

LECTURES
ON THE
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.



LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. By WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M.A., late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Edited from the Author's MSS., with Notes by WILLIAM HEPWORTH THOMPSON, M.A. In 2 vols. 12mo. \$2.50.

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ROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS,

New York.

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ON THE
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

BY
WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M.A.
LATE PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN.

EDITED
From the Author's MSS. with Notes,


BY
WILLIAM HEPWORTH THOMPSON, M.A.
FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE,
AND REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE Lectures which I have undertaken to edit were delivered to the students of Trinity College, Dublin, from the newly-instituted chair of Moral Philosophy, of which Mr. W. Archer Butler was the first occupant. In the interesting Memoir of the Professor, written by his friends and literary executor, the Rev. Thomas Woodward, and prefixed to the volume of sermons published in 1849, we are informed that this chair was first founded by Dr. Lloyd the Provost in 1837, and that Mr. Butler was appointed to fill it "immediately upon the expiration of his Scholarship." According to the data furnished by his biographer, this honourable distinction must have been conferred upon him before he had completed his twenty-sixth year, and it would seem that he entered without delay upon the duties of his office, which he retained until his premature death, which took place in 1848. The present Lectures seem to have been delivered during the first four years of his professorial life, as we may infer from an interesting notice inserted in the *Dublin*

University Magazine for 1842, in which Lectures on Aristotle (forming the last series in these volumes) are expressly mentioned. Before that period, however, the Professor had ceased to write his Lectures *in extenso*: for we are told that "in the Ethical Lectures on which he was then" (1842) "engaged he had abandoned the custom of *reading* his Discourses." It would seem to follow that his design of writing a complete history of Philosophy was never realized, and that the Lectures which have been placed in my hands were, in fact, all that their Author penned upon that subject. A large pile of papers now in my keeping contains ample materials for structures never completed, and furnishes striking evidence of Mr. Butler's varied and profound erudition.

In explanation of the delay which has taken place in the publication of the finished Lectures, it may be well to state that the MS. remained in the possession of Mr. Woodward (whose professional engagements prevented him from undertaking the labour of editing it) until some eighteen months ago, when the present publishers purchased the copyright from that gentleman. Having previously expressed a favourable opinion of some specimen Lectures which had been shown to me, (one of which is annexed to the Memoir before referred to,) and being further informed that no other Editor

was forthcoming, I was induced to undertake the task proposed to me, in the hope of stimulating the interest in such studies, languid though it be and intermittent, which does undoubtedly exist in this country. I hoped, too, that the Lectures, after all allowance had been made for a posthumous and unfinished work, would tend to raise rather than diminish the reputation of an Author whom, though personally unknown to me, the masterly "Letters on Development" had led me to rank among the most gifted spirits of his generation. My task has been rendered both more laborious and more interesting by the fact that the references to original writers, without which a history of Philosophy is of little use to the student, were almost entirely wanting in the MS. In the endeavour to trace the authorities I have naturally been led to a closer consideration of some of the Professor's views, which, in not a few instances, has induced me to expand a reference into a note, and in some cases to give my reasons for dissenting from the statements in the text. With the text itself I have meddled as little as might be, finding it difficult to prune the redundancy without impairing the force and impressiveness of the Author's language. Greater liberty has been used with the interspersed translations, though even here I have mainly confined myself to the tacit removal of inaccuracies by

which the sense was affected. These, it is fair to say, were neither numerous nor very important; for, though Mr. Butler did not pretend to the title of an exact classical scholar, the philosophical acumen of his mind has generally enabled him to seize the true meaning of even the more recondite works of Plato and Aristotle.

It is no part of an Editor's duty to criticize post-humous writings which are given to the world partly on his own responsibility. He has a right, however, to state how far that responsibility extends; and I say, therefore, without hesitation, that the Lectures included in the Introductory Series appeared to me unequal in merit to those that follow, and that I wished to withhold them. They were evidently hastily composed,—as in fact appears from notices in the Author's handwriting,—and in some places they bear the appearance of having been produced to meet a sudden demand. Their rhetorical pomp of style, a meaning not always definite in itself, and frequently obscured by the very excess of illustration, the frequent repetitions, and, above all, a certain vacillation of judgment on speculative questions, are faults which must strike the intelligent reader, and which would, I am persuaded, have been acknowledged by the accomplished Professor himself. I have consented to edit them in deference to the opinion of persons

better able than myself to estimate their probable reception by the mass of readers, to many of whom, it is thought, some of the characteristics in question may prove attractive rather than repellent, while those of maturer taste may be induced to tolerate the style in consideration of the really fine vein of thought and sentiment which it conceals.

Of the Lectures which follow, the most original are those on Plato and the Platonists, which fill nearly the whole of the second volume. They are, unquestionably, as the Author informs us, "the result of patient and conscientious examination of the original documents;" and they may be considered as a perfectly independent contribution to our knowledge of the great master of Grecian wisdom. Of the Dialectic and Physics of Plato they are the only exposition at once accurate and popular with which I am acquainted,—being more accurate than the French and incomparably more popular than the German treatises on those departments of the Platonic philosophy. The Author's intimate familiarity with the metaphysical writings of the last century, and especially with the English and Scotch school of psychologists, has enabled him to illustrate the subtle speculations of which he treats in a manner calculated to render them more intelligible to the English mind than they can be made by writers trained solely in the technicalities of modern

German schools, or by those who disdain the use of illustration altogether. To the Ethics and Politics of Plato equal justice has not been done, but from notes which have come into my possession I am inclined to think that this defect was in a great measure supplied in the unwritten Lectures on Ethics to which allusion has been made.

The brilliant Lecture on Neo-Platonism which concludes the fourth series I make no apology for publishing, though sensible that the subject has of late received additional illustration. How much of it came from secondary sources, and how much from the fountain-head, it may be left to the curious to investigate.

The three Lectures on Aristotle contain an able analysis of the well-known though by no means well-understood treatise, *περὶ ψυχῆς*. They were preceded by a discourse on the literary history of the Philosopher and his writings, which, as the subject has been treated satisfactorily by others,* it seemed on the whole better to omit. An unfinished fifth Lecture on the Physics is omitted only because it is unfinished. It is a most promising commencement of a detailed examination of the Aristotelian theories of nature, which it is to be regretted that Mr. Butler never completed.

* As by Professor Stahr in Dr. Smith's *Dictionary of Biography*, Mr. Blakesley in his *Life of Aristotle*, &c.

In composing his comparatively brief notices of the *earlier* Grecian schools, the Author appears to have made considerable use of the German histories of Philosophy, especially that of Ritter. His estimate of Socrates, on the other hand, evinces the same independence of judgment and the same preference of original documents which mark his Lectures on Plato, and, as far as they go, those on Aristotle also: but the subject is handled in a manner too slight and cursory for its importance. In the notes I have endeavoured to direct the attention of students to sources of more complete information. The account of the minor Socratic sects, which concludes the first volume, will be found valuable by those University students who may wish to understand the allusions to the tenets of those schools or their founders with which the Platonic dialogues abound. The Megarian doctrines are explained with especial clearness, and the history of this succession of Sophist-philosophers appears to me to be treated with remarkable ability.

From these observations it will be seen that the description of this work in the title-page needs some qualification. The absence, for instance, of any account of the Stoics and Epicureans is a grave omission in a history of Philosophy. It would doubtless have been supplied had the Author completed his original design, for very copious collections for the

purpose are to be found among his MSS. As the Lectures stand they constitute a history of the Platonic Philosophy,—its seedtime, maturity, and decay: and on such a work the very omission of the collateral sects bestows a unity which it might not otherwise have possessed. To the theologian the importance of studying this philosophy is becoming daily more apparent; and it is no slight honour to the great Protestant University of Dublin to have furnished the first or one of the first examples in recent times of an upright and intelligent history of Platonism written by an uncompromising defender of the catholic truths as well as of the historical evidences of Christianity.

I ought to add that the very complete Index which will be found at the end of the Second Volume has been prepared by my friend Mr. H. MONTAGU BUTLER, Fellow of Trinity College, to whom my best thanks are due.

W. H. T.

CAMBRIDGE, Dec. 12, 1855.

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
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INTRODUCTORY SERIES.



LECTURE I.

ON THE SCIENCE OF MIND, OR PSYCHOLOGY.

GENTLEMEN:—

IN undertaking the important task of directing, or, at least, of stimulating, your studies in the general philosophy of man, I am aware that I appear before you in a character which greater abilities than I can ever hope to manifest would require courage to sustain. I enter alone and unarmed (save, as I trust, by a love of truth and a simple desire of diffusing it) upon a field of contest where some of the mightiest intellectual leaders that the world has ever known are now only known in their *prostration*,—a field on which a new adventurer, however humble his pretensions, exposes himself therefore to the scorn of assailants who would depreciate either his *subject* or *himself*; who either believe that what Locke and Leibnitz failed to discover must be undiscoverable, and therefore be literally non-existent in relation to the powers of man, or (by what he admits to be a far more reasonable prejudice) that difficulties which have baffled such sagacity as theirs can scarcely have been reserved for *his* vision to penetrate. It is no misemployment of your time to occupy some portion of it with a consideration of at least the former of these prepossessions. To believe a subject unworthy your attention is practically to disqualify you from attending; and as long as the importance of any branch of knowledge, or the possibility of its attainment,

*Difficulties
affecting a
Lecturer on
the History
of Philo-
sophy,*

is questioned, the most laboured general statements of its nature and bearing may expect to be received with distrust or indifference.

Of myself I shall say little. If I have commenced by expressing my real sense of the peculiar difficulties and responsibilities of the office I have ventured to undertake, it was less in order to attest *my own* feelings and to solicit general indulgence (for to these things I trust it would be almost superfluous to advert) than, by deepening *your* feelings of the importance of the subjects we are met to discuss, to impress upon you, as hearers, the part which it becomes *you* to perform in such a capacity.

and the
present
Lecturer in
particular. It would little interest you to be told that your professor must, *for the present*, be content to come before you with the rapid results of brief and disturbed reflection—the fragmentary speculations of occasional leisure; and that with the defects of a preparation so cursory not *he* is to be charged, but the circumstances of a calling before whose demands—arduous, constant, and imperative—even the duties of this chair, urgent as *they* are, sink into comparative unimportance. As little would it interest you to learn that the grateful acknowledgments which his feelings prompt towards those who have placed him in it only augment the diffidence under which he labours as to his powers of justifying their choice; that, if he is relieved from the hazards of a contrast with able predecessors, yet the very fact that he *is* so relieved only serves to remind him how naturally it will be expected that a choice thus singular should be met by merits correspondingly unique;—nay, that, in the unavoidable tendency of all hearers to comparisons, he is perhaps saved from such a contrast with a line of immediate predecessors only to be contrasted with the favourites of each hearer's studies and experience, with the philosophic ancestry of ages, with the congregated luminaries of every country and every time. These

are considerations which, however momentous to your lecturer, are of little moment to you. It would not, indeed, be judicious or warrantable to insist on them. To enlarge on *my own* convictions of responsibility would be to suppose that they could be questioned; to suggest to *you* a spirit of indulgence would equally be to suppose you in peril of forgetting what is assuredly the simplest, and ought to be the least laborious, of human obligations.

Gentlemen, the matter becomes of more importance when I pass from the Lecturer to his *subject*.

Let us then endeavour to define, before proceeding to any detailed investigations, What is the subject we are to consider? What are its

*Subject of
these Lec-
tures de-
fined.*

claims upon your attention? What are the difficulties or encouragements of the study? And what the requisites for its profitable pursuit? Such considerations are, indeed, better estimated at the close of a course than at the commencement of it,—better appreciated as deductions from the student's experience than as preliminaries to it: yet even *now* they may tend, by exalting our conceptions of the subject, to awaken—and, by defining its aims, to direct—attention. This study, which involves the logic of all other studies, has also a logic, and, I will add, an ethic of its own. The general laws of all inquiry undergo some striking modifications in their application to the study of man; and the moral habits which are demanded in *all* the researches of truth become peculiarly tested in the management of this. I may perhaps, then, indulge the hope, that the few preliminary investigations which I purpose to premise, may in some measure serve as the same rapid education for this philosophy which this philosophy itself is for universal science.

During some seven or eight Lectures of the present term it is my intention to discuss these preparatory topics. For the *STYLE* in which the discussion may be conducted perhaps the best mode of securing your indul-

gence would be to explain its *purpose*. That purpose is determined by the *capabilities* of the machinery which is put into my hands to work. There are two ways by which the thoughts and feelings of a single mind may be made the thoughts and feelings of many:—by *writing* and by *speech*. Now, though writing be only a series of signs of speech, it possesses one great and exclusive advantage—its parts are not merely successive in one sense, but coexistent in another: and hence, any point of a *written* argument may be reproduced at pleasure in all its original vividness, while no point of a spoken communication is capable of reappearance except in the fainter form of remembrance,—every such exertion of remembrance being not only a withdrawal of attention from the present, (which the written document *also* requires,) but a positive and irrecoverable *loss* of whatever the present may be conveying, (which the written document preserves for inspection.) This distinction, then, at once establishes the difference of object in establishing the difference of capabilities between the book and the lecture. In books we address the thoughtful reflection of the solitary student in language suitable to the peculiar advantages which books alone possess,—that of enabling him to go back upon his progress, to count its steps, and (if attention ever flags, or the difficulty of the argument require it) to bring up his arrears without any present loss. The necessary deficiency of oral instruction ought (as I conceive) to make its object in a great measure different, and its style altogether so. The one case of the experimental sciences excepted, its true utility will ever be *less* the communication of new and profound truth, if that truth require a long course of reasoning, than the production of an interest, the creation of a taste, the stimulus given to the circulation of thought. You will understand, then, that my purpose will be not merely to deliver truth, but also by any means that occur to me to make it generally

acceptable; and I request, once for all, that the execution may be measured by the declared object,—an object which makes the endeavour to interest your fancy and your feelings as real and necessary a part of my duty as the direct communication of truth itself.

The subject of Mental Philosophy may be considered in *two* lights, and approached by two corresponding roads of access;—it may be regarded as it is the beginning, or as it is the end, of all human studies. These two opposite yet harmonizing aspects of the subject we will now consider at some length. Contrasted in their nature and of very different degrees of practical utility, they nevertheless serve to reflect on each other a reciprocal illumination which distinguishes each by enlightening both.

*Mental
Philosophy
may be re-
garded in
two lights.*

I. Setting out from THE MIND ITSELF, as the great receptacle at once and instrument, both of knowledge and of activity, we may consider it as the sole original substance of all the diversified phenomena of the intellectual and the voluntary life. We may regard science and action as its remote product and creature; or rather we may neglect the product in the process of production. In this view of the relation of things, the human soul is contemplated as the starting-point, not as the goal, of knowledge,—as its initial requisite, not as its final attainment. The mind is regarded as a simple nature, which, while preserving a perpetual identity with itself, evolves from its own essence (of course under certain exterior conditions) all the varieties of scientific truth. Placed in apposition with external nature, it begins to labour upon all around it by its own inherent and mysterious activity: mingling itself with nature, it transforms and assimilates it to its own likeness,—and the result is, a mechanical system of the universe, a system of quantitative science or mathematics, a system

*The in-
quirer may
set out from
the mind it-
self; pass-
ing from
the consi-
deration of
its laws
and facul-
ties to their
manifesta-
tions;*

of optics or acoustics, a system (when, among the number of its evolutions, in a manner externalizing its own nature, the machine, at once engine and material, labours on itself) of intellectual and moral principles! In like manner (in continuance of *this* view of the Mind and its Philosophy) the *Imagination and the Emotions* are considered to simply reveal *themselves* in the creation of *Poetry*: the world of Nature, which, by the agency of *Reason*, was just now elevated to the dignity of a scientific order, is now, by *this portion* of the same versatile essence, either employed—its positions and relations being altered—as the material of new structures, or—remaining itself unaltered—becomes charged with all the emotions of the mind itself; thus giving occasion, as we shall hereafter see, to the two great divisions of the poetical genius and its manifestations. From generation to generation this varied activity, in all its different directions and intensities, goes on unabated; until at length it reaches its existing point, (whatever that may be,) and all that is, at this hour, registered in books, as well as all that has been but inwardly conjectured—the verified discoveries and the faint suspicions of philosophy, the recorded visions of poetry, and the unrecorded but incessant poetry of hope and remembrance in every age,—*all* are only the different attitudes assumed by this one unchanged yet ever-changing essence.

In this view, then, Gentlemen, the Philosophy of the Mind is to be regarded as the *first* step of science; because it is the observation and theory of that without which science cannot exist. In the *logical* relationship of the sciences it holds this position; and in this view unquestionably its study would actually be the *first* undertaken by a Being of a superior world descending to contemplate and scrutinize the attainments of ours. Let me illustrate a thought which may illustrate others.

Let us imagine (imaginary suppositions are admissible

in scientific discussions when they enter not as hypotheses for the reason, but as pictures for the fancy) a Being possessing such enlargement of capacity as to command in his sensitive and intellectual scope a vast range of the habitable worlds of the universe; and enabled, by concentrating attention, to study any particular individual of the splendid group, even as we are able to fix attention upon a single field in an expanded landscape. That such a conception is not without plausibility sufficient for its purpose, those will concede who remember that we ourselves actually stand in a very similar relation to the little worlds of animated nature which the microscope can discover in every drop of water. Such a Being as I have supposed, philosophizing upon worlds, would probably deem no object more worthy of immediate investigation than the several proportions of knowledge attainable by each of these divisions of the intelligent universe. But such a study, if conducted as we study the literary history of countries, would be a tedious, uncertain, and, to the gifted spirit we are accompanying, a superfluous process. *He* enters upon the special investigation of each with a wide general induction formed from all. Such a Being, already informed, by contemplating his gigantic scheme of analogy, of the several degrees and capacities of intellect, would have already learned to pronounce on their relative possibilities of attainment. His sole or chief inquisition would be into the *psychology* of each nation of intelligences; and in its psychology he would see, in a manner, its whole attainments involved. Each species of intellects would of course labour upon the field of external knowledge exposed to its view, and the actual acquirements would vary as *it* varied; but yet the laws and the limits of investigation, as general formulas, should be sought in the respective psychologies alone. To confirm the truth of this representation we might ask whether in this world of ours, where the

field of knowledge is the same to so many species of animals, the sphere of attainment is not invariably determined by the mental elevation. Knowledge is the product of Mind into Nature; and where one element remains the same, the knowledge evolved will be directly as the other. If then such a Being as we have been supposing were to fix his curiosity upon *our* world, the volumes he would first open in order to collect the general outlines of his information would be—not the records of our academies of science, not the physics of Newton nor the mathematics of Lagrange, brilliant but partial glimpses of our Reason—nor yet the endless tomes of our poetry and romance, a still more circuitous path to his purpose,—but (if he could find any to be trusted) the simple catalogue of our common faculties, in which he would see *potentially* present (to adopt the scholastic distinction) every truth that Reason ever mastered, and every image that fancy ever unveiled to the poetical idolatry of mankind.

II. But though it be conceivable that the philosophy of the human mind might present itself in this its logical priority as the first and principal object of speculation to the reason of a comprehensive observer, there is also another and a very different path by which the same great subject may enter the field of thought. If in the method just described it be assumed as the first, it may also be arrived at as the *last* term of science. While the accomplished observer we have imagined, comprehending from the eminences of a higher intelligence a compass of prospect denied to man, might demand it as the simple prerequisite for all his general conclusions as to man's susceptibilities of knowledge and of power; it reveals itself to the humbler faculties of man himself only at the close of a long course of researches. Let us

*or Mental
Philosophy
may be the
last arrived
at.*

pursue the steps of the discovery,—the true Historical
genesis of
Philosophy. genesis of philosophy. If your guide on the way shall appear to deviate from his object, he will trust to your candour not to decide until you are in a position to compare the point of attainment with the direction of the journey. As the mind is first aroused to consciousness by sensation, it continues for a long period to maintain the direction it has originally received; and the understanding is the last thing understood by itself. Solicited by necessity, and then aroused by wonder, and then stimulated by curiosity, and then perhaps rewarded by unexpected discovery, the faculties are at first wholly engaged by the vivid and exciting world around them. That the infancy of science resembles in this respect the infancy of nature seems to be a fact unquestioned by all its judicious historians; and the exceptions, to which we may hereafter refer, will be seen not to disturb the real sovereignty of the principle. The world is all to man at first; he forgets that in truth he is all to the world! The soul, essentially a foreigner in the earthly sphere of sense, may at least be permitted to indulge the *curiosity* of a foreigner also. Were I appointed to plead its cause instead of to investigate its history, I might remind you on its behalf, that among its earliest developments of scientific energy have been those which seem to beat against the *outer wall* of its dwelling; and that astronomy, the science of the remotest realms of the sensible universe, has preceded the classification of earths and the systems of vegetable and animal nature. The stars which seem to glitter on the confines of the world of sight are the earliest objects of its contemplation; and the adoration that at length mistakes them for their Maker is but the melancholy resource of an imagination exhausted in the effort to pass beyond them! May we not say of the soul at this crisis of its history, that just so a prisoner confined

Man's faculties first awakened by outward phenomena.

for a time in a narrow cell, at first eagerly assails the outer door of his gloomy abode, watches each *sparkle of light* that seems to gleam from without through its crevices, and at last—finding all unavailing—retires with a sigh to the corner of his dungeon, and, as his eyes contract to their situation, becomes by degrees reconciled to the darkness?

To continue the history of intellectual development,—cursorily, because only with a view to after-conclusions,—from observations of outward nature more or less accurately collected and disposed in a rude symmetry, the mind frames its first hasty edifices of natural science; edifices destined themselves to be but the materials of

*Second
step—rela-
tions of
Space,
Geometry.*

the scaffolding of a future and better architecture. Circumstances probably of casual utility first suggest the important abstraction, by which, neglecting the particularities of material things, it regards them as all existing in *place*, and as admitting accurate admeasurement of their mutual distances; and then as existing in *space*, and capable of measurement in their three dimensions. The conceptions of space and figure as an object of science being once obtained, they are not likely to remain unfruitful; more especially as demanding no further aid from sensible observation these abstractions meet the favourite tendencies of the meditative genius. Hence originate *the mathematical sciences*, the unparticipated creation, and thence the chief glory of human reason; sciences in which the infinite variety of relations secures perpetual novelty; and in which the elementary simplicity of the notions which these relations modify entails on all their consequences their own incomparable distinctness. Happy, if born out of physical necessities as to their historical use, and out of sensible perceptions as their metaphysical condition, these daring sciences had not too long abandoned their humble parents; until, at perhaps the greatest era of

human reason, under the guidance of modern genius, the brilliant wanderer (who in the last flights of the Alexandrian school had, under the auspices of Proclus and his followers, almost disappeared in the densest clouds of metaphysical speculation) was once more reclaimed, deductive sagacity restored to inductive observation, the abstractions of pure space once more bound to their physical concretes, and the soul and body of natural science united in one immortal frame.

Now, Gentlemen, observe to what point we have followed the progresses of the scientific genius; and observe also at what point the limits of these double energies of observation and reasoning already appear to be inexorably set. For it is one of the paradoxes of the human mind, that amongst its earliest efforts it reaches its furthest limits; the geometry of a school-boy is conversant with subjects that the geometry of Laplace cannot overpass. The early mind has not indeed explored the immeasurable riches of the intervening country; but nevertheless it has truly reached its boundaries! In physical inquiry we perceive that our primitive investigator has observed the constant successions of many phenomena, and has imagined much, doubtless, that he has *not* observed. In Mathematics he has detected many relations of figures, and found them to be different aspects of the same extensions; many relations of numbers, and found them to be different expressions for the same number. For some time, doubtless, the pursuit of knowledge is so ardent that the pursuer is lost in his object; and the object, diffusing and enlarging to the view, seems itself to comprehend all things. The very confusion of the vast and shifting prospect dazzles and bewilders, but fixes and fascinates, the eye. The mind is not yet *worthy* of a philosophy! Even if a moment's reflection were at this time to revert from the extent of the prospect to the structure of the intellectual

*Limits of
mathematical
science.*

organ that beholds it, and in a relative sense creates what it beholds, we can easily imagine that the result, disclosing so much weakness with so much strength, would at first appear humiliating and repulsive. Admitted to a glimpse of the interior of the temple of nature, the early naturalist stands at the portals, astonished by its vastness, and appalled (as yet) by its mysterious gloom: far from suspecting that he is himself the noblest object in the edifice, he only aspires timidly to borrow respect from his position, not to confer it, to lose his petty individuality in the immensity of things, and become, in a manner, a portion of all around him. Gentlemen, long before the achievements of inductive science had illustrated the mind itself with the very light it was casting upon nature, there was a higher philosophical accuracy in the inspired computation of the *Psalmist*. If *he*, in his early astronomy, "considers the heavens, the work of the fingers" of God, and asks, "What is man," that he can become an object of affection and care to the Architect of a universe, it is not that he may place man below these splendid but inanimate structures; his argument—*prophetical* purport apart—is not directed to sink man below nature but to exalt God above man and nature. Setting the human reason far beneath that divine reason which formed it and all things, he argues the beneficence of the Godhead in affirming the elevation of man, and glorifies the Author of Nature in exalting its interpreter. "Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet!"

But, Gentlemen, that recoil from the outward to the inward world which man, of his own definite will, might perhaps remain forever without effecting, (similar to that reverse passage from the inward to the outward, which a great French metaphysical critic of the last century—and I perfectly agree with him—has called

an instinct “plus sûr que la raison même,—à franchir”), this retreat of the observer upon himself is at last effected by the *spontaneous course* of reason. May I here request your special attention to a train of observation which will reward the very small exertion it requires?

It may be conceived that in the mind of some sagacious and ample genius, a review is held of all its actual attainments. I am, for the sake of distinctness and brevity, ascribing to a single mind what, you will readily apprehend, is, in point of fact, the gradual process and combined result of many minds. At first, perhaps, such a mind reflects upon that portion of its knowledge which holds the pre-eminence in utility and in accuracy,—its knowledge of the mutual distances and positions of material objects, its various devices for ascertaining them, for measuring their size, and computing their numbers. These reflections from their very nature have concern with abstract magnitude, being independent of all varieties of sensible structure. By an easy process of successive analysis the mind of our reflector passes from results to elements, from propositions proved to those definitions which, as geometrical data, state the simplest conceptions and combinations of figure, or, as names of numbers, the infinite variety of repeated units. The inquirer pauses. Can the human mind advance no further? Gentlemen, the *geometrician* can advance no further. The science of related magnitudes is arrived at the limits of its dominion. Reduced to its definitions, it resigns its office; content with investigating the relations of extensions and numbers, it relinquishes to a superior authority the presiding ideas of extension and number themselves!

The mathematician can give no account of the fundamental ideas of his science, Extension and Number.

Perplexed by this unexpected limitation, the mind we are accompanying next perhaps recurs to its

Ultimate facts of physical science lead in the manner to metaphysical inquiry.

acquirements in the science of the mutual action and individual structure of bodies themselves. Here, at least, with all plain and palpable to the senses, it may hope to escape those humbling repulses which checked

its former course. Event follows after event, and body is bound to body with a definiteness and precision which leaves nothing in mystery. Clearer eyes, and an ampler field of vision, might perhaps be desirable; but scarcely a clearer or an ampler judgment. Yet stay!

Sequence.

Event follows event: does this indeed involve no subject of speculation apart from the sensible fact? Is there no relation here detected which physical science cannot explain, because physical science presupposes it? Not only this, but the same event follows the same event. Is there no new relation inserted here which the science of nature is not to anatomize as its subject, but to revere as its parent? As the inquirer advances the prospect thickens and darkens on his view. This piece of marble, thus compact and ponderous, may, under percussion, resolve into dust. What is it that now retains these atoms of dust in union? and what is it that annihilates the union, and for a massive whole presents a heap of severed particles? An obvious

Force and Causation.

analogy calls the agent *Force*. And what is force? Shall we style it the unknown cause of equilibrium and of motion? What then is a *Cause*? How has the relation arisen? And how is it thus inextricably involved in every exertion of force? If this mass be subject to such laws, the world, nay, the universe, is but a large mass; and if this body require a cause to bind and to loose it, the universe itself

First Cause.

must require a cause. Where then, in what reservoir, shall we deposit this great original fountain of causation? But more still; it appears that this same body, unbound by its proper forces, will dissolve in

sunder,—unsupported, will fall to the earth. As the one arises from the excess of a superior force, so, doubtless, does the other. It seems then that the natural tendency of force is to produce *Motion*. Motion is a succession of events, and, like all successions, presupposes that relation of time which we approached so unavailingly before. But it supposes another element; it is evolved in *Space*; that is, it exists in that elementary nature or notion, which in our former mathematical researches we were obliged to surrender as the appanage of a higher and mightier science.

Force produces motion,

which again implies the idea of space, of which material science also can render no account.

Such, Gentlemen, we may imagine to be the baffled speculations of the inquiring student of material nature at the close of his researches. Thus it is that, by slow degrees, and through the steady path of analysis, the mind is half won to itself from the world of external appearances. But even yet, perhaps, it is not prepared for that happy and systematic view of things which can alone reduce to light and order this vague and heaving chaos. Absorbed in that thoughtful reverie which such conceptions of the profoundest mysteries of nature are so apt to produce, we may represent the mind as now sinking back upon itself in the very attitude which withdraws it from the contemplation and influence of external things. The supposition is perfectly consonant to truth. The great fundamental notions which I have mentioned,* space, time, causation, and so forth, are in fact the main conduits between the inner and the outer worlds; appearing to belong almost equally to both, they form the portals

Thus the mind is won back to itself from nature.

Space, time, and causation, hold an intermediate place between the subjective and objective.

* ["The idea of space seems interposed between the two great worlds of matter and mind, belonging to both and neither."—*Author's MSS. Ed.*]

by which the mind enters upon nature, or retreats from nature into its own more wondrous depths. Our reflector, then, leaving these notions as they exist in the independent reality of the world and its Author, for the same notions as they exist in the perceiving mind of man, has already opened to himself the gates of psychological investigation. He summons the mind before the tribunal of its own reason; and expanding in the faithful mirror of memory all or much of its past experience, he awakes to a truth, which, however obvious when expressed, no one possessing the slightest philosophical genius ever yet perceived for the *first* time in all its force without an emotion of admiration. He

*The in-
quirer a-
wakened to
the reality
of the sub-
jective.*

begins to perceive all that knowledge of outward nature which he had been accustomed to regard as wholly terminating in its material objects,—as a something appertaining to the stars, the fire, the waters, or whatever else was his subject of physical inquiry,—itself silently taking its place as a part of a long train of his habitual thoughts and feelings. Not only are his conceptions of moral duty, law, and propriety, beings of the mind, but all the variety of sciences are the *secretions* of the faculties. He learns that for all which is added to sensible impressions, which, exclusively of remembrance and comparison, could not raise the impressed being to a higher rank than that of the meanest vegetable, he is solely indebted to the incessant activity of the invisible principle within him; that the mind invests the world with

*Laws of
nature re-
solvable in-
to laws of
mind.*

the intellectual chains of its own laws and relations, as it invests it with colours; and that, if all which the mind does for the world could be abstracted from all which the world does for the mind, the result would be the same as if the reader of some splendid work of philosophy or fiction, a Principia or an Iliad, were in the midst of

his sympathizing enthusiasm to be struck with total fatuity, and suddenly sink to beholding an unmeaning succession of black characters upon a white surface, instead of that glorious array of visions or speculations which the volume—like the world around it—in merely suggesting by previous mental laws, seemed itself actually to contain and produce!

Thus, Gentlemen, by faithfully following the course of a consecutive analysis, I have brought you to the same final point from which our philosopher of a higher world was enabled to set out. You now perceive how it is that the investigator of the external world learns at last to discover both (to adopt a Kantian expression) the “*receptivity*” and the modifying agency of his own mind; how he finds that to every branch of human knowledge, both as to its material and its process of growth, there is a definite limit beyond which it cannot pass, and at which every subordinate science yields up all further authority to the primary philosophy; and how each separate species of rational inquiry by successive resolutions into its components, attenuated, as it were, to its elements, is bound to disappear into this one first, last, and all-comprehending science. Thus is the mind to knowledge what the *prima materia* of the schoolmen was to the sensible world, the single substance of all its phenomena; and thus a perfect theory of the mind would be analogous (though distantly indeed) to what the coveted “science of substances” was imagined to be, as compared with the ordinary natural philosophy of observed qualities. It teaches not indeed, as that mistaken and impossible science was expected to do, to determine, *à priori*, all the powers and susceptibilities of bodies; but even in its present state it can and does determine, *à priori*, what is the course of reasoning adapted to any possible subject, and what are the

Primary
Philosophy,
to which all
special
sciences necessarily
lead up.

x

last necessary limits of discovery in any possible pursuit.

This Philosophy described.

Of all these illustrations, which of course you will understand to be intended only as such, the high and noble purport is, the following simple but magnificent generalization, that there is a philosophy which is to every specific philosophy what that specific philosophy is to the individual objects of its classifications, that the sciences which theorize the world may be themselves theorized, that the subjects of their inquiry and the relations whose endless varieties they detect may be themselves resolved into classes of subjects and classes of relations, that these classes of subjects and relations are themselves again amenable to one grand final classification, as the attributes of a single permanent substance. Gentlemen, that substance is the mind of man, and THAT philosophy is the philosophy of the human mind!

Process from mind to nature, and from nature to mind, further illustrated.

I trust that now you will have perceived the mutual bearing of the two directions in which I told you our philosophy might be approached. You will have perceived that the one method, beginning with the analysis of the mind, derives all the sciences from *it*; that the other, beginning with the sciences, derives the philosophy of mind from *all of them*: that the one proceeds from the centre to the circumference, the other from the circumference to the centre: that the one discovers every thing in the mind; the other, the mind in every thing. And it may be necessary to add, that you can easily infer, how unlikely to be chosen, in the actual history of human learning, as well as how unwise and preposterous for a being formed as man is formed, would be that former mode of *synthetical* inquiry which, from a prior enumeration of all the faculties of the mind, would conclude as to all

First process synthetical, second a natural.

the varieties of its development, and all its possibilities of acquisition; how impossible is any synthesis which is not preceded by *some* analysis; how certainly such a speculation, if undertaken by man, would be based on an *inadequate* enumeration; and how, therefore, in its full extent, it must be left to those superior intelligences whom I have instanced as employing it, and who may be supposed (fortified by a vast previous experience in the natural history of minds) to detect, with one glance at the world and its interpreter man, the scope of his reason in its application to his scene. It is indeed a fortunate adaptation of that presiding wisdom which rules the growth of the world's reason as it does that of an individual, that that philosophy, which, as I have shown you, is the law of laws, the classification of classifications, the ultimate term of science, should for the most part be evolved in its due place: not appearing, as an inductive philosophy, until the reason of man has sufficiently acted itself out in nature to display the diversity of subjects and relations which the theory of the mind undertakes to reduce to system.

But though assuredly I would not presume to offer to this age and audience any discussion of the theory of mind which was not essentially analytical, I have, on the present occasion, sketched its synthetical aspect likewise, because I am not now considering the *method of prosecuting* the subject, *but the subject itself*; and this double view of the science of thought, as the beginning and the end of human studies, is eminently calculated, by contrasted lights, to hold the subject in a strong and steady illumination. Showing you that it is at once the science of which all others are *cases*, and the *residual science* which remains when all others are subtracted; it evinces, by combining both views, that you cannot pitch upon any spot, whether public or secluded, in the vast territory of human knowledge, at which you

will not find yourselves at the same point, moving to and moving *from* this philosophy, while in the very process of the motion you are practically developing its truths.

The first conclusion to be drawn from this *dominant character*, which thus forms the prerogative of the metaphysical philosophy, is all but expressed in the very statement of the fact. It is a topic which we shall have hereafter to resume, but which I think it well, for purposes of immediate use, to anticipate in some degree in this place. I allude to the practical influence which our views of the principles of this science must exert over the progress of every other. Cultivated as the sciences now are, by *separate* detachments of labourers, this influence, I admit, becomes less prominent and perceptible; men are more engaged with the details, and less with the principles; the same hands are seldom busy at both; and I am not so bigoted to my own pursuits as not cordially to join in felicitating the world upon the change. It is the result and it is the cause of the multiplication of knowledge. I rejoice in the indication which such divisions and subordinations of labour afford; that the intellectual *manufacture* is thriving, and that the enlightened tastes of the age keep the market in perpetual demand. When I speak of the influences of this more abstract philosophy over the sciences, I surely do not desire that the influence should be so unnaturally aggravated as to *consume* those subject-sciences it sways; that the government should be increased until it should have nothing to govern, and supremacy expire in its own completion! No, Gentlemen; the reciprocal security of physical and metaphysical science is in their constant union and parallel motion;—the direct grasp of the one and the comprehensive scope of the other make them the hands and the

*Practical
influence
of general
views of
metaphysical
science.*

eye of philosophy; and they should consent and harmonize, and mutually impart instruction, as you will hereafter learn that these organs do! And, however I may “magnify my office,” I will freely concede that I know no period of philosophical history so deplorable

Schoolmen.

as that long and gloomy one (the scholastic ages) in which men, forgetting the *practical developments* of reason in the frivolous sophistry which they mistook for an effective study of reason’s *nature and properties*, considered that they had done their duty as leaders of the public intellect when, by the toil of years, they had succeeded in adding a new page of verbal combinations to the barren folios of their fathers, and in contributing by the everlasting “Distinguo” a new illustration of the almost infinite divisibility of human thought! I will go further, and add, that a period not wholly

Seventeenth century.

unworthy of rivalling it in this industrious perversion of the course of inquiry, and overweening estimate of purely metaphysical deduction, was that *succeeding* age, the earlier part of the seventeenth century, which, with transcendent merits of its own, had not escaped the inheritance of its predecessor’s errors,—an age in which the ambition of each illustrious thinker to assume the sole throne of the newly-emancipated mind of Europe urged each to attempt embracing the whole circle of knowledge, and to reject all assistance either of preceding or contemporary genius, and in which, as an inevitable consequence, there being actually *no time* for the tardy process of inductive collection, the metaphysics of the philosopher almost invariably determined his entire scheme of physical doctrine.

Leibnitz.

Who could imagine that the question of free-will at one period has been intimately concerned in the question of a *vacuum*,—and, more marvellous still, the moral character of the Deity involved in the phenomena of *elasticity*! The long line of inference which con-

nected in logical consequence these antipodes of the world of thought was not drawn, Gentlemen, in the brain of some dreaming schoolman; it existed in a mind which no learned institution should hear even censured without a reserve of respect and admiration,—

Scholastic metaphysics too exclusive; Cartesian too arbitrary and ambitious.

the mind of Godfrey Leibnitz.¹ But, while I make these concessions, and admit of the scholastic ages that their metaphysics were too exclusive, and of the Cartesian age that its metaphysics were too intrusive and arbitrary,

I cannot admit that in our own age they *ought* to be, or *can* be, without influence upon the progress of natural science. Whether in constituting and fixing the vast and massive *base* of all knowledge; by furnishing and illustrating the primary notions of geometry, or the science of space and figure, of algebra, or the science of pure magnitude, of mechanics, or the science of force, of chemistry, in its thousand provinces, as the science of material structure, in exhibiting with constancy and rigour *the rules* by which alone the edifice can be durably raised, or in tracing the *limits* beyond which it is not given to any human power to extend it, it would be

Logic and metaphysics of an age must affect its scientific labours:

preposterous to deny that the metaphysical and logical principles of an age must act upon its direct scientific labours, inasmuch as those principles, reduced to a systematic form, are not

only the very essence of its knowledge, but, in a


¹ [I am unable to cite any passage from Leibnitz which exactly corresponds to either of the notions here attributed to him. In his Letters to Clarke (Postscript to Letter IV.) he objects to the doctrine of a *vacuum*, that it derogates from the Divine Perfection; and in the *Confessio Naturæ* (an early work) he mentions elasticity as one among the properties of bodies which demonstrate the existence of an incorporeal principle. See also his proof of Immortality, *ibid.* I suspect Professor Butler to have had one or both these places in view; but to have written from memory. Ed.]

manner, the authorized exponent and representative of the public judgment, deliberately issued, upon its own intellectual subjects, progress, character, purpose, and destinies. As the reason of man influences his will, so does the mental philosophy (which is the collective judgment) of a people influence and guide its scientific activity; and as the one influence in innumerable cases occurs without any immediate reference to any settled or systematic theory of conduct, so also that secret but important directive light, which I may term *the latent metaphysic* of an age, may operate irresistibly and incessantly, without having its source, its mode, or its power, detected. That such influences—the invisible electricity of the whole body of science—do exist, those indeed only can deny who deny that the subjects of all inquiry are ultimately metaphysical subjects, and that the rules of all inquiry are ultimately logical rules; a statement, the latter member of which would be to contradict an unquestioned definition, and the former of which, even considered not as a matter of definition, but of fact, I trust you will be in no danger of admitting, after the combined synthetical and analytical investigation of the *subject* of the philosophy of the mind which I have had the honour of presenting to your acceptance upon this day.

though the men of the age be unconscious of such influence.

Subjects of all inquiry ultimately metaphysical: rules of inquiry ultimately logical.

Gentlemen, upon our next day of meeting I propose, after extending the analytical discovery of this philosophy through its other departments, as poetry, history, and our personal experience, to attempt exhibiting to you the primary *division* of the subject; a division in which, as I shall feel obliged to depart very widely from the philosophy now popular in these countries, I fear I shall have even *more* reason to require your indulgence than I have had upon the present occasion.



LECTURE II.

ON THE SCIENCE OF REAL EXISTENCE.

GENTLEMEN:—

OUR last meeting in this place was occupied with a general preliminary account of the nature of our subject,—an account not certainly so distinct and luminous as I trust you will have formed for your own use at the close of our researches, but serving sufficiently as an introductory and temporary guide,—an outline map which you will hereafter fill and colour for yourselves. In a case like this, we must in some measure anticipate what is to come, while we cannot take full advantage of it; we must borrow from the future to illustrate the present, while yet to borrow much would be only to obscure it; and in attempting the preliminary “abscissio infiniti” which is necessary to the methodical delivery of every course of doctrine, it is often hard to avoid for a while condemning our hearers to that perplexed suspense in which it is so much easier to pronounce what a subject is *not* than to define what it is. The exposition of every philosophical subject must, at first and for a time, repose upon the future which is afterwards to repose upon it; content with that *twilight* illumination whose light is uncertain because reflected from a sun not yet arisen.

*Conclusion
arrived at
in the fore-
going Lec-
ture.*

You will remember, Gentlemen, that I attempted to show you by what processes deductive and inductive the great and dominant science of sensibility, intelligence, emotion, and action, is arrived at; how it is assumed at the begin-

ning or detected at the end of the long and labyrinthine journey of scientific speculation. It is, as I evinced, the *prime* or the *ultimate* science; the mystic fountain of all the streams of knowledge, or the ocean as mysterious in which their waters are lost. More especially I insisted upon *the latter* of these views,—the view which is best adapted to an assembly of restricted and fallible human intellects,—showing you how in constructing the philosophy of man we achieve for all science the same lofty generalization which the sciences themselves achieve for their own respective objects; how the same resemblance or identity of qualities which they apprehend in the multitude of different instances, and to which they therefore apply a common name, is also to be discovered in their own ultimate subjects of inquiry and processes of inquiry, and is made amenable to the same principle of nomenclature; how, in short, the metaphysician inducts his universal laws from *them*, as they induct their universal laws from external nature. So far we had proceeded, and from these views we had begun to draw some obvious but practically important conclusions, when I was last honoured with your attention.

*Philosophy
of man the
science of
sciences.*

But, Gentlemen, I request you particularly to observe that when I represent our science as a generalization from all the varieties of *Natural Science*, though I describe truly I do not define *adequately*. Such a description, though valuable for its present purposes, is far from doing complete justice to the claims of this philosophy. In narrating the generation of the universal science, I have derived it, *historically*, from a more or less advanced *physical* science, from which both in the order of *time* and in the order of *reasoning* it naturally evolves itself. But though, certain disturbing influences excepted, it is thus true that it is not through the pathways of feeling and imagination that men travel into

*This is,
however, an
inadequate
definition.*

metaphysical inquiry, yet the science whose birth I have traced for you from the speculative reason soon asserts a dominion coextensive with human nature itself. I have shown you that what is termed the Philosophy of Mind is the ultimate science of *nature*; you must remember that it is also the ultimate science of *man*, and the science of man "*humani nihil alienum putat*."

The sciences not the sole occupation of the human faculties.

Were the labours of the mind in the collection of facts and the ascertainment and application of laws, or in the logical comparison of its own conceptions, the whole story of its activity,—were the character which Voltaire has somewhere bestowed upon Clarke (that of being a "mill for reasoning") an adequate definition of universal humanity,—to have proceeded thus far would be to have reached the limits of our scope as natural philosophers of mind. The heritage of our metaphysics would be confined to the transcendental problems bequeathed by our mathematical and physical sciences,—a rich inheritance indeed, and a responsible one, but not yet all that humanity has to offer to its own reflection. The sciences—mighty monuments as (even in their present state, without regard to their future development) they unquestionably are to the dignity of the spirit of man—are not to be considered as its *only* glory. It has assumed other positions which demonstrate other faculties,—positions the evidence of which is among us in

Imagination, emotion.

a thousand forms. In its treasures of *poetry and fiction* it has ceased to reason, in order to imagine and to feel. Here then the science of mind addresses itself to new problems; and, in the analysis of the great productions of verbal or pictorial poetry, resolves poetry into the poet acting, and, by its cautious course of successive generalizations, attains to the mental laws of imaginative agency in its relation to the produc-

Science of man includes the theory of these faculties, and their products.

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tion of elevating or pleasurable emotion, as it attained to the law of the gravitating force in its production of all the diversified yet consenting harmonies of the universe. The Iliad is to an Aristotle what the planetary appearances were to a Newton; that is to say, each is equally an aggregate of phenomena which confusedly pointed to some predominating law or laws, themselves the utterance and the development of some presiding mind. All intellectual arts disclose the intellect that originates them, and are the outward portraiture of inward faculties and laws. This is true alike of creation itself, and of the secondary and subordinate creation which is denominated poetry; the Art or, to speak more correctly, the Science of Criticism is the physics of the World framed by imagination under the guidance of taste; in both, phenomena very different indeed in their nature but very similar in their scientific aspect are resolved and classified; poetry is the "nature" of genius, and, if you will have it so, nature itself is—the poetry—or the poem—of God.

Here, then, in virtue of its systematizing authority, we have extended the domain of our philosophy beyond the region of the sciences; and we find that it traverses the fairy-land of fiction and of feeling with as assured a step as that with which it marks its supremacy in the former territory,—gathering and classifying the ornamental flowers of fancy as carefully as before it classified the useful fruits of speculative truth. The facility and amusement of the investigations may indeed differ in these very different provinces, but the principle of progress to the psychological theorist is the same, whether it lie through the pleasure-grounds of imagination, or through those regions which, though containing mines of *internal* wealth, may perhaps be, as is always remarked of the districts rich in mineral treasures, externally desolate, rugged, and difficult of access. The science of

observed nature, whether mental or material, is ever uniform with itself; the position of the mind in relation to these subjects of its inquiry admits of one mode of progress, and admits of it alone.

*Philosophy
of History
included in
the Philoso-
phy of Man.*

And the same philosophical analysis which I have described as reducing to law and order the recorded processes of science and the recorded impulses of imagination, is obviously applicable to every other record of mental action. (I am still regarding our science in its more popular aspect, as the ultimate science not of nature but of man.) *His-*

*General
conception
of History.*

tory, then, which in its widest sense may be defined as the record of "the development of things in time," and in its more restricted sense becomes the register of only human changes, is itself no more than an assortment of facts for our arrangement: a truth of boundless importance and fertility, which it has been reserved for later ages to discern, and for future ages to verify. "What species of amusement or instruction," says Mr. Godwin, "would history afford us, if there were no ground of inference from moral causes to effects, if certain temptations and inducements did not in all ages and climates produce a certain series of actions? The amusement would be inferior to that which we derive from the perusal of a chronological table, where events have no order but that of time." (*Pol. Just.* i. 268.) A great principle is always first carried to excess; it rushes into the mind with a force which impels it to the opposite extreme, and across every barrier of caution; like the lightning in suddenness and brilliancy, it seems, like it too, to fill at once the whole breadth of the horizon of thought. Mr. Godwin does not stand alone in modern times, in exaggerating beyond its real limits that greatest of conceptions, the philosophy of history; and the authority and ability of Frederick Schlegel have already, I fear,

urged the notion to extravagance, in his views, so widely circulated *abroad*, of the historical development of the laws of intelligence. But, Gentlemen, the disguises of a truth must not tempt you to doubt its substantial reality; and it is one of the most valuable lessons in the *ethics* of philosophical inquiry, to learn how to see truth in its excesses, and to defend it even when it deserts itself. Principles, great and novel, seem, like men, to have their wild season of youth, and seldom pass to their sober application without a previous period of extravagance. And there exists a philosophy of history, though it be never destined for the perfection of our philosophy of nature; there are periods, and generally determinable periods, in the march of men and empires, though the perturbations be too intimate and their causes too minute to allow us to give these historical recurrences the accuracy of our astronomical cycles. But on the present school of philosophical history I must postpone any further comment until our next term, when, in rapidly surveying the history of philosophy itself, I shall hope to find opportunities of noticing this kindred subject. But, in addition to all these more *deliberate* manifestations of nature and of man which I have presented to you as subjects for your philosophical anatomy, and subjects in two lights, both as to the matters upon which they are engaged, the truths they reveal, (which terminate by resolving into the final topics and truths of metaphysics,) and as to the mental procedures they call into action; in addition to these great specimens of nature and of mind which are contained in the museums of science and literature, I have finally to note another, a fourth rich material for reflective analysis with which you are provided, not by erudition, but by nature. We have detected our metaphysics where man probably first found it; in the labours of physical science searching for truth of

laws and principles; we have discovered it in history recording truth of facts and events; we have found it, more latent but not more inactive, in poetry, beautifying and transmuting both the former, and have known, or, I trust, will hereafter know, how to interpret the deep-thoughted sentence of Aristotle, *Φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαίωτερον ποιήσεις ιστορίας ἐστίν.* (*Poet.* c. 9.)¹ But,

*Individual
experiences
are materials
of psychological
induction.*

beyond all these records of "*instantiæ prærogativæ*" for your psychological inductions, we are not to forget another vast and important volume, that diary whose pages are forever augmenting in number,—the volume of your personal experience! In that region of knowledge every man is his own historian; and in it (though, as a *distinct* source of attainable truths, I have placed it apart) we may all find the miniature representation of that wider historic theatre which has

"A kingdom for a stage, princes to act,
And monarchs to behold the swelling scene."

Such indeed is the sameness of human motives and all the variety of external scenes of action, that each individual is truly a microcosm of the whole moral universe; and if, not confining ourselves to the actual experiences, we were to consider the *susceptibilities*, of any given human being, it might be affirmed intelligibly enough that a single individual contains within himself an undeveloped infinity of individuals, that each man is in possibility all men, and that each life renewed amid other scenes might be multiplied into a history of the world. And perhaps,

*Every individual
a microcosm.*

¹ ["Poetry is a thing more philosophical and weightier than history."
Ed.]

were history to be considered—or could it be constructed—as the record of the progress of the human race towards happiness, it is with such biographies that it would mainly be concerned; for the happiness of a nation is after all only the aggregate of personal happinesses, and the philosophy of its history the philosophy of personal motives. The pride of human nature seems indeed to have consecrated the same—perhaps fortunate—fallacy in its *patriotism*, which the reason of human nature so long admitted in its logical speculations: in each alike we have learned to invest our arbitrary genera and species with existence, to forget that the “singulars” alone possess it; and by a sort of realism of the emotions, the long predicamental line of country, province, county, family, and the rest, assume a definite being and attributes—their interests and their honour are matter of thrilling import—to many who scarcely recognise the existence or value the happiness of any one individual included under these idolized abstractions!

Political history an aggregate of personal histories.

There are some occasions indeed in which the connection, or rather the identity, of these two great spheres of psychological induction—personal and historical experience—is strongly and instructively established; I allude to those instances in which we can actually detect the agency of private motives in effecting vast national changes,—instances which at once break the powerful spell that, by separating the fields of individual and national humanity, so constantly exalts the life of past history into a certain godlike or superhuman scene, in which *if* individuals like ourselves are conceived at all to act, they are, as it were, dilated into the vastness of the mighty multitudes they control, and assume to *themselves* the magnitude of the interests they are directing. An illusion, I may add, in its general purport and effects not unlike

Examples of this identity.

that old and authorized dogma of the essential difference of the heavenly and earthly motions, which was one among the many reasons that left it to an Englishman of the seventeenth century to explain the theory of the universe. The instances of which I speak, though they occur oftenest under *despotic* governments, are least often detected there; and, accordingly, it is in the contemplation of such scenes, or in living under such constraints, that the illusion has its fullest sovereignty. There the kingly nature is not merely *superior* to that of ordinary men: it is of another origin and essence; it acts by peculiar laws, and owes no allegiance to the inductions of psychology. Yet there, precisely, its melancholy community of being is *most* firmly established; and there even the attribute of superior *power* may most feasibly be doubted. The Philosophy of Mind vindicates to itself the biography of courts and the history of power, in reducing power itself when most uncontrolled to the control of the invincible laws of universal humanity. "Domination itself," says Rousseau, "is servile when it depends on opinion. You depend on the préjudices of those whom you govern by prejudices. To conduct them as *you* please, you must conduct yourself as *they* please." "Oh!" he afterwards adds, after quoting the well-known anecdote of Themistocles and his child,¹ "what little conductors we should often discover for the greatest empires, if from the prince we could descend by degrees to the first hand that gave the impulse in secret!" (*Emile*, liv. ii.) A thought which might suggest a comparison of such a government to an unequal bulk of matter in mechanics, whose centre of gravity

¹ ["Ce petit garçon que vous voyez là, disoit Themistocle à ses amis, est l'arbitre de la Grèce; car il gouverne sa mère, sa mère me gouverne, je gouverne les Atheniens, et les Atheniens gouvernent les Grecs." Ed.]

(that centre on which the whole is set to rest for support, and where its entire force is accumulated for action) lies not at either extreme, but at some point not far from the preponderating side, but secret and invisible in the interior of the mass. I introduce the comparison in order to extend it in strict adherence to our present subject; for in the machinery of public and historical affairs, even such a director as this unseen manager of empires is himself the creature of motives produced by other agents in endless variety and succession; just as the mechanical point of which I have been speaking is itself, wherever it be placed, the result of a thousand combining influences, every atom of the mass really contributing to determine it! Thus it is that there is a sort of horrible "representative" government even in the favouritism of an Oriental tyranny.

But these are only one class of the innumerable cases in which history itself teaches us to identify, as subjects of philosophical contemplation, the life of individuals and of nations. And we require such admonitions. That it is an enormous complication of personal motives which composes the whole actual substance of the grand totalities of history, is, as a speculative truth, easily understood and admitted; but when the whole is presented, we neglect the innumerable parts: and a historical view of an empire, especially where our guide aims at elegance of style and systematic narration, (such a history as Gibbon's,) may be compared to the view of the *natural body*; in the symmetrical "effect" of the entire we forget that it is indeed an effect, that the shape is only the determining surface of masses of interwoven tissues and endless anatomical details, the visible result of which is that outward complexion of harmony and grace, whose very beauty it is to hide them. The same value is thus attached by

*The course
of history
determined
by minute
causes.*

psychological students of history to minute disclosures, which is attached by the anatomist to those rare surgical opportunities which allow the play of the living machine to be witnessed. To the tears of a certain woman many ages ago (to cite an instance from Helvetius) Europe demonstrably owes its present situation, and (I may add) the whole history of modern times, its precise development and character. If the tears of Veturia had not disarmed Coriolanus, the Volsci would doubtless have destroyed Rome; if Rome had fallen, the world would never have known that long chain of victories which in elevating a single empire changed the state of every other; modern Europe would not have triumphed over its ruins or received the impression of its powerful influences, nor, therefore, have been what it is to-day. I take the liberty of adding Helvetius's instance, that we might trace the same great results to even meaner parentage, and find, by a similar course of deduction, in the *geese of the Capitol* the ancestors in order of events to the dynasties and policies

*Physical
analogies.*

of the Cæsars and the Bourbons! Minute personal agencies, then, abound in all histories; for they are, in truth, the ultimate atoms into which all the events of history are finally resolvable. The Philosophy of History, therefore, (if you will allow me one more illustration,) bears to the philosophy of *personal* experience much the same relation which Mechanics bears to *Chemistry*: the one theorizes the forces and motions of the masses; the other the ultimate structure of each, and the arrangement and disposition of its component particles. When the influences of private and individual minds are detected, we have the two departments united; as when the practical mechanic becomes a temporary chemist in examining the strength and structure of his materials: such records restore the unity of human nature, remind the reason of what the

imagination is so apt to forget, and teach us that the history of mankind is still the history of men.

Gentlemen, I have now won the right of reminding you with how accurate an obedience to the inductive spirit of the age (in its own sphere so invaluable) we have conducted our investigations of the subject of the metaphysical philosophy. Without any formal display of the external apparatus of the scholastic method of division and subdivision, which for obvious reasons of utility it is my object in this place to avoid as much as is practicable, I have exhibited to you four great fields for the cultivation of psychological inquiry. These are, the truths, subjects, and processes of science; the recorded results and processes of imagination; the facts, causes, and general laws of history; and the treasures of direct personal experience. I have not pretended, as you will conclude or conjecture from the style (purposely unscholastic) in which I have discussed them, to present these divisions as possessing the adequacy of a scientific distribution, but as being sufficient to suggest to you the extent and the variety of those territories over which our philosophy exerts a direct and perpetual control. It exerts such a control, I have told you, because it is the last and highest generalization from them all. *Science* in all its branches is, as it were, the rich and variegated tapestry which is woven upon this common ground; *Poetry* in its widest sense, and all its many kinds and divisions, is but the practical form of a portion of this philosophy; mankind in the grand and melancholy review of *History* are but performing its evolutions; and in the private experience of mere individual life, every action is an experiment, every practical rule a tacit theorem, in the same universal science of the soul. I have now, therefore, described to you the philosophy of the mind under a purely inductive aspect; that view under which it takes

*Four great
fields of
psychologi-
cal inquiry.*

*Inductive
Psychology
a physical
science.*

its place with lofty humility as the first of physical sciences, but still a physical science, above all others in the extent of its conclusions, agreeing with all in its method of obtaining and employing them.

*But the
Philosophy
of mind is
not exclu-
sively in-
ductive.*

But, Gentlemen, I should not be acting with the sincerity which forms an important article in those ethics of philosophical inquiry to which I have already alluded, if I did not confess it as my opinion that the philosophy which is now and in these countries usually designated by the title of the Philosophy of Mind, has, when rightly considered, a scope *beyond* the inductive inquiry of contingent truth; and that even when I ventured to describe it to you as the grand and final classification of all the varieties of all the sciences,—being to them what they are to nature, as the physics to which experimental science was itself an experiment, geometry a fact, and algebra another fact,—as including the “*axiomata maxime generalia*” of which the *Paradise Lost* might be a poetical instance, the age of chivalry a historical,—even in these representations I had not exhausted the claims and offices of philosophy. There is, Gentlemen, a region which lies beyond the scope of the popular metaphysic of our age and country, a region upon which the heavy clouds of the scholastic and mystical theology have indeed long been suffered to rest, and whose substantial existence, confounded to the common eye with the mists that encompassed it, has at last been almost rejected in

*Question of
the objective
reality of
knowledge.*

rejecting *them*. I refer to that profound, perhaps abstruse, certainly most important, department of speculation, which is devoted to investigating the objective reality of our knowledge, and the inferences as to real and independent existences which can be concluded from the constitution and principles of our intellectual being. Such a branch of study—

the second great division of the system of metaphysical inquiry which I propose to you—would include as its chief subjects those important topics, the independent reality of material substance, the reality and value of abstract truth, the absolute nature of time and space, and, above all, the real eternal and necessary existence and attributes of that great animating principle of all things which anti-

of material substance, of space and time;

quity, by a noble and just analogy, entitled the soul of the universe, and whom it is given us,—while by the force of irresistible convictions of his Deity we can place him on the throne of the universe,—by the revelation of his assumed Humanity, to welcome to the almost nobler throne of the heart. All these considerations are of the kind which have been termed *a priori* reasonings,—that is, reasonings which

Meaning of a priori reasoning.

conclude the reality of certain existences from notions and convictions shown to be inseparable from our intellectual nature, as distinguished from conclusions obtained by the aid of experience and analogy. Whether the human reason is competent to effect this vast and momentous transit from relative and subjective classification to objective and absolute reality, has in all ages been a matter of disputation. Researches of this kind, prosecuted indeed with

Causes of modern denial of the possibility of metaphysical science.

very various success, and sometimes pursued into the boundless forests of intricate verbal distinctions with a very deplorable waste of industry, formed the great theme of metaphysical science almost until the age of Descartes, who was himself one of the most enlightened cultivators of this region of speculation. The scholastic metaphysicians, however,—on whom the yoke of an external authority pressed heavily, and who, set in the close harness of ecclesiastical dogmas, were too laboriously employed dragging the ponderous chariot of the church in tri-

umph to have opportunity for exulting in the wide champaign of speculation,—were scarcely ever attracted to the profound *logical* questions that this branch of knowledge involves. Occasional skepticism, the great stimulant of philosophical activity, was either too feeble to rouse them to examine the basis of their enormous fabrics of ontological science, or was consumed in skirmishing among the intricacies of its outer fortifications. The great question—perpetually recurring to the few who *think* in metaphysics—whether reason can directly recognise the absolute, is, so far as I have ever seen, untouched in their writings. At this time the triumphs of the inductive physics seem in these countries to have destroyed the taste for such inquiries, and when contemplated in the clear, piercing, and brilliant light of positive discovery, the dim shadows of ontology, if seen at all, seem only the gaunt and ghastly spectres of a departed philosophy, phantoms which haunted the midnight of science, and, lingering through its early dawn, have not even yet wholly vanished before its growing splendours. The majority of the chief authorities of our country in later times not only neglect this high metaphysic of absolute truth, but deny its legitimate existence. Dr. Hartley only approached, Mr. Hume disbelieved, Dr. Reid doubted, Mr. Stewart reiterated his doubts, and Dr. Brown—the genius and spirit of whose philosophy is that of Hume, with the negligent morning-gown of Hume exchanged for a gorgeous and spangled court-dress—denies the possibility of *à priori* deduction as applied to the Deity, reduces the knowledge of mind as a substance to the evidence of memory, traces the knowledge of matter to such an application of the Humian theory of physical sequences as I conceive contradicts the theory itself by still supposing a principle beyond it, and discourages all researches of real existence not contained in direct ex-

*Scottish
school.*

perience and the law of the belief of similarity of future to past, by constantly affirming that every form of knowledge must be relative to the knowing mind,—a certain truth indeed within its proper limits, but one which still leaves open the further question, whether there may not be principles in the mind, forms of our intellectual consciousness, which, though, considered as a portion of consciousness, they be relative and personal, yet, considered in themselves, are the all-sufficing proofs of independent irrelative existences. Whether there be not absolute apprehension of absolute natures, as well as relative belief of relative truths: whether, by a process wholly indescribable because altogether unique, the “pure Reason” (to adopt a phrase that marks an epoch in philosophical history) does not assert its own incommunicable privileges as a revelation from the reason of the universe to man, and not as a projection of man upon the universe, a revelation present to all, appropriated by none, and bearing with it essentially a character of objective, independent, and absolute. It is with a view to this identity of the absolute reason in all minds, that the sublimest of the Latin fathers as well as one of the loftiest of philosophical speculatists (St. Augustine) has spoken so constantly of the “*Intus in domicilio cogitationis, nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina, nec Barbara veritas.*” (*Confess. ii. 13.*) But need I recur to the authority of that incomparable person for proofs of the depth of that conviction of all patient uncorrupted thinkers,—that our perceptions of Truth descend upon us from on high, and that our reason is the faint but faithful shadow of the reason of God? What do you suppose gave permanence or power to the mystical numbers of Pythagoras and the realized ideas of Plato?

A metaphysic based on, but transcending, psychology.

Kantian epoch.

Testimony of Augustine.

Recognition of an objective reality by the greatest thinkers in all ages.

Pythagoras and Plato.

*Male
branche
and Des-
cartes.*

What secret influence taught one of the subtlest of modern minds his vision of all things in God, or so long supported the idealism of the followers of Descartes? Never be induced to believe, Gentlemen, by any dexterity of sleight or sarcasm, that such diviners of truth as these, if they did go astray, went astray with a folly which, if you believe the vulgar representations of their views, was truly grosser than the

*True prin-
ciples of
philosophi-
cal criti-
cism.*

hallucinations of lunacy. Those who honour me with their attention will hear, I avow it, a very different species of criticism. I would gladly teach you to prefer contemplating the truth that gave such systems their still undestroyed charm, to resting in the errors that disfigured and enfeebled them. I would willingly lead you to a reverence for the leaders of our human reason, even when, misled by the double fascinations of imagination and emotion, they sometimes rather wished a theory than established it. While you sternly discountenance the result of error, accustom yourselves, by tracing out its origin, to disintricating the germ of truth it invested; refute incomplete views not by rejecting but by completing them; and remember that even when, by too fondly worshipping a partial vision of truth, great thinkers have erred, a certain modified ambition is due to those very errors which flow from an excess of intellectual elevation. It is a feeling of this kind which, in despite of logical reclamations, will ever give an echo in exalted minds to the celebrated declaration of Cicero, that even an error shared with Plato was better than the truth of others. In the particular instance before us, the hypotheses of Plato, Augustine, Norris, Cudworth, Malebranche, and the rest, seem to me to have all been the sensible or imaginative forms of real truth. The inseparable conviction that reason is in its essential nature irrelative, that "states of mind"

and "modifications of thought," and the rest of the vocabulary of the popular philosophers of the day, will never exhaust the mighty mysteries of absolute truth which the mind directly contemplates when it recognises the necessity of causes and substances, and a first cause and a first substance,—the conviction, often undefined but always present, that to know *by* the reason is to know *in* the God who is Himself the reason of the universe,—this was the one great basis of all these various structures of philosophical system, which, however fantastic in their architecture, were none of them unsolid in their foundation.

But to enter into any actual discussion of this great question would now be premature. I confess, and with the sincere humility which becomes me in differing from my first masters in these studies, that my apprehension of the importance of the science of Real Existence, as a legitimate branch of metaphysical speculation, which was among the earliest convictions of my mind, has not diminished with its growth. Nor has my anxiety to see these profound questions established and elucidated been overcome even by the repulsive obscurity of the small portion which I have been able to penetrate of those antagonists of Kant, who, since the death of that great man, and during the latter section of his life, have been mainly engaged in discussing them; or by the seductive popularity, grace, and brilliancy of those very opposite teachers, who, by a prejudice not perhaps *altogether* to be regretted, reject every species of investigation which cannot be reduced to the forms of the Baconian logic, and tolerate no metaphysical science but that which our admirable Scottish contemporaries have denominated the Inductive Philosophy of the human mind.

*Statement
of the au-
thor's con-
victions.*

*Assertion
of the pos-
sibility of
meta-physi-
cal, not in-
compatible
with a due
recognition
of the value
of inductive
science.*

And, Gentlemen, while I have just now vindicated to the metaphysical philosophy a class of investigations to which there is no analogy in any inductive science whatever, while I contend that we impair the majesty of the First Philosophy when we confine it to the rich but restricted field which the authors to whom I have last alluded were content to cultivate and adorn, I trust that from the manner in which I depicted the former (or psychological) division of our subject, you will acquit me of any weak or presumptuous purpose of disparaging the philosophy of induction. I am not worthy to praise it as it should be praised; yet even I can contemplate with astonishment its conquests, vast, various, and secure, that invincible caution with which it has progressively mastered territories of truth so long abandoned to a dogmatism that had subjugated every thing to its authority but Nature herself; and with which, by substituting unwearied vigilance in this great warfare for the rash and rapid errors of the former tactique, this slow but triumphant method, like Fabius of old, "cunctando restituit rem." These are avowals almost superfluous in the countryman of Boyle, speaking the language of Newton.

I shall close this subject with two observations which, as not demanding much previous reflection, may fittingly be introduced in this early part of our discussions.

*Relation of
Metaphy-
sics to Psy-
chology
illustrated
by that of
Experimental
to Mathe-
matical
Physics.*

The first is this; that you may discover in the twofold distribution of Universal Metaphysics into the Philosophy of the Mind properly so called, and the Science of Real Existence, an analogy, not unworthy of notice, to the corresponding resolution of the complex Science of Physics into the departments of observation or experiment, and of mathematical deduction. In pure psychology, as in experimental science, we abstract in order to

classify; in ontology, as in mathematics, we abstract in order to apprehend the necessary relations of our abstractions. The one is the reproduction of consciousness under the form of system; its aim is to transform it by successive simplifications from a confused aggregate of mental states into a definite catalogue of functions; as it were, to take asunder the many-coloured web of experience and lay the unravelled threads in bundles according to their colours and shades of colours, the whole web being still present, but the whole under a new form and collocation. But if we retain the whole, we retain nothing more; psychology is never wider than the consciousness it reconstructs. If it be the object of the science to be "the *whole* truth," it is equally its object to be "nothing *but* the truth." In all this its identity of aim and method with the material sciences of *observation* is obvious; and has been illustrated in a thousand forms by authors with whom I may presume my academical hearers sufficiently acquainted. The other division, having duly received this strict and methodized report from reflection of the entire contents of the consciousness, proceeds by the instrumentality of reason to hold judgment upon reason itself, to examine the scope and value of this rich inventory of knowledge, and to determine its relation to the eternal realities of absolute nature. The similarity of this species of inquiry, (I no longer say its "identity," for the relation here detected, of the relative to the absolute, is purely *sui generis*,) the resemblance to the *mathematical* sciences, consists in this, that in both we search for relations not only *fixed in fact* but *necessary in essence*, which we not merely *believe will*, but *know must*, exist.

If these views be correct, it may naturally be expected that as the busy experimenter, a Priestley or a Boyle, is seldom the profound mathematician, so the devoted psychologist

Psychological investigation frequently indisposes to metaphysical inquiry;

will not generally be so deeply interested in those high speculations which contemplate the relation of reason to the universe. And this parallelism is verified in the history of philosophy. You do not look for a theory of association from Spinoza or Schelling. Again, is more popular, it may be expected that these divisions of meta-physical speculation should correspond with their physical counterparts in their relative *popularity* with the mass of thinking men; and that the same preference which the variety and activity of the chemical discoverer obtains above the abstractions of the pure mathematician should also belong to the inductive inquiry of consciousness, as compared with the absorbed and remote investigations of the source, scope, and authority of reason.

and usually precedes it in order of time.

A third scholium is this:—that as mathematics take their first rise out of abstractions from physical experience, so the ultimate researches of ontology may be observed to originate in at least a partial pre-existent psychology; and we may perceive—what we might have conjectured—that reason is not weighed in the balance until some previous attempt has been made to ascertain its shape and dimensions. The actual position of *German* philosophy—the great theatre of this mode of speculation—will very definitely illustrate this observation, which I introduce not as an isolated fact, but as a principle of method. The existing German schools owe their historical origin to the appearance of the *Critique of the Pure Reason*, in

1781. What was the origin of that performance, which even its despisers (who, I believe, are in this country much more numerous than its readers) must allow to have achieved an epoch in the history of the mind, if not by its merits, at least by its influence? Gentlemen, the *Critique* was in reality the genuine descendant of the early Scottish

The German preceded by the Scottish school.

school of Reid, which was itself traceable to the alternate coincidences and controversies of the ultra-Lockians with the last brilliant remnants of the Cartesian spiritualism. Now, the labours of Kant were themselves an effort—though certainly a cautious and measured effort—at vindicating the authority of reason in relation to the world it interprets; and so far as they were such they arose out of a *previous* psychological system, the system of Kant himself, as it grew into its enormous *Kant*. proportions out of his own slow and laborious classifications of the categories of reason. But the many who believe that the great professor of Königsberg *betrayed* the cause of human reason will oblige me to pass to a late period. Pause then upon the daring edifices of Fichte and Schelling, and examine if ^{*His successes.*} the principle does not hold, that ontological systems are chronologically subsequent to philosophies of mind. These systems—at least the systems of Schelling and his followers—suppose the Kantism they *oppose*; that is, they, for the most part, admit the logical analyses of Kant, while they despise the timidity of his restricted conclusions; that is, their ontology, be it sound or visionary, is built upon a preconceded analysis of the intellectual powers and laws, and from an antecedent *formal* logic originates that *substantial* or essential logic which directs its efforts to give to the reason itself an immediate contemplation of absolute objective being. Gentlemen, I do not now venture to decide; perhaps, under the circumstances of the case, I owe an apology for at present canvassing, at such length, the general legitimacy, or the processes, or the successes, of these efforts. They form a branch of metaphysical investigation of which the very phraseology is probably novel to many of you, and which has been (as I have already remarked) almost wholly neglected by *our* most influential guides in later times. I may, however, add that I

have for my own part derived little satisfaction from the bold solution offered by the most famous of our German contemporaries—the Plotinus of this age—for the great problem of reason, and that I must agree with that cold but just decision of Dugald Stewart with which the great Scottish psychologist frowns from his presence that monster unacknowledged by consciousness, the “intellectual³ contemplation” of Schelling, renewed by the master of the French eclectic school under the title of a “pure apperception:” yet I cannot consent to relinquish the vast inquiry, and I still believe that a middle course (something like that which, as far as I can collect from very imperfect sources of information, has been adopted by Bouterwek⁴) may be found, which

³ [*Anschauung*. (*Intellectuelle* as distinguished from *sinnliche*.) Schelling thus describes the difference between his own use of this term, and that of his more cautious predecessor:—“Kant gieng davon aus: das Erste in unserer Erkenntniss sey die Anschauung. Daraus entstand gar bald der Satz: Anschauung sey die niedrigste Stufe der Erkenntniss.” “Aber,” rejoins Schelling, “sie ist das Höchste im menschlichen Geiste, dasjenige, wovon alle unsere übrigen Erkenntnisse erst ihren Werth und ihre Realität borgen.” And elsewhere:—“Uns wohnt ein geheimes, wunderbares Vermögen bei, uns aus dem Wechsel der Zeit in unser Innerstes, von allem, was von aussenher hinzukam, entkleidetes Selbst zurückzuziehen, und da unter der Form der Unwandelbarkeit das Ewige in uns anzuschauen. Diese Anschauung ist die innerste eigenste Erfahrung, von welcher allein alles abhängt, was wir von einer übersinnlichen Welt wissen und glauben. Diese Anschauung zuerst überzeugt uns, dass irgend etwas im eigentlichen Sinne *ist*, während alles übrige nur *erscheint*, worauf wir jenes Wort *übertragen*.” Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften*, pp. 165, 208. Compare Plato, *Theæt.* p. 185, E. φαίνεται τὰ μὲν αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων—Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε—Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν;—Ἐγὼ μὲν ὦν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπορέγεται. Also the context from p. 184, C. Ed.]

⁴ [Better known as the historian of Modern Poetry and Eloquence,—a popular and eloquent rather than profound writer. His philosophical reputation, which is of a secondary order, is said to rest on his *Apodeiktik*, and his *Handbook of the Philosophical Sciences*, (1820.) Bouterwek

shall establish the internal independence of reason, *in some sense* its essential "objectivity," and direct apprehension of absolute truth. But this is matter for future consideration; and, whichever way your opinion inclines, you will at least admit that the subject deserves the honour of inquiry. I must remind you, however, for fear of misconstruction, that the force and cogency of all demonstrations of existence, *as demonstrations*, will remain unaltered, whether you assign them an absolute reality or only a relative and inferential truth.

On the whole, you will, I trust, agree with me as to the object of these latter remarks, that we shall best pursue that method which has been pointed out by the progressive developments of the human mind, and in our discussions in this place postpone these speculations of the higher logic until we shall have examined with some care the actual furniture of the human mind.

Here then we pause for the present, and, bound by the strict necessities of method, defer to a future period our conceptions as to that world

"To us invisible, or dimly seen,"

which lies beyond our consciousness, and of which the pure reason reveals only the bare existence and the primary attributes. On our next day we shall again return to the mind itself, and to the humbler, but perhaps safer, philosophy which classes its varieties,—a restricted subject, perhaps, if compared with the former, yet how vast if it be remembered to include every form of thought, knowledge, and feeling! Leaving that mighty sphere of

was first a Kantian, but afterwards adopted the views of Jacobi. In his *Introduction to the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences* he reasserts the Physical principles of Aristotle. Ed.]

essential reality for our daily and less ambiguous region of experience, I might tell you, with Milton,—

“Half yet remains unsung, but narrower bound
Within the visible diurnal sphere;
Standing on earth, not rapt above the pole,
More safe I sing.”

On our next day of meeting, then,—after briefly summing, and more explicitly enforcing, the views which in a merely suggestive form I have adduced to-day,—I will attempt to sketch for you some of the various *aspects* under which the philosophy of which we have now gained the general idea has been contemplated in various periods of the world's history. This task (a natural completion of our present topic) I shall hope at least partially to accomplish, in citing and illustrating some of the numerous *titles* by which it has been designated,—as “Wisdom,” “Philosophy,” “Metaphysics,” and the rest. As I am not aware of this information having been anywhere reduced to an available form, such a discussion will serve the great object which I still propose in these discourses,—that of constantly making them a stimulant and supplement to your own independent researches. And, at all events, these considerations, historical and philological, will possess the popular merit of being *less abstruse and obscure* than the subject which occupied the latter half of this lecture can ever admit of being.

LECTURE III.

COMPASS AND MEANING OF THE TERM ONTOLOGY.

GENTLEMEN:—

IN my last address to you, I completed the first great division of the general subject of Philosophy. I endeavoured to explain to you that I was disposed to divide it in direct reference to the objects of its consideration, that is to say, according as these objects were simple phenomena, or the great realities deducible from the existence of these phenomena: according, therefore, as its method was inductive or speculative, enumerating the facts of consciousness, or investigating existences not cognizable by, but involved in, that consciousness. The one division of the science, for example, resolves the whole internal experience into a few faculties, (or ultimate modes of consciousness;) it reduces all the known varieties of mental posture into phenomena of sensation, phenomena of intellect, phenomena of sentiment, phenomena of volition. The other, basing itself upon the “return” handed in by this analytical inquiry, and detecting in the phenomena it contains, or some of them, certain characters that involve realities beyond the scope of immediate consciousness, finds in the laws of the human reason—speculative and practical—a revelation of the absolute laws of the universe, and more especially the involved certainty of that Supreme causative and reasonable nature, who is the Law of Laws, and the depositor in the human mind of those principles of truth which we possess as the testimonial and

Recapitulation.

Philosophy both inductive and speculative.

manifestation of his all-containing and all-disposing existence. "Cogito, ergo sum," was the well-known postulate of Descartes: to those who can reflect, "Cogito, ergo Deus est," will not appear a less cogent conclusion.

I acknowledged that in this distribution I had departed from the philosophical chart designed by our most popular authorities. To enter into any defence of such a course would be at present misplaced: the event will vindicate it, or nothing can; and I am not sorry to defer as long as possible a trial where success alone can justify revolt. I might indeed produce countervailing authorities, but that I do not wish to occupy your time with a conflict of names where reason only should decide.

