.S. offers the labourer means to build up property for himself. When it is mentioned that a co-operative store established in the autumn of 1919 reduced the cost of living in a labourer's home during the following winter by 10/- a week over the winter of 1918-19; when it is remembered, too, that besides saving this substantial sum, though wholesale prices meantime had risen, the labourer, as a member of a prospering society, was looking forward to a dividend

and was part-owner in a solvent business, it is clear that he has here a means to lift himself above the hunger-margin that hitherto has been his lot. But the co-operative ideal goes farther than this. A co-operative bank has been established for the purpose of buying estates coming on the market and re-selling on the annuity system to skilled workers who will take no more land than they can work with the labour of their families. Already areas have been planted thus with labourers who are now proprietors.

It is proposed, too, and the plan has been put into operation at some few centres, to introduce *co-operative agriculture* by similar methods. Agricultural co-operation means co-operative trading by the farming community. Co-operative agriculture means communal working of the land. The intention is to lease extensive pieces of land to organised groups of labourers, who will till and reap in common and divide the proceeds, buying out the land by annual instalments. Many theorists believe that this system is more scientific and will prove more efficient and highly productive than individualistic farming. Readers of E. T. Craig's narrative describing the co-operative commune founded at Ralahine, Co. Clare, in 1831, under the inspiration of Robert Owen, will find that the experiment has once been tried—though on rather too imaginative lines—with much promise; and from Mr. O Cofaigh's notes to the new (abridged) edition,* they will learn that the agrarian problem in modern Italy led to big experiments in co-

* *An Irish Commune* (Dublin, 1920).

operative farming that have proved extremely encouraging. United cultivation of extensive areas with up-to-date appliances might be expected to be more expeditious and productive than the divided cultivation of small areas by old-fashioned methods. But this applies more to large crops of grain than to the cultivation of fruit and vegetables, which require intensive and individual attention. In the former, co-operative agriculture will probably prove conspicuously efficient.

In large operations, the labourers' societies may give the lead to the peasant proprietors. And does not nature appear to dictate united labour on big routine tasks? Does not the ploughing up or reaping of a large area seem to call for military tactics? In Russia, we are told by Kropotkin, "the irrigation canals are digged and repaired in common. The communal meadows are mown by the community; and the sight of a Russian commune mowing a meadow—the men rivalling each other in their advance with the scythe, while the women turn the grass over and throw it up into heaps—is one of the most inspiring sights; it shows what human work might be, and ought to be." It may be that as the co-operatively farmed labourers' holdings prove successful, the small holders now farming individually will feel impelled, by example, to cast down their ditches and unite adjoining farms, ploughing and reaping extensive areas in the same scientific fashion—but retaining certain acres for individual attention. The countryside then, instead of being a patchwork as at

present, will be a sea of waving grass or corn, with homesteads, surrounded by orchards, planted here and there like islands. Thus the labourers' colonies may lead the whole countryside on towards the true co-operative commonwealth.

§ 6.—*Urban Guilds*

But what of the worker in the city—the industrial worker? The model of the C.A.S. is scarcely applicable to town life. In the cities, co-operative stores may reduce the cost of living to those who patronise them, and the co-operative movement has been amazingly successful in the Scottish urban centres, owing, doubtless, to the shrewd frugality of the Scot, who values the saved penny more than less canny folk. In Belfast, the city co-operative, with its many branches, its magnificent drapery emporium, its educational guild and meeting hall, does a business with over one million pounds of an annual turnover.

It has been observed, however, by Mr. and Mrs. Webb that co-operation appears incapable of development beyond a comparatively narrow limit in the cities. Nowhere, even under the most favourable conditions, does it seem able to handle more than 20 or 25 per cent. of the urban distributive trade. The reason is partly that only the thrifty section of the middle class is attracted by the stores: the rich despise it and the poor are not fitted for it. Also, it must be remembered that if the cost of living were reduced throughout the urban population by uni-

versal adhesion to the co-operative store, there would be a corresponding fall in wages. Again, where even next-door neighbours are strangers, it is impossible to work up that family-like community sense which enables the C.A.S. to concentrate the activity of its district. This point is clear from the contrast between rural and city shops. The former, as we have seen, is even in the gombeen stage, linked up with a variety of activities, so that the people can readily conceive the development of industries, etc., from their own shop. In the city, groceries are bought in one shop, meat in another, cloth in another, hats in a fourth, and boots in a fifth. The single customer goes to a score of different establishments for his various needs, and does not even trade at those nearest to his residence, but travels to different shopping areas on occasion. Hence the difficulty of organising so chaotic a life on the rural co-operative model.

But though the ideal co-operative policy cannot be carried out in the cities, the stores are a desirable institution, and the Labour movement is pressing forward their establishment. In the event of strikes, a series of co-operative stores in which the trade unions held an interest, could be used in Dublin as in English cities, to provision the workers during the critical period. Again, the Just Price could be enforced throughout the city shops if the stores, acting in direct union with the co-operative producers in the country, set the example in lowering and controlling food prices. The urban stores are the nucleus of a just machinery for adjusting relations between the

consuming industrial worker and the producing farmer. The time will come when they will be used by a National Government for controlling the distribution and price of food. Meantime, they are not of much use save as levers against profiteering by proprietary shops.

A different model must be sought, then, for the democratising of urban economic life. Not the co-operative commune, but the guild or soviet, here appears as the alternative to capitalism. The business for constructive democracy is to effect a transfer of capitalist urban industries from their present owners to the organised workers employed in them. Industrial democracy is the word. It is important to note that industrial democracy is regarded, not as an ideal order, but as the lesser of two evils. Had Ireland been free to maintain and develop her ancient distributed rural economy, there would have been no growth of unwieldy big cities, like Dublin and Belfast, on the English, or capitalist, model, and so there would have been no problem of capitalism to handle. The normal order would have been that of the co-operative commune, and when, as in the case of mines, railways, or shipyards, rural communes could not handle a mammoth development which in turn could not be subdivided, then these great undertakings would have been established or controlled under some system harmonious to the general co-operative order. We can conceive that the co-operatives of a certain area would have combined to develop a coal mine that could serve them all, while the great national federation might have handled the

shipyards. It is hard to conjecture what place the workers in these industries would have held. Would they have been mere employés, wage-earners, denied by rule a voice in management, like the workers employed by the English Co-operative Wholesale Society? The principle followed by the English C.W.S. is that the consumer must be master, but its rule against employés' right to members' status is objected to (surely rightly!) as reducing them to the position of a capitalist wage-slave.

There is an obvious dilemma. But the present conflict between "consumers' co-operation" and "producers' co-operation" is really due to the external pressure of the capitalist order. Were co-operation dominant, the conflict would disappear. The distinction between producers and consumers would be forgotten if a co-operative order arose. The I.A.W.S.—the national federation corresponding to the English and Scottish C.W.S.—is trying to obliterate the differences between the two classes by acting for both; but it is clear that so long as the producer has open to him a more profitable market than that offered by the co-operative consumers' groups, and as long as the consumers buy from capitalist producers in preference to co-operators when a bargain offers, so long a true merging of interests will be delayed. Hence the need to organise the urban productive worker in independent producing societies of a type that is fitted to present rather than to future, or ideal, co-operative conditions. This brings us to the guild or soviet.

Now, the guild is not native to Ireland, nor is it congenial to the national genius. Its fundamental principle is that the individual relies for support in difficulty and for vindication of his human rights, not on his kindred, but on his fellow-craftsmen. It bases brotherhood on occupation instead of on natural social affinity. We have already expressed approval of the modern idea, expressed in the soviet and guild movements, that for purposes of efficient administration men should express their will through occupational instead of geographical constituencies. But this we hold to be a principle that should not be extended *beyond* administrative application. The farmer should vote as a farmer, the teacher as a teacher, the manufacturer as a manufacturer, where technical questions are to be decided: but the basis of society is not to be changed hereby. Here is a commune in which a farmer and a teacher vote in separate occupational organisations with respect to the administration of their respective industries; but when it comes to a matter of providing relief or benefits for one or the other, he should not look to the College of Agriculture or the Educational Guild: he should look to the commune, his neighbours or natural brotherhood. His rights as a citizen are to be defended by his co-citizens, not by his fellow-craftsmen. His citizenship is of the substance of his nature: his particular craft is but an accident. It is true that men of one craft like to gather together when a technical problem is up for decision; but when work is over their associations cut right across occupational lines, and the man as a

man seeks friends of congenial character, forgetting his work-a-day interests. Thus the rural commune harmonises with social idealism, expresses the true communal spirit, as the guild-owned factory in the city can never do. The association of men to run an industry is an economic association only, and cannot satisfy more than one phase of human nature.

Corroboration of this view may be found in the classic works of Mr. and Mrs. Webb on Trade Unionism. Therein it is amply proved that the Trade Union movement tends more and more to rid the unions of their earlier functions of friendly societies, and to strip them of all but industrial activities.* The work of defending and succouring the individual citizen must, under present conditions, fall on the State; but under the Co-operative Commonwealth it will fall on the commune. This in turn will prevent that selfish exclusiveness in craft guilds and trade

* ". . . We may therefore expect that, with the progressive nationalisation or municipalisation of public services on the one hand and the spread of the co-operative movement on the other, the Trade Unions of the workers thus taken directly into the employment of the citizen consumers will more and more assume the character of professional associations. . . . A Trade Union is, of necessity, financially unsound as a friendly society. . . . With Trade Union membership . . . virtually or actually compulsory, Trade Union leaders will find it convenient to concentrate their whole attention on the fundamental purposes of their organisation, and to cede the mere insurance business to the Friendly Societies." —*Industrial Democracy*, Vol. II., Chap. IV.

unions which shows itself when the capitalist enemy is removed and no check on what the Webbs call "corporate selfishness" interposed. The double organisation of men on vocational and social lines alone can ensure executive efficiency on the one hand, and security against exploitation by producers—democratic no less than capitalistic—on the other. The guildsman has yet to show us how this double organisation can be achieved under his scheme. We have seen how it may be done under the C.A.S., and we note that the guildsman's difficulty rises from the fact that he is working against an unnatural difficulty, urban concentration, the result of capitalism, and so cannot go straight towards the ideal like the rural organiser, who has a clear field.

