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EDITORS:

REV. M. J. O'DONNELL, D.D.

REV. GARRETT PIERSE, D.D.

REV. EDW. J. KISSANE, L.S.S.

REV. WILLIAM MORAN, D.D.

REV. PAUL WALSH, M.A.



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## Some More Theology About Tyranny.

A REPLY TO PROF. O'RAHILLY.\*

IN the last number of the IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY an article appeared under the title "Some Theology about Tyranny." The scope of the article is somewhat wider than the title indicates, for in reality the whole theory of political authority is submitted to an examination, perhaps a little hasty and superficial, yet not without erudition and plausibility. For many of the doctrines advanced Catholic teaching would seem to provide no warrant. Therefore, as the article has attracted wide attention on account of the high standing of its author and the wealth of erudition which it seems to display, it may not be amiss to examine what theology says to Prof. O'Rahilly's principles. In this brief review, I shall draw to some extent on the opinions of theologians but much more largely on authoritative official sources.

### I. PROFESSOR O'RAHILLY'S THEORY.

Professor O'Rahilly's article consists of a theory on the origin of civil authority, and the application of this theory to the particular questions of oppression and usurpation. The theory itself I would sum up in three assertions:

(1) All legitimate government is based on the consent of the governed.

(2) All civil authority is committed by the people to their rulers, but the people retain a certain "inalienable radical sovereignty."

(3) All such authority can be validly repudiated by the people even when repudiation is illicit.

To anyone who has read the Encyclicals of Leo XIII. on civil government, the theory thus expounded sounds

\* We owe an apology to our censor. By arrangement with our printers, everything is submitted to the censor through the publishers. So far as the printers of our October issue could remember, when we inquired on the 12th of that month, the usual procedure had been adopted in connexion with Mr. O'Rahilly's article. Through some accident or other, however, the proofs never reached the censor. We were unaware of the fact until the issue was published and in the hands of the subscribers.—THE EDITORS.

strangely familiar. In fact, the Pope in explaining what he calls the "novum jus"—that is, the scheme of political right which is the groundwork of modern revolutionary thought—says:<sup>1</sup>

"Moderns in great numbers, following in the footsteps of those who in the last century styled themselves philosophers, maintain that all power comes from the people, that therefore those who exercise power in the State, do not exercise that authority as their own but as the mandatories of the people, and on condition that it can be revoked by the will of the people from whom they hold it. Quite the contrary is the opinion of Catholics who hold that the right to rule comes from God as from its natural and necessary source."

It should be noted that in this modern opinion, from which, according to the Pope, Catholics must dissent, there are three distinct statements—(a) All power comes from the people. (b) Rulers are but the mandatories of the people. (c) The mandate is revocable.

However, Prof. O'Rahilly does not put forward this theory as his own, nor does he defend it by argument. He claims that it is Catholic teaching—"the principle of popular supremacy traditional in Catholic writers apart from a handful of Gallicans and Legists from the 13th to the 19th century"—and he adduces in support of his contention the authority of several theologians, including Suarez. Now, it is quite true that the opinion of Suarez was for several centuries the *sententia communis* amongst theologians, but that opinion differs in many essential features from the theory of Prof. O'Rahilly as already expounded. These theologians taught that in the beginning power came from the people, but once it was vested in the future ruler it became irrevocable. To use the language of the schools, it depended on the will of the people "*in fieri*" but not "*in facto esse*." As the authority of Suarez on this question is supereminent, let him speak for all his followers:<sup>2</sup>

"In the first objection which he (King James) proposes he answers Bellarmine and draws certain inconvenient conclusions. . . . 'If the ruler gets his

<sup>1</sup> Encyclical "Diuernum illud," 29th June, 1881.