*Psychology.
Ontology.*

I ought to observe, however, that when I term these departments the Philosophy of the Mind, and the Philosophy of Real Existence,—or, to use the compendious Greek forms, Psychology and Ontology,—I employ this latter term in a sense considerably different from that which was so long consecrated by scholastic usage. The ontology of the schools (however we may adopt Leibnitz's¹ well-known remark as to the general

*Ontology of
the School-
men unpro-
fitable.*

merits of these disputants) *was* unquestionably a very misguided and unprofitable branch of speculation. The reason is obvious: they disjoined it too much from the anatomy of the mind itself, and consequently suffered this most sublime and interesting in-

*Reason of
this.*

¹ [Leibnitz observes in reference to the schoolmen, "Iniquos esse qui illorum temporum lapsus tam acerbè perstringunt: tu s̄ illic sis, aliter sentias . . . Nec vereor dicere Scholasticos vetustiores nonnullis hodiernis et acumine et soliditate, et modestia, et ab inutilibus quæstionibus circumspectiore abstinencia longe præstare."—*De Stilo Nicolii*, c. 27. Ed.]

quiry to lose itself in a wilderness of words. The same reason will account for the fact which I noticed in my last lecture,—that they omitted altogether, or almost altogether, the logical question, how far absolute truths and real existences can be concluded from mental states that at first appear to be wholly relative and subjective. Now, in the investigation which I would propose to you under the title of *ontology*, these inquiries would form, as assuredly they ought to form, a principal article of discussion. And thus the rational ontology of *this* school, instead of being “scientia maxime universalis circa ens, ejusque proprietates genericas, seu circa genericas rerum notiones quibus singulares comprehenduntur occupata,” would form for the most part an important department of universal logic. “Logic,” Gentlemen, is the science of those relations which constitute human knowledge. (As an “art” its definition flows from this, exactly as the idea of any art from its correlative science: it is the practical application of the truths which the science discloses.) Scientific or Theoretic Logic may therefore be said to consist of two departments, which, though I dislike instituting new titles, might perhaps be conveniently styled *formal* and *substantial* Logic: the former being the Logic which analyzes the reason as it evolves itself in the formation of knowledge, and thus a portion of general psychology; the latter, the investigation of the connection between the relations formed by the mind and the reality of things, and thus constituting a principal part of the speculation, which for brevity I have included under the title of *Ontology*. A more extended use of this word, which has been sometimes adopted, I notice to exclude. It is that in which, all human science being considered as the science of what is or what *ought to be*, the former branch is designated

Logic as a science and as an art.

Distinction of formal and substantial logic.

Lord Brougham's use of the word ontology rejected.

as "ontology." This employment of the term has the weight (whatever that may be) of Lord Brougham's authority. There seems, however, to be no great advantage gained by disturbing established nomenclature in order to convey the old distinction of physical and ethical knowledge. The Science of Ontology, therefore, as I would define and distinguish it, comprehends investigations of every real existence either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced *immediately* from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties by the human soul.

*Objection
to any use
of the term
answered.*

It may be asked, why adopt this long and mystical Greek term to express a class of inquiries which you seem just now to have considered as a portion—an exalted portion doubtless, but still a portion—of *Logical Science*? Because though we arrive at them through conclusions of the conscious reason, and therefore through the path of Logical Science, and though the legitimacy of this transit from consciousness to absolute truth may be a fundamental question in the inquiry, yet the entire inquiry swells beyond the limits of that substantial or higher logic of which I spoke. It does so, first, because though it be within the competency of logic to establish the *con-*

*Ontology
transcends
the pro-
vince of
Logic.*

nection of the phenomenal with the real, yet it is not accurately within the compass of logic to discuss the real existence itself. The higher logic and the higher physics differ, in short, as the common logic of physical inquiry from the subject of that inquiry. Secondly, and chiefly, because the science of logic is the theory of the relations that constitute *knowledge*, and the deductions of which we are now speaking are capable of being raised upon other

portions of our nature besides the purely intellectual. *This* is a consideration of importance; and may perhaps evince that the science of Real Existence is capable of an extension beyond what is conceived by its most devoted cultivators in

*Proposed
extensions
of the term
ontology.*

our age. The innovation, Gentlemen, requires your indulgence; yet I will dare to claim your attention. It is a general principle that the human mind, in *all* its aspects equally, supposes some corresponding counterpart of positive reality. The idea is of immense compass and importance. Regard the *intellectual* part: it concludes a "sufficient reason" for all

*Ontology of
the reason,*

things, and a final sufficient reason, which by irrefragable proof gives us *the Divine Intellect*. Regard *of volition*, the *voluntary* part, (in combination with the reason:) it claims a source of existence to all things, and finally a mightier source of existence than can be supplied by any secondary ancestry, and thus through the principle of causality (a principle of reason developed by the experience of the will) learns directly to rest in a first and *Divine will*. On this point a considerable number of reasoners, who admit the cogency of ontological reasoning in general, pause. But can we no further clear away the dust of sense, and expose the mirror which contains the full image of God in the soul of man? Regard the *moral* nature of this same

*of the moral
nature,*

mind; remembering that *every* original capability of the mind is equally liable to the supervening influences of cultivation, or neglect, or perversion, but that to be *duly* estimated it should be regarded in the state of cultivation, carefully considering that the "cultivation" of which I speak is not to *add to* the capability, but simply to give it brightness and prominence. Just as we judge the true purposes and beneficial tendencies of the earth, neither by the barren wilderness which neglect has produced, nor by the wild unprofitable vege-

tation of a field of weeds, but by the result which is evolved from the application of reason to the native capabilities of the soil. Contemplate then *the moral nature*, and may it not be shown that the inherent sense of right and wrong, when brought into its full development by the high culture of education and reflection, (not to speak of any higher influences,) does truly establish the real existence of some *superior nature*—no longer Creator, but *Judge*—which by its own essential constitution necessarily acts by the principle thus deposited in the human mind as the perpetual testimony of the existence and agency of such a being? Hither also some few of our English and foreign guides have ventured to advance. They have granted that a *Divine Judge* may be inferred in the same manner as we have inferred a Divine Intellect and a Divine Will. But, Gentlemen, man does not merely reason and will,—and by the inevitable force of an instinctive deduction regard his reason and will as the counterparts of a Final Reason and Will; nor does he merely recognise the distinctions of justice and injustice, and recognise them through the densest mists of passion and prejudice, which, like every other atmosphere, distort the direction of the light rather than destroy it: he also, by as real a susceptibility of his original constitution, *feels* all the variety of *passions and emotions*. Shall I advance, Gentlemen, or will you dread the vulgar charge of mysticism when you accompany me in proclaiming that there is for this portion of the human spirit likewise a real and permanent object correspondent?—in short, that there is an

“ontology” of the *emotions*, whose aim is to demonstrate that they also demand and attest a scene beyond the present, and an *object* such as no modification of passing consciousness can supply? that by an invincible conviction each desiring heart may be made to *feel* the truth which each reflective

and lastly,
of the emo-
tions.

intellect can *prove*? Thus it is that man's entire nature may be made to display the testimony of a God, and the prophecy of a future world; and that such proofs and speculations belong immediately to the science termed Ontology you will not deny, if you remember that I have already defined it as that science which undertakes to show what inferences as to real existences, not capable of being in this world direct objects of consciousness, can be deduced *immediately* from the existence of certain states and functions of the human mind. I have introduced the qualifying term "immediately," in order to discriminate these conclusions from the multitude of inferences as to past and future existences which are attainable by mere *analogy*; and I have stated that the existences deduced by these ontological reasonings are not "capable of becoming direct objects of consciousness in our present state," in order to distinguish these convictions from those which principles equally immediate produce relative to things not present; for instance, the veracity of memory, and of that law of our mind which gives to the future a certainty not inferior in degree (though only conditional in kind) to that which the faculty of memory bestows upon the past: the law, namely, which compels our belief in the stability of nature, that is, to express plainly a matter which has often been made perhaps needlessly mysterious, the law which obliges us to believe that the same continues the same, and the relations of all things continue unaltered in whatever part of time or space they be considered. From such conclusions as these of memory, or of the constancy of nature, the reasonings which I have been considering at such length are discriminated, then, in this respect, that the latter are not capable, as are the former, of being themselves, at least in the present scheme of our nature, portions of our immediate consciousness, whether past or future. This, however, does

not in the slightest degree invalidate the certainty with which—breaking the bonds of that present scheme—the reason of man perceives beyond itself a universal reason, beyond the will a universal cause, beyond the moral faculty a principle of universal right, beyond the affections a scene adequate to their expansion and an object adequate to their concentration. We do no justice to the primal elements of our human nature when we deny a place in our philosophical systems to these vast and assumed conclusions; nor is it fitting that these majestic convictions—the topics with which poetry adorns her pages and oratory animates her thousands—should be suffered to stray through the world, without being at length claimed and reduced into the fold of a strict and scientific method. They teach us that we are not only formed for eternity, but actually living in eternity; that our nature may well bear the shock of a “change” which is in truth no change; and that much which is yet to be known by experience is now known by inference. We see indeed “through a glass darkly;” but remember that, though the dimness of a glass may cloud the rich colouring and the perfect beauty of an object, it does not hide or alter one inch of the general outline!

*Different
names of
the science
thus distin-
guished.*

Gentlemen, the science which I have thus distinguished into its two great departments of relative phenomena and absolute existences, which in the former view we have considered as a purely inductive philosophy, like all its brethren, (though more exalted in its scope than any,) patiently observing and constantly classifying,—the prize lying here for him who has the keenest eyes to detect, and disentangle from all the variety of complex thought, those circumstances of generic identity which form a basis for classification,—which, again, in the *latter* aspect we have seen interrogating the functions and principles

thus established, and discovering involved in them a true objective world presided over by a mighty Spirit, who, in making our minds the mirror of his own, has enabled us in gazing on the mirror to refer the reflection to the reality:—this great science, as it has been in most ages of the world cultivated under some form or other, so it has received a great variety of *titles*, many of which are still almost indiscriminately applied to it, and some have nearly or altogether perished with the peculiar views which produced them. A slight consideration of these designations is not only recommended by respect for antiquity, and by the natural progress of the subject, which has now brought us to a point where we can afford to pause, but will also, if I mistake not, be found of considerable advantage in illustrating its general nature. A difference of names for (apparently) the same notion will be usually found to correspond to a difference of aspect under which it has been viewed; and in studying the progress of the human mind you will often find that an explanation of terms might be made to amount to a history of philosophy.

At an early period in the annals of know-
ledge, when its compass was so limited as to
admit of being easily comprised within a single head,
the general appellation of “wisdom,” or its equivalents,
was applied to it all; and it is in this comprehensive
sense that the term was attributed to the earliest Greek
sages, to the Egyptian and Oriental teachers of know-
ledge, and among them to that illustrious monarch whose
name even in fable is still the talisman of the East, and
whose title of Wise seems to have included not merely
the “understanding heart to judge the people,” but also
a large proportion of learning derived from purely phy-
sical observation. It appears, however, to be certain
that the “wisdom” of primitive Greece was principally
of a moral and political character; and the definition of

*Sophia, or
wisdom.*

Horace which refers the doctrine of that period to legislative prudence, and the regulation of civil life, is probably a correct historical depiction:—

“Fuit hæc sapientia quondam

Publica privatis secernere, sacra profanis,
Concubitu prohibere vago, dare jura maritis,
Oppida moliri, leges incidere ligno.”

From this prominently moral aspect of that universal learning which was then entitled *wisdom*, you can easily understand the subsequent process by which the same title became appropriated to all investigations of the nature of the mind and of those laws of duty which, collected from the mind itself, are elevated by reflection into rules of conduct to control that mind from which they originate. Omitting for the present the investigation of the kindred appellation σοφιστής, in the time of Aristotle I find the term, if not more restricted, certainly more speculative in its import. With him wisdom (ἡ σοφία) is the investigation of the first elements and causes of things, including, The Good and the reason of things, among these causes: in his own concise words—δεῖ αὐτὴν (τὴν σοφίαν, sc.) τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν, καὶ γὰρ τὰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἔστιν. (*Metaph.* i. 2.) As the philosophy of Greece advanced, the Stoics, whose views, as far as they were novel or influential, were principally of an ethical character, again appropriated the phrase to the conduct of life; and their “wise man,” whom Horace has so shrewdly satirized, and whom Epictetus has so sublimely depicted, was independent of all merely scientific learning but that which taught him the general principles of that universal system with which it was his duty to link his destinies. The passive fatalism of the Stoic, however, passed away, leaving, upon the highroad of that history of the soul which one day will so far outweigh

the poor chronology of empires, a mighty monument, *not* indeed of the wonders which the unassisted human mind can attain, but (what is scarcely less important) of all which it is competent to conceive and desire. In the subsequent use of the same word by the inspired writers of the *New Testament*, though we may observe an occasional reference to the merely sectarian and scholastic usage, (as where it is said that "the world by *wisdom* knew not God,") yet the direct and chosen import is wholly moral and practical, as in the singularly beautiful description which St. James gives of what he terms the *wisdom from above*, and which, as you all doubtless are aware, is wholly composed of its influences and operations upon the heart and affections. In modern times, however, this term, "completing the cycle of its history," seems to have reverted back to something not very unlike its original signification among the gnomics of Greece; and no one expects in the *Traité de Sagesse* of Charron, and still less in the conversational use of the word among ourselves, any thing more or less than the direction of high intellectual power by high moral principle.

I may remark in passing, as a fact for those who cultivate that most curious and interesting branch of inquiry, the history of Words, that both the Greek and Latin forms of this important term have suffered an almost equal degradation in our English usage; the Greek form being, with perhaps one technical exception, only represented by "sophist" and its derivatives, and the Latin form "sapience," "sapiënt," &c. being strangely enough condemned to the almost exclusive purposes of *irony*.

A similar extension, for similar reasons, was in the first ages given to that humbler term, "Philosophy," which has since borne so important a part in the history of human advancement. This celebrated word, which, originating in early Greece, has

*Philoso-
phia.*

since visited nearly all European languages, owes its birth, according to uniform tradition, to Pythagoras of Samos, who it appears, first of all the great thinkers of old, was "wise" enough not to call himself so. "Wisdom," says his Alexandrian commentator, "is conversant about those fair things which are first, and divine, and incommixt, and always the same; by participation whereof we may call other things fair. But 'philosophy' is an imitation of that science, which likewise is an excellent knowledge, and did assist toward the reformation of manners." (Iamblich. *Vit. Pyth.* 59.) Surely you cannot now remain ignorant of what *Wisdom* and *Philosophy* signify! But, to remove the veil of mystical language, Pythagoras's notion² was plainly this, that the title of Wisdom should be appropriated to that kind of knowledge which the Architect of the universe possessed of his own works material and moral, which he beheld as the outward image and adumbration of his own eternal mind; and that the title of Philosophy, or the aspiration after Wisdom, was suited to the imperfect, gradual, and progressive knowledge which the *human* spirit is permitted to attain of the laws enacted by the Divine. This, then, may serve as an instance of the instruction which I told you was sometimes derivable from the history of a single term, and with this purpose it may be useful as well as interesting to dwell for a while upon the infancy of a title whose long career of existence has been since so famous. In the adoption of this word (combined with some slight but authentic traditional records of his doctrine) you discover two cardinal principles held and proclaimed by the illustrious founder of the Italic school. First, that the eternal mind alone deserved the title of "Wise," or perfectly intelligent; a principle which it is impossible not to connect with

² [Qu. his biographer's? Ed.]

certain declarations in those inspired writings of which some have supposed Pythagoras may not have been wholly ignorant, but by which it is at all events easily conceivable that the Oriental instructors of Pythagoras may have been indirectly, or even directly, influenced. "The Lord possessed me," says the author of the book of Proverbs, speaking of that which we term Wisdom, "in the beginning of his way, *before* his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was," &c. In this article of the Pythagorean exposition, you may already perceive the faint³ germs of the bolder Platonic theory of the reality and *pre-existence* of the Divine ideas,—a coincidence between which and the inspired passage I have quoted was doubtless in the mind of Milton, when, describing the consummation of the work of creation, and after previously borrowing from this very passage one of his most daring images,* he tells us that the Divine Artist returned to his heaven of heavens to contemplate how the new-formed world showed

"In prospect from His throne, how good, how fair,
Answering His great *Idea*." vii. 557.

The *second* doctrine involved in the selection of this term by its inventor was not less important in relation to man than the former in relation to the Deity. It was implied in the connection of the σοφία and φιλοσοφία, that the great object of *human* science was the discovery and contemplation of the order thus impressed, and because it was impressed, by the Divine nature upon the material and moral universe,—a principle which again, ac-

³ [The doctrine in Iamblichus is *Neo-platonism*,—not "faint," but full-fledged. Pythagoras is indebted for much of his "wisdom" to the same source. Hence, doubtless, its "Oriental" aspect. Ed.]

* "The golden compasses prepared
In God's eternal store." See Prov. viii. 27.

cording as it was viewed in its speculative or its practical aspect, evolved itself in the Platonic definition of *science* as the contemplation of ideas, and in the Platonic criterion of *moral* perfection as assimilation to God. I need scarcely pause to remark what a striking example these successive modifications present of a tendency, which, in tracing the historical filiation of sects and systems, I shall hereafter have constant opportunities of noticing,—the tendency which great ideas have, when once breathed abroad upon the world, to become at once more distinct in their *expression*, and more intense in their *degree*, with the progress of thought; how conjectures fructify into doctrines, speculations rise into systems, and the vague diffusive *suppositions* of one century harden and crystallize into the definite *positions* of another.

So far, then, for the primitive application of the term Philosophy, which, like the “Wisdom” of which it was intended as the copy and counterpart, at first involved the whole mass of knowledge which the period possessed, beyond the practical informations of immediate experience. But as science broke asunder into the sciences, and the objects of knowledge came near enough to the eye to be seen in different directions, these separate objects, and of course the separate pursuit of them, received distinct designations; and the term Philosophy, sometimes preserving its *generality*, stood for the habitual prosecution of any kind of learning; and sometimes, *contracting* its range, became appropriated, as by Aristotle, to the investigation of those supreme principles which give law to all the subordinate departments of knowledge. In the former usage it stood for science universally; in the latter, for the universal science. When the term was thus unfixed you may easily imagine with what latitude it was sometimes employed; and I suppose none of you have read without a smile the definition which (at the opening of nearly the most

perfect fragment of contemplative antiquity) the Roman philosophical orator has given us of "Philosophy;" a definition in which we may see something more of the orator than of the philosopher,—much more of the rhetorician, perhaps, than of either. "Philosophy,"⁴ says he, "is the art of *speaking with copiousness and elegance* upon the greatest questions." It would be doing much injustice, however, to Cicero to conclude that these words (though it cannot be denied that they are very characteristic of the writer) comprise his full conception of the objects and compass of studies which he repeatedly describes in terms not more glowing than comprehensive. As a general fact it may be observed that he, as well as the other Latin writers, leans rather to the moral than the intellectual use of the term;* in this practical sense of the term (when no qualifying adjective is united with it) Cicero has been followed almost uniformly by

⁴ [The passage runs thus in the original:—"Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quæ de maximis quæstionibus copiose posset ornatè dicere."—*Tusc. Qu. i. 4, 7.* The context, as well as the words themselves, prove that this was not meant for a general definition of philosophy. Cicero is speaking of the compatibility of philosophical with rhetorical studies, and of the particular philosophy which, as an orator, he himself preferred. As well might "Philosophia commentatio mortis" be quoted as a definition. Cicero had studied dialectical nearly as attentively as ethical science, and describes its functions with singular fulness and precision. (See *Orator*, c. 4, 16.) Nor is his threefold distribution of philosophy "in naturæ obscuritatem, in disserendi subtilitatem, in vitam atque mores," less correct than it is elegant. (*De Orat. i. c. 15.*) Those who are disposed, in compliance with a common prejudice, to think meanly of Cicero's philosophical understanding, would do well to read the Academic Questions. Ed.]

* "Tu Inventrix *legum*, tu magistra *morum et disciplinæ*." And in the same book, (*Tusc. Qu. 5:*)—"Est autem unus dies bene et ex *præceptis tuis* actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponeendus!" (a thought of which we have the *religious* aspect in the 84th Psalm.)

the long line of authors and conversers who have spoken and written since the classic ages.

Gentlemen, to the Platonic theory of the principles of knowledge its great propounder seems to have given the title of *Dialectic*, (a term in which you trace the influences of his Socratic education.) By his rival, however, this term was degraded to signify the logic of *probabilities*;⁵ and in modern times it has become synonymous with logic in general, being perhaps more directly applied to the arts and artifices of argumentative disputation. With reverence to the mighty spirit of Plato, it may, I think, be fairly said that his application of the term was the least justifiable of the three.

The Platonic "Dialectic" appears in the writings of Aristotle under the celebrated title of *Metaphysics*. For this word, under whose imposing auspices so much that is valuable and so much that is absurd has since been given to the world, you are, I presume, aware that we are not indebted to Aristotle himself, but to one of his ancient commentators, Andronicus of Rhodes, who is supposed to have intended by the inscription upon his manuscripts, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, that the fourteen books so styled were to follow the physical treatises in the order of place and transcription,

⁵ [I think that this statement is founded on a misconception of Aristotle's meaning in the first chapter of the *Rhetoric*. It would be more correct to say that he limits dialectic to the refutation of fallacies. See *Soph. Elench.* 2. Διαλεκτικοὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων συλλογιστικοὶ ἀντιφάσεις. "The Dialectician is one who syllogistically infers the contradictions implied in popular notions,"—evidently a description of the Socratic method. In this same chapter he distributes discussion (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) under the four heads of didascalie, (his own method,) dialectic, peirastic, (arguing for exercise or trial of strength,) and eristic, (arguing for victory,) oddly enough making διαλεκτικὴ a branch of τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. In another place (*Metaph.* iii. 2, 20) he distinguishes dialectic from philosophy, of which, in its highest sense, dialectic is in Plato the synonym. Compare also *Soph. Elench.* c. 11. Ed.]

perhaps in that of study, perhaps in that of rank and dignity. It is not very certain that in any of these respects the methodizer perfectly understood the intentions of his author. From this equivocal and accidental parentage, however, subsequent ages have received a term which sometimes stands for all philosophical inquiries into the mind and its conceptions, and sometimes for every speculation, when it becomes unintelligible. Its *stricter* signification is still pretty much the same with its ancient one,—the investigation of the causes and principles of things, as far as reason can penetrate and arrange them.* The portion of Aristotle's writings which pass under this title have, in every age, been the peculiar study and perplexity of critics; and I have little doubt that their prolonged and almost despotic authority is a good deal traceable to the very conciseness of their oracular sentences, which, sometimes signifying every thing or nothing, as the reader pleased, by a very singular contrast allowed every speculator to find his own fancies authorized by a writer who was yet the most curt, condensed, and dogmatical the world has ever known!

To speculations of this kind the title has also been given of *The First Science*, (*ἡ πρώτη σοφία*, ^{*Prima Philosophia.*} or *φιλοσοφία*,) and "The Mother-Science;" the authorities of Aristotle, Descartes, and Lord Bacon, (not to speak of innumerable names of minor note,) sanctioning its application, though not all to accurately *the same* notion. In one passage of his writings Lord Bacon conveys in his own peculiar style (certainly the most admirable

* "Prima pars philosophiæ," (says Descartes, in strict consonance with his peculiar method,) "est *metaphysica*, ubi continentur principia cognitionis,—inter quæ occurrit explicatio præcipuorum Dei attributorum, immaterialitatis animarum nostrarum, necnon omnium clararum et simplicium notionum quæ in nobis reperiuntur." In another place he styles Philosophy a tree whose roots are metaphysics, trunk physics, and the branches all the separate sciences. (*Epist. Auth.*)

combination of picturesqueness and precision that ever was devoted to philosophical purposes) much the same views which I have been endeavouring to convey to you of the relation in which these studies stand to all others,—adopting to express them the title we are now considering,—“*Alius error est, quod post singulas scientias et artes suas in classes distributas, mox a plerisque universali rerum cognitioni et philosophiæ primæ renunciatur; quod quidem profectui doctrinarum inimicissimum est. Prospectiones fiunt a turribus aut locis præaltis,—et impossibile est, ut quis exploret remotiores interioresque scientiæ alicujus partes, si stet super plano ejusdem scientiæ neque altioris scientiæ veluti speculum conscendat.*”—*De Augm.* i. Descartes’s use of the same phrase, which he employs as precisely synonymous with metaphysics, (“*Hæc est quæ prima Philosophia, aut etiam Metaphysica, dici potest,*” he says in the prefatory epistle of his *Principia*.) is so constant as to make it unnecessary to cite any particular instance. It is enough to say that the celebrated *Meditations*, which, when they first appeared, produced an impression upon the European mind only rivalled by that of Locke’s *Essay* about fifty years later, and which are still deeply worth the perusal of all who take an interest in these pursuits, were originally published in 1641, under the title of *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*. Descartes’s notion of this “First Philosophy” was nearly or wholly the same with that of Aristotle;⁶ and both include under

⁶ [Aristotle’s description of the *Philosophia Prima* is worth transcribing:—*Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν, ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρησάτω, καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ὄν. *Metaph.* v. 1, 12: “If there is no existence apart from the compound existences in nature, physics must be the first science. On the other hand, if we assume an immutable existence, that existence must take precedence of the*

it, though by a very different chain of connection, all abstract discussions of the existence and attributes of the Divine nature. The Aristotelian theology is the ultimate term of the Aristotelian *physics*; the Cartesian theology, of the Cartesian philosophy of *mind*: each arrives at the necessary existence of God, the *one* through the external world of matter and motion, seizing the great truth of a prime *Mover*,—the other, from a contemplation of the internal world of thought, pronouncing the reality of that infinite Being whose “idea” we can neither exclude from the mind, nor modify when there. You can easily conceive how these very opposite aspects of the same great truths heightened the resolute hostility of the two schools; a hostility somewhat obtrusively expressed in the old editions of the *Principia* of Descartes, (that edifice of sublime hypothesis,) where the bold soldier of Touraine is depicted setting his right foot upon the prostrate volumes of his master, with an inscription beneath proudly importing that he who had solved all the miracles of nature remained himself the only unexplained miracle on earth:—

“Assignansque suis quævis miracula causis,
Miraculum reliquum solus in orbe fuit!”

I have already given you some account of the objects which by the scholastic authors were included under the title of “Ontology;” and I have, I hope not ineffectually, endeavoured to exhibit to you the more definite and important topics which I would wish under the same designation to substitute in their place. We may there-

former, and the corresponding science must be the first, and, because the first, a universal, philosophy. The office of this philosophy must be the contemplation of substance or existence as such,—of its essence and its essential attributes.” He had previously styled it *Theology*, (τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσόφαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογική.) ED.]

fore pass to the old and convenient term which has lately been revived by many of our continental contemporaries, "Psychology," which is intended to express with perfect simplicity the investigation of the appearances and laws of the mind apart from all ulterior applications. To form an expressive contrast with Ontology, a term has been given currency by some living philosophers, (philosophers are fond of triumphing over the Roman emperor's impossibility;) and though I believe the coinage has not got much circulation in this realm, it certainly passes for a legal tender in Germany. The term is *phenomenology*,⁷ and is cautiously expressive of its precise objects,—the apparent in contrast with the real, τὸ φαινόμενον as distinguished from τὸ ὄν. By the word *Pneumatology* was formerly intended the general science of spirit under its various subdivisions, angelic, diabolical, and spectral, as well as the living soul of man; in short, a universal spiritual physics. Although in this bold theory of the *superior* intelligences the positions must have been, apart from the authority of fathers and a few scriptural passages, wholly arbitrary, this difficulty did not prevent some of the schoolmen from calmly apportioning to each class its respective science; and those who left to wither in neglect the rich field of the human heart understood perfectly the capacities of the archangel Michael, and could appropriate

⁷ [The word was coined, I believe, by Hegel. It is not synonymous with "psychology," rational or empirical, but is rather the science of Man as he develops himself in history: if we may venture to put that interpretation on the description of the *Phänomonologie des Geistes*, with which we are favoured by a recent historian of recent German philosophy:—"Die Welt ist das Phänomen, und also die Wissenschaft die *Phänomenlehre des sich selbst als eine Gemeine freier Ich erscheinenden Ich*:" "the science of the phenomena of the Ego appearing to itself as a community of free Egos!" Ed.]

their separate offices to every order of the heavenly hierarchy. We are told that in the mystic volume of *man's* destinies there are "things which the *angels* desire to look into:" the bolder curiosity of man has not only "desired" to reciprocate the knowledge, but more than once has dared to imagine it in his possession! "Pneumatology," however, to follow the fortunes of the term, rapidly became the exclusive science of the human spirit, —the brother-spirits being either relegated to their distinct provinces, (Angelography, Demonology, &c. &c.,) or appended as a supplementary subject to the department of Natural Theology. In this sense the designation is still often employed; though as a philosophical term it has been, perhaps justly, censured as including, or insinuating, something hypothetical as to the physical nature of the mind. It is a curious example of the metaphorical and the literal use of words or ideas, that in this instance we actually possess two important and wholly dissimilar sciences, named from the same original term, the one (Pneumatics) in its literal and the other (Pneumatology) in its figurative application: it will, perhaps, surprise you to be informed that even by so late a writer as Adam Smith the word *Pneumatics* was still employed to denote the science of the *soul*.

The authority and ability of M. Destutt-Tracy *Ideology*. have given some limited circulation to the term "Ideology," as a title for the philosophy of the mind. When you remember what are the doctrines which this writer (a follower, though an independent one, of Condillae) labours to support, you will sympathize with the degradation of a term, which, from once standing for the mysterious exemplars of the intellectual world of Plato, has sunk to serving the purposes of the philosophy of mere sensation. Indeed, the story of this famous word might form a varied and instructive tale; and in the long fortunes of the "Idea," sometimes exalted above

the sphere of earth, and as invariably depressed by the very extravagance of its own ambition, the Scott of philosophical romance might find at once a hero and a moral.

With particular and special titles for the mental philosophy (such as, for instance, "The Theory of the Representative Faculty") I do not now concern myself; as, originating out of peculiar views, the names are there a part of the systems, and only to be canvassed in canvassing *them*.

Among some of our contemporaries^s it is not unusual to style this philosophy "Egoism," or the "Science of Ego;" a mode of expression which aims at evaporating every particle of hypothesis in selecting a phrase of pure and extreme simplicity; but which, though often highly convenient for purposes of exposition, scarcely compensates by occasional utility for perpetual barbarism.

*Philosophy
of the
Mind.*

The phrase *Philosophy of the Mind*, which has obtained so much celebrity from the victories which the Scottish School have achieved under its banner, is not liable to any strong objection. I would only repeat, that if it be understood as merely including the physiology of the consciousness as a succession of phenomena, it does *not* cover the amplitude of legitimate human speculation upon the theory of thought. But fortunately, as the term "Philosophy may comprise any

^s [I know not to whom Professor Butler alludes. "Egoism" is commonly used to denote a particular theory of perception, which resolves all phenomena into modifications of the conscious subject; *e.g.* the theory of Fichte. So applied the word is expressive enough, and hardly deserves the sarcasm in the text. It is not more barbarous than its homonym "egotism," and much less so than "egomism," which occurs in "Baxter On the Soul," (1737,) where it is attributed to certain Cartesians. Sir W. Hamilton finds the same word in a Scotch author, also of the last century. See his notes on pp. 269 and 293 of the collected edition of Reid's Works. Ed.]

speculation whatever, and as "The Mind" may be regarded as directly concerned in every speculation that is busied with the human nature, or faculties, or fortunes, the phrase can always expand or contract with the purposes of the employer; and this facility, invaluable in a general title for a progressive science, will always make this designation too convenient to be forgotten.

We have now, Gentlemen, closed our rapid review of the principal titles by which men in different ages have represented to themselves the great speculation as to the constitution and destinies of their spiritual nature. I trust you agree with me that such a *résumé* is not either uninteresting or unprofitable. You observe in the titles chosen the aspects contemplated; you see vagueness and accuracy of conception uttering itself in corresponding vagueness and accuracy of expression; the well-formed figure giving its own symmetry to the dress that clothes it. But, more than this, in such a review you catch glimpses of the history itself of philosophy opened in these its varying designations; a few words, when linked with the knowledge of their origin and uses, become the rallying-points round which our scattered ideas cluster; and we hear in each no more a few arbitrary syllables, but the disputes and the decisions, the wisdom and the follies, of an age.

Gentlemen, having arrived at this point of progress in our introductory course, it becomes my duty to canvass the question to which I have already slightly alluded,—of the *importance* of the studies which I have been endeavouring to describe. In our next lectures we shall enumerate some of the popular objections which prejudice has advanced against its cultivation; and we shall proceed, in the first instance, to answer them, not so much by any *direct reply* (which would be a tedious task) as by the more instructive method of establishing the claims

of *all* knowledge, and of this philosophy as a real *portion* of knowledge. This argument, stated at length, and involving subjects of the highest moment to the welfare of humanity, (would that I could do them adequate justice! but I still rely upon your indulgence,) will form the principal topic of the next (or Monday's) discourse.

LECTURE IV.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INDUCTIVE SCIENCE OF THE MIND.

GENTLEMEN:—

AFTER considering at some length the subject of our present studies in its two great divisions, I closed this preliminary statement in my last Lecture with a brief review of the various appellations which this philosophy has received in different ages,—“Wisdom,” “Philosophy,” “Metaphysics,” “Pneumatology,” and the rest; and I did so, not only because I was not aware of any antecedent authority to which I could refer you for the information in a combined and succinct form, but also because it appeared to me that in discussing these names we were, in point of fact, obtaining rapid but useful glimpses of the position which the general subject has held in the minds of men in various stages of the history of human reason. From the whole I think you may draw a few valuable deductions; as, first, that the subject itself at a *very early period* attracted the notice of contemplative minds; again, that, though at first involved with every other in a common mass, it soon detached itself, and that in every successive age this separation became more decisive and complete. Thirdly, that, as it may be viewed in both a speculative and an experimental aspect, so antiquity, and the copyists of antiquity, principally adopted the former, and the present and recent ages have strongly inclined to the latter. And, fourthly, that the complete scheme of philosophical inquiry is that which combines both without impairing either, which does entire justice to

*Inferences
from the
foregoing
Lecture.*

the demands of human reason, and, while it encourages strenuously the labours of observation, also holds open its portals to every investigation as to the value of our knowledge in the world of realities, and the legitimacy of the conclusions which pure reason can establish with regard to its own position in the universe and the being of its supreme and eternal Author.

Psychological should be kept distinct from metaphysical speculation.

I feel it right, however, to state, for the satisfaction of those who suspect the solidity of such speculations, and for the information of others, that as these inquiries are dissimilar in their nature, so should they be presumed *distinct* in a methodical delivery of doctrine; or, if they mingle at all, that they should be connected without being confused, and appear in juxtaposition without passing into "combination." Thus, those who acknowledge no science of mind but that which simply classes phenomena will be at liberty to pause in accompanying us whenever we arrive at the close of our psychological inquiries; the supposed mysticism of ulterior disquisitions shall not affect the accuracy of these previous inductions; by keeping the subjects carefully separate we shall prevent the infection from communicating, and, adopting Lord Bacon's justification of his aphoristic method, "*res nudas et apertas exhibemus, ut errores nostri notari et separari possint.*"

Objections to the study of Mind considered.

But is the study of mind, whether relative or absolute, actually *worth the labour*? This is, doubtless, a question of importance at the threshold of every science. It is unworthy of the independence and authority of reason to enter upon *any* proposed inquiry without having some preconception of its utility or its dignity. And the question becomes still more important in entering upon *mental philosophy*, which, from a variety of causes, has failed in obtaining the distinction so abundantly and so justly

bestowed upon the cultivation of the physical sciences of the material world. In defence of the claims of the philosophy of mind, much, both of argument and eloquence, has already been displayed by writers with whom, I suppose, I may safely count many of you familiar. The subject, however, demands its place; it is far from being exhausted; and it is my duty not to forget, in consulting for the erudite tastes of some of my hearers, the equal claims of the least-practised intellect among them.

The objections which are commonly professed—still more commonly insinuated—more commonly than either, *felt*—against the Philosophy of Man under all its many aspects, I will not now directly undertake either to canvass or refute. To establish the truth is to destroy by replacing them. I allude to those weak prejudices which regard all such discussions as in their nature either nugatory or unintelligible,—either not worth understanding, or impossible to be understood: those which discharge every appeal to the theory of the faculties by general declarations that man if he be the boast is also the riddle of the world, that the mystery of the soul is not to be solved by itself, that every inquiry into such matters, far from deserving the proud title of science, scarcely escapes the charge of presumptuous folly. Again, that the vaunted discoveries of the psychologists of modern times are obviously capable of no useful practical application; that if they be *truth*, which is questionable, they are at least sterile truth; that no arts are facilitated, no conveniences multiplied, no “fortunes made,” by these unprofitable truths; that while a fortunate chemical analysis detecting some undiscovered metal may secure the fame and the wealth of the humblest compounder of medicines, no one has yet heard of any analysis of complex feelings which has ever wrought the same charm; that much as we may

say of the force of impressions and the balance of the passions, and how theory can state and arrange them, we can scarcely compare these "dynamics" of the mind with those mightier sciences of force and motion which at one time tell you how much an ounce of silver would weigh upon one of Jupiter's invisible satellites, at another, new-modelling the world by its own detected energies, drive the hugest and densest masses across the ocean in the face of the winds by a vapour lighter than the wind itself! Others, again, reiterate that our business is not to examine, but to act; that we must take truth as we find it, and feelings as we find them; that precision is not to be sought or expected in matters of mere practice; that a creature so volatile as man is not really subject to any general laws whatsoever. While another party, fearing for the effects upon the manners and dispositions, lament that metaphysicians are proverbially dreamers; that habits of mental inquiry are a misfortune to their owner; that their victim, if he be not made unhappy by his gift, escapes it only by becoming, under their influence, cold, callous, and unfeeling,—regarding the beauty of emotion as the anatomist does the symmetry of person, not as a theme of admiration, but as a subject of dissection; that, in short, these botanists among the feelings destroy the flower in investigating its structure, and sacrifice the colour and the odour in seeking to determine the class and the order. Others, finally, reversing the charge, declare with calm conviction that there is no difficulty whatever in the science of man; that it is too simple to require discussion or admit of hesitation. Ah, Gentlemen, there is no folly so hopeless as that which finds no difficulty in philosophy and penetrates all nature with a glance!

Such are some of the objections which appear to me still to float in the atmosphere of the public mind. These opposing forces are not, you perceive, very con-

sistent with each other, and in truth suffer so much from civil dissension as almost to excuse external hostility. Let us proceed to silence them all by the simplicity of truth.

We claim then a place for the science of thought, first, because it *is* a science. In professing to communicate knowledge,—that is, to disclose either new facts or new relations of old facts,—it advances a claim which, properly understood, is perfectly free from all conceivable exception.

Answers to objections.

The argument here, if methodically considered, (and we cannot be too exact upon a point of so much moment,) resolves itself into a syllogism of which the major proposition, or principle, states the universal value of knowledge, and the minor, or application, the claims of this philosophy to be considered as a portion of knowledge. Confused notions about both abounding in society, it would be difficult to say which of the two propositions is oftener contested, because oftener misunderstood. Let us dwell for a while upon the former. As long as the highest happiness is attainable, and made by the laws of the universe dependent upon exertion, knowledge (except in the case of a being incapable of exertion) must in itself be a blessing. Were that monstrous inconsistency possible, that the grave can be the actual termination of a being capable of entertaining the conception of an infinite God,—a tenet not less absurd than it would be to maintain that the mechanism of a watch, marking as it does the progress of time, was never intended for any purpose higher than belongs to the structure of the pebble on the shore,—were *this* the case, it would not, perhaps, be impossible to establish that ignorance might, in some cases, or in all cases, be a positive advantage in the game of happiness. But constituted as man is, a real element in an immense scheme of perfection, with his rational felicity made

Psychology is a science, and no science is unimportant.

proportional to his dignity in this scheme, and his dignity proportional to his conscious voluntary efforts in the right direction, (inversely as the opposite,) and (in a world where the principles of imitation and respect are so often injurious or at least uncertain) these efforts susceptible of being safely and securely directed only in obedience to a previous knowledge of the course in which they ought to ply,—in such a system of things, knowledge (whencesoever obtained) must ever be a true and genuine benefit. That is to say, if we are made to appreciate truth and to seek it, and if the universe be founded not on delusion but on truth,—the same truth which we are formed to seek,—it may then be stated as a general principle, that no scientific truth can actually be discovered by the human mind which it is not, on the whole, better should be known than not known. To suppose the contrary would be to suppose that the acquired knowledge impairs some previously received and venerated principle, or is applicable to some unlawful end. Now, if the previous “principle” be intuitively or demonstratively certain, this is impossible; and if it be not, it *may* be false: it may therefore legitimately be summoned to descend into the arena to vindicate its prerogatives against the invader; and whichever succumb, or whether both be reconciled, human reason is the real winner,—and therefore the *happiness* which is built upon the right employment of that reason. And as to the application of scientific truth to the cultivation of arts injurious to the peace and happiness of mankind, surely it must be obvious that the evil in this instance is not in the possession, but the application; that the crime is not in the new-discovered relation, but in the old malice that misemploys it. The same quantity of heat which, duly disposed, warms the face of nature into all the fertile beauty of a summer noon, may be condensed into the means of boundless destruc-

tion and of indescribable torture: but who lays the evil to the charge of the element thus perverted?

It is because this general objection to the claims of all knowledge is *more constantly* (for reasons which I shall just now notice) advanced as a prejudice against the philosophy of mind than against any other intellectual pursuit, that I have troubled you to consider it thus far, or that I request you to continue your attention to it a few minutes longer.

The exceptions, then, to this principle of the universal value of Truth in all its provinces are only apparent. Truths, however, differ in degrees of value, and should, if possible, be possessed in proportion to their degrees of value,—placing, of course, at the culminating-point of importance those which express the relation of man to his Author, and which intimately affect the reception and influence of all others. These primary articles of knowledge, I may add, are so evidently demonstrable as to admit of being *à priori* pronounced incapable of subversion by any subsequent discoveries. This being granted, it will, I think, be found that wherever the communication of knowledge appears to result in evil, the evil is always attributable to the communication being incomplete; partial truth being sometimes equivalent to absolute falsehood, and often as dangerous in its results. If you draw upon paper a figure nearly approaching a circle, and tell a child that such is the figure of the world he stands on, without telling him that you have only drawn the visible projection of the real sphere, it is obvious you may communicate an impression almost as false as if you had sketched a pentagon or a square. To inform a savage that flame applied to the touch-hole of a piece of ordnance will cause its charge to be projected with enormous force, is to tell him a true and a useful fact; to neglect to add that the gun will recoil in pro-

*Exceptions
to the uni-
versal value
of Truth
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apparent.*

portion to the violence of the explosion, is to endanger his life by the very truth you have told him. Were it possible (that I may apply the principle to one of its most interesting cases) to acquaint the peasantry of a country with the science of Newton and the poetry of Milton and all the other splendid triumphs of the cultivated human mind, the gift would render them hopelessly disqualified for a life of humble labour: add to your splendid present a knowledge as profound and assured of the truths and precepts of Christianity, and, without one scientific proposition or noble conception losing its real value, the ambition they might generate becomes contemptible, the labour they might supplant is welcomed as a duty.

Objection.
Knowledge
can never
be complete,
and ignorance
may be better
than partial
enlightenment.

But it may be retorted, that, as *all* human knowledge is *necessarily* incomplete, this statement will only prove the danger, or the uselessness, of every acquisition of information whatever in the present state; and that, according to our own argument, it *might* be better that man should be wholly ignorant, or decline prosecuting his progress in enlightenment, than arrive at a greater degree of knowledge, which, since it can never be absolutely complete, may produce an impression as false, and practical results as pernicious, as ignorance itself. That in the spirit of our own reasoning all is peril, and equal peril, from the lowest stage to the highest, from absolute nescience to absolute omniscience; and that if the danger be in the imperfection, the ploughman will not escape it by exchanging his own partial knowledge for the partial knowledge of a Newton or a Locke.

*Reply to
objection.*

To this form of the objection it may be replied, that, when we assert that the danger is in the imperfection, we not only do not deny, but impatiently assert, that the danger will *diminish* with the diminution of the imperfection; that, on the lowest

ground, the danger of partial knowledge (though, as we have insisted, it be a *real* danger) is probably, on the whole, not so great as that of total ignorance, while, on the other hand, it carries in its very nature a principle of improvement; that both instinct (in the affection of curiosity) and reason urge us to acknowledge that the true remedy for the evils of limited information is to widen its boundaries; and that (as, with a view to such objections, we before laid down) the nature of the primary moral truths is such as to govern all subsequent acquisitions, and (something like the unshaken confidence a natural philosopher has in the great laws of matter and motion) to be substantially independent of apparent *discrepancies*, while from all *corroborating* facts or discoveries they willingly consent to receive strength and elucidation.

Let me conclude the discussion by condensing its principles. Knowledge is speculative whose object is truth, or practical, whose object is the application of truth. As to speculative knowledge, its pursuit is recommended by four distinct advantages,—innocence, dignity, pleasure, and *possible* utility. As to practical knowledge, it is either *moral*, as the conduct of life, or *not moral*, as the arts in general. The latter species is recommended by obvious *actual utility*. For the former there are two supposable substitutes,—the principle of imitation, and the principle of habit. Both (though invaluable when regulated) are, as independent and solitary guides, liable to the fatal objection, that, while they are equally powerful for evil and for good, they possess within themselves no internal principle of right direction. This principle of direction, under whatever aspect it be considered,—natural or supernatural,—must be essentially a principle of knowledge. In granting, then, that it is *the highest species* of knowledge, we assume that it is knowledge; differing from all others not in kind, but

in importance, and to be maintained in its supremacy not by superseding all its brethren, but by *accompanying them all*. The real lesson, then, to be derived from the objection is, not that any species of logically admissible scientific inquiry is to be discountenanced as dangerous or forbidden ground; not that the conscience, or the sense of interest, can ever justifiably pull back where the reason is anxious and able to go forward; not that truth, or the reality of God's material and moral universe, has any blemish that it is ashamed or afraid to show the most inquisitive examiner: none of *these* conclusions, whose absurdity eclipses even their cowardice, but another most momentous conclusion, that it is the duty of every man who undertakes to convey knowledge, as far as he can, to convey it *complete*; that is to say, to infuse into the immediate elements of his communication those additional principles which direct its partial operation, to impart along with *all* truth the *highest* truth, along with every knowledge the knowledge of man's self! Here, then, Gentlemen, the path of the argument crosses into our own domain, and the objection itself only fortifies the claims of the *philosophy of the human mind*! The evils of misguided learning owe their origin to errors respecting the relation which human nature bears to the objects of its knowledge, and still more to errors regarding the source and nature of its real happiness. These errors can only be neutralized by opposing truths,—truths which shall rectify alike its follies as to speculation and its follies as to practice. The theory of these truths, if such a theory exist, is included in the philosophy we propose to discuss.

But this is to borrow from the future. As far as we have yet advanced, we merely claim for this philosophy the rights which belong to every science which professes to investigate and deliver truth. Holding that man possesses the same faculty of perceiving the relations of

things in whatever sphere of his knowledge they exist,—holding with Cicero¹ that “*Natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi*,”—that “*Omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia simplicia constantia*,”—we ask, for the theory of all which most concerns us, the consideration which is readily conceded to the theory of Saturn’s satellites, or to hypotheses as to the secret of the fructification of a fungus.

But, conceding the general principle, can we establish under the shelter of this important major proposition the claims of this philosophy? High as its objects and pretensions are, does it indeed deserve the name of *science*? and is that which is proved of science universally proved implicitly of this? Here, then, as the claim is to a title, the title must be ascertained; and hence we are reduced to the necessity of more accurate *definition*. If we may justly define all science to be the investigation of the relations established between beings, (a definition which will include the two great divisions of science,—hypothetical and real,) and if we can show that in the case under consideration there ARE relations “*established*,” and relations “*admitting of investigation*,” our “minor” proposition will be satisfactorily proved. No great expenditure of reasoning is absolutely required for either of these affirmations; yet the subject opens views of such importance that the proof and illustration of them both will occupy the remainder of this and probably the entire of the following Lecture. To commence with the former. The mind, we assert, is subject to laws.

It will not be denied that science exists. The existence of science in any region whatsoever presupposes constancy of relations. Relations are states of a conscious mind. Therefore constancy of relations supposes constancy of states of mind.

The existence of any science implies the possibility of a science of the Mind.

¹ [*De Fin.* ii. 15, 46. Ed.]

That is to say, the existence of any science of any description implies that the mind is subject to established laws; and therefore, so far, the mere existence of science implies the possibility of a science of the mind.

*Constancy
of mental
Laws.*

"But this establishes the constancy of mental laws only so far as these admitted sciences extend; leaving us in uncertainty as to the stability of the rest." The conclusion, even with this limitation, might be shown to extend much further than appears obvious to a cursory observer; for in the detection and belief of truth how vast a portion of the human mind is brought into action, and in admitting the reality of discovered truths *how much* of the mind is, therefore, inclusively, conceded to be superior to caprice, or uncertainty, or chance! But it is safer, because simpler, to recur for this further portion to *experience*, and to *those convictions* which give its chief value to experience. The course of active human life is distributable into two great divisions, as guided by reflection, or as obedient to instinct, passion, habit, and accident. *First*, then, how far does *reflective agency* infer the immutability of the mental constitution? We answer, that the whole conduct of life proceeds upon the supposition of mental laws; life is but the evolution of consciousness; and in every case where man acts with a purpose, his acts are but the expression of his knowledge that what has been will be.

*Uniformity
of sequence,
sameness in
difference.*

The detection of sameness under difference, as it is the essence of scientific sagacity, so it is the essence of *practical* sagacity also; but of what value would be the perception of substantial sameness under circumstantial difference, if the facts which were perceived to be the same could not be trusted to as producing continually the same results? that is, if there were not, beyond a perception of identity, a conviction of *law*? Now, this is just as true in conscious life as in unconscious matter. Of what value would it be to have

beheld (by the gifted vision of genius) the same fact of gravity appearing under different circumstances, in the elevation of the mercury in the tube and in the descent of a stone from the hand,—to have caught the one *Protean* fact concealing itself, at this time under the outward garb of rusted iron, at another in the phenomena of respiration,—to have found the substance of the diamond in the animal breath, so that the story of the Eastern princess whose mouth dropped diamonds as she spoke became no longer a fiction,—to have seen the prismatic spectrum and the rainbow owing allegiance to the same sovereign law, or (as is probable) the lightning of the heavens and the beating of the human heart as two results of one agent,—of what value would be these and a thousand such discoveries, if the sameness thus apprehended were only a momentary and accidental recurrence, and not known to be a permanent arrangement, arising out of original properties—that is, mutual relations—with which the elements of things were at first invested by Providence, and of which properties all the course of nature is only the combination or the separation, but never the *alteration*? And if, passing from speculative truth to practical application, you convert Science into Art,—if the theory of latent heat takes active existence in the steam-engine, or the theory of dioptrics in the common telescope, or the discovery of the cooling power of a metallic tissue in the safety-lamp of Davy,—it is equally, or even more, evident that the construction of the machine supposes a previous conviction of the constancy of the law. In this great traffic with nature, by which we may be said to enrich her with arts as she enriches us with materials, we embark (as in all other commerces) our industry upon the faith of her promise; and the machine or manufacture is at once the monument of our confidence and of her fidelity. Here, then, again,

*Constancy
of natural
laws im-
plied in the
existence of
the Arts.*

is the same principle of experimental science,—for a machine is nothing more than a permanent experiment; the difference not being in the thing or the process, but in their object, which in the one case is *discovery*, and in the other case is *use*. But in every case, the observation and experiment that go before discovery, the rule or the machine that come after it, there is still the conviction—unchangeable as its object is unchangeable—that the laws of Nature (like those Eastern laws of which we read in Scripture) are laws *that alter not*.

*The art of
life follows
the same
analogy.*

Now, Gentlemen, there is an Art of more importance than any of the arts that “recreate life,”²—the art of *life itself*. “Life” (of course I use the popular sense of the term) is the constant exercise of practical rules similar in their discovery to those of which we have just been speaking; that is to say, it is literally the exertion and the product of an art; and to contemplate a life at its close is, in a manner, to inspect a “machine” whose parts are not coexistent but successive. The object and use of the machine thus completed is indeed hidden among the secret purposes of God, who, constituting us as the mechanics of our own conduct, reserves among the deep counsels of his mighty administration the final causes which assuredly exist for the life and trial of every single being of all his creatures. There is a direct object, and there is an ultimate object. The direct object of Life is Duty; the ultimate object is that reason of existence which extends to man in common with every created thing: the former is often missed, for it is to be attained by man; the

² [“Athenæ

Et recreaverunt vitam legesque rogarunt,
Et primæ dederunt solatia dulcia vitæ,
Cum genuere virum tali cum corde repletum
Omnia veridico qui quondam ex ore profudit.”

LUCRET. vi. 3. Ed.]

latter never, for it is the purpose of God. Our ignorance of the ultimate object of the complicated machinery of each existence does not, it must be remembered, diminish either the *importance* of that object, or the *fitness* of the machinery to attain it, or our *certainty* of that fitness: on the contrary, we are to conclude that the ignorance is *part* of the fitness, since it exists. Voluntary agents, we yet work for a purpose beyond our contemplation; each is the conscious architect of a separate chamber of an edifice whose *general* effect, internal dependencies, extent, and purpose, can only be known to the one Reason which can comprehend infinity. Leaving, then, the *object* of the mechanism, let us return to its *formation*.

Man is an artist, and constructs his rational life upon observation. His operations in the pursuit of happiness are experimental forms of previous knowledge, of knowledge at first obtained instinctively or accidentally, and afterwards abridged and generalized into practical rules. It is obvious, therefore, that the same confidence as to the stability of fixed laws which originated the steam-engine, the microscope, the air-pump, the thermometer, must exist to give value to all the maxims of civil and of personal prudence. Indeed, so truly is this the case, that the very word which is now technically employed to signify the ground of all scientific physical knowledge—the word “experience”—is much more frequently employed to denote the foundation of all *practical* knowledge in the affairs of life; and, in common usage, is seldom applied to the former purpose, except, perhaps, in the sense of *professional* skill, where it holds a kind of middle place between the ground of scientific induction and the ground of practical wisdom.

As far, then, as the reflective agent is concerned, there can be no doubt that his rules, whether right or wrong, in being rules, proceed on the tacit or expressed conviction that the mind manifests itself under unalterable

laws. The expressions of these laws are the formulas of psychological science. The "man of the world," who would blush—if he *could* blush—to be thought a sage, runs through the whole gamut of mental philosophy in an hour, without knowing it, just as the equilibrist, who balances himself upon a cord, and a dozen other things upon himself, exemplifies half the laws of Statics without ever having heard of the existence of Galileo or Newton.

The Emotions subject to uniform Laws.

But man does not merely reflect; his experience includes other and apparently more uncertain elements. Can we ascribe this stability to passions, which are the proverbial types of instability? can we give laws to caprice itself, or chain that "fine frenzy" of imagination which

"Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi"

within the narrow pinfold of a metaphysical theory?

To this we reply, in the first place, that the former reasoning involves the regularity of this portion of the mental constitution. For the very experience of which we spoke is in a great measure a tacit theory of the passions. Iago excites the jealousy of the Moor with as accurate an application of means to ends as that with which an experimentalist excites the dormant electricity of his glass plate or cylinder; and an orator arranges his topics to inflame the passions of his auditors to frenzy, with the same calm reliance upon general rules of previous experience as when he aims at the nobler end of securing rational conviction. The tempest is as truly a result of atmospheric laws as the calm; and, properly understood, there is a "*method*" in all "*madness*" as well as in Hamlet's, though the thread that links its follies be sometimes difficult to trace. Indeed, so far is the stability of the laws of passion admitted, that their changes

are usually *better* understood than those of the reason; and for one who can judge the propriety of an argument, there are fifty who can criticize the proprieties of Shakespeare.

Of the other phenomena whose apparent irregularity exempts them from control, the *real regularity* is equally attested by practical experience. That there are laws of *Imagination* is obvious in (what Bacon would call) the "prerogative instance" of dreaming; where the modifying influence of circumstances is matter of universal remark. "Habit" is itself the name of a law. And instinctive principles of belief, though, from their nature being simple and unanalyzable, they are irreducible to *more* general laws, are yet felt above all others to be permanent in their nature, and are not less matters of *science* than the ultimate elements of bodies to the chemist. Strictly speaking, the whole mass of reason and action is reducible to such principles; and in this point of view the instinctive principles are not subject to law, only because they are *the laws themselves*.

But secondly, even though the laws of emotion, and the rest, were undiscoverable, or undiscovered, we should be entitled to conclude that they exist. We may assume higher ground than we have yet approached. Our argument is no longer experimental or analogical, but profound as human reason itself. To this point (on account of its importance, which extends far beyond our immediate subject) I request your special attention. There is a principle in the rational nature which renders it impossible not to believe that every phenomenon whatsoever has a reason for its existence and for every circumstance of its existence. To possess reason is to possess this conviction. It is possible that higher intelligences may possess principles similar to this, but of greater compass, of which we have

Were these laws undiscovered, we should be entitled to believe that they exist.

For Law is presupposed in the existence of Reason.

no conception; but they *can* have none that contradicts it; just as the man gifted with sight can direct his course better than the blind man by touch; yet the sight cannot contradict the touch, or make that quality not to exist which the touch feels to exist. But however the higher orders of nature may be gifted, with us the conviction of which I speak is the deepest element of the intellectual being; and though it grows in prominence as the reason is cultivated, being fullest and clearest in the scientific mind, it is truly perceptible in every mind

*Rational
conviction
of Law an-
ticipated by
Instinct.*

whatsoever. I have long been in the habit of considering that the law of the stability of nature, and our confident expectation of that stability,—a law which has attracted since Hume's time so great a proportion of the attention of metaphysicians,—may be considered to rational and intelligent beings as truly an inferior and *sensible* form of the primary principle which I am now considering. I am stating an instance of a principle of (as appears to me) vast importance, namely, that instincts which, under their sensible, practical, *occasional* form, actuate the lower animals, and man also (who really belongs to that lower stage before the birth of reason) in his infantine state, are apprehended *by the reason* (that is, by the faculty in this world exclusively *human*) under the form of *necessity* and *universality*. A reason arising from the original nature of things is, in its essence, irrelative to time and space; and to suppose that every succession of phenomena will be *invariably* successive—that is, will forever recur the same if it recur at all—is only to suppose what surely is no very mysterious assumption, that what has been reason will continue reason forever; that if in the nature of any being there be a fitness for connection with other beings, as long as the being exist the fitness will exist, and therefore the sequence which is, as it were, the active and outward manifestation of that fit-

ness. The antecedent then to the rational reflector as distinguished from the lower animals, and from his own state before the birth of reason, is *neither* an efficient cause, *nor* is it a mere antecedent expected to be invariable. Our reason, refusing productive efficacy to matter, denies the one; the same reason, with as unequivocal an evidence, attests something beyond the other. A physical antecedent, as contemplated by reason, is a being in whose nature there is a fitness for being connected with its consequent, which fitness was the ground of the original arrangement, and could not have admitted of any other; and which fitness having in its essence no relation to time or space, and therefore being of course as permanent as the being itself, produces in rational intelligences the infallible conviction that the sequence will last as long as the beings composing it exist; reason thus corroborating and justifying the persuasions of instinct. Nor is there any Necessarianism in such a doctrine further than the Necessarianism to which I shall never refuse to subscribe,—the impossibility of the Divine Power ever acting otherwise than in consonance with, and as the development of, the Divine Wisdom. It is this fitness, instinctively recognised, which is the true source of that supposed confusion of efficient and physical causation which has so much perplexed our modern philosophers; and, perhaps, of that equally puzzling, because universal, conviction of a connection, in some sense “necessary,” between the successions of causes and effects. You perceive, then, that we extend with assurance the dominion of law and regularity not only *far beyond* our actual experience of its sway, but over every portion of the universe where there exists any element for it to govern. It is not merely a contingent principle of experience, but a necessary principle of reason; and, I must add, it is on

*Rational
idea of
Causation
determined.*

*The à priori
conviction of Law
transcends
experience,*

this ground, and this ground alone, that we call *God* the God not of the visible universe, but of infinity itself; a conclusion wholly unattainable by the popular argument of "design," for the very simple reason that no inference can overpass its premises. The revelation of reason tells us, that wherever there is being there must be law; and wherever there is law there must be God. It empowers us to assert that if, as poets have dreamed, there be beyond the visible harmonies of the world a realm such as their "*Chaos*," *Chaos* itself, whatever we understand by the term, is but a form of order, and as directly relative to its object as the harmonious structure of an eye or an ear; and the poet who has so wondrously described it has still not left it *uncontrolled*, when, in words which painting never rivalled, he has depicted

"the throne
Of *Chaos* and his dark pavilion spread
Wide on our wasteful deep!"

Such is our irresistible conviction of the nature of the universe. I shall only add, that your decision of this point leaves the logic of physical inquiry untouched; as, whatever be the *foundation* of the conviction of the permanence of nature, the conviction instinctively exists; and, whatever be the ground of the connection of events, the connections themselves (which are the object of physical inquiry) can only be ascertained by observation. You are not, therefore, to imagine that, in doubting the completeness and accuracy of the modern metaphysic, you are at all questioning the accuracy of the admirable logical views with which it is connected. Leaving the general principle to future discussion, I now return to its immediate application in the subject before us.

*but by no
means sup-
ersedes it,
either in
physical*

*or in psy-
chological
inquiry.*

In common with every other phenomenon of nature, the successions of mental states must

have their reason in the mutual suitability of the elements that compose them, and, therefore, their perpetual sameness of recurrence,—this conviction being wholly independent of our knowledge of the *actual* laws of succession. And, just as the chemist is well aware that the results of innumerable combinations which he has never tried—perhaps which have never yet come together in any part of the whole extent of nature—are yet as fixed and settled in nature's counsels as those which he is every day witnessing or producing, and will show themselves so when they do occur,—so the metaphysician is assured that the boundaries of his classifications are the boundaries of his *knowledge*,—not those of the assured, universal, and invariable order which pervades the world of mind. Of the millions of intermingling waves that ripple the surface of a bay, there is not one which is more truly the creature of chance than the great tide-wave of the ocean itself. Of the innumerable modifications of feeling, which, passing rapidly over its surface, make the history of an hour in any human mind, there is not one which does not appear,—disappear in introducing its successor,—reappear to give place again,—by laws as fixed and stable as that which, during the whole succession of these superficial changes, was, probably, urging on the main current of the mind in the desire and pursuit of happiness.

Gentlemen, it thus appears that the history of Consciousness is a part of the history of nature; that, like all conceivable existences, it is subject to order regulating its successions; and that *that* which discovers law in every thing is itself subject to law. The mind which detects a creative intelligence in every disposition of successive facts does not refuse to add *its own* testimony to that great truth. The transcendent Artist who has formed this wonderful mechanism of thought, and who has purposed to direct

*History of
Conscious-
ness is a
part of the
History of
Nature.*

its energies to Himself, has enabled it to do so by enabling it to recognise its own structure.

*Are the
Laws of
Conscious-
ness dis-
coverable?* This conducts us to the not less important question,—the other element of our argument, —Are these laws of the conscious principle, thus assuredly existing, capable of being *discovered*? The reply is, that, in proving them to exist,

*Proofs of
the affirm-
ative.* we have in a considerable degree established their amenability to inquiry; for a part of our proof arose from the fact that they had *actually* been made matter of habitual analysis. Action and conduct imply not merely the existence of laws, but the

*Evidence of
Language.* *knowledge* of them. Another proof is derived from the evidence of *language*,—a medium of investigation to which I may often have occasion to invite your attention. Language, Gentlemen, is the sensible portraiture of thought, the dial-plate of the mind; and every fact, whether of change or constancy in the outward indication, marks a corresponding fact in the inward machinery. We are not without physical analogies sufficiently illustrative of this relation which the observation of language bears to the analysis of the mind. It was of importance to the theory of acoustics that the vibratory motions in sonorous masses should be accurately determined. The vibrations themselves elude the keenest eyes, and from their rapidity, as well as minuteness, are beyond the reach of direct instrumental observation. How were these invisible *data* to be gained? The happy thought occurred (to Chladni, I think) of strewing fine sand over the vibrating plates; the sand of course assumed forms directly dependent on, and thence indicative of, the vibrations; and thus one of the most secret and exquisite operations of nature became the subject of easy ocular inspection. Now, this device exactly illustrates the metaphysical uses of language. It is the sensible form of almost imperceptible

facts, and snatches from the secrecy of the invisible world of mind a constant report of its processes: while in the combined investigation of *different* languages the indications may be compared and corrected; much as in the ingenious "principle of repetition," by which Borda has taught astronomical observers to rectify the imperfections of their instruments. Language is often indeed the embodiment of prejudices; but you are to remember that there is not a single error or prejudice which does not arise according to laws as real as truth itself, and whose analysis may not, therefore, expose these laws to view. The mistletoe is as true a result of the laws of vegetation as the oak it disfigures; and the "perturbations" of the planetary bodies are themselves elements in the stability of the system.

In every civilized language, then, there are words to be found expressive of certain familiar properties of the mind, as well as phrases expressive of many of their minuter relations and more striking manifestations. Such are sense, reason, imagination, habit, genius, dulness, memory, contemplation, and the rest. The invention of such terms supposes a previous observation of the great general facts which they convey; and the constant use of them in the same, or nearly the same sense, shows that that observation is currently admitted to be correct, or nearly so. The object, therefore, of psychology is not to reclaim to cultivation a field suffered till now to lie fallow, but to correct and assort the produce of a field whose cultivation is as old as reason itself; and the opposition, so often complained of, between (what is termed) the vulgar and the philosopher, arises not because the one is exclusively vulgar and the other exclusively philosophic, but because they are *both* philosophers, though in very different

*Terms of
mental
science con-
tained in
popular
discourse.*

*The differ-
ence be-
tween the
philosopher
and the
vulgar a
difference
of degree.*

degrees, and therefore, of course, with very different results.

Our next Lecture (on Thursday) will continue, and, I hope, conclude, *this* part of our general argument for the reality and importance of mental philosophy.

LECTURE V.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

GENTLEMEN:—

I RESUME our discussion of the susceptibility which the mind possesses of becoming the object of physical discovery. In the argument, as far as it has yet proceeded, you will easily perceive that I prolong it less for purposes of conviction than for those of illustration. The argument, as a mere argument, could be comprised in a small compass. But I am anxious that you should not only recognise the truth, but recognise *the value* of the truth; that, in admitting its cogency, you should feel it enlighten, as well as compel; and that the fiery darts, *ignea tela*, of truth's defensive warfare,—like *other* fires,—in the very process of destroying what directly opposes them, should reflect illumination on all around. It is with this intention that I have interspersed the simplicity of these reasonings with intimations of other and more remote doctrines,—intimations which the rigour of a strict method would scarcely permit, but which the sagacity of a reflective audience welcomes as its appropriate stimulant; and, however I may seem to deviate from the direct road of demonstration, it is not impossible that these deviations may be themselves the directest road to a higher goal,—that of making you familiar with the true nature and bearings of the great subject which engages our attention.

We have seen, then, that an Inductive Rever. pitulation. Science of the Mind, the immediate subject of our present consideration, is demonstrably possible, from

the very existence of science of any kind, and the very conception of regularity and law as applied to any subject whatsoever, which necessarily supposes a regularity of *mental* relations, without which the conception could never have had being. We have seen it proved from the existence of such a thing as a practical conduct of life; which has been shown to be precisely analogous to any ordinary *art*, and equally to suppose the influence of laws in that region with which the art is engaged, that is to say, in the mind of man; and we have seen that the inference embraces states of mind wholly independent of reason and proverbially capricious,—nay, includes them with peculiar force, inasmuch as it is with these and their laws that the art of life is especially concerned. The force of these proofs from experience has been corroborated by an appeal to that great instinct of reason which assigns intuitively to every phenomenon an adequate cause and reason of existence, and thence a certainty of recurrence unaffected by changes of time or space. The *reality* of the laws being shown, we proceeded to establish their liability to discovery, partly from the same train of reasoning which established their existence, and partly from the indications afforded by language, in which the *invention* of mental terms proves the *attempt* to classify the properties of mind and their perpetuation, the general admission of the classification as correct, or at least as an approximation sufficiently convenient for all practical purposes. Now, where the subject, and the instruments, of investigation remain unchanged, a less perfect knowledge is a guarantee of a better, because *its* existence proves that there is at least no radical characteristic in the nature of the subject and of our relation to it, which would seclude it from the dominion of science, and therefore from the influence of that glorious attribute of all legitimate science, its capabilities of indefinite and perpetual improvement.

Indeed, without leaving the boundaries of language itself, we may recognise striking proofs of this process of amelioration. If, as we have been maintaining, language exhibits the visible surface produced by a perpetual undercurrent of analytic thought, and in its rudest form is the rudest form of *science*, so, the nomenclature of any subject often may be said to give us in a condensed and portable form the main elements of its actual condition, and always rises in precision as that condition improves in scientific accuracy. So that the improvement of language is itself the constant witness of the progress of thought. And in the general intelligence of *our own subject*, as manifested in the use of language, you may perceive at once the testimony to this progress, and the means of furthering it:—the testimony to this progress, in the unquestionably greater precision which marks the use of terms denoting intellectual powers and processes in general society; the means of increasing this precision, in the certain though insensible influence of accurate expression. If language be the creature of mind, it is also its guide: the child of thought supplies the blindness and supports the feebleness of its parent. One of the great benefits of metaphysical studies upon the mass of society is to be found in this very diffusion of exact phraseology, inevitably productive of exact thinking, perhaps indeed the greatest, certainly the most universal, though the most neglected, advantage to be obtained from the vigilant supervision of a great school of metaphysicians in any country. Terms expressive of the great subjects of reasoning are at first refined and purified in the alembics of accurate science. Thus definite, they descend among the vulgar; and though perhaps these distinctly-moulded types of thought may at first be clumsily handled in colloquial usage, yet if they lose

*Argument
from the
phenomena
of Lan-
guage fur-
ther pur-
sued.*

*Diffusion
of exact
phraseology
one great
benefit of
metaphysical
studies.*

ness have taken this place among the sciences; and, though this be not all, it is much. It is universally felt that mind is logically a part of nature; it is not so universally felt that it is the *noblest* part: but the former step is so vast and momentous that it may palliate the deficiency of the latter, to which it is the safest preliminary, and of which, in logical method, it ought to be the antecedent. But I pass from this argument to another which better secures my great object of *illustrating* the general subject while *proving* the particular question.

*Organ of
Psycholo-
gical disco-
very.*

The most instructive argument in proof that the mind is liable to a discovery of its laws is derived from the unquestionable fact, that, as there is a field for discovery, (before established,) so there is an *adequate organ* for effecting it. The astronomer has his stars and his telescope, the naturalist his insect and his microscope, the optician his light and his prism, the crystallographer his crystal and his reflector to measure his angles, the chemist his earths and his electric pile, the *metaphysician* his mind and his faculty of attention. In before explaining that the mind is subject to arrangements of law and order, you will remember that, among other arguments, I proved this point from the existence of *science of any kind*: I return to that argument to corroborate the present one. For that this provision of instrumental apparatus is sufficient for all the purposes of mental observation and science, you will agree when you remember that, in point of fact, every other subject of observation must be reflected upon this mirror of consciousness before it is capable of being known. If the composition of air or water can be an object of human science, it can be so only by observations of a series of human sensations; and this observation itself, as well as these sensations themselves, are but phenomena of the conscious mind. Thus every material science is, in a manner, a science of mind, by being a

science of successive sensations; and it will scarcely be denied that attention may observe the phenomena of mind, and convert them into science, when it is remembered that every thing which professes to be science is built on this very supposition.

The facility with which we can apply this instrument varies, however, very considerably according to the portion of the subject investigated. In all cases equally it supposes a subject of inquiry and a process of inquiry; that is, it supposes the reproduction by the suggestive principle of a certain state of mind, and a continuous secondary process by which we keep comparing and examining it, as well as weighing its value and meaning. The facility then will vary as these operations vary, both or either of them; it will rise exactly as it is easier to reproduce, or as it is easier to examine. The processes of sensation or of voluntary effort are usually the easiest to reproduce, but they are by no means the easiest to examine. The processes of emotion, on the contrary, are exceedingly difficult accurately to reproduce; while they will probably be found not peculiarly difficult to examine. The processes of reasoning offer about the same facility or difficulty to both operations. The power of reproduction, it is obvious, depends on the power of commanding the antecedent state or states with which the required one is connected; and the power of examination will depend on the complication or the simplicity of the phenomenon examined, in relation to the examiner. It is precisely so that the naturalist's chances of discovery of the structure of some novel insect will be determined by his chances of obtaining the insect for observation, and the powers of the microscope he can employ in observing. Now, in the phenomena of *sensation*, of *voluntary effort*, of *reasoning*, demonstrative or contingent, there is certainly no *mental* difficulty in

Facility of using this organ varies in different departments of the subject.

securing the antecedent requisite to produce them: I say no "mental" difficulty, because any other casual and external difficulties are plainly irrelevant to the scope of our discussion. By presenting the eye to the landscape, the ear to the concert, the hand to the flame, the sensations attached to these requisites are certain to arise. Again, the unparalyzed limb is certain to obey the exertion of muscular effort. And in like manner, by presenting, (no longer the mere bodily organ to its material co-agent, but,) in a metaphorical sense, the mind to any subject of speculation, trains of reasoning will arise, which may be fixed in written signs, and which will always be certain to arise as often as the attention is directed to the signs. In all these cases, then, reproduction is easy, because not only are the laws of succession known, but these laws are available for practical purposes. But in the case of the *Emotions* we have a very different task. Here we may indeed know, in a wide and general manner, the laws of sequence, but these laws are ill available for practical occasions. We cannot summon love, and fear, and hate, and hope, and ambition, into our closets for inspection, in all their original energy of life. At best we must be contented with dissecting their inanimate remains as presented in the sepulchral crypts and dim recesses of memory. These wayward recusants acknowledge no allegiance to the requisitions of philosophy. Tyrants when we would reject, they are rebels when we require them. To examine fear or anger, in the ordinary sense of examination, involves a contradiction; for to be calm enough to examine the emotion would no longer be to experience it. In these cases, then, of immediate emotions, the true materials of inquiry will be, partly *remembrances* of our own, and partly direct observations of their workings and results *in others*.

*Difficulty
of analyzing
the
Emotions.*

I am here, perhaps, unduly anticipating a subsequent

topic; yet, as I have commenced, I ought not to conclude without completing, at least, this branch of it. Passing, then, from the facility of reproduction to the facility of *examination*, we shall find that these qualities are not at all governed by the same law of change,—that they do not increase or diminish in mutual correspondence. Examination is either analysis or pure reflection; it either simplifies phenomena or it weighs them. “Analysis” (in the science of mind) is the resolution of associations into their simple elements. It is difficult, therefore, according as the elements sought are minute, are in a state of complicated union, are presented in such a disguise as that the result of the combination assumes a form unlike the components. The next question is, of course, *where will* this close and elusive complication of minute elements occur? It will occur wherever the association has been formed at a period antecedent to *observation*, or to which the scope of memory does not extend; wherever the association has been *constant* and unbroken; wherever it has entangled in this constant union a *great number* of elements, *i.e.* as the association has been early, constant, complex. Now, in some of the phenomena of sensation, or, to speak more accurately, in some phenomena of the *information derived through the medium* of the senses, these qualities are all eminently combined. All sensitive natures seem to have in some degree—rational natures in a very high degree—the tendency to convert things which appear into signs of things beyond them, to pass from the unimportant to the important; and you know that the great law of connection or association forms a perpetual basis upon which this tendency can act. Language being the capital instance of this invaluable principle, we say, by a convenient metaphor, that the mind has a perpetual tendency to convert every thing into a language. Now, of all the

Analysis distinguished from pure Reflection.

Analysis of simple sensation.

dialects of this perpetual language, the simple sensations are the most obvious and striking. The sensations may, you will remember, be regarded under two very different aspects:—positively, in themselves, as

Involuntary association of the sign with the thing signified;

states pleasurable, or painful, or indifferent; relatively, as signs of things ulterior. It is in this latter office that the intricate combination of which I am speaking exists. The mind, conceiving the thing signified while perceiv-

ing the sign, assumes habitually that it perceives the signified; and the office of analysis is, by revealing the real process, to exhibit to the mind the history of the prejudice. Let us advance another step, and inquire, In what department of the diversified field of sensation will the language-making tendency become most observable? I answer, first, in whatever case the *direct objects* of the organ are discovered in the most constant and general association with subjects of importance to the mind that constructs the language, and, secondly, in whatever case the organic affections are most easily *distinguishable* from each other, so as to render the language unerring and precise. Now, these two requisites meet very conspicu-

in the case of Vision in particular.

ously in the instance of *Vision*. Its object—light in all its varieties—is usually present to us during two-thirds of our existence, and, by

being reflected or otherwise modified by all kinds of solid matter in due proportion to their magnitude, shape, and distance, becomes a universal intelligencer between the conscious being and the tangible world around him. While, in addition to this property, its minutest distinctions of place and colour are exquisitely appreciable; the spot of the organ upon which it falls and the shadowings of the colour being, both of them, impressions sufficiently definite to be never mistaken as long as the mind, and the organ which ministers to it, are soundly constituted,—*mens sana in corpore sano*.

Hence the eye is, of all organs of sense, the richest depository of signs; a privilege which becomes peculiarly conspicuous from the fact that of all the organs it possesses perhaps the least claim to be considered under the other aspect of the sensitive frame,—that is, as a medium of direct pleasure. Indeed, it is worth noting that the mere pleasure of light is most observable in extreme infancy,—exactly when it is most required in order to urge and stimulate the organ into such activity as may form a basis for its higher subsequent destinies as the great channel of external knowledge. In this latter office its agency is so prominent as to have made “seeing” a metaphor for “understanding” in almost every language, and the principal terms for the degrees and varieties and means of knowledge to have been everywhere derived from the processes of vision,—such terms as “demonstration,” “intuition,” “evidence,” and the rest. And when to this process of constant interpretation, which makes all the value of vision, is added a parallel course of purely mental association, the case becomes sometimes one of astonishing rapidity of combination. Take the instance of a linguist writing a translation of a written document,—a performance which we know is continually accomplished with almost the velocity of thought itself. Yet there are here no less than *four* successive connections preliminary to each word of the version. There is the perception of a written mark, and, first, the connection of a sound with that sign; secondly, the connection of an idea with that sound; thirdly, the connection of a sound (in the new language) with that idea; and fourthly, the connection of a written sign with that sound. In this series, however, we have set out from the acquired perception of the shape, &c. of the original written sign, and pursued the mind through merely its own admitted conceptions. To commence the history, therefore, we must trace the

genealogy of the written version from that primitive chaos of the mind, in which, uninformed of distance or figure, the eye could only convey to the conscious being a vague impression of colour. We must strip it of its borrowed attributes, and contemplate it still presenting this sensation alone, in order to behold the mind clothing that dead element with life, and, by a train of rapid association, converting an indefinite impression of colour into that perception of a written sign from which we commenced our former series. When you cast up the heap of associations which thus gather upon a single impression, you will easily recognise the fact, and the cause, of the difficulty which attends the analysis of the phenomena attributed to sensation.

I shall leave this instance as an illustration of a subject which it would be premature to discuss at greater length. The consideration of the difficulties which accompany the analysis of volitions, emotions, reasonings,—as well as those which attend that pure contemplation of a thought apart from all analytical purposes, to which I have referred,—we shall resume hereafter.