§ 7.—*Irish Bolshevism*

Irregular circumstances require irregular expedients, and so the foreign system of guild organisation must be called in in Ireland where foreign capitalism has created urban concentration. But it is to be anticipated that as a rural economy is developed, and the economic and social balance is changed, urban conditions will be modified. Dean Inge thinks it probable—so he tells us in his *Outspoken Essays*—that the great cities of England will waste away in the future, even until the plough is driven over the site of many a present urban hive. "We are witnessing the decline and fall of the social

order which began with the industrial revolution 160 years ago. The cancer of industrialism has begun to mortify, and the end is in sight. Within 200 years, it may be . . . the hideous new towns which disfigure our landscape may have disappeared, and their sites may have been reclaimed for the plough." When so profound a thinker foresees this great change in England, decentralisation is surely no fantastic dream in Ireland. The causes pointing to a decay of the cities are the closing of those undeveloped markets on the exploitation of which capitalism was built, the unrest of the workers caused by high prices and the post-war conditions, the release of industry from the coal-centres by the development of White Power and electricity, and the food problem arising from the decline of overseas supplies.

Dr. Inge thinks that the revolt of the workers against the moneyed classes will " kill the goose that lays the golden eggs "—that the democracy is sawing away the branch on which it stands. But whether or not the centralised capitalist system ends in so cataclysmic a revolution as is imagined, the revolt against centralisation exists, and is sure to show itself in newly industrialised countries. [Did not modern Germany build its glass-works in the odorous pine-forests instead of in a Lancashire or a Black Country?] The new lands have built their cities on open scientific plans, contrasting with the higgledy-piggledy confusion of the old world's urban agglomerations. They may learn farther from the old world's failures and avoid all future concentration of industry.

Ireland will not need to wait for the epochal changes that Dr. Inge anticipates, then. With her, decentralisation will be the order of growth. Under the distributive system, she will be able to support some three to four times her present population without forming big cities or adding to those that exist, and she will then be so far from the saturation of modern England that her fields will produce food for all her twelve to sixteen million souls. If Dr. Inge's expectations are realised, the population of Britain may sink to a balance at which it will have a similar density to the Irish, the figure being, perhaps, 25 million souls.

When rural industry develops, and the balance of population is changed, the present few urban masses will be transformed. No longer will the cities be the home, like Dublin at present, of the administrative, educated and artistic classes. With the diffusion of industry and administration, the cultured and skilled classes will be distributed through the country, and the multitudinous shopkeepers, luxury-workers, and hangers-on who cluster in the city under the shadow of the well-to-do, will not be massed in the deserted centres, but will be distributed, too. It must be remembered that before industrial capitalism ruled, and when the great folk were the landed aristocracy, this was actually the state of affairs. We are returning to the distributive order of the pre-industrial ages, after a fit of centralisation which, though it has lasted a century, is but a small episode in the mighty march of history. So we visualise the big cities being

tapped of an extensive section of their present inhabitants, particularly the "middle class" and its parasites. Suburban districts cease to expand, but their villas pass from the occupancy of civil servants and pensioners to well-paid artizans and industrial workers. Thus is solved the slum problem. Meanwhile many shops and duplicated services disappear in the wake of the drawn-off classes and big co-operatives begin to engross the retail trade, supplanting the multiple shops and capitalistic emporia. We have now a mainly industrial or commercial population held by either natural causes for concentration, like harbours or mines, or by established capital plant, *e.g.*, Guinness's brewery, Belfast ropeworks.

As this change comes over such cities as Cork, Belfast, and Dublin, the social problem becomes immensely simplified. Homogeneity of population begins to appear. In all likelihood, under the influence of national decentralisation, as the centrifugal forces relieved that pressure of population which confuses the issue to-day, a big city would tend to develop distinct internal groupings. In such cities as London, of course, there are distinct quarters—Fleet Street is occupied by journalists, the Inns of Court by lawyers, Bishopsgate by shipping firms, Whitehall by government servants. But intensity of population merges and mixes the individuals of these various groups. Under the new order they would tend to function as municipal units. With the removal of middle class domination, the workers would feel an increased soli-

darity. In different districts they would begin to combine like their brethren in the country, for co-operative buying and selling, and in proof of our conjecture that the new order would be favourable to urban co-operation, it may be pointed out that in Britain co-operation has enjoyed what success it has only in the industrial cities, proving a failure in the more mixed centres. In Ireland, urban co-operation has been a comparative success in Belfast, but thus far a failure in Dublin. But the fundamental break with the present order will take place in the actual control of the industries which we expect to become the basis of the towns' existence. Capitalism may still have a space to run, but no observer of historic tendencies can doubt that in one form or another, workers' partnership in or control of industry must come sooner or later. James Connolly, socialist, gave his life's energies to the development of such a control in Ireland, and Social Democracy, as he outlined it, will be seen to resemble closely the soviet model.

Writing in 1908, Connolly said:

> The Socialist thinker, when he paints the structural form of the new social order, does not imagine an industrial system directed or ruled by a body of men and women elected from an indiscriminate mass of residents within given districts, said residents working at a heterogeneous collection of trades and industries. . . . What the Socialist does realise is that under a Socialist form of society the administration of affairs will be in the hands of representatives of the various industries of the nation; that the workers in the shops and factories will organise

themselves into unions, *each union comprising all the workers at a given industry;* that said union will democratically control the workshop life of its own industry, electing all foremen, etc., and regulating the routine of labour in that industry in subordination to the needs of society in general, to the needs of its allied trades, and to the department of industry to which it belongs. That representatives elected from these various departments of industry will meet and form the industrial administration or national government of the country. In short, Social Democracy, as its name implies, is the application to industry, or to the social life of the nation, of the fundamental principles of democracy. *Such application will necessarily have to begin in the workshop*, and proceed logically and consecutively upward through all the grades of industrial organisation until it reaches the culminating point of national executive power and direction. . . . It will be seen that this conception of Socialism destroys at one blow all the fears of a bureaucratic state, ruling and ordering the lives of every individual from above. . . . In short, it blends the fullest democratic control with the most absolute expert supervision, *something unthinkable of any society built upon the political state.**

Commenting on Connolly's essay, from which the foregoing extracts are culled, Mr. Richard Dawson—a blood-relative of the Fat Boy in Pickwick, and author of *Red Terror and Green*, a five-shilling shocker for anti-Bolshevists—remarks: "Study of this statement of policy enables us to understand the debt which in later days Lenin confessed he owed to Connolly, and how Mr. —— is able to boast that Bolshevism was born in Ireland." It will be agreed

* James Connolly, *Socialism Made Easy.*

that Connolly's words, especially those italicised, have the Bolshevik ring. The Irish temperament, always intuitive, tends to fly from a hint to a conclusion, and the author of *Socialism Made Easy* was ahead of the socialists of Europe in detecting the bankruptcy of State socialism, and planning that industrial unionism which has succeeded it in the proletarian movement. It may be observed that Connolly's words would have been more applicable in a highly organised industrial country, but even if he had never studied in Marxian schools, nor laboured in Britain and America, it is likely he would have expressed much the same ideals in whatever industrial dialect he used. The conception of the self-governing workshop, and of the ownership of industries by unions, may appear advanced to the English mind, that goes step by step; but the Irish imagination flashes to it as the obvious and appointed end once the existence of organised industries is accepted.

We have already referred to William Thompson, the so-called forerunner of Marx. The little-heard-of Corkman was in reality the forerunner of distributivism, not collectivism; of co-operation, not Socialism. Menger has invested him with a false glory, but he deserves a true glory quite as resplendent. He will yet be found a well of wise thought for modern use, and students of his forgotten pages will discover with amaze much of the theory of guilds and soviets worked out a hundred years before Orage or Lenin. In the notes to *Labor Rewarded* (1827), there will be found a constitution based on self-governing com-

munes organised in a hierarchy of provincial and State assemblies, that cannot fail to suggest the present constitution of Russia. But what is immediately to our purpose, the ideas of James Connolly will be found worked out in detail in the course of the same volume.

Following Owen, but showing in his writings a far more shrewd and practical mind than the great Englishman, Thompson hoped to see society regenerated by the formation of rural communes. As he outlines his phalansteries, they bear a close resemblance to the modern C.A.S., except in their being somewhat more communistic than the C.A.S. has yet shown itself—a reservation that may be due to the difficulties of the theoriser, or the as yet undeveloped state of the real thing. He proposed that industries should be communally embarked on by the communes, as now by the agricultural societies. But when he was faced with the problem of giant industries, such as coal mines or manufactures requiring big plant, he was confronted with the same problem as ourselves, and proposed the same solution as James Connolly. He laid it down that amid the agricultural communes into which a modern nation would be federated, there would be some industrial communes, groups of workers owning, working, and controlling, here a mine, there a textile factory. And as to the mode by which labour was to advance towards this consummation, Thompson was curiously prophetic of Connolly and Liberty Hall. For the workers were to be combined in a "Central Union of All Trades" (the

parallel of the One Big Union), and the separate sections were to purchase out the capital they worked with.

> . . . In those trades which require large buildings and machinery, the funds of the general union, of every particular manufacture, should be permanently devoted to the erection of suitable buildings, and the purchase of the best machinery to give employment to the industrious in that line, who might, from time to time, be thrown out of employment in any part of the country through disagreement with their employers; the general union approving of their conduct, and entitling them to work at the Trades' Manufactory. These buildings should be always made, by purchase, rent free, or as nearly so as possible. Then, in case of want of employment, whether from refusing work on the part of employers, or refusing labour on the part of the employed, the industrious, instead of spending their time in irksome and corrupting idleness, instead of wasting without return the contributions of the employed in their and other lines of trade, would be able to support themselves while out of their regular employ. The funds of all Unions should be everywhere directed to *supplying work to the unemployed* from unjust conduct of their employers, *not to support them in idleness*. . . . The unemployed and ill-used from every part of the country would, in their turn, find refuge in these peaceful sanctuaries of industry. Out of the products of the labour of those employed in these Trade-Manufactories, nothing should be withheld from the labourers but the head-rent, if any, and the cost of management; that cost to be, *like remuneration to that paid to the labourers,* to as many persons, mutually agreed on by the Trades-Unions and the Labourers themselves, as might be necessary to perform that easy and honourable duty.

The clause "mutually agreed on by the trades unions and the labourers" is significant, and anticipates modern developments. Thompson does not stand by those national guildsmen of to-day who see the trades unions as permanent trustees of industries. Instead, he is for those of the newer school of guildsmen, the school accused of Bolshevism, which favours the independence of local industries under local, not national, guilds. As thus:

> . . . If, as would probably happen, the labourers working in these Trade-Manufactories, should wish themselves to become the proprietors of them, paying the Trades-Unions out of savings from their earnings or from any other resources, the cost of such buildings and machinery, such laudable wishes for an approach to real independence should, by all means, be encouraged by the Unions. The whole cost of the buildings and machinery should be divided into shares, according to the number of people they were capable of employing; and every individual paying the amount of a share should become a capitalist-labourer, and would thus enjoy an increased part of the products of his labour. . . . As these Trade-Manufactories would thus come to be possessed by *joint-stock companies of the labourers themselves,* other buildings and always improved machinery should be erected with their funds by the Unions, to keep up a constant refuge for the honest and industrious losing their employments. The establishments of capitalist-labourers would . . . prove that capital can be accumulated without the aid of capitalists.