<sup>2</sup> "Defensio," Lib. III., cap. iii. § 2.

power from the people, the people can rise against the ruler whenever they will and reassume their liberty, relying on the very right and power which they have transferred to the king; especially as Bellarmine says that the people never so transfer their power as not to retain it radically, in order that in certain cases they may be able to resume it actually.' We reply that none of these inconvenient conclusions follow. . . . After the people have transferred their power to the king they cannot, relying on that power, at will, or as often as they wish, resume their liberty. For if they have yielded their power to the king and he has accepted it, by that very fact the king has acquired the supreme authority. Therefore, although the king has that authority from the people by donation or contract, the people are not allowed to take away the king's authority or reassume their liberty. Just as a particular person who has renounced his liberty and by sale or gift has made himself a slave cannot afterwards release himself from slavery; so too it is with a *persona ficta* or a community when it has completely subjected itself to a ruler. When the people have handed over their power to a king, they have deprived themselves of it, and therefore they cannot justly rely upon it to rise against the king, for they would thus rely on a power which they do not possess; and so *their act would not be a just use but a usurpation of power.*"

If then an attempt to recall the authority entrusted would be a usurpation of power, it follows that civil authority *in facto esse* does not depend on the will of the people, nor can it be said that "the national repudiation of a government would be valid even if it were illicit." Consequently, if the people repudiate their ruler and proceed to constitute another, that other is a usurper, for his only title is the usurped power of the people. The third point, therefore, of Prof. O'Rahilly's theory goes far beyond the traditional Catholic view.

So far I have only examined Prof. O'Rahilly's doctrine in the light of the *sententia communis* and I have shown that even according to the old traditional view the people cannot repudiate the government at will. But now we

must ask, What of the great principle of consent itself? Is the consent of the people the sole origin of legitimate civil authority? In this again the theologians fail Prof. O'Rahilly, for Suarez admits not one but three titles; (a) Consent: (b) Victory in a just war: (c) Prescription. But even if we grant that the older theologians did universally admit the principle of consent, surely the Church did not cease to teach about the year 1800. In fact, on the present subject her teaching during the 19th century has been particularly important, for within the last century successive heads of the Catholic Church have spoken officially on the origin of civil power. Several Popes<sup>3</sup> have made definite pronouncements, yet outside a passing reference to Gregory XVI and Pius IX, Prof. O'Rahilly never mentions their teaching. Any Catholic must see at once how serious this omission is. Let doctors and theologians dispute as they will, when once the See of Peter speaks officially, even though the solemnity of an infallible decree be absent, other authorities however great fade into insignificance. Now all the Popes speak the same language, and all, in one way or another, reject not only the theses of Prof. O'Rahilly, but even the *sententia communis* that the consent of the people is the basis of legitimate authority. Thus Leo XIII in his famous Encyclical "*de Civili Principatu*" (*Diuturnum illud*) says:

"To refuse to acknowledge God as the author of the power to rule is to wish to destroy the splendour of political power and to cut its sinews. But as to the statement they make that it depends on the will of the multitude, in the first place they err in their opinion, and besides they build political power on too unstable and flexible a basis."

Now it may be objected that Pope Leo's statement refers only to the *continuance* of power and that in a democratic state, at least, power originates from the people. But the Encyclical forestalls this objection:

<sup>3</sup> The documents referred to or cited in this article are:—

- (a) Gregory XVI, *Mirari vos*, 15th August, 1832.
- (b) Pius IX, *Quanta cura*, 8th December, 1864.
- (c) Leo XIII, *Diuturnum illud*, 29th June, 1881.
- (d) Leo XIII, *Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae*, 16th February, 1902.
- (e) Leo XIII, *Epistola ad Cardinales Galliae*, 3rd May, 1892.
- (f) Pius X, *Condemnation of the Sillon*, 25th August, 1910.



"It is important to observe here that those who rule the State may in certain cases be chosen by the will and judgment of the people, and that herein Catholic doctrine offers neither dissent nor opposition, *but that choice marks out the person who shall govern, it does not confer upon him authority to govern*; it does not delegate power, it designates the person who shall be invested with power."