*No region
of the mind
beyond the
reach of
observation
and disco-
very.*

I trust that you perceive, what alone for the present I was anxious you should perceive, that though different portions of our subject are differently circumstanced as to facility of reproduction and examination, yet this difficulty does not at all amount to an exclusion of any portion from liability to these processes of observation; at least, that we cannot assume that it does, prior to actual trial. Far less, from these vague assertions of the difficulty or obscurity of the subject, unfairly generalized from the fact of a few *real* obscurities, can suspicions be justly entertained of its total impracticability. And the dissolution of this prejudice leaves the ground open for the plain and unanswerable statement, that, of all species of observation, the observation of which attention is the

instrument and consciousness the object is in its own nature the most legitimate and warrantable, and that, so far from being essentially unsusceptible of philosophical investigation, the difficulties which attend this subject, however discouraging, are purely *incidental*, and therefore capable of continual diminution as practical skill increases. To discover the living inhabitants of the sun, if such there be, may be pronounced essentially impossible; to determine its rotation was scarcely to have been deemed so, because the inquiry demanded great care in the use of the organ which inspected, and a patient protracted course of observation from the inquirer.

Upon this whole argument—the liability of the mind to a discovery of its laws—the opinion of Lord Bacon, as the oracle of inductive science, will of course be received with respect.

Opinion of Lord Bacon in favour of the possibility of Mental Science.

Lord Bacon, then, answers decidedly in the affirmative. He saw plainly enough that wherever the mind could reach there it could observe, and wherever it could observe there it could induct, and wherever it could induct there it could discover; and he knew that there was nothing in the conscious intelligence to seclude its successions from the same influences which were capable of classifying every other attainable succession in the universe. Whenever the true meaning of discovery was firmly grasped, the application was universal. The stars of heaven, the flowers at your feet, the *soul* that scans both,—observe, induct, and you know them equally. Translate a geometrical proposition to any portion of space, and it is equally true; apply the Baconian formula to any region of experience, and it remains unimpeachable. It is with regret I have to remark that the excessive spirit of system, and, I fear, the national prejudices, of M. Victor Cousin, have betrayed him into a very unjustifiable misrepresentation

Cousin's critique of Bacon examined.

*His parti-
cularity to Des-
cartes.*

of our great English philosopher. In order by contrast to exalt the rival glory of Descartes, (which M. Cousin, as his editor and a Frenchman, is naturally solicitous to support,) he asserts that the tendency of the counsels of Bacon was in such a sense and manner exclusively material as to blight the growth of mental philosophy. So unfounded is this charge, that Bacon himself expressly declares the applicability of his method of inquiry to the construction of metaphysical, ethical, and political theories. (*Nov. Org.* lib. i. Aph. 127, and *De Augm.* lib. vii. cap. 3.)* And in the

* "Jam enim Historiam et Tabulas Inveniendi conficimus de Irâ, Metu, et Verecundiâ, et similibus; et etiam de exemplis rerum Civilium; nec minus de motibus mentalibus Memorîæ, Compositionis et Divisionis, Judicii, et reliquorum, quam de Calido et Frigido, aut Luce, aut Vegetatione, aut similibus." *N. O. i.* 127. And, speaking of moral investigations, (*De Aug. Sc.* vii. 3,) he assumes both the *importance* and the *legitimacy* of the inductive inquiry of mental phenomena. For instance, in one place, "Quâ in parte debuerant Philosophi strenue et gnaviter inquirere de viribus et energiâ Consuetudinis, Exercitationis, Habitûs, Educationis, Imitationis, Æmulationis, Convictûs, Amicitîæ, Laudis, Reprehensionis, Exhortationis, Famæ, Legum, Librorum, Studiorum, et si quæ alia. Hæc enim sunt illa quæ regnant in Moralibus."

[The 127th Aphorism commences thus:—"Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet; utrum nos de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, logicis, ethicis, politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis, loquamur. *At nos certe de universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus*; atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientias pertinet; ita et nostra, quæ procedit *per inductionem*, omnia complectitur." In the chapter from which the second passage is cited occurs the following true and exquisite criticism:—"Subiit admiratio Aristotelem, qui tot libros de ethicis conscripsit, affectus, ut membrum ethicæ principale, in illis non tractasse; in rhetoricis autem (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri possint) locum illis reperisse (in quo tamen loco de iis, quantum tam paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit) nam disceptationes ejus de voluptate et dolore huic tractatui nullo modo satisfaciunt; non magis quam qui de luce et lumine tantum scriberet, de particularium colorum natura scripsisse diceretur: siquidem voluptas et dolor erga affectus particulares ita se habent, ut lux erga colores." *Ed.*]

Nov. Org. ii. 26, you will find an actual analysis of the phenomena of memory, in exemplification of the method of induction.* Nor need I cite to you his many ingenious suggestions as to the *doctrina de fœdere*, or doctrine of the laws which govern the connection of mind and body; a curious and important subject, in which, except the labours of the phrenologists be received as science, little progress has been made since his age. I might refer to his other writings, more particularly to the wonderful little volume, his *Essays*, for testimonies to the existence of the very same spirit of mental investigation, though in these more popular performances no longer confined within the strait bonds of logical formularies. This is indeed only what might be expected from a thinker, who, setting utility as the great aim of philosophy, must have felt how important is that science which teaches man to combine and arrange his own experience, and out of its theorems to collect so many rules whose utility is infinitely more extensive than that of any material art whatever. What indeed is that whole mass of writings of which the *Novum Organum* presents the result, but a series of contributions of the highest value to those very sciences which their illustrious author is accused of neglecting or despising? That a secret but urgent determination to exalt, at any expense of precision, his favourite philosopher, was at the bottom of this misstatement, I can scarcely doubt when I follow a little further the brilliant course of this most eloquent professor, and find him (*Cours de l'Histoire*

* His object is to determine, as an example of what he calls Constitutive Instances, the circumstances that are found to assist that faculty. After a lengthened investigation, he concludes with six specimens of these aids. I will not presume to translate them out of his own inimitable language. They are, "abscissio infiniti; deductio intellectualis ad sensibile; impressio in affectu forti; impressio in mente purâ; multitudo ansarum; præexpectatio."

de la Phil. du XVIII. Siècle, vol. i. p. 94, edit. 12mo) discovering, in the plain and unpretending rules which Descartes presents in his *Tract. de Methodo*, (general practical rules in the study of nature,) the whole substance of the minute and exquisite directions which Bacon has so elaborately composed for the construction of a theory. Descartes tells us that he proposed to himself as invariable rules—as his entire code of logical legislation—the following practical principles. Their substance is this: 1st, to admit nothing as true which the mind could hesitate about receiving; 2dly, to resolve complicated difficulties into convenient parts; 3dly, to begin with the simplest and easiest, and proceed to the more difficult and composite; 4thly, to make a perfect enumeration of every single particular concerned in the question, and be sure to omit none. These are the famous *regulæ Cartesianæ* which his Port Royal followers so highly eulogize. That they are correct in a general sense, no one will deny; that in the inventive mind of their great author they were pregnant with speculations and discoveries, I shall never question; but that, as presented to ordinary thinkers, they contain any thing either very novel in theory or very useful in practice, I must take the liberty of doubting. Far less can I admit that they include all that is of value in the logical institutions of Bacon. How M. Cousin establishes the point you may judge when I inform you that, after stating that Descartes's "ut difficultates quas essem examinaturus, in tot partes dividerem, quot expediret ad illas commodius resolvendas," (Rule 2,) (which you at once see is a mere general rule in the investigation of any question,) is the same with the Baconian Physical Analysis, the "dissectio et anatomia mundi," he next instructs us that the 3d rule of Descartes, (which he terms the 4th,) which counsels the progress in inquiry from the simple to the complex,—

Comparison of the Cartesian rules with the Baconian.

"incipiendo a rebus simplicissimis et cognitu facillimis, ut per gradus ad difficiliorum et magis compositarum cognitionem ascenderem,"—that this, expressly stated by the author himself to be a rule in *inquiry*, is really the same with the Baconian *synthesis*, that art which, as M. Cousin truly defines it, "out of all the parts divided and successively examined and exhausted by analysis, *reconstructs and forms a whole, a system*;"—that the rule directing the mere pursuit of truth is the same with the rules that guide the now successful analyzer as to the mode in which he should convert his analysis into theory! But, says M. Cousin, Bacon declares "*mens humana si agat in materiem, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando pro modo naturæ operatur et ab eadem determinatur; si ipsa in se vertatur, tanquam aranea texens telam, tum demum indeterminata est et parit telas quasdam doctrinæ tenuitate fili operisque mirabiles, sed quoad usum frivolas et inanes.*" M. Cousin translates the latter part of this admirable passage, "*quand elle s'applique à l'âme elle n'aboutit qu'à des rêveries frivoles:*" and this makes our great philosopher declare that *observation applied to the mind* can never lead to any but frivolous reveries. I suppose I need scarcely tell you that this version is a gross perversion of Bacon's purport; which was simply to discourage the preposterous efforts of the philosophy then popular to construct the physics of the external universe from ideal and arbitrary hypotheses.¹

¹ [It may be interesting to compare the opinion of another competent critic with the judgment passed by Cousin. Dugald Stewart observes, "The merits of Bacon, as the Father of Experimental Philosophy, are so universally acknowledged, that it would be superfluous to touch upon them here. The lights which he has struck out in various branches of the Philosophy of Mind have been much less attended to; although the whole scope and tenor of his speculations show that to *this* study his genius was far more strongly and happily turned than to that of the Material World. In the extent and accuracy of his *physical*

The brilliant reputation of M. Cousin can bear these spots, as well as the great name of Descartes could have stood without these exaggerated encomiums, and therefore I need not apologize for noticing them. Indeed, the powerful influence which M. Cousin must ever exercise over his readers obliges me the more strenuously to warn you that the usual catholicity of his philosophical spirit almost invariably narrows in estimating the merits and influence of Lord Bacon.

The great Englishman, then, was unquestionably a psychologist; and it is unjust to deny that his own comprehensive mind fully recognised the fertility and value of this province of inquiry. Nor surely has the influence of his views departed. The present improved state of psychology is indirectly his creation; for unquestionably it is due to the irresistible influence of the vast triumphs achieved by inductive observation in the external world. Hobbes sat by the side of Bacon himself; but, still more, Locke breathed the atmosphere of Newton. While "hypotheses non

knowledge he was far inferior to many of his predecessors; but he surpassed them all in his knowledge of the laws, the resources, and the limits of the human understanding. It would be difficult to name another writer prior to Locke whose works are enriched with so many just observations on the intellectual phenomena. Among these, the most valuable relate to Memory and Imagination, &c." Dissertation, i. p. 49. Of Descartes, Mr. Stewart says, "The glory of having pointed out to his successors the true method of studying the theory of Mind is almost all that can be claimed by Descartes in logical and metaphysical science. Many important hints, indeed, may be gleaned from his works; but, on the whole, he has added very little to our knowledge of Human Nature." "Les mathématiques," says D'Alembert, quoted by Stewart, "font aujourd'hui la partie la plus solide et la moins contestée de la gloire de Descartes." The influence of Descartes on the Cambridge thinkers of the Restoration has not escaped Mr. Stewart, who instances John Smith, one of the "Cambridge Platonists" of that era. The Latin Orations of Barrow furnish testimony to the same effect. Ed.]

tingo" was echoing from every side of Europe, the psychologist grew ashamed of assuming passions and powers. Experience was questioned, classification began, and systems followed, which, differing abundantly from one another and from the truth, agreed, all of them, in the great principle that hearsay was no evidence in the courts of philosophy; and that nothing was to be admitted as a faculty which could not be proved as a fact.

That the *speculative* side of the Philosophy of Man was equally revealed to Lord Bacon, it would not be easy to establish. But neither was it discountenanced. Mere verbal subtleties indeed he abhorred and despised. Nor was it much to be wondered at, with a thousand barren years of them before him. But in his own statements of his philosophy truth of every kind is equally welcome. And he has not forgotten the metaphysical principles of nature and of the soul, either in his treatment of the subject of natural theology, or in the physical and logical compartments which he has assigned to discussing the transcendent qualities and adventitious conditions of being. Circumstances, however, urged him to concentrate his energies where they were most demanded; and if his principal object was that of combining facts into theory, and if he did not fully penetrate the importance of vindicating the divinity of Reason,² of Morality, of Love,

*Speculative
side of his
philosophy
imperfect,
and why.*

² [Bacon's views of the relation of Religion to Philosophy (*de Augm.* Lib. iii. 1, 2) are peculiar, and, as might have been anticipated, have called forth the censures of German historians of Philosophy, (see Ritter, *Gesch. d. Phil.* x. p. 320, seq.) A passage which has been generally overlooked throws an important light on this subject:—"Neque enim a theologiâ mutuaremur, nisi etiam cum principiis philosophiæ conveniret." (Lib. iv. c. 3). Of this "borrowing from theology" a very brilliant instance is furnished in the inimitable critique, from a Christian point of view, of the ancient theories of the *Summum Bonum*. (*Ib.* lib. vii. c. 1.) Ritter has the good sense to reject the

we cannot perhaps censure him more than for not anticipating the *Principia*.

Bacon not responsible for the errors of his followers.

Causes of the narrowness of modern psychology.

But, though Bacon himself be acquitted, the philosophical revolution occasioned mainly by his writings may not be equally guiltless. Wisdom was not justified of her children. The great spirit of the master was confined and warped by his disciples. And from the habitual contemplation of material nature, where all facts are *in themselves* of equal dignity, the mind, in passing to itself, learned unconsciously to transfer the same undistinguishing level to this new and peculiar set of phenomena; and thus gradually sunk into the perilous error of seeing *only* a succession of appearances—sensitive, reasoning, moral, emotional—in the internal world of man; a succession of *differing* phenomena, indeed, for we can only recognise “succession” by difference; but a succession of phenomena not distinguished by any measure of relative importance, but the importance of mere duration and intensity. To express the same in the picture-language of imagination,—as Bacon himself might have chosen to do,—the student of material nature contemplates a vast and level plain, where, though there be compartments many and various, yet the only measure of distinction he recognises is, as it

preposterous opinion, revived by some recent writers, that Bacon's Christianity was a mask assumed for the purpose of conciliating the theologians. But the profound theological views opened out in divers places by Bacon he has not found it within his scope to notice. How much, for instance, of the so-called “internal evidence” is condensed in the following pregnant sentence of the chapter last cited:—“Nulla, omnibus seculis, reperta est vel lex vel disciplina, quæ in tantum communionis bonum exaltavit, bonum vero individuale depressit, quantum fides Christiana: unde liquido pateat, unum eundemque Deum fuisse, qui creaturis leges illas naturæ, hominibus vero legem Christianam dedisset.” On this text, the sequel, to the end of the chapter, is an exhaustive commentary. Ed.]

were, the comparative value of the soils for purposes of utility, the different amounts of *rent* which art can exact from each; the student of man, if he understand his task aright, should contemplate a widely-diversified landscape, where, if there be some expanses of level ground, and much that yields a rich return to interest, there are also heights which join with heaven, and whose altitude must itself be included as an essential element in every scientific survey of the country. To transfer to this latter region habits derived from familiarity with the former is obviously to render your report mutilated and imperfect. This transference *has* in some measure been produced by the successes of inductive science. It has created the impulse of a true psychology, but it has tended to stunt the offspring it produced. But is this the error of Bacon? is this the fault of the induction with which his name is immortally linked? No, it is the weakness of *his followers*,—or, rather, the weakness of human nature itself, which cannot bear success without urging it to extravagance!

In vindicating to the cause of the mental philosophy the name and influence of this great authority, I may fittingly terminate this long argument. When “the god” was brought upon the ancient stage, it was a sign that the drama was closing.

Permit me to recall to you the simple basis upon which I have constructed the observations which have now occupied us for nearly two lectures. The argument, which began from the foundation of the subject, was this:—that all knowledge is valuable, and that the mental philosophy is a real portion of knowledge. The *major* proposition we vindicated from objections; and the more zealously, because those objections are peculiarly directed against this very species of inquiry. The proof of the *minor* we rested upon two propositions,—that the mind is subject to laws, and that its laws are subject to

Recapitulation.

discovery. The arguments for the former proposition I recapitulated when commencing the present lecture. The arguments for the latter were partly the same with those for the former, (as might be expected; for it is by the *discovery* of the laws, in some measure, that we know them to *exist*;) partly derived from the phenomena of language, partly from the fact of actual progress in the pursuit; but chiefly from the very nature of the case, which exhibits the mind as possessing adequate *means* for effecting a series of observations of its own phenomena, and for reducing their multiplicity into the harmonious unity of science. From these premises thus based upon undeniable observation, the required conclusion seems irresistibly to flow,—that the Philosophy which has for its objects the ascertainment of the principles of the human mind, and the statement of their value, is (in its simplest character) deserving of the attention of intelligent men. It offers itself as a contribution to the mass of knowledge; that claim is shown to be legitimate; and such claim, supposed legitimate, involves a title to universal reception.

LECTURE VI.

ON THE SUPERIORITY OF THE SCIENCE OF MIND TO ALL OTHER SCIENCES.

GENTLEMEN:—

WERE I to confine myself to the argument which has been stated and enforced in the last two lectures, I should do but scanty justice to my subject. It is an argument of weight, and properly preliminary to all others. But the advocate of mental philosophy is not content with establishing that, as a genuine portion of science, it deserves the cultivation which is deserved by *all* science. Were the astronomer to vindicate his sublime and interesting pursuits by an argument which was equally applicable to the laborious classifier of animalcules, you would consider that he had coldly defended his cause; were the Philosopher of Man to share arguments with the astronomer himself, perhaps he would vindicate his calling as inadequately.

It is with this view that I proceed to assert, not only that this Science prefers claims in common with all, but that in the dignity of its object it surpasses all.

*The Science
of Mind
surpasses
all other
sciences in
dignity.*

I might, upon this topic, without assuming the responsibility of a single statement of my own, and with the slight trouble which the consultation of indexes requires, enrich this hour's discourse with testimonies the most varied and brilliant from writers of every age. You cannot be ignorant how unbroken is the chain of evidence which attests the universal conviction of man that in the Principle of Thought there lives a something essentially

superior to all which in this scene of existence is connected with it. So elevating is the influence of the habitual use of the intellectual powers, that this conviction discovers itself interwoven with systems whose professed object is to discountenance it; and the secret tendency of reasoning-habits continually counteracts the conclusions themselves of the reasoning. I scarcely except from this remark even that tissue of degrading sophistry which in the last century polluted a Christian age with corruptions which the worst forms of heathen speculation never equalled. By a striking coincidence of opposite tendencies, at the very moment that the French philosophers were straining every nerve to annul the distinctions of man and brute, they were engaged in continual vindications of the independence and authority of reason; and the same page which argued that the watchmaker and his watch are equally mechanical arrangements and equally perishable dust was enlivened by violent reclamations against those fanatics who would dare to bar the free intelligence of man from winging its glorious ascent through all the spheres of truth. A few ounces of cerebral matter which prejudice baptizes as "the Soul," at one time, at another this marvellous dust, claims the universe as its inheritance. As long as skepticism is unpopular, or at least resisted, these contradictory results are indeed inevitable,—the skeptic having to flourish the sword of reason's independence with the one hand, while the other is on the throat of this infant of the skies to choke its holy breathings for the better world.

Evidence of this superiority drawn from the writings even of those who deny it.

e.g. of the French materialists,

who assert the paramount authority of reason while resolving reason into a function of matter.

But, even apart from this necessity of *position*, the very tendency of philosophical habits is indirectly to increase the philosopher's exalted estimate of the mind. In fact, his *own interests* are embarked in the

Additional evidences.

intellectual vessel which he charts for the voyage of discovery. He cannot but feel that, if the mind be worthless, his own labours must participate in its worthlessness: few reasoners will thus (except for the poor prize of eccentricity) abandon to contempt the chosen occupation of years; and I strongly suspect that no philosopher ever depreciated the human soul who did not reserve a secret exception for *his own*. These are not high motives; they are, however, human ones. But it would be unfair to assert that they stand alone, even in that lowest form of the skeptical philosophy which we are now regarding. The uniformity of the testimony which reflective science in all—even its most unworthy—modifications is found to bear to the essential dignity of the soul of man, is interwoven in the very nature of the reflective process itself. The habit of speculation:—what is it but the purest form of internal freedom, and the most definite type of progress? In almost every thing else subordinated to laws which we feel an encumbrance, here alone we are governed by laws which, if we perceive them at all, we perceive only as the guides and perfecters of liberty. It is true that obscurities shadow the path of progress, it is true that in this vast enigma of the Moral and Physical World truth hides itself under every form of perplexity; yet even the very defeats of the mind are triumphs; for this “reaction infers action,” and to have failed in the attempt supposes the power of attempting. To him who contemplates philosophical history as the revelation of the powers and destinies of the Human Intellect,—the Human Intellect which for some thirty centuries back has been the One Hero of all that wondrous story,—to his view there is nothing but victory, and repulse itself is progress. Now, I say that, in the mind of the speculator himself, this peculiar character of intellectual activity—its superiority to bondage or

*The habit
of speculation
a manifestation
of inward
freedom.*

subjection, and its felt capability of constant and growing development—cannot but separate itself from every other part of the thinker's experience, *whatever* be the strain or tendency of his thoughts. And though his aim be to write himself down to the brute, still, if he pursue that aim in the melancholy sincerity of conviction, he cannot but feel that, in the very process of pursuing the unhappy conclusion he seeks, he is wandering among the high grounds of nature; that the man is there eminently man; and that, disguise or distort it as he may to every habitual speculator, the distinguishing essence of his being is to be found in his *mind*!

As I understand it, then, it is from motives and convictions of these various kinds that the almost invariable attestation of reasoners of every cast to the essential dignity of the reasoning mind arises. And though in some of these cases the value of the testimony is considerably impaired by tracing its motive, yet in the last-mentioned, which is far the most important, we certainly have no right to think so. For here the rights and privileges of mind are disclosed in the practice of its faculties; the discovery is no illegitimate result of collateral prejudices; it is a conviction carrying its own evidence, and no more a prejudice than the confident belief of an eye-witness can be termed a "prejudice of sense." And I repeat, that these convictions are altogether irrespective of the express philosophical views of those who have avowedly professed or unconsciously betrayed them; except indeed as far as the opposition may be regarded as heightening the value of a conviction which thus subsists in defiance of every effort to destroy it.

That this argument of universal attestation can be derived with even greater force from the cultivators of *moral* excellence, I suppose it is unnecessary to remind you. If even perverted intellect is forced to recognise its own dignity, how much more completely does the

noble bondsman of duty feel that his "service" is indeed "perfect freedom," and that the essence, whatever it be, in which the principle of virtue inheres is that on earth from which the next step is to heaven!

I trust you will not imagine that this question of the supreme value of the mental portion of our complex nature is one too trite to engage you. Believe me, it is only very superficial thinkers who fail to perceive the fundamental importance of correct and definite notions upon such points as these. Your views upon the very question with which I am now endeavouring to interest you are in fact the views which will determine, or have already perhaps unconsciously determined, the side you assume in the great contest which, subsisting since the fall and to endure till the restoration, pervades every sphere of life,—individual, social, political,—the side of faith or of disbelief, of hope or of distrust, of charity or of selfishness. Your practical theory—from whatever source derived, and on whatever considerations founded—as to the nature, dignity, and importance of the mind you bear, is the determining element of every other practical theory whatever.

A great question here occurs, for a great authority has not yet been cited.

We are arguing a case of evidence,—the uniform testimony of mental labourers to the peculiar dignity of their labours. Now, in searching for such evidences, I suppose there are few inquirers whose first impulse would not be rather to approach the oracles of *ancient* than of modern philosophy, or, if at all the latter, those only or eminently who have drank deepest of these primal fountains of thought. Are we then to conclude that these high conceptions of the mind belong chiefly to antiquity, and that the mighty event which, revolutionizing the

Importance of forming a just estimate of the subject under review.

Are the views hitherto advocated encouraged by the Christian religion?

civilized world, created the distinction of modern and ancient, fails to encourage or to justify these great convictions? If so, with whatever reluctance, it is our duty, and, I trust, our determination, to relinquish or to modify them. But is it so?

Spirit of Christianity humiliating; apparently, therefore, unfavourable to faith in the greatness of man.

I will concede, then, that *at first view* the influences of Christianity do not appear favourable to this exalted estimate; and that it is even possible that they have *indirectly* tended to remove the splendour of such views from our general philosophical literature. The spirit of Christianity, so far as it is depressive and humiliating, cannot certainly be said to present lofty portraiture of man in those very same words and sentences in which it is engaged convicting or condemning him. And if there be any speculator who descends into his laboratory of speculation, from an exclusive study of these words and sentences, it is not only possible, but probable or certain, that impressions thus received will manifest themselves among his subsequent processes of thought. And in this way the effects complained of as discoverable in general literature may be granted as true, and accounted for as natural; and this, without any slight to either Religion or Philosophy; with some censure, perhaps, of those who contemplate both too narrowly.

But Christianity has a double aspect:

Christianity, however, possesses a double aspect, and Literature is a word of wide significance; and, contemplating both in their fullness, I have no doubt you will perceive how real is the testimony which the highest of all authorities lends to the conclusion I have been so anxious to establish as to the peculiar dignity of the Mind,—the subject of our studies. But it asks a little thought, and perhaps a little candour also.

Observe, then, that it would be unreasonable to expect from Christianity a species of attestation wholly foreign

to the range and purpose of the revelation. But if this would be unreasonable to expect, it is one degree more unreasonable to build an argument on the absence of that which it *was* unreasonable to expect. This is the simplest general reply (and the best where it is inconvenient to descend to special inquiry) to the objection to our conclusion derived from the absence in the Christian revelation of testimonies to the dignity of the INTELLECTUAL powers of man. Granting the assumption, whether true or false, to be true, I reply, that it would be strange indeed if a revelation expressly, and (for all we can see) exclusively, concerned with the *moral and spiritual* man, were to waste its momentous influences in supplying those intellectual excitements which were beyond its aim, and which nature will always be found of itself adequate to supply. Turn then to the objection derived from the spirit of its MORAL views of humanity as a lowly and dependent nature.

*it lowers in
order to ex-
alt;*

Can we derive, it is asked, any support to an assertion of mental dignity out of elements so unpromising as these? Gentlemen, they form its *strongest* support. In truth, to what a height does this marvellous system elevate the nature to which it proffers these lowly counsels! How inapplicable would they be to any but the most exalted! How majestic is the dependence which is dependence on a God! how lofty the humility which bows only to heaven!

But further: you are to remember, that, beyond the moral man of antiquity, this Faith proposes itself as creating another, a SPIRITUAL man. Now, though it be true that most discussions concerning this spiritual nature, by habitually excluding from their own sacred region every inferior topic, separate their spiritual philosophy from all the other departments of mental speculation or science; yet, as, whatever be the process of this supernatural agency, the mind is certainly its subject, so

all which is believed and established of the former should really be set to the account of the privileges and dignities of the latter. In this high and mysterious point of view, which realizes the expression of St.

*rendering
men "partakers
of the Divine
nature."*

Peter, and makes a portion of mankind literally "partakers of the Divine nature," I suppose it will scarcely be denied that Christianity justifies the loftiest conceptions which philosophy can form as to the essential or acquired greatness of the human mind.

*Doctrine of
the Incarn-
ation;*

But why should I pause upon this? The fundamental doctrine of Christianity is one which exalts human nature to a degree even more prodigious. The assumption of that nature by the Creator of it brings us to a point where conception absolutely fails; where the light of imagination *goes out*; where language moves without ideas; where all is lost in one vast and vague emotion of awe at the contemplation of ourselves! awe at the glimpse this amazing story gives us of the immeasurable importance of our human nature in the system and counsels of the universe! This doc-

*the perfec-
tion of rea-
son:*

trine, and all it brings with it, are exclusively Christian. Though it seems to me, the more I consider it as a subject of speculation, to be the very perfection of reason, and to take its position with the most symmetrical beauty at the head of all religious truth, it does not appear to have been ever anticipated as a tenet among the imaginary creeds of antiquity,—at least, (for we must not forget a sort of monstrous caricature-resemblance in some of the follies of the Indian mythology,) in any sense or purpose at all similar to those of the revealed doctrine. The common mythology of paganism

*and pecu-
liar to
Christian-
ity.*

*Pagan
counterfeits
of this doc-
trine.*

and Christianity, indeed, exhibits an apparent and momentary agreement in this union of the divine and human natures; for the gods of

Greece and Rome were exaggerated forms of humanity; and it may perhaps be asked, whether, if we reject the testimony which pagan deifications offer to the dignity of the human spirit, we have any right to seize with such earnestness the similar testimony afforded by this article of the Christian faith? We reply (even apart from the very different value of the two authorities,—the inspiration of God revealing his mighty purposes, and the folly of man pursuing his poor delusions) that there is no real similarity in the cases as to that point which alone concerns the argument. The argument is, that Christianity attests the priceless value of the human nature in publishing the assumed manhood of a God. The case alleged to be similar must therefore be found to propose as a doctrine the two members of the union, respectively real and complete. But, properly understood, there is no God in the pagan incarnation. The divine element is wanting. The idolatrous worshipper of deified humanity did not unite deity to man, but substituted man in the place of deity. Now, to degrade the conception of God is not to elevate that of man; and hence, even if the anthropomorphism of paganism had been true, it would have failed in adding a particle of testimony to our assertion of the dignity of the human spirit. While, on the contrary, Christianity, incorporating in the history and fortunes of humanity the genuine God undefrauded of one ray of his attributes, lifts the manhood thus consecrated by the presence and inhabitancy of the Godhead, and, as a consequence of this communion of the natures, actually exalts the human essence by every lineament of grandeur which it adds to the divine!

The evidence, then, which the faith bears to this point, instead of being doubtful or hostile, is express and favourable; instead of clouding,

Anthropomorphism of paganism degrades deity without exalting humanity.

While,

The converse holds true of Christianity,

which consequently supplies fresh incentives to the study of

*man's na-
ture.*

it illuminates, the prospect of humanity, and thence allows us to give to our cultivation of the Science of Mind every motive that can be derived from believing our subject to be of the highest importance, and believing it on the highest conceivable authority.

I have now concluded, I hope so as to satisfy your convictions, such comments as I thought it useful to offer upon the evidence borne, by systems inspired and uninspired, to the dignity of the essence whose laws you are to study. And with this appeal to authority I should content myself, were there not one peculiar attribute of mind which from its character of surpassing greatness it would be impossible to omit in any

*Considera-
tion of Im-
mortality.*

review of its claims. You of course anticipate that I allude to its immortality. Upon this subject the decisive information of revealed religion has reversed the course of argument. Antiquity argued the immortality of spirit from its dignity; I, on the contrary, have to remind you of the dignity on the assumption of the immortality.

The general proposition, that that which is immortal in its nature, and immortally conscious, must to itself and in itself possess the highest rank in a world of perishables, is too obvious for detailed proof. This day, indeed, I have been chiefly engaged in endeavouring to show you the depth and value of truths which we commonly neglect as too trite for consideration, attempting that most difficult task for writer or lecturer, to interest you with views whose real importance we are constantly so apt to forget, while we are familiar to weariness with the words expressing them,—the husk and the shell of thought; but *this* portion of our argument, its great premiss once granted, no effort at explaining or impressing it can, I believe, confirm. "Elucidation" here can only obscure; like those modifi-

cations of *light* which, as opticians show us, result in absolute darkness.

It is of more consequence to observe how this great truth operates to heighten *the value of our own science*. It is a weighty consideration, that there is no just conclusion here formed which is not formed to last forever! Some of the truths of this science are in their essence eternal; others share the immortality of the soul to which they belong. We deal here with an imperishable material. That the physics of the conscious being are destined to be *wholly* unalterable, we do not indeed assert; but surely in some of its chief laws and principles we may fairly assume it so. And in that case reflect that a discovery now ascertained may be considered as ascertained for eternity. The laws of all the visible elements of the universe may vanish; the discoveries of science, as far as they are experimental discoveries, may yet be superseded by laws and relations of a different character, if a reason should exist to command the alteration; but, from the nature of the system to which he belongs, the *principal* laws of the conscious being may be presumed to be inwoven in its permanent identity, and thence to be its laws forever. But, however this may be,—and I admit that certainty is not attainable upon such a point,—there assuredly *is* a view in which the present constituents of our immortal nature are themselves immortal. They are immortal in *their consequences*. Upon the *moral* aspect of these elements eternal results are suspended; and thus a character of eternal moment is impressed upon all scientific conclusions as to their nature and authority. Judge then with what reverential caution they should be examined! However high may be your estimate of the discovery of wisdom in the phy-

*"Forma
mentis
eterna."*

*Laws of
conscious-
ness proba-
bly share
the immor-
tality of the
conscious
subject.*

*Moral as-
pect of the
question.*

sical creation, you must not forget that in this peculiar study you traverse the selected theatre of God's divinest

*Freedom of
the Will.*

operating. The special gift which is termed the Freedom of the Human Will comes to increase the unique importance of the subject, and to individualize it from all others. In the physical ar-

*The Divine
legislation
uncondi-
tional in re-
gard to na-
ture; con-
ditional in
respect of a
free agent.*

rangements of inanimate nature the Divine Governor orders simply: in this alone He orders *if*; here only He establishes a conditional legislation and in a manner suspends Himself upon us! All these things may teach you to acknowledge the dignity of the Human

Mind, and the corresponding dignity of the science which investigates it. And with these remarks I conclude an argument in which, if I have not been able to interest you, I implore you to attribute the defect to my weakness and not to the subject itself, which is incomparably the noblest that can occupy the thoughts of man. I earnestly hope that the minds of many here, self-evidencing their own dignity, have anticipated me, if not in the letter, at least in the spirit, of these reasonings.

Observe the position of our argument. We have now shown that the Mental Philosophy is *a science*, and that it is the science *of the greatest of earthly subjects*. Properly speaking, this is to have completed the discussion of the question; yet a few additional details may serve to adorn or illustrate our case.

*Dignity of
Mental
Science
further il-
lustrated.
Its supre-
macy,*

You may remember that in the first Lecture which I had the honour of presenting to you I stated the position of universal supremacy which the Science of Mind (in its most comprehensive form) occupies in relation to all other sciences. In order to assist the arrangement of your thoughts, I must remind you that every thing which was then laid down belongs *directly* to this division of

our subject; and was then introduced rather to arrest your attention from the outset, by showing you at once the benefits of the study, than with any very precise adherence to methodical order. The supervision which the General Philosophy exercises over all the particular departments of inquiry, in encouraging, restraining, directing them, was intimated; and I may add, that in many of the scientific *reports* of our own day its harmonizing and systematic spirit is eminently conspicuous. The miner of mathematical and chemical truth may for a long period work in the dark of a particular problem, because he knows he is in the right place for the discovery of treasure; but if new veins are to be sought and worked, the head-engineers will come above ground and survey the aspect and indications of the country.

and supervision of all particular departments of science.

But it may be objected to this statement, that these practical principles in the logic of inquiry are *oftener* collected out of the experience of discoverers than independently invented as guides to discovery. In the first place, it may be answered, that as long as the objection is stated in only this *comparative* form (and it cannot be otherwise stated with truth) it really advances nothing which we are called upon to deny. Further, it cannot be disputed that, *whenever* it may have been *formally* stated, the logical principle itself must have *tacitly* existed in the mind of the first discoverer who obeyed it. In the very act of abandoning a false science for the path of just inquiry, he was himself guided by that latent logic which after-ages were to extract and condense from his writings or example. But, besides this, it is, upon other grounds, of eminent utility that the methods of inquiry should, however discovered, be reduced to rules. These rules, succinctly stated and constantly enforced, preserve in the minds

Objection Scientific experience anterior to logical rules.

Answers to objection.

*Utility of
general
rules of
inquiry.*

of investigators a definite test to which appeal can rapidly be made, and impress as first principles what without such remembrances could only be derived, incidentally and precariously, from a crowd of examples and a long previous scientific experience. No one, surely, who is at all conversant with the history of modern science, can doubt that the purely logical writings which have illustrated and defended the method of induction have powerfully aided in securing to it that happy supremacy which renders at this day the philosophic public justly intolerant of any physical inquiry of facts in which it is forsaken. Still less can any judicious inquirer doubt the influence of the purely logical treatises in which it was first adequately proposed and vindicated.

*Illustra-
tion.—
Analogy of
poetical cri-
ticism,*

The position, origin, utility of *Poetical Criticism* may serve to illustrate these views of this part of logic, which is indeed the criticism of inquiry. It is most true that the rules of poetical criticism are usually collected from the examples which genius has spontaneously offered; yet it is most certain that the silent criticism of taste operated in the poet's original performance, and still more manifest that it is of utility that the direction of his splendid course should be mapped down in its principal points as a guiding-chart to subsequent voyagers; that what in him was the almost-unconscious instinct of taste should become to future ages the definite rules and decisions of judgment.

*which, ori-
ginating in
feeling and
taste, ripens
into theory.*

If this be of unquestionable advantage in the case of criticism, I suppose the same or greater value can scarcely be refused to the analogous systems of logic. It is true that both this logic and this criticism are in some measure framed as the "physical" conclusions of a wide *induction*; but surely their practical utility as lights to guide the path of future invention is not dimi-

nished by a circumstance which only adds strength and certainty to their declarations.

Besides these considerations, which both answer objections and illustrate the subject itself, there is one additional characteristic belonging to the logic, and to the criticism, and indeed to all the practical maxims whatever, that are deduced from our science. It is this: that the student continually receives the maxims in connection with their reasons. They come as the last inferences from a long train of preceding proofs,—a position which, whether they be maxims of reasoning, taste, action, or manners, is peculiarly calculated to insure not merely correct principles but permanent and comprehensive ones. The rules are premised to be as permanent as their causes, and at the same time to receive all modifications which their causes justify. By being rooted deep among the first laws of the mind, they acquire a strength which secures them from being shaken by the blasts of passion or prejudice, at the same time that by being constantly referred to their causes they vary as these vary, and are thus at once resolute against every wrong impulse and flexible to every right one,—a combination of qualities unattainable by any means but this scientific analysis of practice. How beautiful is it to see the maxims of daily life, like so many isolated physical laws, reduced under the sovereignty of a few mental principles,—the Newton of the market-place finding facts for his philosophy in every transitory attitude of our human nature!

The General Philosophy connects maxims with their reasons.

Maxims, and other such aphoristic principles, of speculation or practice, when *not* thus systematically deduced, are liable, though true, to two evils,—either to be received with suspicion, or to be received with an exaggerated and unmerited approbation. 1st, Aphorisms are peculiarly liable, though

Digression concerning the use and abuse of Aphoristic writing.

true, to be rejected by accidental prejudices, and this for the simple reason that they contain nothing *calculated to meet* the prejudice. Stray truths of this form, cast in among a heap of unwelcoming prejudices, fall upon an unprepared soil, and have nothing in them capable of tempering it; being unable, therefore, to grapple with this ungenial mould, they wither at once: or, to change the comparison, they are like those hypertrophic masses that sometimes grow into connection with the animal body, but which, being unvisited by the circulation, and having little or no dependence upon the general system of the frame, gradually loosen their feeble hold, and detach themselves almost unnoticed from the limb they but encumbered. I have said, 2dly, that maxims separated from their metaphysical proofs are apt to impose on the reader by an undue appearance of depth and importance. This may be accounted for without much difficulty. Truths are valued in proportion to their universality and their novelty; that is to say, of truths equally universal the value is as the novelty, and of truths equally novel the value is in proportion to the universality of their application. The appearance of *both* is possessed by the maxim. For as to *novelty*, if the various premisses were given (that is, if the maxim were changed into the inference) we should at once perceive *how much we had really known* of the matter in hand,—“really known,” I say, for it is certain that these premisses must have been all actually under our observation and knowledge, or we could not have instantaneously acknowledged the force of the conclusion. The conclusion (which is the maxim) is the only part of the whole which we did not know before: instead of being (as we are apt to imagine in its detached state on the page of Swift or La Rochefoucauld) a proposition as wholly novel as the qualities of some new-found metal, we find it (in its inferential position) only the condensed

form of familiar truths. On the other hand, as to the illusive *universality* of maxims: this form of boundless applicability which they affect, and which causes so much of our admiration of them, is really in few or no cases strictly admissible. Now, this delusion would be impossible, and the admiration which is founded on it therefore suspended, if the maxim were introduced at the close of the reasoning which justified it; for then the conclusion would be qualified and limited by the extent of the premisses. I do not know whether you have ever observed that the most prolific maxim-makers in the world are men in a passion! Nothing short of universal propositions satisfy them. This is not merely that the mind has no time to pause upon exceptions, but that anger refuses to admit them. Rochefoucauld, anatomizing mankind's poor virtues, in his study commences his terrible catalogue with the dexterous salvo of a "souvent;" La Rochefoucauld in a rage would have sternly refused quarter to any fraction of humanity, and found the vices of a world little enough to supply fuel for his frenzy

I ought to add to these explanations of the illusive excellences of aphoristic writing the deception produced by reading a number of them successively. The mind usually estimates the depth of any remark by the distance of that remark (supposed true) from its own conclusions on the same subject; and, therefore, the less it can discover its own depth the greater will appear the depth of the author studied. Now, in the rapid and dazzling succession of thoughts wholly detached from each other, the reader has not time to form or settle his own conclusions; the waters of the intellect are too disturbed to allow of his seeing their natural depth; and all which is lost to his own powers is transferred to those of his author. I need not remind you that writers of great systematic clearness and continuity flatter the intellect

of the reader into the opposite delusion, and lose a portion of their fame as thinkers from their excellence as expositors. What confirms this explanation of the illusory value produced by the rapidity of the succession is this: that a maxim-writer who *perpetually changes* his subject impresses us with a higher estimate of the profundity of his observations than one who divides his book into chapters and heads,—La Rochefoucauld, for instance, than La Bruyère,—or than La Rochefoucauld himself in that edition (of Amelot de la Houssaye, I think) in which his maxims are classified by subjects. The deception, I may observe, is not at all unlike that produced by the rapid manœuvres of legerdemain, in which the power of evading the detection of the spectator depends on the incapability of the mind to pursue as fast as the practised organs of the juggler move.

From the remarks before made it will be evident that aphoristic writing is employed with greatest advantage on subjects of *manners*, because there the suppressed proofs are remembered rapidly, being usually matter of common observation, and because in that field no one expects or requires more than a general and customary truth; this being, indeed, all which we have to guide us in our own rules of experience. In *philosophy* this aphoristic method is best used in stating queries and *conjectures*, (as Newton has employed it,) or in any other office preliminary to new enterprises of science. Lord Bacon's peculiar reason for selecting it, which I quoted in a former lecture,—though modest indeed for him,—is eminently adapted to all inferior discoverers. With him, however, to write in aphorism arose, I would say, from the predominating spirit of his inductive habits; he stated universal propositions as he stated particular facts,—in lists and tables for separate rejection or separate acceptance,—strung to-

Use of the
aphoristic
method in
Philosophy.
Instance of
Newton,
and of Ba-
con.

gether like a chain of experiments, where each rests on its own exclusive merits.

To a person, then, whose sole or principal object is the simple possession of truth, whether attractive or unattractive,—or, rather, to whom truth can never be *unattractive*,—there can be little doubt that the habit of constantly descending from the great general principles of the mind to the explanation of all the practical rules of life and conduct as instances must be peculiarly satisfactory. He must feel that every special case receives dignity when it enshrines a general principle, and that every general principle receives interest when it is capable of constantly embodying itself in actual practice.

To this most valuable attribute of Moral Science one popular objection still remains,—the everlasting burden of cursory and feeble thinkers. It is urged that the habit of investigating the reasons and origin of practice weakens the supremacy of beautiful and happy and beneficial illusions. The metaphysician is declared to be the iconoclast of a religion in which, though the deities be phantoms, the pleasure of the worship is at least no phantom. We reject, they cry, that wisdom where to be wise is to be miserable; the only truth we recognise is happiness! and the sovereign logic for us is that logic of the heart which shows the way to it!

Popular objection to Moral Science, that it weakens salutary illusions.

To all this the *simplest* answer would, of course, be contained in an honest appeal to the whole Nature of Man, which includes an element of obligation; which obligatory principle imperatively commands the pursuit of all that is right; which *right* must in many cases turn upon the nature of ourselves, and the scene around us,—the investigation of which, and their relations, is the investigation of Moral Truth. But a lower ground may be a more persuasive one. We affirm, then, that the mere calculator of happiness must remember

Reply to objection.

that the human being has indissoluble connections with the past and future as well as the present; and that the great drama which exhibits the spousals of Truth and Happiness should really be contemplated as occupying a theatre far more extensive than these reasoners conceive of. In the criticism of this great work, is it fair to judge of the author's style, or of his intended *dénouement*, by the glance of a minute at a single scene in the midst of the intricacies of the plot? But an answer more intelligible still is found in denying the assumption made. We allege that Truth, in its discovery and its possession, conveys pleasures both nobler and more permanent than those of the illusions it banishes. Let Poetry itself declare; for Poetry is of course the recognised expression of these emotions. When the poet Campbell, in one of the most popular utterances of these childish pleasures of ignorance, contemplates the rainbow, he exclaims,—

“I ask not proud Philosophy
To tell me what thou art!”

Observe now whether the same object may not minister to a very opposite source of poetic pleasure.

“Nor ever yet,”

says Akenside,—

“The melting rainbow's vermeil-tinctured hues
To me have shone so pleasing, as when first
The hand of Science pointed out the path
In which the sunbeams, gleaming from the west,
Fall on the watery cloud.”

Such is the versatility of the poetic faculty, that it can attach itself to every form of thought; and the imagination of man has the same peculiar endowment as that which exalts his bodily constitution among animals,—that of living undestroyed in every climate. Nor are harmless illusions dissolved by analyzing them. We

seem to see distance after a thousand perusals of Berkeley; and the illusive connection of happiness with the past (one of the most interesting of psychological facts) remains as powerful as ever on the evening of a day spent in speculating on the cause of it. "What then," it will be asked, "is the benefit of the speculation whose result seems so abortive?" *This*:—that we disarm the prejudice of any power of evil, while we retain its power of soothing and enchanting; we preserve the opiate that tranquillizes, while we neutralize the poison that kills. Besides this, illusions will still be plenty for those who love them. We *widen* indeed our circle of vision as we rise in science above the surface of facts; but for those who delight in contemplating them, clouds will still wrap the distant as truly as the more contracted horizon; shaping themselves no less promptly into every form which the breath of Fancy can mould, and receiving as before every gorgeous hue which the light of Genius can pour down to illumine them! But, above all, remember that in Truth itself is beauty, and in the perception of it pleasure. What spectator is not animated with delight at the contemplation of the order and proportion of a noble specimen of architecture? Yet all this order and proportion are purely intellectual conceptions of the spectator's mind, and as invisible to the brute as to the blind. And such conceptions as these, coming midway between mind and matter, may form a stepping-stone to that pleasure still more exclusively mental which arises from contemplating the noble architecture of truths symmetrically ordered, each supported by its antecedent and supporting its successor, the remotest parts connected by reciprocal correspondences, and all uniting into the grand single and finished harmony which is called a science.

LECTURE VII.

ON THE DISCIPLINARY VALUE OF THE SCIENCE OF MIND, ITS DIFFICULTIES, AND THE SPIRIT IN WHICH IT OUGHT TO BE PURSUED.

GENTLEMEN :—

As (contrary to my original expectation) this is the last time that I can hope for the pleasure of addressing you,

The present Lecture supplementary. it will be my object to make the present Lecture as much as possible *supplementary* to those which have preceded it, a receptacle for observations

collateral to the principal argument; in short, to make it serve the purpose of those resting-places upon a military march where stragglers are collected that have incidentally detached themselves from the steady progress of the main line. As even here, however, some

Plan of the Lecture. regularity will tend both to my own and to your prompt intelligence of the subjects noticed, I may premise, that we shall consider, in the first place, some additional topics illustrative of the value of our present pursuits,—topics derived both from the peculiar character of the age in which we live, and from the operation of metaphysical studies upon the mind independently of ages or eras. In the second place, we shall pass, by an easy transition, from the utility of this philosophy as a discipline to a cursory consideration of those difficulties which make a principal part of that utility. And, in the last place, we shall glance at the moral spirit which should direct and colour all inquiries into the nature and destinies of man. I do not offer these views as complete; my time permits me to do little more than hint and insinuate the truth. Indeed, an attempt at *completeness* would be

vain under any circumstances. Every hour that I consider these topics—and I mention this not from personal motives, but sincerely to encourage your pursuit of them—I find the prospect they open to widen until it is almost lost in infinity.

In continuation, then, of the topic on which we were engaged for the last few lectures, the importance of the study of Universal Metaphysics, of metaphysics in each of its divisions, whether simply as the inductive physics of the consciousness, or, more profoundly, as the science of the reality, extent, and value of human knowledge, (let me rather say, the value of humanity itself in all its varieties of reasoning, emotion, action, as the great problem of the universe,)—I would call your attention to the peculiar force of its claims in the circumstances of the age into which you are born, and the spirit of which you are all destined either to perpetuate or to obstruct, by your example in espousing or opposing it. It is no flattery to tell you this: the omnipotence of example is wielded by the humblest of your fellow-creatures. Every atom, even those beyond the grasp of the microscope, contributes to the force of a mass of matter in motion; and that great aggregate which we call an age or era of history is but the enormous compound of a multitude of elements individually almost invisible. If, then, you wish to *join* in the spirit of the age, you must understand it in order to contribute to it; if you prefer to *counteract* it, you must equally understand it in order to do so effectually. Now, I say that one of the dominant, perhaps indeed the dominant, characteristic of the existing age is the tendency to restless examination of the principles of all things. What are the popular subjects of discussion? In politics, the ground and origin of subordination; discussing of national wealth, the nature of wealth itself and of value, (“Political Eco-

Importance of Metaphysical Study inferred from the circumstances of the present age.

Examination of principles characteristic of this age.

nomy," as a theory, being indeed the direct growth of this spirit of analysis applied to finance;) in theology, the fundamental rule of all faith and the privileges of the church as an interpreter; in logic, the final authority of reason itself; in morals, the essence of duty. Nay, we might advance into regions of thought less liable to external or accidental influences. In physics, the ultimacy of the laws of motion has been lately made the subject of disquisition, (by Prof. Powell;) and in pure mathematics themselves, (the most remote of all studies from the operation of outward and social tendencies,) inquiries into the nature of the different species of quantity which make the subject of its different branches have attracted much interest, (a topic, I may add, to which an able contribution has been presented by an eminent member of our own University.) However you determine about cases like *these*, considered as instances of a common principle, cases where the chain of dependencies would seem so attenuated as to be almost imperceptible, about the *former*—the instances derived from the moral and political sciences—I believe you can have little difficulty in perceiving that the analytic tendency is truly the great characteristic of the public mind. How this marked and prominent character *has arisen*, I cannot at present pause to discuss at any length; the admission of the *fact* is all I require. When you reflect upon the pervading influence of all revolutions in *political* opinion, you will probably agree with me that in the growth of *democratic principles* may be found at least a leading cause. (I make no apology for such references: I trust you feel that it is the happy privilege of philosophy to contemplate the present with the serenity of an historical retrospect.) The specific character of the polemics of republicanism is the tendency to publicity, inquiry, censure; in short, to that which, transported into the sphere of philosophy, becomes the spiri-

*Growth of
democratic
principles a
cause of
this ten-
dency.*

of bold examination into the principles of all things, the spirit of audacious and indefatigable analysis. Commencing in political discussion, its very spirit—that of pursuing inquiry to the utmost—must urge it through every topic with which political opinions are connected; while again, the philosophical habits in their turn powerfully react upon the practical. With how intimate a bond these opposite regions are united, it cannot be necessary to suggest either to those who honoured a former lecture with their attention, or indeed to those who are at all conversant with the writings or the history of speculations to which the present age has given birth. Such must have seen that the philosophy of human nature in any age is usually the condensed expression of that age; that it is the refined and sublimated spirit which, diluted and diffused, takes shape as the habits and manners of the people. It is the logic of the public practice; the grounds and reasons which each generation presents to the tribunal of time as its memorial and justification. The history is the philosophy in action; the philosophy, the history in speculation; they are (to borrow a scholastic metaphor) the matter and the form (or idea) of the times. The reciprocal action of these elements is powerful and perpetual, and has been more and more evidently so ever since the press has given an almost instantaneous ubiquity to thought.

*Philosophy
is to His-
tory as
Form to
Matter.*

From that time in popular convulsions rival principles have begun to lead parties where rival passions led before, and men have fought to maintain not only beliefs, but *opinions*. It was so in the great Reformation, where Christianity indeed was made the external scene of conflict and supplied the weapons and the uniform, but where the human mind itself, panting for free thought, and the principle of authority that would perpetuate

*Influence
of the press
in convert-
ing the con-
flict of pas-
sions into a
conflict of
opinions.
Examples.
Reforma-
tion.*

its fetters, were the real combatants. It was so in the terrible century of religious war that followed, down to the Treaty of Westphalia. It was the same contest of principles that, just as toleration was secured abroad, broke out on questions of *government* in the great civil war of England, and that was happily suspended by our Revolution. It was the same secret but burning zeal for theoretic perfection against practical deficiencies that exploded at last in the terrific volcano of the French Revolution,—the most tremendous battle of principles the world ever saw, and certainly the most misguided; but still in its essence a battle of principles. I need not tell you that a similar contest of rival principles subsists to this day; and that now, as for the last three hundred years, the passions and the party-feelings are the *body* to which principles—be they right or wrong—are still the *soul*. And though the “contest for opinions” is commonly decried as the worst form of human folly, I confess I have eyes sharp enough in the detection of good, to find in even this folly an element of hope and indications prophetic of a happy future. Before I pass to reminding you of the conclusion I am drawing from these facts, I pause for a moment to show you the nature of the influence which the press has had in producing them; and I trust that the vast importance of the subject, and its frequency as a topic of discussion, will justify the momentary digression. The easy and rapid dissemination of thoughts is the usual, the true, and in its form the most general, solution of the question; but in being thus general it is also, perhaps, somewhat vague and indistinct. It is quite obvious that rapid dissemination is, in itself, uninfluential for either good or evil. A series of unmeaning combinations of the twenty-six letters of the alphabet would work no change upon mankind,

*Religious
wars of the
seventeenth
century.*

religious

*Civil War
in Eng-
land.*

*First
French
Revolution.*

though the copies were multiplied by all the presses of Europe, and transmitted by all its posts. Now, remembering that our question is founded upon a very important change,—namely, the spread of contests in which great theoretical principles are involved, as contrasted with contests arising out of pure caprice or passion,—we must look beyond that which in itself is inadequate to produce any change; that is, we must look to the other element of the press,—the nature of the *thoughts disseminated*,—in order to understand the influence of the dissemination. Consider then that the two modes of communicating mental influences are Writing and Speech. What is the character of written dissertation as contrasted with oratorical appeals? This:—that, all the accessory arts by which oratory succeeds in persuading through the *feelings* being excluded, a more habitual appeal to the reasoning-powers becomes inevitable. Written matter tends (I speak only of tendencies on the whole) towards discussion of principles, and spoken matter towards vivid picturing of details. Thus—to draw an illustration from the combination of both—a nation governed by *written speeches* invariably inclines (we know the instance of a neighbouring country) towards speculative politics. The real force of the press, therefore, in raising principles into the vanguard of action, and making the Reason of things the great rallying-point in public consideration, is to be traced immediately to its power of rapid dissemination, but ultimately and chiefly to that inevitable tendency of written thought to dwell more upon reasons and principles than upon habits and passions.

Comparison of Writing and Speech as modes of communicating thought.

Oratory speaks more to the Emotions: writing to the reason.

I return to the conclusion which I am anxious to impress upon your minds. If (from whatever cause) the analysis of principles both in action and speculation be the predominating

Hence in modern times an increasing tendency to analysis;

character of modern times, and more peculiarly the character of the present age, an acquaintance with the ultimate laws of the mind, and with that master-science which holds in its hand the last link of every chain of thought, rises from the dignity of a fine accomplishment to the intrinsic authority of a necessary and fundamental attainment.

hence, too, an increasing necessity for an acquaintance with the ultimate laws of thought.

In such an age, not to be habituated to the analysis of thought, and to the investigation of the elements of political and private duty, is really as great a deficiency in general education as it would be to live as a chemist among chemists without cultivating a knowledge of the commonest processes of decomposition, or as a mechanic among mechanicians without a familiarity with the ordinary principles and instruments of dynamical effects.

Influence of the study of chemistry on mental science.

The illustration which I have casually employed suggests to my recollection another cause, which I have often thought has not been without its efficacy in promoting the analytic spirit on the existence of which these remarks have been founded. I allude to the growth of the science of *chemistry*. It would certainly be a striking instance of the reciprocal influence of studies, and even of the influence of philosophy upon action, if it could be shown that this science (which you will remember has the advantage of being the most familiar and popular of all) has exercised a power of this universal and pervading extent over the general mind. It seems to me that it *has* done so, by exemplifying and encouraging habits of indefatigable analysis; by supplying a very convenient *phraseology*¹ for these purposes, (a matter in itself of no slight

¹ [As an instance of the felicitous use of chemical phrases and ideas in illustrating mental science, may be cited a passage from Sir J. Mackintosh's elegant Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy. "Defects

importance;) and thus by both stimulating and assisting the constant search for elementary principles, and the solicitude to detect in all subjects, under outward and palpable manifestations, inward and invisible constituents.

Another argument in proof of the value of these mental speculations it would be improper to pass without notice, although I may presume that your text-books have already made you familiar with it: I mean the beneficial results upon the powers of investigation and discovery which must be produced by the study of the mind as a bundle of tools, or a system of machinery, for that purpose. These advantageous results such a study may produce in two principal ways: first, by *defining the limits* of the faculties, and thus exhibiting in general outlines what they can and cannot attain. Locke, whose great work originated in difficulties on the subject, seems to have been peculiarly impressed

*Further
uses of men-
tal science.*

*Study of the
faculties as
the instru-
ments of
discovery.*

*Locke's
Essay.*

of the same sort" (as that of Brown, who substitutes the term "Suggestion" in place of the hitherto-received "Association," in explaining the origin of the complex emotions) "may indeed be found in the parallel phrases of most, if not all, philosophers; and all of these proceed from the erroneous but prevalent notion, that the law of Association produces only such a close union of a thought and a feeling, as gives one the power of reviving the other; the truth being, that it forms them into a new compound, in which the properties of the component parts are no longer discoverable, and which may itself become a substantive part of human nature. They supposed the condition produced by the power of that law to resemble that of material substances in a state of mechanical separation; whereas in reality it may be better likened to a chemical combination of the same substances, from which a totally new product arises." *Diss.* Sect. vii. The term "Fusion" has accordingly been suggested as a convenient substitute for "Association," in describing the growth of the more complex out of the simpler desires and emotions. Ed.]

with this ground of importance. I may add to his homely but most profound remarks, that as there is a general and final limitation of the faculties, within which is possible knowledge and beyond which is certain ignorance, so there is also a relative and mutual limitation of the *faculties with respect to each other*, as well as of the chief subjects upon which each can be exerted. Of both these latter distributions you find a magnificent example in

*Bacon de
Augmentis.*

the great work of Lord Bacon, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*,—an example whose defects may perhaps be best excused by observing that no subsequent attempt to reform it has been pronounced more faultless. The objection on which the Comte Destutt de

*Apology
for Bacon's
division of
the faculties
into me-
mory, ima-
gination,
reason.*

Tracy enlarges, that his introductory division of the faculties into the Memory, the Imagination, and the Reason, is not elementary or ultimate, may be granted as true, and yet not injure its claims as a division both *distinct* and *adequate*.

Our division of Great Britain into England, Wales, and Scotland is not less true, and for many practical purposes may be more convenient, than if we had subdivided it into all its multitude of counties or of parishes. Another objection of the same author is more important:—that which denies the distinctness of the division, and urges that “there is no one branch of our knowledge—not even a single one of our judgments—to which all our intellectual faculties have not co-operated.” The assertion in this form is, if these names of the faculties be used in their ordinary sense, perhaps too bold; but the principle is undeniable. It is indeed obvious that the simplest deduction of reason cannot be effected without the aid of memory; and that the operations of imagination in the production of poetry would be equally impossible without the aid of that faculty. Memory, again, without the deductive power of reason would be nearly useless; and imagination almost as much so; while Rea-

son itself in its march of discovery can scarcely operate without the imagination of hypotheses. Against this charge, therefore, the best answer on behalf of Lord Bacon is, I presume, to be found in appealing to his *aim*; which, being merely practical, admitted of being attained by classifying the departments of human thought under the faculties which, in popular apprehension, seemed principally, though in metaphysical strictness they were not exclusively, engaged in them. It is true that for purely scientific purposes the animal system of Linnæus, which includes the *Man* and the *Bat* in the same division, may be highly valuable; yet, as a basis for popular instruction in natural history, it may be doubted whether more interest may not be excited, and thence (which was Lord Bacon's direct purpose) more stimulus to increased knowledge created, by a division founded on circumstances somewhat more obvious to common observation.

The second advantage which I would specify as afforded by our science to the reasoning-faculties does not regard their limitation but their *use*, their improvement to the highest pitch of power *within* the range determined by the former considerations. Valuable comments upon this most important subject are to be found scattered in a variety of authors both ancient and modern. The "technical memory" of Grey, Feinagle, and others; the copious rhetorical counsels of Aristotle, Cicero, and Bacon, for the improvement of memory and the aid of judgment; the elementary systems of Pestalozzi and other methodizers of intellectual education,—all these and such like plans and advices are founded upon those elementary laws of the mind which you are here to consider, and follow as directly from them as the structure of a telescope to augment the powers of the eye, from the laws of light and vision. It is not unlikely that if the mind were strictly subjected to an intellectual

Use of mental science in regulating the exercise of the faculties.

Examples.

regimen, like the body and its muscular system, results as far beyond ordinary calculation might be produced. The extraordinary power sometimes generated by constant practice in particular pursuits may assist us to some conception of the energies which are *dormant* in human minds only because they are not aroused by cultivation. It is true that in these cases the power greatly depends on the exclusiveness of the pursuit; for different habits of the same faculty interfere with each other's influence, and neutralize, like interfering rays of light, producing darkness; but to this I would reply, in the *first* place, that this truly demonstrates the importance of turning the habit upon *noble* pursuits, in which case the exclusiveness would become a *blessing*; and in the *second* place, which is very important, that there are habits of so general a nature as to be *universally* applicable,—habits of the faculties themselves, as contrasted with habits of any special exercise of the faculties. Of these I will mention, as the most important intellectual habit I know of, the habit of attending exclusively to the matter in hand. This habit of exclusive attention I believe to be attainable in such a manner as to act altogether irrespectively of the immediate subject of attention, to fit equally to every occasion for which it is demanded. It is commonly said that genius cannot be infused by education; yet this power of concentrated attention, which belongs as a part of his gift to every great discoverer, is unquestionably capable of almost indefinite augmentation by resolute practice. It is certain indeed that it is only a *part* of genius. One of the most interesting of the few but precious relics of Newton's conversation is an expression imputed to him relative to his own intellectual powers. You probably know that on one occasion he is reported² to have modestly said, that in all he had ever

² [He says so at the commencement of his first Letter to Dr. Bentley. See Bentley's Sermons, ed. Dyce, p. 203. Ed.]

discovered he was only conscious to himself of patient contemplation,—that in his perseverance lay all his power. Coming from such a man, nothing could be more beautifully characteristic of his unassuming spirit; yet I am disposed to think that Newton's experience is, so far, the experience of every discoverer. For analyze the fact. The genius that discovers unknown truths consists of two elements,—a process of close attention to the point examined, and a constant supply from the hand of nature of ideas connected with it. The latter is a wholly involuntary process, the former is a voluntary effort. Newton, therefore, in common, as I think, with every inventor, could only retain a distinct consciousness of the *voluntary* part of the process as *his own* personal act: here alone he was agent; all else was executed for him by the independent revelations of nature. But though attention be only one element of scientific genius,—the ear, as it were, with which it listens to the harmonies of the universe,—yet you are not to forget that it is truly an indispensable element;—nor that the chances of discovery increase in proportion to the strength and concentration of this faculty. For every idea is vivid in proportion to attention; and every idea suggests a greater number of related ideas in proportion to its vividness. One of the chief uses of *writing*, in the process of inquiry, is that it arrests the ideas at pleasure under the direct inspection of the intellect; and a geometrical diagram assists the investigation of a problem not more by its concise collection of the conditions of the question, than by the efficacy of the sensible object in preventing the wanderings of the mind. This, then, I think a fair instance of an intellectual habit of immense importance, conducting to the most splendid results, capable of raising inferior minds to achievements for which without it the most gifted intellect must depend on chance, and unquestionably attainable to every man by determined practice.

And, surely, the science which develops such truths and rules as these is not unworthy your notice.

Educational uses of metaphysical studies.

From this subject the transition is natural to another very important instance of the utility of your studies in this place: I mean their peculiar and invaluable efficacy in sharpening the intellect. This efficacy seems to turn upon two principal circumstances,—upon the necessity, which above all other pursuits they involve, of that *intense contemplation* of the point at issue, to the exclusion of all others, to which I have just been adverting; and upon the very nature of the *subjects* of metaphysical reflection and analysis, which continually exhibit instances of differences and resemblances so important, yet so minute, as to exercise the mind in the constant detection of the subtlest relations of analogy and discrepancy. The *peculiar* degree in which metaphysical studies possess both these characteristics, so precious in every discipline of the intellect, will perhaps be best illustrated by a brief comparison of them with the only pursuits which can, I suppose, be placed in competition,—the *mathematical* sciences. My remarks shall be concise, as I cannot now afford time to enter at any length into the late controversy on the subject.

Comparison of metaphysical with mathematical studies.

The first object of discipline which I have noted—the habit and power of intense exclusive contemplation—will be of course conferred by any study in proportion as that study requires it. Now, it appears to me that the very improvements of mathematical science are constantly diminishing its value as a discipline for contemplative power.³ Its perfection is the perfection of a

Improvements in mathematical science tend to diminish its educational efficacy;

³ [This opinion is undoubtedly plausible. That it is fallacious appears to me to have been satisfactorily shown by Mr. R. L. Ellis, of Trinity College, in his evidence addressed to the Cambridge Commis-

language,—a language of arbitrary signs or figures which so completely detains the subject in the easy grasp of the mind or recalls it so promptly at pleasure as to relieve the investigator from the strong necessity of intense exertion in apprehending or retaining it. Now, exactly as the excellency of mathematics (its perfect language) enfeebles it as a discipline, so the misfortune of metaphysics (its imperfect language) improves it as a discipline. With respect to their comparative efficacy in producing the habit of detecting subtle resemblances or differences, I cannot but conceive in this point also the Mathematical Sciences to yield the supremacy. In the consideration of lines and numbers the smallest difference is as distinct as the vastest; the equation of one right line is as different, and perceived to be as different, from the equation of that whose conditions approach it nearest, as it is from the equation of a curve. Now, in subjects of metaphysical consideration, though the differences may in point of fact be as *real*, (for all difference is *equally* difference,) yet the instantaneous impression may not be that of difference at all, and the perception of difference, when it does occur, may be by no means equally clear and complete. That is, we may apprehend that there *is* a difference, and yet not be able to pronounce in what circumstance the difference lies until after painful and prolonged reflection. For example, between the phenomenon called a “volition” (or exertion of *Will*) and the phenomenon called a “desire,” between the state of mind which immediately precedes the motion of a limb or is said

while the imperfections of the language of metaphysics improve it as a discipline.

Perception of minute resemblances and minute differences promoted by metaphysical in a much higher degree than by mathematical studies. Minute not less real than broad distinctions.

sioners. See the *Cambridge University Report*, Evidence, p. 224. The remark is besides scarcely consistent with the opinions and preferences expressed by the author in the very next page. Ed.]

to move it, and the state of mind which constitutes the *wish* to move it, there are few reflectors who will not at first declare that there is a difference; and yet there are probably few who can enumerate and define the circumstances that establish the difference. This, indeed, is an inferiority of mathematics as a discipline to *all physical* sciences; for in all these alike the detection of minute differences must be more difficult than in the science of space and number; but to the *metaphysical* sciences the inferiority becomes peculiarly striking,

The most valuable disciplinary parts of mathematics are those which border on metaphysics.

because the discrepancies there are so peculiarly delusive. Hence the most valuable *disciplinary* parts of mathematics are those which contain the *new notions* and principles introductory to each new branch; for example, the opening conceptions of geometry and of algebra,

and of the application of these sciences to each other, and the vast and profound principles upon which the more modern calculus is erected; and I have no doubt that a student has gained more advantage to the faculties of thought from one hour of those which he passed in thus exploring and measuring the basis of each new structure of mathematical science at which he arrived, than from a much greater expenditure of time and labour consumed in subsequently traversing some of its inner intricacies. Now, these very introductory

Principle which should regulate the choice of a special disciplinary study.

principles are the metaphysics of the mathematics. Finally, observe upon this question, that though (as I have before remarked) *general* intellectual habits of attention, precision, perseverance, acuteness, are indeed truly valuable,

and capable of being acquired apart from exclusive connection with a special *subject* of them, so as to be in a considerable degree transferable to any at pleasure, yet, as the subject upon which they are acquired will always be that upon which they are most promptly avail-

able, it is of importance that that subject should be selected from those which are of the highest and most constant utility. In this point of view I presume there can be little hesitation in or choice between the Mathematical Sciences—which, admirable as they are, are restricted to a narrow circle of pure speculation, and beyond that magic circle of their wonders are powerless—and the science which, in being the Science of Man, contains in it the subjects, the principles, and the proper discipline, for every possible department of thought or practice.

In what has been thus argued we have shown the superior utility of the Science of Mind as an indirect education of the intellect, altogether independently of its actual discoveries of truth. In this *latter* aspect, I freely admit that its rival might enjoy an apparent triumph; for assuredly the harvest of new and various truths which the mathematics have yielded is, if we *number* the produce, far beyond any thing which moral speculation can display. But metaphysical conclusions compensate for their fewness by their vast generality of application. Indeed, in this point of view, mathematics themselves might be regarded as the result of a few convictions of the kind which *metaphysics* contemplate; and all real physical science as the result and creation of the first *logical* principles which led to it. Such principles, like heat or electricity, are more known in their consequences than in themselves: we cannot see them till they are embodied in practice, and then we give the practice all the credit which is *theirs* of right. Besides this, from other reasons, on these subjects above all others, we are unjust to our teachers: in the sciences of matter and relation discoveries are easily traced to their owners, but *here* discoveries, (and those general impulses to juster thought which are better than posi-

Paucity of metaphysical results compensated by their generality of application.

tive discoveries,) though no less real, no less perceptible, and no less valuable, are appropriated with difficulty to their respective authors. Great writers are lost in the very light they diffuse: they create a general illumination which at length destroys the solitude or the pre-eminence of their own particular glory. One principal object indeed of just philosophical history is, by abstracting us from this dazzling illusion of subsequent and present time, to restore their true magnitude and splendour to the mighty spirits whom we are forgetting while we profit by them. The sun, splendid as he appears to us, would appear still more intensely brilliant if we could contemplate him from a point beyond our atmosphere, and thus behold him burning in the midst of a firmament as black as midnight, than as we see him from our position, encompassed by those nearer masses of reflected light whose splendour, though derived from his own, almost competes with its great original!

I shall only add (to prevent misconception) that you are not to consider that in what I have said I am regarding mathematics in *themselves*, but mathematics as a discipline; nor even this *positively*, (for I do not at all question the value of their influence to a certain high degree,) but *comparatively*, as contrasted with the speculations which form the subject of our present studies.

*Difficulties
of metaphy-
sical science
are elements
in its value
as an intel-
lectual dis-
cipline.*

You perceive, then, that the very difficulties of metaphysical science constitute a chief element in its value as an intellectual discipline. This, however, must not be permitted to prevent our efforts to diminish these difficulties; for we may expect *greater* advantages from the improvement of our actual knowledge of man and his faculties than could ever be derived indirectly from the mere in-

tellectual exertion to attain it,—besides that we may confidently calculate that the human mind will never in this world arrive at such a pitch of knowledge as to want new and sufficient subjects on which to exercise and strengthen its powers. Indeed, the matter compensates itself; for the attainment of such a stage of knowledge would render the discipline for future effort no longer necessary. You will perceive that the greatest cause of perplexity which you may expect in these studies (and the same reason explains that long continuance, frequent recurrence, and difficult removal of errors on the subject, so often charged against metaphysical philosophy, and certainly so comparatively unusual in the exacter sciences, and in the physics of the external world when once *they* had become sciences of observation; for *there* a discovery once made is a discovery forever, *there* nature once conquered never rebels against her chain) arises from the difficulty of subjecting these things to instantaneous attention and experiment, and when you have succeeded in obtaining a firm grasp of the point, the equal, or nearly equal, difficulty of conveying your conviction to others in language which will speak neither more nor less than you wish. This double difficulty—of *subject* and of *language*—belongs, it is manifest, in a far higher degree to mental than to material science, and seems to me to explain (prejudices apart) almost the whole history of metaphysical error. The imperfection of metaphysical language, arising from its constant suggestion of unwarrantable *material analogies*, (of which I may observe that the controversy on “Free Will” is a very striking example,) has been noted by all our more modern writers; I shall only add (for I cannot now pause upon any subject) that in Bacon’s day an error precisely opposite, or rather an opposite development of the same error, appears to have existed,—a singular case of philo-

Nature and causes of these difficulties. Obscurity of subject.

Imperfection of language.

sophical revolutions. We complain of the illegitimacy of explaining mental processes by material similitudes; he notices, as a principal *idolum tribûs*, the “naturalium operationum ad similitudinem *actionum humanarum* reductio.”⁴ From both these difficulties—that of subject and that of language—arises another very remarkable evil; it is this,—that unwarrantable deference to the authority

*Deference
to author-
ity.*

of names is far more prevalent in the field of human than of natural philosophy. I say it arises directly from these difficulties. It does

so, just because in consequence of these imperfections of mental grasp and of language—more especially of the latter—we are always obliged in perusing an author to take so much upon trust. We naturally prefer concluding that we have not perfectly understood him, to concluding that his account of his consciousness or his convictions is erroneous. This indolent subjection of the mind, (so different from our reception of a geometrical process or a chemical experiment,) when exaggerated by collateral prejudices, begets that vast accumulation of traditionary folly, swelling on from generation to generation, which has so peculiarly encumbered and degraded the science of human nature. But language not only produces this deception by its imperfections, but it perpetuates it by its authority. After terms of

*Tendency
to realism.*

great apparent weight have been invented and authenticated, they give a fictitious reality to

imaginary entities; we cannot endure to think, after a long and arduous course of labour in mastering a complicated phraseology, that we have “toiled” so much and “caught nothing;” and therefore, in determined self-consolation, we persuade ourselves to respect these modifications of idle breath, as if they were indeed the eternal substances of truth and nature. Hence, by degrees, a

[⁴ *De Augm.* v. cap. iii. Ed.]

new human mind is framed, overcharged with attributes and characters that nature never recognised. It is no longer the conscious being of a certain limited number of faculties and passions that thinks and feels in our daily experience, but an intricate and complicated being framed out of essences, accidents, positive and primitive qualities, intrinsic and extrinsic causes, actual and potential faculties, and so forth; in short, the unmingled product of that most arid of all the soils of fancy,—the *logical* imagination! In illustration of the cause of the prevalence of these errors, I will ask you to conceive how valuable would be *the supply* of that which our science wants,—namely, the appeal to direct and unequivocal experiment. Conceive a philosophical Frankenstein gifted with the power of creating or of modifying minds according to his theories,—enabled, just as a mechanic takes asunder the parts of his machine, to strip his creation of its attributes, so as to fit it to all the various philosophies of knowledge, and, by examining the living result, to reduce to experimental evidence the deficiencies or the superfluities of these accounts. Is it quite certain that the human mind—the *man* that we know and feel—would be perfectly evolved in any one change in the succession? Much as we admire and reverence the great authors of these mighty theories, the Aristotles, Platos, Zenos, Descarteses, Lockes, Kants, &c., and great as have been their unquestionable services to the freedom and progress of thought, yet, in the darkness and difficulty of the subject, is it not sadly possible that every apparition in the series of theoretic men—thus built *secundum artem*—might prove *an idiot*? Differing as they do, and supplying each other, is it not probable that the real man, if he exist among them, can only be constructed by extracts from them all? Or, as a less ambitious speculation, imagine how rapid would be the progress of psychology

Impossibility of direct experiment in metaphysical science. Imaginary case.

in a single month, if I could introduce into this place (as the anatomical professor can accomplish in his lecture-room) a metaphysical "*subject*" to demonstrate on, with the power of appealing to its manifest structure in as perfect a security as that which the anatomist can enjoy, of neither omitting what *is there*, nor supposing what is *not*. Such then are the imperfections of our minds in relation to this great object of thought,—ourselves; and such are some of the intellectual prejudices which obstruct the rapid and steady progress of the science. I hope I may trust to your own sagacity and interest in the subject, for maturing, enlarging, and enforcing topics which here and now I can but transiently notice.

*Ethics of
metaphysical
study.*

The last subject upon which I wish to address you, and the last because I wish it to leave a deep and clear impression, has reference to the moral tone and spirit in which it becomes you to pursue the science of man. The great principles here are,—the fearless pursuit of truth, in the bright and holy confidence that all truth will ultimately right itself; the careful expulsion of all counteracting influences in study which can be traced to *undue* prepossession of any kind, or by whatever title consecrated; and the cultivation of a spirit of candour towards all who, whether, as you think, in truth or in error, have given, or are giving, their days in sincerity to advancing the growth of human knowledge.

These things are not to be taught by logical reasonings. I trust that, as far as my humble influence can reach, I shall know how to teach them by my example.

*First point.
Love of
Truth for
its own
sake. The
pursuit of
truth is un-
restricted
by religion.*

As to the *first*, the unswerving pursuit of truth, I have before now endeavoured to show you how little the principle is restricted by the precepts of either morals or religion, if these precepts be but rightly understood. I have remarked how poor is the compliment which mistaken zeal

pays to the economy of the universe when it commands us to resign the occupation of penetrating or contemplating it. I cannot but pronounce that Science is indeed *one* part of the great Praxis of the imitation of God; for the great object of science is to gain harmonies, and He is the framer and perceiver of the final harmony of all. It may be that there is but *one* Law in the universe, of which all the laws of possible science are developments; but it can scarcely be denied that there is a oneness, in *some* sense, in the structure of the whole,—for if creation have a purpose, the means must partake in the unity of the purpose; that the Creator alone contemplates this transcendent singleness and simplicity of nature from its summit; that human minds stand at various heights of elevation, and in proportion to their elevation take in less or more of the great and ultimate unity of all. The religious or moral scruples which would deny this essential holiness of science is real infidelity; because it proceeds on a tacit separation (I fear more common than we imagine) of the Physical and the Moral God of the world. Though it be not precisely perhaps the “*knowledge*” with which science deals, yet it is worth your while to remember the union of “*knowing*” and “*loving*” God so constant in the loftiest of the Evangelists; and to remember that when Christ himself sought a title he declared himself “*the Truth*.”

Science is a part of the imitation of God.

Expressions in the Gospel.

The *second* point was the exclusion of prepossession. The great philosophical division of these moral prejudices in relation to our present subject is into those which arise from habits of *skepticism* and habits of *dogmatism*. The one cannot tolerate any discussions of first principles, through fear of leading to skeptical conclusions; and the other cannot endure any discussion which would seem to establish lofty ones, and is perpetually working at the

Second point in the ethics of metaphysical study. Exclusion of prepossessions, whether skeptical or dogmatical.


elementary principles. And on points (such as the controversy of Necessarianism) where there are two classes of facts, neither will bear the statement of the opposite; the fact, doubtless, being that both are mysteriously true, —that we see the extremes, while the middle, where they unite, is involved in clouds. Here, again, the great office of a perfect science is to produce a reconciling harmony. Two persons at opposite sides of the base of a pyramid can perceive clearly enough that they are opposite; but as they ascend they approach; and could they but scale the summit they would find opposition to disappear. and *sides* to vanish in a single *point*!