The reflecting reader cannot but be surprised at Thompson's detailed outline of modern tendencies.

set down one hundred years ago. Nor can he doubt that herein is evidence that the democratic program to-day is no mere sally of the modernist spirit, but is expressive of instincts deep in the Irish character. Thompson's policy is being followed by men who have never read it. [No extracts from *Labor Rewarded* have before been printed, so few are aware of Thompson's far-seeing vision.] In Dublin a large tailoring industry is owned by the workers. Up and down the country several similar experiments are in hands. In one case big transport contractors, after endangering the workers' employment by mutual competition and lock-outs, were put out of business by the workers striking and securing the transport contracts collectively, under the direction of their union. When certain bacon curers threatened to close down their works in protest against labour-control of the price of bacon, the workers carried on the business successfully under a workshop committee.

Direct action on these lines is now democracy's confessed policy, and anyone familiar with Irish conditions can foresee as rapid and revolutionary a development as that which, in politics, followed the adoption of the Volunteer policy. Those who doubt the coming of social democracy must be blind to its psychological appeal. All know how the pomp and glamour, adventure and exhilaration of military exercises enthuse the common man, impelling him to physical exertions and activity that he would grudge in daily labour. Social democracy infuses a similar zeal into the workers, and in these days the notion

of capturing industries in economic battles may well come like a clarion. And so you have groups of workers here and there, talking in the evening of how they will run such-and-such an industry, or administer such-and-such an estate, when the day arrives.

While Thompson foresaw co-operative groups engaged in industrial pursuits, he was awake to the difficulties they would encounter in capitalist competition, stoppages of raw material, etc., and had his plans laid for each contingency. But he was driven to the significant conclusion that industrial communes would never be fully secure if dependent on others for food supplies.

> . . . What remedy, then, presents itself to these Trade-Manufactories for self-support against the evils of depression or loss of trade? *Let them purchase,* or rent with a stipulation for future purchase, *enough of land in their neighbourhood to raise their own food, and to eat it at first cost.* Let a general account be kept of the manufacturing and agricultural industry; let every agriculturist be taught the manufacturing branch, and let every manufacturer be taught to aid in agricultural operations.

Thus every industrial worker is—at the least—to be an allotment holder, or in the ideal circumstances, the factory is to have its own farms. Such an ideal is being worked on by Liberty Hall in efforts to secure parcels of land to be owned by various unions. Thompson goes on to argue that to enjoy more and more of the whole produce of their labour, the

"Trades-Manufactories" must see to it that one after another useful craft is practised within the association, thus freeing from external dependence.

> . . . If these associations of capitalist-labourers wish to be still more independent, let them invite into their association as many tradesmen, shoemakers, masons, carpenters, bakers, smiths, machine-makers, etc., as will be necessary to supply as many as possible of their most indispensable wants within themselves. . . . Should any poets, painters, theologians, naturalists, chemists, political economists, musicians, arise amongst them, let such receive a remuneration equal to the amusement or instruction of the Association, and that the Association desires their services.

The Trades-Manufactories, Thompson says, will thus be converted into Trade-and-Agricultural Associations, and so we get back in some degree to the C.A.S. model again. Our philosopher further observes that contiguity of dwelling will be desirable for the various members of the associations, and though this will be a difficult thing to achieve in cities where vested interests block symmetrical development, it will be possible in the case of newly-growing groups. Hence: "*Foresight in the arrangement* of a Manufacturing and Agricultural Association would be supremely desirable." In other words, Trades-Manufactories should so far as possible seek rural sites for their establishment! So Thompson advocates decentralisation, or, where urban concentration cannot be evaded, as close a link with the soil as is feasible, as well as a policy of grouping the workers

into a compact unit residentially. If we carry this conception somewhat further, cannot we imagine great industries in certain city districts becoming the nuclei for the union of all citizens in their neighbourhood in a co-operative community?

§ 8.—*City Communes*

This, indeed, is exactly our conception of the way out in the urban problem. Here we have, say, a huge textile factory. Its hundreds of employés will, it is suggested, begin by founding their own co-operative store, but all neighbouring residents will be admitted to membership, as they are admitted in the stores started by the farmers in agricultural districts. The commune then tends to employ its own craftsmen, and various profit-making enterprises in the district are thus absorbed. A communal spirit is generated as by the rural C.A.S., and the fact that the majority of members are the factory workers does not prevent this spirit from promoting the interests of all, any more than the farmers' predominance prevents the growth of a mixed agricultural and industrial commune in country places like Dungloe. As the cities cease to be points of centralisation and resume their old-world character in being communities held together by some natural common interest, as their present dilution of parasite classes is drawn away, the process we have imagined will grow.

We conceive, then, that a distinct communal de-

velopment may come to pass in the towns, and the model of the C.A.S. be *adapted* to urban conditions. Here the communes will be predominantly, but not exclusively, industrial, and so we frankly accept the conception of the nation federated into mixed types of communal groups. And why not? Farmers and artizans are equal citizens, equally deserving of a place in the nation. Communes of various bents are similarly desirable. But will not the rural communes exploit the urban by over-pricing their monopoly of food? Or may not a commune grouped round a vital industry exploit the whole community? The mixed character of each commune is the safeguard against this. The guild socialist and the anarchist, who would make each industry self-regarding and independent, tempt producing groups to become exploiters. It is well known that one of the causes of the decline of the medieval guilds was the advantage they took of their monopolies, and there is no reason to believe that a modern guild, tempted by monopoly, would be less greedy. A national guild controlling a certain vital industry might prove as aggressive as a capitalistic trust. A policy which should avoid segregating industries would escape this danger. By organising men in communes wherein the group-consciousness was not governed by a single economic interest, selfishness would be discouraged, and a general broad view would stand before the members in their deliberations. The distinction is seen in the two types of co-operatives now working in Ireland. In the creamery, where the members are bound to-

gether solely by their interest in getting a high price for butter, there is as narrow a spirit of profit-hunting as in a capitalistic joint-stock company. In the developed C.A.S., where labourers and industrial workers are members, and workers' or consumers' interests are vocal on the committee as well as farmers' or property-holders' interests, there is a general sense of enlightenment and an intelligent grasp of the co-operative principle. Here it is easy to convince each class of the need of give-and-take, and an appeal from the national wholesale for action on a certain line in national interests is heard with the respect due from a consciousness to which all factors of the human complex are present.

May we emphasise a point already hinted at, viz., that the conception of the city as grouped into conscious co-operative communes, is not a novel or fantastic one, but one of historical standing. Like most advanced modern ideas, it is a medieval one revived. The conditions to which we and our fathers were born are not normal to the trend of history. Several generations have lived in circumstances brought about by a vast eruption or upheaval; but all the wonders of the modern era do not make our period other than an abnormal one. The industrial revolution and the capitalist era now show signs of wearing out, and in a thousand ways the lineaments of the old world are reappearing through the dissipating smoke. Individualism was but an unnatural fit, and humanity is returning to the communal instincts which guided it through the ages. And our conception of the city

of communes is but a modern version of the medieval practice. "A medieval city," says Kropotkin,* "was not a centralised State. During the first centuries of its existence, the city hardly could be named a State as regards its interior organisation, because the middle ages knew no more of the present centralisation of functions than of the present territorial centralisation. Each group had its share of sovereignty. The city was usually divided into four quarters, or into five to seven sections radiating from a centre, *each quarter or section roughly corresponding to a certain trade or profession which prevailed in it, but nevertheless containing inhabitants of different social positions and occupations*—nobles, merchants, artizans, or even half-serfs; and each section or quarter constituted a quite independent agglomeration. In Venice, each island was an independent political community. It had its own organised trades, its own commerce in salt, its own jurisdiction and administration, its own forum; and the nomination of a doge by the city changed nothing in the inner independence of the units. In Cologne, we see the inhabitants divided into . . . *viciniae*, i.e., neighbour guilds."

The large cities, then, we imagine as formed into *viciniae* round the chief natural nuclei. Dublin would be grouped in *viciniae* round the harbour, the university, the brewery, the biscuit works, etc. Smaller towns would not lend themselves to sub-division, and would form unitary communes.

* *Mutual Aid in the Medieval City.* Reprinted in *Mutual Aid* (1902).

In these latter, another element of medieval town life would be speedily reproduced. Kropotkin tells us how "it was the city itself which used to buy all food supplies for the use of the citizens," and if an urban co-operative were endowed with the whole distributive work of the town, nothing would be more natural than for higgling of the markets and irregularity of food supply to disappear under municipal purchase of prime necessities. The flour, fish, meat or milk supply of a certain town would then either be looked after by food producers united in the commune, or would be a matter of contract. The problem of exploitation and control of prices will be simplified when the State can demand certain allocations of fuel, food, etc., from the producing communes for the municipalities. "We know also that in nearly all medieval cities . . . the craft guilds used to buy, as a body, all necessary raw produce, and to sell the produce of their work through their officials. . . . Not only all merchants of a given city were considered abroad as responsible in a body for debts contracted by any one of them, but the whole city as well was responsible for the debts of each one of its merchants. . . . We learn that the merchant guild of this town (Ipswich) was constituted by all who had the freedom of the city . . . the whole community discussing all together how better to maintain the merchant guild. . . . The merchant guild of Ipswich thus appears rather as a body of trustees of the town than as a common private guild." The co-operative model is clearly perceived in this: "The craft guild was a

common seller of its produce and a common buyer of the raw materials, and its members were merchants and manual workers at the same time." Observe that the medieval scheme, like co-operation, differs from modern communism or collectivism in maintaining communal action without destroying private property.

Before leaving the medieval example, we may note Kropotkin's remark that "the greatest and the most fatal error of most cities was to base their wealth on commerce and industry, to the neglect of agriculture"—the error of the antique Greek city-states. The small town, clearly, should not make the town limits the boundary of the commune, but should unite with the surrounding countryside (as is done by the co-operatives set up in the country towns at present)—while the cities should maintain an alliance with the rural communes having a superfluity of food. Also, the national distributive federation must be given power to preserve a just balance of distribution between the different types of communes.

§ 9.—*The Triple Order*

From the foregoing, it would appear that we are advocating a co-operative polity. This will be regarded by some as Utopian, and by others as too rigid or exclusive. Mr. Leonard Woolf's notable book, *Co-operation and the Future of Industry,* describes us a State run on a purely co-operative basis, and the effect of the picture is one of unreality. It is hard to believe in these theoretically perfect orders.