One would have thought that such authoritative pronouncements as these would have silenced controversy and finally determined Catholic doctrine, yet in the year 1910, Pope Pius X in condemning the Sillonists was forced to declare that they repudiated the doctrine recalled by Leo XIII on the subject of the essential principles of society. Now, what was the doctrine of the Sillonists? Pope Pius summarises it thus:

"Authority, it is true, comes from God, but it resides primordially in the people and emanates from them by way of election or rather selection, yet not so as to leave the people or become independent of them. It shall be external but only in appearance, but in reality it shall be internal *because it shall be an authority based on consent.*"

I cannot see in what the doctrine differs from that expounded in the article under discussion, yet Pius X declares that it is "a theory contrary to Catholic truth."<sup>2</sup>

He adds:—

"The Sillon attributes authority primordially to the people from whom it is communicated to the rulers, in such a way, however, that it continues to reside in the people. Now Leo XIII has formally condemned that doctrine in his Encyclical on Political Power, in which he says: 'Moderns in great numbers, etc.'<sup>4</sup>

And again,

"No doubt the Sillon holds that the authority which it attributes to the people descends from God, but in such a way that it remounts from below upwards, whereas in the organization of the Church it

<sup>4</sup> The words "radical sovereignty" according to their normal meaning should signify the doctrine here condemned. The doctrine which, very improperly, they are used to signify, we shall consider later.

descends from above downwards. But . . . Leo XIII has refuted by anticipation this attempt to reconcile Catholic doctrine with philosophic error, for he goes on to say: 'It is important to note, etc. . . .'

We might sum up these pronouncements of the Popes in four main propositions:

- (1) Authority comes from God Himself; it does not depend on the will of the people.
- (2) Authority does not vest in the first instance in the people, who afterwards pass it on to the ruler.
- (3) In certain cases (e.g., under a democratic constitution) the people designate the person who shall be invested with power. They do not confer authority or delegate power.
- (4) Since the power has not come from the people they cannot recall it.

What then of Suarez and the other theologians whom Prof. O'Rahilly quotes? Is their opinion completely discarded? I will answer in the words of a distinguished Irishman. Dr. Healy, the late Archbishop of Tuam, in an article contributed to the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* shortly after the publication of Pope Leo's Encyclical, writes as follows<sup>5</sup>:—"We think the present Encyclical deals a serious blow at the probability of that opinion (i.e., the Suaresian), and indeed, in face of the Pope's language, we do not see how it can henceforward be maintained amongst theologians with any show of probability." This conclusion becomes irresistible if we place side by side, as Dr Healy does the doctrine of Suarez and that of the Pope. I use the Latin text in both cases:—

*"Nec sufficit designatio personae neque est separabilis a donatione vel contractu aut quasi contractu humano ut habeat effectum conferendi potestatem . . . Potestas regia necessario est ab homine immediate conferente et non tantum personam designante (Suarez, Def. III., c. ii., n. 17)."*

*"Quo sane delectu designatur princeps, non conferuntur iura principatus neque mandat imperium sed statuitur a quo sit gerendum." (Leo XIII, Diuturnum illud).*

<sup>5</sup> *Papers and Addresses*, p. 476.

It is manifestly impossible to reconcile these two statements, and consequently the Suaresian theory, at one time very probable owing to the extrinsic authority on which it rested, must now yield place to the official teaching of the Church. In this place let me remark on the charge of reaction which Prof. O'Rahilly levels against Taparelli and others. As I understand it, reaction in the domain of thought means the discarding of a new and generally accepted doctrine in favour of an old and obsolete one. On Prof. O'Rahilly's showing, therefore, he is himself in the position of reactionary. If Taparelli be the prime criminal, the charge should be one of innovation, not of reaction.

I may be asked, was not the opinion of Suarez the *sententia communis* amongst Catholic theologians prior to the 19th century, and if so, is it possible that the Church has changed her doctrine? Of course, there is no question of official doctrine, for prior to the 19th century no official pronouncement had been made. Now, I am not at all concerned to deny that within the last hundred years a great change of opinion on the question of civil authority has taken place in Catholic schools. An opinion which was once commonly received and which no one thought it worth while to question, has been questioned and carefully examined. As a result it has ceased to be common and has apparently become obsolescent. Certainly it is no longer received in the schools in Rome. Thus, Mgr. Solieri, the present professor of Canon Law in Propaganda, makes it a distinction between voluntary and necessary societies that in the former authority is delegated by the people, in the latter it comes from the "jus praevalens" or the author of the "jus praevalens." Now the State is a necessary society, and of such Mgr. Solieri says:—"Nor does it follow that the subject of supreme authority holds his power by delegation from the people: rather we should say that he gets it from the 'jus praevalens' itself and that the people only designate the ruler."<sup>6</sup>