*Third
point.
Universal
candour
and toler-
ance.*


As to the last point, the necessity of universal candour, and of the habitual distribution of this merit to all men, in these speculations above all, this great qualification is perpetually talked of, and perpetually forgotten. Men have proposed theories of benevolence in terms of polemical scorn, and, in descanting on the nature and remedies of prejudice, have ingeniously contrived to make the doctrine its own example. Is it not a sufficient proof of this perversity, that the word "Polemics," originally significant of hostility of any kind, should have become exclusively devoted to religious and moral disputation? But on this subject time will not permit me to enlarge. I can scarcely speak with impartiality upon it; for I have myself required from you, and shall still require, so much of this benevolence of criticism as to be too interested a witness in favour of its merits. If I may judge from the past, however, I shall not be without hopes of preserving your candid consideration of my future efforts; nor without hopes—though our meetings for this term have, I confess, been small to a degree which has disappointed my expectations—yet of contributing some aid towards eventually creating in our University an interest in subjects

which in most others are considered the noblest that can occupy and ornament the mind of man.

The next term at which my many and weighty duties of another kind may permit me to meet you, I hope to introduce you, as a further preliminary to detailed investigations, to the History of the Progress of Philosophy through ancient and modern times.



FIRST SERIES.



LECTURE I.

ON ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

GENTLEMEN:—

A CONSIDERABLE period has elapsed since I last had the honour of meeting you in this place. Many circumstances have combined to lengthen that interval,—circumstances which I anxiously trust may not again unite. I know not how far I can count upon you as being even partially the same audience as I last addressed; still less can I flatter myself that you retain any very distinct impression of the views which I then proposed to your acceptance. This is, on my own part, the more to be regretted, as these views differed in many respects from the doctrines—at least, from the method and *order* of doctrines—popularly adopted in the philosophical literature of these countries; and were, besides, in a great degree intended as preparatory to the wider developments which I hope, if spared for this work, in my future labours to offer you. There is indeed, I believe, in the words of even the humblest labourers in the field of general philosophy, if their labours be but honest and truthful, a characteristic unity of style and thought, which, while it has the advantage of making all the efforts of the same mind mutually illustrative, often has also the disadvantage of making them mutually dependent, and of giving to each the position not merely of a useful confirmation but of a necessary supplement to all the rest. This is a principle which, in various degrees, extends over even the most dissimilar regions of mental exertion. The poetical, the

Introductory remarks.

historical, the political, the rhetorical efforts of the same intellect will almost invariably be found to bear the family-likeness of a common parentage. Thus, (to take one striking example,) the seventy volumes of the writings of Voltaire will be found to embrace almost every species of literary workmanship; yet there is scarcely a page of these multiform productions which a judge of even moderate discrimination in the flavour of intellectual growths could not almost unerringly identify. How much closer this interdependence must be when the productions are of the same kind, how much closer still when they belong to a single subject,—to a single course of instruction,—I need not remind you. This it is which makes the *solutio continui* so dangerous to the general effectiveness of any progressive series of instruction. It is hard to perpetuate a common vitality in such disjointed members of an organized system. The only remedy, or palliative, for this disadvantage—which is in some degree inseparable from every course broken into fragments as our academic lectures are—will be to multiply the centres of vitality by as much as possible giving to each its own internal completeness; so that (to carry on the figure) the whole may resemble those animal systems which, while partaking of a common organization, are also independent of section, each minute portion possessing its separate faculty of life and motion. And this it is my desire to attempt, as far as it may seem practicable to realize it.

Of the HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, the subject to which I formerly dedicated our present discussions, it now becomes my duty to present you with some outlines. I would not be understood to offer any thing more. I do not pretend to give you more than the etching of a reduced engraving, which if swelled to a size at all proportionate to the real vastness of the object, and filled up with the elaborate minuteness of touch which

an object so delicate in its lights and shadowings requires for its finished portraiture, would far surpass the time and the attention which I can reasonably expect from my hearers. My end is attained if I can so far disclose to you some of the attractions of the subject as to induce you to have recourse to the original sources of information. And let me suggest to all of you who feel an interest in this history of speculation, that the more constantly you penetrate to these originals, and the less you are habituated to depend on secondary representations of their force and spirit, the more beneficial will be the intellectual exercise, and far the more secure your own convictions. To your estimation of *my own* labours I most freely extend the principle. It may be the usual object with literary enterprise to content its judges; I should be very sorry to imagine that I sent you away contented with what you can here obtain.

The History of Philosophy has been attempted by many hands. Indeed, so extensive has been on this subject the mass of learned labour, that it has given birth to a distinct article of inquiry, with which some historians have prefaced their recitals, under the title of the "History of the History of Philosophy;" and, indeed, from the rapid daily increase of contributions to the subject in *both* these branches (especially among our German contemporaries) I am half inclined to apprehend that before the close of the century our sons shall find even this last history capable of producing *another* reflection of its own. Understood in the most general sense of the phrase, no age which has possessed philosophy has been without a history of it. In those first and feeble hours when men depended almost wholly, as in the infancy of all civilizations, upon traditional authority for the validity of their principles and the direction of their researches,

*Histories
of Philosophy
are
very numerous.*

Philosophy itself originally a professed history;

philosophy itself was little more than a *history* of inherited beliefs. Wherever the scope of inquiry is rather the interpretation of doctrines than the interpretation of nature, the preliminary research must of course turn less upon things than tenets. This condition of mind is sometimes found to be prolonged into stages far advanced in civilization.

as at this day in the East.

It exists in almost every country of the East in a greater or less degree, and indeed must be discernible in all countries where the claims of Revelation and Inquiry are not understood and defined. Yet such is the unconquerable strength of the impulse to reflective inquiry when once aroused, that, as we shall see, in India, Philosophy has really manifested herself under the prudent veil of Interpretation; and systems analogous in many respects to our own philosophic theories conceal their daring proportions in the mystical mantle of theological commentary.

As men advance in the path of speculation, the history of doctrines becomes of less consequence. The ardour of philosophic youth, like that of the youth of nature, undervalues lessons transmitted from the past.

Two great eras in the history of speculation: the dawn of science in Greece, and its revival in modern Europe.

The two movements contrasted.

The two *great* instances of such an awakening of the genuine spirit of speculation must to us ever be the dawn of science in Greece, and its regeneration in modern Europe. These great experiments, however, differ widely and obviously in their circumstances, spirit, and history. The movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was essentially a "revival of letters;" its life was in the spirit which antiquity breathed into it across a thousand years; it was a revolution of imitation, collation, erudition, in which (the great religious change apart) the discovery of manuscripts held it above the discovery of systems. Accordingly, to this second birth of philosophy the re-

mark which I have made is not at all so applicable as to its first wondrous apparition in Greece. There was little time for historical researches, little patience for them, little *regard* for them, among the first bold explainers of the universe, in the islands and colonies of Greece. Among these active teachers the exercise of thought was preferred to the investigation of its previous exercise; and the field of antecedent experience was itself too narrow to be worth the trouble of cultivation. The age of the Sophists seems to have brought with it some attempts towards the systematic collection of opinions, if the work of Damastes,¹ "*Of Sophists*," (of which no more than the title remains to us, *Suid.*,) was of the historical kind. But, though subsequent ages of declining Greek literature were affluent in these digests and biographies,* (most of them unhappily only preserved to us by name in the pages of Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Athenæus, and the more learned of the Christian fathers,) I do not know that we can point to any certain traces of the record of systems and the criticisms of their mutual bearing, before the time of *Plato*. But *Plato*, if he be something higher than an historian, is *not* an historian. His scattered notices of previous philosophers, valuable indeed as materials, are themselves, with few exceptions, too occasional and incomplete to rise to the dignity of historical detail. I am not satisfied that he can always be fully trusted; nor indeed can I easily believe that speculative tenets can have been

Independence and boldness of Grecian thought.

The first recorder of systems is Plato, who, however, is not, strictly speaking, an historian of philosophy.

¹ [Περὶ ποιητῶν καὶ σοφιστῶν is the title of the work mentioned by Suidas, who makes Damastes "a pupil of Hellanicus," and places him "before the Peloponnesian war." Ed.]

* [Generally styled "Successions of Philosophers;" "of Sects;" "of Opinions," &c.,—or else professing to be distinct individual lives of eminent masters.

filtered through a soil so racy and peculiar as his extraordinary mind, and arrived without a tinge from their passage. Of one illustrious person he has indeed presented us with the noblest series of memorials that the world has ever seen from any uninspired source. It is now pretty generally understood that the remark I have just made is abundantly applicable in this instance; and the exquisite art, no less than *dramatic*, with which the additions are incorporated into the composition of the Platonic Socrates, the skill with which the simplicity of the original character is preserved and yet the tone of the doctrines exalted, the features accurate though the complexion be heightened, may serve to make us distrust the same gifted reporter when he undertakes to tell us of Parmenides and Timæus. [The true Socratic gospel is the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.]

The great rival of Plato also comes before us as a detailer of the history of doctrines. On Aristotle.
Aristotle's claims to veracity and candour the traditions of antiquity so vary that it is exceedingly difficult to pronounce any positive decision. By some critics and biographers whose remains have reached us, he is charged, as with many other gross immoralities, so with unfair suppressing and deliberate perversion. Some of these assailants have been thought to have gone so far* as to charge him with the literary incendiarism of collecting and burning all the attainable writings of his predecessors, partly in order to distort them at his ease, and partly to construct his own edifice out of their ruins. His defenders would not have much difficulty if all the charges against his historical justice were as chimerical as this preposterous falsehood. Aristotle speaks copiously of his predecessors; a modern writer has even termed him the true "father of the history

* Reported by Stanley as "a common report" in his day.

of philosophy;" but he always cites as one who is anxiously pressing on to establish his own conclusions, and he introduces his opponents less to partake the triumph as equals than to grace it as captives.² I will translate a few lines from the close of his first book of Metaphysics, as containing the spirit of his views of the labourers who had preceded him. They may be regarded as an abstract of his usual habits of criticism. "Thus," says he, after a long discussion of the views of Plato, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and others, "it is evident, from all we have said, that the researches of all philosophers are deducible to the four principles established by us in the Physics; and that beyond these no other exists; but these researches have been carried on inaccurately; and if in one view they have anticipated us in all these principles, in another they have not yet mentioned them. The defects of the researches of our predecessors have been sufficiently displayed," &c. You observe the two objects here proposed: first, to prove that little has been done, and then, that that little is provided for on better principles in the new system. These indeed are the objects of *all* systematizers, as well as of this great master of system; but this only suggests that the warning should be *generalized*, and that you *never* can receive without precautions the statements of a theorist who can march to conquest only over the ruins of the prostrate theories of his rivals. Yet, I confess, the vastly superior

His character as a historian of system.

² [The eloquent though perhaps exaggerated censure of Bacon is well known:—"Aristotelis confidentiam proinde subit mirari; qui impetu quodam percitus contradictionis, et bellum universæ antiquitati indicens, non solum nova artium vocabula pro libitu cudendi licentiam usurpavit; sed etiam priscam omnem sapientiam extinguere et delere annisus est. Adeo ut neque nominet uspiam auctores antiquos, neque dogmatum eorum mentionem ullam faciat, nisi quo aut homines perstringeret aut placita redargueret." *De Augm.* iii. c. 4. Ed.]

sagacity of criticism, as well as the superior proximity to their predecessors, which belonged to both Plato and Aristotle, as compared with the critics and compilers of the Western and Eastern empire, attach to their reports such a weight of authority as ought perhaps to counterbalance objections as great as those I have insinuated. At all events, to those who will, and can, constantly apply due precautions, and allow judiciously for occasional purposes, prepossessions, and haste, (a task unquestionably demanding much patience and practical shrewdness,) to *such* the notices of these great masters

*Other his-
torians of
Philoso-
phy.
Cicero.*

become the most valuable historical records in the compass of ancient philosophy. I do not even except Cicero, a name which in a review of this kind cannot be omitted. Far superior to Aristotle in all the graces of style,—as superior as a finished painting to a hard dry etching, superior also in his greater comparative freedom from the prepossessions of a system, (though in this respect you know that Cicero is far from blameless,)—the difference of *date* between these two reporters, as counted from the first school of Greek philosophy, can never be forgotten when we speak of an age in which the invention of printing had not yet secured, almost beyond the possibilities of extinction, the genuine tenets of a master. I cannot also but express the dissatisfaction which I have always felt in perusing Cicero's statements of the doctrines of the elder Grecian schools. I cannot but persuade myself that in these criticisms there is either an absence of that patient sagacity which is essential to a well-qualified judge of the works and processes of pure thought, or else that captious desire to exhibit, under their most uninviting aspect, all possible forms of solution to the ultimate inquiries of human reason, which is so apt to be fostered by the habits of the academic philosophy, itself an imperious master even while

it disavows all mastery. At all events, there is a want of that without which our present study can never be effectively carried on, or happily, or instructively; and that is, a boundless reverence for all the sincere efforts of every honest human reason.

[To any of you who are anxious to collate Cicero's accounts of his predecessors, I may mention that I am instructed by Professor Tennemann of the publication of a work by "Gedike," a German *littérateur*, containing, in Latin, a well-digested collection of all the passages in his writings relative to ancient Philosophy,³ 2d edit., Berlin, 1801.]

³ [A sufficient substitute for this work is furnished in the copious Onomasticon appended to Orelli's Cicero. Many readers will think the preceding estimate of Cicero, as a historian of philosophy, too unfavourable. Soundness of judgment and accuracy of statement characterize his notices of those systems, and they were not few nor inconsiderable, which he had thoroughly studied. Witness his account of the controversy between Stoics and Academics on the Criterion of Knowledge, in the Academic Questions, which contain moreover brief but most exact information concerning the tenets of the minor Socratic sects. Cicero's knowledge of the writings of Aristotle was extensive. He seems to have read most of the works that have survived and many that have perished, in particular the exoteric works, of which his own dialogues perpetuate the form and manner. With the voluminous Theophrastus he was equally familiar. Though his knowledge of Plato was less complete, (the *most* abstruse dialogues, the *Timæus* excepted, being nowhere alluded to by him,) his notions of the general outline of the Platonic scheme are apparently derived from good sources; and his appreciation of the dialogues he had read (among which are included the *Laws* and *Republic*) is both vivid and discriminating. His familiarity with the philosophic literature of the two centuries immediately preceding his own time is obvious and acknowledged, and though, as Stahr observes, (*Aristotelia*, ii. 141,) Cicero may not unfrequently have quoted from secondary sources, the number of the elder authors whom he had studied for himself is so great as to justify the warmest admiration of his literary industry and truly astonishing erudition, ("wahrhaft staunenswerthe Belesenheit.") Nor can Cicero be justly accused of want of "reverence" even for the earliest philosophers. Witness his

Another ancient writer, in whose remaining works (though still more deeply tinctured by his system) valuable accounts are to be found of the Grecian schools, is the celebrated skeptic Sextus Empiricus. In order to confute the dogmatists, he exposes them, and thus incidentally supplies useful confirmations or explanations to other and more direct authorities. The writings of this able assailant of reason are in other respects highly curious; and it will surprise a student who is familiar with the sophists of his own age or language, to discover how very few of the logical difficulties of modern skeptics are at all as modern as themselves.

Sextus Empiricus. In considering the views of *Epicurus*, which fill so large a space in the chart of ancient philosophy, you will naturally have recourse to the magnificent poetical essay of *Lucretius*. This great poet, however, who himself possessed independent powers of philosophical speculation, cannot always be adopted as an accurate transcriber of the actual opinions of Epicurus, though perhaps, for this very reason, a safer and more impressive indicator of the views to which, by strict necessity of reason and of *events*, these opinions will everlastingly be found to lead.

Among the writers who, carrying on their own processes of thought, occasionally inform us of the views of antecedent inquirers, Seneca and Plutarch are not to be overlooked. Seneca, the most elaborate of all the interpreters of the Stoical institutes, often

estimate of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus, (*Acad. Qu. ii. 23.*) He seems to have read Xenophanes and Parmenides, and to have appreciated their importance in philosophical history. (*Ib. ii. 23, 37, 42.*) Of Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans he appears to speak at second-hand, and the same may probably be said of his notices of the older Ionics, which, though scanty, are by no means unimportant or inaccurate. But in regard of these, Cicero may fairly be allowed the benefit of the maxim, "*Ars longa, vita brevis.*" Ep.]

throws the strong light of contrast upon the Epicurean school, as well as reprobates the "Academicorum nova scientia, nihil scire." His books of Natural Questions (an amusing study to a modern Newtonian) illustrate a vast variety of points in the history of ancient physics,—the least interesting to my mind, however, because far the least rational, of all the efforts of the science of antiquity. In the science of mind, the subjects of investigation are either logical, where little is left for mere observation, or psychological, where observation is to a certain considerable degree inevitable, and always feasible, even to a single individual; but in the physical investigation of the material world (especially that part of it with which the ancients chiefly busied themselves, astronomy, and the extensive department which they termed meteorology) to theorize without vast and combined and registered observation will infallibly lead astray; the first aspect of the phenomena to an observer who does not vary his position, or multiply and diversify his trials, being usually some intricate complication in which the original laws are wrapped up under a thousand disguises,—disguises which, in most cases, no effort of individual sagacity has the smallest chance of penetrating by the exercise of mere reflection. Hence it is that, while the physical conjectures of antiquity are seldom of value, except as illustrating (which they do very strikingly) the successive forms under which the imagination accommodates itself to facts, and facts to itself, the relics of the genuine reflective science of the ancients are always deserving of reverent inspection, and even in their very errors will generally be found to present an aspect of truth.

Plutarch comes before us both as a direct and indirect recorder of the theories and sentiments of philosophic antiquity. His indirect or occasional references are principally to be met scattered through

Plutarch.

those most delightful treasures of the gossip of Greece and Rome, his biographies. Far less generally known than these universally-popular remains, his moral writings—highly valuable for their own sake—are also of much value in a historical light. His⁴ principal *direct* contribution to the history of philosophy is the treatise *De Placitis Philosophorum*, if indeed that treatise be Plutarch's. It is a lively, superficial sketch, strongly reminding the reader—except in its moral tone, which is somewhat higher—of the graceful, unsubstantial forms in which Philosophy was accustomed to reveal herself in the France of the last century. It cannot be omitted, however, in any collection of our few ancient authorities. You will add to it the philosophic physician *Galen's* tract on the history of philosophy; which indeed seems to be little more than a republication of the other, or a continuation of it.

*Diogenes
Laertius.*

The largest collection of these details, transmitted to us in a classical language, is the well-known work of Diogenes Laertius, who probably⁵ lived about the time of the Antonines. A voluminous and very miscellaneous collection, the reader of it must bring at least as much light as he receives, in order to study it with advantage. It would be ungrateful, however, to despatch, with only this negligent criticism, a collector to whom we are indebted for a vast assemblage of facts, anecdotes, and sentiments, which, but for the

⁴ [Very interesting notions are to be found in Plutarch's controversial tracts against the Stoics and Epicureans, especially in that *adv. Colotem*. Also in the treatise on the Delphian *Ei*, and in the *Questiones Platonicae*, &c. Both the *Placita Philosophorum*, and the tract attributed to Galen, are now acknowledged to be spurious. Ed.]

⁵ [More probably in the first half of the *third* century. He mentions both Sextus Empiricus and his *successor* Saturninus,—the former but not the latter being mentioned by Galen, who died A.D. 200. See Diog. Laert. ix. § 116, and the notes of Menage. Ed.]

humble industry of Diogenes Laertius, would have been forever lost to modern times. It has been the laborious task of many modern critics to investigate the authenticity of his narratives, and to correct his occasional precipitancy. The erudite commentary of Menage is the principal performance of this kind.

The commentary of Menage upon the biographies of Diogenes Laertius recalls naturally the beautiful treatise attributed to Origen,⁶ under the title of *Philosophumena*; for it was in this commentary that the world of letters was first made acquainted with some portions of that valuable relic. The anxiety which these extracts stimulated for a completer publication was gratified by Gronovius in the eleventh volume of his magnificent *Thesaurus of Greek Antiquities*, (published separately in 1706 by Chr. Wolff.) This composition consists of a remarkably clear compendium of the doctrines and successions of Grecian philosophy; and, though written, as the introduction declares, as preliminary to a confutation of some of the more philosophical heresies of the time, is free from exaggeration and misstatement to a degree not always observable in

Philosophumena
attributed
to Origen.

⁶ [It may seem superfluous to inform the reader that Origen's claim to the authorship of this treatise is now waived in favour of his contemporary, Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus. The *Philosophumena* is the introductory book of a larger work in ten books, entitled *Against all Heresies*, (usually quoted under the title *Confutatio Hæresium*.) Of these ten the last seven were discovered nearly entire in 1842, and were edited in 1851 by a Frenchman, M. Miller, under the auspices of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press. The newly-discovered books are very rich in quotations, and contain some new and interesting fragments of the earlier philosophers. The fidelity with which such passages are cited often contrasts somewhat ludicrously with the forced interpretation put upon them by the author, the object of whose treatise is to show that the Christian heretics were indebted for their doctrines to pagan authors. See Bernays's *Epistola Critica*, appended to the 4th volume of Bunsen's *Hippolytus and his Age*. Ed.]

the references to pagan philosophy by the champions of our early Christianity. The ascription of it to Origen is attended with many difficulties. In the outset the author *seems* to claim the honours of the episcopal office, which we know Origen never possessed. Speaking of the apostolic spirit, he says, ὧν ἡμεῖς διαδόχοι τυγχάνοντες τῆς τε αὐτῆς χάριτος μετέχοντες, ἀρχιερατείας⁷ τε καὶ διδασκαλίας, καὶ φρουροὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας λελογισμένοι, &c. It is, however, barely possible that (as Gronovius, who, as well as our own Pearson, advocates its Origenian descent, holds) the author may *not* have meant the highest order of the Christian ministry by these expressions; and certainly no other candidate has been shown—Epiphanius, Ætius, Didymus, &c.—whose claims are at all more plausible than those of the learned catechist of Alexandria, to whom the manuscripts collated by Gronovius were unanimous in ascribing it.

Epiphanius.

The Epiphanius who has just been mentioned has himself presented us with an abridged view of the Greek philosophy; and I may add, that the Christian Fathers in general (due allowance being made for their own strong prejudices against the theories they undertook to state) will be found an opulent source of information on many points connected with the subject of our present researches, more particularly the Alexandrian Clement, Eusebius, Lactantius, Origen, and Augustine.

The Christian Fathers.

I have now nearly exhausted the scanty store of our ancient authorities. Philostratus and Eunapius consecrated their labours to the Neo-platonic school; and the latter⁸ wrote a work still

Philostratus and Eunapius.

⁷ [The meaning of this word is fixed by Tertullian, as quoted by Dr. Wordsworth in his well-reasoned treatise on this subject:—"Dandi baptismum jus habet *Summus sacerdos*, qui est *Episcopus*." *De Bapt.* c. 17. Ed.]

⁸ [Philostratus also wrote *Lives of the Sophists*. This book, which is

extant, under the title of *Lives of the Sophists*. A very beautiful edition of this collection was published in 1822 by Boissonade, (at Amsterdam,) with vast critical aids and illustrations. Eunapius belonged to the latter period of the school, and furnishes some curious specimens of its extravagances. Athenæus, though a libeller in whom confidence can scarcely be placed, will deserve to be consulted, as well as the fragmentary notices of Aulus Gellius and Macrobius. *Athenæus, Aulus Gellius, and Macrobius.* The fifth century gives us the physical and ethical selections of Stobæus, of which, themselves *Stobæus.* fragments, we possess but fragments. The edition of Prof. Heeren, published at Göttingen in 1792 and 1801, though I have not myself seen it, I have heard from high authority so abundantly praised that I cannot hesitate to direct to it your notice. In earlier times the prison-hours of the illustrious Grotius were consoled by critical labours upon the same precious text. Beyond these I know not that I can offer you any further material guidance except Hesychius's treatise of the sixth,⁹ the *Myriobiblion* of Photius, of the ninth, and the Lexicon of Suidas belonging to the tenth century.¹⁰ That confused, though with all its faults valuable, repertory may be considered as the last¹¹

valuable to the historian of Literature, and also, though in a less degree, to the historian of Philosophy, is best read in Kayser's Edition, Heidelb., 1838.]

⁹ [Hesychius of Miletus (*temp.* Justinian) wrote a short treatise *περὶ τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ διαλαμπάντων σοφῶν*, which has been edited by Orelli, Leipz., 1820. The work is in great part a mere abridgment of Laertius, and has, in its turn, been largely used by Suidas. Some notices it contains which, according to Orelli, are not to be found elsewhere. Ep.]

¹⁰ [The date of Suidas is uncertain. Many additions seem to have been made to the original Lexicon, some of which refer to events in the *eleventh* century. Ep.]

¹¹ [We must except the Commentary of Eustathius, who lived late in the *twelfth* century. Ep.]

existing depository of genuine and original classical learning; in that gloomy age the primal light expires, and the next generation arises in the dim reflected beams of exposition, criticism, and collation of the past.¹²

From this slight sketch of the amount of our ancient originals (the primary materials for our researches) you will easily perceive that their real extent is not great. Probably to many of you this conclusion will come with some surprise. When these authorities meet you repeatedly cited in their diversity of editions on the crowded margins of learned treatises of various kinds, they acquire an illusive multiplicity. They seem to increase in actual quantity and number, as light appears to do by repeated reflections. It will at least be some compensation for the regret we feel at remembering the irreparable loss of so many interesting sources of thought as time, and war, and accident, and barbarism, and bigotry, have destroyed, if a knowledge of the limited extent of our real possessions lead you to contemplate the prospect of surveying them without the vulgar dread of being wholly lost in the labyrinth.

This enumeration does not comprise the sources of Oriental Philosophy.

You will have observed that in this list I have almost exclusively confined myself to classical authorities. My reason has been, not at all that these are our *only* means of attaining a conception of some of those philosophies which the Greeks termed Barbaric, but that the native authorities are of so wholly distinct a character, that to have enumerated them in a common catalogue

¹² [In this enumeration of ancient sources, the Greek commentators on Aristotle should have been mentioned. Some of them, as Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who lived in the second and third, and Simplicius, who died in the sixth century of the Christian era, take very high rank among secondary authorities. Ep.]

would only tend to confusion. You will easily separate the general body of authorities into the natural division which sets on one side the works themselves of the philosophers, and on the other the details regarding them or their doctrines preserved in the writings of others. Now, it is with the latter I have principally engaged you, (the former being too obvious to require specification,) and of the latter it may be said, with almost equal truth, that *all* Eastern philosophy belongs to it, (as professing principally to record traditional dogmas,) or that *none* does. In either case, these Oriental sources are separated from the purpose and matter of our late enumeration,—in the former view of their position, as being only apparently not really historical, in the latter, as being neither one nor the other. We shall therefore reserve them for brief notice when the philosophy whose condition we are to trace by them shall come under inspection.

*Reason of
this.*

You will also perceive, from the nature of the works we have cited, that the idea of a *philosophical* history of philosophy does not appear to have ever come before the mind of the ancient speculatists with any thing of the distinctness and force it has assumed of late years. A mere abstract of tenets, without connection or order, without any enlightened attempt to harmonize apparent contradictions, by detecting the secret unity that reconciles them, (or, what is scarcely less valuable, by detecting the principle of the error,) without any comparison of analogous doctrines in different systems, without any investigation of the occasional influences of external circumstances, as political constitutions and crises, climates, habits of life,—and, still more, without any attempt to trace the march of reason itself amid all the variety of its forms and dresses,—this detached unorganized enumeration seems to have been the highest conception which the ancients possessed of a

*Defects of
the ancient
histories of
Philosophy.*

history of philosophy. And yet it would be unjust to the memory of one great man to omit the following striking passage from Hippocrates. "It is a useful study," says that acute and comprehensive thinker, "to contemplate with attention the progress of arts and sciences, and to seek carefully why it was that certain views and experiments have not succeeded in public estimation when they really deserved success, and why others have obtained celebrity without any genuine claim to it. Was it chance? Then *such* a chance would deserve deep investigation."* In this suggestion you recognise the *spirit* which should animate a general history of opinions, and a *direct* annunciation of one important branch of it. We shall presently see how these conceptions of the illustrious physician were revived in a form still more substantial and definite among the *desideranda* of Lord Bacon. As to the great leaders of the Grecian mind who have exercised so vast an empire over subsequent ages,—the Platos and Aristotles,—they were too busy in fortifying their own edifices of speculation to bestow any real attention upon the laws of progressive advancement before and around them, even if a mass of *experience* had been collected adequate to justify positive conclusions. I should rather have expected this class of inquiries to have originated among the erudite professors of Alexandria; and *is* it quite certain that in this respect time has not robbed us of some portion of our literary inheritance? However this may be, the great revolution of that age must have soon occupied and absorbed the attention of all speculative men; and it did, we know, ultimately exercise on pagan philosophy an influence that hurried it off into a strange supramundane region, which

* I owe this quotation to M. Dégérando, (in his pretty, not profound, *Histoire Comparée*,) [t. i. p. 118, where, however, no reference is given. Ed.]

afforded indeed some of its most striking *experiences* to the history of philosophy, but was exceedingly unfavourable to the cultivation of that study itself.

It becomes now my duty to present you with some notices of the bibliography of our subject as cultivated by the erudition of modern ages.

Modern bibliography of the subject.

I confess, however, that I altogether despair of communicating an idea at once clear and copious of the literature of this vast department, within the limits of time to which a lecture, to retain any hold on the memory, must necessarily be restricted. I am not ashamed to add, that for a *complete* account of this enormous aggregate of learning (itself no small library, and every day gathering new contributions) I cannot pretend to be qualified. Many of these voluminous performances of the last fifty or sixty years I have never seen and never expect to see; many more I have now and then found occasion to refer to, and can only estimate from the degree of familiarity such transitory acquaintanceship permits. Notwithstanding this, I think I may venture to promise that I can make you acquainted, without much danger of material error, with at least the *principal* stages and monuments of the progress of the study. The occasion requires no more.

In that great reformation of the direction of thought which will forever make the fifteenth century one of the most interesting in the history of humanity, the *rediscovery of classical literature* performed a leading part. It is of course unnecessary to dwell upon the immediate historical causes of this event: they are familiarly known to you all. While the scholastic doctors of the West were proud to devote their labours to illustrate the dark dogmas of a spurious or disguised Aristotle, consecrating their inexhaustible perseverance to the embellishment of an image whose faint and false copy of the great original came to them

Period of the revival of letters produced no histories of Philosophy.

through the double and distorting medium of Hebrew translated from Arabic translations,—the literati of the Grecian empire,—such men as Michael Psellus the historian, Eustratius, Metochites, were still enabled to study, along with the other remains of classical literature, the profound and pregnant purport of the Stagyrte in his and their native tongue. But the Ottoman cloud long impending over the city of Constantine at length discharged its thunders; and the new occupant of the throne of the Comneni and Palæologi had little value for a knowledge which had not enabled its possessors to preserve their freedom, and which he found to be in them but too consistent with such habits of servility as his ruder barbarian philosophy had dignity enough to despise. Accordingly, the men of letters fled the beautiful capital of the East, ever since lost to Christendom, and brought with them the precious deposit of ages to the shores of Italy. The desolation of the East forced on the civilization of the West. Venice, Milan, above all, the brilliant commercial democracy of Florence with its Medici, received and welcomed them. I have not time to enlarge. Suffice it to say, the interpretation of antiquity became the passion of the time. Above all, its philosophy attracted attention, and the conciliation of its doctrines with the tenets of the Church became the chosen task of the chief writers of the South of Europe. This might be deemed a probable period for the prosecution of the *history* of Philosophy. Far from it. This was but the *infancy* of the modern European mind,—a mighty infancy indeed, but still an infancy, and *dependent*. And the conception of the History of Philosophy belongs not to such a state, but to the highest and most practised vigour of the adult intellect. Besides, these venerated relics (like those of their sanctuaries) were for a time too profoundly revered to be subjected to the rude grasp of the historical dissector. But towards preparing at a

distance the materials for future edifices, much, doubtless, was done. Detached dissertations, abstracts, enumerations, analyses, soon abounded. The struggle which necessarily arose between the disciples of the recovered Aristotle and the recovered Plato added earnestness, and therefore vigour and value, to these labours. As this active warfare proceeded, among other critics of the progress of past and present thought, the learned Spaniard Ludovicus Vives—from the year of the discovery of America—held a distinguished place. His treatise *De Causis Corruptarum Artium* (1531) contains thoughts which three centuries have not deprived of freshness. Another of his writings, *De Initiiis, Sectis, et laudibus Philosophorum*, is more directly connected with our subject. Nothing of the kind in that age is, I believe, beyond it; but it is *not* beyond its age. Books on the same subject I have seen cited under the names of Chytræus and Frisius, and dating in this sixteenth century; but, as I have never seen the originals, I cannot venture any judgment regarding them. It is quite certain, however, that nothing was directly contributed to the real history of Philosophy, as a systematic study, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, worthy to delay its pupils in the nineteenth. The labours of this period were distinct, detached, preparatory.* Philosophy was not yet ripe for her own history: she had too vast a part to play in the coming age to find time or inclination as yet for reflecting on the laws of her own movements.

*Sixteenth
century.
Ludovicus
Vives, &c.*

We arrive at the seventeenth century,—the century whose earlier years were illumined by Bacon and Descartes, whose later period was filled with

*Seventeenth
century.*

* Such (for example) as Telesius's account of the philosophy of Parmenides; Patricius's *Dissensiones Peripateticæ*, still considered of high authority; Melancthon's *Physics of Aristotle*; Lipsius's Stoical treatises, &c.

the fame of Malebranche, Leibnitz, Newton, and Locke.

*Bacon's
idea of a
History of
Philoso-
phy.*

Bacon, whose comprehensive and creative intelligence let few of the *possibilities* of human science pass, has marked with great force and beauty the proper characters of a history of this kind,—not perhaps its highest characters, but characters such as sufficiently separate his *prospectus* from any thing that had been realized before his age. I allude to the description of the History of Letters which you will find in the fourth chapter of the second book of his treatise *De Augmentis*,* and to another important passage in the fourth chapter of the third book of the same work, on the construction of a proper collection of the *Placita*, or Cosmological Determinations of the Ancient Philosophy. I must now be content with a mere reference; but I hope hereafter to draw your attention to the passages themselves.

I will now proceed to enumerate, for your direction and assistance, the writers upon this extensive subject who appear most to deserve your notice,—beginning about the middle of the seventeenth century. To those who are not really interested in the attainment of accurate knowledge, such a catalogue must appear insufferably tedious, even though abbreviated to the compass which my present time necessitates; but, as I will not presume that any of my auditory are of these superficial habits, I make no apology for descending to being useful. I can only say that such a sketch would have been to myself invaluable at the outset of my boyish studies; and I can easily believe there are others similarly circumstanced. The object *here* is, not to find authors, for they are innumerable; but to select a few whose value can be warranted, and which are not very difficult of attainment.

* See Dégérando, tome i. p. xii. &c.

The great philosophical movement of the seventeenth century acted upon minds according to their previous intellectual habits and constitution. While it urged the more ambitious and less laborious to attempt achieving for themselves a name in the records of the history of reason, it turned the labours of the critic into the *construction* of such a history; philosophy now being, each day more and more, forcibly vindicating to itself a right equal to that of military or imperial glory, to the possession of its Livys and its Tacituses. However, as the Livys and the Tacituses must be preceded by the humbler diligence of chroniclers and annalists, you must not be surprised if we *commence* by the collectanea of our own Stanley, (the first edition dates 1655, the second dates 1687,) under the title of a *History of Philosophy*. But Stanley's miscellany is rather a commonplace-book of anecdotes and extracts than a history. It was translated long after, in 1711, into Latin, and illustrated with notes and other additions, which render the translated form (as I understand) much superior to the original.* The book, regarded in the light in which I have presented it to you, is of real value; bringing together an immense assemblage of detached materials, and not the less valuable, doubtless, for being totally without connection or system,—a task for which in its perfection, perhaps, the age was not adequate,—assuredly not the author; and the attempt to effect which would only have led to perversion, suppression, or distortion. In the year 1658 the work of Gerard John Vossius, *De Philosophia et Philosophorum sēctis*,
G. J. Vossius.
 was published by his son. It bears many marks of the great learning and ability of its compiler, many marks also of being a posthumous performance. Its author's

* Let us not, however, refuse to our countryman the honour of being the *first* extensive collector of the stores of antiquity.

name has added more celebrity to it than it has added to the name of its author. The treatise of Duhamel, the predecessor of Fontenelle, *De Consensu Veteris et Novæ Philosophiæ*, belongs to the year 1663. The writings of De Launoy, of the Sorbonne, which are many and various, will be found valuable for occasional reference, especially to those who are anxious to investigate the literary history of the Middle Ages. A very learned but very fanciful work of the same period may be read with some advantage

if read with great caution,—Theophilus Gale's *Court of the Gentiles*, 1677, and his other works,—the collection called *Opuscula*, &c. It was the fashion of his age and school to discover in the law and history of Moses the primal fountains of all speculative knowledge; a project which, however well intended, has ever seemed to me (apart from its actual fallacy) exceedingly ill judged. Its practical result will ever be, not at all so much to exalt the majesty of the Jewish revelation as to elevate uninspired writings to an equality with it in point of authority; and thus, while increasing its absolute, to diminish its comparative, dignity. And such precisely was the result in the similar attempts upon *Platonism* by Mirandula and others at the revival of letters. Christianity was the apparent, but Plato was the real, gainer by the alliance. Very different in its value and authority is the great work of Cudworth, which was published in the following year, 1678. *The Intellectual System* (waiving a few peculiarities which detach without much difficulty from the body of the work) is of inestimable value to the careful student of philosophical doctrines. "He launched out," says one whose learning was worthy to praise Cudworth, "into the immensity of the Intellectual System, and at his first essay penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip atheism of its disguises,

Duhamel.
De Lau-
noy.

Gale, Court
of the Gen-
tiles.

Cudworth.
Intellectual
System.

and drag up the lurking monster into day." (Warburton, *Div. Leg.*, Pref. to books iv., v., vi.) You will, if possible, accompany Cudworth with the learned notes of Mosheim. To pass from the English to the Gallican Church,—the *Evangelical Demonstration* of Huet, *Huet.* 1679, (which is easily attainable,) contains a vast treasury of ancient learning in this department. Huet is to be read with much the same precautions as that Eusebius whose title perhaps he affected to imitate; that is to say, with due and constant allowance for the writer's own opinions and prejudices. The subtle historical skepticism, and the research equally extensive and minute, of the Dictionary of Bayle, (1697,) *Bayle.* gave a powerful impulse to all inquiries into the history of opinions. It has many faults, some repulsive and some dangerous; but it will ever occupy a prominent place in the history of letters, as first exemplifying on a vast scale that union of positive learning and keen inquiry which, if it has sometimes led to consequences unhappy and unjustifiable, is also the source of every thing practically valuable in the knowledge of the past.

In 1705 was published (a posthumous work too) the *History of the Various Fortunes of Metaphysics*, of James Thomasius,—a performance *Eighteenth century.* *Thomasius.* which judges of some weight seem to consider as forming almost an epoch in this study. Many important and pregnant remarks scattered through the writings of Leibnitz were gradually leading to notions more profound of the science of philosophical history; though the time was not yet arrived for attempting the realization of such views. Can we say that *our own* age has seen more than the *attempt*? I must not suffer the brief history of jurisprudence of Heineccius, 1718, *Heineccius.* nor even the invaluable *Bibliotheca Græca* of Fabricius, 1805-28, (to which all subsequent *Fabricius.*

writers, without exception, gratefully acknowledge their obligations,) nor the History, now forgotten, of Des Landes, (1730-36,) to detain me from introducing you

at once to the vast achievement of Brucker, a

Brucker.

work which alone is a library, and which must ever be the groundwork of all histories of Philosophy. The first volume appeared in 1742, having been preceded (as in most of the historians of Philosophy) by many detached dissertations; among the rest, a *History of Ideas*, of great research and value, which appeared in 1723. It would be impossible to exaggerate the

*Character
of his his-
tory.*

patience, the care, and the unaffected honesty with which Brucker has executed his immense task. His own maxim he undeviatingly followed:—

“Quærendi sunt fontes, ubi haberi possunt, proximi.”

With a diligence truly German, he has explored the biography of philosophers as well as their doctrines; and it would be difficult to name a circumstance concerning either transmitted to us from antiquity, which the indefatigable industry of Brucker has not gathered into the vast granary of his six quartos. But the results of this industry are too vast for ordinary appetites or ordinary digestion; and Brucker will ever be regarded rather as the encyclopedist than the historian of philosophy. He is referred to by all who cultivate an accurate knowledge of ancient reason; he is revered as the true father of the critical history of philosophy; he is, I can truly affirm, plundered unmercifully by the dealers in borrowed erudition, (witness the *Encyclopédie*, whose articles on ancient philosophy are simply Brucker served up in epigrams;) but it is probable that the author himself of this great digest is the only person who has ever read his work consecutively. To trace the subtle influences of ages and climes, to reduce to their laws the complicated efforts of intelligence, if destined for *any* age, was certainly not for Brucker's;

and perhaps, even after his learned, comprehensive, and most admirable performance, the world did not still possess more than the materials for the history of Philosophy.

To the well-known work of Montesquieu it is probable that the higher conceptions of this study which have since arisen may trace, if not their origin, at least their growth and vigour. The *Spirit of Laws* was a work prolific of works to come. The main ideas—the influence of circumstances upon development, and the possibility of classifying the starting varieties of political history under the simpler laws of human nature—admitted so natural an application to the kindred varieties presented in the history of reason, that we might feel surprise if such essays had *not* been suggested and attempted. It was for a Frenchman to generalize the external relations of humanity; to the German mind we should look for the transference of the design to its internal development. And yet, though many detached works were produced which manifested the commencement of the fermentation,—innumerable dissertations on the *Idea of the History of Philosophy*, on its rules, design, utility,—a long period intervened before a vigorous attempt was made to realize these exalted conceptions. Meanwhile, in France the writings and the influence of Condillac, the most arbitrary and exclusive of all speculatists, were little calculated to foster the catholicity of philosophical spirit which alone can qualify for the honest and temperate survey of the long story of human reason. His own *Traité de Systèmes*, and similar sketches, are not histories, but arguments, not the statements of a judge, but of an advocate. The school of which Condillac was the metaphysical oracle was still less qualified for this work. To an exclusive philosophy they added the bigotry of irreligion; accepting miscellaneously all

Montesquieu: indirect influence of his *Spirit of Laws*.

Condillac. Anti-historical spirit of his opinions.

historical conclusions, however mutually destructive, from which arguments could be extorted unfavourable to the Jewish and Christian revelations, and, with the arrogance of ignorance, affecting to despise every other.

Condorcet. The *Esquisse* of Condorcet, which Dégérando praises, seems to me to be deficient in every requisite which could confer value upon such a work.

Goguet. I have, however, pleasure in recommending the learned treatise of the President Goguet, on the *Origin of Laws, Arts, and Sciences*. It first appeared

in 1758. The beautifully-written dissertation of D'Alembert prefixed to the French *Encyclopédie* will, like almost every thing from the pen of that

exquisite artist of style, reward perusal; but in it, as in all the writings of that period, the ambition of the writer injures the precision of the investigator; and a brilliant epigram is often the Procrustes' bed to which truth must submit to fit herself or be rejected. After many preliminary labours,—those for instance of Meiners

Tiedemann. and Gurlitt, the great work of Tiedemann appeared in Germany. It was published from 1791 to 1797. The title—*The Spirit of Speculative Philosophy*—sufficiently indicates the superiority of its historical design to the performances we have been considering. Tiedemann was a disciple of the philosophy of Locke;¹² and his views, it is admitted, strongly colour his historical conclusions. Tennemann,

Tennemann, a Kantian. who was a Kantian, soon followed. Superior perhaps to Tiedemann in learning, he was also, like him, encumbered by exclusive loyalty to his philosophical master. His voluminous history was published in detached volumes from 1798 to 1820.

Buhle. Buhle's History appeared in 1800. I know nothing of it, except from some severe and, it

¹² [Qu. of Leibnitz? Ed.]

must be allowed, just criticisms of Dugald Stewart upon its representations of the later philosophy of Britain. Indeed, in every statement which I make of the value or importance of *untranslated* German works, I must request you to make deductions answerable to my very imperfect acquaintance with that most arduous and peculiar language. There *is*, however, a French translation of Buhle. Dégérando's *Comparative History* appeared in 1804, and was republished under a much-improved form in 1821. It is easily accessible, and, if not very profound, is always pleasing, amiable, equitable, and unaffected. You do not require to be reminded of the admirable Fragments of the immortal Adam Smith, edited by our late and lamented Dugald Stewart; nor of that excellent philosopher's own Dissertation, which no one will neglect who cultivates the modern history of European reason. Finally, we arrive at Ritter and V. Cousin. Ritter is always learned, often original, often also capricious: Cousin, whose history of *ancient* philosophy is only brief and introductory, is vivid, systematic, sweeping, and eloquent. But the long period I have now detained you warns me to cease. Detailed criticism upon these latter writers is indeed the less necessary, as their general views of the method and object of scientific history will appear in some degree represented in my next Lecture, when I shall endeavour to lay before you my views of the ideal and the prospects of the genuine History of Philosophy.

*Nineteenth
century.
Dégérando.*

*Adam
Smith's
Fragments.*

*Dugald
Stewart.*

*Ritter and
Cousin.*

LECTURE II.

ON DEFINITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, AND ON THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTIONS OF A HISTORIAN OF PHILOSOPHY.

GENTLEMEN:—

*Definition
of "Philosophy."
The Science
of Principles.*

IN commencing to speak of the History of Philosophy, we may be asked what we mean by "Philosophy." Let us say then that philosophy is the science of principles,—of the principles eminently of knowledge and action. This will probably serve for a definition as precise and comprehensive as any other, to those who require or value one. A logical

*Questionable value
of such preliminary
definitions.*

definition is not, however, of much consequence in opening our present subject, or any subject which explains and limits itself in the course of detail. Students of the History of Philosophy will be sure to form their own definition, ideal or verbal, in the presence of facts. They will insensibly add, subtract, modify, as circumstances direct. It is thus indeed that, child and man, we gather all our ideas of the significance of our own language; experience is our prompter; and what living experience does for us, history will not fail to do, which is the image of experience. Indeed, if I were to govern myself by those who have already treated this subject at large, I should

*They are
frequently
found inadequate,
and so
transgressed.*

be warned to beware of definitions. The majority of their performances commence with these formal designations of the nature and limits of the subject; and I have generally observed that either the definition is inadequate, and afterwards fortunately transgressed, or that this prefatory outline is so vast, not to say indistinct, as never to

be filled up in the execution of the work. Among the ancients, as Philosophy signified the pursuit of knowledge in all its forms, (for in the infancy of science, as in that of art, the division of labour is not known,) the history of philosophy would have been the history of *every* effort after the attainment of information. Among modern authors, although there is little fear of this confusion, although philosophy stands clearly apart from the brilliant array of her subject-sciences, yet this very remoteness and loftiness of separation seems to leave the great object scarcely defined in the distance: each speculator is enabled to see it, not as it is, but as he would have it; and the shadowy form of "Philosophy" resembles that magical apparition in the Faust of Goethe, in which each of a thousand beholders recognises only the image of his own beloved. The excellent Brucker, whose habits of intellect were simple, straightforward, and practical, finds in philosophy the science of *happiness*. It is, says he, at the opening of his great repository of learning, "*Studium sapientiæ*;" and "*sapientia*" is "*solida cognitio veritatis circa eas res quæ ad veram hominis felicitatem faciunt, et ad usum et praxin applicari possunt.*" This partial and limited view of philosophy could scarcely have been expected from a pupil of either of *his* masters, Descartes or Leibnitz. But if Brucker lean too much to the practical purposes of philosophical inquiry, his more modern countrymen seem to incline with an equally undue bias to the speculative. Philosophy is defined by Tennemann "*the efforts of reason to realize the idea of science according to the primary laws of nature and liberty.*" With Jacobi* it is

Wide meaning of "Philosophy" among the ancients.

Modern attempts at definition.

That of Brucker;

of Tennemann;

of Jacobi.

* I take this (of Jacobi) *not* from actual perusal.

"the science of determinate connection independent of experience." And with all the creative and profound thinkers who have risen out of the fragments of the Kantian school, the same tendency is more or less manifested. Possessed, absorbed, by the great question of the value of human reason, they can scarcely admit the title of any philosophical discussion which does not ultimately flow into these depths of thought. Restlessly agitated by the desire to penetrate these august sanctuaries of man, of nature, and of Deity, they coldly turn aside from the slow and scanty conclusions of mere experience: they have no real sympathy but with those who, like themselves, would prefer winging their dim way forever over an illimitable ocean, to taking shelter in the ark of a more timid philosophy, though it could show in its little compass a specimen of all that the daily world possessed. Better, they think it, to hope for those things than to possess these!

Historians of Philosophy, however, must have no predilections, and therefore no exclusive definitions. The world of thought is vaster than any system, and no school that the world has yet seen is fitted to constitute itself the arbitrary judge of all. When Buffon styled himself a mind equal to the majesty of nature, he assumed a title which not only no individual, but no class of individuals, is competent to arrogate. And in this study, as one of the most valuable of its practical advantages is the liberation from exclusive prejudices, it would be peculiarly unfortunate to *commence* by sacrificing to one which would vitiate the entire course of investigation.

The historian of Philosophy has no right to adapt its definition to the peculiarities of a system.

Considering, then, "Philosophy" in its widest significancy, as the "Science of Principles," and freely allowing you to interpret the definition in proportion to your knowledge of the subject, I shall proceed to consider the nature, plan,

Conditions of a perfect History of Philosophy investigated.

and requisitions of a perfect history of its progress. My subsequent Lectures will be far, indeed, from realizing the ideal thus sketched; but they may occasionally assist you towards conceiving how it *might* be realized. And I am not without hopes that hereafter, when the plan of these courses shall allow me to descend into minuter details, I may, by extending the History of Philosophy over several successive terms, present you with labours less unworthy so great an object.

When an ordinary observer *first* contemplates the vast mass of thought regarding the great problems of nature, humanity, and God,—which exists either actually in the mouths and minds of living men, or in the state of written record,—there is (we may conceive) scarcely any perception of distinction, either in source or aspect, between any of its mingled materials. He perceives, indeed, plainly enough, the diversity of subjects and solutions that lie before him. He sees that there is scarcely a corner of the human mind or its concerns which the light of inquiry has not visited, and on which some verdict, or a variety of verdicts, may not be discovered. He sees that the same verdict reappears in different ages, and in different forms, and in different countries; and he remembers that many important *practical* developments have been contemporary with these various opinions, and contemporary too with their recurrence; and he suspects, perhaps, a relation deeper than any accidental synchronism between these two orders of phenomena. He cannot also fail to remark at any given age the difference in the rate of progress of co-existing nations, all nevertheless pursuing the same path with different velocities, and in a kind of successive order; so that the state of the intellectual world reminds him of that of the physical, where at the same

The Phenomena of the Intellectual World at first sight seem to defy analysis.

instant one country is at its midnight, another in its opening morn, another in that noon beyond which it ceases to ascend, another, again, in its evening decline, and all succeeding all. In some quarters, too, he sees, or seems to see, isolated fragments of speculation or belief, that appear wholly disconnected from all around them in space of time; for which he cannot discover any origin or any posterity, which seem, like the mystical patriarch, "without father, without mother, without descent." Here, by slow gradations, a people climb, from stage to stage, to opinions which seem to satisfy their intellectual wants; there, a single powerful and comprehensive thinker seems to hold in himself the philosophic destinies of centuries, yet even *he* often as much creature as creator, often rather the gifted interpreter of the vague conjectures and unformed conceptions of his age, than the sole explorer of the truths on which—their editor even more than their author—his name is inseparably inscribed. He sees beneath him a mighty and fluctuating mass, the collected result of an enormous expenditure of human thought, or the product of some external influence, or the combination of both. But a mist rests upon the scene; and as yet he discerns little further: except, indeed, it may be the prominence of a few stately structures which in various points of the intellectual landscape out-top the misty cloud that hangs upon the rest. In their *outward form*, too, how various is the aspect of these myriad tribes of sentiment and opinion! Sometimes they stand in panoply of proof at the close of a long file of deductions, armed at all points and defying all assailants; sometimes they meet us in august but broken fragments, the *torsos* of gigantic systems, all whose other members have forever perished, (thus, the relics of the *Eleatic* doctrine;) sometimes in vague aspirations where reasoning seems to have as it were evaporated in desires, fears, hopes;

sometimes, again, in the form of dogmas imperative and decided, not condescending to acknowledge the support of a reason on which they profess their right of enforcing terms and prescribing limitations. In their *style and temper*, the same diversity. In one teacher, the calmness of self-assured superiority; in another, the calmness of humble conviction; in a third, the restless energy of anxious proselytism; in a fourth, the absence of all character, in the cold strength of simple argument; in a fifth, a sixth, a seventh, severe and caustic bitterness,—that most melancholy of all spectacles,—the comrades who are embarked in the common vessel of human destiny, and under the common pressure of the tempest of human affliction, wasting the few hours allotted to each in contests, not for the priority of service, but for the reputation of it, for the name of strength where none are strong.

Now, the true object of a true philosophical history is to reduce this vast aggregate to the methodical unity of system; to classify its varieties, and to detect (as far as may be possible) the laws of their manifestation and their recurrence. It is in a manner the psychology of the human race, and undertakes to do *that* for the principles that lie hid in the stores of the universal mind, which ordinary psychology undertakes to do for those which regulate the development of an individual. In this aspect alone it rises to the dignity of a science, and, if completely realized, would assuredly assume rank among the highest of all.

And, as a first (and remote) approximation to the great work of system, we shall distribute that vast course of human thought which I have described into *three distinct* streams, which in *fact* are constantly united, but which philosophical analysis will easily separate. However blended be these currents of thought, you will have no difficulty in considering that

First approximation to a classification.

all meditations, beliefs, convictions, manifest themselves under the distinct forms, *first*, of *irreflective* conceptions, the unlaboured product of the mind, without any definite act of attention or clear notion of the object in view; *secondly*, of *reflective* conceptions, the produce of a direct search for truth, accompanied by a perfect act of attention, and a notion more or less determinate of the object of inquiry; and *thirdly*, of *revealed* conceptions, coming altogether from an external source, and in which the mind of man is, and knows itself to be, merely recipient. These classes, especially the first and second, it is not always easy to separate in real history, so as at once to reduce any intellectual phenomenon to its proper place; but in conception they are not less individually distinct from each other than together inclusive of the whole extent of human thought.

Now, to which of these divisions belongs Philosophy and its History? The question is of some importance, because much confusion has arisen from misunderstanding, or not permanently preserving in force, the proper answer. In the history (as far as we can penetrate it) of those ancient movements of national intellect which have *eventuated* in Philosophy, reason rises into action, as generally from some external impulse, so without, for a considerable period, any distinct conception of the objects of its inquiry or the limitations of its powers. Now, with this period the History of Philosophy, properly conceived, has no more *direct* concern than the physiology of human motion, in its perfect gracefulness, could have with the vague gropings of a wanderer in the dark. Again, these movements of mind in almost all the early distributions of the human family are found connected with professed revelations from heaven, (a strong presumption, I may observe, in favour of some original reality;) and

With the first and third class Philosophy and its history are not concerned.

with the web of these revelations it is that the first vague conceptions of the independent mind are found to be inextricably interwoven. That is to say, the first and third of our distributions, either apart or together, are those out of which the philosophical history of every country, in its primal development, is found to emerge. But these stages, though preliminary to philosophy, are not philosophy. Now, our men of erudition, whose tendency is always to estimate every element of learning in the compound proportion of its antiquity and its difficulty of access, by constantly including this species of undefined contemplation in their notion of Philosophy, have consequently been led to include it in their *histories* of Philosophy; and thus have detained and perplexed their readers with speculations not only unprofitable, but absolutely irrelevant to their true subject, respecting the "Philosophy" (as they term it) of ages in which we have no reason to believe that any conception of systematic inquiry, or even of systematic hypothesis, was ever attained.

Philosophy, then, belongs (and solely belongs) to the *second* division of human thought. It *can* commence only when reflection has commenced, as a conscious and independent exercise of the faculties : more particularly regarded, it begins when men, in any age or country, have for the first time proposed to themselves (by analyzing the principles of their own reason and their past experience, whatever that may have been) to render a satisfactory account of themselves, of the universe around them, of that great Being who governs both, and of the precise relations in which these terms are connected with each other. The first beginnings of these studies will of course be feeble, partial, and changeable; but wherever the independent use of reason upon them exists, there "Philosophy" exists, and *not except there.*

*Philosophy
begins
where re-
flection be-
gins,*

and consequently its history is the history of reflective thought only. Reflection always preceded by spontaneous action.

Philosophy, then, lies in the exercise of the reflective faculties in the investigation of first principles; and the history of Philosophy is the history of that exercise. A clear conception of this at once abridges our labour and renders it more substantially profitable. In all cases (both

of individuals and of communities, which have so many striking analogies with them) instinctive action precedes reflective analysis; and in some instances the former has been carried to extraordinary perfection, and at length raised to the height of exquisite Art, where the latter has scarcely been ever manifested.

Examples.

Temples are built before architecture is theorized, diseases are healed before physiology is understood, sculpture is perfected before the muscular anatomy is systematized, drawing exists before perspective, poetry before criticism, music before acoustics; and, in like manner, both reason and the moral nature are long in operation before the effort to comprehend them or their objects has truly arisen. There is an instinctive logic, as there is an instinctive gratitude or a natural conscience; but the history of Philosophy should as little commence with these spontaneous developments as the history of *Criticism* should commence with the poems of Homer. On the other hand, the reason (previous to all philosophical development) may be externally and accidentally directed to objects (especially through the channel of religious doctrines) which long afterwards become the objects of genuine speculation; but the sameness of the object no more warrants us in identifying the mental movement towards it, than it would justify us in classing the gaze of the peasant at a planet with the telescopic examination of the same body by the astronomer. It is true, the change from the irreflective or merely recipient to the reflective state may not always be immediately discernible; a portion of every detailed history

of Philosophy will always be justly occupied in fixing the transition; it may be unsuccessful in detecting it, and altogether undecided as to where in this border-land the boundaries of these rival districts should be accurately drawn: the distinction, however, is not the less real between casual and dependent opinion and independent reflective effort, and must in aim and substance be preserved as our only security from confusion and embarrassment.

Having thus, by a general analysis of the mass Subject approached. of human thought, cleared the particular notion of our subject from those adscititious encumbrances with which mistaken diligence has overloaded it, and endeavoured to intimate more precisely its proper scope, (the efforts of self-dependent reason to define its own principles,—those of the moral activity,—those of the universe as a whole,) we may proceed with a better chance of utility and success to a further analysis,—that of the subject itself,—*of Philosophy considered as susceptible of a History.*

In order to obtain a more comprehensive grasp of the subject, we shall do well to approach it gradually and from a distance; first considering (though briefly) the conditions under which all things become appreciable, become matter of historical detail; and then passing into the peculiarities of our immediate question. For in studying the History of Philosophy we may fairly involve the Philosophy of History. Let us begin from the depths of the purely mathematical and purely logical sciences, and rise to the historical or contingent; thus, in their resemblances and contrasts, illustrating each by each.

(a) In all human conceptions of real existences there are two elements logically separable:—the substantial and the circumstantial; the thing itself, and the relations under which it is appre- Preliminary distinctions.

*Substance
and rela-
tion.*

hended. We speak (for example) of That which resists compression and whose points of resistance are spread through space, as of something which really exists, though we can only know of it in that relation to ourselves which is expressed in such a definition. We speak in like manner of That which thinks and feels, as of another distinct substance; though that thinking nature can only apprehend directly what it does, not what it is, and can know what it does only under similar relative or subjective conditions. In the same way, on a grander scale of thought, we may contemplate the whole universe as a vast phenomenon; under which the reason of man, by an inevitable deduction, recognises the absolute necessity of some substantial Being, without the presupposition of which the notion of existence itself involved in every rational assertion would be impossible. This distinction, then, of the substantial and the circumstantial—the absolute and the relative—seems to be involved in the very foundation of human reason.

*The neces-
sary and
the contin-
gent.*

(b) Now, of the circumstantial or relative conditions under which this absolute essence manifests itself to human apprehension, some, it is plain, are mentally necessary, others mentally contingent: that is to say, some are such that to perceive at all we must perceive subject to them; others such, that to suppose them altered would involve no contradiction. Of the former are such conditions as these, that every particular existence must be referred to a definite period of *time*, that every particular existence must be referred to something which *makes it to exist*, &c.; of the latter are such as these, that events should be experienced to exist at one part of time rather than another, that events should be experienced to follow under particular orders of succession rather than any other. The former are known to be certain from mental

necessity; the latter are discovered to exist from actual experience. These two orders of coexisting beliefs, wholly distinct in their nature and origin, are harmonized to each other in the complexity of the human mind by the adapting skill of the great Author of our Being.

To the second of these classes—events in their nature contingent but known to be stable, which forms the domain of the Natural or Inductive Sciences—must be added a third. As we have passed from apprehensions of truths felt to be necessary and immutable, to apprehensions of truths felt to be contingent but fixed, so we now pass from these events contingent but fixed, to events conceived as contingent but unfixed. This third department includes all events, on whatever laws dependent, *which are (and so long as they are) considered as casual or accidental influences and connections.* In this class are, then, involved all facts whose laws of occurrence are either themselves unknown, or are, though partially known, yet suspended upon conditions which are undetermined or indeterminable.

Subdivision of contingent existence into determined and undetermined.

That all the course of human perception consists of apprehensions of these three kinds, it is, I suppose, unnecessary to delay you in establishing. But that which the mind does for nature, the history of knowledge does for the mind itself. It converts the knowledge of truth into itself a *new* truth, and registers the *story* of knowledge as a series of phenomena rich with the most valuable materials for the observation and classification of the inductive inquirer. And this it does under exactly the same circumstantial conditions as we have just seen to be applicable to every other mode of investigation and degree of knowledge. It regards the apprehension or successive apprehensions of truth as themselves mani-

Consciousness is the aggregate of all three classes of apprehensions.

festations (like all else) of that absolute will which as First Cause, that absolute existence which as Prime Substance, sustains the universe; it perceives them as produced in time and through space; it states their ordered succession; and, finally, it notes those accompanying circumstances which, not as yet reduced under definite law, it leaves to future inquirers to methodize and arrange. All history, to be true, must be based upon facts; to be profitable, must be systematized by induction. Let us then briefly examine both, with reference to our subject. Let us no longer speak of history in general, or of the history of knowledge in particular, but of the History of Philosophy especially, as concerns the collection of its facts and the establishment of its laws.

*Application
of these distinctions.
First duty
of the historian of Philosophy:
to trace
the facts
internal as
well as
external of
the history
of opinion.*

(a) As regards, then, the History of *Philosophy*, properly so called: what will be the *elements* of inquiry in the collection of its facts? The first and most natural distribution should be this twofold arrangement. It should, on the one hand, collect and combine the scattered rudiments of pure reflective truth or error in every age, expounding (as far as is at once discernible) their *internal* connection; it should, on the other, trace the interwoven order of circumstantial events which may illustrate their *external* fortunes. That this double line of inquiry is really necessary, as regards the origin and propagation of *error*, will perhaps be readily conceded; but, as concerns the history of *truth*, men are not so promptly inclined to admit its necessity. If truth, when presented to man, must as truth command his assent, from the universal identity of the mental constitution, it is conceived to derogate from the reality and the dignity of truth, to represent its success as dependent on circumstances not inherently connected

*Though
truth is
one, its human
manifestations
are diverse.*

with it. Now it is, indeed, certain that all truths are mutually consistent; that every separate problem, if solvable, has one truth for its solution; and that this truth, if fully and fairly brought before the mind, both as to its grounds and its deductions, must inevitably be known for what it is. But truth, though in itself thus sublimely uniform, does not manifest this uniformity in its apparition among mankind. When it becomes (so to speak) *incarnated* in human history, it suffers the weakness of its position; and that which in its nature is one changeless reality seems to shiver into a thousandfold diversity. The *history* of Truth does not suppose truth itself to be multiple; but it supposes the circumstances, degrees, and aspects of its manifestation to be multiple. It is the office of the science of truth to investigate truth as it is in itself; it is the office of the history of Truth to investigate truth as it appears to man. The one finds real unity in the diversity of things; the other often finds superficial diversity in the unity of truth. And this statement, as it is applicable to all histories of the particular sciences, so is it peculiarly applicable to the history of the science of the first principles of nature and man; which, indeed, is the reason why I have inserted a representation general in its bearing, in this particular division of the subject.

To illustrate this point, (the apparent diversity of real truth,) on which the possibility or utility of a history of Philosophy so much depends, let us venture to classify some of its most general cases.

*Causes of
this diver-
sity.*

Truth, indeed, of all kinds, specially the true theory of man and nature, is *one*. But this single truth (which of course comprehends an extensive series of propositions) may, 1st, be expressed in a diversity of forms; may, 2dly, be joined with a variety of other propositions not evident or not true; may, 3dly, be only partially seen as to greater

or less *degrees* of it; may, 4thly, be seen by different observers in *different* parts exclusively; may, 5thly, (though seen entire as to its actual elements,) be yet so apprehended and stated as to destroy the proportion between the parts and to give undue weight to some. If you conceive the constant application of these formulæ to the fortunes of philosophical truth, you can have no difficulty in perceiving how the actual unity of truth does not at all contradict the possibility of a perpetual diversity of its manifestations.

As to the complete enumeration of facts, then, the history of Philosophy includes the full statement of doctrines held, and the full statement of circumstances influencing their fortunes. And to accomplish this first task of such a history, you will readily perceive, requires no common endowments of industry, of learning, and of critical sagacity. I pass to the second and higher office of the historian of Philosophy,—the establishment of *the laws* that are found to obtain in the reception and diffusion of philosophical opinions.

Secondly, the historian of Philosophy has to determine the laws which regulate the reception and diffusion of opinions.

Now, as we have defined for *the enunciation of facts* the two classes, doctrines and their circumstantial accompaniments, so shall we consider each distinctly in reference to the discovery of the *inductive laws* that (under the ordination of Providence) are found to regulate their successive history and mutual influences.

First, as to doctrines themselves.

The *first* effort of classification is here directed to the reduction of the variety of systems under the smallest attainable number of leading principles. This generalization has been attempted with great boldness and brilliancy by many of the later writers upon this branch of history. An able representation of their views, with many ingenious additions, may be found in the clever

This he accomplishes, first, by classifying the schools of doctrine according to their intrinsic differences:

work of M. C  usin. It is, after all, little more than an amplification of a single passage in the History of Tennemann, itself the result of preceding and protracted dissensions among the German literati. It is impossible, however, not to observe in these systematic statements a tendency to the substitution of *   priori* deduction for experimental *induction*, precisely similar to that which marked the infancy of the physical science of the material world. In *this* study, moreover, the rapidity of the theorist is peculiarly suspicious; because facts can be disguised with peculiar facility, and thence both the historian and his pupil deceived into fancying an account complete where much is supposed or much omitted.* These cautions are not, however, to be considered as detracting from the reality or dignity of the study itself; one which, indeed, in some degree forces itself upon the most ordinary readers of philosophical systems. Of empirical, of rational, of skeptical, of syncretistic, of mystical schools, all men will speak who read to reflect; it is of only the more importance that they should speak of them with perception of their constituent tenets, and correctness of application to particular instances.

The second effort at the establishment of historical laws is directed to the *development* of doctrines in the hands of successive teachers. Of this principle the most general form unquestionably is, that doctrines increase in intensity and exclusiveness in proportion as they are transmitted through a longer series of defenders engaged from conviction or from situation to support them. When the original principles have been altogether exhausted of their consequences, this progression of course ceases; but until then (unless

*secondly,
by tracing
their inter-
nal develop-
ments:*

* A striking instance of this tendency is exhibited in the writings of the celebrated Professor Hegel, of Berlin, who seems to have ventured the conception and execution of an *   priori* history of human knowledge.

externally affected) it continues, the remotest consequences, which are usually the last deduced, being always the most daring and exclusive. For examples, you may recall the Socratic hesitancy heightened into the Academic skepticism; Platonism compared with Neo-platonism; Locke and Condillac; Descartes and Fichte.

*thirdly,
by deter-
mining
their mu-
tual action
and reac-
tion.*

The third class of these laws of the history of Philosophy I would refer to the mutual action and reaction of different systems. The effects—which are well worthy of the deepest inquiry—will be found to be of opposite kinds; that is, to result in either limitation or exaggeration, according to circumstances. A very striking instance of the latter efficacy may be found in the Cynic and Cyrenaic, and their successors, the Stoic and Epicurean, institutes. Of the former the instances, though less definitely observable, are, perhaps, still more constant and more numerous; especially in those whose minds are not prepossessed by professional interest or the enthusiasm of a party.

*Supplemen-
tary obser-
vations.*

To these intimations of some of the guiding-principles of the scientific history of doctrines considered in themselves, I shall add two or three further remarks to exercise your powers of reflection. One shall be, that, in almost all instances of philosophical development, the whole world—its origin and principles and construction and object—has been the *first* subject of human consideration. The reasons are, among others, these:—

*Objective
tendency of
all early
specula-
tions.
Its causes.*

The more constant interest felt in these external objects, on account of their being the great and earliest sources of pleasure and pain. The vast *variety* of outward objects which stimulates curiosity, (minds being nearly the same in all men.) Their differences and resemblances are far more easily detected. They appear far more easily modifiable by human effort; and thus the study seems to promise more valuable results. They admit of far greater

varieties of explanation and hypothesis. The passage from the outward to the inward worlds is usually accomplished by one of three paths: 1st, *Religious belief*; for this, in a manner externalizing the mind itself, (in the conception of a supreme mind or minds,) transforms even the outward tendency into a mental one. 2d, Logical disputation or skepticism, which forces the examination of the principles of reason. (This agent is remarkable in the transition to the Socratic age in Greece.) 3d, The discussion, even though it be only the practical discussion, of general *morals*. (This influence is remarkable in the transition *from* the Socratic teaching to that which succeeded it.)

Transition from the outward to the inward effected in three ways.

Another remark for your consideration is this, illustrative of the last: that the external world is scarcely ever at first considered in detail but *in the mass*, as one vast phenomenon. It is usually explained, in this stage of reason, by a mingled solution composed out of a few facts of ordinary experience and vague analogies of man's own organized frame.

Tendency of early speculators to consider the outward world in the aggregate.

Another observation is, that among the *first* problems proposed to himself by man are the vastest,—the origin, for instance, and subsistence of the world. The reason is the total absence of scientific *method* on the one hand, and of detached experimental knowledge on the other. From the combination of these remarks, you will rightly deduce that the first manifestation of Philosophy is usually in the form of a metaphysical physics. That it is largely tinged with *religious beliefs* is a fact arising from a distinct origin, circumstantial, not essential.

Vastness of the problems thus proposed.

Philosophy first manifests itself in the form of metaphysical physics.

A last remark upon this head relates to the form or dress of doctrines in their early appearance. This is almost universally more or less *imaginative*.

Imaginative dress of the early

*theories.
Tendency to
personifi-
cation.*

tive. General laws are impersonated, and a strong tendency evinced to place a demon or elemental god over each class of observed phenomena. The tendency of imagination is polytheistic, as of science monotheistic. Even in the human frame itself there is found among savage nations the belief of a multiplicity of *souls*;* the process leading to *poly-psychism* being exactly the same as that which multiplies the directors or animators of the universe. When philosophy advances, it emancipates itself from this servitude to a poetical superstition; but it is long before it attains the notion of a supreme principle other than a divine fire, or air, or light: witness the whole course of the first ages of Greek philosophy.

*Collateral
influences
affecting the
develop-
ment of
opinions.*

These observations (which I will trust to your own reflection to enlarge into others more refined and more valuable) must for the present suffice as regards the laws of the rise and propagation of doctrines considered in themselves. I will finally offer a few remarks on the other division,—the influence of collateral associations and events upon the character and fortunes of philosophical systems. Of these the most convenient division would set on one side

*Personal
character.*

the influences of *personal* disposition and habits of life, on the other those of *surrounding circumstances* in all their variety. That in the former class influence is really exerted upon the formation of individual opinions, I need not pause to establish. For instance, peculiarity of intellectual powers directs to a preference for those reasonings and conclusions in which those powers are called into action. Peculiarity of moral feelings colours the aspect of moral deductions, giving a disproportionate hue and prominence to those feelings as elements of ethical truth. Disposition and tempera-

* Mentioned, I think, by Dégérando.

ment are similarly and strongly influential in urging the mind to an exclusive admiration of that side of general truth in which such constitutional peculiarities are either justified in theory or brought into practical operation. We pass to the operation of *habits of life*. These, whether practical, artistic, literary, political, or religious, exert influences of which the history of philosophy presents many prominent instances; but which have, perhaps, never yet been examined and analyzed with the precision they deserve. I can only offer a hint or two on the less prominent of these secret tendencies. The operation of *literary* habits (as apart from purely reflective ones) is towards the consideration of human nature principally as it is susceptible of literary representation; that is, of representation under the established forms of received phraseology. The operation of habits of artistic production is towards the statement of human nature in relations of perfect *symmetry*, and with a view to the attraction of admiration by *novelty*. The operation of religious habits favours the subordination of all the principles and powers of the mind to a supernatural sphere of influences past, present, and future. Hence the systems produced under these impulses when they arrive at *philosophical* completeness, and are urged to the last measure of their course, are usually founded on a basis really and fundamentally skeptical; that is, on the utter depreciation of the claims and prerogatives of human reason. Pascal and Huet are examples; the modern mystical school of France still more so.

Of the *other* class of influences, not personal but external, the field is altogether too vast for our present survey. As in the preceding cases, I shall rather suggest than expound; leaving the subject to fructify in your own subsequent contemplations.

Political,

The *principal* sources of influence in this department are—peculiarities of political position, peculiarities of social connection, peculiarities of climate and natural scenery. Of the first briefly. DESPOTIC governments are favourable to speculations *remote from active practical application*; that is, in natural science to mathematical inquiry, in mental science to mystical theories, in moral views to individual discipline rather than social enterprise or regulation,—to asceticism and quietism. Of all these you have a prominent example in the state of science in India, where a despotic exclusiveness forms the principle of the whole social fabric. FREE governments are favourable to speculations political and practical, rather than to those of an abstract and internal character. The government of a complete democracy is inevitably accompanied (among a cultivated people) by philosophical theories eloquent and unsolid. Ancient Athens, and revolutionary France, will at once occur to you as corroborating a principle to which indeed I know scarcely an exception.

Geographical.

Of the influence of *natural position and surrounding scenery* upon the complexion of the favourite philosophical doctrine of a country, much has been ingeniously speculated. Whatever be the real amount of this efficacy, it probably belongs almost wholly to the earlier and more imperfect stages of rational development. It is perhaps unwarrantably fanciful to find in the vast features of Hindostan the type at once and motive of its theories, and in the broken and diversified landscapes of Greece the image of its prodigiously-varied mental manifestations.

Difficulties in the way of the historian of Philosophy.

With regard to the *difficulties* affecting the branch of inquiry we have been this day discussing, the principal are the scattered position of the facts to be combined; the peril of premature generalization, to which, as we have seen, special

facilities are afforded; and the prejudices, which, because the systems of other ages are in many respects the systems of the present day, are apt to reflect the prepossessions of the present day upon the discussions of other ages.

The general *uses* of such inquiries it is (if I have made myself intelligible) scarcely necessary to recapitulate. Besides the general uses of *all* knowledge of the highest order, the constant practical applicability of every law investigated in the history of speculation bestows on *this* a peculiar value. One detached result I cannot omit. It is that in explaining the general laws which regulate the formation and transmission of thought, these inquiries will be found (as I may hereafter attempt to show) to furnish a very forcible contribution to the mass of the evidences of *the Christian faith*; by demonstrating the total improbability of the generation of the Christian system of belief and practice in consonance with these laws, and through a purely natural process. By this physiology of the history of opinion, it might, I say, be invincibly shown, that Christianity (under its times and circumstances) was indeed a distinct and peculiar energy thrown into the system of human thought and human events; and not producible by any pre-existent function or organism contained in that system. But this altogether incidentally.

*Practical
uses of the
history of
Philosophy.*

Finally, the history of Philosophy, the history of the Church, the history of Governments,—what lesson do they all unite in teaching?

*Its tendency
to produce
tolerance.*

Tolerance and candour. This is, above all others, the practical admonition which the story of opinions should have a tendency to impress. Astronomy, by fixing the laws of the heavenly bodies, destroyed one principal field of superstition; the history of Philosophy (cultivated as I have now ventured to represent it) would tend to achieve the same destruction of intolerance, and by means ex-

tremely similar. In this case, the effect is produced by the strong arm of science reducing to simple laws and connections, no longer the revolutions of the skies, but the revolutions and interferences of error and of truth; and, while such a labour would tend to lessen the undue power of casual associations by exposing their influence, it would tend also to create in the mind of the philosophical observer that calm and equitable appreciation of the genuine position of man in respect to truth, which is one of the happiest aids that science can lend to the soothing precepts of practical religion. Recognising everywhere the unity of human nature in the variety of position, it sees, or teaches to see, in each honest misconception the misfortune of a brother, not the crime of an enemy: and in harmonizing, if not contradictory opinions yet contradictory prejudices, by referring those opinions to the almost inevitable partiality of views, it finds even in the cold domain of speculation some of that happiness, and may perhaps anticipate some of that reward, which the Divine Author of the great Practical Philosophy of Man promised, when he declared, "Blessed are the *peacemakers*; for they shall be called the children of God."

On our next day of meeting (*Tuesday*) we shall enter, I hope, upon some discussions of the *Indian* systems of philosophy; on which so much has lately been thought and written, that we can scarcely omit some notices of them.

LECTURE III.

ON THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES.