But we do not conceive the term Co-operative Commonwealth to signify a cast-iron co-operative system. We do not anticipate a total abolition of all speculation, profit-making, wage-earning, and individualism. Nor do we, while opposing State Socialism as an order, hold that no industry or activity must be State-owned or controlled. On the contrary, we see room in the Co-operative Commonwealth for both capitalism and socialism. Our views are expressed with great cogency by Dr. Ryan, of the Catholic University of Washington, who writes* :

> The elements of our economic life, and the capacities of human nature, are too varied and too complex to be forced with advantage into any one system, whether Capitalism, Socialism, or Co-operation. *Any single system or form of socio-economic organisation would prove an intolerable obstacle to individual opportunity and social progress.* Multiplicity and variety in social and industrial orders are required for an effective range of choices, and an adequate scope for human effort.

Thus, it is propounded that a *mixed system* alone can satisfy human nature and social justice. Most Rev. Dr. Fogarty, it will be recalled, recommended a "Mixed Co-operative Commonwealth" to young Ireland as the goal for its endeavours. Dr. Ryan goes on to quote with approval the adumbration by Mr. Aneurin Williams, M.P., of a triple order.† Mr. Williams writes :

* *Distributive Justice* (1919).

† *Co-partnership and Profit-Sharing* (Home University Library).

> . . . Where there are great monopolies, either natural or created, by the combination of businesses, there you have a presumption in favour of State and municipal ownership. In those forms of industry where individuality is everything ; where there are new inventions to make, or to develop and put on the market, or merely to adopt in some rapidly-transformed industry; where the eye of the master is everything ; where reference to a committee or appeals from one official to another would cause fatal delay: there is the natural sphere of individual enterprise pure and simple. Between these two extremes there is surely a great sphere for voluntary association to carry on commerce, manufacture and retail trade, in circumstances where there is no natural monopoly and where the routine of work is not rapidly changing, but on the whole fairly well established and constant.

Mr. Williams gives too condescending an eye to "association," and sees the State in too bourgeois a light. He fails to visualise revolutionary conditions. He writes in terms of the present order, forgetting that if that order were done away with, the State as we know it, and consequently Red Tape, would disappear, and the distinction between "association" and "socialism" would be less deeply marked. But his idea of a triple order is in harmony with our own conceptions. The new order must, we suggest, have its socialistic (i.e., collectivist) element, combined with a co-operative element, and a profit-making (or capitalistic) element. Functions will be allotted to each in accordance with experience and experiment. Such a triple order would, Dr. Ryan remarks :

> give a balanced economy in which the three great socio-economic systems and principles would have full play, and each would be required to do its best in fair competition with the other two. Economic life would exhibit a diversity making strongly for social satisfaction and stability, inasmuch as no very large section of the industrial population would desire to overthrow the existing order. . . . The choice of three great systems of industry would offer the utmost opportunity and scope for the energies and the development of the individual. And this, when all is said, remains the supreme end of a just and efficient socio-industrial organisation.

In these few words, Dr. Ryan sums up a volume of wisdom. The principal objections to socialism, to capitalism, and to co-operation would all go by the board if in the new order all three were so balanced that none of them dominated life and crushed out freedom. If socialism, as it was formerly interpreted, ruled, and all workers were employés of the State, there would be little liberty for the individual. Red Tape would come back, and a small group of bureaucrats would dictate the conditions of life to one and all. Then if co-operation became the universal order, the community would lack cohesion. Group interests of a new sort would arise, and new rivalries. Communes in naturally poor districts would find it hard to get their share of attention in railway services and in allotments of imported goods. And we know too well what is the result of allowing capitalism a free hand.

How, then, are the three elements of the Triple

Order to be adjusted? We suggest that something like the following will be the outline followed:—

(1) *Co-operation.*—This will replace capitalism as the *normal* or general form of economic activity. Rural Ireland will be organised in co-operative communes like Templecrone, and food supply, clothing production, general distribution, and (probably) education, will be entrusted to these communes.

(2) *Collectivism.*—Railways and other transit services will be owned and controlled by the State or municipality. The question as to whether these services should be conducted by guilds, soviets, or State bureaux, is one outside our present consideration. The medical faculty will be made part of the Civil Service. The post office and telegraphs will be collectively owned and controlled.

Shipping is difficult to place. But probably the solution will be that the State will own sufficient shipping to serve the vital transport needs of the nation, while the co-operatives, through their federations, will own coast-wise and fishing fleets, as well as some ocean-going vessels for private services. Privately owned ships will also be on the sea, so long as private speculators find it worth their while to supplement the publicly-owned tonnage.

(3) *Capitalism.*—So long as the necessities of life are produced and distributed co-operatively or collectively, there will be no restriction on private enterprise. Most of the luxury trades, probably, will always be conducted on a private basis. There will, indeed, be co-operative and municipal theatres, but

there may be private ones, too, and learned societies, literary groups, etc., will own their printing presses, magazines, museums, and libraries. Industries dependent on inventions will be stimulated by the allowing of private gains, and as private gains will be practically confined to such cases, instead of being permitted, as at present, in gambling with necessities, the worker and inventor will be encouraged instead of the exploiter and trickster.

In respect of the capitalistic element, it is to be remarked that the allowing of private profits does not mean the allowing of sweating. The meliorist socialist who tries to reform the present capitalist order by fixing minimum wages, maximum hours, etc., is rightly condemned as a foolish tinkerer with something too immense to be patched up. But when the operations of capitalism are restricted from food supply, and profit-making industry subdued to the interests of a general co-operative order, then it will be possible to meliorate the capitalistic element. Profit-sharing and co-partnership are fairly condemned as useless drugs in dealing with a dominant profit-making system. But they would be very proper modifications of capitalistic enterprises when capitalism was subordinate to public interest. In all private concerns under the new order, then, profit-sharing rules would modify private gains. This, however, would benefit the entrepreneur as well as the workmen, as making it easier for him to secure labour in the non-competitive market. It is notorious that luxuries become necessities through time, and so it

could be made the law that when a luxury trade had yielded profit during the inventor's lifetime, but had since grown into a necessity trade, the community should have the right of reversion on his death, subject to some reasonable payment to his heirs. Thus, if a luxury trade has created a demand that has made it a necessity, it may pass from private hands on the inventor's death, all patents being withdrawable, and the workers, or else the local co-operative or the municipality, being given the right to take over plant, etc., at a maximum cost payable to heirs, and fixed by the State.

§ 10.—*The Problem of the Class War*

A communist who was asked his opinion of the Distributivist program considered he had exploded it when he asked: "How can you bring the Distributive Order about?" He was answered by another question, viz.: "How do *you* propose to bring about the Communist Order?" To reach Distributivism is certainly no harder a task than to reach Communism, and in every country in the world there are influential parties, including often many of the nation's finest intellects, seeking to follow the Bolshevik example. But there is really no reason why Distributivists and Communists should not work together in endeavouring to end the reign of ungoverned individualism. "The man who draws up programs for the future is a reactionary," said Marx; and so a loyal Marxian might consistently admit the possibility of the Social

Revolution ending in Distributivism. It is quite conceivable that if ever the socialist parties come into power they will find Distributivism the best plan to build on. Socialism is, in essence, less an economic policy than a moral idea. The socialist should be one who desires the social good. If he advocates the socialisation of property to this end, it is only as an expedient or means; and he is not stultifying his socialism, he is not becoming an individualist, if he ultimately resolves that the social good is best served by restricting the boundaries of socialisation. The Distributivist can, in the higher sense of the word, claim to be a Socialist. He is a Socialist who advocates limited communalisation of ownership. It is noteworthy that according to some observers the Russian Revolution seems now to be tending to the principle of distributed property.

Distributivism can, then, be approached through Socialist propaganda. On the other hand, Ireland is under-industrialised, and the proper line seems to be to concentrate on co-operative construction, leaving industries that cannot be co-operatively handled to develop on capitalist lines until means are found to absorb or moderate them into the new order. There are two reasons why the policy of class war is regarded with reserve by Irish distributivists. First, there is no highly developed industrial system ready to be captured by a workers' revolt, while the undeveloped natural resources allow scope for democratic initiative that will long occupy it in full. Secondly, patriotic and religious forces exist in

Ireland that are believed to be strong enough to bring about class-assimilation and obviate conflict. Still, the co-operative policy is a revolutionary one, and the possible failure of peaceful efforts to bring about the co-operative commonwealth must be faced. Co-operation can progress until it governs distribution; it can control the creameries and most of the agricultural industries; it can start various small industries. But at a certain point it is bound to find itself faced by a dead wall in the capitalist monopoly of raw materials. Sooner or later it will find itself ringed round and its progress barred by—Private Property in the sources of production. Already the movement discerns the attempt to ring it round in the agricultural machinery combine. The war-time refusal of sugar cards to newly-formed Co-operative Societies, crippling them as it did, was another example of the sinister power of individualism to impede the popular movement. How will ascendancy be dislodged? How will co-operative democracy secure access to sufficient coal, iron, wool, transport, machinery, ships, land, for its continued expansion? How will capitalist control of the Press and State and League of Nations be broken? Obviously there are here two forces or classes ranked against each other and incapable of amalgamation. A fight must come, for if Co-operation progresses Individualism is doomed; and Individualism, living by force, will fight for its life by every means in its power, however violent or vile.

It may be that Co-operation will command such an

overwhelming majority of adherents that the ultimate struggle will be bloodless, and will be won by the ballot box. But we know well how Capitalism and Imperialism can buy and corrupt big armies of slaves, and so it may be that when the pull comes the minions of Capitalism will be deceived again with the plea that the fall of Capitalism means their own fall, too, and so will fight once more against their brethren because they are deceived with a lie. We cannot at this early stage forecast with assurance the latter end of the contest, but we can see that the only way to prevent Capitalism and Imperialism from beating us with our flesh and blood is to create a brotherly—a religious—consciousness across the lines of the two orders. We must convince the worker that his due loyalty is to his fellow-worker, not to an ascendancy to which he is bound only by a temporary cash-nexus. We must rouse in him a loyalty to his own kind and inspire him with the ideal of citizens working together for the common interest. To isolate the profiteer and create solidarity among workers is the surest means we have of avoiding violence in the future—for the few profiteers could not put up a fight against a class-conscious world.

The workers must press their case with the minimum of hostility to the employing class as men. "In all things, charity" is a maxim which bids us give any section to which we are opposed in interest, every chance to reach a friendly settlement. Individual employers must not be attacked without an offer to allow them to adapt themselves to the new conditions.