The reasons for this change of opinion must be sought in the historical circumstances of the time. The upheaval of 1789, which sent a wave of revolution and social unrest over Europe, excited a livelier interest in discussions on

<sup>6</sup> "Jus praevalens" here means natural law.

civil authority; such discussions began to have more real import, and so, arguments which before were allowed to pass, were criticised and rejected. In fact, during the last century the arguments which satisfied Suarez have been riddled. Again, as part of the same movement, there has been a great advance in historical studies. History lent no support to the great Jesuit, but it showed on the contrary that the origin of civil power has had other sources. For instance, was it not by superior force rather than by consent of the subject peoples that Rome ruled half the world, yet Apostles and Fathers of the Church had inculcated obedience and loyalty to the Caesars.

Moreover, as Newman says,<sup>7</sup> "the logic of facts at times overrides all positive laws and prerogatives and reaches in its effective force to the very frontiers of immutable truths in religion, ethics, and theology." By the logic of facts it has been borne in upon the rulers of the Church, that the teaching of Suarez did not provide a sufficient defence and protection for the revealed dogma that civil power is from God and that those who disobey resist the ordinance of God. The majesty of Caesar and the obligation of civil obedience have suffered from the attacks of ultra-liberal ideas, and the theory of Suarez has been regarded rather as a help to the enemy than as a defence against him. It has been weighed in the balance and found wanting.

## II. OPPRESSION.

Applying his theory to the case of oppression, Professor O'Rahilly deduces that the people may actively resist an oppressor (1) because of their inalienable radical sovereignty, (2) because of their right of self-defence. As the phrase "inalienable radical sovereignty" is ambiguous, it may be well to state what exactly it represents. Commenting on certain words of Bellarmine, Suarez makes two exceptions to his general principle that, by the act of transfer, the king acquires all power and the people deprive themselves of it. The first exception refers to explicit constitutional reservations, the second to the case of tyranny. The people always reserve to themselves the right to depose in self-defence a ruler who insists on oppressing

<sup>7</sup> *Via Media*, Preface § 30.

them. This is what Professor O'Rahilly enlarges into "inalienable radical sovereignty." However, the point is of minor importance, as we reject the theory both of Suarez and Professor O'Rahilly.<sup>8</sup> We must now consider, from our own point of view, the question whether subjects may actively resist an oppressor.

In reply to this question two answers have been given. Some authors, like Taparelli, hold that passive resistance alone is allowed, and these derive powerful support from the language of the Popes. Gregory XVI, in his Encyclical *Mirari vos* (15th August, 1832), says:—

"The laws of God and man cry out against those who by disgraceful plots, by treason and sedition, try to rebel against princes and to overthrow their authority. For this reason the Christians of old, to avoid defilement by such disgraceful conduct, even when persecutions were raging, did good service to the Emperors and promoted the safety of the Empire. . . . Christian soldiers, says St. Augustine, served the infidel Emperor, but when it was question of the cause of Christ they acknowledged none but Him who is in Heaven. They distinguished between the Eternal and the temporal master, and yet for the sake of the Eternal Master they were subject to the temporal one. *This fidelity of the early Christians to their rulers shines all the brighter if we consider with Tertullian that at that time they lacked neither numbers nor forces if they wished to meet their enemies in the open field. . . . These noble examples of inflexible subjection to their rulers which proceeds of necessity from the most sacred principles of the Christian religion* condemn the detestable insolence and wickedness of those who . . . make it their whole aim to loosen and pluck up by the roots every right of government, that they may bring slavery to the peoples in the clothing of liberty."

In the passage which I have italicised Gregory XVI. seems to say that the early Christians, even though they could have faced their enemies in the field, were prohibited

<sup>8</sup>In translating the passages which he cites from Banez and Suarez, Prof. O'Rahilly renders "respublica" by "nation." Why? It does not mean "nation," and to translate it so distorts the meaning of the text. The Roman Empire was a "respublica" but it contained within it many nations.

from doing so by the "most sacred principles of the Christian religion." Hence he would allow only passive resistance. In the Encyclical already quoted Leo XIII uses very similar language. Whether the ruler be infidel or believing, tyrannical or benign, the counsel is always "obey, obey"—yet neither Pope seems to realize that this is the language of "fatalistic servility." Surely such authoritative admonitions are sufficient to account for the opinions of Taparelli without attributing them to a spirit of Gallicanism or reaction. After all, Taparelli enjoyed the friendship and influenced the opinions of a Pope who was pre-eminent even amongst the successors of St. Peter. Better still, he died a martyr of charity. Contempt or abuse of such a writer recoils upon oneself.