GENTLEMEN :—

I PROCEED to endeavour to interest you with some notices of the remains of the *Indian Speculative and Practical Philosophies*. It is a subject upon which, notwithstanding the labours of many illustrious inquirers, our information is still exceedingly ambiguous and defective. It is, likewise, a subject which in some respects is so widely removed from our Western habits and associations as to require a rare power of identification with new positions and circumstances in order to be thoroughly intelligible,—a sort of metempsychosis of which few are capable without repeated efforts and long and laborious practice. Towards the elucidation of the literature, both imaginative and philosophical, of India, much has of late, indeed, been contributed; and Britain has fairly occupied that pre-eminence in the investigation which her superior acquaintance with the country, the extent of her resources, and the authority of her functionaries, made to be her duty towards the general cause of erudition. The Society of Bengal, as well as those of Bombay, Madras, and other British stations in the East, have enjoyed the advantage of investigating the subject in the midst of Indian scenery and associations; while the Royal Asiatic Society has brought to the common store the benefits of retirement from the pressing demands of civil or military offices, and the facility of consulting the parallel or contemporary collections of other literatures preserved in the great libraries of England, and of making those *comparisons* of the intellectual de-

*Indian
Philoso-
phies.*

*Sources of
informa-
tion.*

velopment of different countries which reflect so strong a mutual illumination upon all. On this head, the connection of the Indian with the Egyptian and early Grecian systems will be considered the topic most remarkable and attractive. The tradition, so universal among at least the later Grecian writers, of the travels of Pythagoras in the East, as well as some very striking resemblances between the Hindû systems and the cosmogonies of the Italic school as recorded by Ocellus and Timæus, if they do not constitute a proof, at least warrant an investigation; and unquestionably it is from the Indian sources (many of which are still unexplored) that the light which may yet clear this interesting question can alone be reasonably anticipated.*

*Possible
connection
of the In-
dian sys-
tems with
those of
Greece.*

I suppose it unnecessary to inform you, that if we are to believe the records themselves of Indian wisdom, or the affirmations of their modern expositors, the antiquity of their speculations reaches to a period transcending the boldest suppositions of European chronology. The professed revelations on which the great part of the fabric of their philosophy is

*Their sup-
posed an-
tiquity.*

* As I have touched on the subject, I may, however, be permitted to add, that it is not impossible that the reports of the early Grecian systems may have been coloured by the *subsequent* intercourse with India, in the age of Alexander, by the expedition of Megasthenes, and, still more, during the existence of the Bactrian power, from the 255th to 126th year before our era,—to which, indeed, we may add the close connection between the great commercial city of Alexandria and the merchants of India during the entire reign of the Ptolemies, and under the Roman Empire. Knowing, as we do, the changes which the Alexandrian teachers introduced into the Pythagorean philosophy, it can certainly not be thought improbable that some of these changes may have originated in Indian associations. The writings of Clemens contain an account of Buddhism,—a proof that the philosophy of India had attracted notice in the literary circles of Alexandria. But on this topic I cannot now enlarge.

built claim a far higher antiquity than even the epochs of their *astronomical* science; and the principal monument of the latter (the Surya Siddhanta) is revered by the Brahmins as having been issued from heaven precisely 2,164,930 years since. Well aware of the mysterious and indefinite veneration with which extreme antiquity surrounds its objects, and the ready answer which the character of a celestial revelation whose date is placed where no investigation can follow supplies to the objections of heresy, the Indian teachers proclaim that the basis of their philosophical convictions is a revelation co-eternal with nature herself; that no time has existed when the Vedas have not been; that the universe itself cannot claim a remoter origin than these declarations of the will and the character of its Author. In illustration of this belief the sages of the Mimansa (or orthodox) school are wont to affirm that the *language* in which these records are embodied is no human or arbitrary dialect; that the association of words and thoughts is (at least in *this* instance, though the assertion indeed seems to be general) no conventional connection; but that *sound* (which by one curious tenet of some of these schools is held to be eternal) was from the beginning of all things irrevocably connected with the truth it was to express. The entire constitution of the Indian community, its immutable castes, and the very arts or offices they cultivate and discharge, (which are for the most part assumed or alluded to in these writings,) are thus stamped with the impress of an unfathomable antiquity; and the astonishing inviolability which has confessedly characterized them in all periods of their history is easily explained by the affirmation that, formed from, they are formed for, eternity.

Those bold attributions have met with the usual fortune of such claims among inquirers who, being free from the national prejudices which gave them force,

have had leisure for skepticism. The preposterous demands of the Bhattas of Hindostan have produced a reaction of total disbelief, which, if not as absurd in reason, is perhaps as ungrounded in fact. Descending, then, from that platform of eternal and supramundane existence on which alone the sages of Agra and Benares will consent to take their stand, and directing our course by the scattered glimpses of historical light, and the indications afforded by the internal state of the books and of the country, let us briefly notice some of the simpler probabilities of the question of Indian antiquity.

*Pretensions
to antiquity
examined.*

*Argument
from the
apparent
antiquity
of the In-
dian astro-
nomy.*

The first and the most imposing of those fortresses in which the advocates of the primitive glories of India intrench themselves is the argument founded upon their astronomical remains.¹ This point has been laboured, with the sagacity of an accomplished astronomer and the eloquence of an accomplished writer, by the illustrious French historian of the science, Bailly. The tables of Tirvalore, whose epoch dates three thousand one hundred and two years before our era, are those on which he principally relies. It will be obvious to you all, that if by theory or observation the true laws of the motions of the heavenly bodies are once discovered, the possession of their configuration at any one epoch will involve the assignment of that configuration at any other. That these (or any other) tables, therefore, commence from any given epoch, is no unequivocal proof that the observation they profess to record really belongs to that epoch; the same principles which allow the astronomer to prophesy the future will enable him to picture the past. The determination whether the observation be genuine or fictitious will, as regards a

¹ [On this subject compare Elphinstone's *History of India*, b. iii. c. 1. Ed.]

state of the science less improved than our own, generally turn upon the actual *accuracy* of the representation of the heavens at that supposed period. Now, tried by this searching test, the Indian tables unquestionably cannot stand scrutiny. A pretended conjunction assigned to the epoch in question (the Calyougam) is demonstrated to be a mere approximation, such as the present attainments of the Indian astronomers would have enabled them to reach, but which any direct observation must infallibly have transcended. The great name of Laplace gives as much weight to this inference as any human authority can be conceived to do.

But this is a mere negative conclusion. Probable date of the Indian Tables. A very happy suggestion was advanced in some papers in the sixth and eighth volumes of the *Astronomical Researches*, towards resolving the interesting question of the actual date of the Indian Tables. Mr. Bentley observed that the most likely time when the actual observation was made would be that at which the errors of the tables would be less than at any other; and that if that time could be computed, we should manifestly detect the epoch from which all other fictitious or predicted notes arose, the error accumulating with the distance. By laborious calculations on this principle he determined the Brahma Gupta tables to the year of our era 536, and that Surya Siddhanta, of whose millions of years I have lately spoken, to about the year 1000. Of the connection of the Greek and Indian astronomers much has been speculated without any decisive result. There are marks of resemblance, and also marks of difference: one of the latter is worth noticing as an instance of the decisiveness of those historical confirmations which are derived from the immutable truths of mathematical science and the constitution of the physical world. In one of the elementary astronomical calculations the sine of ascensional differ-

ence is not employed, but the arc of ascensional difference itself; a difference which could be safely neglected only in a *tropical* climate, and the neglect of which proves that the rule was formed for the latitude in which it is now found. On the other hand are not merely resemblances, but, as it is said, direct references by name to the astronomical skill of the Greeks (or "Yavans") in some of the elder fragments of Indian learning. The diurnal rotation of the earth was held, and exploded, by both. For the further elucidation of the point, we must, I apprehend, await further discoveries in the field of Indian literature itself. Unquestionably the mathematical knowledge of Hindostan is at present possessed less as a productive treasure than as a traditional deposit, and seems to partake of the character of the country itself, where all is stationary, and the present venerates the past too highly to venture to outshine it.

*Argument
from the
antiquity
of archi-
tectural
remains.*

In the enormous buildings and excavations—such as the fortress of Dowlátábad, the cave-temples of Ellora—which are to be met in every part of India, other writers find evidences of a vast, united, and highly-cultivated people; while, again, the exceeding minuteness of laws (to which remote antiquity cannot be denied) would seem to infer a high degree of civilization in all its departments among the people whose daily life and intercourse these laws were meant to regulate. That institution of castes which is found in all the most ancient records of India presupposes antecedent advancement; and we know that Alexander found beyond the Indus the monarchs of vast, and, it would appear, civilized, empires. Of the imaginative literature of India (the Mahabhârât, Sacontala, &c.) the antiquity is undeniable; and for the principal feats of their skill in the mechanical arts (celebrated in the earliest ages) they themselves

know no origin later than the instruction of the gods. I do not speak of the legends of the conquests of Sesostris as attesting the early existence of Indian empire; because such accounts, even if unquestioned in authenticity, throw little or no light upon the question which immediately concerns us,—the antiquity of Indian *civilization* as a presumption in favour of the antiquity of its *philosophy*. We are not, however, to forget the Sanscrit language itself, a language of richness, variety, and strength, and of whose claims to be considered the parent-language of the European dialects it is, after the labours of Bopp and other philologists, almost impossible to doubt.

With these various topics of consideration affording undeniable presumption in favour of the antiquity of Indian literature in general, the subject of the date of Indian philosophy in particular is as yet encumbered with insurmountable difficulties. The peculiar formation of the text-books themselves is such as to have admitted of interpolation with such facility as to nullify almost all conclusions from the antiquity of one to that of another portion of the same collection. The works which are transmitted under the highest characters of age consist almost wholly of *sutras*, or detached aphorisms, with, often, little discernible connection; and the productions of greatest extent are crowded with episodes which some Oriental scholars conceive to be unquestionably assignable to different eras. Under such circumstances it would be wholly impossible, within the limits of a lecture, to enter into any complete discussion of the respective antiquity of the various relics of the Indian philosophy. I shall therefore substitute the conclusions of those eminent Orientalists who have devoted their almost exclusive attention to the subject,—as far as even they have ventured to pronounce. The Vedas,

*Difficulty
of deter-
mining the
date of In-
dian Philo-
sophy.*

The Vedas. which, as I have said, are the common basis of almost all Indian speculation, are assigned by Colebrooke to one thousand four hundred, by Sir W. Jones to one thousand six hundred, years before Christ. The entire collection of the Vedas, if it exist at all, has not been achieved by any Western scholar. These famous writings are composed of prayers, of doctrines, and of precepts, miscellaneously collected, and are accompanied by certain summaries or abridgments, called Oupanischads. The great centre of Indian

Laws of Menou. legislation—the Laws of Menou—are ascribed by Sir W. Jones to about eight hundred years before our era: by Schlegel they are regarded as of much higher antiquity. The Purānas, or

Purānas. Theogonies, are eighteen in number. They are deeply tinged with the speculative beliefs of India, and abound with fables conceived in that fantastical spirit which has always characterized Eastern invention. Their date is quite uncertain; but probability would ascribe them to an epoch later than the former. To the Vedas belongs a practical commentary, all whose precepts are considered of authority equal to that of the Sacred Writ itself. This is the Purva (i.e. Prior) Mimansa.

The Mimansa. It treats altogether of the nature, occasions, limitations, extensions, of religious observances; that is, of the varieties of *dharma* or duty,—a word which, very characteristically, signifies in one gender “moral merit,” and in the other “an act of ceremonial devotion,” (a fact to which a parallel may be found by those intimate with the lower class of Irish in their use of the word *duty*.) This collection, which is voluminous, consists of between two and three thousand sutras, and nearly one thousand sections under the title of *Adhicaranas**. These works—

* In its discussions of the circumstances of religious duties it enters into many minute casuistical distinctions, and hence has a character

the Vedas, Puránas, and the Mimansa—form the chief monuments of the theology and moral literature of the Brahmins; and within the circle of these productions they would probably be willing that the national mind should forever move.

Of course you do not require to be reminded of the peculiar conformation of society in Hindostan, in its relation to the boundless authority of the priesthood. Upon this subject, as it meets us perpetually in studying the various fortunes of speculation in the nations of antiquity, a remark must be hazarded. An established priesthood, (omitting a few occasional advantages in their concentration for purposes of research,) vested with peculiar privileges as public instructors, must be injurious to the free growth of knowledge in every case but one,—the case in which they are the guardians and expositors of a *true* revelation. This necessitates their existence, and justifies it; but, this one case apart, I know no instance in which it can be fairly affirmed that the exclusive privileges of a sacerdotal class did not operate injuriously upon those nations—Egyptian, Indian, or any other—in which they existed. Subsisting by imposture, they were obliged to cherish public ignorance to prevent its detection; and their very wisdom was converted into a crime by the fact of its concealment. I have made this distinction, with regard to the priesthood of a true and false revelation, because, simple as it is, it has constantly been overlooked by two classes of writers who are equally in error; and because it is necessary to guard against the *unlimited* extension of conclusions to which a candid

Constitution of Indian society. The Priesthood.

Evil influences of a sacerdotal class.

quite as much *logical* as moral. Indeed, almost every investigator of the Mimansa seems to have been struck with its close resemblance to the elaborate disquisitions of the casuists of the Roman Church

survey of the history of ancient philosophy must (within its own sphere) inevitably lead.

The Hindû Philosophy professes to be an interpretation of the sacred records.

But even the vigilant guardians of Hindû theology come before us themselves in the light of philosophic investigators. To what precise origin the Vedanta philosophy is to be attributed, on what occasion the interpretation of the Vedas was thus reduced to system, or what impulse first urged the students of the sacred text to theorize its contents in a methodical exposition scarcely less revered than the original itself, it seems now almost hopeless to inquire. But the fact is certain, that by the side of the eternal Vedas, the incarnations of Deity, reposes tranquilly a vast and elaborate system of Man, Nature, and God; a system out of which all the other forms of Indian speculation seem more or less directly to have arisen, and which, if not itself independent, was at least the occasion of independence to others. For the references in the Brahmá-Sutra (the chief monument of Vedantism) to the rival systems of Capila, Kanáda, &c. bear every appearance of having been later interpolations,—redoubts added to meet successive heresies, like the articles of our Athanasian Symbol.

The entire mass, then, of speculation in India bears this common character, that it all professes to be expositions of ancient revelation. In this Brahmin and Buddhist alike coincide; for even the Buddhist himself, whose daring incredulity laughs at the Vedas, names with reverence a certain Buddha or series of Buddhas, from whom his doctrine declares itself traditionally descended.* This, then, being the common character of all, the sects of Indian philosophy are best divided

* In the orthodox systems this reverential notice of their founders is unbounded. Capila (the founder of the Sankhya) was no less than a son of Brahma; or, according to other Puránas, an incarnation of Vishnu; and the author of Karica (the principal monument of the

not upon *mutual* differences of doctrine, but upon relative distance from the common centre of the old and standard revelation, the awful Vedas themselves. Thus considered, the true parallel for Indian philosophy will at once occur to you,—the *scholastic systems* of modern Europe. Making due allowances for differences of circumstances, it is in Scotus and Albertus and Occam that we find the Western echoes of Gótama and Kanáda and the rest of the Hindû logical theologists.

If we examine in this light the vast collection of writings, whether original, or expository of originals, or expository of expositions, which compose the Hindû philosophical literature, we shall find eight principal forms of doctrine. Two rigorously orthodox: the Mimansas, 1st, the Purva Mimansa, by Djaimini; and, 2d, the Vedanta, by Vyása. Of these we have spoken. Two of a much more independent character, yet received with respect: the Nyaya, (by Gótama,) a philosophical arrangement of all the possible subjects of thought; the Vaiseschika, (Kanáda,) a system partly logical and partly physical, embracing the atomic hypothesis. Still more heterodox are the two famous Sankhyas, the Sankhya Capila, and the Sankhya Patandjali, the distinctive titles being from the reputed founders. And totally heretical are the tenets of the sects of Jaina and of Buddha. In making this distinction I adopt the learned labours of Colebrooke,—the scholar to whom, perhaps above all others of this age, Oriental literature is indebted. I particularly recommend to you the disquisitions from his pen in the *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*. Until the original texts themselves be presented to us in a European form, these memoirs are probably the most authentic reports extant of the tenets of the Indian schools. You may add to these

sect) professed to have received his doctrine by traditional succession from Capila himself.

the labours of M. Abel Remusat in the *Journal des Savans*, and the writings of Sir W. Jones. The Baghvat-gita (one remarkable Indian monument) exists in an English translation by Wilkins. It was also translated by Wm. Schlegel in 1823. The Oupnekhat is also translated by Anquetil-Duperron.

To explain minutely the peculiar views of these sects would be a task requiring volumes, and to the preservation of which no human memory would be competent. Those who are familiar with the powers of minute distinction displayed in the writings of Aristotle and of his commentators can alone form any conception of the subtlety of logical discrimination which is evinced by these speculators. It presents indeed a fearful contrast, to observe the exquisite refinement to which speculation appears to have been carried in the philosophy of India, and the grossness of the contemporary idolatry, paralleled in scarcely any nation of the earth, as well as the degraded condition of the mass of the people, destitute of active energy, and for the most part without a shadow of moral principle to animate the dull routine of a burdensome and scrupulous superstition.

It will be, for our present purposes, more instructive to take a general view of that side of the human mind which appears mainly to be revealed in the Indian speculation; illustrating the subject by references to the systems themselves.

Characteristics common to all the schools of Indian speculation. The liberation of the Soul.

In all the forms of Indian philosophy, whether orthodox or heterodox, one common object is equally professed as the present aim of human wisdom,—the liberation of the soul from the evils attending the mortal state. And in all, this object is attempted by means not dissimilar,—that is to say, by one modification or other of that intense *abstraction* which, separating the soul

from the bonds of flesh, is supposed capable of liberating it in this life from the unworthy restrictions of earthly existence, and of introducing it in the next to the full enjoyment of undisturbed repose, or even to the glories of a total absorption into the Divine Essence itself. In the unity of this object we may recognise perhaps the lingering traditions of original revelation, still upholding, in the midst of sensuality and degradation, some convictions of the primal dignity of the human nature and destiny; but still more strongly may we detect the secret but continual influences of a climate which, indisposing the organization for active exertion, naturally cherished those theories which represent the true felicity of man to consist in inward contemplation and complete quiescence. For *some* universal principle can alone account for the unbroken similarity which (in spite of the ingenious disquisitions of some Orientalists, who would find in their favourite field of inquiries varieties as numerous as those of European philosophers) does, in the great and leading features, characterize the entire series of these systems.

To arrive then at eternal beatitude, and at the promissory foretaste of that fuller consummation which the Yogi in even this life may attain, is the final scope of all Indian speculation,—of some, as of the Sankhya Patandjali, expressly and from the outset, of others, as the Sankhya Capila and the systems Vaiseschika and Nyaya, more remotely and indirectly. But as the attainment of this superhuman condition is supposed to be principally dependent on what the Sankhya Capila calls “a clear knowledge of discriminate truth,” the discipline for the blessing is made to include a vast series of preliminary doctrines with regard to the material and im-material worlds, and a complete apparatus of dialectical distinctions. Generally speaking, I find in the Hindû Institutes two paths specified

Two principal means of liberations.

as leading to the state of perfectibility,—religious ceremonial observances, especially sacrifice; and the exercise of absorbed contemplation. The former is ranked highly; the “aswamadha” or immolation of a horse under certain circumstances (to which you may remember the reference in Southey’s *Kehama*) is considered to entitle immediately, and *ex opere operato*, to exalted privileges; but even the Vedanta Sutras themselves do not class these performances with the contemplative knowledge of the Divine Soul of all things. The Sankhya Capila states the matter still more boldly. Sacrifice, the best of all *temporal* means, says the divine son of Brahmé, is insufficient for the great object of absolute exemption from all mortal evils, were it merely because it supposes the *slaughter of animals*, and thus violates a higher precept interdicting the shedding of blood; but still more because, in point of fact, Indra and the other subordinate deities who have gained the celestial state by these sacrificial works are deceived in expecting immortality: a thousand Indras have passed away, and a thousand more shall pass. To arrive at the possession of the prerogatives of the wise, wisdom itself must be sought and possessed. How then shall it be attained?

*Indian
dialectic.*

To solve this master-problem, the Indian systems usually commence with copious logical discussions; which, whatever be their origin, and however peculiar their dress, unquestionably leave the Hindoo pupil little to learn from Zeno or Aristotle. The Nyaya (of Gótama) is a system of pure dialectic, and, coupled with that of Kanáda, includes a complete scheme of categories, (Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Particularity, Aggregation;) a minute catalogue of all the possible subjects of thought; and a sufficient account of the syllogistic form of reasoning, which (by returning back on the question) is made to consist of five mem-

Categories.

Syllogism.

bers instead of three;² which is *substantially* the same with our Western syllogism. The Sankhya of Capila declares that (exclusive of Intuition, which belongs to higher natures) there are three species of know-
Sources of knowledge.
 ledge, Perception, Inference, and Affirmation or Tradition, (which is meant to include the informations of Sacred Writ, and of those gifted beings who retain the recollections of former worlds;) and it professes to show that the other sources contended for are in truth reducible to these. The Nyaya considers that we cannot place knowledge under less than four topics; which it calls Perception, Inference, Analogy, and Revelation. From these fountains (whichever enunciation be adopted) the Sankhya, which seems the
Principles of knowledge.
 most elaborate of all the Eastern schools, proceeds to deduce the certainty of twenty-five principles, out of which the universe is composed; and endeavours to establish from these elementary propositions those views of the total distinction of soul from any material essence (on the due appreciation of which that high contemplation can alone be founded) which is to end in raising the soul above the bonds and infirmities of space and time. We shall return to these Sankhya "Principles" in the course of the very brief collective sketch of the chief dogmas of the Indian schools, which it is now the time to present. We have seen the common object; we have seen the common path proposed for its attainment, the knowledge of soul and body; let us

² [The Hindû syllogism is made up, apparently, of an enthymeme and a regular syllogism: one of which is superfluous. As in the specimen given by Elphinstone, vol. i. p. 230, note.

1. The hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes.
3. What smokes is fiery, (as a hearth.)
4. Accordingly, the hill is smoking;
5. Therefore it is fiery. Ed.]

now inquire as to the Indian views of that knowledge itself.

*Theology
of the
Orthodox
Schools.*

We begin with the Supreme Being. The Uttara Mimansa, "which is to theology what the Purva Mimansa is to works and their merit," which is the great depository of the Vedantine beliefs, and whose chief extant memorial is the *Brahmé Sutra*, attributed to Vyása, (an avatara of Vishnou himself, the reputed author also of the Mahabhârata, the great Hindû epic,)—this, the high-orthodox school of philosophy, declares from the Vedas themselves—of God—that he is the Supreme Eternal One, the Emanatory Cause (*i.e.* at once the efficient and material cause) of the universe. From him all proceeds; into him all is to be ultimately resolved; as a spider extends and retracts his thread, or (to use another common Hindû comparison) as the tortoise protrudes and then gathers back his lower limbs. It would not be easy to parallel the sublimity of the descriptions which the Vedas themselves contain of this All-creating Essence: the whole riches of a most opulent language are exhausted upon the infinity of his perfections; and the very title of God-head (Bhargas) is constructed of three monosyllabic verbs which signify to shine, to delight, and to move. In both the Brahmin and the Buddhist systems a trinity of natures is discoverable; though upon the precise attributes of each divine personage there seem to be many varieties of opinion. In the ordinary expositions of the Vedantine theology they are declared to be Creator, Conservator, and Destroyer; among the atheistical followers of Capila a sort of natural trinity is professed under the title of Goodness, Foulness, and Darkness; and among the Buddhists of Nepaul (according to Mr. Hodgson's interesting account) the same notion reappears under the names of Buddha, Dharma, and Sanga, —Intelligence, Matter, and Multitude. Such is the

Deity of the Vedas. The Deity of the Sankhya of Patandjali seems to be of much the same character. But the Sankhya of Capila (to which I have just referred) denies the existence of a God altogether in any other sense than that of an intelligence issuing out of primitive nature and to be resolved hereafter into it. These sages urge that we can derive no proof of a supreme Creator distinct from insensible nature, either from sense, reasoning, or revelation. All things are evolved out of an intelligence which was itself but a secondary formation. Were God detached from nature, he could have no inducement for creation; were he fettered to nature, he could have no ability for such a work. I need not remind you how completely these sophisms anticipate the more modern atheism of Europe. Of course, you may suppose the Capilists are obliged to exert some ingenuity in endeavouring to reconcile their views with the solemn Theism of the Vedas. They argue that the passages in these sacred records really refer either to a liberated soul, or to some of the mythological deities; or by some other such evasion endeavour to escape the fate which drove the followers of Buddha out of the Indian peninsula. I suspect, from scattered intimations, that, while the Capilists attack the foundations of religion, the Buddhists originally were guilty of the darker crime of attacking the authority of the priesthood,—a difference which will sufficiently explain the difference of their fortunes. It is certain that, even to the present day, a genuine Buddhist, from the heights of his ascetic sanctity, is apt to despise the inferior aids of sacerdotal ministration, and is in fact more highly revered by the people; upon the same principle which gave to the mendicant saints of the Roman orders an influence so far above that of the secular clergy.

The Vedanta philosophy does not *enlarge* upon nature

*Theology
of the
Capilists.*

as distinct from its great Author. But this deficiency is fully supplied by the copious dissertations of the Sankhya and *Vaiseschika* physics. I before stated that the Sankhya Capila constitutes twenty-five principles of the universe. At the head of the list stands the venerated name of Nature or *Pracriti*,—eternal matter undivided, without parts, not produced, but productive. The next title on this solemn bead-roll of the universal system is Intelligence, (*Buddhi* or *Mahat*), first production of nature and prolific of all subsequent existence; and for the accommodation of religious associates, it would seem that this very Intelligence divides into a triune Deity: thus conciliating (though awkwardly) the theistic and atheistic hypotheses. Third on the catalogue comes the *Personal Conviction*, (*Ahancara*), a singular element in a system of nature; but which seems to me to be internally connected with the theory of *Illusion*, (*Maya*), which this school probably countenanced; and which may seem to base physical existence itself on the transitory belief of it. The Capilist next enumerates five pure elements which themselves produce the grosser and perceptible elements of the external world. The organs of sense and motion are then named, and that *Manas*, or *Mind*, which seems to discharge the same functions as the *communis sensus* of the old psychologists, with additional functions of activity. “The external sense perceives, the internal examines, consciousness makes the self-application, and intellect resolves.” Finally is introduced that eternal essence which, though it may transmigrate through innumerable bodies, is made by wisdom capable of final liberation and perpetual repose,—the *Purusha*, or Soul. The treatise itself (the *Karica*) sums up the whole:—“Nature, root of all, is no production; seven principles, including the Great Intellect, are productions and productive; sixteen are productions unproductive; soul is neither production nor productive.”

In the Vaiseschika, a physical system more precise and intelligible is enounced. According to Kanáda, (the author of this system,) there have been from all eternity simple, incomposite, ultimate atoms; and from the aggregation of these, according to definite numerical proportions, the world has had existence. The Buddhist school seems to contend that these primitive atoms are *indefinitely* aggregated; and adds to the theory, that objects themselves exist only when perceived, not reasoning on any Berkeleian grounds, but holding that at each instant there is a momentary union of atoms which are instantaneously scattered as the perception ceases. It is a remarkable peculiarity in many of the Indian systems, that they incline to supposing the excellent to have been gradually formed out of the evil: "from darkness," says the Karica, "came foulness; and from this was formed goodness:" and we have seen that the same treatise supposes nature to have generated the Supreme Intelligence.

*Vaises-
chika of
Kanáda.
Physical
theories.*

Atomism.

*Good
formed out
of evil.*

But the great object to which (as I have before remarked) all these systems equally tend is the ultimate realization of that union with the Supreme Nature in which it is conceived that eternal beatitude is to consist. *Creation* is understood by the Karica as the union of soul and body; and the soul, invested with a subtle semi-material frame, (*lingá*), is by all these theorists regarded as passing through perpetual and successive transitions from body to body; a frame which the Karica likens to the attenuated flame which hovers over the wick of a lamp. According to the Vedantins, this life is itself a place of retribution; and all future transmigrations are also of the nature of recompense. By the aid of this supposition, protracted into an antecedent eternity, the expositors of the Veda boldly essay to grapple with the question of the

*Union with
the Su-
preme
Nature.*

existence of evil as consistent with the infinite excellence of the Author and substantial cause of all; and I may, in passing, observe that there is scarcely a controversy in modern theology relative to free-will, grace, the merit of works, or the value of faith, to which you may not find copious allusions in the text of the Vedas, or the Sutras of its commentators. So similar under all systems, whether true or false, must be the main elements of the relations of man to God. The glory of true religion is not to have named these relations, (which are obvious and inevitable,) but to have illumined their nature and fixed them upon an infallible foundation.

A circumstance which aids this resemblance is the representation which the Indian philosophy gives of the estate of man,—which it perpetually paints in the gloomiest colours. “The gods are happy, animals are dull, but man is the miserable slave of foulness and darkness.” The *Karica* enumerates no less than sixty-two obstructions, besides the whole tribe of organic disabilities, which prevent the perfectibility of the human soul.

For example, *error* mistakes irrational nature, &c. for the Soul, and imagines “the Deliverance” to be absorption into these. *Illusion* imagines transcendent power to be deliverance, which is only a step to it. Nay, even Content itself is but a negative state, and far removed from the true eminence of the soul. It is folly to consider that this condition will come by luck, or without study, or by the mere act of nature, or by the decree of destiny. These convictions may ease the soul, but they cannot advance it! And from all these lowly postures of thought the wise man will still struggle forth, and exclaim, in the sublime language of the Veda itself, “May that soul of mine, which is a ray of perfect wisdom, pure intelligence, and pure existence,—which is the inextinguishable light fixed within created bodies, and without which no good

act is performed,—be united by divine meditation with the spirit supremely blest, supremely intelligent!" Or, again, "May that soul of mine which, distributed in other bodies, guides mankind as a skilful charioteer guides his rapid horses,—that soul which is fixed in my breast exempt from old age,—be united," &c. as before. For the possession of this supernatural elevation the cultivators of practical wisdom incessantly labour. Prolonged attitudes, endurance of suffering, unbroken meditations upon the divine nature, accompanied and animated by the frequent solemn repetition of the mystical name "Om," are the means by which the Yogi, for perhaps three thousand years, has sought the attainment of an ecstatic participation of God, and, half-deceiver, half deceived, affects to have already soared beyond earthly limitations and achieved hyperphysical power. Towards the complete consummation of this final liberation, the Vedas proclaim (and with slight differences the philosophic schools consent to the statement) that there are three degrees,—two preliminary, the possession of transcendent power in this life, (that is, of magical endowments,) and the passage after death into the courts of Brahma, which are only precursory to that last and glorious reunion with the First Cause himself, which terminates all the changes of life in an identification with the very principle of eternity and of repose.

But it is time to release your attention. The effects of such views of God and man may easily be conjectured. Upon the mild sages of the Ganges they probably produce little result beyond the occasional suggestion of elevated ideas, perhaps more than counterbalanced by the associations of a minute and profitless superstition. But upon the enormous mass of the nation these baseless dreams can only result in the perpetuation of ignorance and the encouragement of imposture: to both of which they

*Effects of
Hindu
speculation
upon the
learned,
and upon
the vulgar.*

manifestly and directly tend,—to the former, by being unfitted for the vulgar mind, to the latter, by countenancing pretences to supernatural power. How can we leave the subject—which must often have recalled your *Christian* associations—without a secret gratitude for that belief which, while it displays in every page of its records more than the casual sublimities of the Hindû Wisdom, is not, like it, degraded by deception and enfeebled by extravagance, but presents to its members the Indian doctrines of divine communion in such a form as not to dazzle but to enlighten,—which, while it encourages man, instructs him also in humility, and never fixes the thoughts upon the ineffable attributes of God in such a sense as to withdraw them from the duties and the charities of daily life?

On next Thursday we shall commence our consideration of the Grecian Philosophy.

LECTURE IV.

ON GREEK PHILOSOPHY, ITS ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS,
AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT.

GENTLEMEN:—

FROM the mysterious forms of the Indian *Passage from India to Greece.* mythological philosophy, from the vast sacerdotal institutions that have produced and protected it, from that petrification of living society in one immutable attitude which contrasts so wonderfully with the changing world of ordinary history,—we pass to-day to a very different scene. We pass to that country, four centuries of whose existence possess a share in the thoughts of every educated man, as extensive, it may truly be affirmed, as all the remaining mass of ancient profane history! We come to that country to which the filial devotion of every cultivator of his own intelligence turns as to the mother-country of the mind; to which every man instinctively points when he would illustrate the indefeasible claims and inherent destinies of human nature. A speck of the globe—a few cities on either side of a narrow sea dotted with isles scarcely discoverable on the chart of a continent—has been the outward and visible scene for the successive apparition of the whole universe of mind. On that little theatre of mental action, and in the rapid development of a couple of busy ages, performers have played their part, who, even after the vast European movement of our later centuries, still preserve, if not their exclusive authority unquestioned, at

Services rendered by the Greeks to humanity,

least their intellectual eminence unshaken. There poetry still finds in many departments her most exquisite ex-

In arts; amples, there (and perhaps there alone) sculpture

finds her ideal cease to be a dream, there painting, doubtless, may lament that her more perishable materials should have defrauded *her* of her triumphs, and music, that *her* achievements must be received upon the faith of history; there Philosophy has at least directed her course to every point of the compass of thought, and touched at all its points of access; and there, finally, language, on whose ministrant services reason and imagination are alike so dependent, arrived, even in its infancy, at a perfection which made its proud and conscious possessors to class all who spoke not their own melodious tongue by one indiscriminate appellation characteristic of their vocal inferiority. But great as are these services to civilization, they are not the only ones for which Europe is indebted to that glorious people. Placed as the outpost of that continent which was one day to take the lead in the civilization of mankind, the Greeks *fought* for the cause of human enlightenment as well as personally advanced it. I well re-

In arms. member in early boyhood being laughingly asked my opinion of the relative importance of

Marathon and Waterloo; and to me, to whom every thing later than Greece and Rome was at that time a cipher in historical calculation, but one answer was possible. I doubt if I should now remodel my verdict. What was the day of Marathon as an element in the history of man? Was it the brilliant struggle of some mountain-tribe against the wild ravages of some ancient Zenghis or Timour? Gentlemen, it was the cause of the *world* which was perilled that day. The destinies of ages hung tremblingly upon every blow of these gallant men of Attica. When, as the old historian tells us, the soldier, covered with the dust of that im-

mortal field, rushed into the Athenian assembly with his *Χαίρετε! χαίρομεν!* and fell dead of his wounds as he gasped the words, he spoke a message to which the civilization of ages was to be the echo or the answer! Had the despot of Western Asia been as successful as his Turkish copyist two thousand years later, had he gained his footing in Greece at that hour, and flooded with his slaves the soil in which were deposited the seeds of the world's advancement, the civilization of Europe had been adjourned for centuries. Homer and the early lightnings of the Lyric Muse would have been perhaps irrecoverably lost; no age of Pericles would have placed Athens where she is in your hearts; her borrowed light would never have taught Romans to think and feel as well as act; and the spirit would not have existed which, evoked from its sepulchre in codex and palimpsest, was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries once more incarnated in modern form, and became the vivifying principle of the literature of Italy, France, Germany, and England.

The historians of Greece have given us *few* specific accounts of its first intellectual impulses. *Poverty of early records.* Those who were the best qualified for such researches continually lament the poverty of materials, the contradiction and uncertainty of traditions. The political and civil story of Greece seems, by transient and shadowy glimpses, to stretch to a thousand years before its intellectual birth. Far in the depths of antiquity we catch the venerated names of the patriarchs of the land,—of Ægialeus, and Inachus, and Deucalion, and Ogyges. So remote is the chronological position held by these lords of the Pelasgic and Hellenic tribes, that the very gods begin their dynasty at a later epoch: it is not thirteen centuries before our era that Saturn is said to have been expelled from Crete by the vengeance of that Jupiter whom a singular and capricious fame

subsequently exalted to the loftiest position ever held by deceased mortal. Phœnicia, Phrygia, and Egypt supplied colonists¹ who mingled with the Hellenic race, and who, it is probable, rapidly lost their national characteristic in their incorporation with another people and under the powerful influence of new local relations and excitements. As Greece is said to have done at a later period, so doubtless even now "*capta feros victores cepit*;" for few traces of distinctive foreign character are observable in the subsequent history of the united nation. A rude and stormy chivalry arose among tribes separated by the hills and rivers of the most varied country in the world; leaders were at their head whom (magnified through the mists of time) after-ages converted into demigods; and perhaps the present condition of the Albanian mountaineers is not very unlike that of their Epirot forefathers, and even the more southern clans of Greece, in the *earlier* heroic ages. But Greece had already some elements prophetic of civilization. She was singularly free from the contracting institutions of the East, and by some early essays of maritime communication she had learned to import thought as well as wealth. A religion diversified and practical in its forms already gave occupation to the fancy: the names of Orpheus, Linus, Musæus, belong alike to the religion and the poetry of antiquity. The Argonautic expedition, (whatever its duration and extent,) the great national movement against Troy, must have increased the stores of thought, though attended, it would seem, with much domestic calamity; and the latter attests the progress of the Grecian states to the great

Early colonizers.

Elements of future civilization.

Commerce.

Religion and religious poetry.

Early wars.

¹[Compare with this statement the third chapter of Bishop Thirlwall's History, where the question of the colonization of Greece by foreign settlers is fully and candidly discussed. Ed.]

principle of national unity, one of the most fertile sources of civilization. Still, the progress itself was slow; the age of Pericles was far distant; and I confess, when I contemplate the subsequent rapidity of Grecian development, I do not see my way through the three or four centuries of littleness which (accepting the ordinary chronologies) succeeded the war of Troy. The Heraclidean invasion of the Peloponnesus (which by producing the Ionian and Dorian colonizations was remotely a means of mental advancement) created, doubtless, a temporary unsettlement; yet the children of Hercules were themselves a vigorous race, and not more unlikely, perhaps, than any other Grecian tribe, to further the national reputation. But Homer—or the Homeric—had by this time worked the miracle of the Iliad; and this was the proof and the pledge of what the Grecian mind had yet in store for the world.

*Homer and
the early
epic poets.*

The period from which we may date the real impulse of intellect and imagination in Greece, I would place about that time, not very distinctly marked perhaps in chronology, when the old kingly institutions sank almost everywhere before the democratic principle,² and Greece assumed the form of an aggregate of small republics connected by a national feeling, reverence for ancestry, unity of religion and oracles, and the universal Amphictyonic Council. Democracy made Greece never tranquil, but it made her always brilliant. It made distinction the prize of eloquence; and, until the people became itself a tyrant, it threw open a free path to speculation. These advantages existed at a dear price, but still they existed. The passion for glory, the fervour of emulation, is a

*Subversion
of mon-
archy.*

² [The old kingly institutions sank before the *aristocratic*, not before the democratic, principle. See Thirlw. ib. c. 10. Ed.]

troubled light for a nation to walk by; but yet it guides where no other light can carry: and it is not for posterity to blame Greece if she sacrificed herself for its opinion!

Setting aside minuter discussions, and regarding the aspect of the whole, the history of Grecian development is, with all its uncertainties and obscurities, a type almost perfect of *the ideal representation* of such a history. Every stage of progress which reason deduces as probable, investigation will find correspondingly realized; and as in this *geology* of time we penetrate into the depths of Grecian history, we seem to turn up every successive stratum and deposit, down from the rich luxuriant soil of cultivated reason and fancy to the rude and primitive mass of merely sensible impressions,—exactly as in an individual mind the imagination was the first instrument of advancement from sensible wants and necessities; and you know to what effect *this* faculty was cultivated, from the age of Homer (or rather of Homer's antecessors, of those to whom he himself traces his poetical lineage) to the age of Archilochus and Terpander. Now, allowing for other contemporary influences, it is scarcely too much to say that Grecian history grew out of the Grecian epos, and Grecian philosophy out of its lyric and

*Epic poetry
the parent
of history.*

sententious poetry. Herodotus is a Homer without his hexameters, his divine agents, and his similes; the whole texture of his style is interwoven with Homeric phrases, not purposely introduced, but manifestly forming an element in the very substance of the composition. If a chieftain displays extraordinary valour against Persian or Lydian foes, it is still, as in the old Trojan days, *ἐμέμνητο ἀλκῆς*: the untaught fury of the people still *χειμάρρῳ ποτάμῳ ἕλεος*: the rain still descends, as it did in the verse of Homer, *ἐξαπίνης* and *λαβροτάτῳ ὕδατι*. Even those critics whose organs were practised in such discernment detect in the prose of the chronicler

of elder Greece the faint music of secret numbers, like the dim undertone of streams in a forest; “*ipsa didalektos*,” says Quintilian, “*latentes etiam numeros complectitur*.” Though it be prose, it is still the *Musa pedestris*. And doubtless the preceding forms of this transition had still less completely escaped from their brilliant vesture of imagination: poetry, I doubt not, would be found with her wings almost unclipped in the historical writings, had they been preserved, of Hecataeus, Pherecydes, Cadmus of Miletus.³

But philosophy,—the habit of hypothesis to harmonize the world, or of inquiry to penetrate its realities, or of rational conceptions to define its origin,—did this also issue out of an education of the imaginative faculty? What can more truly evince it than the fact that all the primitive suppositions and results of Grecian philosophy were themselves expressed in metrical forms? Thales⁴ was a poet, Pythagoras dictated verses, Xenophanes, the originator of the profound Eleatic school, and Parmenides, his still more

Poetical
origin of
Greek Phi-
losophy.

³ [This description, exaggerated as regards even Herodotus, (where does *χειμάριον ποτάμιον* occur?) is wholly inapplicable to his predecessors, whose style was dry and destitute of poetical ornaments, though the matter of their narratives was sufficiently fabulous. See the criticism of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Thucyd. Judicium*, p. 138, 36) compared with that of the rhetor Hermogenes, (*De genere dicendi*, ii. 12.) Ed.]

⁴ [The poem ascribed to Thales is acknowledged by Diogenes Laertius (no skeptic in such matters) to be spurious, (*Vit. Thalet.* c. 23.) He questions the authenticity of *all* the writings which passed under the name of this philosopher. From the manner in which Aristotle records his opinions, it is evident that *he* knew of no genuine work of Thales. See Brandis, *Gesh. d. Phil.* p. 111, and his article THALES in the *Dictionary of Biography*. What “verses” of Pythagoras are alluded to is not clear. The “Golden Verses” were assuredly not his. See Brucker, i. p. 1017. In regard of certain Orphic verses attributed by Ion Chius to Pythagoras, see Lobeck’s *Aglaophamus*, i. p. 330. Bentl. *Epist. ad. Mill.* p. 331, ed. Dyce. Ed.]

abstruse successor, delivered their whole system of doctrines in a poem. Empedocles expressed his theory of the world in hexameters of great spirit and fire. Anaximander was specially remarked as having been the first to depart from this practice among the Ionics, as Zeno of Elea among the Italian sages. And even the earliest prose compositions of these writers (when not employed in direct argument or dialogue) seem to have been moulded into the mystical and oracular forms of a measured delivery, bearing much the same relation to poetry that the recitative does to the aria in music. And the poetical spirit which animates the style of even Plato at a much later era proves to what a period the influence of imaginative forms pervaded the regions of the higher philosophy. In fact, consider the nature and distribution of that wondrous and multiform art to which the imagination gives birth. You will divide it into two master-forms, of which the others are inferior and subordinate varieties. Poetry either details the succession of events, or it expresses individual affections. It is either narrative, continuous, external, historical, *epic*; or it is occasional, detached, internal, *lyric*,—supplying vent to the pressure of emotion,—whether of admiration, of hate, of sorrow, of joy, of terror, of exultation,—and so forth. The early lyrist of Greece were contemporaries and fellow-citizens of its first philosophers. Still, there is a chasm between Xenophanes pronouncing his metrical dogmas on the unity of things, and Simonides or Stesichorus. Let us try if we cannot bridge this abyss. Among those who delivered, either at national and religious festivals or in their more private wanderings, their poetical aliment to the imaginative Greeks, some doubtless (as indeed the existing fragments sufficiently establish) appropriated, as their more peculiar province, the great themes of man's circumstances and destinies, and of that vast and com-

*Theory of
the trans-
ition from
poetry to
philosophy.*

plicated system of which he was a part. Religious ceremonies, and the demand for corresponding hymns, would supply constant development to this sublimer and more abstract tendency of thought. The reduction of the elder cosmogonies into forms satisfactory to the imagination would force the poet into metaphysical and physical contemplation, even though his own mental conclusions, once more invested and disguised in the dress of sense and of mythology, might never appear as philosophy in his verses. The great and universal work of *legislation*—the labours of the Zaleucuses, the Charondases, the Solons—would demand the voice of poetry, sometimes to express the law, sometimes to aid its efficiency by celebrating its excellence;* and such a task can scarcely be fittingly executed without many a profound meditation on the nature of man and of government,—on ethical and political philosophy. If you reflect on these circumstances, I think you will not refuse to admit a passage, not only conceivable but almost inevitable, from the youth of the mind to its manhood, from imagination to reason. Nor will you be surprised to find reason herself emerging deeply marked with the traces of her origin, and poetry for a considerable period testifying the undue prolongation of her influence in swarms of hypotheses, which are, as it were, the poetry of speculation. But, circumscribed as my time is, we cannot dismiss this subject without glancing at the powerful *auxiliaries* which fortified the path of the Grecian intellect to speculation.

Auxiliary causes of the development of speculation.

First and chiefest of all, we are to remember that Greece was a *free* country, and a country of boundless publicity in all its civil pro-

Freedom, and consequent publicity.

* Solon wrote a long poem on the Athenian commonwealth. (*Pausan. Philo.*, &c.)

cedures. This advantage—not too common even now—was in the early Grecian era, as far as we can learn, a blessing solitary in the world. I need not remind you of that India through which you have lately accompanied me, or of those vast Asiatic edifices of empire, of which little more than the king and the king's murderer and successor are known in history. Conceive then the influence of this spirit of publicity upon the development of the reason. Every man ran the course of his day,—every man delivered his *opinion* and struggled for it, as a champion at the games; he had all Greece to witness him. The Grecian love of glory in all its forms—physical and intellectual—was so impassioned, and their sympathy with mental energy, however manifested, so cordial, that for a long period it supported philosophy even against their superstition; and if a few of the leading teachers were ever and anon banished from Greece, or from the world, how many hundreds of these speculators were suffered to live and die in peace! Now, of this emulation and this glory *publicity* was the parent. Cyrus, as Herodotus tells us,⁵ laughed at the Spartans for meeting together to practise on each other in the public squares; “the Persians,” as he says, “being unprovided with any place of public resort!” Does not the historian's simple remark speak volumes?

To one element of the Grecian liberty of speculation I have before alluded. We must not forget that Greece was unencumbered with an exclusive *sacerdotal caste*, that is, with an *hereditary* corporation of priests; for the difference is wide between a priestly order and a priestly caste. Among the Greeks many of the functions of the priesthood were discharged by the heads of families; and though the priest and his office were always regarded with profound respect, yet

*Absence of
a sacer-
dotal caste.*

⁵ [Lib. i. c. 153. Ed.]

we have few instances of even an attempt at spiritual tyranny. The priest was venerated on account of the religion, not the religion on account of the priest. Of the *mysteries* themselves the great body of the educated citizens were participators, and the sacerdotal exhibitors of these performances seem rather to have been regarded as the mechanists, managers, and "showmen" of the rites, than as, either in themselves or their office, forming an essential element of the solemnity. Like all historical representations, this is of course to be taken with occasional allowances and exceptions. The priest from interest, the statesman from policy, the people from habit, and the religious affection, which must have some food, and "abhors a vacuum" in its established objects,—all parties would conspire to resist a *direct* assault on the majesty of Olympus, (as all so often testified in the "Sacred Wars" of Greece;) but in the convenient disguise of metaphysical abstractions the philosopher could usually escape detection, the priests themselves perhaps (in the community of the *mysteries*) were not unwilling to countenance speculation as long as the popular belief was not endangered, and, as a last resource, philosophy could fly to her own mysteries, her "esoteric doctrine," and there take shelter from the vengeance of the gods.

To those who perceive how, in the progress of the human mind, all things are connected with all, it will not be chimerical to add, as an antecedent and motive to the essay at philosophical system in Greece, the study of art itself, and the boundless admiration of its performances, which was ever so strong a characteristic of the Grecian people. The study of art has two tendencies corresponding to its two elements. A work of art is the realization in the sensible world of ideas and relations that belong to the world of thought. To a vain and sensual people, or to that class among a people, the works of art will delight

The diffusion of a taste for Art favourable to speculative habits.

the sense and pass no further than the eye and ear. But it is not so with the higher few who either produce such works, or are critics worthy to appreciate them. To such the visible or the audible is mainly valued as it is the type and symbol of those conceptions of order and of harmony at which the outward work points, if it does not realize them. The sensible object, even the connected associations, so manifold and so magical, are to such thinkers only the vestibule and the antechamber that lead the mind to repose in those loftier principles of symmetry which, as they are anterior to the art and to the artist, are by a natural extension held anterior to that great achievement of the greatest of artists,—the universe itself,—and to form, in truth, its plan, its basis, and its framework. Pythagoras, and his school of music and geometry, will occur to you to illustrate how real was this influence, and to what an extent it could operate to modify the views, and even the language, of its votaries in every department of philosophy.

*Instance of
the Pytha-
goreans.*

These local and internal causes unquestionably predisposed to philosophy; but to the actual impulse which first set the reason upon inquiry, it is probable that foreign influences strongly contributed. The latest writer upon this subject (Dr. Ritter, of the University of Kiel) maintains at great length the self-organization of Grecian philosophy; a doctrine to which, assuredly, the great body of ancient testimony is adverse. I know how remotely traditional a large portion of this evidence is; but, even waiving the authority of the Eastern and Alexandrian cities, how much will remain to influence any reasonable belief upon a subject *in itself* (in spite of all the learned professor's reasonings) affording scarcely any grounds for conjecture on either side! Habits of commercial intercourse had been established long before the period to which we now refer; and we

*Foreign in-
fluences.*

have direct attestations to an intimate political connection between Ionia and Egypt at the very time when the earliest Greek philosophers attempted to systematize nature and man. More than the *impulse* to inquiry, and perhaps a few elementary suggestions, I think it is indeed probable Greece never inherited from Egypt or Phœnicia. The Grecian intellect soon outstripped the boasted "wisdom of the Egyptians." Indeed, we know that Thales surprised his Egyptian directors with a geometry more perfect than their own. The story of the measurement of the Pyramids proves (if authentic*) two points. It proves⁶ that geometry must have been but very imperfectly cultivated in Egypt, if a conception so obvious and elementary could be received as a valuable accession to the stores of the science; and it proves with what rapidity the earliest seeds of suggested knowledge (for *all* attest that *geometry* came from Egypt) germinated in the mind of Thales. Shall we deny the compatibility of the same facts, of foreign and feeble origination,—of Grecian and rapid development,—to the wider "Science of Principles" itself?

* We owe it to Laertius, and Pliny, and Plutarch,—no earlier authority that I know of.

⁶ [The Greeks were singularly anxious to give to others the glory of one of the most solid if not the most brilliant of their intellectual achievements,—the invention of Geometry. Though they profess to have received Geometry from Egypt, it is remarkable that each step in the progress of the science is ascribed to a Greek,—not to an Egyptian. The most probable opinion is, that though the Egyptians had carried the art of *mensuration* to a perfection which astonished their Greek visitors, the Science or Theory of Geometry was the exclusive product of the Grecian mind, meditating, it may be, on the empirical precepts of the priestly agri-mensores. The well-known passage in the sixth book of Plato's *Laws* (p. 819) may thus be reconciled with that in the fifth, (p. 747, c.) in which he disparages the vaunted Egyptian "wisdom," representing it to be mere "cunning," (*πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας*.) Ed.]

On this subject, however, of the foreign or exclusively internal origination of Greek philosophy, I need not, I suppose, tell you that much has been speculated and much written. My object, I confess, as a *Lecturer*, is rather to give you, in their spirit and general connection, my own results, (such as they are,) and occasional suggestions and directions for those who have time and inclination for further inquiry, than to enter into an actual statement of the evidence itself upon this or any other question of pure erudition. This course—perhaps the more arduous and responsible of the two—I adopt for two reasons:—first, my present labours are principally intended not so much for directly *historical* purposes, as with the simpler view of exhibiting to you the extent, variety, and attractions of the subject itself: and, besides this, I act upon my own experience of the almost total inutility of that kind of oral instruction which consists of lengthened enumeration and is mainly addressed to the memory. What is merely addressed to the memory, if forgotten, is lost *itself*,—and *time* lost; what is addressed mainly to the reason, though forgotten, (which is far less likely,) leaves improved faculties behind it. For in points not too directly affecting temporal and eternal happiness, it is scarcely too much to say, that it is better to seek truth without finding it, than to find it without seeking it.

Three great periods in the history of Greek philosophical development:

1. From Thales to Socrates.

2. From Socrates to the late Academy.

3. From the revival of philosophy under the Roman Empire, to

The common, and the natural, division of the history of Greek philosophy makes it consist of three great periods,—the first embracing its varied movement, from its dawn in the speculations of Thales and Pythagoras, to the great epoch of the teaching of Socrates; the second, the successions of the schools which grew out of the Socratic reformation, and which may be considered as having run through their entire development (to have given out all that was in

them) by the time of the fifth academy,—about half a century before our era; and the third, the attempts at revival, overwhelmed by the irresistible infusion of foreign elements, and carried on, under various names and with various fortunes, until the death-warrant of Grecian philosophy was signed in Justinian's decree for closing the schools of Athens in the year 529. This triple division includes a period not very far below twelve hundred years,—a period of prodigious mental activity; a period, for many reasons, immortal in the recollections of man, and which no multitude, violence, or extent of future revolutions in his history is ever likely to obliterate, or even obscure. The visible scenery of classical philosophy may assist your remembrance of its distinctions,—*countries* serving the purpose of the mnemonic chambers of which old rhetoricians speak, in our recollection of a continuous and diversified history, as well as in this case exercising many and obvious influences on the complexion of the history itself. The first act of the drama of Grecian speculation was performed upon the varied theatre of the Grecian colonies,—Asiatic, insular, and Italian,—of even Thrace itself,—verging at length (in Anaxagoras) to Athens: the second, the most brilliant and effective of all, belongs almost exclusively to that famous city; in the third, Philosophy opens her career in Alexandria, extends in a new form to Rome,—to the Syrian cities,—and at length returns, weak and faltering, as a pilgrim to his birthplace, to expire among the ruins of the old glories at Athens.

Let us now (without indulging in excessive or fanciful generalizations, and yet without confining ourselves to the mere letter of the ancient records) endeavour to combine in rational connection the successive results, and the actual progress, of the Grecian intellect in the first of these periods. We

*the closing
of the
schools of
Athens by
Justinian.*

*First
period cha-
racterized.*

have facts—often only detached and unconnected facts—delivered to the memory in the history of philosophy as to the senses in the history of nature: let us essay to interpret these facts into the higher language of law and principle. In some cases the separations and combinations are so obvious as to have occurred even to the least philosophic of the old recorders; in others, much light has been introduced into the darkness by later analyzers:—wherever I shall have seen reason to coincide with them I will freely adopt their conclusions, wherever I disagree, advance such as I think more likely to represent the reality,—in both cases without often troubling you, for the present, with the fact, or the reasons, of assent or dissent.

I will only observe, in attempting thus to extract the subtle spirit from the miscellaneous fruits and products of thought in these primitive schools, that, if in one respect their antiquity brings us difficulty, in another it simplifies the labour. The main difficulty it brings is the rarity, the vagueness, and the very doubtful genuineness of our materials; the alleviation is to be found in a mental peculiarity which belongs to all early efforts of thought. That peculiarity is *its fearless straightforwardness*. Not discussing remote conclusions, it is not afraid of them, and does not provide against them. It sees no finger-posts erected by old experience to warn the wanderer among the abstruser by-paths of speculation to beware of adjacent precipices. Accordingly, wherever thought would carry, the first disciples of thought would go. Their solution might be false or partial, but they worked out their problem as far as their intellectual calculus would enable. Now, (accidental circumstances apart,) the more natural the operations of reason the more symmetrical. Where a crystallization is undisturbed we soon detect its process and its law. Thus it is that we can calculate—transferring

*Its boldness
and total
want of
circum-
spection.*

the principle to *moral* natures—the conduct in any given crisis of an honest man with more certainty than that of a *rogue*; rectitude is one and invariable, obliquity manifold and mutable; and if we can but be certified that a character tells itself out with sincerity, we may make its former the counterpart and prophecy of its future actions. This fearless prosecution of dogmas, as well as another peculiarity of a similar nature, (the power of a leading principle to modify *every* division of the speculations of the same mind,) is a characteristic of *all* the schools of philosophy in Greece, and eminently of those now before us,—precisely *because* they were to so great a degree self-originated and unpossessed of antecedent experience. And from this property, as I have said, their laws of progress and connection are the more easily calculable. They took views originally limited indeed, (hence their mutual oppositions and exclusions,) but they seldom limited the consequences of them; and if one generation of a school did not reach the last term of the hereditary philosophy, that term was sure to be evolved among the conclusions of some successor. Thus, the *Ionic tendency* is traceable in an almost unbroken line of descent from Thales, through Leucippus and Democritus, to Epicurus: the Pythagorean, from Pythagoras, through Timæus, &c., to Plato: the Academic, from the more Socratic elements of Plato's mind, through Xenocrates, &c., to Arcesilaus: the Stoic, from Zeno to Chrysippus: and so of others, in more or less degrees.

*Principles
pushed
fearlessly
to their re-
sults.*

Once more: let me recall you to the first stage of this vast Grecian development. I need scarcely tell you that I do not purpose to discuss or enumerate the special conjectures as to particular physical facts—the nature and constitution of the sun, moon, and stars, &c.—which are scattered among the relics of the early sages. Of these things they *could* form no

*Defects of
the Ionic
physics ac-
counted for.*

judgment worth the regards of an age like ours. They were without our artificial senses,—our telescopes, our microscopes, our magnetic needles; and before we indulge in triumph over the childishness of some of their conjectures, let us remember how much of modern physics is primarily due to these inventions, and how much of these inventions is due to accident. Besides, there is, I confess, to me something irreverent towards these venerable men in eagerly exhibiting what Providence has allowed us now to call their weaknesses; we forget the courage and depth of their abstract views of nature and man, in smiling over Anaximander's hypothesis of eclipses as produced by the stoppage of apertures in the sun and moon, or Xenophanes's notion of the stars as condensations of the clouds. At the same time, happier views, where they occur, and seem to have been at all legitimately arrived at, would deserve, of course, to be recorded with honour.

*Distinction
of "sub-
ject" and
"object,"*

The division of "subject" and "object" is obvious. If not in all languages, it is assumptively in all minds. Metaphysicians may fix and define it; but they only shape and polish the precious mineral of reason which, in its rude and primitive state, is buried deep in every intellectual soil. Now, science may occupy itself with either of these provinces. The reason may forget itself for the universe, or forget the universe for itself. It may inquire into the facts and the relations of the outward order, and may even dare to pronounce certain principles regarding them to be true by an *à priori* necessity; or it may (remembering that all these principles are but the prescripts of its own nature imposed upon that which is not itself) drop back upon its own essence, and, neglecting for a time all practical applications, examine, first, the principles of its own constitution, and, secondly, the legitimacy of their

in Physics;

transference to the world around it. Similarly *in Ethics.* in morals: the mind, with its boundless faculties of conception and combination, may declare, may illustrate, may systematize, the rule of right; may exhibit its various applications in all the variety of human conjunctures; may pronounce the high probabilities of its future corroboration in a world which is to contain the solution of this; may even imagine ideal constitutions of society in which the rule would be maintained without fear of infringement: or it may once more fall back upon itself, and question its own reason and consciousness as to the true nature, the certain existence, the authority, of such a rule. Now, of the first period of Greek philosophy, it may be remarked that it was, with scarcely an exception, the philosophy of the object, not of the subject,—of the universe, not of man. It was the *rebound* of baffled reason from the impenetrable bulwarks of the universe that at length drove it back upon itself,—and perhaps deeper into itself in proportion to the strength of the shock. The mightiest of all problems was the very first it essayed in the very inexperience of its childhood; as infants (ignorant of the signs of distance and the limits of their power) are said, when presented to such objects, to stretch vaguely towards the sun or the stars! We shall soon see how reason was finally forced to return upon itself through the inevitable paths of dialectical disputation and the skepticism of the first “sophists.”

*First
period ob-
jective.*

Of this great body of investigators of the universe, all antiquity has coincided in constituting two classes; which, from their first and chief localities, have been termed the “Ionic” and the “Italic.” But their distinction was of a deeper character than can be presented by geographical position,—a distinction reaching to the very foundation of their entire habits of speculation. We have already assigned to

*The distinction of
Ionic and
Italic is not
merely geo-
graphical.*

Double aspect of objective thought.

Facts and laws of Facts.

Physics and Mathematics.

the ante-Socratic sages the study of the impersonal or objective in general; we must now divide *this* also, and classify them by the double aspect in which it can be beheld. In doing so I only comment and develop the views of Aristotle himself, in the able but rapid *résumé* which he inserts in the first book of the *Metaphysics*. The world consists of facts and relations of facts, of things and the laws of things, of matter and the harmony of matter, of (to borrow an analogy often too seductive) a body and a soul! The combination makes the universe. We should now smile at any teacher who claimed exclusive honours for purely physical or purely mathematical science: we know that the physiology of the world demands them both, the one to surprise with all the boundless variety of compositions and decompositions which experiment detects, or produces, in the material substratum of the world; the other, from a few of these *elementary* physical laws (perceived, or conceived, to operate uniformly) to pronounce all the effects of their combinations, to express in a line the harmony of ages, to be the true gamut or "notation" of the ideal music of the spheres. It is the Oriental story of the lame mendicant who was sharp-sighted and his strong-limbed neighbour who was blind: separated, each was powerless to stir; united, they advanced with ease and rapidity. But it is the calmer *age* of philosophy that allows these serene reconciliations; its youth is ardent and exclusive. Thales and Pythagoras, who possessed all, and more than, the knowledge of their times, both saw this double aspect of nature: Thales was a mathematician, Pythagoras was, doubtless, a naturalist; but the temper and taste of each was more powerfully attracted by opposite views; however in the course of nature they might both acknowledge these potent prin-

Thales and Pythagoras.

ciples to be alike engaged in the complexity of the effect, when they came to characterizing the entire product, the contrasted points from which they contemplated the majestic scenery of the universe obviously affected their decision. In the Ionic school the direction impressed by Thales is much more observable in the progress of the school than in the teaching of the master; in the Italic, from the very commencement, the personal influence of Pythagoras infused into the entire succession the strong peculiarities of his own intellectual and moral character. Moreover, you are to remember that, properly speaking, Thales himself had no school or special sect; he was (so to speak) a "gentleman of private fortune" at Miletus, who travelled to gratify a curiosity for universal information, and to feed the energies of a working and creative intellect; his "disciples" were friends, united by taste and character: Pythagoras, on the contrary, was essentially a sectarian leader; for many years the oracle and high-priest of one of the most exclusive societies of antiquity; the legislator of mystic purifications, ablutions, initiations; in his personal nature regarded as little less than a god, (or an actual God, if we believe Iamblichus, whose Pythagorean gospel, however, I advise you to study in a most skeptical spirit,) and of influence sufficient to make the most trying sacrifices the price willingly paid for admission to his *σύστημα*.

Gentlemen, the philosophers of both these divisions were *not* believers in a God in any sense which a Christian reasoner would assign to that great proposition. The innumerable attempts to attach the glory of such a conception to the names of Thales, Pythagoras, and the rest, have always appeared to me completely unsuccessful.

Before entering upon a sketch of the connection of their systems, it may be well to speak of this point, as unfounded notions respecting

*Were the
early phi-
losophers
Theists?*

*Reasons
for answer-
ing the
question in
the nega-
tive.*

ancient theology (arising, I suspect, from inexperience in the original documents, few as they are) have ever been a source of hesitation, obscurity, and misconception in the popular expositions of the earliest Grecian theories of nature. In the Ionian school (until the publication of the opinions of Anaxagoras, who, as I believe, was himself very far from a clear and compre-

Examination of the theological dicta of Pythagoras.

hensive mastery of the conception) there assuredly appears nothing worthy of the name of Theism;⁷ in the system of Pythagoras (whose religious tendency is often celebrated) Deity is indeed named, and many expressions employed which, seen through a modern medium, might appear fraught with singular sublimity; but a closer inspection of the system, not as it was remodelled in the pompous pages of Porphyry and Iamblichus, but as it came from the venerable founder himself, discovers a deity with scarcely a character of distinct or personal subsistence, a mystical unit in a universal harmony, a pervading fire of which our own souls are *parcels*. The *moral* attributes which he attached to deity seem to me (most creditable as they are to their illustrious designer) to belong, in *his own* conceptions, less to God than to the gods; or, if viewed in any higher light, to be so inextricably confused with that mystical arithmetic of which he considered the universe a sensible representation, as to become, by their place in the system, rather harmonic laws than moral essences. So completely was this the case that, before he could thus sublimate *Justice*, he was obliged to call it a *square-number*, &c. If, however, a deity *were personally and distinctly avowed* as separate from his creation, such notions as these would not be wholly inapplicable, *symbolically* regarded; indeed, they are, as it were, the mathe-

⁷ [A partial exception must be made in favour of Xenophanes, as, I shall endeavour to show in a subsequent note. Ed.]

matrical dress of the modern ethical school of Clarke. But you may observe, as a general scholium upon this subject, that ancient philosophy, even in its subsequent and highest flights, on this side of mysticism, dreaded to transfer to pure Deity the attribution of human excellences, except in a form, as in Plato, abstract, unpractical, and irrelative to individuals; while, on the other hand, ancient religion overlaid its deity with human weaknesses, low, contracted, and debasing,—two parallel experiments on a vast scale, performed in the two great provinces of human nature, to testify the profound want, in the complex system of the reason and affections of man, of some yet unuttered representation, which, by uniting the objects of both, could give to mankind all that was best in humanity without compromising Deity, and all that is awful in the divine without sacrificing the tenderness, intimacy, and sympathy of the human nature! But to return to the primitive schools, and their conceptions of the prime agent of the physical world.

One of the most difficult tasks, but one of the most necessary, for the inquirer into the true spirit of a remote philosophy, is a *total abstraction of all local and modern ideas*. Unless you can close your eyes for a moment to the blaze of evidence with which Christianity, and the writings consequent on Christianity, have surrounded the belief of a Supreme Agent separate from the world he has called into existence,—unless you can conceive your affections disengaged from the hold with which the Christian Revelation has fastened this truth around the heart,—nay, unless you can even remove the fainter light of the Platonic and Ciceronian theology,—you cannot apprehend the true position and difficulties in which the first *rational* explorers of the universe were placed. We may think that, by a strong effort of ima-

Opposite defects of the popular and philosophical theology.

Difficulty and necessity of laying aside modern ideas in judging of the early philosophies.

gination, we can adequately conceive this state of human reason in its first awful interview with nature; but we are still like those who, after looking at the sun, pass suddenly into darkness: for a time there remains upon the eye the involuntary image of the brightness we have left. The conception of the free production of a universe by an Infinite Essence altogether above and beyond it is *not* elementary in human reason; it is not the step of the child, but the stride of the man.

The religion of antiquity was unfavourable to right conceptions of Deity.

The *religion* of antiquity was so far from aiding the progress to this conviction that it perpetually counteracted it; polytheism, far from bringing light into the obscurity, filled it with phantoms, and taught men to be contented with them! It presented a catalogue of divinities whose *tombs* were scattered through Greece: even the sepulchre of the Father of Gods and Men, which was the special boast of Crete, and the heaven which these immortalized benefactors gladdened with their presence, was only, as it were, the "upper story" of this world. To all beyond religion could only give the name of "Fate;" and philosophy too often was content to follow in its footsteps.* In fact, (and the remark is worth your notice,) *Homer* was to antiquity not at all unlike what (on very different grounds of authority) the Bible is to us; and you will find through almost all of ancient philosophy the same anxiety to confirm a philosophical dogma by the high traditional evidence of Homer that among us a

Anxiety of early speculators to accommodate their opinions to the Homeric theology.

* The traces of this wretched labour to accommodate speculation and superstition, to match each prodigy in Olympus with a hypothesis in philosophy, (or, as degrading a task, to justify the latter by the former,) is observable through most of the history of the Grecian reason; and perhaps was never wholly got rid of, though its results were pretty much what Lord Bacon stigmatizes in another case,—"*fantastica philosophia et heretica religio.*"

daring speculatist often evinces to confirm his notions by their supposed consonance with the Scriptures. Homer was the public document of polytheism, the popular repository of the national beliefs. Entangled among these fancies, the efforts of the reason were constantly hampered and misled; its theological tendency was downward to be *popular*; and when, struggling out of these fantastic illusions, it strove at length to meet the immensity of nature, untaught and unassisted, it grew bewildered with the vastness,—made one wild though sublime effort,—conceived an ἀρχή, or principle, which might be to nature what the life or soul is to the body,—an inherent, inseparable energy,—and fell exhausted, still outside the threshold of truth!

We are not to call these early labourers of reason “Atheists,” for all, or almost all, admitted a governing-principle in some sense; they were Pantheists, in that higher form of Pantheism which, though it associates the universe necessarily and irrevocably with its principle, yet does not wholly confound them, and even allows to the moving-spirit a certain superiority over the mass it pervades. Much has been said of the sublimity of the instantaneous obedience to divine command expressed in the third verse of the book of Genesis; but for a far profounder sublimity of conception you will refer to the *first*:—and every investigation of the feeble and wavering theology of primitive reason will deepen your reverence for that old and venerable record which, in the midst of so much uncertainty as even the wisest acknowledged when they approached the relation of nature and its cause, calmly prefaced its story of the world with the declaration, without exception, reservation, or indecision, that “In the beginning God *created* the heaven and the earth.” Nor was this “the wisdom of the Egyptians:” Thales and Pythagoras surely did not leave that country

The early philosophers are nevertheless not to be styled Atheists. In what sense they were Pantheists.

less rich in its ancient learning than the Jewish cosmogonist; yet both found the world to be living, *ἐμψυχον*, and its God to be the *ψύχων*, or animating principle, of the universe. How convenient are the preferences of skeptical criticism! It can fall in raptures of admiration before the *νοῦς διακοσμῶν*—the ordering Intelligence—of Anaxagoras, though obscurely and timidly put forth; it turns coldly from that page which, ages before him, without an effort, scaled the full height of the conception, and presented to us the result in all its glory, unweakened by limitation, unalloyed by error, and unclouded by doubt!

Anaxagoras the first Theist.

That this representation of the elder philosophies is the true one, I might argue from the unanimous tradition of antiquity,—that to the Anaxagoras whom I have just mentioned belonged the distinction of *first* placing Pure Intelligence at the helm of the universe. “When,” says Aristotle, (in the 1st *Metaph.*, c. iii.,—far our most valuable document for the philosophy of those times as respects these questions,)—“When a man said that there was in nature, as in animals, an intelligence which is the cause of the arrangement and of the order of the universe, this man appeared alone to have preserved his reason in the midst of the follies of his predecessors, (*οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ’ εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.*) Now, we know that Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ first openly maintained these views, though Hermotimus of Clazomenæ has the credit of having anticipated him.” Such attestations as these (with the well-known fact that this Philosophy obtained a characteristic *title* from his system) surely outweigh the multitude of refinements by which some critics have endeavoured to antedate these views. You will also hereafter perceive how even Anaxagoras himself supplies the harmonizing intelligence with pre-existing materials.

But these representations will become more probable, because more consistent, in the rapid review which I shall attempt of the real spirit and connection of these systems. By seizing (if we may dare to say we have indeed seized) that spirit and connection, we shall see with the eyes and hear with the ears which in Ionia contemplated the features and in Italy caught the harmonies of nature much more than two thousand years ago. We shall behold our infant reason in its cradle; and (with all its comparative deficiencies) I think I shall induce you to agree that *that* infancy was yet the infancy of a Hercules! To this subject, then, we will devote our next meeting.

LECTURE V.

ON THE EARLY EFFORTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY IN
GREECE—THE IONIC AND ATOMIC SCHOOLS.

GENTLEMEN:—

*Early
Greek phi-
losophy.*

It becomes my duty to endeavour to present to you some account of the first efforts of philosophical inquiry in Greece. A subject attended with many internal difficulties has been to me made yet more difficult by the pressure of many present engagements. In order, then, to excuse any deficiencies you may observe in the sketch I shall present, I must be

*Obstacles to
its investi-
gation.*

permitted, for my own defence, as well as your instruction, to refer to some of the *obstacles* that have at all times impeded the progress of investigators in this field. The extent of these difficulties they only can estimate who sincerely search for truth; those who lightly adopt the easy solutions of theorists on secondary information will, of course, not appreciate the labours of penetrating to sources they have never desired to reach; but they who honestly desire to understand, not the speculations of the modern systematizers of history, but the reality of ancient wisdom, will be at least as anxious to fix the certainty of facts as to follow the succession of deductions.

*Lateness of
sources of
informa-
tion.*

Among these difficulties in the ascertainment of facts is to be mentioned, in the first place, the *lateness* of the traditions on which we depend for the principal part of our knowledge of primitive Grecian thought. On Plato and Aristotle we are chiefly dependant for this service; and their distance is such as to oblige even them to contemplate their objects

through the dim and distorting medium of two, or more than two, centuries. The accounts transmitted by *Aristotle* are, in his usual dry and definite style, clearly enough separated from the mass of his own reasonings; but those of *Plato* are so inextricably entangled in his speculations, that it is almost as difficult to recover the original philosophies from his dialogues as it would be to subtract a particular tint of colour from a painted landscape of a thousand blended hues. His sages are introduced, not with the precision of a report, but as the heroes of a drama; and we as little look for the cold reality of truth in his philosophical representations as we look for the accuracy of history in an historical romance. *Plato* seems, indeed, destined to spread the influence of his personal character almost as far backward into history as he did *forward* into the course and fortunes of human thought. The speculations of primitive antiquity are resuscitated in his pages, but the resurrection is in another and a glorified body.

*Character
of Aristotle's*

*and of
Plato's
historical
accounts.*

At a later period a new source of perversion arose. The early assailants of Christianity in the schools of Alexandria, anxious to match the miracles of Christianity with rival wonders, exalted the first teachers of Grecian wisdom into the apostles of a supernatural revelation. Endeavouring to elevate them to divinity, they loaded them with all the characteristics and the opprobrium of imposture. The fame of *Pythagoras* has especially suffered by this injudicious advocacy; and the philosopher of *Samos*, installed as a god, is decorated with the insignia of a juggler and a hypocrite. On the other hand, the Christian teachers, not yet instructed by experience as to the true nature of their argument, were often tempted to retaliate by representations scarcely more justifiable, and to deny to the early sages even a

Perversions introduced by the early assailants of Christianity,

*and by its
apologists.*

glimpse of those truths in moral science whose exclusive light they conceived that the religion of Christ had claimed as its own.

Misrepresentation aided by the oral transmission,

The circumstance which gave facility to all these misrepresentations was the transmission of doctrines by *oral delivery*. Passing from teacher to teacher, each added or subtracted according to the tendencies of each; and the ultimate condition of a tenet was the representative, not of the mind of the original framer, but of the complex, and often contradictory, succession of minds through which it had passed.

and by the figurative dress of the early doctrines.

To this was added the uncertainty arising from the *very form* of these doctrines, which, expressed in the highest strain of figurative language, often admitted of a diversity of interpretations with nearly equal facility, and assumed to each commentator a complexion reflected from his own habits of thought. Had, however, these reasoners commenced their views from elementary grounds by a regulated process, even this rich and ornamental dress could scarcely have perplexed beholders as to the true direction and rate of their progress. But no such methodical march is discoverable in the first essays of inquiry: all is there detached, conjectural, aphoristic, unsettled. The way to discover is seldom learned but by discovery itself; and *methods* are the last things perfected in philosophy.

There is a further cause of confusion, which I think necessary to be mentioned, because it assumes the prerogatives of superior accuracy. It is the habit of reducing all the eminent names of the early philosophers under fixed successions,—making each the inheritor and continuator of the doctrines of a single determinate predecessor. I am strongly inclined to think that this enrolment of philosophers in files is altogether the creation of an age far later than their own,—an age in which such

The habit of ranging philosophers in "successions" a frequent cause of confusion.

successions were established, and in which, consequently, habit had made it difficult to conceive philosophers otherwise propagated and preserved. Pherecydes is made the common teacher of Thales and Pythagoras; yet we know that he was (as well as Anaximander, who is made the pupil of Thales) their mere contemporary. And it cannot be questioned, the radical differences of systematic views of teachers supposed to be successive and dependent are such as to deprive these hypothetical successions of much claim to probability.¹

We saw, at our last meeting, that the universal character of the first age of Grecian speculation was its outwardness,—its tendency to theorize the visible universe in preference to the consciousness or its phenomena. The first impulses of the mind are, as we observed, almost invariably external; it becomes mingled, and even identified, with its objects; and the manner in which *colour* assumes extension, figure, and place, is a type of that wider and more perpetual instinct which leads the soul to diffuse itself upon, and to lose itself in, the material universe. A sufficient indication of this fact in the present case is to be found in the very *titles* of the treatises whose fragments, or whose traditions, remain from that age: they are, almost without exception, discourses *περὶ φύσεως*, (*De rerum natura*.) The question in debate (for it is well at once to fix this) regarded nothing less than the origin and subsequent revolutions of things; and the effort, doubtless, of these sages was to supply to the

Externality of the first age of speculation.

Its subject was "the nature of things."

¹ [The remark of a late eminent scholar on this point is true, and well expressed:—"Solent fere grammatici hominibus inclytis magistros quærere quam maxime inclytos, et sine magistro vix ullum patiuntur; adeo ut nonnumquam claris scriptoribus affinxerint ejusmodi præceptores, quorum aut ob ætatis distantiam aut aliam quamvis ob causam discipuli illi esse omnino non potuere." Ed.]

speculative mind something answering to the vague affirmations of the popular creed. Hence they perpetually kept these superstitions in view, and made it a constant object to harmonize their physics with the public theology,—to make their *cosmogonies* an explanation of the *theogonies* of the poetical faith.

The question was, then, What was to be fixed as the "*ἀρχή*" of the surrounding universe?

This is a word which, as then understood, can scarcely be correctly rendered into any term in our language. It was not the *cause* of the world, nor yet the final element, but rather that thing which should be *assumed* to give a rational explanation of the rest. The word "Principle" is, perhaps, nearest to its significancy, because almost equally indefinite. The *ἀρχή* was the last term to which the inquirer's analysis brought him,—whether it resulted as water, or fire, or harmony, or unity, or mind. The word is reported to have been first employed by Anaximander, who made the Unbounded his *ἀρχή*; and to Plato is ascribed the useful labour of distinguishing between it and the kindred term *στοιχέιον*, with which it was often confounded. The word slowly limited itself; but in the early stages of its use (more especially in its application to the first principle of the air and fire philosophies) its uncertainty has forever left the true scope of its employers in a great measure undecided. We can, however, plainly enough detect the *gradual progress* of these schools, in all their divisions, towards the conception of the

*Search for
an ἀρχή, or
principle.*

*Gradual
refinement
of this con-
ception.*

Infinite and Absolute Being,—a process wonderfully instructive! The elemental *ἀρχή* rising gradually from its grossly-material nature into the finer forms of matter, escaping at length even these subtler bonds, and becoming no longer a fire, or an air, but, as it would seem, a *spiritual* flame and diffusive presence, until at length the element, in even its most attenuated state, seems to

have been conceived as little more than the type or symbol of the Supreme Principle.

We agreed, at the last Lecture, to follow as our safest guide the division established by Aristotle, (since revived as if it were a discovery,)—with which internal principle of division the geographical discrimination of the Ionic and Italic schools nearly corresponds. In selecting an ἀρχή for the universe, you must remember that these speculators were without a *revelation*, on the one hand, to fix their religious views,—without *experimental* investigation, on the other, to fix their scientific ones. What then remained? Suppositions more or less approximate to the truth, or reasonings independent altogether of experience: in other words, physical analogies or mathematical deductions. Here, then, lay the point of difference. Both parties sought general laws, but the one, by analogies of phenomena, the other, by the first principles of quantity itself; the one attempted to class the contingent, the other, to fix the necessary and eternal; the one evolved things in time, the other co-ordinated them through space. The one was the remote and shadowy image of our chemistry, the other, perhaps, of our mathematical mechanics.

*Aristotle's
distinction
adopted.*

*Ionic and
Italic, or
Physical
and Mathe-
matical
schools*

We shall consider first the fortunes of the Ionic teachers, and of those connected with them in principles. “Let us,” says a letter attributed to one² of themselves,—“Let us begin all discourses with *Thales*.” To introduce any light into these obscure recesses, we must, however, once more attempt the work of classification. The simplest principle of division will

*The Ionic
philoso-
phers.*

² [Anaximenes, in one of two epistles quoted by Diog. Laertius, ii. c. 2, and supposed to be addressed to Pythagoras. They are very paltry forgeries, the production evidently of the same hand to which we owe the epistles of Thales found also in Diogenes. Ed.]

be that which places on one side those philosophers who accounted for the universe by the transformations of a *single element*, and who, for the most part, conceived the universe as a *vital organization*; and, on the other, those who explained it by the combination of atoms, united either fortuitously or by intelligent agency, or (as Empedocles) operated on by a twofold principle of attraction and repulsion, which, from the analogy of the affections, he styled "love" and "hatred." Now, it appears to me that Thales, the common parent of these very opposite theories of the world, actually involved in his own teaching the germs of both; that is, that he, in adopting both water and a moving-principle as alternately his ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, did really include both the purely vital and the purely mechanical interpretations of the universe. But, as I would much rather furnish your minds with thoughts than with names, let us enlarge for a while upon this double aspect of the world as it presented itself to the physical section of the primitive philosophy.