The Irish Catholic employer and the Irish Catholic worker have two things in common in the name of which they should canvass every means to avoid fratricidal strife. Let it be borne in mind that, in the capitalistic past, the young man of enterprise and ambition had no opening but Capitalism. There was no big co-operative movement in which he might become a captain of democratic industry like Paddy the Cope. Men like the late Mr. W. M. Murphy became capitalists by sheer force of circumstances: all honour to their achievements. If more men of Mr. Murphy's brilliant constructive ability are born into Ireland, their energies should be secured for co-operation by offering them in the movement scope for their genius, honour and rewards. In dealing with capitalists, co-operators should give them every means to serve the new order, and open no guns on them till they definitely reject peace and oppose progress. They were natural to the last stage of evolution, and their individual services might be invaluable in the next. It is possible that the social deadlock will be solved in the crucible of the national crisis. Dáil Eireann has opportunities that are not enjoyed by any of the class governments. In England, France or America, it would be preposterous to ask the workers to abstain from direct action and trust the Government, because in these countries the governments are class institutions, and are already in the enemy camp. The Dáil is not a class government. It is admittedly the most representative national institution, and it voices the community's

will more accurately than any other body. The grim tests of outlawry and imprisonment have selected its members—men filled with "the love of the fatherland and the spirit of sacrifice." Here are men to whom national interest will be of supreme appeal, and they have an amazingly united support among the masses. A government that is strong can afford to be impartial, and we shall hope to see the social question grappled with by those whose motives are above suspicion. If the agitator is commanded to abstain from unlicensed action, the reactionary on the other hand may be commanded with equally authoritative a voice to yield to public interest.

In all industrial disputes, there are right and wrong. If these are not differentiated, it is because an impartial and powerful authority is not brought to bear. Sometimes the workers are unreasonable, and make demands that can lead to nothing but the decline of an industry that they cannot conduct themselves. A just and firm authority could determine their fault. Often the employers are greedy and selfish, and will allow the workers no share in the control or fruits of an industry. Here authority should condemn the masters. If abstract Christianity were conscientiously obeyed by both classes, the Church could command a just arbitration in each case. The State has coercive powers that the Church has not: it can command where the Church can only advise. Social strife should be dealt with by appeals to reason, justice, morality and patriotism. When an employer or a class stubbornly ignores all these,

then the Big Stick should be used and the State called in. But not before. Two facts must be recognised by the parties to the social problem—(1) that workers' control of industry in some form is now inevitable, but (2) that for the time being it is not feasible in more than a few industries in other than an elementary or incomplete form. It will probably be long before the workers are trained for the management of large industries. The advocate of cataclysmic revolution favours the training of the workers by sheerly throwing the management on them, as ducklings are thrown into the pond to teach them to swim. The principal objection to cataclysmic revolution is, that it is subject to reactions. A complex social order given over to unskilled revolutionaries breaks down and the *emigrés* return. Cataclysmic revolution, moreover, is scarcely practicable in Ireland, since England is, after America, the greatest anti-revolutionary power, and violent revolution could not succeed in Ireland without a sympathetic movement across-Channel. Progressive revolution is none the less revolution, and if only driving power can be maintained behind it (which is the chief difficulty, and which is shirked by the *sansculotte*), it is sure and effective. Christianity overcame paganism by progressive revolution, and the victory was thorough.

Progressive revolution is, therefore, advocated in Ireland for a variety of reasons. Before plunging into a class-struggle for the expropriation of capitalists, a friendly settlement should be offered.

It should be possible to draw up proposals for the purchase and taking over by the workmen of different factories or industries and the division of big ranches. These proposals should be made in terms as favourable to the owners as is reasonably possible, and couched in fraternal terms as from one loyal Catholic to another. They should then be presented to the owners through some ecclesiastical intermediary. Where the workers are yet too backward to be able to run the industry themselves, a profit-sharing co-partnership proposal should be made in place of a purchase proposal. It is quite possible that in many a case the Church's influence would here soften the asperity of class war, avert struggle, and secure a bloodless, tearless, glorious solution. The Dáil could be called upon to exert its influence when workers proved unreasonable, or to organise the basis of compensation or co-partnership where friendly settlements were agreed to. How splendid a thing it would be could Ireland thus, by her supernatural faith, achieve what elsewhere has been won only by bitterness and passion! How noble would be the fame of the voluntarily-abdicating owner-class, and how warm a current of national charity would be generated! Those who surrendered would never regret it. They would be remembered for ever; the people would praise them for ever.

CHAPTER VII

THE ULSTER QUESTION

What tho' we've looked in silence
  On our country's brightening eyes?
Was our silence not prophetic
  Of a soul about to rise? . . .
So ariseth gallant Ulster
  In her firm and fearless few,
With the fires of their fathers
  And their love of Erin, too.

"BELFASTMAN."

THE Ulster Problem is a factitious one. What are the facts? Certain inhabitants of Ireland, who have long enjoyed an ascendancy that began with the Penal Code, have opposed every extension of liberty towards the submerged nation. In latter days they have been financed from Conservative quarters in England, and their lower class inflamed with a bigoted propaganda towards the frustration of Irish self-government. The existence of such a population within the borders of Ireland is an Irish domestic question. Sinn Féin has always declined to state

what measures would be adopted towards these people by an Irish government, because it is impossible to prejudge the case. As it was impossible to know what attitude Ulster Unionists would take on the withdrawal of the British army of occupation, so it was impossible to treat with them while they relied on that army to preserve for them an unreasonable ascendancy. In a self-governing Ireland, no class will be allowed the unnatural advantages which Irish Unionism has hitherto enjoyed. On the other hand, claims for special treatment of peculiar cases will be listened to where reasonable; and a claim to ascendancy is a different thing to (say) a claim for special fiscal treatment. The claim we have known we cannot listen to; the claim that *may be* we cannot discuss till it is made.

A cantonal system of government is favoured by many in the South of Ireland—another phase of the devolutionary tendency that we discussed at length in another place—and under such an order the N.E. enclave would enjoy regional government appropriate to its peculiar industrial conditions. So far as there is any honest case in N.E. Ulster for peculiar treatment this would meet it. Every responsible Irish leader, questioned on the point, has expressed willingness to see such an arrangement adopted if it were truly desired. But no measure denying the sovereignty of the Irish Government in N.E. Ulster, or sanctioning the Two-Nation heresy, could be endured.

The very grounds on which Partition has been

advocated are those which render it most obnoxious. It has been pointed out that the Orangeman is bitterly hostile to Catholic Ireland. That is a reason for refusing to leave him master of the destinies of Catholic Irishmen. His fanaticism is a bye-word. In the years 1920-21 we saw in N.E. Ulster something that cannot be imagined as happening anywhere else in the world in the twentieth century—industrial workers refusing to work with their fellows of a certain creed, and men being shot in the streets for a refusal to deny their faith. Conceive this :—A harmless boy going home from work finds himself confronted by an armed picket on a bridge. He is seized, and asked his religion. When he confesses that he is a Catholic, he is ordered to curse the earthly head of his Church on pain of death. He refuses—and is shot dead. Three hundred years ago this would be called martyrdom. To-day it is called "a regrettable occurrence." Again, a zealot from the shipyards or rope factory, after working hours, takes a repeating rifle to a convenient roof, and blazes away at certain grounds known to surround a monastery. His hope that some Papist will be hit comes true, and a harmless monk drops dead. Elsewhere, a convent stands devoted to teaching, prayer and charity —superstition, if you will. A hurried message reaches the nuns and they fly; a few minutes later a mob fires the religious house, and it is gutted. These things happen, not in Mexico, but in Derry and Belfast in the year of grace, 1920. British forces occupy each city meanwhile, and are assumed to be

maintaining law and order. They never fire on the zealot rioters, however.

These horrors are not to be laid to the door of the Protestant religion. No Irishman is stirred to that error. They lie at the door of some anachronistic, Totemistic, avatistic savage lust. There can be little doubt that the bigotry of N.E. Ulster is a form of mass insanity. Its accompaniment of the hideous drums (only those who have heard a town vibrating with the horrid noise can conceive the ghastliness of this survival of the Tom-tom) is confirmatory evidence. The savages' medicine-man is not wanting to complete the proof, for the infected masses are incited periodically by men who claim spiritual guidance—and who disgrace the faith of Bunyan and Baxter, Comenius and Clifford by calling themselves Protestants. The disease must be looked on dispassionately, as with the eye of a doctor, not with anger or resentment, but with pity for the men who shoot and burn as well as for those who are shot and harassed. Devout Protestants deplore the outbreaks as well as Catholics, and will assist the national government in sternly quelling any recurrences. Dáil Eireann has decreed it illegal to impose religious or political tests in industrial employment, and this rule will be enforced as power becomes available. Under national rule, Catholic and Protestant will be terms unknown in civil affairs, and men will be selected on grounds of character and efficiency, any employer who breaks away from this rule being subject to hard law.

It is not with a view to invidious comparisons between religions that we feel it desirable to touch on the treatment of Protestants in the South of Ireland. It is to be pointed out that, whereas Orangemen are rebellious where they are grouped in a fairly solid *bloc*, and are in a position, not merely to defend themselves, but to persecute a Catholic minority, there is no such seditious spirit amongst the "scattered Protestants" who live in small minorities among the Catholic population. Proof that Catholic Ireland abhors bigotry is found in the fact that where Protestants are too much isolated to protect themselves against boycott or preferential treatment, they do not suffer, but, on the contrary, flourish, and amass quite a disproportionate share of the wealth of the district. A couple of recent testimonies by eminent Protestant ministers may be quoted with advantage. Rev. W. H. T. Gahan (Church of Ireland Rector), Gorey, writes:

> Speaking for myself, I may say that, having spent a ministry of fifteen years in the Midlands and South of Ireland, I cannot remember a single instance of anything but kindness, consideration, and a spirit of more than tolerance from my Roman Catholic friends and neighbours. Lest I should be regarded as particularly fortunate in this respect, I may add that, during recent months, when I have come into contact with many of our clergy from different parts of the South and West, and when one's conversation inevitably turns to the state of the country, I have not heard a single complaint of religious intolerance or hostility, but many willing, and some half-surprised, testimonies to the contrary.

Again, Rev. Dr. Denham Osborne (a distinguished Presbyterian minister) points out that Southern ministers of his communion have repeatedly made public their testimony to the kindly relations existing between the surrounding community and their congregations, adding :

> This was done by the Moderator of the General Assembly, a Southern minister, at the recent meeting in Belfast. It was done by the Moderator of the Synod of Dublin, the minister of Waterford in April last. It was done also by the Convener of the Irish Mission, a Dublin minister, and other speakers during the Assembly meetings. If I may refer to myself I have repeatedly repudiated in public this charge of intolerance. Fellow-Churchmen of mine have done the same ; and many of them, like myself, have given scores of years and service to our Church in Southern Ireland.