Many "moderns," on the other hand, while acknowledging that the ideal attitude of a Christian people suffering oppression is one of passivity, defend the liceity of using active resistance as a last resort and under given conditions. They ground its lawfulness, however, not on any radical sovereignty of the people, but on the principle of self-defence. The ruler has a God-given right to govern, the subjects have a God-given right to the blessings and advantages of ordered civil life. If, then, their ruler violates the rights of the subjects, the subjects may *servatis servandis* repel by force the aggression of the ruler. This argument, which is used by Suarez himself, is but the application of a well-known and generally accepted principle, "*licet vim vi repellere*." Speaking of this second opinion, Professor O'Rahilly says it involves its defenders in an inconsistency, but his explanation is so obscured by misconceptions and inaccuracies that it is hard to follow him. He argues (a) That "most of these writers allow the people rights against oppression which they deny them against usurpation." This is not so. No writer denies that the people may actively resist a usurper. Professor O'Rahilly is confusing his own definition of usurpation with that of his opponents. He says (b) that "self-defence is a form of government far more difficult than ordinary government. It is the decision of a people to set up a new government in place of one which is already in existence." But self-defence is not a form of government, it is an act or acts; and, in so far as it involves a decision, that decision has for its object, resistance to and



the elimination of the oppression, not the overthrow of the old government or the establishment of a new one. When Ireland was threatened with conscription, the Irish bishops called on the people to resist the oppression; they did not ask them to overthrow the government. The people, then, are the judges, but they judge of one thing only, i.e., whether in the circumstances they are called on to defend their rights. Of course every true Catholic will admit that, if an appeal to the Catholic Church be possible, the appeal should be made and the decision accepted. Personally I agree with this second view. After all, every Irishman must remember with gratitude that the Popes have often given assistance, both moral and material, to our nation when resisting intolerable persecution.

### III. USURPATION AND PRESCRIPTION.

In this third part of my article I intend to deal with one question only—Can a usurper ever become a *de jure* ruler apart from the consent of the people? At the outset, it should be noted that we do not define a usurper as Prof. O’Rahilly does—“a government which has never been established by the free consent of the people or which has forfeited that consent.” There are several valid titles to civil authority admitted by Catholic writers, and consequently by usurper we mean a government which has no true title of any kind. Can such a government ever become legitimate? Many philosophers and theologians—in the 19th century all who have dealt with the question—hold that with the lapse of time it may acquire valid authority by prescription. This doctrine Prof. O’Rahilly views with a scorn and indignation which, I think, are far from being justified. As I have already said, Suarez, who is the chief exponent of the old *sententia communis*, admits, besides consent, two other titles to legitimacy—victory in a just war, and prescription. With regard to these he says:—<sup>9</sup>

“When therefore the war has had a just ground, the people are really deprived of the power which they had, and the ruler who has conquered them has acquired a real right and authority in that kingdom,

<sup>9</sup> *Defensio*, III., cap. ii., 20.

because, if the justice of the war be supposed, this would be a just penalty. . . . However, it chances often that a kingdom is occupied through an unjust war—in this way nearly all the more renowned empires were extended—in which case neither supreme authority nor any true power is acquired at the beginning, as all just title is wanting, but in the course of time it happens, either that the people give their free consent, or that supreme power is got by the successors through *bona fide prescription*. Tyranny then ceases and true authority and supreme civil power begin to exist.”

Suarez, therefore, admits prescription, and, without the support of his great authority, other names carry little weight. Facts were too strong for Suarez. To deny the legitimacy of the governments in the great empires of antiquity was impossible, for it would make chaos of civilization, and he could not but see that such empires depended, not on the consent of the people, but on the might of the phalanx or the legion.