Reflections on the different aspect of the world implied in these distinctions.

Man explains the universe by *himself*. Whatever be the real value of the laws he imposes on the world, and in imposing seems to detect; whether these relations under which he co-ordinates nature are of the eternal essence of nature herself, independent of human perception, or are merely mental,—the laws rather of his own constitution than of external existences,—and thus necessary by a merely subjective necessity: however you decide *this* question, on which so much thought has of late been exhausted, it will still be the truth, even if not the whole truth, that, in the first instance, man explains the universe by *himself*. He subjects the world to the empire of his own intellectual principles; he projects the shadow of his own reason on a world

Man seeks to explain the universe by himself.

whose existence is yet felt to be distinct and independent of him. You know that a great portion of every logical investigation of human nature is occupied with defining and classifying these laws of reason (causality, substance, identity, diversity, &c.) under which, to receive the world at all, we are obliged to apprehend it. To accomplish this is a high achievement of advanced reason. And the difficulty is not at all so much to enumerate *all* these principles as to enumerate none but the true ones; for, though man has no right to make *à priori* application to the world of any principles but those supreme intuitions which possess the universality, necessity, and immediate evidence of pure reason, his early tendencies are constantly leading him to a wide and vague application of his *whole nature* to the world around him, to see himself in every thing, to recognise his will, and even his sensations, in the inanimate universe. This blind analogy is almost the first hypothesis of childhood. The child translates the external world by himself. He perceives, for example, successions under the law of causality, but he adds to this causality his own consciousness of voluntary effort. He perceives objects under the law of extension, but he has little conception of an extension which should overpass his own power of traversing it. The child personifies the stone that hurts him; the childhood of superstition (whose genius is multiplicity) personifies the laws of nature as gods; the childhood of philosophy (whose genius is *unity*) made the world itself a living, breathing animal, "whose body nature was, and God the soul."

Tendency to personification in the infancy of Philosophy.

The universe a living organized whole.

Gross as was this conception, it reacted in an error still more unfortunate. When our organized nature had been thus transferred to the universe, as even the faintest inspection of man displayed a superior and inferior principle,—a mover and a moved,—it was natural,

and on the grounds of the application necessary, to constitute such in the external world. But, as the feeble psychology of that age had not arrived at a clear and definite separation of the motive power from the animal system, there was no such definite separation made in the great external organization. Accordingly, whatever seemed the most subtle or pliable as well as universal element in the mass of the visible world was marked as the *seminal* principle whose successive developments and transformations produced all the rest; and then the *living principle* in this (confused with itself) was called by the same name. Then came the reaction I have intimated. When from the world these theorists

*Physical
produce
psycho-
logical
errors.*

once more descended into themselves, they came with all the machinery of their external system about them; and, as it would have been preposterous to exalt the spirit of a man above that of the universe, the predominant element in the world became the presiding principle in the human microcosm,—and the *soul* was now fire, now air, now a mixture or quintessence of the elements. This tendency was, of course, strengthened by the belief, almost universal, that the soul was itself a detached portion of the divine nature, and that, after the completion of its allotted changes, its destiny was absorption into the vague and unfixed essence to which they were wont to give the title of God,—a striking point of resemblance to those Indian systems in whose examination we were lately engaged.

But, as there is a motion of organization, so there is a motion of mere local arrangement and elementary affinity. And the possibility of explaining the universe by this apposition of primitive particles was also contemplated by these philosophers. Now, this may be accomplished on two suppositions; either by mutual affinity, or by intelligent agency: and this was

*Opposite,
or me-
chanical
theory.*

probably the true distinction between the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. However this be, you can easily conceive that the latter, by the very force of his doctrine of intelligence, might be led to reject the class of analogies I have mentioned, and to consider the universe as the aggregate of particles of infinite smallness, combined and arranged by the presiding agency of a supreme reason.

Having thus attempted to distribute these numerous teachers under two general classes, we may now proceed briefly to note their respective views. As to Thales, I have said that an inspection of the few accounts preserved of his doctrine led me to think that he, without perhaps much precision, embraced a combination of both. I have no intention of entering into minute statements of special tenets, which you can obtain in any of the ordinary sources. But we know that Thales considered Water the primary element, out of whose transformations the material world was formed, for reasons which you may find recorded in Aristotle, and which certainly evince the great Milesian's tendency to the *organic* theory of the world. Other reasons have, however, been conjectured, and, perhaps, traditionary doctrines mingled with the current of the speculations of Thales. We know also that he added to this original element a formative principle of motion, (which, indeed, Cicero³ pronounces to have been his "god.") Here, then, we seem to perceive

Thales,
born B.C.
639; died
B.C. 542
perh.
His specu-
lations seem
to involve
the germ of
both the
mechanical
and dyna-
mical theo-
ries.
His ἀρχή,
"Water."

³ ["Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret." *Nat. D.* i. 10, 25. Here, however, the speaker is the Epicurean Velleius, who in this Dialogue is purposely made to misrepresent the doctrines of the philosophers. "Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur," &c. *Ib.* c. viii. 18. The hypothesis of a *formative* and a *formed* principle is quite at variance with the reported tenets of Thales, and with the whole spirit of the earliest Ionian

a syncretism of both the systems I have noted. But I would further invite your attention to the intimate reciprocal influence of the theology and psychology of that remote age,—an influence, indeed, which is still manifested in the too frequent connection of atheistic and materialist views in our own times. Thales, as we are well assured, defined the soul as a principle *δεικνύτον*.⁴ Extending the principle, he attributed separate souls to all moving things,—as to the loadstone,—and held that “the world was full of demons;” portions, as Aristotle⁵ saw, of the universal soul. You will perceive that this perfectly harmonized with that theology which made the Deity the moving energy of the universe,—i.e. the energy which operated those successive transmutations by which the primitive aqueous element was condensed into the harder or attenuated into the subtler portions of the world. Thus the different fragments of his philosophy illumine each other, and reveal the lineaments of a proportioned system. Certain reports of the Thaletic teaching preserved in Clemens and Laertius are too *late* to be safe, and seem discordant with the character of these recognised principles of his philosophy.

Anaximander, who is ordinarily placed next to the

Philosophy. It would have been, in effect, an anticipation of Anaxagoras. Ed.]

⁴ [Pseudo-Plut. *De Placitis Phil.* iv. c. 2. Aristotle’s statement is more guarded:—“If we can rely on the notices we have of Thales, he too would seem to have conceived the soul as a moving-principle; for he is reported to have said that the *loadstone* possessed a soul, because it could stir iron.” *De Anima*, i. 2, 17. This passage throws doubt on the *δεικνύτον* of the author of the *Placita*, who probably had it from an inferior source. The word is found in the fragments of Philolaus, who was contemporary with Socrates; and also occurs in Plato’s *Phædrus*, 245, c, whence it is borrowed by later Pythagorists, as the Pseudo-Ocellus and Hermes *ap. Stobæum*. Ed.]

⁵ [*De Anima*, i. 5, 20: “ὅθεν ἰσως καὶ θαλῆς ψήθη πάντα πλῆρη θεῶν εἶναι. For “demons” read therefore “gods.” Ed.]

founder of the Ionic philosophy, I omit. It has, I think, been very clearly shown by later⁶ inquirers that his position in the consecutive history of thought is altogether different. The whole character of his views seems unlike those of a pupil of Thales; and we know that Aristotle, in his rapid but precise sketches, is never found to include Anaximander.

Reasons for omitting Anaximander in this place.

We rise, then, from the principle of water to that of *Air*. This element seems happily to unite corporeal and spiritual qualities; and, though Anaximenes betrays no indications of direct Theism, we may recognise in his very Pantheism the effort to reconcile, in some intermediate substance, the opposite qualities of the mental and material natures. As before, the soul reflects the ultimate principle of the world: the last element of the world is air, and the soul is air.

Anaximenes, B.G. 548. His ἀρχὴ "Air."

In Diogenes Apolloniates⁷ we have the com- *Diogenes.*

⁶ [Anaximander is placed by Ritter at the head of those philosophers of the Ionian school whom he calls Mechanical, to distinguish them from the Dynamical school, of which he makes Thales the father. This distinction is adopted in substance by the author of these Lectures: I have therefore adopted it in terms in the margin. Anaximander, it should be observed, is frequently mentioned by Aristotle in the *Physics*, though but once in the *Metaphysics*. The statement which occurs shortly afterwards in the text, that he is overlooked by Aristotle, must therefore be understood to refer solely to the "sketch" contained in *Metaph.* i. See below, p. 305, note. Ed.]

⁷ [Diogenes Laertius is very brief in his account of this philosopher, whom, however, he styles ἀγαν ἐλλόγιμος. He quotes Antisthenes for the assertion that Diogenes was the pupil of Anaximenes, which the character of his theory renders probable. A detailed account of his speculations is to be found in Simplicius on the *Physics* of Aristotle, fol. 32, quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 27. He was contemporary with Anaxagoras, (Diog. L. ix. 9,) and probably survived him. A dissertation by Schleiermacher on "Diogenes of Apollonia" is preserved in the *Transactions of the Berlin Academy*, 1811, and was republished in his *Philosophy*.

Apollo-
nates flor.
perh. B.C.
450 to Pel.
Wur.

mentator and refiner of Anaximenes. The "air" of Diogenes possesses intellectual qualities, precisely as the "fire" of Heraclitus, to whom we shall presently arrive. The deity of Diogenes is a divine air pervading the universe, itself a huge vitalized organism. The *breath* of man is his soul, or the vehicle of his soul.

His "Air."

Heraclitus
flor. B.C.
505.
His ἀρχή,
"Fire."

But we have not scaled the ladder of the elementary universe. In the views of Heraclitus, (to whom, following the thread of thought rather than of locality, I now pass,) Fire was the substance of the universe; God, and the soul of man, a subtle and diviner flame. Heraclitus is said to have been instructed both by Hippasus and Xenophanes, but on vague and unsatisfactory authority: from his Ephesian origin, and the complexion of his doctrine, Creuzer^s conjectures Oriental associations. In Heraclitus, then, the universe was reducible to an eternal Fire, whose motions in never-ceasing change (δύσις) were regulated by the co-eternal ordinances of supreme fate; fire, which seems in the sun and stars to be enthroned in the loftiest chambers of the universe; fire, whose boundless energy is manifested openly in destruction, and secretly, but universally, in the great work of renovation and life, and whose agency in the "caloric" of the modern chemistry is scarcely more refined than the physics of Heraclitus made it. Such an element as this seemed, if any, to claim supremacy over the other materials of the physical world. The tenets of Heraclitus, however, extended into all the recesses of the moral as well as the physical system. Believing all the subject of incessant change,

Doctrine of
perpetual
flux.

sophical Works, vol. ii. p. 149. The fragments have been edited, together with those of Anaxagoras, by Schorn, Bonn, 1829. Ed.]

^s [No sober historian of philosophy has adopted this plausible fancy of Creuzer's. It is satisfactorily disposed of by Bernays in the *Rhein. Mus.* vol. vii. p. 93. Ed.]

his doctrines tinged his life and conversation with a melancholy which became proverbial through antiquity. But why is it that Heraclitus is found so eminently *obscure*? 'Ο σκοτεινός was his title even among his contemporaries. It strikes me that the solution is to be found in the *peculiarity* of his position. Of all the physical theorists of his time who looked upon the world as a vital organism, Heraclitus, perhaps, arrived nearest at the purely spiritual⁹ conception of its author. Such a state—the *transition*-state from one to another, and distinct view of the principles of the world

His melancholy.

Causes of his obscurity.

Comparative spirituality of his conceptions.

⁹ [Such seems to have been Justin Martyr's opinion, *Apol.* i. c. 46:—"Those who have lived in communion with Reason (*Logos*) are Christians, though they may have been reputed Atheists; as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and their like." Compare the citation from Eusebius, &c. in Bentley's *Remarks on Freethinking*, p. 408, Dyce. The Heraclitean "Fire" is endued with spiritual attributes. Aristotle calls it *ψυχή*, and says it is *ἀσωματότατον*, (*De Anima*, i. 2, 16.) It is in effect the common ground of the phenomena both of mind and matter; it is not only the animating but also the intelligent and regulative principle of the universe, (*πῦρ ἀεφύζον φρόνιμον* . . . *πάντα διακίζον κεραυνός*), the *ἔννους λόγος*, or universal Word or Reason, which it behooves all men to follow, though the multitude live as if it were not, walking by the light of private judgment, (*ἰδία φρόνησις*.) If this theory seems to materialize mind, it may with equal fairness be said to spiritualize matter; and the phrases quoted above, from undoubted sources, appear to justify the assertion in the text: which may be compared with that of a very recent German writer:—"Das bewegte Eins des Heraclit, das Werden, ist so immateriell als das ruhende Eins der Eleaten, das Seyn." Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.* i. p. 57.

Among modern aids to our knowledge of Heraclitus may be mentioned Schleiermacher's dissertation, published first in Wolf and Buttmann's *Museum*, 1808, and republished in the second volume of his Philosophical Works. It bears the title, "Heraclitus the Obscure, of Ephesus, exhibited by the aid of his Fragments and the Testimonies of the Ancients." A valuable supplement to this treatise is the *Heraclitea* of Bernays, Bonn, 1848, to which add his two papers in the Rhenish Museum, (*Heraclitische Studien*, R. M. vol. vii. p. 90, and a dissertation

—is marked with restlessness, disquietude, uncertainty, and obscurity. Nor will you be surprised to find in such a teacher the germs of much which became subsequently developed in complete system: this is a character which always belongs to these denizens of the border-land of discovery. From Heraclitus's theory of perpetual fluxion Plato derived the necessity of seeking a stable basis for the universal system in his world of ideas, as Aristotle expressly tells us: and this lofty mysticism of his language unquestionably had a pervading influence over that great philosopher's mind.¹⁰

on the New Fragments contained in the Pseudo-Origen's Confutation of Heresies, ib. vol. ix. p. 241;) also his *Epistola Critica* to Mr. Bunsen, which appeared in the fourth volume of Bunsen's *Hippolytus*, and is reprinted in the third volume of the same author's *Analecta Ante-Nicena*, together with annotations on the recovered Fragments. Ed.]

¹⁰ [Heraclitus was perhaps the greatest speculative genius among the forerunners of Plato, who began his philosophical life as a student of this philosopher, and who dedicated his maturer powers to the task of reconciling the Ephesian doctrine of Unrest and Development (τὸ ρέον, τὸ γηγόμενον) with the Eleatic principle of Permanence, (τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἐσὸς.) The Stoics also built up their elaborate physical system with Heraclitean materials; and, to descend to modern times, some of Hegel's most daring paradoxes are conceived by their author to have been anticipated by Heraclitus. (Heg. *Gesch. d. Phil.* i. p. 334; *Wissenschaft der Logik.* b. i. § 1, c. Anm. 1.)

Heraclitus is further known by his Aphorisms, which are among the most brilliant of those

“Jewels five words long
That on the stretch'd forefinger of all time
Sparkle forever.”

Among the most famous of these are the following:—Πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων: “War is Father of all things.” (All things are evolved by the strife of antagonistic forces.) “No man can wade twice in the same stream.” (Material substances are perpetually losing their identity.) “The wisest of men is an ape to the gods.” (Hence Pope, “And show a Newton as men show an ape.”) “Ἀρμονία ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων,” (implying the well-known “Ars celare artem.”) “Time is a child at

We have now seen three of the ordinary elements elevated into the successive honours of supremacy. Pherecydes (the supposed master of Thales) had, long before the age of Heraclitus, declared *Earth* to be the original matter; and nothing now remained but the work of composition. The great compounder of all the past systems of nature was Empedocles; and this I consider the chief character of his doctrine. Empedocles declared that there were four elements equally concerned in the constitution of the world, and that forces which he, in a kind of philosophical mythology, termed "Love and Hate," animated these primary substances into the harmony of motion. In the fragments¹¹ of Empedocles I seem to recognise the traces of a most miscellaneous philosophical education, in which Ionic and Pythagorean influences are almost

Empedocles
flor. B.C.
444.
A Syncretist or Eclectic.
His four elements.

His miscellaneous philosophical training.

his sports," (ever constructing, ever levelling.) "Life is the death of gods, death their life," (a dictum reproduced in various forms by the Pythagoreans, Plato, Euripides, &c., as in the well-known exclamation: —*τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν*;) "Men are mortal gods, gods are immortal men." "*ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαίμων*." "A man's character is his destiny." "*Πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει*." (The greatest clerks are not the wisest men.) The celebrated dictum *αἴνη ψυχῇ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη* is sometimes given thus:—*αἴνη ξηρῇ ψυχῇ σοφωτάτη*. If, as seems probable, this is a misquotation, (*αἴνη* for *αἴνη*, and *ξηρῇ* a gloss on its less usual synonym,) the "Lumen Siccum" of Bacon is derived from a false reading of Heraclitus. The error, however, is at least as old as Galen. See Bacon, *de Augm.* i. *Opp.* vol. iv. p. 22, ed. 1778, 4to:—"Cum autem conclusiones inde deducuntur, quæ oblique rebus nostris applicatæ, vel infirmos metus gignunt, vel immodicas cupiditates, tum demum nascitur cruciatus ille et perturbatio mentis qua de loquimur: tunc enim scientia non est amplius lumen siccum (ut voluit Heraclitus ille obscurus, *Lumen siccum, optima anima*) sed fit lumen madidum, atque humoribus affectum maceratum." Ed.]

¹¹ [The best collection of these Fragments is that of M. Karsten, Amsterdam, 1838, whose numbers are adopted in the passages quoted in these notes. Some additional lines have come to light in the newly-discovered *Confutatio Hæresium*, book vii. Ed.]

equally observable. He speaks of monads,¹² of elements, of genii or demons, and of a soul of the world, to which,

¹² [The doctrine of monads—that is to say, ultimate corpuscles or atoms—is attributed to Empedocles by Plutarch, (*De Fac. orb. Lun.* p. 926, quoted by Karsten.) But neither the word nor the notion occurs in his Fragments: and Aristotle seems to deny that Empedocles was an atomist, (*De Gen. et Corr.* i. 8, *de Cælo*, iii. 4.) Falser still is the statement of the Pseudo-Origen, who in the *Philosophumena* speaks of a “divine Monad,” or “intelligible Fire,” as one of the tenets of Empedocles, confounding, as would seem, Pythagorean with Heraclitic or Stoical notions, and making Empedocles responsible for the compound. This author, whom we may venture to call Hippolytus, is to be trusted only when he quotes. By the Monad of Empedocles he probably means what our philosopher styled “the Sphere or Globe,” *σφαῖρος*, by which he figured the original uncreated universe, (compound, *μίγμα*, is Aristotle’s synonym for it,) which contains in its bosom the four elements, as yet unsundered, together with two coequal and co-ordinate developing forces, Love and Hate; by the latter of which the elements are separated, being then by Love reunited and combined into the forms of organized nature. The word *σφαῖρος*, a coinage of his own, was suggested by the *εὐκύνου σφαίρης ὄγκος* of Parmenides; though Empedocles understands by it a physical rather than a metaphysical unity. The motive to this philosophical figment is obvious. Empedocles strove here, as in other parts of his system, to combine, if not to reconcile, the Dynamical and Mechanical theories of Nature, which divided the speculators of the Ionian school. His *σφαῖρος* is a syncretism of the primeval chaos, the *ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα* of Anaxagoras, and the vital forces which, under the names of air, water, or fire, operate, according to Anaximenes, Thales, or Heraclitus, all the varying phenomena of the universe. His *νεῖκος* and *φιλότης* (Love and Hate, Discord and Amity) are evidently suggested by the Eternal Strife, the *πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων*, of Heraclitus,—perhaps are intended as an improvement upon it. They, and the elements upon which they act, make up the Totality or *σφαῖρος* to which Empedocles gives the name of God,—herein differing essentially from Anaxagoras, whose Supreme Intelligence is conceived as extraneous to the undigested mass which he “comes to organize,” (*εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησε.*) In modern language, Anaxagoras is a Theist, Empedocles a Pantheist. But the process of creation is the same in both philosophers,—consisting not in change of one substance into another, which Empedocles repudiates as decidedly as Anaxagoras, but in the due mixture and juxtaposition of elements in themselves immutable. Empedocles is praised

as I have uniformly noted to you, the soul of man is made the correlative, being itself a *quintessence*¹³ of the elements. The process of communion between man and the world around him is effected, according to Empedocles, by the action of the same element upon the same; according to which tenet he distributes the elements among the senses respectively;¹⁴ but the Pythagorean pupil is still mani-

Theory of perception.

Pythago-

by Aristotle for fixing the number of these elements, which Anaxagoras leaves undetermined: a judgment which might surprise us, did we forget that Aristotle adopted all four into his own scheme of Physics. The "Globe" of Empedocles is a favourite plaything of the later Platonists, who scruple not to identify it with their own *κόσμος νοητός*, or "region of intelligible forms." See Karsten, *Emped.* p. 323. Ed.]

¹³ [The reader must not infer from these expressions that Empedocles is responsible for the word "quintessence," or that he uses any corresponding Greek term. *Quinta essentia* (πέμπτη οὐσία) is of Aristotelian extraction. It denoted the fifth element, out of which the heavenly bodies were supposed by that philosopher to be formed. *De Mundo*, c. ii. 6.—στοιχείον οὐσαν ἕτερον τῶν τεττάρων, ἀσχητόν τε καὶ θεῖον. Empedocles admits no such fifth element. Ed.]

¹⁴ [A very curious philosopheme of Empedocles deserves notice here. He held the doctrine—eagerly espoused by some of the most considerable physical speculators of antiquity—that from all bodies minute particles are perpetually thrown off, which find their way into other bodies by corresponding minute passages, (πόροι, "pores.") This theory of Emanations (ἀπορροαί) he employs to explain the action and reaction of substances upon each other, and in particular the phenomena of sensation and perception. In pursuance of the hypothesis, Empedocles was led to the invention of the plausible principle, which was adopted without inquiry by nearly every ancient school, *similia similibus percipiuntur*, "like is only perceived by like," (v. 321.) Earthy particles, he tells us, are known by their impact on the earthy elements in the human frame, "water is felt by contact with the water, fire by attraction to the fire within," &c. This naïve but ingenious fiction was embraced by Democritus, and after him by the Epicureans; with this difference,—that *they* hypothesize a *vacuum* through which the emanative particles pass, which Empedocles explicitly denies, (v. 63. See his elegant simile of the *Clepsydra*, v. 282.) Plato, who laughs at the hypothesis of emanations as an explanation of the phenomena of the senses,

reason
element.

fested in the resolute denial¹⁵ of all knowledge that deserves the name to the feeble grasp of sense, and the restriction of true apperceptions to the eternal verities of reason. The philosopher of Agri-

(*Meno*, p. 76,) adopts the general principle (*similia similibus*) in his theory of the Intellect, and of its relation to the cognate Ideas, the intelligible incorporeal objects of an incorporeal intelligent subject. (See *Republ.* p. 508.) Similarly in the *Timæus*, p. 35, he represents the soul as compounded of two principles, the principle of identity or permanence, (*ἡ ταυτοῦ φύσις*), and the principle of change or diversity, (*ἡ θάτερον*), corresponding respectively with the intelligible and the sensible universe, *γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον*, (Arist. *de Anima*, i. 2, § 7, where see Trendelenburg's learned and accurate note.) The same principle seems to lie at the root of Bacon's twofold division of the soul into the "spiraculum" and the "anima sensibilis;" "quorum alterum ortum habuerit a Deo, alterum e matricibus elementorum." (*De Augm.* iv. c. 3, p. 118.) Many other curious philosophical hypotheses are traced to this source by Sir W. Hamilton in his *Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 60. Ed.]

¹⁵ [Cicero places Empedocles in the same category with Socrates, Democritus, and Anaxagoras,—“Omnes pæne veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil seiri posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitæ, et (ut Democritus) in profundo veritatem esse demersam; opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri; nihil veritati relinqui; deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa.” *Acad. Post.* i. c. 12. There are passages in the Fragments of Empedocles which undoubtedly point to the distinction between reason and sense, on which so much stress was laid by Parmenides and the Eleatics; for instance, in the lines,—

γυίων πίστων ἔρυκε νόει δ' ἡ δῆλον ἕκαστον. v. 53.

and

τήν σὺ νόῳ δέρεκεν μηδ' ὀμμασιν ἡσο τεθηγώς. v. 108.

But, as Karsten and others have properly observed, these passages are not to be interpreted too rigorously. If Empedocles had denied *in toto* the credibility of the senses, it would be difficult to account for the estimation in which he was held by Lucretius: difficult also to reconcile such unbelief with the materialism implied in his theory of the universe. This Sextus Empiricus seems to have remarked, for he says, Empedocles represents that “all the senses are trustworthy, if under the control of reason,” (*τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν ἐπιστατούντος*.) *Adv. Math.* vii. 124.

gentum is, therefore, usually¹⁶ classed as an appendix to the Italic school: I have, however, thought it well to place him with the Ionics in his philosophy of the elements, as an arrangement more conducive to a harmonious view of the progressive development of the entire subject.

Empedocles was in fact not more a rationalist than Democritus and Anaxagoras, in whose company he is placed by Cicero. Complaints of the imbecility of the human faculties, compared with the obscurity and vastness of Nature, are common to *all* the ancient philosophers. The *ποῦς* of the Agrigentine was, in his own case, a vivid and highly-inventive fancy,—not, as in Parmenides, an almost preternatural power of speculative abstraction. Empedocles is even classed by Aristotle with the philosophers who identified intellect and sense. *Metaph.* iii. 5. Ed.]

¹⁶ [As by Brucker, whose account of the philosophy of Empedocles is, however, not to be relied upon, being derived, in great part, from bad secondary sources. On the question to what sect or succession Empedocles may most properly be referred, Karsten has the following sound remarks:—"Multum autem disceptatum est, in qua philosophorum secta Empedocles sit ponendus: plurimi eum Pythagoreis, alii Ionicis, alii Eleaticis annumerandum opinati sunt. Ex iis vero quæ disputavimus, apparere arbitror, illius rationem cum omnibus his sectis connexam, nullius earum proprium fuisse. Cum Eleaticis in eo consentit, quod unum illud immotum perfectumque, ab illis τὸ ὄντι assignatum, in mundi principia transtulit; cum Ionicis in hoc præsertim, quod res naturæ perpetuo fluere, et huc illuc agitari censuit; cum Pythagoreis pleraque, quæ ad res divinas, ad animos et religiones pertinent, habet communia; quibus Orphica quædam placita et instituta adiecit. Sic e diversis elementis conflata est Empedoclea ratio, unius tamen ingenii signo et effigie impressa." *De Emped.* pp. 5, 7. The same author thus characterizes his theology:—"Physica Empedoclis doctrina cum theologia arctissime cohæret; est, ut ita dicam, naturæ ἀποθέωσις, summo jure Pantheismus appellandus. Talis autem sentiendi ratio tam temporibus quibus vixit Empedocles, quam ingenio ipsius et moribus consentanea erat. Quippe evanuerant dii, obsoleverant fabulæ, emortua erat religio, a priscis Græciæ vatibus consecrata; ita factum ut eruditiores aut divinum numen plane tollerent, aut, si qui essent acriore religionis sensu, hi converterent se ad naturæ vires, in easque transferrerent divinos honores et munera, fabulosæ antiquitatis Diis negata, quorum nil nisi nomina et umbras retinebant." Ed.]

Step from
Empedo-
cles to
Anaxa-
goras.

When the universe had been thus humanized, and the very affections of the human nature attributed to its attractive and repulsive forces, it is evident that philosophy had but one step further to make in order to reach the completion of the analogy. The world was not merely to be endowed with organization, and with active principles of desire, but still more with the regulating energy of an *intellect*. That by some such progressive course as this Anaxagoras was led to his conception of the Supreme Intelligence, I cannot but think highly probable. But along with the principle of Intelligence Anaxagoras had coupled a system which totally discriminates him from the teachers whom we have as yet contemplated. The architecture of the universe was with him executed on a different plan, and framed out of different materials. But, to understand this, we must retrace a few steps, and recur to that Anaximander whom we before rejected from the ordinary classification.

Anaximan-
der flor.
B.C. 573.
His: "Inf-
nite."

Anaximander (who is said to have been the first of the sages who committed his views to writing) is represented in the very detached and doubtful reports preserved of his doctrine to have declared that the principle of the world was a certain *ἀπειρον*, the basis of innumerable changes, of worlds perpetually rising and falling, and of gods, who, if distinct from these worlds in substance, are at least equally liable to the fate of incessant mutability. You may find his theology in Cicero, (*De Nat. Deor.* lib. i.) The word *ἀπειρον*, on which our opinion of his views must rest, has usually been rendered *infinitude*; but, when we find Aristotle calling it a *μῦγμα* of elements, we may be inclined to suspect that Anaximander meant a state of being *without limitations* or divisions,—in other words, a state of chaotic combination; a conjecture in which I find myself confirmed by a late

or Chaos.

learned writer on this branch of learning. So far was Anaximander from sympathizing with the theory of universal *vitality*, that he endeavours (as has been well shown) to solve the phenomena of organization itself by mechanical theories. Here we observe, then, a decided warfare of principles: the pupil of Thales symbolizes ill with his reputed teacher, and not at all with his reputed successor. You will find this point well reasoned out by Ritter¹⁷ in his account of the Ionic philosophy; and, as I think, at least as convincingly established as a question can be on which our information is so defective.

His mechanical tendencies.

In *Anaxagoras*¹⁸ the theory of a mechanical, not vital, union of particles, arrived, in its legitimate course, at a far higher perfection. To the philosopher of Clazomenæ, matter, ever numerically the same, underwent combination and separation from the energy and dictates of a supreme mind.¹⁹ No point of space is unoccupied by

Anaxagoras B.C. 500 to B.C. 428. His theory of matter and of mind.

¹⁷ [This view of Ritter's, (*Gesch. de Phil.* iii. c. 7,) peculiar, if I mistake not, to himself, has not found favour with more recent historians of philosophy, as Brandis and Zeller, who agree in classing Anaximander with his predecessor Thales and his successor Anaximenes, and deny the atomistic tendency attributed to his doctrines by Ritter. (See Brandis, *Handb.* i. p. 133; Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, i. p. 73.) The classification of the ante-Socratic philosophers proposed by Zeller is in its principle different from that of Ritter, and seems to me on the whole more natural and more in accordance with Greek, as distinguished from modern, especially German, ideas. Ed.]

¹⁸ [The Fragments of Anaxagoras have been edited by Schaebach, (Leipzig, 1827,) who has added a copious Latin commentary. Also, more critically, by Schorn, (Bonn, 1829.) They are all taken from Simplicius, who quotes them in his invaluable commentary on the *Physics of Aristotle*. Ed.]

¹⁹ [Anaxagoras, unlike the early pantheistic speculators, rigidly separates his Supreme Intelligence from the material universe. His *Nous* is a principle infinite, independent, (*αὐτοκρατές*), omnipresent, (*ἐν παντὶ παντὸς υἱόρα ἐνόν*), the subtlest and purest of things, (*λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων*).

particles, which, nevertheless, are infinitely small; but the entire is pervaded by the influence of a guiding reason which unites elements in their fitting position, affinity, and proportion. The same Reason which can explore the world must have been exerted to arrange it; and man can see in the work the image of the intelligence of the Artist. This noble conception of the universal frame was, in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, carried into many minuter details; and in the inferior parts of his structure he of course committed the errors which all must commit who venture upon interpreting nature without duly compelling her to answer the question of reason, and to reveal herself. The harmony, however, which the doctrine of an arranging Intellect bestowed upon the theory of the universe, soon attracted notice, and multiplied converts; and, though Anaxagoras suffered from the jealousy of those who dreaded

His influence on subsequent speculation.

that Deity would supplant the deities, the manifest and happy influence which he exerted upon the subsequent direction of the Grecian philosophy is the sure test of the substantial efficacy of his teaching, and the proudest monument to his memory.

Socratic development.

At the same time, in our admiration, we must preserve measure and proportion. It was So-

των καὶ καθαρῶτατον,) and incapable of commixture with aught besides, (μέμικται οὐδὲν χρήματι.) (Though the word *ἀσώματον* is not found in Anaxagoras, immateriality is evidently implied in the last two predications.) The Nous is also omniscient (πάντα ἔγνω) and unchangeable, (πῶς ὁμοίως ἐστι.) Simplicius, in *Arist. Phys.* i. f. 33. The extract from which this account is taken is quoted at length by Ritter and Preller, § 64. But for the accident of its preservation by Simplicius, we should have been unable to form an adequate idea either of the purity of Anaxagoras's Theism, or of the justice of Aristotle's remark, that, compared with his predecessors, the philosopher of Clazomenæ was like a sober man among stammering drunkards. (*Met.* i. 3, 16.) Aristotle, however, as well as Plato, (*Phæd.* p. 98,) complain of the timorous application of this sublime principle by its author. Ep.]

crates who made of the *Noûs* a genuine Providence, and who thence fixed on its true basis the study of, and the argument from, final causes. "We know," says he, in one golden sentence of the *Memorabilia*,²⁰ "our soul by its operation; and so we know the Deity by his works."

*ment of the
Nous of
Anaxa-
goras.*

The physical views of the mechanical²¹ philosophy

²⁰ [B. iv. c. 3, 14. Ed.]

²¹ [The systems of Anaxagoras and Democritus, though classed together as "Mechanical," are related rather by contrast than resemblance. Anaxagoras held a *plenum*, Democritus a *vacuum*: Anaxagoras made matter infinitely divisible, Democritus assumed a *minimum*, ("atom," *ἄτομος*, *insecabilis* :) Anaxagoras taught that different material substances consist of particles differing in kind as the substances themselves differ, (*homœomeria* :) the atoms of Democritus are homogeneous, differing only in configuration. Again, the *atoms* are eternally in motion; the chaos of Anaxagoras, essentially inert, requires the agency of a mind to sunder and arrange its co-inherent particles: with Democritus all things are under the control of Fate; according to Anaxagoras, under that of Intelligence. As Dr. Whewell observes, (*Hist. of Ind. Sc.* i. p. 64,) the atomistic doctrine "points to the corpuscular theories of modern times," while that of Anaxagoras "may be considered as a dim glimpse of the idea of chemical analysis." The following lines of Lucretius contain a luminous account of the *homœomeria* :—

Principio, rerum quom dicit homœomerian,
Ossa, videlicet, e pauxillis atque minutis
Ossibus hic et de pauxillis atque minutis
Visceribus viscus gigni sanguenque creari
Sanguinis inter se multis coëuntibu' guttis
Ex auriq̃ue putat micis consistere posse
Aurum, et de terris terram concreescere parvis,
Ignibus ex ignis, umorem umoribus esse,
Cetera consimili fingit ratione putatq̃ue.
Nec tamen esse ulla idem ex parte in rebus inane
Concedit, neque corporibus finem esse secandis.

* * * * *

Linquitur hic quædam latitandi copia tenuis,
Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnis
Res putet inmixtas rebus latitare, sed illud

*Leucippus,
date uncertain.
Father of
the Atomic
Philosophy.*

were continued in a very different spirit by the *Atomists*, to whom Leucippus is attributed as founder. The excessive and chimerical extravagance of these theorists was mainly produced by the rival extravagance of the Eleatic school. The local history of this succession of philosophers is very obscure and uncertain; it seems to have had some connection of hostility with the Eleatics, and to have probably arisen in Elea: we know, however, that its champion, Democritus,²² was a native of Abdera in Thrace. Its true scope cannot be perfectly comprehended without the contrast of the Eleatic institutes:²³ we may, however, in the consecution of doctrine, briefly notice these sages as our closing sketch, and as presenting the fullest development of the Ionian mechanists.

*Connection
between the
Atomic and
Eleatic
Schools.
Democritus,
B.C.
460 to B.C.
387.*

Apparere unum, cujus sint plurima mixta
Et magis in promptu primaque in fronte locata.

Lib. i. vv. 834 seqq. 875 seqq. Ed.]

²² [The Fragments of Democritus have been collected and carefully edited by Mullach, in his *Quæstiones Democriteæ*, (Berlin, 1843.) It does not appear that Leucippus left any written record of his opinions. (See Mullach, p. 374, not. 3.) Ed.]

²³ [The Atomic and Eleatic doctrines may seem, at first sight, to have nothing in common. We learn, however, from Simplicius, (*in Phys.* i. fol. 7,) that Leucippus studied philosophy under Parmenides, (for whom Zeno is falsely substituted by the author of the *Philosophumena*,) and a passage in Aristotle (*De Gen. et Corr.* i. 8) explains the relation between the two systems. Accordingly, much of the phraseology and some of the postulates of the Eleatics were adopted by Leucippus and Democritus, who however gave a physical, material meaning to the metaphysical notions of the former school. Thus their *vacuum* is styled *μη ὄν*, (*Non Ens*,) their atoms *ὄντα*, (*entia*;) and they boldly assert, in defiance of Parmenides, "quod non-Ens est," (*ἐστὶ τὸ κενόν*, *Phys.* i. 8; *οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν τοῦ μη ὄντος εἶναι*, *Metaph.* i. 4.) Again, the Eleatics denied the possibility of motion, on the ground that motion implies this very contradiction. But Democritus, by his hypothesis of a *vacuum*, was enabled to assert the possibility of motion also. In denying motion, Parmenides denied the possibility of change, or "generation and

In the philosophy of Leucippus all traces of a Supreme Intelligence disappeared. The universe—a dark, unshaped mass—consisted of two principles, (if they can so be termed,) reality and inanity. Through a boundless void (here differing both from Anaxagoras and the Eleatics) atoms, infinite in number and diversified in figure, eternally wandered,—their wanderings governed by that dark negation of guiding law to which the title “Necessity” was ascribed. To contemplate the scenery of the universe exists the soul, which (according to the principle so often noted) is itself a subtle combination of atoms.

*Atheism of
Leucippus.*

*Reality
and Void.
Atoms the
only reali-
ties.
The soul it-
self a com-
bination of
atoms.*

Time, Space, and Motion (it was thus Democritus took up the strain) are all eternal. As truth can only contemplate that which really exists, and as atoms and void alone are worthy the name of real existences, they are the only genuine subjects of real knowledge, and all else is but the shadowy diversity of internal impressions which can claim no real archetype. Thus was commenced that species of skepticism which has since, under various forms, been so constantly reiterated. To Democritus, in the pursuit of this his system, belong many anticipations of truths which modern psychology regards as its exclusive discoveries. He affirmed, with great perspicuity and decision,

*Eternity of
Time,
Space, and
Motion.*

*Skeptical
inferences.*

*Democritus
the first
who distin-
guished
primary
and second-
ary quali-
ties.*

dissolution.” But, motion secured, generation and its opposite can be explained; for they are but motions of atoms to or from each other. The propositions, “atoms are homogeneous,” and “they possess magnitude,” are proved by Democritus on grounds as purely *à priori* as those on which the Eleatics built their theory. The *first* follows from the assumption that Like can only act on Like; the *second*, from the postulate that no number of infinitely-small parts can constitute a magnitude. These instances are sufficient to show that the early Atomic theories contained a dogmatic as well as a skeptical, an *à priori* as well as an empirical, element. See the following note. Ep.]

that secondary²⁴ qualities are but the modifications of human sensibility, and that by touch alone can man discover the external world. But not *this* alone is the result of touch: the gods themselves are known only by material contact; and no new conception can reach the soul (which itself is a compound of round and moving atoms²⁵) except through the direct proximity of emitted images. Thus, by a total materialism, was laid the basis of that philosophy of which Epicurus soon became the completer, and which, ornamented and enlarged by the progress of science, has been transmitted, without much *substantial* change, to so many of the medical psychologists of the present day.

I had hoped to have this day embraced the Italic and Eleatic developments of reason, as well as the different branches of the Ionic and Atomic; but I am compelled;

²⁴ [So Theophrastus informs us, *De Sens.* 69, (ap. Mullach, p. 216:) Τὸ μὲν σχῆμα καθ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ ὀλως τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. "Figure" (according to Democritus) "has an *independent*—sweetness and the other sensible qualities have only a *relative*—existence," h. e. sunt quatenus percipiuntur. (See also *ibid.* p. 204.) In *Frag.* 2 he places all the senses upon a level in respect of their truth: "Sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, are all alike dark and uncertain." The idea of figure, then, is *not* derived from the senses. Neither is that of magnitude, which is presumed in figure; nor of weight, which may be resolved into magnitude, for weight depends on the proportion of matter to void in a given substance. These speculations are, however, difficult to reconcile with other testimonies which represent Democritus as identifying knowledge and sensation, and even as asserting that all sensible appearances are true. Compare *Arist. Metaph.* iii. 4, 10. Mullach, p. 415, supposes that this last was one of those early opinions which Democritus, according to Plutarch, afterwards abandoned. This, however, is improbable, and seems to be contradicted by Theophrastus, who complains that in one of his treatises Democritus sets out by pompously announcing his intention of proving the truth of the senses, which in the sequel of the same treatise he entirely subverts. *Ed.*]

²⁵ [Aristot. *De Anima*, i. 2. *Ed.*]

by the multiplicity of the subject, to defer these contemporary schools until our next meeting on Thursday. You will have perceived that it is not my object to present to you *details* which you can obtain with ease in any of the ordinary text-books, but to offer some contribution towards harmonizing in your minds the *general* history of the progress of philosophic inquiry, without sacrificing truth of facts to a favourite theory.



LECTURE VI.

ON THE PYTHAGOREAN AND ELEATIC SCHOOLS.

GENTLEMEN :—

Introductory remarks.

At our last meeting we rapidly traversed the field of philosophical contemplation presented in the labours of the Ionic school, and in those of some other speculators whom congeniality of views, rather than proximity of place or any immediate historical connection, associates with them. I endeavoured (with a success, I am afraid, very inferior to my design) to supply to your minds some of those leading ideas in which ordinary histories are apt to be so deficient, but without which the barren chronology of systems and their teachers is nearly as profitless as any other acquisition of mere memory, and not at all, as we are too prone to think, rescued from inutility by either the dignity of the subject or the rarity of the possession. It is the difference between an anatomical enumeration and a physiological discussion. Facts and dates are as indispensable as a map of the nerves or of the blood-vessels; but in the physiology of history alone can the student look for the organization, the action, the play and life of the whole.

Having been unable to comprise the entire ante-Socratic movement in my last Lecture, we must again prepare to penetrate into this patriarchal age of Greek philosophy, where all is so intermingled and so incomplete, but where all is likewise promissory of a mighty future. It is like that pre-Adamite world where dwelt, as some Oriental fictions held, the gigantic shadows of men as yet unborn: the outlines of systems to come

were dimly traced in enormous proportions; and the mind, yet in the phantom-peopled twilight of an imaginative superstition, wandered, almost unconsciously, through the path it was afterwards to travel in a fuller light and with a march more assured.

We saw that, in the absence of a true experimental philosophy of nature, two paths, and, as far as we can see, two paths alone, lay open to the speculator on the mysteries of the external world:—the one, that of analogies more or less correct; the other, that of pure *à priori* deduction: the one looking on nature, but looking on her with a careless and short-sighted glance; the other withdrawing the eye almost wholly from the sensible world, and, with introverted glance, contemplating the ideal forms of the mind, in order subsequently to apply, by an arbitrary and vigorous imposition, these mental conceptions to the material structure. The former of these courses, in some degree adopted by all these sages, was ardently, and almost exclusively, embraced by the Ionic and their kindred schools; the latter was the peculiar province of the theorists of the Italic sects. We have already traced the fortunes of the former. A few words will give the moral.

Had the Ionic and Atomic schools, instead of vaguely conjecturing the successive transformations of the world at large, condescended to the task of minute observation and particular experiment, the physical sciences might have been anticipated by many centuries. But the exceeding subtlety of the elementary principles of the material world, or the diversity of nature's disguises, was as yet little suspected; experiment was therefore slightly, or not at all, employed to extort her secrets; while, on the other hand, the real magnitude of the visible creation was so utterly unimagined, that the naturalists of this primitive age could speak of the

Recapitulation.

General reflections on the method of the Ionic and Atomic schools, and the causes of their failure.

earth and heavens as of a single mass or system,—vast, indeed, but raised upon a common base, and placed, in all its parts equally, within the easy reach of fair conjecture. It was as if the inhabitant of a noble and extensive edifice were to speculate on its materials and architecture,—*not* as if the seaman of a little bark were to conjecture the nature of the immeasurable ocean through which it floated, a speck upon the waters! Thus, hypothesis followed hypothesis, guess supplanted guess, according as any unobserved fact, or ingenious analogy, gave it currency; until, at length, opposing authorities enfeebled each other, the oracles of physical science became less regarded as more and more numerous and contradictory, and the inquisition of nature, darkened into a hopeless mystery, almost universally made way for moral researches. Such was the fate of the system of physical conjecture, such the moral it furnishes. We must now reverse the picture, and briefly sketch the efforts of the contemporary system of physical demonstration, with its transition into the metaphysical system of the universe. I shall only observe, that you are not to take any of these terms as characterizing *completely*—they are intended to characterize *eminently*—the views (Ionic and Atomic, Pythagorean, Eleatic) to which they are applied. At no time were the leaders of these schools *exclusive* contemplators of a single aspect of the external world; they were all, in some degree, *metaphysical*; all, in some degree, *mathematical*; all, in a high degree, conjecturers as to the process of the *physical* changes around them. But, to rest upon the prominent features of their habitual speculations, the Ionics were a physical sect, the Pythagoreans a mathematical sect, the Eleatics a metaphysical sect: their attempts to satisfy themselves as to the objects of their thoughts and experience usually lay in the field of these different

The early systems classified according to the element predominant in each.

sciences; it was there they sought the solution of the universe, and there they endeavoured to persuade the world they had found it.

Pythagoras,¹ from whom the Italic schools date their origin,—whether instructed by foreign teachers or directed by his own meditations,

Pythagoras, date uncertain; flor. about B.C. 540 to 510.

¹ [The reader of this Lecture should bear in mind and allow for the admitted difficulty of ascertaining how much of Pythagorean doctrine is derived from Pythagoras himself, and how much was excogitated by his real or pretended followers. Aristotle only once mentions Pythagoras, (in the *Magna Moralia*, *init.*:) οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι is elsewhere his form of citation. Among the genuine “Pythagoreans,” Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, was the most distinguished. His fragments, preserved in Stobæus and elsewhere, have been edited by Boeckh in his justly-celebrated monography, *Philolaos des Pythagoreer's Lehren*, Berlin, 1819. These fragments, coupled with the notices in Aristotle, (*Metaph.* i. 5, 7; xii. 4, 8; *Phys.* iv. 6: *Magn. Mor.* i. 1, and elsewhere,) are the most authentic sources of information concerning this remarkable school, and enable us to test the genuineness of other documents. Philolaus is said to have been the first Pythagorean *writer*, Diog. L. viii. 15. The treatises attributed to Ocellus Lucanus and Timæus Locrus are undoubtedly spurious. The former is filled with Eleatic rather than Pythagorean matter; the latter has the air of an abstract of its Platonic namesake, containing, moreover, terms used in a sense unknown in the time of Socrates, (as ἰλημ, ὀρίζων, &c.) Ahrens condemns them on grounds of *dialect*, (*de Dial. Dor.* p. 23,) including in the same sentence all the supposed Pythagorean fragments, except those of Philolaus. The same is said to be the conclusion of Gruppe, in his treatise *über die Fragmente des Archytas*, &c., Berlin, 1840. A great crop of forged epistles and treatises sprang up in the century preceding our era, watered by the pious zeal of the philosophic Juba, King of Mauritania, who paid highly for additions to his library, especially in its Pythagorean department. Accordingly, the art of literary forgery appears to have attained a degree of perfection in his time which it never afterwards recovered. Those who would know more of this curious subject may consult Ritter and Preller, p. 61, (where the necessary references are given;) Mullach's Preface to his edition of Xenophanes, &c., (which contains the work of the false Ocellus;) also Ritter's *Geschichte d. Philosophie*, vol. i. p. 377, 2d ed. Ed.]

(for into the voluminous discussions, which have left this matter very much as they found it, I do not now mean to enter,) or, as is most probable, governed by both,—had long devoted his intellectual adoration to

*His wor-
ship of
Order.*

the lofty idea of Order. This attribute—which seems the perfection, or necessary to the perfection, of all to which it can be applied—he

first, it is probable, learned to venerate in the happy adaptation of civil government, to which the efforts of the commanding minds of his age were so constantly directed, and in which this har-

*Application
of this idea
to civil go-
vernment;*

mony of reciprocal relations is so prominently manifested, as itself the very essence of that condition of mankind. From this political order the transference was natural to the internal republic of the reason and

*afterwards
to the indi-
vidual
mind.*

the passions of the individual; and Pythagoras could not but feel that, however affections more prompt and decisive may be necessary to urge to action or to fortify in endurance, yet to the calm observer it was of the very essence of

*Virtue re-
presented
as a pro-
portion or
harmony.*

virtue, or one of its leading characteristics, that it involved the perfect *proportion*² of all the active principles of the soul. With Pythagoras, whose system was, in its ultimate intention, a purely *practical* system, this was the *most* impressive consideration of all: but a mind so accomplished, and so thoughtful, was not likely to rest

²[This, though attributed by Laertius, viii. 33, to Pythagoras, is rather a Platonic than a Pythagorean *placitum*. The notions of the Pythagoreans seem to have been cruder and more fanciful. They defined Justice to be a square number, (ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἰσός, *Magn. Mor.* i. l.) identifying all the virtues with numerical relations, and thus (according to Aristotle) intruding wholly alien conceptions into the region of Ethical science, (τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων (ὁ Πυθαγόρας) οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο.) The dogma that the *soul* is a Harmony, so ingeniously refuted in Plato's *Phædo*, was probably Pythagorean. See Ritter and Preller, § 102, a. Ed.]

in any single or restricted application of a great principle. When, accordingly, from the sphere of action the Sage of Samos passed into that of speculation, the same harmonious order seemed even more conspicuously to reveal itself as the presiding genius of that serene and silent world. He had, from his youth, dwelt with delight upon the eternal relations of space and number, in which the very idea of proportion seems to find its first and immediate development, and without the latter of which (number) all proportion is absolutely inconceivable: and to that ardent genius whose inventive energies were daily adding new and surprising contributions to the store of discovered relations, it at length began to appear as if *the whole secret* of the universe was hidden in these mysterious correspondences. The extension—unwarrantable, indeed, but in an age so inexperienced in the wiles of hypothetical illusion scarcely to be wondered at—may have, on the known principles of Pythagoras, proceeded thus. The mind of man perceives the relations of an eternal order in the proportions of space and number: that mind is, doubtless, a portion³ of the soul which animates the universe; for on what other supposition shall we account for its internal principle of activity,—the very quality that essentially characterizes the Prime Mover, and can scarcely be attributed to any inferior nature? and on what other supposition are we to explain the identity which subsists between the proportions or principles authenticated by the reason, and the proportions or principles that are perceived to exist in the spaces and multiplicities around us and inde-

Speculative application of the same idea.

Mathematical studies of Pythagoras.

Extension of Mathematical conceptions to the sciences of mind and nature.

Explanation of the process.

³ ["Pythagoras Pythagoreique . . . nunquam dubitarunt quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus." Cicero, *de Senect.* 21, 78. Compare *de Nat. D.* i. 11. Ed.]

pendent of us? Can this sameness be other than the sameness of the external and internal portions of a common nature? And as that universal soul reflects the symmetry of the universe it vivifies, so do these fragments which are deposited in human clay; even as the same mirror which presents a vast and single image, if broken into innumerable pieces, will return as many images as there are fragments. The proportions of the world inhere in its divine soul, being themselves its very essence, or, at least, its attributes: what, therefore, the mind of man feels, the mind of the universe cannot but confirm and countersign,—and the universe itself answer and acknowledge. Man, then, can boldly *assert* the necessary harmonies of the world; he possesses within him a revelation which declares that the world in its real structure *must* be the image and copy of that divine proportion which he internally adores.⁴ Again, the world is assuredly perfect, as being the sensible type of the Divinity, the outward and multiple development of the Eternal Unity; it must, then, when thoroughly known, answer to all which we can conceive of perfect; that is, it must be regulated by a legislation, of whose code *we* have the highest principles (whatever may be the details) in those first and elementary properties of numbers which stand nearest to unity. The world is, then, through all its departments, moral and material, a living arithmetic in its development, a realized geometry in its repose: it is a *κόσμος*, (for the word is Pythagorean,) the expression of harmony, the manifestation to sense of everlasting order: and he approaches nearest to the eternal fountain of beauty who, by dwelling with greatest constancy upon proportions and fitnesses, escapes the region of apparent irregularity to reside in that of per-

⁴ [See a remarkable extract from Philolaus in Stobæus *Ecl.* i. p. 453, quoted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 109. Ed.]

petual symmetry. Hence you at once perceive why it was that to *geometry* Pythagoras first introduced his disciple; in this science he found the representation, and the very language, of his philosophy of proportion: and you also see how it happened that the entire school invested mathematical truths with a moral character, and in return clothed morals in the dress of mathematics. This, indeed, forms one source of the difficulty which critics still find in the attempt to penetrate the precise meaning of the expressions of the school of Crotona: they pass with such subtlety from the practical to the theoretic—from the arithmetic of virtue to the virtue of arithmetic—that we can pronounce with as little definiteness as, perhaps, they themselves possessed, to *which* department any particular proposition is intended mainly to relate. It is the same difficulty which, in all cases, is found in separating the type and the antitype in two counterpart languages.

I should weary myself and you if I attempted to recount one-half of the conjectures which have been advanced towards giving that “harmony” to the assertions of Pythagoras which they were intended to illustrate. The endeavour is usually fruitless or unsatisfactory when built upon a few detached phrases which may have almost any signification or none: I think it more profitable to offer a few remarks upon the aspect of things which must have presented itself to the mind of Pythagoras, steadying my course by occasional reference to the preserved traditions of his teaching, but scarcely venturing to reduce to the consummate precision of a modern theory a series of views which, in the mind of the master himself, were rather a habit of thought than a regular system of nature.

Though Pythagoras found in geometry the fitting *initiative* for abstract speculation, it is remarkable that (notwithstanding his acknow-

Though Pythagoras was a geometrician, his

explanation
of
Nature is
rather
arithmeti-
cal than
geometri-
cal.

ledged proficiency in that science which he largely enriched) he himself preferred to constitute the science of *numbers* as the true representative of the laws of the universe. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaks indeed of eternal truths, yet, when the notion of symmetry or proportion is introduced, it is absolutely necessary to introduce, and often necessary to insist in preference upon, the properties of Number.

Nature an
"imitation
of Num-
bers."

Hence, though the universe displayed the geometry of its Constructor or Animator, yet Nature was eminently defined as the *μίμησις τῶν ἀριθμῶν*.⁵ Moreover, in order to represent in a mathematical form the successive developments by which the vast totality was evolved, it is obvious that the production of numbers offered the most immediate example and the most expressive language. But, besides attaching himself to abstract relations in *all* the departments of nature, he found in number the most suitable type of these harmonies, because it alone is *universally* applicable; for, under the law of multiplicity, the world in all its parts is inevitably conceived. But, again, number presented itself in preference from its being a higher reach of abstraction, and thence, apparently, more completely mental, and thence, finally, more applicable to the ultimate laws of the universe, and to the identification of these with the mind itself of man. Geometry presupposes space; but number presupposes but the conception of any existence whatsoever more than single. Once more: the relations detected in number reveal themselves under a character more *mystical*, (a reason hinted by Aristotle in his account of Pythagoras,) as more remote from merely sensible experiences, than

⁵ [Arist. *Metaph.* i. c. 6: Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει. Ed.]

those of the science of space; and thence the imagination would be naturally led to attribute to these relations, and to others yet undiscovered, powers and properties much more completely transcending the sphere of daily evidence.

The key to all the Pythagorean dogmas, then, seems to be the general formula of unity in multiplicity:—unity either *evolving itself into* multiplicity, or unity discovered as *pervading* multiplicity, (which latter is answerable to what we term harmony or proportion.) The principle of all things (the same principle which, in this philosophy, as in others, was customarily called *Deity*) is the primitive unit from which all proceeds in the according relations of the universal scheme.

"Unity in Multiplicity" the leading idea of Pythagorism.

The Primitive Unit, or Deity.

This primitive nature⁶ seems sometimes spoken of as having *nothing* in common with the arithmetic of the world, and sometimes as being the ultimate substance of it all,—a discrepancy which has given rise to much discussion, but which, perhaps, is most easily reconciled by observing a peculiarity in the notion of "1," which makes it easily applicable to either view.

Discrepancy of statements.

Probable reconciliation.

For it is evident that the unit may be considered at the same time as no number itself, and yet as the element of all. Thus, 1, considered by itself, is assuredly no number in the same sense in which 2 is,—a fact evident from the admission that "1," multiplied by itself, produces no increase, and, in fact, has no proper significancy; $1+1$ (or 2) being the first abstract number,—the first conception of addition. And if it be asked how the repetition of that which is no number can produce number, the answer is, that it is the repetition itself which constitutes the number; that in $1+1$ it is not the 1 on either side of the sign which includes the

⁶ [See Arist. *Metaph.* xii. c. 6. Ed.]

essence of the number, but the sign—the *plus*—itself. By reflecting on this, it does not seem difficult to conceive how the Pythagoreans, with a very apt and forcible application of this arithmetical language, could perceive in the Eternal Unit that heads the numbers of the universe at once a nature infinitely removed from all the harmonious multiplicity that surrounds him, and, at the same time, the necessary prerequisite for its production and existence.

But, though this All-creative Unit sees in the universe only the redoubled product of itself, it is not, in the fullness of its nature, contented with a mere plurality, however completely dependent on its own everlasting essence as foundation. And this gives rise to the second aspect under which I said that the school of proportion contemplated the world:—one which I conceive to be altogether separable from the former. When, uttering itself abroad, the Eternal “One” became many, it willed not—the very nature of the generation forbid—that a total divorce should forever exist between the created and the Creator. And yet, if they be sundered with a discrepancy of nature so total as exists between plurality and unity, it seems internally impossible that they can ever be connected. But this is not so. Into the sensible world of multitude the all-pervading Unity has infused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his image upon that world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man. What, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical and diversified,—which we perceive as the combination of a thousand elements, yet as the expression of a single spirit,—which is a

chaos to the sense, a *κόσμος* to the reason?

What is it but harmony—proportion—the one governing the many, the many lost in the one?

The world is *therefore* a harmony in innumerable degrees, from the most complicated to the most

*Idea of
Harmony
as the One
in Many,
or the
Many in
One.*

simple: it is now a Triad, combining the Monad and the Duad, and partaking of both; now a Tetrad, the form of perfection; now a Decad,⁷ which, in combining the four former, involves in its mystic nature all the possible accordances of the universe

I do not wish you to consider that for every one of the foregoing propositions I have any decisive text; I have endeavoured, combining fragments of tradition, to present a general sketch of the line of march by which the Pythagoreans appear to me to have moved; and, if it differs from the accounts of others on the one hand, you are at perfect liberty to differ from *it* on the other. There are certain special interpretations of the Pythagorean numbers, to which, as I conceive them altogether conjectural, I think it unnecessary to direct your attention,—such as those which pronounce the Monad to be God, the Duad matter, the Triad the complex world. I think it likely that such *applications* may in detail have been made by Pythagoras: once on the highway of *à priori* theory, he could scarcely have remained in the region of pure abstraction; and we know, from his astronomical speculations, that he did *not*. For our own instruction, however, I think it more profitable to attempt harmonizing the general principles, which are always curious, and often true, than to follow them into applications of which the record is uncertain and the benefit inconsiderable.

When, once more descending from these lofty calculations, Pythagoras sought to apply them to his practical philosophy, he looked for a medium of connection. He found it (where few would have expected) in the theory and

Pythagorean views of Music, as a link between the ideal and practical.

⁷ [That is, $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$. Compare Philolaus, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. p. 456, for the mystical virtues of the Decad. The passage is quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 105. Ed.]

practice of *Music*. This study possesses the advantage of being at once a subject of profound mathematical calculation, and an art productive of the most powerful results on the affections. It linked the mathematical and the moral: and it linked them the *more* closely that in every case of mental impression the pleasurable result was found mysteriously to correspond with fixed arithmetical proportions. It may easily be imagined how this connection (which, even in the present advanced state of physical science, has attracted so much unavailing curiosity) impressed and charmed the mind of a philosopher in search for mystic relations between the soul of man and the sensible world. In his mind a single principle was essentially diffusive, and reappeared in every sphere of thought. Accordingly, having once discovered (for the *discovery* itself is attributed to him) that the changes of sound were indissolubly connected with changes of length and tension, he reversed the proposition, and asserted that sound—that which is essentially “harmony”—perpetually waited on proportion; and that, as the heavens themselves were ordered in consonance with number, they must move amid their own eternal harmony,^s—a harmony to which the soul of man, from familiarity, through all its series of past transmigrations, (for this was the solution of the difficulty,) had become deaf and irresponsive. Indeed, this was but one instance (though perhaps the most prominent one) of the tendency which the Pythagoreans had, as, on the one hand, to finding proportions in the world of sense, so, on the other, to finding the world of sense in their proportions. As sound was made to accompany the harmonious march of the heavens, so light and fire were exalted to

“*Music
of the
Spheres.*”

^s [Pythagoras ad harmoniam canere mundum existimat. Cicero, *de Nat. D.* iii. 11, 27. Ed.]

the throne of the elemental world; and, as that throne, in consistence with the laws of geometrical precedency, must be the centre of a perfect, and therefore circular, motion, the great depository of light and heat—the sun—must occupy the centre of the universe,⁹ and the planets, in circular orbits, at musical intervals, describe their measured revolutions around him: while (so determined was Pythagoras to construct the world upon his preconceptions of numerical fitness) a tenth body, to us invisible,—the Antichthon,¹⁰—exists to consummate the mysterious Decad, which Pythagoras's astronomical knowledge did not allow him otherwise to complete. If in a future world such minds are permitted to meet and discuss their recollections of earthly speculations, we may imagine Pythagoras learning from the lips of Newton of a harmony in which the simple realities of nature so far exceed all his gorgeous fictions, and gladly admitting what it is so hard to teach the dreamers of all ages,—that the proudest imaginations of man, in every depart-

Astronomical notions of the Pythagoreans.

⁹ [Something to this effect is found in Pseudo-Origen, *Conf. Hæres.* vi. 23. Other Pythagoreans asserted a central fire, distinct from the sun: ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου πῦρ εἶναι φασιν, Arist. *de Cælo*, ii. 13; Φιλόλαος πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ περὶ τὸ κέντρον, Stob. *Ecl.* i. p. 488. This fire they symbolically called the "Watch-tower of Zeus," (Διὸς φυλακή, πύργος, οἶκος,) and the "Hearth-altar of the universe," (ἑστία τοῦ παντός.) (Hence probably is to be explained Plat. *Phædr.* p. 247: Μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ.) Ten bodies revolve round this fiery centre: the Heaven, or firmament of fixed stars, the (five) planets, the Sun and Moon, the Earth, and her counterpart the Antichthon. (Stob. *ibid.* quoting Philolaus.) Ed.]

¹⁰ [Aristotle's criticism of this Pythagorean fancy is worth translating. "Further," he says, "they construct a second Earth, (opposite to this of ours,) which they call the Antichthon. Thus, instead of seeking out reasons and causes which shall agree with the phenomena, they prefer to force the phenomena into accordance with certain reasonings and notions of their own." Ed.]

ment of inquiry, are not only almost invariably *beside* the works of God, but, in the vast majority of cases, are infinitely *beneath* them!

The Pythagorean views of *the soul* of man were deeply modified by their physical, and still more by their moral, tenets. The soul was a moving number;¹¹ that is, as we may suppose, a self-moving monad, the copy (as we have seen) of that infinite monad which unfolds from its own incomprehensible essence all the relations of the universe.¹² In its physical constitution it was termed fire, exactly as the Deity was also frequently described. It was intellectual¹³ and passionate, νοῦς and θυμός,—the former portion sempiternal, as being, indeed, but a ray of the Eternal Fire; and Pythagoras encouraged every form of divination and magic by that connection which seems almost invariable (we have seen it universal in India) between *these* superstitions and the doctrine of the identity of the soul and its Deity. But in *morals* the legislator of Crotona found his appropriate sphere. In his

¹¹ [Ἀριθμὸν ἐαυτὸν κινεῖντα, Pseudo-Plutarch, *de Placitis Phil.* iv. 2; τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, Arist. *de Anima*, i. 2, 7. Ed.]

¹² [So Pseudo-Origen, *Conf. Hæres.* vi. 28: πῦρ γάρ ἐστιν ἥλιος, ψυχὴ. Aristotle, *de Anima*, i. 2, 6, relates that "certain of the Pythagoreans maintained that the motes floating in the air were *soul*: while others conceived that it was soul which caused their motion. The reason is, that these motes appear to move perpetually, even when the air is perfectly still." This and other passages imply considerable diversity of views among even the genuine Pythagoreans. Ed.]

¹³ [The *triple* division of the soul into νοῦς, θυμός, and φρένες, (Diog. L. viii. 1, § 30,) of which the *last* only is peculiar to man, is more fanciful and therefore probably more authentic than the twofold distinction in the text, attributed by the Pseudo-Plutarch (*Plac. Phil.* iv. 4) to Pythagoras and Plato. See also Cicero, *Tusc. Quæst.* iv. 5. If Plato borrowed largely from the Pythagoreans, later writers have given much that is Plato's to Pythagoras, and this distinction among the rest. This appears clearly from Arist. *Mag. Mor.* i. 1, 7. Ed.]

usual numerical notation moral good was essentially *unity*, evil essentially plurality or division.¹⁴ In the fixed *truth* of mathematical essences he found the exemplar of social and personal virtue: truth was, therefore, a peculiar Pythagorean virtue, and justice the glory of man. From these elements the Pythagorean neophytes naturally were led to the life of cenobites:¹⁵ their community was secret, silent, and guarded with all the forms of a solemn initiation; and, to manifest the purity of their disinterested association, he who determined to abandon the connection was suffered to depart, and presented with double his original contribution; but over his seat was erected a sepulchre, and his fall was honoured with all the melancholy ceremonies of a funeral rite. He had not, indeed, deserted life, but he had forsaken all which makes life valuable; and a physical death, which may but liberate the soul, is surely not to be deplored with the same grief as that moral suicide which prepares the long and miserable slavery of the immortal spirit through all the endless succession of its future changes!

On such a system as this much might be said, if time allowed us to say it. You have, of course, perceived its radical defect as an explanation of the universe,—a defect which it holds in common with every physical *demonstration* of particular facts by the mere exercise of abstraction. It

Pythagorean Ethics.

Radical defect of the Pythagorean scheme.

¹⁴ [Pseudo-Plutarch, *Plac. Phil.* i. 7, partially confirmed by Theophrastus, *Met.* 9, quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 111. Ed.]

¹⁵ [These particulars are taken from Iamblichus, v. p. xvii. *al.*, and are to be received with caution. Very early writers, however, testify to the existence of a strictly-ascetic rule of life in the Pythagorean societies, as Herod. ii. 81, who identifies the Pythagorean with the Orphic discipline. The Pythagorean Life (*πρόσος βίου*) is referred to by Plato, *Rep.* x. p. 600. The Orphic, *ibid.* ii. p. 364; and *Legg.* vi. 782, c. See Grote, *H. G.* iv. c. 37. Ed.]

substituted reason for evidence, and imagined that the soul would find within itself the copy of all outside it. Now, as far as the universe is subject to mathematical laws, this process is unquestionably correct; and in the system of Pythagoras, as in every other hypothetical solution, some truth gave currency to much error. But, in order to interpret the universe by calculation, we must first discover what the laws *are* whose *operation*, under all their conceived varieties, we are to determine by our calculus. If certain spaces, times, velocities, be given, we may fix all their diversities by the properties of number and space; but no reach of mathematical conception can determine the original elements themselves. In the system of Pythagoras, then, as in all that have ever influenced the world long, the misapplication of a great principle formed and perpetuated his error.

*The later
Pythagoreans.*

In the later Pythagoreans the system appears to have undergone considerable change. Timæus (whose fragment, whether authentic or not, contains some of the noblest passages of human composition) smiles at the metempsychosis, and deliberately declares it, and similar theories, to have been falsehoods justifiable upon grounds of public expediency.¹⁶

Nearly at the same era with Pythagoras a travelling sage arrived in Italy from Ionia. He brought with him

¹⁶ [See Tim. Loc. 104, D. This passage is itself an indication of the spuriousness of the treatise referred to, which is surely overpraised by Prof. Butler in the text. See above, note (1.) The theory of "convenient falsehoods" would not unnaturally commend itself to "Timæus Locrus." Would that he were not indebted for it to Plato! in whom it is unhappily to be found, though in a less "developed" form. (*Rep.* v. p. 459.)

I may remark, in passing, that an anonymous biographer of Plato represents the philosopher as having *purchased* the treatise of Timæus Locrus from the Pythagoreans. This statement, however, confounds Timæus with Philolaus, whose book *was* purchased by Plato. Ed.]

his Ionian tendencies, and in Italy amalgamated them with Pythagorean views. This distinguished person was Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the celebrated school of Elea,¹⁷—a school whose interesting character as well as deep obscurity makes me regret that I can afford to it upon this occasion so few moments. For this, as well as other deficiencies, I must throw myself upon the possibilities of the future; as I should, indeed, regret to think that circumstances should prevent me supplying you on some future occasion with details less unworthy of subjects so deeply interesting to every one who feels that, in studying the reason of others, he pursues one main path to the knowledge of his own.

As the Ionics had studied external varieties, so the Pythagoreans had studied mental harmonies, until they saw nothing else in the universe; and as the Pythagoreans externalized mental harmonies, so the Eleatics (under four eminent leaders, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus) externalized the conclusions of the pure reason itself,¹⁸ and thus may be said to

The Eleatic School,

compared with the Ionic and Pythagorean.

Its passage through Ontology to Dialectic. Xenophanes, B.C. 600 to B.C. 500,

¹⁷ [The best recent books on the Eleatic philosophy are—Karsten's *Fragments of Xenophanes and Parmenides*, Amsterdam, 1830–35; Mullach's edition of Aristotle *de Melisso, Xenophane, &c.*, (which includes the Eleatic fragments, &c., Berlin, 1845; Stallbaum's larger edition of the *Parmenides*, Leipzig, 1839; and Brandis's articles, *Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus*, in the *Dictionary of Biography*. Brandis had paved the way to a more complete knowledge of this very Greek school of speculation in his *Commentationes Eleaticæ*, published at Altona in 1813, and had been followed by M. Victor Cousin, in his essays on Xenophanes and Zeno, republished in the *Nouveaux Fragments Philosophiques*. Mullach's text of Xenophanes and Parmenides appears to me to be an improvement on Karsten's, who, again, had much surpassed preceding editors. The statements in the text agree with Ritter's, whom Professor Butler evidently consulted. Ed.]

¹⁸ [Parmenides *professed* this, as in the remarkable *dictum*, τὸ αἰνὸν

nearly,
(Karsten.)
Parme-
nides, B.C.
520 to B.C.
450, nearly,
(Clinton.)
Zeno, B.C.
495 to B.C.
435, or
later, (Id.)
Melissus,
Nor. B.C.
444.

have formally created the metaphysical system of the universe. It is to be observed, that, as the Eleatic philosophers advanced, they appear to have become more and more purely dialectical, until in Zeno the system became almost wholly a logical system; so that they seem to have travelled through ontology into logic,—a singular and important fact.

To those who investigate by the *mere* exercise of reflection the relations of the external world, one main distinction will perpetually present itself. Some of these relations are both single and multiple, (as those of arithmetic and geometry;) others are in their very essence *single*, (as substance, absoluteness, identity.) The former constituted the Pythagorean field of contemplation; the latter, the Eleatic: the one assumed the world, and would harmonize its variety; the other assumed reason, and denied the possibility of real variety. Hence the great maxim of the Eleatic sect, τὰ πάντα ἓν.¹⁹ The very ten-

νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι. (Idem est Cogitare atque Esse.) Frag. v. 40.
So v. 93:

τῶντ' ὃν ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα.
οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ὄντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἐστίν,
εἰρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.

"Thought, and that for which Thought exists, are one: for thou wilt not find Thought apart from Being, wherein Thought is affirmed." The reader will be reminded of the Cartesian "Cogito, ergo sum," of which Parmenides seems to assert the converse. To have become conscious of the antithesis implies a high reach of speculative ability, justifying the θαυμαστὸν βάθος attributed to this philosopher by Plato. Ed.]

¹⁹ [Plat. *Sophist.* p. 242: τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἐτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς λόγοις. The words ἐτι πρόσθεν have puzzled interpreters. Brandis supposes them to refer to the Pythagoreans, who, however, were hardly so early as Xenophanes. It is Plato's habit to trace the early system to a mythic or poetical origin: as in *Theat.* p. 152, where he affects to father the Heraclitean doctrines on Homer, or "yet more ancient authors." Comp. *Phileb.* p. 30. The greater number of such

dency of the Pythagorean school was obviously to depreciate the *sensible*, a principle which pervades all their fragments; and the next step in the march of system was to negative the *reality* of the sensible altogether, and to declare that reality belongs only to essences,—that all essences are *One*. Xenophanes was the Spinoza to whom Pythagoras was the Descartes. Not content with any form of the Dualistic system of the universe, and almost as little with the Emanative, he boldly declared that in the system of things there is truly no plurality,—all that so appears being merely presented under a peculiar æsthetic or sensible law.²⁰ God

*Sole reality
of the One.*

*Denial of
Plurality.*

*The One
styled by
Xenophanes
God.*

passages are, in my opinion, mere banter. See, however, Karsten, *de Xenophanis Philosophia*, p. 93, note (4.) Ed.]

²⁰ [It seems to me probable that, in asserting the Unity of God, Xenophanes did *not* find himself compelled to deny the existence of a Plurality. If we may trust the unfavourable and, as some think, unfair critique on Xenophanes in the treatise *De Melisso Xenophane et Gorgia*, written by Aristotle, or, as Mullach with great probability suggests, by an epitomator of a lost treatise of Aristotle, the Deity of Xenophanes was carefully distinguished from the outward universe (τὰ πολλὰ) on the one hand, and from the *Non Ens* on the other. (See c. 3, 1, 10, ed. Mullach.) It was Parmenides who, in order to complete the reasonings of his master, first perceived or imagined the necessity of identifying Plurality with the *Non Ens*: in other words, of denying reality to the outward, phenomenal world. If this view is correct, there seems no ground for qualifying the theology of Xenophanes with the epithet “pantheistic.” For though the term pantheism be sufficiently vague to include theories approximating, on the one hand, to Atheistic materialism, on the other scarcely distinguishable from the purest Theism, it can by no stretching be made to comprehend a doctrine which assigns to the Divinity moral as well as intellectual supremacy, which acknowledges an outward universe distinct from Him, and which represents Him as causing the changes in that universe by the acts of an intelligent volition. All these characteristics, it appears to me, are found to meet in the simple but sublime description of God with which the father of the Eleatic school commenced his philosophic poem:—“There is one God, among gods and men the greatest: unlike to mortals in outward

(for thus does philosophy adopt this name to consecrate its conclusions) is the one sole Being of the

shape, unlike in mind and thought." He has no parts, no organs as they have, (comp. Arist. I. I. 977, B,) being "all sight, all ear, all intelligence," (οὐλος ὁρᾷ οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει;) "wholly exempt from toil, he sways all things by thought and will," (νόον φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει;) "exempt too from motion, he abides ever in one place, (ἐν ταύτῳ;) for it ill befits Him to wander hither and thither in space." The epithet κράτιστος, which does not occur in the remaining fragments, we learn from the author of the treatise, was applied to the Deity by Xenophanes, and in the sense of "excellent as well as all-powerful," (τοῦτο δυνατότατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων.) This lofty, however imperfect, Monotheism is placed by its author in glaring contrast with the anthropomorphic follies of the popular religion, which he lashes with a force of sarcasm entitling him to a high place among ethico-satirical poets. We are further informed, by the author of the treatise, that the God of Xenophanes was described as "uncreated," or more properly "uncaused," (ἀγένητον.) This attribute, necessary in order to distinguish the Deity from the world, (τὰ γινόμενα,) was supported by arguments which, though used by Xenophanes *only* in relation to the divine nature, (τοῦτο λέγων ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ,) do virtually prove more than he seems to have designed to prove; striking, in effect, at the root of *all* phenomenal reality. This inference, which escaped the ἀγροικία (*Metaph.* i. 5) of Xenophanes, did not elude the acuteness of his pupil and successor, who accordingly scruples not to denude the God of Xenophanes, styled henceforth the One, of all attributes but bare existence, and to deny even that to the phenomenal universe, or the Many. We cannot wonder that the great logical coherence—we may add, the paradoxical character—of the system of Parmenides drew upon it the eyes of antiquity, and diverted them from the speculations of the simpler but more devout Xenophanes. Nor is it unnatural to suppose that the utterances of the master would be construed in accordance with the principles of his scholar,—the vague by the more definite, the simpler by the more finished and elaborate, theory. Accordingly, we find that Xenophanes has obtained credit for much that is the exclusive property of Parmenides and Zeno: in particular, for identifying God with the universe, and for denying "plurality."

To support this view fully would exceed the limits of a note, already perhaps too long. I shall therefore only add, that the opinion is founded on a comparison of the remaining fragments of Xenophanes with the testimony of Aristotle, (which I have been careful to discriminate from his criticisms,) and that I cannot find it inconsistent either with the

universe; and all which manifests itself within the sphere of sense is merely the illusive representation of a phenomenal world, which to experience seems diversified, but which reason cannot possibly admit to be other than one unchanged and unchangeable nature. In truth, the very notion of change involves contradiction; for, whether the second member of the alteration be like or unlike the first, it may be irresistibly shown that there is no adequate cause for a true and genuine change. The "God" of Xenophanes becomes (as has well been noted) in Parmenides purely metaphysical "existence." This philosopher (whose system was expressed in spirited and effective verse) brought the doctrines of the school into a shape more precise and comprehensive, by clearly distinguishing the double worlds²¹ of sense and of reason,—views

Change involves a contradiction.

Parmenides converts the "God" of Xenophanes into "Being."

language of Plato, that the Eleatic Unitarianism "originated with Xenophanes, nay, *earlier still*," (Soph. p. 242,) or with the statements (again distinguished from the *inferences*) of Aristotle in the well-known and important passage in the fifth chapter of the first book of his *Metaphysics*. That it is necessary to draw this distinction between what Aristotle records, and what he infers from the writings or sayings of the earlier thinkers, will be conceded, I apprehend, by most persons conversant with these subjects, and, if it were doubted, might be proved *ex abundanti* from instances in the little treatise already so often referred to; as, particularly, from that singular instance of bad faith, the pretence that, because Xenophanes uses the term "sphere-like," the God of whom it is the (evidently metaphorical) epithet must needs have been "corporeal"!—an inference, by-the-way, at variance with Aristotle's own express testimony in the passage quoted from the *Metaphysics*, and, if true, fatal to those who would identify the theory of Parmenides (who uses the selfsame epithet evidently in a *non-material* sense) with that of his predecessor. I have said nothing, in this place, of the account of Xenophanes given by Simplicius, because I believe it, as well as the passage in Cicero's *Academics*, ii. 37, 118, to have been taken, mediately or immediately, from the Aristotelian treatise. Ed.]