It is, perhaps, foolish to lay stress on Catholic Ireland's freedom from religious prejudice. In the twentieth century, no normal community, whatever its religion, cherishes sectarian suspicions or hostilities. All is summed up by saying that Ireland is a normal community : no evidence whatever has been brought against her, as against the Orange faction, to challenge her claim to be normal. In point of fact, Protestant Irishmen's possession of wealth and technical skill makes them valuable citizens, and, in a free Ireland, they are certain of opportunities to take leading parts in big developments. If creeds were ever taken into account Protestants might be sure

that prudent nation-builders would, *à priori*, tend to cultivate their interests! If and when the unthinkable happens, and Catholic Ireland persecutes Protestant citizens for their faith, it will be time for the victims to cry out for succour. But what protection has the prosperous Protestant in the Republican South to-day that Belfast should lack to-morrow?

The whole case is factitious. Tory politicians have been behind the whole Ulster agitation. Not on the infuriated and ignorant bolt-thrower in the shipyards lies the blood of the murdered Catholic, but on the Carsons and Londonderries and Croziers who have fanned the flame of bigotry for unscrupulous political ends. The difference between the financing of the "Ulster" and the National movements is eloquent. In national Ireland, every national movement is financed by the hard-earned pennies of the men-in-the-ranks. There have been no rich subscribers to the Volunteer, Gaelic League or Sinn Féin funds. The people have paid their own expenses. The whole Ulster agitation was financed by rich subscribers, mostly resident in England. The Ulster Volunteer would march—when he was paid to. He would never put his hand in his pocket for his alleged convictions. He never made a sacrifice. There is not one single record of sacrifice in the whole story of the U.V.F. There has never been even the smallest glimmer of a literary movement associated with Unionism to show that any intellectual or idealist stirring was behind it. When a big parade was called, the rich men had to subscribe for hun-

dreds of bowler hats with which to equip their panting warriors for the photographer's benefit! It is fairly clear that so artificial an agitation will not seriously menace the *fait accompli* of recognised Irish independence. The element of bigotry would be suppressed like any mob-outburst. It could not live a day without the connivance of those in power.

But above and beyond all this rests the fact that when the free state appears in its true character to the Belfast worker, it is even likely that he will discover an enthusiasm for it. The fact that Ireland today, unlike England, is exporting more than she is importing, having a heavy balance of trade in her favour, so that under an independent regime her £ would be worth at least 25s., has convinced not a few Ulster business men that Republicanism may be a paying proposition. The chance to become the citizen of creditor, instead of a debitor, nation, would determine the loyalty of many if they could see their way to freedom! And as for the worker, the spectacle of Dáil Eireann's Democratic Program in operation would bring about a landslide. This, indeed, is what the Unionist most fears. Hence his frantic efforts to strangle the Labour movement in Ulster, which has so far undermined Carsonism that Belfast Corporation itself is trembling. The incitement of the recent religious pogroms was intended to stop, in bloody reaction, that growing Labour consciousness, which is fast loosening the Belfast masses from old allegiances, and putting them in a position to form new ones.

It is an historical fact that the "Ulster" movement is of recent and artificial origin. The Two-Nation theory is a novel invention. The Orangeman is a perverted Irishman; he is not a Scot or an Englishman, for these we always absorbed when they settled among us. It is your pervert who is most hard to reconcile. But even if he were a foreigner, no case would exist for partition. For the growth of a foreign population on a corner of a nation's soil does not give that corner the right to secede. Part of Liverpool has a strong Irish majority, but it has to obey English rule, and rightly so. Whitechapel is a Hebrew settlement, but it cannot claim independence from Britain. The English nation was there before the growth of the settlements, and some part of it is still diffused through the settled areas. To cut off the districts would be to inflict a hardship on Englishmen who have a native right to English rule, in favour of strangers who live there on sufferance. Also it would break up established economic, cultural and legal interests vested in the unity of England, and having the sanction of history.

The nation may not betray its dead, nor its unborn: it stands above time and cannot recognise in temporal interests the right to break its traditional continuity. If any Belfastmen choose to regard themselves as not Irish, then they put themselves in the position of Jews in East London. The Irish nation was in N.E. Ulster before them, and it is still there, however diffused it may be held to be. The traditional and historic boundary of Ireland is un-

mistakable. Those who are unwilling to accept Irish citizenship can, if they desire, "opt" for English citizenship—and go to England. We believe, and the event will prove it, that when Irish justice and the liberal but firm rule of Dáil Eireann are established, very few, either workers or business men, will "opt" for the discarding of their Irish rights. In any case, the Irish nation cannot stultify its historic claims by yielding to unjust demands on purely hypothetical grounds. The special treatment of Ulster is a domestic question, and will remain such until the Irish people outrage humanity by an intolerant action that is foreign to their nature and would be fatal to their interests.

In securing the founding of an Ulster Parliament —opened in Belfast by King George under such military precautions as would have been needed in rebel Kerry—sandbags, machine guns, military decrees, scrutinies—the Ulster politicians played to secure title-deeds with which to bargain later with Southern Ireland. They had small intention of running the Northern Parliament in the form in which it was set up; but with this Pale Parliament in their hands, they calculated that they could bargain with the inevitable Irish State for special advantages under the new régime. It gave them a *locus standi* that no other section of the Irish people—Labour or Co-operation—enjoyed. Probably they will prove so little enamoured of Ulster devolution that, if they can succeed in trading these title-deeds once the Irish State is at work, they will waive the

local government that some timid Irish-Irelanders have been anxious to thrust upon them. The enormous economic possibilities of the Irish State will be seized on by our North Easterly friends with no delay, and probably they will, for pocket reasons, aims at national manufacturing and distributing monopoly, etc., discard Ulster autonomy when Southern Ireland is advocating it. For Ulster autonomy to-day is but a move in the game for a lion's share to the old Ascendancy of the jobs under the new Irish State.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SPIRITUAL ASPECT OF SINN FEIN

> . . . Truly, as soon as the rules and dictates of Christian wisdom, which are the assured basis of stability and peace, came to be disregarded in the ordering of public life, the very structure of the State began to be shaken to its fall ; and there has also ensued so great a change of thought and conduct that, unless God comes to the rescue, the dissolution of human society itself would seem to be at hand.
>
> —BENEDICT XV. (1914).

§ 1.—*Religion and Revolution*

THAT which matters most to Irishmen in the Sinn Fein revolution is its spiritual significance. For good or bad, it must be assessed by its moral fruits. And for the world, the moral element in the Irish movement is its most interesting element. What answer does Sinn Fein Ireland, this ancient but renascent Catholic nation, make to the problems of the times? Has she any contribution to make, by her example, to the wisdom of the age?

To-day, the whole world is in a sinister condition of unrest. Strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions and decay are seemingly universal. The wheels of industry, stopped by the war, cannot be got going again. Executions for political offences, imprisonment without trial, falsification of the press, mass coercion, corruption of currency, are "taken for granted." National and class hostilities are more savage than ever in history. Truly, "the dissolution of human society" which Pope Benedict feared seven years ago seems definitely to have set in. And no intelligent observer could quarrel with the Pope's analysis of the causes of unrest: "the lack of mutual love among men; disregard for authority; unjust quarrels between the various classes; material prosperity become the absorbing object of human endeavour." The collapse of religion as a factor in modern civilisation is recognised by all, and rejoiced in by some. It is, at the same time, becoming clear that unfaith can destroy, but cannot build. Religion is like a cement that has mysteriously vanished, so that the old edifice is falling, and naught remains wherewith to build up the new. Regarded even, as a rationalist regards it, viz., as a superstition, religion is now seen to be a necessary factor in order or progress. Hence a changed note is heard in the most advanced revolutionaries' utterances. The academic revolutionary in these western countries still cheerfully talks, from his armchair, of the need for a violent and utter overthrow of the present order. But the Bolsheviki, who are face to face with the

realities of social revolution, are significantly anxious that "total demolition" shall be avoided as the revolution spreads. Thus, in their Communist Manifesto, they speak of the present unrest in society, and describe their movement as "the best and only means by which . . . the proletariat can be saved *and with it society itself*." Thus the most advanced practical revolutionaries recognise the danger in which society stands. They admit the possibility of "red ruin and the breaking-up of laws" as the outcome of the present crisis. And so when the arm-chair revolutionary talks of blowing-up everything and relying on "spiral forces" or "immanent evolutionary tendencies" to build New Jerusalem on the ruins, he has the support neither of Catholic authority nor Bolshevik experience. His policy is likely to bring back the Dark Ages.

The Bolshevik holds that Soviet Communism alone can avert that dissolution which all thinkers fear. But even if it be granted that the Bolshevik's system is in all respects the soundest organisation of humanity, yet the spiritual sickness which is wrecking the present order would still need to be cured ere the new could function satisfactorily. When humanity was virile, the exhilaration of manly endeavour made masters and servants work vigorously together. But to-day, healthy *joie-de-vivre* is dead. The professional worker still enjoys his craft, but the ordinary worker has lost all zest in labour. Even higher and higher wages will not tempt him, for profusion of cheap luxuries has made him *blasé* and

indifferent. Merely to make him part-master of the factory he works in will not rouse him, for this will mean only that his wages are increased by the capitalist's rent and profit ; and as he will work less when driving force slackens, production will lessen and he will be no richer than before. To-day, in point of fact, the skilled worker is receiving wages far larger than the salary which he could hope for under a socialistic régime. So it is clear that no economic change can change society unless it involves a psychological change. The disease is of the spirit.

"And yet," says Dr. Inge, "there is a remedy within the reach of all if we would only try it. The essence of the Christian revelation is the proclamation of a standard of absolute values, which contradicts at every point the estimates of good and evil current in the world. . . . Christianity increases the wealth of the world by creating new values. Wealth depends on human valuation. . . . It is hardly possible to estimate the increase of real wealth, and the stoppage of waste, which would result from the adoption of a rational, still more a Christian, valuation of the good things of life. . . . [It is important to take] into consideration, in all economic questions, the *human costs* of production, the factors which make work pleasant or irksome, and especially the moral condition of the worker. Good-will diminishes the toll which labour takes of the labourer; envy and hatred vastly increase it while they diminish its product. . . . There is one thing which can make almost any work welcome. If it is

done from love or unselfish affection, the human cost is almost *nil,* because it is not counted nor consciously felt. . . . In all useful work the keen desire to render social service, or to do God's will, diminishes to an incalculable extent the 'human cost' of labour. This principle introduces a deep cleavage between the Christian remedy and that of political socialism, which fosters discontent and indignation as a lever for social amelioration. Men are made unhappy in order that they may be urged to claim a larger share of the world's wealth. Christianity considers that, measured by human costs, the remedy is worse than the disease."