²¹ [This distinction of "worlds" is Platonic, not Eleatic. For the Eleatic formula *ἐν τὰ πάντα* forbids any such dualism: as the counter-

which in Plato were heightened and completed; and with which you may compare the further extension of the principle in the philosophy of the once-celebrated Campanella, who establishes *five* separate worlds, (sital, material, mathematical, mental, and archetypal.) By this time the Eleatic philosophers had learned almost wholly

*Melissus
denied
Space.*

*Paradoxes
of Zeno.*

to discard every conclusion derivable from experience. Melissus completed the system²² by denying space itself, with all its appendages; and Zeno of Elea was its apostle and warrior through the cities of Greece. The paradoxes of Zeno are well known: their scope and purpose is not so generally apprehended. It has of late been very clearly developed by the German critics. The advocates of a sensible world, and those of a purely rational world, had at length come to public discussion,—in Athens especially, which was now rapidly becoming the “eye of Greece,” after having been so long its protecting arm. The zealous republican Zeno, (who is said to have been himself a martyr to a high

formula of the Platonists (*ἐν καὶ πολλὰ*) implies it. The “world of sense” was to Parmenides and Zeno the *Non Ens*, a mere blank negation; in Plato it is a real world, because *οὐσίας μετέχον*, and therefore cognizable by reason, whose office it is to find the One in the Many, (Law in Phenomena.) It is true that in the latter half of his poem Parmenides indulged in some exceedingly vague cosmical speculations; but he takes especial (one would have thought unnecessary) pains to warn his hearers that these are mere flights of fancy, without the slightest ground in truth and reason. Some physical notions are also attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, who possibly, as Zeller confidently affirms, confounds him with Melissus. Zeller, however, is too much in the habit of marching to his conclusions by the “high *priori* road.” His account of the Eleatics is, notwithstanding this drawback, admirable as a concise and luminous exposition of a very obscure subject. See *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. i. p. 149. Ed.]

²² [Melissus rather corrupted than “completed” the Eleatic system. See the critique of Aristotle, *Met.* i. 5, 12. Ed.]

spirit of liberty,) carrying his independent spirit into logical encounter, undertook to prove that for every paradox imputed to the rationalists a score could be objected to the theory of a real sensible world. Hence his arguments against motion, (whose reality, as that of all change, was strenuously denied by the whole Eleatic school;) and, still more, his arguments to prove the impossibility of a *sensible* unity. As the Pluralists held that unity was absurd, he determined to show that Pluralism was absurd; and, for this purpose, the Palamedes of Elea (as Plato terms him²³) was incidentally led to deeper and more systematic views of the nature and distributions of *dialectical science*. It is from his "Art of Logic,"²⁴ composed with this view, *His dialectic.*

²³ [In the *Phædrus*, p. 261. Palamedes was a great inventive genius, the "sophist" of the heroic ages. Another *locus classicus* concerning Zeno exists in Plato's *Parmenides*, p. 128, where his philosophical relation to his master is clearly set forth. Cousin infers, from the less respectful tone adopted in the *Phædrus*, that Plato was ill acquainted with Zeno's works when he composed the latter dialogue, (*Frag. Phil.* p. 170.) But the sophisms of which Zeno was the parent quite justify the epithet in the *Phædrus*; which rather proves that Plato well knew the man he characterizes. Commentators are too apt to see malice in the elegant banter of Plato. The dialectic of Zeno had its serious as well as its ludicrous, a philosophical as well as a sophistical, aspect. The one is faithfully exhibited in the most serious, the other is lightly sketched in the most exuberantly "festive," of the Platonic dialogues. Where is the inconsistency? Ep.]

²⁴ [Zeno was the first, or one of the first, who wrote philosophical dialogues, (*Diog. L. iii. 47.*) which bore, perhaps, a rude resemblance to the purely-dialectical portions of the Platonic dialogues. Diogenes further styles him "the inventor of dialectic." This he may have been, if we understand by dialectic the method of question and answer. But no work of Zeno's is mentioned under the title "Art of Logic," as Professor Butler says, if I understand him rightly, in the text. Such a work must have comprised a theory of reasoning,—a matter beyond the reach of any ante-Socratic school. The best, if not the only, single treatise on this philosopher is M. Cousin's *Zénon d'Elée*, already referred to in note (17.) It has, however, too much the character of an *éloge*. The

and publicly taught by the author, that to Zeno of Elea has been ascribed the high honour of its invention. Into this subject I have not now time to enter; but I have sufficiently accomplished my purpose if I have exhibited to you that the bold logician of Elea was no vender of idle subtleties, (as we are in the habit of terming him,) but, on the contrary, the active and consistent defender of a vast and profound system of the universe in relation to man,—a system since revived in many forms, and on whose true merits and *conciliation* with other truths the philosophical world is, I fear, as discordant in this day as it was in the days of Xenophanes or Zeno.

We have now briefly sketched the progress of this remarkable school; that is, we have at least seen that their *object* was to demonstrate the absolute unity of the universe, and to establish that all variety was, in truth, only the apparent diversity under which it is given to the perishable senses to contemplate it. Among their merits it must not be forgotten that they inspired notions more abstract and exalted regarding the Supreme Author of all; and it is remarkable that the Eleatics were led to employ the *à priori* arguments for the existence and attributes of God (very similar to those of Clarke and others) at the very time that Anaxagoras was bringing to light the teleologic one. And so it has ever since been. The Supreme Author of reason levies his tribute justly from every part of our nature, and in all its principles obliges us equally to recognise his own image and superscription. It is, perhaps, happy for us that we are not wholly dependent upon such proofs; but, even among our higher privileges, it is

life of Zeno in the *Dictionary of Biography* is from the pen of Prof. Brandis, and therefore needs no recommendation. Ed.]

surely interesting and useful to observe what man has done when unpossessed of them, and a happy task to return thanks to Providence that, while leaving us in light, he never left the world altogether in darkness.

The speculations of the Eleatic school were resumed and continued subsequently to the age of Socrates in the school of Megara, (as it was termed from the city in which it was established,—the birthplace also of its principal founder, Euclides.) The dialectical tendencies of the Eleatics were here carried to their utmost development, and new subjects for the subtleties of distinction and definitions afforded in those *ethical* discussions which the teaching of Socrates had now made popular. This Eristic school, however,—for such was the title which its disputatious habits obtained for it,—was still, through all its departments, manifestly tinged by a strong Parmenidean infusion; and the principle of *unity* was the directive light by which it endeavoured to guide its course through every successive region of research. The universe was still one eternal nature; evil was not permitted to exist, as breaking the mighty singleness of the uniform whole; and, as good alone was real and invariable, so all that was invariable and real was of the nature of good, *ἐν τῷ ἀγαθόν*. And as the deductions of the pure reason, pursuing a single immutable course, tend to the One and the Unchangeable, the Megarics were led to condemn the value, and even deny the cogency, of all *analogical* habits of conclusion; while, in the field of practical morality, that which was the sameness of unity to the reason became the quiescence of apathy to the conduct or affections; and Stilpo, the chief teacher of practical philosophy among the Megaric succession, declared that the prime felicity of wisdom consisted in total impassibility. But I am anticipating the period which belongs to a future Lecture in my de-

sire to present to you, as much as possible, the complete development of each leading idea.

To the revolution effected by the teaching and authority of Socrates, with its immediate antecedents and consequences, we will pass at our next meeting.

LECTURE VII.

THE SOPHISTS—SOCRATES.

GENTLEMEN:—

HAVING followed, with a hurried, but, I trust, not altogether an unfaithful, step, the principal lines on which the Grecian philosophic reason travelled during its first period, we are at length obliged to pause where it pauses. As long as truth is sincerely held in view, the very errors of infant philosophy command respect for their motive, and insinuate admonition in their consequences: they are so many experiences in the youth of science, on which its advanced age has already grown wise, and may perhaps still afford to grow wiser; if they betray the weakness, they are also invested with the attractive simplicity, of childhood; but as soon as the attainment of truth is degraded into a secondary or incidental end, and the importance of the prize is forgotten in the dexterity of the contest, philosophy not merely cannot be said to have forfeited our respect, but even cannot truly be considered *to exist*. To such a crisis as this we have now arrived. I am bound to notice its causes: they demand, and will reward, your attention. The materials for the history of this transition-period are not scanty, but they are scattered: they are to be sought in every department of the civil and political, as well as literary, history of the time; for the entire character of the Athenian mind in the age of Pericles is revealed in the career and the influence of the Sophists.

*Crisis in
the history
of Philo-
sophy.*

*Transition-
period.*

*The So-
phists.*

*Sophistry
the mimicry of Wis-
dom.*

What is sophistry? It is the *mimicry of wisdom*,¹—the *form and attire*, without the substance and body, of well-ordered reason. If then you would seek the causes which fostered the growth of this evil, you must seek what motives those were which impelled the teachers of philosophy to prefer the form of wisdom to its reality, or to the search for its reality, and their auditors to countenance or flatter the deceit.

Its causes.

Now, to begin with a principle of the highest generality, it is, I am persuaded, not fanciful to observe, that in the Grecian intellect there was in all the regions of thought a tendency to dwell upon the form in preference to the internal reality of objects. This is, in fact, the genius of *art* expressed in its ultimate formula. In religion, the Greek delighted in the temple and the pro-

*Preference
of form to
substance,
a tendency
of the
Grecian
mind.*

¹ [So Aristotle, *Soph. Elench.* c. 2, who adds, "the sophist is one who trades in this unreal wisdom." Compare Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 23:—"Sophistæ . . . qui ostentationis aut quæstus causa philosophantur." The mercenary or self-seeking character, and the absence of scientific method and scientific earnestness, are features which enter into all the portraits of the "sophist," as drawn by the philosophers. See the passages collected in the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, No. II., "On the Sophists." A significant definition is also that of Philostratus, and the more remarkable as proceeding from an admirer:—"The ancient Sophistic may be regarded as a philosophizing Rhetoric." Of the Sophists known to us, some, as Gorgias, have more of the rhetorical, while Protagoras and others show more of the philosophic element. The vulgar applied the term indiscriminately to all men of science or letters except the poets,—*generally*, however, as a term of reproach. The entire question is much too intricate to be dealt with in a note: but the testimonies accumulated by the author of the article referred to will at least revive the memory of that distinction between "Sophist" and "Philosopher," between the true seeker of wisdom and his counterfeit, which the greatest thinkers of antiquity laboured to establish, and which the most brilliant of modern historians is thought by some to have succeeded in obliterating. Ed.]

cession more than in the god; in poetry, his joys, his sorrows, his meditations, were moulded in a form essentially picturesque,—such as the eye could contemplate; in the ideal beauty of statuary, his taste inclined to precision of outline even more than to depth of expression; in history, (notwithstanding Thucydides, the recency of whose subject necessitated accuracy,) he inclined to the perfection of style more than the perfection of veracity; in national policy, wealth and power themselves were scarcely valued in comparison to that floating phantom of “glory” which is their shadow! But it is superfluous to follow the application minutely. It is well known that, in other departments of intellectual exertion, subsequent ages have robbed Greece of her supremacy; that in the arts of form—in the perfection of external beauty—she has never been surpassed. To investigate the causes of this remarkable phenomenon is not within my present sphere; I have but to state and apply it. In such a disposition, then, of the national mind, with so peculiar, predominant, and pervading a genius, it seems fair to conclude that there must have existed a perpetual *tendency to transmute science itself* into an art of design, a tendency whose constant and powerful activity could only be resisted by efforts of extraordinary firmness on the part of its cultivators. Now, the sophists were the artists of philosophy. They made of the simple and natural process of philosophical discussion a series of practical manœuvres, and taught men to construct by rule and compass disquisitions upon the good and the true, as they had been taught to build a temple, or chisel a statue, or design a picture.

*Instances
in Art, Re-
ligion, and
Literature.*

*The So-
phists were
the artists
of Philo-
sophy.*

We saw, in a former Lecture, how important were those advantages which Greece had contributed to the development of thought in the

*Publicity,
as it had
fostered the
growth, led
also to the*

corruption,
of Philo-
sophy in
Greece.

perfect publicity of her institutions; we must not now close our eyes to the same fact as a source of its errors and extravagances. As publicity had fostered philosophy, so publicity aided to destroy it; as it had cleared the path and encouraged the race of speculation, so it now beguiled speculation into the oblique and tortuous by-ways of verbal subtlety and dialectical display. The anticipation of general sympathy which at first had fortified (as a powerful and legitimate corroborative) the young energies of Grecian thought at length usurped the whole mind, and became its only adequate motive for exertion; and men who mainly sought to please the public taste could rise no higher than the public taste permitted. Now, as we just observed, the cordial sympathies of the Athenian public (for it is in *Athens* that philosophy has now established her seat) never penetrated with undiminished intensity from the form to the substance of reason; and the professors of wisdom who would attract such a people should possess the skill of rhetoricians and the promptitude of oral logic, quite as much as the depth, perseverance, and sincerity of genuine science. They should be able to confute rather than to convince, and at least as deeply skilled in seeming as in being wise. Nay, upon the principle before laid down, it is scarcely extravagant to say that the Athenian listener preferred (not merely the semblance without the reality, to the reality without the semblance, of reason—but even preferred) the semblance without, to the semblance with, the reality of truth. The brilliant falsehood which defied, or seemed to defy, logical detection was the very triumph of form and colour over weight and solidity; it was eminently the creation of art and of the mind; it was *that* to reason which the work of Apelles or Zeuxis might be to nature, —the very perfection of imitation!

The transition into this unfortunate stage of the

Greek philosophy was accelerated by a fact to which it requires some abstraction from present circumstances to assign its adequate amount of influence: I allude to the want of any engine of diffusion corresponding to our *art of printing*. The absence of such a mode of publication, forcing the teachers of science almost altogether upon *oral* delivery in their solicitude for fame, inevitably perverted them into *orators*. He who sought public distinction (the perpetual passion of an Athenian) looked for it principally in the number and rank of his immediate disciples and auditors; and his style and topics of discussion were necessarily regulated by his anxiety to augment them.

Prevalence of oral over written discourse, another cause of corruption.

But, besides these distracting influences, so fatal to the serene sincerity of philosophical inquiry, we shall discover another in the new position in which philosophy at this time finds her ministers in Greece. Wisdom was now sold for *money*, — a circumstance almost equally injurious to the buyers, to the sellers, and to the commodity in exchange. The inferior ranks of the Athenian youth might be contented with inferior masters; but the young men who held the great offices of the state in prospect sought from the most accomplished minds in Greece the knowledge of nature, of man, of his passions, and, above all, of the means of swaying them. Eloquence was the engine of ambition: to eloquence, then, and to truth only so far as it is subservient to eloquence, the pupil, and therefore the master, solicitously and almost exclusively applied himself. To the morality of the rhetorician right and wrong are only indirectly important; right and wrong became, therefore, of inferior moment; the object to the “artificer of persuasion” was not self-conviction, but social influence, and, consequently, the object

Philosophy discovered to have a marketable value.

It is combined with Rhetoric, an art to which right and wrong are indifferent.

of a philosophy governed by such motives must be the discovery of those weaknesses and those plausibilities on every side of every question which may enable the student, at the shortest notice, to advocate or oppose any proposition whatever. The genius of professional sophistry is, therefore, essentially *skeptical*; and, in point of fact, the leading names among the sophists of the Socratic age are enrolled likewise among the philosophers of skepticism.

*Hence a
moral skepticism.*

This view presents the Athenian sophists under a darker aspect. But, unhappily, it is only too characteristic of the entire condition of Athenian society at the period in question. The Athenian mind had, for two centuries, been passing under a course of education in which the powers of taste—the perception of the beautiful—had been refined to a degree almost inconceivable to a people of less practised sensibility. It had to the cultivated class—of which alone I now speak—become their religion, or the garment which alone made their religion of interest; and every thing which could minister to this emotion was welcomed in proportion to its efficacy. Along with painters, and statuary, and architects, and minstrels, came the *sage* with his portraits of the beauty of virtue and the order of the world: and he had his place with the rest, and for the same reason. But, as he had no claim to attention when his power of charming the imagination was past, he too had to give way when rival magicians in speculation appeared who could artfully fascinate the soul with a still more pleasing *terror*, who could invest with a certain dark and stern beauty the fiends of disorder and dismay, could call the world a lovely chance, and human life a dream, and preach that it was the whole canon of its duty, the whole perfection of its virtue, to recline, crowned with flowers, and hear the

*Views of
the state of
Athenian
society.*

songs of Anacreon.² Such a system has a double aspect: its gayer side will, assuredly, be popular,—its gloomier pictures perhaps even more so. I know not whether you will fully enter into the thought when I observe that, in the excess of luxurious refinement, there appears to be, in the more sensitive order of minds, a singular tendency to melancholy, more especially to the melancholy of unbelief,—a feeling transient, it may be, but often recurring, which can thoroughly sympathize, from the midst of its satiety of enjoyment, with those gloomy teachers who deplore the nothingness of life, and which, forced to recall how visionary is all which once promised to be happiness, cannot bear to think that there is *any* happiness in promise which is not a vision also!

In such a state of society—alternately careless in luxury and ambitious in effort—it is not difficult to conceive what success might attend an active and eloquent disputant, who, as PROTAGORAS of Abdera, equally suited all its tendencies, by declaring that there is no criterion whatever of truth, that “man is himself the measure of all,”³ and that, consequently, the reality of

Protagoras, born
B.C. 480,
perh.; died
B.C. 411,
prob.

His maxim, “Man the measure of all.”

² [I would fain have expunged this passage, had it been possible to do so without deranging the context. It probably would not have survived its author's revisionary criticism. As a description of the Sophists and their disciples, it is thoroughly inappropriate. The effeminate Epicureanism indicated by it was the vice, as the “songs of Anacreon” were the production, of a later age. The strains of the *true* Anacreon are not those of a voluptuous trifler; nor were the lusts to which the Sophists were accused of pandering those of the senses. Ed.]

³ [See Plato's *Theætetus*. It is difficult to determine how much of the acute argumentation and subtle mental analysis to be found in this dialogue existed in the work of Protagoras which it professes to review. But, until this point is settled, it is impossible to measure

things was as manifold as the variations of human feelings,—a principle which it seems he fearlessly applied to even the existence of the gods,⁴ which, without honouring the problem with a definite decision,⁵ he pronounced to be altogether doubtful; or who, as GORGIAS, though receiving (as we are told) one hundred minæ for his lessons in rhetoric, taught a philosophy which upheld the impossibility of transmitting real truth by words; or who, as HIPPIAS, boasted himself master of all the arts,

*Gorgias,
born bef.
480, B.C.;
died about
380 B.C.*

aright the speculative powers of the greatest of the Sophists. The *practical* tendency of the dogma, that “the Individual” (for that is the meaning of ἀνθρώπος) “is the measure of all things,” is unmistakably immoral; but we are not entitled to assume that Protagoras consistently carried out his principle: indeed, the contrary seems to follow from the distinction he sets up in the *Theætetus*, between the Good and the True, as regards their comparative cognizability. But, though Protagoras may not be open to the charge of teaching immorality, it is clearly shown by Socrates that his principle ought, in consistency, to have been extended to moral as well as metaphysical distinctions, and that it is virtually as subversive of the one as it professedly is of the other. ED.]

⁴[According to Eusebius, this doctrine was broached at the outset of Protagoras’s “Treatise concerning the Gods,” possibly a different work from that Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος which, according to the same authority, Porphyry had read. (Compare Euseb. *Evang. Præp.* pp. 468 and 720.) The latter is undoubtedly the work reviewed in the *Theætetus*, and from passages in that dialogue it seems to have been called by its author Ἀλήθεια, to which the addition ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος may have been made subsequently. Concerning the writings of Protagoras, see Frei’s *Questiones Protagorææ*, p. 178, seq. The treatise “Concerning the Gods” may have been filled with speculations resembling those of Critias in his tragedy called *Sisyphus*, of which a considerable fragment is preserved. (See Wagner, *Fragm. Trag.* iii. p. 102.) It may be remarked, in passing, that Mr. Grote’s attempt to justify Protagoras by the example of Xenophanes (*H. G.* viii. p. 499) leaves out of sight the important fact that, while Xenophanes denied and ridiculed the gods of the popular Pantheon, he was a devout believer in one supreme Deity,—a faith which can under no pretence be attributed to Protagoras. ED.]

from the loftiest to the least; or, as *DIAGORAS*,⁵ professed open Atheism; or, as *Euthydemus*,⁶ and others, declared justice the creature of human policy, and man destitute of every principle of obligation beyond instinct and compulsion. Protagoras, indeed, was banished, and Prodicus is said to have been put to death as a public corrupter,⁷ (a charge which certainly his beautiful apologue⁸ does not corroborate;) but the estimation in which these public declaimers were held is abundantly manifest from the writings of Plato, especially the “Protagoras,” in which a most vivid and dramatic sketch is presented of the pompous pretences of the genuine sophists of the Athenian porticos. For instance,—to borrow a picture better than a hundred dissertations,—“Entering, we found Protagoras walking up and down in the portico, and with him, walking on one side, Callias, son of Hipponicus, Paralus, and Charmides; on the other side, Xanthippus, son of Pericles, &c., and Anti-

Diagoras,
flor. about
424 B.C.

Prodicus,
date un-
certain, but
died later
than B.C.
399. *Plat.*
Apol. 19, E.

Passage of
the Prota-
goras illus-
trative of
the estima-
tion in
which the
Sophists
were held.

⁵ [Diagoras is not usually classed with the “Sophists,” nor is the statement that he “openly professed Atheism” capable of proof. See Professor Stahr’s life of Diagoras, in Smith’s *Dictionary of Biography*, vol. i. Ed.]

⁶ [Perhaps Thrasyarchus is intended. No such opinions are attributed, so far as I know, to Euthydemus, of whom extremely little is known. Ed.]

⁷ [This strange statement is found only in the Scholiast on Plato (*Rep.* x. 600) and in Suidas. Its truth is most questionable. Prodicus was described as a corrupter of youth by *Aristophanes*, (Suid. in *vit. Prod.*) All that is known of this Sophist has been collected by Professor Welcker in an interesting article which first appeared in the *Rhenish Museum*, and has been republished in his *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. The reader may also consult the life of Prodicus in Smith’s *Dictionary of Biography and Mythology*, written by Prof. Brandis, who has drawn largely from Welcker, correcting him, however, in some particulars. Ed.]

⁸ [Recited by Socrates in *Xen. Mem.* ii. 2. Ed.]

mærus of Mende, who bears the highest reputation of all the disciples of Protagoras, and is studying with a view to hereafter being a sophist himself. Others followed behind to catch what was said, seeming chiefly to be foreigners whom Protagoras brings about with him from every city through which he travels, charming them (*κηλῶν*) with his voice, as Orpheus of old, while they under the fascination follow the voice: some also of our countrymen were in the train. As I viewed the band, (*χορὸν*,) I was delighted to observe with what caution they took care never to be in front of Protagoras, but whenever he turned, those who were behind, dividing on either side in a circle, fell back so as still to remain in the rear. ‘Him past, I saw’ (to speak in Homeric phrase) Hippias of Elis enthroned beneath the opposite portico; around whom, on benches, sat Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phædrus, and Andron, and others,—alike Athenian and foreigners. They seemed to question Hippias concerning the sublimities of nature and the revolutions of the stars; while he, reposing upon his throne, resolved each successive difficulty. Presently I came upon Prodicus of Ceos, who sat retired in a chamber, which Hipponicus had been wont to employ as his store-room; but, in order to receive the stream of gathering guests, Callias had removed the provision-stores, and resigned even that corner to their use. There Prodicus, who was not yet risen, lay cushioned among the bedclothes, and around him several,—as Pausanias, Agathon, Adimantus, and others. But the subjects of their discussion I could not gather from without, though extremely anxious to hear Prodicus; for I hold him to be a man of wisdom more than human; but the perpetual reverberation of his voice—an extremely deep one—confused the words in their echoes.”

And who is it, Gentlemen, that the graphic pen of Plato has here introduced to us as describing (with his own calm inimitable humour) his adventures in that Athenian mansion,—confounding the learned pride of Protagoras, and crushing his tissue of declamation in the iron grasp of close and manly reason? It is THAT MAN whom the simplest and most hurried narrative cannot approach without emotion,—that man whom all ages have united to acknowledge as almost the ideal of humanity itself. When in the midst of these philosophic hirelings, when even in the midst of the honest conjecturers of the material world, the historian comes upon the form of Socrates,—of the calm teacher and martyr of moral wisdom,—though he be the dulllest chronologist of facts and dates, he owns a thrill he cannot repress; and it is, perhaps, to the honour of themselves and of their subject, that of the philosophy of Socrates his biographers have left little definite analysis: every writer seems *lost* in the theme, and unconsciously to assume admiration for inquiry!

*Socrates,
born B.C.
468; died
B.C. 399.*

For the personal history and the customary manners of Socrates, I need not inform you that you are to refer to Plato and Xenophon, and to form your estimate from both. Plato was by his own contemporaries accused of “Pythagorizing” the Socratic doctrine; but the sagacious critic will, nevertheless, find unquestionable marks of genuineness in a *great portion*—though assuredly not in the entire—of the Platonic records. To the *style and manner* of the illustrious teacher they bear the manifest testimony which the representations of a consummate copyist of externals cannot fail to afford. My present object shall be to note the purposes, the influence, and more prominent articles of the actual philosophy, of this great master of practical reason.

*His history
and man-
ners known
from Plato
and Xeno-
phon.*

We have seen in what condition Socrates found the

*Condition
of Philoso-
phy when
Socrates
appeared.*

philosophy of his country. The material world had been assailed by two great parties of explorers with almost equal ill-success. Many curious and valuable truths had indeed been incidentally discovered; but they lost their value in being confounded with the general chaos of conjecture; and no test existed by which they could be separated from the error that surrounded them. In the field of *moral* investigation the enterprises of philosophy had been still more profitless. Ranked as little more than ancillary to rhetoric, the ethical philosophy of man was degraded into the theory of "the colours of good and evil," (to adopt a Baconian phrase,) and the object of search was seldom the true, but the effective; while among the disciples of the Italic school it was usually absorbed in a dreamy and unpractical mysticism. Physical conjecture was, however, the philosophic passion of the time; and Socrates himself began his studies under the Ionic Archelaus in that field. In the *Phædo*⁹ he alludes to his early interest in physical research, in order to illustrate his subsequent discontent with such pursuits; and in the "Clouds" of Aristophanes (exhibited twenty-three years before the death of Socrates) it is as a natural philosopher—the speculator in astronomy, the measurer of flea-leaps—that the moralist is introduced. Now, this is highly important, as illustrating the true position of Socrates as a philosophical reformer. I have been accustomed to compare him with the oracle of the revolution of the seventeenth century, and, by mutual resemblances and contrasts, the results of Socrates and Bacon will illumine each other.

*Socrates
and Bacon
compared.*

*Both aimed
at utility.*

Let us then observe that the purposes of each were alike directed to *utility*, to the profitable as distinguished from the merely formal and the prac-

⁹ [P. 96, A, seq. Ed.]

tically inapplicable. This was equally the leading idea of the Athenian and the Englishman. Observe, further, that neither left behind him *any definite system* upon specific articles of philosophy; that each rather showed the way to think than the results of thought; and that though to minds so energetic and creative it was impossible not sometimes to conjecture and to theorize, yet even theories themselves were intended rather as examples of the general formula of inquiry than as individually self-supported, or as claiming attention upon their own grounds. This is obvious to all readers of the physical speculations of Bacon, who expressly declares it in the arrangement of his own writings: in the recorded conversations of Socrates it seems to me to be scarcely less exhibited. Thus, every discourse exhibits the *mode of inquiry*¹⁰ and the sincerity of truth;

Neither founded a positive system, but each invented a method.

Bacon's physical theories seem intended as examples of his method; and the same may be said of many of the Socratic dialogues.

¹⁰ [The Socratic method deserves to be more precisely described. Aristotle informs us that in the sphere of general philosophy two discoveries are justly attributed to Socrates, the inductive mode of inquiry, and the practice of seeking general definitions, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου, (*Metaph.* xiii. 4.) Of these the former was ancillary to the latter, as Bacon perceived, *Nov. Org.* i. 105. "At inductio, quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad executiendas definitiones et ideas, hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur." It might be rash to assume that the method of Socrates is faithfully represented in *Plato*: but the Socrates of *Xenophon* proceeds on the same plan, though the comparative want of precision in some of the *Xenophontic* conversations may lead us to suppose that *Plato* had improved upon his master. Against this supposition, however, may be set the testimony of *Xenophon* himself, iv. 5, 12: ἐφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιέντας κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι, διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. Where, faulty as is the etymology, the dialectic process is described with singular felicity.

yet scarcely a single dialogue is found to terminate in any direct conclusion,—a peculiarity which in fact has in all ages perplexed the expositors of Plato, but which surely could not have had place without a secret purpose. And from this peculiarity it likewise followed that each of these teachers left *no school* to wear their

Neither
founded a
school.

livery and minister to their fame; naturally, for the very object of each was to show all men how to *think for themselves*. Socrates, indeed,

bequeathed his general principles of ethical philosophy to a few disciples who were content to copy and record him,—as Xenophon, Æschines, Simo, Cebes, Simmias, Crito; but these lasted only for a generation, and left no living succession to champion their tenets. In these respects, then, we see the *similarity* of these two legislators of philosophy: let us now, with equal rapidity,

Bacon di-
verted in-
quiry from

characterize the *difference*. Bacon wearied of ineffective logical speculation, Socrates of in-

Elsewhere (c. vi. 1) we are told that Socrates was never weary of investigating *τί ἐκαστον εἰη τῶν ὄντων*,—in other words, of seeking the right conception or definition. So Aristotle, *l. l. εὐλόγως ἐζητεῖ τὸ τί ἐστιν*. It is clear, therefore, that Socrates possessed, consciously to himself, an idea of scientific method, and that his repeated asseveration that he “knew nothing” was grounded on the comparison of his own attainments with that idea. See Plato, *Apol.* 21, v, and compare Schleiermacher on the worth of Socrates as a philosopher in the *Philological Museum*, ii. p. 549; Zeller, *Philos. d. Griech.* ii. p. 50. Induction was the bridge by which Socrates led his hearers from the “common notion” to the right conception implied in a term, proceeding by the rejection and exclusion of that which was irrelevant or proper to the individual or the subordinate species, “per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas.” See the dialogue with Euthydemus, *Mem.* iv. 2, where the steps in the argument are traced with a precision worthy of Plato. The two counter-processes of the dialectician are described with great elegance in the *Phædrus*, 265, v, fol. 1. Induction, or the gathering under one form the multitude of scattered particulars. 2. Division, or the dissection of the general into its subordinate species, *κατ’ ἀρθρα, ἢ τρέφοντες*, by a *natural*, not an arbitrary, classification. Ed.]

effective *physical*; the former resigned in a great measure the internal world for the external, the latter, the external world for the internal. The physical theorists of the Ionic succession¹¹ were to Socrates precisely what the schoolmen and imaginers of hypothetical worlds were to Bacon; and, as the folly reigned in *different* regions, the path of the reformers lay in contrary directions, and Bacon conducted science into the world of matter, while Socrates had led her into the heart and actions of man.

logic to physics; Socrates from physics to logic and ethics,—each reformation being that which the times demanded.

To speak more specially of the features of this reformation. The merits of the indefatigable converser who, among the groves and public walks of Athens, fought his calm victorious way through all the hosts of sophistry in the latter half of the fifth century before Christ, were mainly these. In the *first* place, he recalled philosophy from eloquence and verbal subtlety by the exercise of the most singular combination of acuteness with practical good sense perhaps ever presented. As a reasoner he manifestly overmatched the sophists themselves, whom he purposely fought with their own arms, and whom, indeed, on some occasions in the Dialogues of Plato he seems to copy (doubtless in order to overthrow) to a degree not altogether acceptable to a modern reader, who forgets the national predilection for these contests, which made it impossible to present truth attractively except in the form of a regular dialectical disputation. *Again*: by Socrates the mind

Socratic reformation further described.

Recall of philosophy from rhetoric and from logomachy.

¹¹ [This clause stands thus in the author's MS.:—"The dreaming disciples of Pythagoras and Thales at length sunk into the puerility of sophistical disputants," &c. This is not true of the disciples of Pythagoras, the greatest of whom were contemporary with Socrates; nor is it clear who are the "dreaming disciples of Thales" referred to. I have therefore ventured to substitute words of my own, justified by *Phædo*, p. 96. Ed.]

Socrates considered the reform of physical science impossible.

of Athens was, in a great measure, withdrawn from studies of which, without some fundamental reform, two centuries had exemplified the hopelessness.¹² Such a reform of physical science the tastes and habits of Socrates do not seem to have even led him to contemplate; but, even had he seen it with the prophetic eye of that great man to whom I have already compared him, it is doubtful whether he would not have resolutely preferred, when he inspected the manners of his countrymen, as a higher and holier office, the almost exclusive dissemination of the principles of moral truth, and of the way to explore and establish them. Again: for the dogmatical assertion of suppositions as unquestionable truths, Socrates, with a reach of logical sagacity peculiarly his own, taught the great principle of humble inquiry, the commencement with

His "scepticism" contrasted with that of other professed skeptics.

doubt,¹³—a principle which subsequently degenerated into a skepticism for which Socrates is not to answer. He made doubt the first step—"skepticism" makes it the entire process and result—of philosophy. But among all the great maxims which the authority of Socrates fixed and fortified in the world of speculation, none should justly rank higher than the principle of *internal meditation*, as the true outset of legitimate inquiry. I promised, as

Socrates represents the transition from objective to subjective in speculation.

¹² [Aristotle says, "In the time of Socrates definition took the place of inquiry into nature, which philosophers deserted in favour of moral and political speculation:"—τὸ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφούντες. *De Part. Anim.* i. 1, 44. Ed.]

¹³ [As Meno tells him,—“I had heard, Socrates, that you are always doubting and causing others to doubt; and now I find it by experience to be so; for you have so bewitched me by your spells, that I am in a state of utter doubt and confusion.” *Meno.* p. 80. For the moral aspect of the Socratic skepticism, see the conclusion of the *Theætetus.* Ed.]

you may remember, that in the person of Socrates would be found that transition from the external to the internal which separates the first and second periods of Greek philosophy. In this maxim, and its consequences, we find the passage effected. For in the principle, comprehensively considered, there is a double aspect,—intellectual and moral. Regarded morally, it declares that the foundations of ethical science can only be laid in a diligent investigation of the *actual phenomena* of the moral constitution;¹⁴

His Ethics founded on a theory of human nature.

and that if sophistical skepticism has questioned the existence of morality as distinct from physical enjoyment or suffering, a genuine philosophy must establish it in that region where alone it can be found,—the world of the human heart,—where, disentangled of all incidental accessories, it lives a pure and primitive formation. Regarded intellectually, it declares that in the principles of the mind of man must be sought the principles of inquiry and of advancement. And it is observable, that Socrates appears to have combined both these views into one formula when he professes to call virtue itself a “science,”

His dogma, “Virtue is science.”

and yet (as he so often demonstrates) a science “that cannot be taught.”¹⁵ Accordingly, in compliance with

¹⁴ [This at least was the interpretation Plato put upon the Socratic “know thyself.” But it can hardly be said that Socrates himself clearly perceived the connection between Ethics and Psychology; at least, there are no traces of such knowledge in the Xenophontic reports, nor are his somewhat arbitrary and superficial definitions of the virtues altogether compatible with it. See the well-known passage in the *Magna Moralia*, i. 1, where the superiority of the Platonic to the Socratic Ethics is traced to Plato’s clearer views of the constitution of man’s nature. *En.*]

¹⁵ [“Whether Virtue can be taught” was a question much agitated in the time of Socrates, who appears to give contradictory decisions on different occasions. Compare *Plat. Meno*, pp. 96, 98, with *Protagoras*,

these master-conceptions of the position of man in regard to truth, the method of Socrates is (as he himself humorously styled it, in playful allusion to his maternal descent) essentially a "maieutic" or "obstetric"¹⁶ method: a constant effort (that is) to "deliver" minds of that secret truth which lay concealed in their own constitution; and hence, perhaps, from the practical method of his master, Plato in part derived his own theory of knowledge as "*remi-*
His irony: its nature and causes. niscence."¹⁷ In the statement of his views and inquiries Socrates employed a peculiar vein of
*irony,*¹⁸—partly, as I suppose, to evade the bigotry of the

p. 361, in the latter of which passages he censures his own inconsistency in first denying that Virtue can be taught, and then maintaining that Virtue is Science; and the inconsistency of his opponent in affirming the first while he rejected the second proposition. According to Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 2, 19, Socrates seems to have adopted the common-sense view that Virtue is partly matter of teaching, partly of practice, (*ἀσκητόν*), and partly of natural disposition. But Xenophon appears unconscious of the logical difficulty of reconciling this with that identification of Virtue with Science or Wisdom which he elsewhere distinctly attributes to his master. The Cynics and Megarics who accepted this identification consistently asserted that Virtue is *διδασκόν*. Ed.]

¹⁶ [Plat. *Theæt.* p. 149. Ed.]

¹⁷ [This doctrine is developed in the *Meno*, p. 81, and more fully in the *Phædo*, p. 72. The conjecture that it was suggested by the teaching of Socrates is highly probable, but the doctrine itself is too speculative and fanciful to have found favour with Plato's master. Ed.]

¹⁸ [Schleiermacher (*Philosoph. Werke*, iii. 4, 9) ingeniously remarks, that "the irony of Socrates is nothing else than the co-existence in him of the Idea of Knowledge, with the absence of positive acquirement; literally, the knowledge that he knew nothing." It is somewhat remarkable that the term *εἰρωνεία* never occurs in Xenophon. Of the thing, however, we have examples in the dialogues with Theodote the Hetæra, *Mem.* iii. 11, and in that with Euthydemus, *ib.* iv. 2. The Latin equivalent to the word is *dissimulatio*, Cic. *Acad. Qu.* ii. 5, 15. Its Greek antitheton is *ἀλαζονεία*, *vanity* or self-glorification. Comp. Arist. *Eth.* N. iv. 13, 2. Whether Socrates really used this weapon so unsparingly as Plato represents is a curious question. Perhaps the

times, and partly, doubtless, to pique and irritate into self-inquisition those with whom he conversed. In many points, unquestionably, his own convictions were not settled; and by the use of this veil (which none ever interposed more dexterously) he at once gained, and gave, the benefits of discussion, and yet preserved his own doubts from inconvenient disclosure. This seems to me the true account of the famous Socratic irony. But in the course of these discussions, and of all the principal circumstances of his life, he professed to be guided by a *warning voice*,—a δαίμων, or ^{His so-called demon.} genius,¹⁹—seldom directing indeed to action, but constantly restricting from evil. Of this remarkable

fact may have lain somewhere between *his* representations and those of Xenophon, who, however, would be deterred by the apologetic purpose of his principal work from giving great prominence to so unpopular a feature in his master's character. Possibly it was a quality for which he himself had no especial relish. Ep.]

¹⁹ [In using the terms "δαίμων, or genius," Prof. Butler appears to have fallen into an exploded error. Socrates always speaks of τὸ δαιμόνιον, or δαιμόνιον τι, "a divine or supernatural somewhat," ("divinum quiddam," as Cicero has it,) the nature of which he does not attempt to define, and to which he never attributes distinct personality,—speaking of it now as a "sign," σημεῖον, (*Phædr.* p. 242, B,) now as a φωνή, or "voice," (*Apol. S.* p. 31, D.) This voice or premonitory sign he undoubtedly referred to a divine original. See *Xen. Mem.* iv. 3, 12, 13; but he nowhere indicates the particular deity from whom he believed it to emanate. According to Schleiermacher, this δαιμόνιον "denotes the province of such rapid moral judgments as cannot be referred to distinct grounds, which accordingly Socrates did not attribute to his proper self; for instance, presentiment of the issue of an undertaking; attraction and repulsion in reference to particular individuals." Plutarch's treatise is well known. Its Latin title, *De Genio Socratis*, is simply a mistranslation of the Greek περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου, and is not countenanced by any words of the author. He never speaks of a δαίμων, nor does Clemens Alexandrinus,—who, however, in one passage conjectures that the δαιμόνιον of Socrates may have been a familiar genius, *Strom.* v. p. 592. This conjecture becomes an assertion in Lactantius, *Inst. D.* ii. 14, who converts the *dæmonium* into a *dæmon* :

attribute, what shall we say? Much has indeed been written and speculated as to this singular accompaniment, which to many minds has invested with the dignity of supernatural inspiration the deeds and words of Socrates: especially when they remember that it was just about the period when the *Hebrew* prophets were ceasing, that this celestial light rose in another land. Without entering into the probabilities of such a supposition, I may state my own opinion:—that this restrictive voice was *originally* meant by Socrates himself as only the emphatic title of *conscience* regarded (as his philosophy invariably taught) as the voice of God in the heart of man; but that, in all probability, as his destinies became more and more remarkable, and as he felt himself manifestly the selected instrument of moral benefit to a thoughtless and corrupt people, his own secret enthusiasm (by a process frequent among men of singular history) began at length to whisper to him that he walked under the special guidance of heaven! Harmless—let me rather say, noble and truthful—illusion! which represented as servant of truth him who surely did the work of truth, and taught to believe himself directed by Heaven him who assuredly did *not* walk without a divine superintendence, who “did by nature the things contained in the law,”—who, an ordained

—“Et Socrates esse circa se assiduum dæmona loquebatur, qui puero sibi adhæsisset, cujus nutu et arbitrio sua vita regeretur.” Apuleius, it is true, had already led the way to this error in his treatise *de Deo Socratis*. It is adopted without scruple by Augustine and other Christian writers, and, as might have been expected, by Ficinus and the earlier moderns, as Stanley and Dacier, in whose writings the *dæmonium* appears full fledged as an “attendant spirit” or “good angel.” Brucker, (*H. C. P.* ii. c. 2, § 9,) with more affectation of criticism, fails, however, to point out the origin of the mistake. The *classical* passages bearing on this curious subject are collected and quoted at length by Kühner in his preface to the *Memorabilia*, p. 18.
Ed.]

minister of that natural code, "showed" to others "the work of the law written in their hearts," and taught their "conscience to bear witness," and their "thoughts" to "accuse or excuse one another" ! (Rom. ii. 14, 15.)

In the science of God, Socrates taught (as we know by unquestionable contemporary evidence, that of Xenophon) that the Supreme Being is the immaterial infinite Governor of all, (*Mem.* i. 4, 17, 18;) that the world bears the stamp of his intelligence, and attests it by an irrefragable evidence, (*Mem.* i. 1, 19;) and that he is the author and vindicator of all moral laws. It is undoubted that to these

Religious convictions of Socrates. God the contriver and upholder of nature, and the moral governor of man.

high and holy principles our illustrious philosopher added much subservience to occasional superstitions. Demons and divination clouded and perplexed the serene simplicity of his theology; and Socrates carried into morals and religion the spectres of old errors, exactly as Bacon (with his magic and witchcraft) polluted with them his physics. In each case alike we justly attribute the excellence to the man, the error to the time. For one maxim of practical religion Socrates has been severely, and, I think, unjustly, censured. He countenanced, as we are told, the adoption

The religion of Socrates tainted with superstition.

in each country of its customary deities. But to me, I confess, this counsel has always appeared rather to manifest the superiority than the inferiority of Socrates to the delusions of polytheism. He knew that such deities were on a level as to authority, that if worshipped at all they could have no claim beyond that local veneration which prescription had given them, and when unable, or perhaps (for he was not infallible) unwilling, to question their existence, he at least endeavoured that these subordinate agents should as little as possible intercept the view of the supreme Artist, that they should *remain* in their provincial governments, lest the attempt to extend the

His toleration of polytheism explained.

authority of any might lead to his universal recognition.

*Socrates
drew the
first lines
of Political
Science.*

In *Political Philosophy* Socrates laid down the cardinal principle of *justice* as the foundation of government, and the true hinge upon which the solution of social difficulties should be made to turn. The systematic resolution of all the theory of society into the elementary principles of natural law²⁰ appears, so far as I can collect, to have almost wholly originated with the comprehensive mind of Socrates.

*His just
views of
personal
morality.*

But in the sphere of personal morals, the science of life, the philosopher was eminently himself. The principles which he here established were of the most universal application, and constantly contemplated practice. But I confess I do not think it easy to condense into any systematic series of deductions the Socratic ethics; and, indeed, the fact which has always struck me as peculiarly admirable in his moral reasonings, is their unfettered *variety*, and the

²⁰ [See the discussion between Hippias and Socrates recorded in Xen. *Mem.* iv. c. 4, esp. § 19, fol. Other detached political precepts occur in the *Memorabilia*,—among the most striking of which are, (1.) "Kings and rulers are neither those who hold the sceptre, nor those elected by the vulgar or singled out by lot, nor those who owe their position to force or fraud; but those, and those only, who are acquainted with the science of Government," iii. 9, 10. Compare the definition of the Art regal, (*βασιλική*), ib. c. 2, 11. (2.) "There are five principal polities: monarchy, or the government according to the laws of willing subjects; tyranny, which is an illegal and arbitrary rule exercised against the will of the governed; aristocracy, plutocracy, and democracy," (the last being somewhat loosely defined, *pro captu Xenophontis*.) Other passages lead to the conclusion that Socrates drew the first lineaments of that Political Science which was afterwards fully developed by Plato and Aristotle. The conversation with Euthydemus (*Mem.* iv. 2, 14-19) upon Justice and Injustice, which resembles the discussions in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, may be mentioned as an instance in point. Ep.]

exquisite calmness and perfect equilibrium with which he allies together all the diversity of motives. The word *Σοφία* includes in it all human excellence,²¹ whether as manifested (reflectively) in the conduct of one's self, or (socially) towards others. Happiness in its true purity and perfection is only to be found in virtue;²² a proposition which he perpetually upheld, and from the misunderstanding of which (as we shall hereafter see) two opposite schools soon arose under the

His ethical distinctions.

²¹ [The identification of Virtue with Wisdom or Science is the most characteristic feature of the Socratic Ethics. Of the four "cardinal virtues," Socrates seems to have acknowledged three,—Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude or Valour. Wisdom he held to be the collective term, to which all these are subordinated. For he denied the possibility of a man's acting counter to his judgment of that which is best, and therefore referred all vicious action to ignorance, (*Xen. Mem.* iii. 9, 4, 5.) *Σοφία* or *ἐπιστήμη* consisted, according to Socrates, in the foresight of the consequences of actions,—not, as in Plato, in the apprehension of Ideas. Socrates was, consequently, a Utilitarian in Morals, maintaining that Good and Beautiful were relative terms, identical with Useful, (*χρήσιμον* or *ὠφέλιμον*,) *ib.* c. 8. He held, however, that, of all the consequences of our actions, their effects upon our own spiritual nature are by far the most momentous, *ib.* i. 6, 9; iv. 8, 6. Hence his repeated exhortations to self-reflection, as the means towards self-knowledge. Though, as Mr. Grote points out, Socrates nowhere formally recognises benevolence as a duty, his principles would lead in practice to the highest form of benevolence,—the endeavour to elevate and purify the minds of others. Hence the spirit of moral proselytism so apparent both in Socrates and the best of his followers,—a spirit, by-the-way, of which we discover no traces in the Sophists. His analysis of Virtue was undoubtedly defective, as Aristotle has pointed out, (*Magna Moral.* i. 1, 5,) for it takes no account of passion, (*πάθος*,) nor of moral sentiment, (*ἦθος*.) This analysis is, however, most interesting to the student of ancient philosophy, as it was the first step towards a systematic morality, the previous theory of the Pythagoreans being justly stigmatized as irrelevant to the subject, (*οὐκ οἰκείαν*.) Compare *Eth. Nic.* vi. 13, 3, 4. Ed.]

²² [See *Xen. Mem.* iii. 9, 14, where happiness (*εὖ πράττειν*) is identified with virtuous action, (*εὖ ποιεῖν*.) So *ib.* iv. 8, 6. Ed.]


very eye of Socrates. For morality in general, Socrates lays three solid foundations,—religion, practical knowledge, and virtuous habits,—and with equal force insists upon the three. But in the conception of the *Supreme Governor*, and of morality as his law, he sought the consummation of his views and of his hopes. And those who (as perhaps you know) have endeavoured to distort the example of Socrates into a support for their views of the natural powers of man, and the independence of practical morals upon supernatural aid, ought surely to remember that *his* scheme of morals was itself constantly referred to religious considerations and divine help; and that his great mind, deeply versed as it was in the practical knowledge of human nature, saw and owned the necessity of assistances *beyond* human, craved them, sighed after them, and, as we have already seen, seems to have at length imagined them present from the very force of desire. To a reformation thus extending through the entire field of practical knowledge, Socrates saw the obstacles, and he was prepared to meet them. The humble son of the sculptor had received his mission: he discharged it, and he was willing to be its victim. In each of the accusers of Socrates, as the *Apology* of Plato expressly tells us, a specific party was represented,—the poets, the politicians, and the orators.²³ They consummated their work of vengeance, but they immortalized Socrates. He must necessarily have soon died; but his enemies alone could have procured us the day of Phædo!

We must now surrender, for a time, Socrates and his age. He left, as we have before observed, nothing behind him that could deserve the name of a school, could

²³ ["Sophists" in author's MS. The passage of the *Apology* runs thus:—ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Δύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. P. 23, E. Ed.]

take his place, or represent the murdered sage in the circles of Athens. But, vast as nature, all minds could find their systems in him; and accordingly, from his teaching, with new and regulated energies, we find Philosophy once more starting into her innumerable and diverging courses. To classify, to inspect, to analyze them, will probably be occupation sufficient for our next series of meetings here. The minor schools of the Cynosarges, Cyrene, or Elis, will detain us but briefly: in the vast and proportioned edifices of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies we shall find subjects to which a more protracted attention must be devoted, but which it must be the fault of your Professor if he fail to make *deserving* of that attention. You will accept my thanks for your attendance; our assemblies have not indeed been large, but I would hope that they have not been altogether without mutual profit and instruction.

SECOND SERIES.



LECTURE I.

SOCRATES AND HIS FOLLOWERS—THE PURE SOCRATICS—THE
MEGARICS.

GENTLEMEN :—

It was one of the last observations which I took occasion to offer to you, in commenting on the fortunes of Grecian speculation,—that in the comprehensive mind of that eminent man with whom our inquiries then ceased were contained the latent germs of innumerable subsequent growths. It was not merely the inventive sagacity of Socrates which placed him in this prominent historic position; though that sagacity was equally vast in its compass and penetrating in its power. It was even more than this,—the freedom, candour, popularity, and variety of his intellectual pursuits; his unrivalled skill in the tactics of conversation, which provoked and managed inquiry; his almost patriarchal amenity of manners, which encouraged and guided it. The soil should indeed be worthless in which the dexterous husbandry of Socrates could deposit no seed that promised future development. We speak of the school of Socrates, but in the technical sense of the term he had *no* school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, the Cynosarges, were the chosen localities of special sects; Athens itself (and in it, as type or miniature, Greece, the world) was the scene of the instruction, as of the studies, of Socrates. He might truly say, with La Bruyère, “Je rends au public ce qu’il m’a prêté: j’ai emprunté de lui la matière de mes ouvrages: il est juste que l’ayant achevé, &c. je lui en fasse la restitution.” His predilection for Athens was, it is true, exclusive. In one of the most eloquent passages

*Socrates
resumed.*

*The causes
and extent
of his philo-
sophical
influence.*

of the Crito¹ he represents the Republic as addressing himself:—"None of the solemnities of Greece has ever induced you to quit Athens, except on one occasion, to attend the Isthmian games at Corinth; war alone could attract you from it: you have not been a traveller, as others; you have never felt a curiosity to see foreign nations and to study their laws; you were contented with us and our government." But in every region of that manifold Athenian world he was at home. He found the human heart there, and found it under every modification of social influence; and to all he addressed a lesson suitable to all. "I respect and love you, Athenians!" he exclaims, in the Apology recorded by Plato;² "but I will obey the voice of the Deity rather than yours; and, while I live and am able to do it, I will never abandon the office of philosophy, the office of giving you warning and advice, the office of addressing in such fashion as this every man I meet:—'Oh, my friend! how can you, a citizen of Athens, (the city most famous of the earth for civilization and resources,) not blush to think only of amassing riches and gaining honours, without once occupying yourself with truth and wisdom,—the soul and its perfection?' And if any of you pretend that he *is* so engaged, I will not take his word for it, I will not leave him; I will question, examine, convict him." In such a spirit as this, we can well credit his declaration that he believed "a man's greatest happiness consisted in *rational discourse of virtue* all the days of his life."

Accordingly, within the limits of Attica the influence of this voluntary philosophic missionary was pervading and powerful. His pupils were as various as the occasions of his teaching. Derived indifferently from every quarter of Athenian society, they carried into all their respective departments of life a tincture of the character of the

¹ [P. 52, B. Ed.]

² [P. 29, D. Ed.]

master,—his extraordinary powers and prompt willingness to display them attracting round him, as hearers more or less constant, not merely all that was excellent in the youthful mind of Athens, but many also (as the founder of the Cynic school) already advanced in age and matured in experience. His very skill as a dialectician dazzled those who could not pass from the form of knowledge to its reality, and who considered as the highest of intellectual attainments that quick and glittering play of weapons which the great philosopher only valued as enabling him to disarm the honest adversary without wounding him, or to strike the blow home and sure upon captious and unprincipled arrogance.

Accordingly, among the constant or occasional auditors of Socrates were seen many whose views had little apparent connection with philosophical contemplation. The future leaders of armies, the aspirants after public distinction, the rivals of the popular assembly, were observed in earnest conference with this indefatigable teacher,—whose versatility of mind was evinced in his prompt adaptation of his topics to the temper and circumstances of each, and in the employment of a style proverbially attractive. “De Græcis,” says Cicero, in exemplifying the various models of discourse, (*Off.* i. 30,) “dulcem et facetum, festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem εἴρωνα Græci nominaverunt, Socratem accepimus.” *This* qualification was indeed transmitted to the subsequent inheritors of his philosophy. It is the precept of Cicero in another passage of the same work, “Sit igitur hic sermo, in quo *Socratici* maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax; insit in eo lepos.” (*Ib.* 37.) The simplicity of Xenophon, the richness and variety of Plato, form our principal examples of this rare excellence; in the time of Cicero it is probable that many others existed, as there is scarcely a dis-

The mixed character of his audience.

Charms of the Socratic style.

ciple of Socrates to whom the composition of numerous treatises in the form of dialogue is not ascribed.

Of such auditors of Socrates as Alcibiades and Critias it is of course unnecessary here to speak; nor are the *philosophical* labours of Lysias, or even of Isocrates, of a character sufficiently marked to detain the student of the history of theoretical philosophy. The intellectual characteristics (as far as a brief sketch can effectually arrest them) of those disciples who themselves became masters

are here our only subject. A natural division offers itself. Some of these pupils of Socrates adhered, without much deviation, to the general principles of their teacher; others, receiving their impulse from him and from the times, originated schools distinct from each other as from their common source, and strongly marked with decided individuality.

The followers of Socrates may be divided into two classes:

First, the pure Socrates,

I. Not possessed of his force of reason or weight of character, the former class yet saw that in the moral elevation of their fellow-citizens lay the great aim of conscientious inquiry; and they seem to have endeavoured, as far as they could, to fulfil this high function. As professed followers of Socrates, they strenuously exhibited his principles. With him they held that God exists, and through his works reveals himself, as an author in his volume; that He is the providential cause and governor of the world, and (above all portions of his creation) the special guardian of *man*; that He is, moreover, the legislator of rational beings, having given them laws whose evident universality forbids the supposition of a partial or accidental origin; and that these laws are accompanied with sanctions of reward or punishment to which the fact of conscience bears perpetual attestation. To this rational scheme of theology thus bound up with morals, they probably added the same series of incidental confirmations which are so constantly

found in the records of the Socratic discussions, the evidence of authentic presages, and the palpable agency of the subordinate ministers of divine vengeance in the terrors of thunder and lightning,—topics which Socrates was wont to advance, though it is now not easy to determine how far he purposely adapted himself in such statements to a popular and not injurious prejudice. The divinity of the human soul, (whether in reality of essence or analogy of properties,) and its immortality in a future state, were the natural, and one of them the necessary, supplement to this lofty theology. Like Socrates, too, they spoke of “knowledge” in a peculiar and elevated sense of that term, (doubtless, similar to the inspired use of “Wisdom,”) as being the great object and chief blessing of man; and of vice principally under the character of a gross ignorance and stupidity. Such were the leading ideas of the philosophy of these writers, enforced with much simplicity of style and purity of language, yet perhaps with no great depth of personal investigation or force of original thought. They came to their illustrious teacher from all ranks of society. *Æschines* had to declare to Socrates that, “having nothing else to give him, he gave him himself;” and *Simo*’s reports of his teaching were designated *σχυρίζοι* from the trade of the reporter. To *Xenophon* (distinguished in as Xenophon, so many departments of action) the reputation of Socrates, and the world, are indebted for an invaluable series of notes of his master’s discourses, and a sketch of his final defence corroborating that of Plato, though (as derived from second hand) inferior in force and spirit; and the accomplished disciple of Socrates is discovered in the elevated morality of the *Cyropædia*. Two dialogues of very uncertain genuineness are attributed to *Simo*, Simo, the only remaining fragments of three-and-thirty. Of *Crito*, who was the author of seventeen, no relic is extant. The *Πινὰξ*, Crito,

Cebes. or Picture, of *Cebes*, is of all the writings ascribed to this body of philosophers perhaps the most popularly known. Of even this performance, however, which has been since translated into nearly every modern language, the genuineness is questioned; and the Stoical cast of the sentiments, along with references involving appa-

Reasons for and against the genuineness of the Tabula of Cebes.

rent anachronisms, has induced many critics to attribute it to a philosopher of Cyzicus who taught in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Wolf, whose critical skepticism has been evinced in so many other instances, is the principal champion of this opinion; but the arguments, though advanced with great ingenuity, are not, as I think, sufficient to counterbalance the almost-universal testimony of antiquity.³ We can scarcely believe, for example, that Laertius, who was nearly a contemporary of the Cyzicene Cebes, could be mistaken in ascribing the *Tabula* to the disciple of Socrates if it were really the work of the later hand. But criticism has almost

The dialogues attributed to Eschines are spurious.

unequivocally refused to admit the claim of three dialogues (usually printed in the editions of Plato) entitled "of Virtue," "Eryxias," and "Axiochus," and formerly attributed to the So-

³ [It is impossible to believe that the *Πίναξ* which we possess was the work of a contemporary of Socrates and Plato. Besides the "Stoical cast of the sentiments," arguments against its genuineness may be drawn from the diction, which bears the marks *cadentis Græcitat̃is*, both in the use of late words, and of solecistic and Latinizing constructions. The question is set at rest by a reference we find in Chap. 33 to a passage in the *Laws*, the latest work of Plato, and not published until after his death, and *à fortiori* until after the death of Cebes, who must have been Plato's senior. Of bad Greek the formula (c. 26) *Νη̃ Δία οὐδέν* is a glaring instance. In c. 15, *κριτικοί* occurs in the sense of *critics*, as in the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus, 366, E. *Παραδοί* would have been used by a contemporary of Socrates. *Περιπατικοί* in the same sentence is also damnatory. With Wolf's arguments I am not acquainted: but the counter-authority of Laertius is of little weight. Ed.]

cratic Æschines, as the only relics of a voluminous writer of dialogues, orations, and epistles. Of Glauco nine, of Simmias the Theban twenty-three, dialogues are said to have perished. The relics of the Socratic philosophy as held by its most authentic interpreters are thus reduced to a scanty and uncertain number; nor can the high probability which we possess as to the true doctrines of the sage and his intellectual offspring, in the pages of Xenophon, Cebes, and the simpler dialogues of Plato, coupled with the traditions of antiquity, altogether console us for this loss. The fate of these writings and of their authors, in the general chances of fame, impresses upon us how rapidly the lessons of a merely practical morality, however useful, disappear before the commanding and attractive presence of vast and proportional systems. A scheme of moral teaching whose excellence lies in its equilibrium requires extraordinary talents to rescue it from the reputation of sameness and insipidity; and the simplicity of truth, which in Socrates was dignity and power, might easily sink, in the hands of his less gifted pupils, into frigidity and languor. Uniformity without prominence fatigues the attention; truth itself in morals, being but the image of a familiar reality, can scarcely carry the charm of novelty; and our own experience will sufficiently remind us that in religion and philosophy it is seldom strongly popular when not in some point urged to exaggeration.

II. But there was little probability that the Grecian mind should long remain in this state of equipoise; or that reverence for the memory and eminence of any man should produce a unanimity which even the acknowledged supremacy of a common revelation has not been found to insure. The variety of intellectual endowments, the difference of moral susceptibility and even of physical temperament, and the desire of

*Glauco and
Simmias.*

*Second
class of fol-
lowers of
Socrates:
those who
carried out
his sup-
posed prin-
ciples in a
spirit of
original
speculation,
or combined
them with
the tenets
of other
teachers.*

special celebrity, would of themselves be sufficient to destroy it. And, almost under the eye of Socrates himself, schools were already forming in which the symmetrical unity of his picture of the soul and its duties was broken into fragments, and in which each leader of a sect had taught himself and his disciples to be contented with one exclusive compartment of a vast inheritance of truth.

The Socratic sect differ not solely in their ethical views.

The Socratic identification of Knowledge and Virtue led to differences of logical theory also.

As might have been expected from the predominantly *ethical* cast of the speculations of Socrates, these teachers were chiefly distinguished by the opposition of their views as to the rule of life and conduct. But they were not so without exception; nor will a view yet more accurate of the doctrine of Socrates lead us to anticipate that they should be so. I have before noticed the peculiar constancy with which Socrates identified Wisdom and Virtue,—a proposition which lies at the foundation of his, and of the Platonic amplification of his philosophy. Now, Wisdom, thus considered, necessarily includes two elements,—correct knowledge of the right, and the habit of constant action according to that knowledge. But, whether it was that Socrates regarded the latter component as too obvious to be formally insisted on,—or that, by a still deeper study of the subject, he considered that the unclouded apprehension of moral rectitude was itself in a great degree unattainable except in and by a course of practical goodness, and thence inclusively supposed it,—or, again, conceived that if the Supreme Good were *perpetually* presented to the soul it would infallibly incline it,—it is certain that he seems to insist on the intellectual element with peculiar force, with a force which indeed to many readers of his discussions seems altogether overstrained. *Ἐφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν*

ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι.* Had Socrates intended by this formula merely to establish the *rule* or *criterion* by which actions were to be determined, and to constitute a conformity to the decision of pure reason as this criterion, he would have said no more than has been ordinarily said since his time; but his meaning seems to have gone beyond this. Unquestionably Aristotle understood him as having represented the state of knowledge as itself the state of virtue:—"ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾗτ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥστε ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον." (*Eth. Eud.* i. 5.) Without at present entering on this question, I remark that such a theory (in whatever precise form originally held) must necessarily involve much *logical* discussion, though always in subservience to moral speculation. If it be held that the full exercise of perfect rationality is the great aim of a rational being, and the constant contemplation of the Supreme Good his surest path to excellence, or itself total excellence,—the investigation of those powers by which that contemplation may be effected will inevitably demand the attention of the ethical theorist. Logical disquisition will force itself upon him in the work of exposition or inquiry. The records of Plato and Xenophon evince how largely Socrates was engaged in discussions as to the nature of Science and Truth; and it is very remarkable, that among the lost writings of his immediate disciples we find many tracts enumerated upon detached portions of the same general subject. Notwithstanding, then, the ethical direction of the Socratic teaching, and the subservience of all its labours to the moral elevation of man, you will not be altogether surprised to find that the school most exclusively dialectical in all antiquity is counted among the various results of the general Socratic movement.

(I.) The school of MEGARA, however, (for The Megaric sect,

* Xen. *Memor.* iii. 9.

it is to this society and succession of philosophers I am now directing your attention,) cannot be correctly understood by those who are content to find in the opinions of its founder (Euclides) a mere development of the views of Socrates. If I mistake not, in a former series of Lectures I took occasion (though in a brief transient reference) to represent this school as the legitimate inheritor of the profound philosophy of Elea, and endeavoured to evince the justness of this account of its origination by the manifest congeniality of its doctrine and phraseology. Cicero has unquestionably stated the true position of the case, by uniting in one character the two elements,—the Eleatic tradition and the Socratic discipleship:—“non multum (dissentiunt) a Platone Megarici, quorum fuit nobilis disciplina, cujus (ut scriptum video) princeps Xenophanes, quem modo nominavi: deinde eum secuti, Parmenides et Zeno. Itaque ab *his* Eleatici philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides *Socratis discipulus*, Megareus; a quo iidem Megarici dicti.” (*Acad. Quest.* ii. 42.) We saw (when treating it in its chronological place) the tendency of the Parmenidean philosophy, in inferior hands, to eventuate in merely logical disputation,—to pass from the substance to the form of reason. We know that in Zeno of Elea—though we have rejected the low and unfounded estimate of that able disputant—this anticipation was, from the pressure of opposition, too nearly realized; insomuch that this active champion of Eleaticism has been commonly regarded as the inventor of the art of methodical disputation: and the reader of the mystic and oracular fragments of Parmenides, in which the deepest questionings of self-searching Reason are, or seem to be, met, laments to find the philosophy of that man at whose extraordinary depth Socrates represents himself in early youth astonished and charmed (in *Theætet.* 183) losing its

*founded by
Euclides,*

*combined
a Socratic
with an
Eleatic ele-
ment.*

coherence, and ravelling into a mass of tangled and unprofitable difficulties.

Euclides, who was either born, as some held, in a Sicilian city,⁴ or connected with that country, would naturally receive his earliest impressions from the philosophy of Southern Italy; and a disposition eminently ardent (perhaps even cholerie) would not be likely to intenerate the stern and disputatious character which it had now unhappily assumed. For though an affecting anecdote is related by Plutarch testifying on one occasion the patience and fraternal affection of Euclides,⁵ we can scarcely attribute the placidity of a philosophic love of truth to one who had recourse to the courts of justice⁶ to gratify that desire for oral conflict which the logical schools could only sometimes meet. With the elements of the philosophy of Parmenides treasured in a mind restless and acute, Euclides (whether directly from Sicily or Megara) came to Athens as the true centre of intellectual activity, and soon became an assiduous hearer of the great instructor of the Grecian mind. Plato's Theætetus presents to us Euclides as preserving in manuscript a long discussion of his master's on the nature of human knowledge. Residing at Megara, we are told that, to evade an Athenian decree which forbade any intercourse with that city, Euclides was accustomed to assume a female dress, and brave the death which was the certain consequence of detection, in order to gain the benefit of nightly conversation with Socrates.⁷ In the Phædo we find him noted as one of the group that

*Euclides:
his character,
and
anecdotes
of his life.*

⁴ [Gela, according to Diog. Laertius, who, however, does not seem to believe the tradition. Ed.]

⁵ [De fraterno Amore, p. 489. Ed.]

⁶ [I can find no authority for this statement, except the *Index* to Laertius. The passage to which the index refers (lib. ii. 5, § 30) has an entirely different meaning. Ed.]

⁷ [This romantic story is found in A. Gellius, *N. A.* vi. 10. Ed.]

gathered round the bed and hung upon the last accents of the Martyr of Virtue; and Euclides is memorable in the history of philosophers no less than of philosophy, as having made his house at Megara the hospitable asylum for his brother-disciples,⁸ terrified and dispersed by the fate of their common master.

It is not probable that this union continued much longer than circumstances necessitated. Euclides established, or continued, his own school independently of extraneous aid, and with sophistry fought the sophists. The cynic Diogenes, who witnessed the tumultuous contests of the pupils of Euclides, and perhaps had suffered from their pertinacious acuteness, took vengeance in a pun, and pronounced that their angry meeting deserved not the title of *σχολή* but of *χολή*;⁹ and Socrates himself, who had witnessed and lamented the perverted sagacity of the Megaric philosopher, declared to his face that he "knew how to debate with sophists, but not with men."¹⁰

Of the substance of these disputations, and the nature of the opinions which were popular in the school of Megara, our records are detached and scanty. A few memorials of Laertius, and a single phrase of Cicero, nearly complete our narrow stores. The waves of time, silently closing over what once were vast and proportioned systems, have left in too many cases but lonely and insulated summits above them; and it is but an imperfect consolation that the scattered and barren peaks that thus rise above the waste of waters may at least be regarded as having been the most prominent points of

⁸ [So Hermodorus, in Diog. Laert. ii. 108. Ed.]

⁹ [Ibid. vi. 24. Ed.]

¹⁰ [Ib. ii. 30. Compare the bitter lines of Timon the Sillographer, ib. § 107:—"I reckon not of such babblers as Phædo, or the wrangling Euclides, who has infected all Megara with a mania for disputation." Ed.]

the entire territory, and may even in some measure assist us to conjecture the shape and extent of regions forever lost to our eyes. The task is indeed difficult and precarious, but to many minds this character will only excite and animate to effort. At all events, with whatever chance of success, it is our duty (unless we would degrade the history of speculation to the dry register of unconnected aphorisms it has been too often made) to *endeavour* to penetrate to the harmony which, whether apparent in error or real in truth, will be found to have pervaded every body of opinions permanent among men; though it is true, if I may alter my former comparison, that our relics of many of these philosophies are like the faint snatches of distant music which the hearer involuntarily combines into a regular strain, scarcely aware how much of the completed result is received from without or created from within. And, whether we succeed or not in presenting a perfect copy of the perished original, the exercise at least is valuable, which accustoms us to pass in our historical researches from facts to reasons, and to recognise in every authentic relic, however isolated or obscure, the element of a theory which once explained and corroborated it. We thus employ upon different materials an art analogous to that of the illustrious naturalist of France: we attempt to reconstruct from these organic remains (the precious fossils of history) the entire framework of systems now no more!

The founder of the school of Megara presents himself as the compound result of three different elements. He came, as we have seen, from the study of the speculations of *Parmenides*, and he underwent a long and assiduous discipline in the hands of *Socrates*. Besides which, we cannot suppose him unaffected by the influence of that strange society of rhetorical philosophers everywhere present and active, the *Sophists*. In

Besides being a student of Parmenides and hearer of Socrates,

Euclides was probably influenced by the Sophists also.

these commingled agencies we shall find a rational solution for the problem of his philosophy.

*Eleatic
Unitarian-
ism de-
scribed.*

We formerly saw that the school of Elea, of which Parmenides was assuredly the most accomplished representative, delighted in separating the world of sense from the world of reason, and—feeling that the tendency of reason is towards generality, uniformity, unity—in gradually reducing all the forms, ideas, or perceptions of reason to the sovereign category of “*Unity*.” They could not believe that the ideas of the Reason can be elaborated from the phenomena of simple sensation, as blood is elaborated from aliment; and, on the other hand, they could not believe that these ideas of the Reason are themselves without any corresponding *archetypes* in the system of being. Accordingly, they pronounced that there is a rational or intelligible world, the correspondent to human reason, and appreciable by it alone. Arriving at this point, they began to *reflect* upon this world of Reason, to measure the divisions and map down the features of this mystic country. In this important work, however, they seem to have discovered the precipitation of beginners; for before long we find them boldly enthroned upon the topmost peak of intellectual abstraction, the solitary idea of unity and existence. The sameness of the archetypal world, its independence of the limitations and variations of time and space, filled and overwhelmed their minds; and, in order to realize this conception of it with more directness and emphasis, they reduced all its categories to the bare notion of singleness and Being, and contrasted, with this one existence ever identical with itself, every subordinate nature liable to change. Now, you know that on the perception of *change* depends the acquisition of all our notions of time, space, and number; consequently, in the Parmenidean philosophy the whole *sensible world* (of which these notions are as it

were the framework) was condemned to a secondary, phenomenal, and transitory being. Moreover, the whole series of apparitions which compose the sensible world—its sights, sounds, contacts, pleasures, pains—have no necessary existence; but though they be all supposed to cease, (as they plainly may be,) though every sense be closed, and every notion that waits on sense be annihilated, the unchangeable, indestructible Idea of *Existence* remains, one and identical. These multiplied phenomena, then, are but the outward and contingent manifestations of this interior reality; to them belongs that *δόξα*, or knowledge of opinion, which is based upon the believed constancy of their sequences, and which affords sufficient assurance for the temporary and physical sciences. Such is the single and all-sustaining principle of the philosophy of Parmenides. But into the bosom of this everlasting essence, thus one and unchangeable, the convictions of man irresistibly force him to introduce the ideas of *truth and goodness*; that they also may share in the same sublime unity, and be with it enshrined above the mutable elements of the sensible universe. How far Parmenides himself adopted this view it is not easy to determine from our very defective materials: if we may trust the highly-finished representation of Plato, the supreme "Idea" of the Eleatic philosopher was *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ὃ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν*; but, however this may be, we may well believe that Euclides, as the pupil of *Socrates*, and with him inclining to the deification of justice and truth, could scarcely fail to invest his supreme and ultimate Principle with *moral* attributes.¹¹ Prepared,

*With the
Eleatic One
Euclides
identifies
the Good
and True.*

¹¹ [It is not, however, certain that Euclides assigned any distinctly-ethical meaning to the term Good. His system seems rather to have been a retrogression from the Socratic and moral to the old ontological view of things. Socrates had said, "Virtue is Knowledge," (*φρόνησις*,

then, by these notices of the influences affecting the Megaric philosopher, you will not hear with surprise his definition of the sovereign good, which, as reported by Cicero, has perplexed so many of the commentators of

ἐπιστήμη, σοφία,) but by these predicates he declared himself to mean practical insight into the nature and consequences of actions. So far as it is knowledge, virtue is one,—one *per se* or formally considered,—for knowledge is formally one. But the *objects* of knowledge are manifold; hence a corresponding multiplicity of virtues. Valour, for instance, is the knowledge of things really to be dreaded; Justice the knowledge of things which may lawfully be done; and Virtue in general the knowledge of the means to true happiness.

The Socratic formula, whatever its defects, is at least practical in its tendency. But the doctrine of Euclides would seem to have made speculation the end or *summum bonum*. For there is little doubt that, when Plato in the *Philebus* intimates his dissent from those who maintain that Intelligence or Knowledge (νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη) is the highest good, his arguments are directed mainly against the Megarics. It may be remarked, that the *Philebus* is not the only dialogue of Plato in which the Megarian dogmas are criticized: though, as they had so much in common with the Eleatic philosophy of Parmenides, they are frequently mixed up with the latter in a manner which renders it extremely difficult to distinguish one from the other. One passage, however, (*Sophista*, p. 246,) is referred by all competent judges since Schleiermacher to the Megarics. We gather from it the curious information that Euclides, like Plato, asserted the reality of Ideas, (νοητὰ ἅλλα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη τὴν ἀληθειᾶν οὐσίαν εἶναι,) being herein distinguished from his Eleatic masters. Perhaps it is to this Cicero alludes, *Acad. Qu. ii. 42*, where he says, “Hi quoque (Megarici) multa a Platone.” Euclides, however, differed from Plato, in so far as he denied to the sensible world that μέθεξις or participation in the ideas which Plato insists on as the ground of its reality. With Euclides, therefore, metaphysics was the only recognised science: Physics and Ethics, the sciences of Nature and Man, were alike impossible. In fact, Plato shows (*ibid.* 248) that the Megarian Ontology was a system of pure Nihilism; or, as he says, with grave satire,—“The absolute Being has then neither life nor intelligence; but stands ever unaffected by change, a thing august and holy, incapable of knowing or thinking.” A passage, it may be remarked, not favourable to those German speculatists who claim Plato as a Pantheist. ED.]

that writer. "Id bonum solum esse (Megarici) dicebant, quod esset *unum, et simile, et idem semper*." (*Acad. Qu. ii. 42.*) Nor will you be astonished that a thinker trained to regard the whole universe as the development of a divine unity should have boldly declared that evil had no real existence, and that that which we mistake for positive evil is merely the privation in various degrees of the supreme good:—τὰ δὲ ἀντιζευμένα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνῆρσι, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων, is one of the few records of his habitual teaching preserved to us by Laertius. But as the upholder of the metaphysical system of unity and identity is accustomed to explain the multiplicity of the sensible world as a manifold *manifestation* of the eternal sameness, an exhibition of itself under various aspects or characters, so the transformation of this supreme principle into a *moral* entity will produce a parallel representation of the diversities of virtue as varied forms of the sovereign good. We are not, therefore, disappointed to find our memorialist, in the passage immediately preceding the last, declare to us, that Euclides ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.¹²

There are two peculiarities in the reasonings of Euclides which seem to have perplexed the historians of philosophy even more than those which I have already enumerated. We are told that he rejected all analogical reasoning,¹³ and that he was accus-

Denied the existence of evil.

His rejection of analogical reasoning, &c.

¹² [This obscure passage is supposed by Brandis (*Handb. ii. p. 114*) to refer to the Megarian doctrine of Ideas alluded to in the foregoing note. It seems, according to this author, to imply that Euclides had departed from the high Eleatic doctrine of an absolute Unity, and that he admitted "eine relative Mehrheit des Seyenden." We hear nothing of εἶδη in the reports of the opinions of Euclides's successors, until we find Stilpo, a hundred years after, engaged in disproving their existence. Ed.]

¹³ [Diog. L. ii. 107. Ed.]

tomed to attack not premisses but consequences.¹⁴ The argument by which he is represented as vindicating the former of these opinions appears at first sight so unsatisfactory as to increase the difficulty. "The objects were either like or unlike: if unlike, the analogy was obviously illusive; if like, it were better to examine the objects themselves." When we remember that the argument from analogy is intended not to supersede positive examination, where it is possible, but to supply its place where it is not, nothing certainly can be more ineffective than to object to this form of reasoning that absence of an impossible perfection which leaves so valuable a probability behind it, in circumstances that forbid any higher order of conviction. The poverty of our materials renders any explanation of this difficulty precarious. The tendency of a purely-metaphysical philosophy is to despise all empirical conclusions; and as probable arguments, in all their innumerable degrees, from bare possibility to fullest moral certainty, form the foundations of belief in the world of sense, the pupil of Parmenides may have learned, and taught others, to slight them. The love of direct consecutive demonstration which urged him to pursue his antagonists through the long labyrinth of their own conclusions, in preference to questioning the original validity of their assumptions, may have been connected with the same general philosophic habits; and, no doubt, the superior brilliancy of the triumph when the contradiction was, after a chase of successive conclusions, at length palpably reached, had its share in popularizing this species of attack in the "eristic" school. I am strongly inclined, however, to suspect that the argument

¹⁴ [ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστατο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιφοράν. Ib. If, as Deycks supposes, these terms were invented by Euclides, to him will belong the honour of having discovered the form of the syllogism, λήμματα being equivalent to the προτάσεις, ἐπιφορὰ to the συμπεέρασμα, of Aristotle. Ib.]

against the use of comparisons (*διὰ παραβολῆς λόγοι*, Diog. Laert.) was originally nothing more than one of that multitude of quibbles for which the school of Megara is famous through antiquity. Suppose the assailant to ask the employer of the comparison, "Are the objects like or unlike?" and to proceed, "if unlike, your comparison is void; if like, since you know them to be like, you must know *both* the objects, and your comparison is superfluous; for what you know you can personally examine, *περὶ αὐτὰ δεῖν μᾶλλον ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἢ οἷς ὁμοῖα ἐστι.*" This, I allow, is very contemptible sophistry; but the student of the fashionable philosophy of Megara will scarcely, on that account, deem it improbable. The very next champion of the school is immortal for conceits in whose company the inventor of such a quibble need scarcely blush.

I speak of Eubulides, the supposed author of seven sophisms whose singular celebrity through antiquity is known to every scholar, and really forms a most discreditable element in the estimation of ancient literature.¹⁵ My object being altogether to accustom you to trace the physiology of the history of speculation, employing facts as little more than the symbols of principles, and such facts only as are *in themselves* indicative of principles latent but real, you may suppose I do not purpose to dwell upon these miserable trifles. When indeed I remember that Philetas of old caught a consumption in the intense study of the *ψευδό-μενος*, and that Chrysippus (the glory of the Stoa) wrote six weighty volumes on the same puzzle, it is only prudence to withdraw from you the fatal attractions of the subject. Athenæus¹⁶ has preserved to us the epitaph of

Eubulides
flor. about
B.C. 340.
His seven
sophisms.

¹⁵ [Eubulides appears to have been the person especially aimed at by Aristotle in his Anti-Megaric polemics. Ed.]

¹⁶ [*Deipn.* ix. p. 401, E. The sophism is given by Cicero, *Acad. Q.* ii.

the unhappy martyr, in which the sophism itself is pathetically personified as the murderer:—

Ξεῖνε, Φιλητᾶς εἰμί· λόγων ὁ ψευδόμενός με
"Ωλεσε, καὶ νυκτῶν φροντίδες ἐσπέριοι!

These logical difficulties are known by titles intimating not the form of the sophism, but its accidental subject. Thus we have, besides the Liar just mentioned, the Veiled,¹⁷ the Horned,¹⁸ the Electra,¹⁹ the Bald,²⁰ the Sorites,²¹ the Hidden. A late ingenious writer, in a dissertation on the subject, has endeavoured to elevate these fallacies into the symbols or examples of profound metaphysical difficulties. The "Veiled," or *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος*, would mark the difference between sensible and rational knowledge; the "Liar" would evince that he who denied the possibility of truth convicted himself, by avowedly

29:—Si te mentiri dicis, idque verum dicis, mentiris, an verum dicis? In Arist. *Soph. Elench.* xxv. 3, it is called "the argument proving that the same man at the same instant lies and speaks truth." Ed.]

¹⁷ [Lucian, *Vet. Auct.* p. 22, gives the following example of the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος*, called also the *διαλανθάνων*, or "Hidden:"—"A. Do you know your own father? B. Of course I do. A. Do you know this person who stands veiled beside me? B. No. A. He is your father: it follows that you don't know your own father." Compare Plat. *Theæt.* p. 165, B: λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. . . ἀραλοῦν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδῶτα τι τοῦτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι. Ed.]

¹⁸ [*κερατίνης*. "What you have not lost you have. But you have not lost horns: therefore you have horns." Diog. L. vii. 187. Ed.]

¹⁹ [The Electra is like the Veiled. Orestes stands veiled by Electra; she knows Orestes, but knows not that the veiled man is he: hence she "τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα οἶδε τε καὶ οὐκ οἶδε." Luc. Ib. Ed.]

²⁰ [The *φαλακρός* was probably a kind of reversed Sorites. As, for instance,—Does the loss of one hair constitute baldness? No. Of two? No. When then does baldness begin? at the n^{th} , or at the $(n+1)^{\text{th}}$ place? If not at the $(n)^{\text{th}}$, why at the $(n+1)^{\text{th}}$? unless the absence of one hair constitutes baldness, which was denied! Ed.]

²¹ ["Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano." Cic. *Acad. Q.* ii. 16. Comp. Diog. L. vii. 82; Hor. *Ep.* ii. 1, 45. Ed.]

speaking falsehood at the moment he made the assertion; and so of the rest. It is remarkable, too, that one of these examples is employed by Plato himself²² for the same illustration; and, indeed, I am not afraid to confess my belief that the expository style of even that great master, admirable as it often is, *was* unduly influenced by the dialectical fashions of his day. This supposed purpose does not seem to have been suspected by antiquity: it is not, however, impossible that it may sometimes have exalted these sophisms from barren perplexities into instruments of instruction; and I will not deprive their memory of the benefit of the possibility. The whole rich inheritance passed into the hands of the Stoics, who did not suffer it to remain unproductive. "Tell me the doctrines," said Chrysippus, "and let me alone for *proofs*!" proofs which he adduced in such multitude, and managed with such skill, that it was said (as of the language of Plato, so of the logic of this Stoic) that, if the gods themselves were to use dialectics, they would adopt the dialectics of Chrysippus.

As far, then, as we have now reached, it is not difficult to discover in the early stage of the Megaric school the mingled influences which I have already noted, the metaphysics of Parmenides, the ethics of Socrates, and the dialectical habits of the sophists. The influence of the

²² [Possibly the author alludes to *Theætetus*, 165, B, where, however, the epithet *δεδότατον* ironically indicates the contempt with which Plato invariably speaks of this and similar tricks of controversy. The dialogue called *Euthydemus* was evidently written for the purpose of laughing them out of fashion. It is probable that in the numerous passages in which the *ἐριστικοὶ* or *ἀντιλογικοὶ* are censured, he has in view the practice either of the Megarics or Cynics, or both. As an instance may be quoted *Meno*, p. 80, E. In the context of the passage in *Theætetus*, Plato shows psychologically the sense in which the logical paradox may be true. Hegel, in his *History of Philosophy*, i. p. 138, is copious on the subject of this and the sister-sophisms. Ed.]

metaphysics of unity and identity seems still more apparent and direct in the opinions of Diodorus and Stilpo, the only remaining names of importance in this body of philosophers. To penetrate, to illumine, and to harmonize their opinions by the faint light afforded in the pages of our ancient reporters is a task in which, though I will use all possible brevity, I can scarcely ask you to accompany me this day.

LECTURE II.

THE MEGARICS, (*continued.*)

GENTLEMEN:—

AT the close of our last meeting we had traced the gradual progress of the philosophy of Megara into the sophistical subtleties of Eubulides; and among the mazes of their perplexing labyrinth

The Megaric School continued.

I was forced, through fear of overtaxing your attention, to leave it. Some notice of these elaborate intricacies was necessary, not from their intrinsic value, but from their accidental celebrity in the literature of antiquity; but, as my object is to pursue the history of Reason itself, rather than to undertake to track its multitude of collateral connections and casual results in contemporary literature, I escape from the subject as speedily as possible; I abandon form for substance; I return with eagerness, from the outward and ever-changing vesture, to the soul and spirit of philosophy.

It seems to me that in the speculations of *Diodorus* we may have an opportunity of making this transition. For, though this reasoner comes before us with a full share of the disputatious characteristics of the school, I do not despair of finding something more solidly instructive in his history, though it seems to have been abandoned as hopelessly barren by the majority of our critics.

Diodorus, who is styled by Cicero (*De Fat.* 6) “valens dialecticus,” and by Sextus is termed

Diodorus Cronus, flor. about B.C. 300.

διαλεκτικώτατος, was originally of a city in Caria, was favoured with the intimacy of Ptolemy Soter, and is said to have terminated a life of intellectual conflict by

dying of grief and shame at being unable to solve the questions of Stilpo in presence of that monarch, who ridiculed his hesitation in a pun upon his name of Cronus.

As far as I can collect the tenets of Diodorus Cronus from the scattered notices of antiquity, he seems to have been eminent for the three following philosophic characteristics. He argued perpetually against the reality of motion; he held a peculiar view of the nature of *συνημμένα*, or connected propositions, affirming (if I rightly understand two obscure and intricate statements of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hypot.* ii. 11, and *Adv. Math.* viii.) that the antecedent and consequent in a just hypothetic ought to be connected by reciprocal necessity; and he was the inventor, or employer, of a species of argument known in the ancient logic by the title of the "argumentum dominans," and specially used it for the purpose (as Arrian shows) of proving that nothing is possible which neither is, nor will be, true. (*Epictet.* ii. 19.) I am now to attempt to illustrate the mental relationship of these tenets to each other and to a common origin,—seeming as they do, at the first sight, connected by so slender a thread: and I do so, not merely as a specimen of the spirit of reciprocal illumination of every element by every other, in which I would have you study the detached records of ancient speculation, but still more as including a valuable lesson regarding the tendency of a great philosophical system. Nor is the interest of the subject diminished by the circumstance that that system has been in our own day revived, unchanged in substance, but adorned with a novel splendour of detail and array of consequences, which have made it the most popular, and assuredly the most dangerous, metaphysical theory of the universe, in modern Germany.

His distinguishing tenets,

and their relation to each other.

We must (to understand Diodorus not as Diodorus, but as the element of a natural development of principles) return to the school of Elea. We found in that school—whose metaphysics were inherited by the Megaric succession—the principle openly stated that the sensible world is purely phenomenal, accidental, apparent; in contradistinction from that substantial world of *Reason* which alone deserves the title of real existence. Considered, then, by the intelligence, the world of existence becomes of course subordinated to the laws and forms of intelligence: it is a world of which we have the interpretation in our own reason, there alone, and there perfectly. Now, of these laws of intelligence, as it is their undoubted character that they regard the Necessary, the Unconditional, the Absolute, so is it certain that this absolute thing, thus contemplated by intellectual intuition, being the common foundation and essential reality of all things, and of all things equally, cannot but be one and ever identical with itself. To the eye of reason, then, there is no plurality, no change; one Being not merely supports, but is, the universe; and all that reveals itself in the lower world of sense is but the external manifestation of this Absolute Unity. Of any thing which that mutable world includes it cannot be said that it *is*—it *becomes*; for its property is incessant change; and of that which incessantly changes, as, on the one hand, there can be no assured science, so, on the other, there cannot even be any true and proper *reality* predicated. Vain it is to affirm, with the short-sighted naturalists of the Ionic school, that it is sufficient for us to trust the regulated sequences of nature: if these sequences be casual, not even the shadow of science can regard them; if they be arbitrary but believed to be invariable, this, again, is not science, but faith; if they be necessary and unalterable, then are they, what we affirm them, the mere manifestations in

Their philosophical importance, and that of their author, explained. The Eleatic theory of the One re-stated.

the world of sense of the necessary attributes of a necessary and eternal thing; they are then, as it were, the Absolute contemplated by the eyes of sense; and all the scientific reality of such laws is only the reality of the absolute Being that exhibits itself in them. The universe, then, is *one*, to the total exclusion of superior, inferior, or equal:—*ἐν τὰ πάντα*.

My present object (as I cannot, to avoid misconstruction, too often remind you) being *not* to estimate the value of theories, but to trace their historical development, I do not now pause to criticize the Eleatic principle of Unity. For the sake of clearness, I simply and rapidly note the forms the same general principle has assumed in different ages; in order that you may be enabled advantageously to *generalize* the instruction afforded by analyzing the relics of Diodorus. You will observe,

The admission of an Absolute Being is common to all rational theories of the Universe. How these theories differ. Theism distinguishes the Absolute Being from the Universe.

Two forms of Theism.

The opposite or Unitarian theory identifies

then, that all *rational* explications of the universe (as contrasted with pure sensualism) admit that there exists a being absolute, self-sustained, and infinite: the point of difference concerns *the relation* between this Absolute Being and the Universe. On the one side, the *Theist* (I speak now not as a theologian, but simply as a reasoner) holds that the Absolute Being and the Universe are two distinct beings, and both real, though not with the same form or quality of reality; and that the connection between the two existences is strictly that of Cause and Effect. This general doctrine is divided between two classes, one of which maintains the energy of the Absolute Being in the Universe to be literally *necessary*; and the other, to be the voluntary result of free activity under the guidance of yet higher attributes, and compelled only by the glorious necessity of ever doing that which is morally best. On the other hand, the Unitarian of metaphysics contends that the Absolute

Being and the Universe are not two but one being; and he holds either,—1, that the *Universe itself*, such as we see and feel it, is the absolute, uncaused Infinite; or, 2, that matter is infinite, and the infinite Universe the modifications of matter alone; or, 3, that a primal force is the Infinite, and the universe that force in infinite action; or, 4, that matter and force are themselves (as well as *thought*) the manifested attributes of the Absolute Being; or, 5, (the system of Spinoza,) that thought and extension are the original attributes of that absolute nature of which the universe is the manifestation; or, finally, the theory of Schelling and his followers, which (upon metaphysical grounds) pronounces the identity of subject and object in that Absolute Unity of which nothing can be determined, (for determination itself supposes limitation,) but which the reason directly contemplates by an exclusive privilege, and than which in truth it can directly contemplate nothing else.* It would be indeed extraordinary if the last form of the theory of pure Unity coincided with the first, and the circle of speculation returned into itself; yet it does appear to me that in their grounds and reasons the school of Elea and the modern votaries of the Absolute Identity probably resemble more completely than any other two systems in the series.

ties the Absolute Being with the Universe. Six forms of philosophical Unitarianism enumerated.

The latest form of the Unitarian theory, that of Schelling and his followers, coincides with the Eleatic.

I need scarcely inform you to which of the foregoing many varieties of hypothesis I would myself incline, as furnishing the true theory of the existence of the universe. The causal energy of God as exerted in the formation and support of a world dependent on but sepa-

* See Ancill. ii. for the above classification. (Frederick Ancillon's second *Essai sur le Système de l'Unité absolue, ou Le Panthéisme*, contained in the second volume of his *Essais*, (Paris, 1832.) See esp. p. 56. Ed.]

rate from Him is not more congenial to religion than it is acceptable to philosophy; but, as a lesson of toleration is never superfluous, I may, before leaving this part of the subject, seasonably remind you that the maintenance of even the latest of these forms of the theory that identifies the Absolute Being with the world of sensible manifestation is not felt by many of its upholders to be inconsistent with a practical acceptance of the *Christian faith*. Whether the world be the attribute of which God is the substance, or the effect of which God is the cause, they regard as a transcendental question upon which Revelation was not meant to enlighten us; and, though assuredly no small exercise of ingenuity would be necessary to reconcile this principle with the express declarations of the Scripture record, or to prove that Scripture did not, popularly indeed, but *positively*, decide the transcendental question itself, or, again, to evince that the Deity of the Bible is only a manifestation of the Absolute Nature in a shape cognizable by the Understanding, yet, while we firmly resist error in every shape, we ought to rejoice in being able to extend indulgence to those maintainers of it whose happy inconsistency allows them to join, with wayward speculative opinions in the regions of abstract thought, a reverential acceptance of the whole law of life, and a coincidence in all the requisitions of practical morality.

*Application
of the fore-
going dis-
tinctions to
the Megaric
philosophy,
especially
that of
Diodorus.*

I return to consider the subject in more direct connection with the Megaric development of it, and specially in relation to the tenets of Diodorus. The supposition of the simple unity of the great All is inseparably bound up with the supposition of its eternity; for whatever is itself absolute, or an aspect of the absolute, has no relation to the limitations of time or space: of such there can (in the ordinary acceptation of the word) be no "*creation*." Now, this eternity is the eternity not merely of the whole, but

of every the minutest element of the infinite mass: and this again inevitably implies the equal *necessity* of the whole and of each such element, whether considered as evolved to our senses in time or in space, or in that resultant of them both which we term "motion." Accordingly, in point of fact, the system is scarcely ever found unaccompanied by the strictest assertion of the doctrine of necessity; and this doctrine, by him actively maintained, will, I apprehend, be found the common chain that links the scattered fragments of the wisdom of Diodorus.

In the first place let us hear Arrian, who, in the nineteenth chapter of the second book of his precious discourses of Epictetus, presents us with the following account of one article in the lectures of Diodorus. "The argument called the dominative,¹ about which disputants interrogated each other, seems to have arisen from hence. Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these. That every thing past is necessarily true; that an impossibility cannot depend on a possibility; that something is a possibility which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving the contradiction, employed the first two to prove that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true." The force of this reasoning evidently depends upon the assumption that in

*His theory
of the
possible,*

¹ [Ὁ κυριεύων λόγος. The propositions in question are perhaps clearer in the original. They are:—1. Πάν παρεληλυθός ἀληθές ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Every truth (i.e. fact or event) of the past is necessary, (could not have been otherwise.) 2. Δυνατὸν ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν. 3. Δύνατον εἶναι ὃ οὐτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθές οὐτ' ἔσται. (Things which never did and never will happen are nevertheless possible.) Though Diodorus has the credit of this argument, it is of older date than he. See Arist. *Metaph.* viii. 3:—Φασὶν . . . οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ κ.τ.ε. The paradox seems framed in order to overthrow the Aristotelian distinction of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. Ed.]

the scheme of the universe every element is *so dependent* upon every other, and (more directly) the future so dependent upon the past, that the assumed necessity of the past inferred the necessity of all that was to come, or, in his own words, inferred that whatever was not to come was an absolute impossibility. As this argument (though Brucker and others despatch it as an elaborate trifle) is evidently connected with the profoundest of metaphysical inquiries, I make no apology for continuing the passage in Arrian. Cleanthes and his followers, he tells us, assumed as premisses the second and third propositions of the series. "They held, that something *is* possible which neither is nor will be true; and that an impossibility cannot depend on a possibility; and they consequently denied that every thing past is necessarily true." The universal connection of the possible only with the possible, and the impossible with the impossible, was here again assumed; but the conclusion was *against* the necessity of *the past*. Chrysippus, the most eminent of the successors of Cleanthes, however, preferred to reject the logical principle which the others had assumed, and boldly asserted that an impossibility and a possibility might be interdependent. It will probably strike you as singular, that in this controversy the doctrine of immutable fate should have been apparently deserted by the champions of the Stoical institute; and this, as well as the general turn of phrase, leads me to suspect that, in perfect conformity to the spirit of the times, and especially of the Megaric school, the disputants were more zealously engaged with the logical² dependence of conceptions than the physical dependence of events. Cicero confirms the report of the views of Diodorus in his treatise *De Fato*, c. 9,—adding

² [Obscura quæstio est, quam περί δυνατῶν philosophi appellant: totaque est λογική; quam rationem disserendi voco. Cic. *de Fato*, *init.* Ed.]

the illustration, "nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse quæ futura sunt quam ea quæ facta sunt; sed in *factis* immutabilitatem apparere, in *futuris* quibusdam, quia non appareat, ne necesse quidem videri." Unquestionably, in all these statements there is the same confusion as to the precise sense of "necessity," "possibility," &c. (whether considered as a quality in things themselves, or as a state of our knowledge regarding them) which has since darkened so many attempted expositions of the subject; and in the last passage it would seem as if the "necessity of the past" meant the impossibility that a thing which once has happened should be known not to have happened, (for in what other sense can past facts evidence their own "necessity" or be considered to be altered from "*true to false*"?) But even this confusion between the *physical connection* of events (independently of *our cognizance*) and the *certainty* or *uncertainty* of our knowledge of them, or even between either of these and the *logical connection* of antecedent and consequent in propositions, is itself (especially the latter) very characteristic of the union of Eleatic metaphysics and dialectics in the school of Megara. When once the universe was to be contemplated as an object not sensible but *rational*,—to be explained out of the forms of abstract reason, and not by the inductions or analogies of observation,—the tendency was irresistible to regard all its connections not as physical, but as metaphysically necessary, connections; that is, as connections of the same kind as that between the premisses and conclusions of a logical demonstration. And hence, from Xenophanes to Stilpo, the difficulty which perpetually recurs, of determining whether the few and detached fragments we meet are truly portions of a philosophy which was content to balance *logical* principles, or which aimed at establishing *à priori* principles of the actual universe. Nor is it likely

that the authors themselves were always clearly aware of the distinction.

If you have accompanied me in what I fear has been a toilsome course, you will have little difficulty in now detecting the true bearing of the Megaric philosopher's theory of the reciprocal connection of a true hypothetic proposition. The combination—or confusion—of logical connection with actual reality is here still more manifestly apparent. You are of course aware that the only truth required in a conditional proposition is the truth of the connection of antecedent and consequent; nor would *this* truth be endangered though each element of the conditional assertion were really false. The embarrassment of the earlier logicians, however, on this very simple matter was altogether inconceivable, and betrays an apparent indistinctness of conception which renders the student doubtful whether it can be possible that he has rightly understood their representations of variance upon a subject so manifestly admitting of none. I will not now afflict your ears with a detail of these unconstructive quarrels: the theory of Diodorus and his auditors alone concerns us. Diodorus is understood to have held that no hypothetic was valid (and probably likewise no simple proposition) in which the propositions, or terms, were not reciprocally predicable or mutually inferential.³ The re-

and of hypothetical propositions.

³[Sext. *Empir. adv. Logicos*, viii. 113. Philo, Diodorus's opponent, had said, "There is but one case in which a hypothetic is untrue,—viz.: when the assumption is true, but the inference false, *e.g.* If it is day, it is night. A hypothetic is true,—1. When both assumption and inference are true; as, If it is day, it is light. 2. When both are false; as, If the earth flies, the earth has wings. 3. When the assumption is false, but the inference true; as, If the earth flies, the earth exists." Diodorus denied all these propositions, maintaining that the only true hypothetic was that in which a true inference is necessarily and always combined with a true assumption. ("Ὅπερ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται

lation of this logical tenet to that system of universal necessity in which every event was dependent on every other, and nothing conceivably possible which was not also real, is too obvious to require comment. [I may note, in passing, that the doctrine that the possible and real are coextensive has been developed in two opposite directions. A French theorist of the last century held a doctrine which involved the proposition that there was nothing conceivable which was not realized in some part of the universe.* The difference, then, between the doctrine of Diderot and that of Diodorus would be, that the one swelled the real to the possible, the other contracted the possible to the real; both equally ending in making them coincide.]

The last proposition which I informed you was held by this Megaric philosopher was that in which the opponents of the reality of the sensible universe in every age of Grecian philosophy agreed, and which formed the great practical example and public triumph of their doctrine,—the denial of the reality of *motion*. In the latter part of my last series of Lectures I believe I endeavoured to show you that this famous proposition was far from being the mere dialectical puzzle it is so commonly represented. The “*Solvitur ambulando*” of a modern logician (an obviously unsatisfactory evasion) was tried upon Diodorus himself in a more disagreeable form. We are told by Sextus Empiricus⁴ that he had gone with a dislocated shoulder to the famous surgeon Herophilus, and that the latter delayed the operation for a considerable period, assuring

*Denial of
motion by
Diodorus.*

ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθείας λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος.) Nothing is said by Sextus of “simple propositions,” to which the controversy is evidently inapplicable. Ed.]

* Diderot—with Mr. Stewart's comments in Prel. Disc. Notes.

⁴[*Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii. 245. Ed.]

the unhappy logician that he had been so abundantly convinced, by his last lecture, of the total impossibility of motion, that, though his eyes seemed to assure him the bone had left its place, he refused any longer to trust those deceiving senses: nor was it without considerable entreaty and earnest recantation that the physician consented to forget that the bone could not have moved "either in the place where it was, or the place where it

*Principles
involved in
this denial.*

was not." The proposition "that *motion* is impossible" is only a popular instance and practical example of the wider proposition, that *succession* is rationally inconceivable; and the principles on which the proof was based are equally applicable to every case of *change*. The true object in them all seems to have been to demonstrate, that, tried by pure reason, change is contradictory; and consequently that, in that intellectual world of which pure reason is the organ, the only real and eternal world, change, and all its phenomena of plurality and succession, can have no being. The steps by which the rational contradiction alleged to be involved in the phenomena of motion was reached were various; but the object was the same in all. It is evident, that to accuse this tenet of violating the evidence of our senses was so far from being an answer to its supporters, that their triumph, and the intended value of it, were actually founded on that very fact. One of the forms of Diodorus's view of the subject led him to assert that, though actual motion was contradictory, accomplished motion

*Distinction
between a
body mov-
ing and a
body which
has moved.*

might be real; *κινεῖται οὐδὲ ἔν, κεκίνηται δέ*, (Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* x. 85:) or, in his own accurate language, the *παρατατικὸν ἀξίωμα* was false, but the *συντελεστικὸν* true. This manifestly turned upon the argument that at any given moment the body being in a definite place was actually not in motion; though in a subsequent moment it might be asserted that it must *have been*. Whatever be the ra-

pidity of the motion, argued the subtle Megaric, at each separate instant the body must occupy a single place, which gives the very notion of *rest*, which again is the formal *contrary* of motion: the same may be said of every successive instant; these instants make up all time: in what time then does the body "move"? Yet, on the other hand, we are irresistibly led to believe that the body *has been* in constant motion: it moves not, yet it will *have moved*. The suggested conclusion was, that the phenomenon of *change* presents a contradiction which cannot stand the test of reason; the world of sense (which is essentially a world of incessant change) is therefore an illusory presentation on which no science can rest; numerical plurality (involving succession) is itself a mere accommodation to the inferior nature; and no safe footing is to be had for philosophic thought, until the mind, penetrating through the veil of sense into the sanctuary of reason, there detects, beneath this multiplicity of appearances, the hidden unity of things,—infinite, eternal, and alone! We may now take leave of the fragments of Diodorus, whose views, you will perceive, I have endeavoured to arrange and harmonize, so as to supply, not merely information as to definite facts, but an authentic illustration of the natural workings of a fundamental idea in speculation. You can now understand that the Megaric philosophy is nothing more than a development, in a dialectical form, of the metaphysical principle of Unity; it is the logic of the Eleatic metaphysics. The illustration will be completed by a notice of Stilpo, ordinarily reckoned as the last name of celebrity belonging to this school. The founder of the Stoics is said to have inherited and propagated the reflections of Stilpo; and his son and pupil Dryso is numbered among the masters of Pyrrho the Sceptic. The fact is internally probable; as the moral theory of

*Connection
of the Me-
garic dia-
lectic with
the Eleatic
metaphy-
sics.*

*Stilpo of
Megara,
flor. B.C.
300, or
thereabouts.*

Stilpo is equally discernible in both. In arriving at Stilpo, then, we may consider ourselves as having reached that stage of the Megaric development when its original principles worked themselves out,—thenceforth combined with new elements, and limited in their influence by more prevailing ingredients.

The logical dexterity of Stilpo was the charm and terror of his age. He was himself a native of Megara, where, by an honour similar to that posthumously accorded to Pindar, his house was reverently spared in the sanguinary siege of the city by Demetrius. Celebrated as he was in his own and succeeding generations, (“philosophus acutus et probatus” is the testimony of Cicero,) our extant memorials of his opinions are not more numerous than of those of Diodorus. But they seem to me, scattered as they are and broken off from the common trunk which supported and united them, to bear very perceptible proofs, in the fruit which they bore, of the germ from which they grew. The family-likeness of the Eleatic and Megaric parentage is stamped upon the remotest and most isolated of its progeny.

*His negative pole-
mics. Im-
pugns the
doctrine of
“ideas.”*

Of Stilpo, then, little more is reported than that he attacked the “Ideas,” (τὰ εἰδη,) now become, in two different theories of them, the badge of the Platonic and Peripatetic philosophy; that he denied the possibility of logical predication, and that in his ethical speculations (to which he earnestly devoted himself) he held that the sovereign good consisted in absolute impassibility, or “apathy.” With these notices the ordinary chronologists of philosophy are contented; but the study would be of little practical utility if some principle were not attainable which might illustrate them by itself, and by each other. These tenets (especially the dialectical principles) are usually regarded as plausible exercises of ingenuity in “eristic” opposition to the popular philosophy of the day; but even diffi-

culties themselves are seldom chosen without a motive; and the very absurdity alleged against one of them would seem to indicate some profounder purpose in its ardent vindicator. The doctrine to which I allude is thus reported by Plutarch,⁶ and, considered as an insulated opinion, does certainly appear eminently absurd. Stilpo denied "that one thing could be predicated of another," by this mode of argument:—"If running be predicated of a horse, the subject is not the same with the predicate; and so likewise when good is predicated of a man: for if a man and good were the same, how could 'good' be predicated of *food* and *physic*, which are confessedly things so different?" The humblest novice in logical science at once rejects this reasoning as a sophism; and we can scarcely doubt that a disputant so eminent as Stilpo saw the force of the obvious objection quite as clearly as we do. It is plain, then, that he must have proceeded upon some principle *deeper* than a logical one; upon some previous theory with regard to human knowledge of which this argument was but an example. To what, then, does this assertion amount, when viewed not in the example but the principle? To the assertion that no proposition is truly affirmable in which the subject and predicate are not absolutely equivalent. Now, I have repeatedly represented the Megaric school as the dialectical form of the Eleatic. The Eleatic reasoners maintained the

*His tenet
that only
identical
proposi-
tions are
true.*

*Probable
metaphysi-
cal basis of
this so-
phism.*

⁶ [Adv. Colot. c. 22, confirmed by Simplicius *ad Arist. Phys.* fol. 26. From Plato's *Sophist* (p. 251, c) it appears that Stilpo was not the inventor of this sophism. It was used by the Cynic Antisthenes, also a bitter opponent of *εἶδη*, to whom the words τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις point the allusion in the text of Plato. A German editor of Aristotle sees in this quibble an anticipation of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. But this is to do it too much honour. See Deyeks, *de Meg. Doct.* p. 85. Ed.]

absolute identity of all which in this world appears individually different, the identity of all in the unity of a common nature; and they regarded it as the triumph of reason that it could detect this sublime sameness beneath the shifting scenery of sense. The business of reason was, then, the perception of identity; and all was ultimately resolvable into *this* category. What, then, was more natural than the declaration of our bold logicians of Megara, that, in the strictness of truth, no proposition was tenable but that which expressed the relation of identity,—that no term was predicable of another except in the affirmation of absolute sameness? and, as a necessary consequence, that every form of assertion which refused to identify the subject and attribute belonged not to the sphere of pure reason, but to that inferior world of the senses with which a just dialectic had no concern whatever?

It is connected with the denial of "Universals."

In the strict prosecution of his fundamental metaphysic, then, Stilpo might be plausibly led to the apparently startling proposition which denied the legitimacy of predicates more extensive than their subject. It is obvious that this train of thought, pertinaciously pursued, would result in the denial of all *abstract notions*; for these abstract notions are the very predicates to which Stilpo refuses his logical passport, as well as being the very attributes that *difference* substances from each other. You will expect, therefore, to find the champion of the philosophy of unity obstinately opposed to every theory of the reality of universals, whether "*in things*" or "*beyond things*,"—Aristotelic or Platonic,—and here, accordingly, history places him. The guardian of the old Eleatic inheritance faithfully fulfilled his charge, and eagerly offered battle to every defender of every modification of the universal idea. The promptitude, the tenacity, and the publicity of the contests of these eristic gladia-

tors of Greece at once remind us of the similar engagements in the scholastic ages; but I suspect that the discussions of the ancient logicians would be found more really interesting and more substantially valuable, because less strictly limited in their theological philosophy, and thence more at liberty to start and follow every variety of metaphysical hypothesis. This, however in its causes a misfortune for these inquirers themselves, may, with great probability, have made their engagements richer in variety and interest. It is a real cause of gratitude, that on many subjects of the higher metaphysics *we* are, for all practical purposes, released from dependence on the caprices of speculation; but we need not on this account resign all interest in their history: it is well to have that ground surveyed to our hand which we are unwilling ourselves to tread.

We must now briefly interpret Stilpo in his character of an *ethical* philosopher,—a department in which he seems to have attracted much of the notice of antiquity, and largely to have influenced the subsequent fortunes of philosophy. I have before observed that internal evidence, as well as historical tradition, establishes the influence of this master in the rule of life advocated by Zeno and the Stoics, by Pyrrho and the Sceptics. The anecdote of the attachment of Zeno is well known,—who, when Crates the Cynic in a fit of jealousy would have dragged this illustrious pupil from the lecture-room of Stilpo, exclaimed aloud, “*You* may remove my body, but Stilpo detains my soul!” And the Stoics themselves approved as a brother him who could reply to the conqueror of his native city, inquiring, (in Seneca’s version of the story,) “*Numquid perdidisset?*” “*Omnia bona mea mecum sunt!*” a sentiment by which, as Seneca, in his usual style of epigram, observes, “*ipsam hostis sui victoriam vicit.*”

*Ethical
opinions of
Stilpo.*

*Zeno of
Citium
Stilpo's
hearer.*

Stilpo's
ἀπάθεια.

The sovereign good of Stilpo was expressed in one word, *ἀπάθεια*, a term which Seneca translates "animus impatiens," not without apologies for the employment of a term which in his days, as well as in our own, seems to have obtained a signification the exact reverse of this philosophic use of it. (Ep. ix.) He distinguishes between this rigorous tenet and the more reasonable doctrine of the Stoics:—"Noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum, ne sentit quidem." (*Ib.*) This is the very principle which Cicero ascribes to the Pyrrhonic sect:—"Pyrrho autem, ne sentire quidem sapientem; quæ 'Απάθεια nominatur," (*Qu. Acad.* ii. 42;) a strong proof, as I have before intimated, of the connection of these philosophic schools through the medium of their respective masters.

This Ethical theory harmonizes with the Eleatic metaphysics.

We have seen the Eleatic principle of Absolute Unity in its metaphysical and dialectical aspects; we must now spare a moment to contemplate it in its *moral* attitude, in which it will be found not less influential in itself or instructive in its manifestations.

Moral aspect of the doctrine of "Absolute Sameness."

The principle professes to merge all individuality in absolute sameness. We may expect, at first sight, to find this doctrine not less active in the world of life than in that of inanimate nature or abstract conception. If, then, the reasoner who habitually dwells upon the oneness of the universe come to apply his views to the properties of separate minds, and if his philosophic loyalty can stand the test of carrying out his principle in the very citadel of individuality, the personal consciousness, he must, to establish his point, (which, if not absolute, is nothing,) undertake to break down the barriers which nature seems to have erected between man and man. Now, if we adhere to the world of consciousness, this enterprise is

impossible. No effort of ingenuity can invalidate the conviction with which each individual pronounces himself to be himself alone, and not another. But, by this time, you can readily conjecture that the Megaric was not to be embarrassed by a difficulty of this nature. He could demur to the evidence itself of consciousness,—not indeed by denying that the witness makes the affirmation, but by refusing to allow the witness's competency. He could declare that the internal sense was as worthless as the external in the search of eternal truth; and that if the laws and principles of morals are to be based upon a scientific foundation, they must be fixed, not on the yielding sands of consciousness, (itself, as Heraclitus had so often shown, never for two instants the same,) but upon the impregnable rock of Reason. The philosopher will therefore, *morally* as metaphysically, labour to forget himself in the universe. He will obliterate the illusive conviction of individuality by making himself, as far as possible, a petty element in a general plan, and regard life, as well as nature, as the necessary servant of unalterable fate. But, if thus it be wisdom to show no will but the will of the universe, it must be wisdom to efface every principle which can urge the will; and this without exception; for, while by perfect neutrality the man leaves himself to the disposal of the governing whole, by the exertion of any affection or desire, no matter how popularly virtuous, he advances himself beyond the level of his place in the machine, and presumes to establish a separate interest in the world. It thus appears (if I am not mistaken in this attempt to penetrate his views) that Stilpo might, by a resolute adherence to his metaphysical principle, have arrived at that ἀνδρεία which has so much perplexed the historians of ancient philosophy: nor can we be surprised to find that, when from these cloudy heights of speculation the philosopher descended into common life, and transferred the theories of the pure

reason into the sphere of sense, he would be likely to display what Pliny calls "rigorem quendam, torvitatemque naturæ duram et inflexibilem." From this result it would seem that Stilpo himself was preserved, either by felicity of natural constitution, or by realizing that absolute indifferentism which is the directest practical form of his theory, or perhaps by that still more common solution of such difficulties to theorists of every class, a convenient oblivion of his whole array of irresistible truths when they threatened the smallest interference with his actual comfort.

Modern pantheism unlike the ancient in this respect; that it is associated with enthusiasm rather than indifferentism.

In our day, under the modifying influence of Christianity, and from other coincident causes, the moral and religious aspect (for it professes a religious aspect) of the system of Absolute Unity is very different. By the German apostles of the system, advantage has been taken of these tendencies to the Infinite which seem to reveal themselves in every human breast, to cast round this imposing theory of the universe a garb of poetry and enthusiasm, which a severe critic has too justly designated "the mysticism of Atheism." That by a special intellectual appreciation that Absolute Essence which is no other than God can itself be contemplated would seem calculated to elevate the soul to the loftiest apprehensions of itself and of nature, were it not that the Object thus discovered is left without attribute, almost without positive being, and a chilling silence observed as to the certainty or authority of all beneath this ultimate abstraction. Every aspiration after the infinite which can animate the heart of man is easily enlisted on behalf of a system which occupies ground so lofty, which does not *ascend* to the infinite, but supposes it attained, and thence at leisure surveys the universe: science, religion, and art,—the true, the good, the beautiful,—seem to swell to new amplitude, and rise to new

dignity, when harmonized together as the necessary developments of that Absolute which is one with the reason and the reason with it; and it is not even difficult to conceive that the more mysterious doctrines of revelation may be ingloriously made to appear the subordinate consequences of the vast conception. But, with all this, the problem (which is no other than to reconcile the finite and the infinite,—simply, to explain the mystery of *creation*) remains too certainly unsolved; and the votary of the absolute, cheated out of his God, receives nothing in return but a vast and impracticable abstraction.

I have spoken of these modifications of the Unitary system (the modern German and the ancient Grecian) in *connection*, because they seem to have both arisen under a form very similar. They both seem to have been in their original essentially *logical* systems,—systems, that is, purposing to show how the reason of man must necessarily contemplate the world to contemplate it at all; and afterwards to have assumed the form of direct *physical* discoveries. In this point of view, the system—erroneous even as an abstract scheme—becomes puerile and fantastic. Yet this metaphysical hypothesis of Schelling is actually styled the “*Philosophy of Nature*,” and the student of the patient school of Baconian induction would start to see with what easy deliberation a teacher, perhaps the most popular and distinguished philosophical master of the nineteenth century, addresses himself to the task of constructing an *à priori* universe. Of course, the universe thus discovered coincides accurately with the universe of reality; and the illustrious professor felicitates himself for demonstrating that to exist which he has seen around him since his birth.

But, even as a merely logical explication of the universe, I cannot think the system of “Absolute Unity” satisfactory. It is true that any multitude may be arbitrarily regarded under the category of unity; the whole

reality of things, the effect and its Almighty Cause, *may* be contemplated as One; but the essential discrepancies of things are not neutralized by this logical amalgamation, nor can any sound mind accord to that fallacious unity which, in spite of irreconcilable discordance, identifies subject and object, cause and effect, finite and infinite! We may, if we please, term the finite a "manifestation" of the infinite, or an emanation, or an aspect: the true difficulty, the transit from the infinite to the finite,—the revelation of the Incomprehensible in a world determinate in time and space,—is not one degree alleviated though we invented ten thousand titles for the process, and called upon every language of the globe to supply its contribution to our terminology. God and the universe exist: it is as impossible to identify the terms as it is to efface either!

*Contempt
of the
Megarics
for the
popular
religion.*

You will not be astonished to find that Stilpo (along with the rest of the succession) was not remarkable for any cordial sympathy with the popular polytheism. With all its faults, the system of the "Unity of All" was at least calculated to raise the conceptions above the deified profligates of Olympus; and Stilpo, for some irreverences about the Minerva of Phidias, was cited before the Areopagus, and banished from Athens. "Ask me," he whispered to Crates, who made some unseasonable inquiries about the proper mode of honouring these marble deities,— "ask me, thou foolish man, when we are alone, and I'll tell you!" Euclides himself was famous for a reply still more evasive. He had been asked, by some intrusive inquirer, how the gods existed, and what were their tastes: "One thing is quite certain," replied the sage, coldly: "they have a thorough dislike for curious questioners."

We here abandon the Megaric school, but its principles, especially its moral principle, we shall recognise, in forms more or less determinate, on future occasions. At our next meeting we shall find it, little changed, among the precepts of Antisthenes, the founder of the famous sect of the Cynics. On that occasion I will endeavour to throw some light on the Cynic and Cyrenaic institutes of human life,—a subject of vast practical interest, the more popular character of which may make some amends for the unavoidable abstruseness of the disquisitions of this day,—disquisitions which the poverty of original materials, (amounting altogether to six or seven fragmentary notices,) the absence of assistance from preceding inquirers, and the remoteness from ordinary conceptions of the fundamental theory which I have endeavoured to make the key of the entire, have combined to render equally laborious to the investigator and (I fear) exhausting to the attention of minds not habitually exercised in these arduous speculations.

LECTURE III.

ON THE CYNICS AND CYRENAICS.

GENTLEMEN :—

BEFORE proceeding to the subject announced for this day, I ought to take a brief and transient notice of the school known by the title of the Eliac, and afterwards (from its most distinguished master, who was a native of Eretria in Eubœa) the Eretriac school. This sect, which, though in its founder Phædo originally Socratic, was in its second founder Menedemus impressed with the stamp of Megaric opinions, differs so slightly from the school so largely illustrated at our last meeting as to require little separate notice. Of Phædo, whose name has been familiarized to every ear by the celebrated dialogue of Plato, we know as a philosopher very little. It is said that to Socrates, who ever professed to regard the symmetry of body as mysteriously connected with harmony of soul, and who had been attracted by the appearance of Phædo in the midst of misery and want, he was indebted for release from a state of disgraceful servitude; and it is probable that the pupil's grateful fidelity was contented with extending the doctrines and reputation of a master so beloved.

*refounded
by Mene-
demus, who
flor. about
B.C. 269.*

In Menedemus, however, who studied under Stilpo, the Megaric infusion becomes strongly perceptible. When I have informed you that Menedemus is related to have held that virtue is one and undiversified, all apparent differences being only differences of name,—that the Supreme Good is itself one

and unchangeable,—and that if not the total suppression, yet at least the absolute government, of desire, was the great element of human excellence,—you will recognise these opinions as a reiteration of speculations already recorded and analyzed. One element in the opinions popular at Eretria is preserved by Cicero, (*Acad. Qu.* ii. 42.) He tells us that to these philosophers “omne bonum in mente positum, et mentis acie, qua verum cerneatur,”*—a doctrine which (if I can venture to interpret a brief and obscure sentence) would seem to make the perception of truth the highest good of man, or to identify in one, truth and goodness, as different aspects of the same original essence. This would appear to betray a Platonic,¹ as well as Megaric, influence; or perhaps a remaining tinge from the old Socratic sources. With his master Stilpo, the Eretrian teacher rejected all but identical propositions, and instituted dialectic warfare against all composite and negative assertions. Of his opinions not much more has been rescued from the wreck of time, if we except the important practical maxim (not uncelebrated in antiquity) that a philosopher ought to get married.

When we were engaged in considering the philosophy of Socrates, we saw that that great teacher had placed, as a corner-stone of practical morality, the proposition that virtue and happiness were inseparably united. Two auditors heard the maxim, but

*The Cynic
and Cyre-
naics.*

* Compare Plat. *Phileb.*

¹ [The doctrine is Socratico-Megaric, not Platonic. It is *combated* in the *Philebus*, probably as the opinion of Euclides. (*οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν* (sc. *ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως*) *ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἀμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν*, p. 20, B.) Diogenes Laertius informs us (ii. 17, 134) that “Menedemus thought scorn of Plato and his followers, and also of the Cyrenaics, Stilpo being the only teacher he really admired.” Cicero (*Acad. Pr.* ii. 42) identifies the Eretrians and Megarics, significantly adding, “Hos contemninus et jam abjectos putamus.” Ed.]

they left their instructor with opposite conclusions. The one held that virtue was happiness, the other contended that happiness was virtue; and both urged their respective opinions to an extravagant length. These auditors were the founders of the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools. Perpetually opposed to each other by the ordinary historians of philosophy, these schools are made to represent two irreconcilable tendencies of human nature. It will be my endeavour to carry the principle of harmony into even this opposition; and to discover, in the origination of these contrasted institutes of human life, the workings of a common motive and the effort for a common object. The aspiration after *independence* is the principle that equally interprets both.

Their moral theories, seemingly opposed, have their root in the same principle, viz.: the desire of independence.

Antecedently to the exercise of reflection, Man, suspecting no disparity between himself and his circumstances, submits to his position in the world, and instinctively imitates surrounding example. Encompassed by slaves, he never dreams that he was born for freedom. More familiar with his own position than with any other body of facts, familiarity produces its usual effect: constancy is confounded with absolute necessity; what is and has been seems to explain itself by its existence; and the wonder which he daily sees he forgets to be wonderful. But with reflection, however raised, come restlessness and dissatisfaction. He is set at variance with the scene around him. He finds himself in the midst of a world of perpetual mutability; yet he aspires after fitness, certainty, repose. If, then, he be (through the mysterious dispensations of Providence) as yet untaught (except in the inefficacious form of a purely speculative tenet) to seek that high repose in resting upon what even the contemptuous Tacitus could find as an element of practical influence in the Deity of the *Jew* alone,—Summum illud et æternum, neque mutabile ne-

Development of this idea.

que interituum,—it is manifest that the first office of self-questioning reflection must be to attempt the arrangement of this matter between the world and the unquiet Being placed amidst it. The problem is simply no other than this:—to conciliate the demands of the mind, irresistibly forming to itself an ideal state of perfect fitness and harmony, with the actual circumstances of man in a world of apparent confusion. When the solution of a *future state* in which this great reconciliation may be effected is presented to the mind, the difficulty is of course so alleviated as almost to vanish; and the corresponding intimations which Revelation contains with respect to the positive uses of the present state in the furtherance of a general scheme of progressive perfection leave (in a practical point of view) scarcely any thing to be reasonably desired on the question. But to speculators from whom this harmonizing truth was hidden, or by whom it was entertained only as a faint and shadowy possibility, reflection was restricted to the original elements of the calculation, and the dispute between Man and his Circumstances remained without mediator or umpire. Confined within the present world, man must prepare to meet his stubborn foe; nor will his enemy allow him choice either of ground or of weapons. The prize of the contest—the ultimate point of all earthly wisdom—assumes obviously this form, the achievement of such a conquest over the uncertainty of fortune as may amount to a total independence of all its possible caprices. And I need not remark, that, as far as the anticipations of futurity can affect *the happiness of the present*, this still remains, as much as ever, the true form of the aim of all genuine *earthly* prudence. The celestial element which Revelation has introduced into the estimate (powerfully influencing as it does, through the agency of faith and hope and fear, the state of present happiness) of course must *enter into* every rational computation

of the sovereign good of even merely temporal life; but it does not alter the principles of the computation themselves. It has thrown a mighty counterpoise into the scales, and it has contributed to enlighten the Reason that holds them; but they are the same scales which the same Reason held two thousand years ago. Prudence is still prudence, and nothing else,—the love of personal happiness still unaltered, however the materials of calculation may vary.

The problem, then, being the attainment of unalterable repose in the midst of change, our first analysis exhibits it—now as ever—as resolvable in two possible forms. The mind becomes independent of nature by a change effected in either the mind or nature,—in the mind by suppressing all its desires, or in nature by compelling it to gratify them. This is the most general form of the difference between the ascetic and licentious systems of human life, and between Antisthenes and Aristippus as their respective representatives. Proceeding from abstract supposition to the theory as modified by the actual relation and character of the two terms, we perceive of the ascetic system that its course is simple and absolute; it presents vast difficulties indeed in practice, but no direct contradiction in its theory. But the case is different as regards the opposite institute; and on the nature of the difference depends the solution of the character of Aristippus. It is obvious that the proposal is hopeless to compel nature to satisfy all human desires; and we may presume that no intellect, however perverted by its extravagant wishes, could seriously advance this as a practicable code of happiness for man. Some modification, then, must be introduced; and in the adoption of this modification lies the peculiarity of Aristippus as a teacher of Hedonism. The enjoyment of pleasure is the business of man; the attainment of all conceivable pleasure is impossible; nor can

*The Hedon-
ism of
Aristippus
described.*

humanity expect to summon, at its call, all the aggregated treasures of every time and every space, which yet alone could duly answer the conditions of such a problem. In this point, therefore, nature is manifestly too strong for man; yet our problem is to subdue nature to his desires. The proper solution will be found in neglecting this unattainable height in theory, without resigning any of its practical advantages. For though a single moment of time and a single portion of space are all which, by the very constitution of his being, is granted to man,—and though into that moment of time and point of space cannot be compressed more than the eternal laws of things will permit,—yet, if such a temper of mind be generated as will snatch from each place and instant the utmost amount of pleasure that it yields, without counteracting the intensity of the emotion by reference to any other possible varieties of past or future position, the subjection of circumstances to the sovereignty of mind—the philosophic independence of change—will have been effected sufficiently to save the principle. This I consider to have probably been the ultimate form of the Aristippean reasoning. The maxim that the philosopher who commands all enjoyment is commanded by none,—the *ἐχὼ δὲ οὐκ ἐχόμεναι* of his own apophthegm,²—the “*mibi res non me rebus subjungere*” of Horace,—are subordinate exhibitions, or easy results, of the foregoing train of speculation.

Having thus endeavoured to illustrate these systems by exhibiting them as contrasted solutions of a common problem, I will notice a few further analogies, before proceeding to a more detailed examination of each.

Further points of resemblance between Cynic and Cyrenaic doctrines.

1. That they *were both fostered by the teaching* 1. *Both are*

² [Diog. Laert. ii. 8, 75. Ed.]

*distortions
of genuine
Socratic
teaching.*

of Socrates, is an historical fact and an internal probability. In the discourses of Socrates a very slight examination shows us elements which the spirit of system might naturally be expected to detach from their subordination and erect into ultimate principles of action. His earnest confidence in the eventual happiness of virtue might easily be misconstrued into a representation that virtue was only of value as it insured it; from which the transition was almost imperceptible into the assertion that *all* which produced real happiness was therefore virtue. In this stage of the deduction we find ourselves with the more mature school of Epicurus; but the earlier preachers of the maxim aspired to higher attainments than their successors. Happiness, not virtue, being once made the object in the foreground, it was felt necessary to confer that *stability* upon happiness which the advocates of virtue had ever claimed for *their* first principle. Despising as unworthy of the science of morals, if indeed this ever occurred to them, the evasions and compensations which Epicurus subsequently employed to shelter his feeble fabric of human happiness, by helping the present from the hopes of the future and the recollections of the past, the Cyrenaics found the *certainly* and *stability* of happiness in confining it to the immediate instant of its enjoyment. Thus, not to urge the deduction further, in this form of their theory you can without difficulty recognise the double distortion of Socratic principles,—the attribution of happiness to virtue lost in the attribution of virtue to happiness, and the demand for the stability of the first principle of morals caricatured by the pretended certainty of all momentary pleasure for the moment of its possession.

Not less manifest is the Socratic influence in the Cynical school; as indeed Greece plainly recognised when it

styled Diogenes of Sinope *Σωκράτης μαινόμενος*.* When Socrates affirmed, (as Xenophon reports him, *Memor. i. 6.*) τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐργυράτω τοῦ θείου,—and when, in conformity with such a principle, he exhibited a constant though temperate hostility to the luxurious habits of his age,—you can at once discern the side of his manifold intellect which attracted Antisthenes to his conversations, and the habit of life which that stern moralist parodied in the club and wallet of the mendicant.

2. The next point of analogy between these opposite systems is in their common disdain of all scientific inquiry, except in strict subservience to the explanation of their respective systems of moral life. I need not remind you that in this particular they are the types of the adopters of *extreme* views of human life, whether ascetic or licentious, in every age of the world.† But until it shall have been proved that the highest glory of man is not to know and commune with his Creator, and that that knowledge and communion is not facilitated by the knowledge of his works, the cause of science will have little reason to tremble at the arguments, however it may dread the influence, of its opponents. It is a singular fact, however, that a vast number of philosophical works are ascribed to Antisthenes by Laertius, who gives us a catalogue of their titles, occupying some pages. It is

2. *The speculative element is by both Cynics and Cyrenaics subordinated to the moral.*

* The Cynic founder himself professed that the life of strenuous virtue required a mental firmness which he styled “the *Socratic* force.”

† The opposition of the advocate of mere enjoyment appeals too little to reason to deserve much notice; the antipathy of the votary of self-denial acquires some show of respectability from its motive. We know how common is that short-sighted jealousy which would dissociate the connection between knowledge physical or abstract and the interests of a pure and high morality.

not improbable that these performances were written *previously* to their author's adoption of his severer maxims.³ We know that he arrived at the school of Socrates already advanced in life,⁴ and doubtless had occupied his earlier days among the disputations of the sophists, of one of whom (Gorgias) he had been the recognised pupil.

3. Both
are suc-
ceeded by
more mode-
rate schools,
the Cynics
by the
Stoics, the
Cyrenaics
by the
Epicu-
reans.

3. Another characteristic in which the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools are united is very remarkable. From each of these sects proceeded successors who inherited their mutual hostility, under the well-known titles of the Stoic and Epicurean schools; but, contrary to the usual progress of philosophic opinions, the principles of the subsequent were less unqualified than those of the anterior teachers. In each case moderation was the result of enlarged experience. The same perpetual attenuation of the more startling peculiarities of the system is observable (as far as we can see) in the whole progress of the Stoical philosophy. In a brief attempt to sketch the principal laws that regulate the progress of opinions, on a former occasion, I believe I noted this double effect of the conflict of principles,—the mutual exaggeration and the mutual diminution. It is not much for the honour of human candour that the latter should be, as here, the more unusual result.

³ [This is certainly not true of *all* the dialogues of Antisthenes. See Diog. Laert. vi. 92, §§ 1, 2. (ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους, κ.τ.ε.) Antisthenes survived Socrates more than thirty years, and seems during that time to have waged a brisk war with Plato and the Academy. He is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus as living during the archonship of Cephisodorus, (B.C. 365.) Aristotle came to Athens B.C. 367, and probably knew Antisthenes, for his notices of the Cynics and their master savour of strong personal dislike. Ed.]

⁴ [The *δυνάμει* of Antisthenes must have been exaggerated. He was but seventy at his death, which occurred, as just stated, after B.C. 365. He was therefore not more than thirty-five when Socrates died. Ed.]

4. The only remaining coincidence which I think it now necessary to notice between these opposing theories of life is the important fact that they both seem to have at length terminated in countenancing an absolute *indifference to life itself*. That this result should meet us among the maxims of Cynicism will probably not surprise you; that it should accost us—a grisly phantom—among the bowers of the Cyrenaic voluptuary may perplex you, as it has perplexed the majority of the compilers of the history of philosophy. I trust, before the close of this Lecture, to evince it to be the natural consequence of predisposing causes. I know no more instructive fact, indeed, than this:—that both the special systems of moral philosophy most celebrated in antiquity seem, whether directly or indirectly, to have furnished their disciples with reasons for the justification of suicide. Is it not a tacit avowal of their universal failure in their universal object? The improvement of human life to its highest value, and the attainment of perfect happiness, were the common object of both; death, the gloomy refuge of despair, discovers itself among the maxims, or the suggestions, or the inferences, of both!

4. *The principles of both led to a contempt of life.*

We have regarded these systems, Cynic and Cyrenaic, in their common origin, and detected those resemblances in the midst of opposition which a common origin and object invariably produce. We must now proceed to contemplate them more distinctly. Virtue, even in her travesty, claims precedence over unblushing vice; and our first inquiry shall apply to the philosophy of the Cynics.

Cynical philosophy viewed in detail.

With the personal history of the masters of Philosophy further than it is necessary to explain the complexion of their teaching, it has not been my practice to engage you. Of the champions of the Cynic life we know little

The personal characters of Antisthenes and Diogenes explained by their history.

more than the occasional references of contemptuous antiquity betray. Antisthenes was of humble origin; the father of Diogenes had been banished for forgery. To men who entered life under auspices so unpropitious, a levelling and rigorous philosophy would be naturally acceptable. The reader of almost any of the lighter fragments of ancient times will not require to be reminded of the peculiarities of Diogenes; but a more judicious curiosity will extend to the state of society in which such a character could obtain immediate and universal notoriety. Historical skepticism has long learned to doubt the story of his *Tub*; an elaborate dissertation has, indeed, been written to prove it the mere fable of subsequent inventors, (Heumanni, *de Dol. Habit. Diog. Diss.*;) but the man is more wondrous than his dwelling, and his moral far more extraordinary than his physical position. It was assuredly no ordinary race of mankind among whom such a teacher could obtain eminence, and it is still the triumph of virtue that even in her worst exaggerations she can command reluctant awe. The title of "Cynic" was a subject of dispute among even ancient etymologists. Some derived it from the scene of the master's teaching, the Cynosarges,—a gymnasium near the temple of that Hercules whom he loved to cite as the representative of moral heroism and physical endurance. Many degraded it to an insulting allusion; but I find Sextus Empiricus happily soften this comparison to a compliment. "The Cynics," he declares, "rejoiced in the title of an animal celebrated as just, tenacious, grateful, spirited, and a terror to plunderers."⁵ To the latest period of heathen philosophy the sect seems to have maintained its scattered existence;

⁵ [The accident of the locality probably suggested the characteristic name. Somewhat similar is the instance of the Dominicans, who were called, or called themselves, *Domini canes*. Ed.]

but when its best and loftiest principles had been incorporated in the Stoical philosophy—"a Cynicis tunica⁶ distantia"—it naturally tended to extravagance in order to maintain its distinctness, and seems to have become to the pagan world of contemplation pretty much what the mendicant orders were to the Christianity of the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. I ought to premise that our knowledge of the Cynic habits is mainly derived from later writers,—such as Laetius, Arrian, and Maximus Tyrius. Few as are the positive records they contain, the value of even such notices is necessarily lessened by the remoteness of the authority. You will then excuse me if I seem to advance with a less assured tread in endeavouring the task of reducing these relics into system.

We saw that the aim of the founder of Cynicism was the establishment of man's total independence of nature, and that the means proposed consisted in the absolute suppression of the affections. The "Life according to Nature," a phrase which in other systems assumed a higher and better import, seems in the Cynic to have signified little more than a life independent of all the appliances of *art*. In the perfect votary of naked Cynicism the amputation of affection should be unqualified. Even the domestic impulses, and the ties of patriotism, we seem to perceive noticed with brief and harsh fridity in the relics of the discourse of Antisthenes. The moral liberty which the annihilation of the passions was to insure was declared to be the supreme good: this was virtue, and virtue brought happiness,—the only happiness the sage could value. Laetius expressly records the maxim, *τέλος τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν*, and attributes to the Cynic legislator that principle which afterwards

*Cynical
idea of the
Life accord-
ing to Na-
ture.*

*Their con-
ception of
virtue.*

⁶ [Which the Stoics wore, but the Cynics dispensed with. Ed.]

made so distinguished a figure in Stoicism, that all between perfect virtue and vice were indifferent, (*ἀδιάφορα*). To such a degree did this enthusiasm for independence urge the Cynics, that, if we may believe many of their ancient assailants, it led not merely to a superiority to ordinary business, but to a wilful exhibition of contempt for ordinary decency.

*Indelicacy
of the
Cynics.*

It is in this view that Cicero speaks of the sect in a passage in his Offices:—"Cynicorum natio tota ejicienda est. Est enim *inimica verecundiae*, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum." (B. i. 41.)

*Remarks
on the
Cynical
morality.*

*Asceticism
fosters the
growth of
pride.*

Now, the first remark which occurs in reference to a system based on the aspiration after total independence through suppression of desire is this:—that, in attempting the annihilation of all other vices, it inevitably tends to aggravate to portentous magnitude the vice of *pride*. In fact, the system amounts to little else than a sacrifice of all the rest of human nature on the altar of this single passion. It is like that stoppage of the natural transpiration in the animal frame which only increases and exacerbates the other discharges. The truth is, that in such a system, whatever may be its pomp of profession, virtue is only nominally the cardinal idea; it is not cultivated for its own sake, but as the minister to another and more prevailing motive; and the Cynic (in this respect too closely copied by the Stoic of after-times) thought much less of *pleasing* the Deity than of being his *equal*.

*Cynical
virtue con-
sists solely
in the sub-
jugation of
the desires
and af-
fections;*

The next observation upon this system regards the Cynic conception of virtue itself. Virtue, being mainly regarded as the means of liberation from the tyranny of those desires which are themselves the dependent slaves of circumstance, was considered to consist wholly in the subjugation of desire. As this rigorous rule

extended to all the varieties of affection, it demanded (especially in those whose nature was not indurated by age and disappointment) a series of continued sacrifices; and accordingly by the Cynic no virtue seemed to be recognised of which the essence was not stern *self-sacrifice*. But this is an error, though even to this day a common error. Self-sacrifice, though a valuable test of the force of the virtuous principle, is not itself a necessary accompaniment of virtuous acts. Virtue consists in conformity to a rule. This conformity, partly through original frailty, partly through the aggravation of evil habit, can, in many cases, only by man be attained with more or less of self-denial: and in such cases the desert of virtue is unquestionably increased in proportion to the self-denial undergone in order to effect the conformity. But so far is sacrifice from being of the necessary essence of virtue, that the perfection of virtue consists in that state which habit has made it a sacrifice to abandon,—a state therefore in which, if self-subjection were of the essence of virtue, vice should obtain its honours; while, on the other hand, years of self-sacrifice are endured by the slaves of ambition and avarice to realize their distant and perspective objects,—cases which plainly show that endurance of pain for a purpose beyond it is only incidentally connected with virtue. It proves the strength of the virtuous principle by trial; it heightens it by exercise; but it does not constitute it.

that is to say, in apparent self-sacrifice.

Defects of the principle pointed out.

This error in the Cynical theory led to consequences similar to those which it has produced in all ages where it has been a prevalent practical principle. The endurance of suffering, valuable only as a means, was insensibly exalted into an end. Pain, which in itself has no moral character whatever, was identified with virtue, and physical misery made the necessary con-

Consequences of its adoption.

Identification of Pain with Virtue.

dition of moral *happiness*. By this perversion the virtues themselves were transformed into their opposites. Resignation, which, when founded on a high and holy principle, is nearly the loveliest form of human virtue, was hardened and embittered into frigid arrogance; and the fortitude that could despise the pomp of kings was itself the abject courtier of public notoriety.

Into the fundamental error involved in the whole principle of the absolute suppression of the affections, as themselves contradictory to reason, I prefer to postpone entering, until we shall have an opportunity of canvassing the theory in its maturer form, in the philosophy of Stoicism.

The influence of the Cynics was limited.

These Cynic parodists of virtue do not appear to have ever attained much real influence over the public mind. Their celebrity, like that of the earlier Christian ascetics, was chiefly confined to the more unlettered classes,⁷ who, unaccustomed to disentangle the complexity of the human heart, assumed that man can have but one motive for voluntary austerity, and that the highest of all. The very extravagance of their tenets attracted those who were not habituated to minute distinction; who want time, or inclination, or opportunity, or natural faculty, to close with subtle truth; and to whom therefore a teacher, to be popular, must forget his precision of outline and delicacy of shading, assuming a style that bears much the same relation to the accurate form of philosophical inquiry as scene-painting bears to miniature. Such disciples have no memory for limitations or exceptions. The Cynics accordingly abounded in those unqualified maxims in which much truth keeps

⁷ [So Aristotle seems to say, *Metaph.* vii. 3, 7, where he speaks of Antisthenes and his admirers as uneducated, ἀπαιδευτοι. This, however, is said in reference to their logical tenets. Ed.]

much error afloat. 'Ο σοφὸς ἀναμάρτητος, "the sage is sinless!" Μανίην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν, "I had rather taste insanity itself than pleasure!" *Cynical paradoxes. (Diog. Laert. vi. c. 1.)* Τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαιότατον, τὰ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν; a truth certainly, but indicative of the coldly negative character of the Cynic teaching. "He that will be my pupil," said Antisthenes, in the same spirit, "must bring a new book, a new pen, and a new tablet." The enemies of cultivation, they became in each successive age more and more the objects of literary ridicule; nor need I remind you of the *Mordax Cynicus* of Horace, or of the unsparing satire—the Menippuses and Cyniscuses—of Lucian.

I have not detained you with any consideration of the *logical* views of the early Cynics.⁸ They were either subservient to the declared *Logic of the Cynics characterized.*

⁸ [The logic of the Cynics was of the Eristic kind, like that of the Megarics, which it resembled in its general physiognomy, though the results to which it conducted were in some respects different. Antisthenes seems to have denied the truth of all propositions that were not identical, (Arist. *Met.* iv. 29,) and therefore the possibility of definitions, (Ib. vii. 3.) These sophisms he may have learnt from Gorgias, his first master. His abhorrence of the Platonic ideas seems to have betrayed him into a rude form of materialism. He denied the existence of qualities, saying, "A man I can see, but I never saw the thing you call humanity." "True! your body has eyes, but your mind has yet to acquire them," was the retort. (Schol. Aristot. Brandis, pp. 66, 68; Tzet. *Chil.* vii. 606.) Many covert illusions to Antisthenes exist in the Platonic Dialogues, and have been pointed out by Schleiermacher and others, of whom see especially Winckelmann, (*Antisthenis Fragmenta*, p. 35, *note*.) To the list he gives ought probably to be added *Sophista*, p. 246, a passage alluded to in a note on the last Lecture. In the War of the Giants there described, the "gods" represent the Megarics, the εἰδῶν φίλοι. Their earthborn opponents have puzzled commentators, who speak, some of Democritus, others of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. The foregoing anecdote, and the materialism it implies, incline me to suppose that Antisthenes is meant. The fierceness attributed to the anti-idealists agrees best with the Cynic character; and the strong terms in which their materialism is described assort ill with the more refined theories of Democritus and Aristippus. Δρῦς καὶ πέτραι

hostility of the sect against all its contemporaries, (such as Antisthenes's attacks on the ideas of Plato,) or the perpetuation of the tenets of earlier schools, or doctrines intended as objections to the value or validity of all speculative science whatever. One principle, attributed by Cicero to Antisthenes, it is but justice to record as some counterpoise to the severity of my past criticisms. In it we seem to discover the sentiments of Socrates professed with the courage of the Cynic; if, indeed, the opinion (which appeared in one of his *written* treatises) was not rather due to the elder philosophy of unity. "Antisthenes, in eo libro qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, *naturalem unum esse* dicens, tollit vim et naturam deorum." (*De Nat. D.* i. 13, 32.)

The Cyrenates.

We must now change the scene, and, instead of the harsh and unwelcome dictates of the Cynic school, attempt to unravel the softer logic of Cyrene. With that city, one of the most beautiful of antiquity, this school is connected throughout its entire development. Whether we class its teachers as one continued succession, or rather (with some historians) arrange

(trees and rocks) are but indifferent synonyms for the "atoms and void" of the one, or for the *ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πάθους* (the unknown somewhat, or quasi-somewhat, which produces sensation) of the other.

This speculative materialism found its counterpart in the ethical theory of Antisthenes, and, if we may believe Xenophon, in his ethical practice also. See the speech of Antisthenes in the *Convivium*, iv. 38, from which we may derive the maxim, that vice is culpable in the inverse proportion to its grossness. An extravagant personal vanity was characteristic both of Antisthenes and of the obscene Diogenes; and it is impossible not to sympathize in the scorn with which the more high-minded Socratics looked upon these odious caricaturists of their master. The germs of Cynicism may indeed be detected in the teaching of Socrates as reported by Xenophon, but these theoretical errors were neutralized by his nobler nature. This topic is well handled by Zeller in his *History of Greek Philosophy*, § 15, p. 57; § 17, p. 117. Ed.]

them in two nearly synchronizing successions, of whom Aristippus the elder, his sister or daughter Arête, the younger Aristippus the son of Arête, and Theodorus Atheus, form the first,—Antipater, Hegesias, and Anniceris, the second,—they seem to have all gathered round the luxurious capital of Cyrenaica. I have before endeavoured to show you how even this system sprung from the effort for a content beyond what nature ordinarily allows; how the motionless rigour of the Cynic, the active volatility of the Cyrenaic, are but two responses to the same question: I must now endeavour, with brevity, but if possible with accuracy, to lead you through the path by which Aristippus appears to have gained his solution, avoiding those aspects of the system which I have already illustrated, and which I may trust to your recollection for still preserving.

Every kind of *speculation*, I remarked already, was by both these sects employed as the mere instrument for establishing their respective ethical conclusions. That system of the human mind was, therefore, adopted by Aristippus, which would lead with the greatest directness to his practical philosophy. Though I have little doubt that this was the process by which the younger Aristippus (for to *him* the theoretic form of Cyrenaism is attributed⁹) modelled his philosophic views, it will, I believe, be most perspicuous to reverse his course of inquiry, and explain the theory in the syn-

*Cyrenaism
in its specu-
lative
aspect.*

⁹ [Aristippus the elder, though the fact of his authorship is disputed, (Diog. L. ii. 8, 84), was undoubtedly the inventor of the Cyrenaic system. He must even have developed it in a logical and systematic form. The consistent theory of pleasure combated in the *Philebus* of Plato was certainly his; and there can be little doubt that the curious and very subtle psychological speculations criticized in the first half of the *Theætetus* were his also; though it be difficult to distinguish them from the doctrines of Protagoras, from which indeed they appear to have differed rather in phrase than in substance. Ed.]

thetic form, deducing the ethical from the elementary physical principles. The author of the system, as we now have it, appears to have set out with the restriction of all human faculties to simple sensibility,—the power of receiving sensations; on which, as those of no two human individuals might be *the same*, no *certainly* of knowledge could possibly, he argued, be built. These phenomena of sensibility (“internæ per-motiones,” Cicero calls them, *Acad. Qu. ii.* 46) being the sole materials of knowledge, and thus the sole criteria of truth, all ethical rules must depend on the *qualities* of

The Cyrenaic sensa-tional-ism.
Its connec-tion with Hedonism.

sensations. Now, the qualities common to all sensations are pleasure and pain: pleasure and pain are, therefore, the only elements of moral calculation. Pleasure being the sole subjective good, all attribution of good, as any thing separate from pleasure, can only regard those objects which are *the means* of pleasure, and which, by a natural license of language, receive the title of that which they *confer*. Virtue, then, and every exercise of the affections (as friendship or patriotism) must fall under the sway of the universal formula: they are all to be sought or cultivated only with a view to the advantage of the possessor. And, as a *cer-*

Present en-joyment the only good according to the Cyrenaics,

tainty is essential to happiness, the sage will (according to the analysis I before produced) insure his certainty in the *immediacy* of enjoyment, carefully rejecting all intrusive suggestions of past or future. Pleasure, they constantly affirmed, is *μὴ ὁρῶντος*, and upheld that we reason inaccurately when we enlarge upon any *universal* notion of felicity, which in truth is only applicable to actual, individual, and instantaneous sensation. The Epicurean insisted upon pleasures of *tranquillity*; the Cyrenaic despised this cold negation: the Epicurean pleaded for

who differ herein from the Epicureans.

mental enjoyment as the great element of happiness; the impatient philosophy of Cyrene disgraced itself by an

almost unequivocal preference for the claims of the body : the Epicurean would draw all the tender recollections of the past, all the bright anticipations of happiness to come, into his treasury of existing felicity ; the Cyrenaic disdained a maxim which if it occasionally heightened pleasure might as often neutralize it by pain. But every sorrow that darkened the horizon of memory or expectation was as nothing to the practised Cyrenaic, who had trained his soul into the unparticipated idolatry of the present moment. This, perhaps, throws some light upon a sentiment which Cicero seems scarcely to have understood. He represents Aristippus (*Tusc. Quæst.* iii. 13) as holding that no griefs were to be regarded but "*insperati dolores.*"¹⁰ According to the representation which I have ventured to give of the Cyrenaic theory of pleasure and pain, these were precisely the only griefs which the genuine Hedonist would allow to *exist*. But when to the advocates of this system the obvious objection was proposed, that this account gave no solution of a very remarkable phenomenon which can scarcely be overlooked in any ethical estimate,—the eternal sameness and independence of the rule of virtue ; that rule acknowledged in all climes under superficial, but with little or no substantial, varieties ; that rule of which Antisthenes had so truly proclaimed, that "it governs the sage far more powerfully than the laws of his country can do,"—the answer of the Cyrenaic was that which has since been so often reiterated by those who clothe his principles in a less undisguised form :—that the sameness of convenience produced a sameness in the means of insuring it, and therefore an identity in the assumption of "virtue." And if any more pertina-

Their answer to objections founded on the uniformity of moral rules.

¹⁰ [Cicero's words are, "Cyrenaici non omni malo ægritudinem effici censent, sed insperato et nec opinato malo." Compare lib. iii. 22 and 31. Ed.]

cious antagonist objected that, by some mysterious contrariety to their own interest, men *are found* who wilfully maintain that even the highest certainty of physical pleasure and absolute impunity from avenging laws cannot justify a man in betraying his friend or assassinating his parent, the Cyrenaic escaped under vague references to the power of antiquity and prescription, and the veneration for all which is consecrated by custom and consent.

The Cyrenaic system exemplified in the life of its founder.

Of this degrading but seductive philosophy Aristippus himself was the example as well as the teacher. Possessed, it would seem, of that constitutional gift of animal spirits which is so often mistaken for higher attainments in the art of philosophical or religious content, he resolutely pursued his maxim of extorting pleasure from every situation, and in every country gathering the fading flowers of enjoyment. We find him in Sicily the accomplished visitant of the court of Dionysius, at Corinth the acknowledged favourite of youth and beauty; but in every fragment of his discourse preserved from antiquity we cannot fail to observe, in the prosecution of his own art of pleasure, that total absence of refinement which proved that he was still ignorant of its most attractive forms. This is important to mention, because it was the *direct result* of the shape in which Aristippus adopted the general philosophy of Eudæmonism. To materialize pleasure, and to rob it of its associations in the past and future, was perhaps to be expected from the first advocate of the system: assuredly, it betrayed that system to have been not yet arrived at its most dangerous maturity.

The minuter varieties which the principles of Aristippus underwent in the course of their transmission from teacher to teacher I am not now about to record. But there are one or two manifestations of their agency too instructive to be overlooked. And with a notice of these, I shall close the subject.

1. The system of the school of Cyrene was a materialist system of psychology; and where a belief in Revelation has not interposed its extrinsic influence, it is undeniable that the materialist system of man has a strong tendency to speculative *Atheism*. I do not assert that it admits of no legitimate escape from this conclusion; I speak simply of the generation of a *tendency* to adopt it. To this result it seems to me that all philosophic history, more particularly the history of the French philosophy of the last century, bears irresistible testimony. To the *Theist* the manifest existence and necessity of a designing Supreme Intelligence becomes a powerful argument for the possible, or probable, or certain, existence of a separate immaterial human mind; for he reflects, if matter cannot generate God to organize it into all its exquisite forms of design, why should it be deemed adequate to originate *that thing from which* alone we learn in the perception of design to *conclude* a God? * While on the other hand, as the materialist's only notion of intelligence in man (and thence his only notion of intelligence at all) is as a function of matter,—one of the innumerable forms of material results,—it is impossible that he can find any reason from analogy for admitting, or at all conceiving, intelligence distinct from matter. Consequently, as design inevitably infers intelligence, he escapes into a confused Spinosism, in which the primary matter of the universe is itself endowed with thought. The very notion of “design” in the materialist's view can signify no more than *mental matter* conceiving suitabilities; and accordingly beyond mental matter the argument from

*General remarks.
Tendency of materialism towards atheism.*

* If (from independent reasoning) we know that the First Cause cannot have been material, can we believe that that which pronounces the necessity of a First Cause is itself a material product? If the *conceiver* of Order was separate from tangible matter, is the *perceiver* of Order the creature of matter?

design is never likely to bring him. How these tendencies are increased by a system which destroys the distinctions of virtue and vice, and thus silences the promise which the conscience makes of a Supreme Judge, it is unnecessary to insist. The result in its completeness is

*Theodorus
Athens,
(B.C. 310,
about.)*

presented in Theodorus of Cyrene, whose daring denial of a Deity is perpetuated in the title which posterity has affixed to his name.*

2. To the development of Cyrenaism finally to be noticed I have already promised to direct your attention.

*The dark
side of the
Hedonistic
philosophy.*

That there is in even the wildest visions of earthly enjoyment a something mournfully brief and unsatisfactory, is a remark with which you are all of course familiar, and the truth of which, doubtless, you can all in many degrees attest. The remark itself is nearly as old as human experience, though under the empire of Christianity alone (for reasons not difficult to be apprehended) it has been brought out with a prominence commensurate to its importance. The same Divine Contriver who has bestowed upon man desires and affections with a view to their rational gratification in the maintenance of his temporal scheme has yet taken care, by affixing to them all this melancholy character of felt insufficiency, to stamp them all as being, in their present exercise, the temporary machinery of a merely introductory stage of existence. To a mind habitually thoughtful, then, it may be expected that the very experience of pleasure will more or less constantly present this supplementary conviction; and, indeed, those who are conversant with one large class of the works of imagination at this day¹¹ most popular in our literature

* *Αθεος.

¹¹ [This was written in or before 1840. In the margin stand the names of Byron and a distinguished living author, to whose recent productions the description in the text is quite inapplicable. Ep.]

will not fail to have observed that their secret but pervading charm consists in the use of this sublime discontent as a means of interest and effect. These dangerous but fascinating productions *attract*, precisely because they administer to two opposite but coincident feelings,—the love of pleasure and the conviction of its nothingness; and they are *dangerous*, because they accustom the mind to be contented with this imperfect development of the purpose of the emotion; to think that to deplore the deficiencies of earth is really to desire heaven; or that vaguely to long for that mysterious world to come, as the complement of earthly enjoyment, is *truly* to elevate the affections to “things above”!

Pleasure, then, tends to betray its own poverty, unless when the natural growth of satiety is prevented by variety or occupation. The possible consequences are twofold. The melancholy conviction must either cast the restless though wearied spirit upon the supposition of a future state, where its disquietude shall find peace, (which is the legitimate lesson of the disappointed affections,) or, in default of the admission of this great reconciling fact,—whether from mere despair of its possibility, or more deliberate disbelief,—must darken into gloomy disgust with life, and impatience of its wretched remnant. The school of Cyrene fails not to furnish its example. In Hegesias, who from his doctrine was surnamed *πεισιθνήτορ*, the philosophy of pleasure became a philosophy of suicide. Pleasures, according to this teacher, were the accidents of rarity or frequency; the pleasures of all classes were levelled to a degrading equality; they were indifferent, worthless, overbalanced by misfortune; and the sage, wearied with the unprofitable chase, would gladly seek the easy refuge of eternal rest. Suicide, like things of less moment, has in various ages of the world spread by the contagion of *fashion*; and so powerful was the melan-

*Hegesias,
the preacher
of suicide.
(lived under
Philadel-
phus.)*

choly rhetoric of this advocate of the grave, that an Egyptian king was obliged to prohibit the publication of his discourses.¹² In that country of mysteries the gloomy orator might have found his own type: the shrouded skeleton of the Egyptian banquet might symbolize the sepulchral visions of Hegesias veiled—yet only lightly veiled—amidst the festive philosophy of Aristippus and his disciples!

The traveller who should now wander over the site of Cyrene would require some effort of imagination to conceive that the ghastly wastes which the jackal and hyena divide with the scarce less savage Bedouin were once the chosen seat of the most luxurious philosophy of all antiquity,—a philosophy the natural product, and (as it were) the intellectual expression, of a society opulent and splendid to excess. Solitary fragments of Doric temples, excavations, and even paintings, still attest the former magnificence of the city of Aristippus; but the groves and gardens in which inanimate nature itself seemed to plead for the sophists of pleasure, and in which, doubtless, so many a young and noble spirit was taught on system to despise virtue as a dream and justify self-degradation by philosophy,—these are forever vanished. If Virtue could for a moment forget that her retributions belong to another world, and in this are but occasional, uncertain, and mysterious, she might smile, or sigh, in melancholy triumph as she stood among the ruins of Cyrene!

¹² [So Cicero, *Tusc. Qu.* i. 34, 83, who adds, (Ib. 84:)—“Ejus autem . . . liber est Ἀποκατεργῶν, in quo a vita quidam decedens revocatur ab amicis: quibus respondens, vitæ humanæ enumerat incommoda.” Ed.]