Dr. Inge offers no practical proposals for the revival of Christian values, so desirable in itself as the salvation of society. In days when childlike faith in supernatural religion was universal, it was easier to evoke respect for Christian values than in days when the supernatural is scorned by the most ignorant, and there is nothing to build on. It seems a vain and foolish thing to appeal to the masses to obey Christian ideals when they do not believe in the historic existence of Christ, nor even in personal survival after death. Professor Bury finds that "Progress" has brought about a complete undermining of belief, so that while lips murmur credos, hearts are all agnostic. "Belief in personal immortality is still very widely entertained, but may we not fairly say that it has ceased to be a . . . guiding idea of collective life? . . . Many people do not believe in it; many more regard it as so un-

certain that they could not reasonably permit it to affect their lives or opinions. . . . One can hardly be wrong in saying that, as a general rule, this belief does not possess the imaginations of those who hold it, that their emotions react to it feebly, that it is felt to be remote and unreal, and has comparatively seldom a . . . direct influence on conduct." Few will challenge this estimate. Whereas religion dominated in determining conduct in former states of society, in the present it is negligible.

It is here that Ireland is unique. We have made the foregoing quotations in order to show how marked a contrast Ireland offers to the rest of Europe. Call it, if you will, the survival of superstition in a priest-ridden country, but admit it you must, that belief in personal survival, and in other items of supernatural faith, does exert an effective influence on Irish life. In Ireland, religion *does* count as a practical force. Instances in proof scarce need to be adduced: they are familiar knowledge. The English Government's efforts to capture the Vatican or the Irish hierarchy are tokens of the recognised power of the Church. The successful moral resistance to Conscription was organised on a religious basis, and undoubtedly owed its effectiveness to that fact. In Ireland, as has been remarked, no one doubts that the National Novena evoked a miracle in the salvation of the people from the holocaust prepared. The belief may be regarded as superstitious, if you will, and it may be held that the

influence of religion in bracing the masses is but a phenomenon of subconscious suggestion. But it is none the less effective. Ideals are not fought for in this way in agnostic countries. The might of the greatest military power on earth is not turned to naught by simple peasant-boys in lands where men have turned their backs on the Faith with which twelve untutored men conquered a world-wide empire. In Ireland, then, the first essential for the restoration of Christian values survives, to wit, *Faith*. She is peculiar among nations, because in her the most advanced revolutionary spirit is united with the most conservative religious tradition. We believe that in this her case is of interest and significance for all other nations.

"The world," says Father Plater, a distinguished English Jesuit, "looks to Ireland to display the beauty of a supernatural faith worthily reflected in an enlightened and harmonious social order."

§ 2.—*A Working Model of a Catholic Order*

Ireland, in short, is the world's working model of Catholic philosophy: that is her significance. Nowhere else on the globe has Distributivism—the system which Catholic social teachers oppose to Communism and Capitalism—such ample opportunity, of historic circumstance and national willingness, to demonstrate its soundness and adequacy. Catholic social theory, we must remind the reader, is totally distinct from Catholic religious dogma: an

atheist can admire it, and on the Continent the so-called Catholic parties have non-Catholics in their membership.

"There is at the present day," writes Dr. O'Brien, a leading exponent of medieval economics, "a growing body of thinking men in every country who are full of admiration for the ethical teaching of Christianity, but are unable or unwilling to believe in the Christian religion. The fact of such unbelief or doubt is no reason for refusing to adopt the Christian code of social justice, which is founded upon reason rather than upon revelation, and which has its roots in Greek philosophy and Roman law rather than in the Bible and the writings of the Fathers. . . . Although Christian religious and ethical teaching are combined in the teaching of the Catholic Church, they are not inseparable. . . . The Christian ethic . . . might be adopted without subscribing to the Christian dogma."

And so it is that we see in England a growing school of thought (led by the *New Age* writers) which favours Catholic social theory, and yet is mainly composed of non-Catholics. It has yet to be seen whether such a school can ever be more than an academic body while lacking the driving force of supernatural faith. But what are the characteristics of Catholic teaching on the present discontents?

First, it repudiates the evolutionary doctrine. We regard Marx as we regard Euclid: he is a useful mental exercise. The Marxian hypothesis helps us to trace cause and effect in many a difficult passage

in history. But we refuse to regard Marxian theories as Marxian laws. An hypothesis that is partly true often leads in science to many discoveries until it is foolishly taken as fully or finally true, when it becomes a hindrance instead of a help. The atomic theory brought about many discoveries until it came to be taken as a law, and then it blinded science for years to the greater discoveries of the present day. And so we go with the Marxian in tracing the economic element in historic development, and part with him when he declares it to be the only element. We do not, accordingly, regard capitalism as an essential phase in social evolution. We regard Capitalism as an ugly abnormality in history, and revolutionary socialism as a reaction that may bring it to an end. The revolutionary movement is a secular force like a storm or earthquake, threatening the things we hate, capitalism, militarism, and the system of hostile states. We welcome it as likely to do our work for us, and yet we cannot cast ourselves into it, because it is not our movement. It does not promise nor ensure the consummation of our desires. It may throw down the things we hate, but our business is to build up the things we love. We hold that the Reformation did not assist progress, but interrupted progress, for it broke up the distributive order that the Catholic Church had developed, and it brought back servility. It is an article of faith with us that man can, and does, go astray. That God has a divine end to which the universe will ultimately work is as much our belief to-day as it was Dante's six

hundred years ago, but still, with him, we hold that the end may often be departed from instead of approached, and the glorious consummation delayed again and again by those who choose to turn their back on it.

> . . . Among themselves all things
> Have order ; and from hence the form, which makes
> The universe resemble God. In this
> The higher creatures see the printed steps
> Of that eternal worth, which is the end
> Whither the line is drawn.
> Yet it is true
> That as, oft-times, but ill accords the form
> To the design of art, through sluggishness
> Or unreplying matter; so this course
> Is sometimes quitted by the creature, who
> Hath power, directed thus, to bend elsewhere.

So we do not accept any movement as being right, because it happens. We are not convinced because the world tends in a certain direction that that is the way to progress. Capitalism and Socialism do not carry us "spirally" higher than the Order that prevailed before Christendom was ruptured: on the contrary, we only welcome revolution because, by cancelling Capitalism, it frees us to get back to that Order of old.

The Catholic, then, is a restless rebel against Determinism. As in religion, he is taught never to rest content with the assurance of salvation, so, socially or politically, he is never content to go with the current because it *is* the current. Catholic Ireland, therefore, is unwilling to yield either to Capitalism or Marxism. It follows, too, from a re-

pudiation of Marxian determinism that we reject the theory of the Inevitable Class War. We do not trace Class War as a permanent feature in human society. *Classes* there always were since man emerged from the patriarchal pastoral life described in the early chapters of *Genesis*; but the periods in history in which the classes co-operated are far more extensive than those exceptional and anarchic periods in which the classes were at war. Over large areas and during long periods slavery was the basis of class relations, and this perhaps may be deplored: yet it is notorious that states recognising slavery ran for ages with as much happiness as is usual on this earth, and a brightly-coloured life of song and worship was enjoyed in which the existence of a slave status for part of the population did not cause discontent or disruption. Under the influence of the Church, slavery was in Europe modified and abolished, and for centuries a hierarchy of free classes worked efficiently. Civilisation was built up by the co-operation of classes, and class-war always coincided with disintegration or decay. Says Mr. Penty in *A Guildman's Interpretation of History*:—

> . . . If Marx's view is correct, and if exploitation has played the part in history which he affirms it has, then I do not see how civilisation ever came into existence. We know that exploitation is breaking civilisation up; we may be equally sure it did not create it. . . . When everything but economic considerations has been excluded from life, men tend naturally to quarrel, because there is nothing positive left to bind men together in a communal life.

The Class War, then, is not to be regarded as a good thing inherent in history, and the mainspring of progress. It is a bad and disruptive thing. But is Class Exploitation, such as undoubtedly exists at the present day in capitalist countries, and such as existed in Ireland when the land was owned by a foreign ascendancy, to be endured without resistance? No. Unjust ascendancies may be attacked. Only it must not be assumed—as the Class War advocate assumes—that every inequality is unjust. The cases we have cited are glaring. Wherever a private person stands stubbornly in the way of the public good through selfishness, there is a case for his removal. But the employing class as a whole is not to be struck at as having unjust power or authority. In the eyes of Catholic authority, it would be wrong to expropriate capitalists without compensation, for it is wrong to involve an individual in hardships to which he is not accustomed. The *de facto* status of individuals must be recognised. That is dictated by mercy and a sense of fitness. Wisdom approves this liberality as the means to avoid bitterness and anarchy. Hence ungoverned Class War is no less than an attack on individuals' rights and is immoral. But stern as Catholic teaching is in condemning the shock tactics of the revolutionary, it fully authorises the use of coercive measures against the unreasonably recalcitrant. Where the workers are capable of running an industry in the public interest, and the capitalist stands between them and security, he may be expropriated by the

altum dominium of the community, provided that he is offered fair conditions. The Catholic policy, then, in regard to workers' control of industry, is one of peaceful negotiation.

In Ireland we hope to see the Church acting as intermediary between wage-workers and owners, in arranging first co-partnership and finally full purchase of industries. Where owners exploit their position of monopoly, there will be no further hesitation about resorting to the Big Stick. But if force is reserved for the stubborn only, instead of being launched against a whole class, it will be so obviously justified that the whole of society will approve its use. It may be, too, that, as co-operation advances, it will find itself ringed round by the Capitalist enemy and denied access to the sources of raw material. Private property in natural sources of production may some day *force* a form of Class War on the most unwilling. But here again, abstinence from warlike measures in normal cases will justify the use of violence when the abnormal arises. There is every hope, however, that long strides towards economic democracy will be made in Ireland without resort to Class War. The Church's influence, if only directed with enlightenment, is capable of persuading Catholic masters to subserve the higher ideal. Should this come about, Ireland may set a radiant example to the world.

Inseparable from Catholic philosophy is the ideal of Order. Those who believe in what is called "perfectibility," and who think that the moral diseases of society can be removed by a change of

institutions instead of by the laborious efforts of religion, quite naturally denounce the Church's "conservatism." Lenin has had pasted up in big letters before the Kremlin, this inscription: "Religion is the opium of the people." The agnostic position is logical. But so is the Catholic. Between the two, men must decide by looking into their own hearts. But hard it is to imagine how any man who has experienced the difficulties of the world and of his own nature, can doubt that suffering is the human lot, or be unconscious of the need for authority. The Catholic position is summarised in Leo XIII.'s famous Social Encyclical:

> . . . To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let them strive as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hard-pressed people the boon of freedom from pain and trouble, an undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they delude the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only one day bring forth evils worse than the present. *Nothing is more useful than to look upon the world as it really is.*

Hence then the justification for Order, Authority and Obedience, by which Catholic theory stands or falls. The wisest laws will often have some unjust incidence, and Catholic doctrine demands that in these cases they be loyally obeyed. Order demands sacrifice, and sacrifice is the human lot. There is thus no room for the Arcadian who will obey only

so long as law pleases him. Those who believe that perfect equality, entire freedom are obtainable in this life have a right to their opinions; but—"nothing is more useful than to look upon the world as it is."

The most outstanding practical feature of the Catholic attitude in social and political matters has reference to Property. As all readers know, Mr. Belloc and the group of writers associated with him contend that on this very issue of Property all Europe will come to be ranged in two camps—the Communist and the Catholic. The Church's moral teaching predisposes every Catholic to Distributivism, or diffusion of private property, and this ideal is advocated very spontaneously by Catholic writers. Pope Leo may be said to have made Distributivism almost an official policy for loyal Catholics, advocating it so explicitly and so strongly as he did as the solution for modern discontents. At the root of this attitude is the moral principle that man has an innate right to property, to deny which is heresy. But Catholic writers have developed the basic principle into a detailed philosophy, and contend that property is an institution which disciplines and develops society. As we have observed elsewhere, "a stewardship over a certain allotment of natural wealth seems to call forth those husbandly qualities in men that make the earth's development most orderly and gracious."

Dr. O'Brien, in the work already quoted from, sets forth the medieval, or Catholic, theory and ideal very clearly. As owners, men have the means to

develop the virtue of *liberalitas*, tempered by prudence. The good steward must display *magnificentia*, or munificence, on fitting occasions, as at the building of a church, or giving splendid marriage feasts. But he must avoid *parvicentia*, a habit inclining one not to undertake great works, when circumstances call for them, or to execute them in niggardly manner. Also he must avoid foolish lavishness, as in undertaking great works not called for. "He who neglected the duty of munificence, either by refusing to make a great expenditure when it was called for, or by making one when it was unnecessary, was also deemed to have done wrong, because in the one case he valued his money too highly, and in the other not highly enough." But if private property is to be the basis of a Catholic order, how are abuses of private property, with which we are all too familiar in the selfishness of some peasant proprietors, to be checked? The answer is found in the principle of the Just Price, to which a remarkable return has been made in Ireland of the "peasant proprietors."

The doctrine of the Just Price simply asserted that it was unlawful to give or receive a price dictated by the emergencies of the buyer or seller; for every article a certain price could be deduced from the laws of justice. Cost of production was the principal but not the only factor determining the Just Price, and was not fixed by the higgling of the markets, but by common estimation. "The common estimation of which the Canonists spoke was con-

scious social judgment that fixed price beforehand, and was expressed chiefly in custom, while the social estimate of to-day is in reality an unconscious resultant of the higgling of the market, and finds its expression only in market price."

Mr. Warre B. Wells, writing in *The New Witness*, in April, 1919, when Irish Labour had closed the ports to the export of bacon, in order to bring down the price, then excessive, pointed out that the Labour Executive's manifesto to the bacon curers contained an extraordinary expression of the philosophy of the Just Price:

> You may be ignorant of the duties you have imposed upon yourselves. You have resumed the responsibility of providing bacon for the Irish people. You chose this duty voluntarily, and the people hitherto have accepted you at your own valuation; they have acquiesced without questioning your ability or organising capacity. To provide food of this particular kind is your duty to your country: that is the service your country demands of you in your capacity of merchants or traders. You have ignorantly and selfishly thought that your only consideration need be to buy cheap and sell dear. Despite your political professions, of whatever brand, you have confessed to the social philosophy of nineteenth-century Manchester: "Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost." The workers are now making an attempt—by shock tactics if you will—to rouse you to a sense of responsibility, and either by co-operating with you, or, if you fail, by acting without your aid, to proceed to erect a sounder social structure.

As Mr. Wells aptly pointed out:

> Irish Labour has not sought in this matter of food prices (except as a threatened last resource) to interfere with private property as such. It has, instead, asserted the principle of the usage of private property in the public interest; and the method which it has adopted in asserting this principle is the method of the just price. Now, I do not think that this is a mere accident due to the immediate circumstances of the case. I believe it is a spontaneous revival of the Catholic social tradition strong in Ireland before the Reformation, persistent despite the comparative indifference of the Catholic Church in Ireland of late to sociological questions, and coming to the surface again upon a specific occasion at a time when there is much troubling of the waters in the hidden springs of national being.

In this passage, the Catholic solution to the social problem is completely summed up. And the writer perceives the most interesting truth about the Irish Labour movement, to wit, that, while it is "extreme" in its thoroughness, its readiness for direct action, yet the instincts of a profoundly religious population are impressing on it a character of its own quite unlike that which the doctrinaire Marxian would desire. The Revolutionary has excellent material in Ireland so long as he works with the grain; but the grain is Christian, and when he crosses the Church, he fails.

§ 3.—*Education and the Future*

In the foregoing section we have dealt with the Church in her natural, not her supernatural, aspects. While it is true that what we may term non-dogmatic

Catholicism is an important and interesting feature of Irish life to-day, it must be remarked that the more spiritual element in the Catholic faith is also a most active element in modern Ireland. It is not too much to say that the Sinn Féin movement has coincided with a profound religious movement; may, in fact, be regarded as an aspect of a religious movement. It is a commonplace that the sweeping out of the old job-hunting political system was a moral purification to public life. But not only have sacrifice and hardship purged Ireland as with winnowing fans, there has been an extraordinary revival of old-world faith. Partly this is due to the teachings of Pearse and many Gaelic League writers, who turned the nation's memory back to Colmcille and Brigid and Breandan and Enda, filling the people's imagination once more with the hero-memories of those saints. But also it was due to the example of those hosts of clerks and country boys who, in prison, in the condemned cell, on the brink of death from hunger, and in the concentration camp, sought fortitude in the favourite Irish devotion of the Rosary.

But further, the truth is that the Christian faith is inseparably woven into the fabric of Irish tradition. It is at the great pilgrimages to Croagh Patrick, where Patrick wrestled with the angel, and Lough Derg, the island shrine, that the splendid spiritual unity of the Irish race is most deeply revealed; and he who is divided from the Irish people in honour for the Lion of the Tribe, though he cherish the political

principles of Wolfe Tone, is still part-blind to the full national vision. Montégut is in essence right when he writes:

> . . . If, as Mitchel predicts, we shall witness a return of the Heraclidae, this return will be led by the Cross and the Catholic banner, amid smoking incense, and to the song of canticles, but not under the flag of Mitchel, under the guidance of Meagher, or even under the aristocratic leadership of O'Brien.

When the Irish people are most deeply stirred, they are closest to their religious tradition. The most notable achievements of the race are associated with the Church, and the most tremendous moments in Irish history—for instance, that when the nation stood braced for a holocaust in 1917—are those in which religion and nationality were united. The union of these two forces then will be the source of the most desirable achievements of the future; so we believe.

Reference has been made to our hope that religion and nationalism will together evolve a noble order of society. But the root of fine living is education, and all our hopes for the future depend on the formation, by national and religious impulse, of a noble system of education. At present, Irish education is a chaos. Its only merit is that, in a clumsy way, it is religious: we are happily spared the secularised and God-denying schools of France or the agnostic schools of Britain. But though the Catechism is taught in our schools and priests are their managers,

yet they are not truly and positively Catholic. They are totally unlike what schools would be in a land where Catholics were not slaves in mind and body. "We are the children of the Crusaders; why should we bow to the children of Voltaire?" cried Montalembert, speaking of Catholic education in the French assembly. This proud spirit has yet to be aroused in the Irish public, which tacitly allows Irish education to be modelled, in all details but the teaching of the Catechism, by anti-Irish and non-Catholic educationalists. A true Christian education would be based on the vision of Dante, Leo, Charlemagne, Hildebrand, Lamennais, Montalembert, Ketteler. Yet, these are scarcely names to Irish scholars, who emerge from the so-called Catholic colleges with their minds stuffed with admiration for Nelsons and Clives, Pitts and Macaulays. Again, national self-respect, quite apart from the demands of true culture, would dictate that Irish students should receive culture from the literature of Ireland. Yet the splendours of Celtic letters are almost as much a sealed book to the Irish scholar, who is their heir, as to an English youth. There are many signs that a complete remodelling of Irish education will soon be undertaken on revolutionary lines. It will then become Catholic and Gaelic through and through.

When control of the Irish schools is seized, the future control will probably be vested in an educational guild with county or provincial committees. Then we shall see, not one, but a thousand S. Enda's rise in Ireland. We shall get back to the

old Gaelic educational spirit, and an education as devoutly Catholic as it is nobly heroic will be achieved. A modern educational guild will recall the antique Gaelic system, under which education was the affair of educationalists. It will be composed of clergy, teachers, scientists and parents' representatives. All who know the Irish people know that such a group will be unyieldingly resolute in giving religion its fundamental place in the schools.

And further, the truth is that the Christian faith is utterly unlike what passes for education to-day. The Gaelic tongue will be its medium, and the sagas will be its texts. Patriotism will inform it. The story of Ireland's Golden Age will dominate it as completely as Classicism till lately dominated European education. And as the new vision grows stronger before teachers and taught, the spiritual passion of the old teachers may awake. When to-day we visit the wild and awful sites on the ocean's brink, or on the mountain-side where the great men of old built their retreats, we marvel at the splendid imagination of those who loved the wonders of angry nature more than prettiness and comfort. Not many of their kind live on to-day; yet, Padraic Pearse was of their company, and we can conceive him, who thought Cuchulain and Colmcille of greater educational value than Ransome or Macaulay, thinking, worshipping, and teaching in the place of the old ascetics. And so, some day, our youth will no longer be taught in the cities and suburbs, but in re-arisen universities and schools at Clonmacnoise, amid the windy Shannon

waters; on Tory Island, amid storm and under terrific sunset lights; on Inis Caltra, where the Round Towers are reflected in Lough Derg. In these frugal and austere abodes of faith and vision, young Eire will gather intellectual and spiritual riches, and will grow strong in body, heroic in mind; "the Táin shall come again in mighty cycles," and a manhood arise among whom Colmcille might walk as he walked with his companions of old.

Another Eirë shall arise
And to remoter time,
Bequeath, like sunset to the skies,
The splendour of her prime.