However this may be, the teaching of Pope Leo XIII. has put the question beyond doubt. I have examined every passage where he speaks of the legitimation of a new government, and I cannot find a single passage where he makes free consent the fundamental criterion. On the contrary he has a totally different criterion, that which Mgr. Solieri in juristic language calls the “*jus praevalens*.” Thus in his letter to the Cardinals of France (3rd May, 1892), he says:—

“In matters political more than elsewhere unexpected changes take place. Colossal monarchies fall to pieces or are dismembered, like the ancient kingdoms of the East and the Roman Empire. Dynasties supplant dynasties, witness the Carlovingian and Capetian dynasties in France. For one adopted form of government another is substituted. . . . These changes are far from being always legitimate in their beginnings; it is even difficult that they should be. Nevertheless the supreme criterion of the common good and public tranquility make obligatory the acceptance of these new governments, *de facto* established, in place of the former governments which *de facto* have ceased to exist. Thus the ordinary rules for the transmission



of authority are suspended and it may even happen that *with time they are abolished altogether.*"

Place beside these words of Pope Leo the passage from Dr. Cronin to which Prof. O'Rahilly takes such exception :—

"As soon as the old government has disappeared or is completely subdued, the natural law must be regarded as proceeding forthwith to legitimise the new government and to regularise its position in relation to the community."

The criterion, then, is not the will of the people but the common good. Towards the procuring of this end nature bends all her energies. The end is a necessary one, and natural law must see to it that adequate means are provided for its attainment. Now the only means are a ruler governing and a people obeying, and so, to avoid anarchy, natural law will even legitimise a usurper. Over and over again Leo XIII returns to this question of the supreme criterion. Thus in a letter to the Bishops of France (16th February, 1892), he says :—

"Consequently when new governments representing this immutable power are established, the acceptance of them is not alone permitted, but is demanded, nay, is even forced upon us by that necessity of the social well-being which brought them into existence and keeps them in existence. And this great duty of respect and submission will continue to bind so long as the exigencies of the common good demand it, for *that good is, after God, the first and last law of society.*"

And again,

"The reason for this acceptance is that the common good of society prevails over every other interest, for it is the creating principle and the conserving element of human society. . . . When, therefore, there exists in any society an authority already established and in operation, the common interest is bound up with that authority which must for that reason be accepted such as it is."

To sum up then the teaching of the Pope : A usurper has overthrown the lawful government, the "virile resistance

of an outraged nation " has been broken by superior force. A stranger fills the Stuarts' throne, and further resistance only disturbs public order and impairs the common well-being. In such a contingency the people must acquiesce in the new order of things and obey the new ruler. The ordinary laws for the transmission of power are suspended and, in the course of time, if the usurper holds his position, the pressure of natural law abolishes them altogether lest the subjects be constantly placed in an " impossible dilemma between futility and criminality." When this stage is reached the new ruler is no longer a stranger but the legitimate representative of the Stuarts. Needless to say, this is the teaching expounded by Dr. Cronin. It is purely a perversion to say that he and those who think with him erect a mere historical fact into a moral right. The insinuation is all the more unjust because Pius IX, in his Encyclical *Quanta cura*, has condemned a proposition which asserted that a fait accompli simply because it was " accompli " gave a moral right. It is a curious fact that a well-known Irish Theologian, Rev. E. J. O'Reilly, S.J., when commenting on this very condemnation, acknowledges prescriptive right. He says (p. 334) :—

" I may add, before leaving this matter of accomplished facts, that their invalidity is to be viewed with reference chiefly to the time which follows them somewhat nearly; for, if the new state of things improperly introduced lasts on for many years, it may, if not essentially wrong in itself, become in a manner legitimated."

We find the same view expressed in the theological essays of Dr. Murray of Maynooth (Vol. IV., p. 392).

There are many other assertions in Prof. O'Rahilly's article to which exception might be taken, but they are mainly conclusions from the principles reviewed. Consequently they require no special consideration as they stand or fall with the principles. Our chief conclusions in this article may be set out in five propositions :—

- I. The one-time *Sententia Communis* on the origin of civil power is not in accord with the official teaching of the Popes, and has now become largely obsolescent.

- II. The people do not give power to the ruler nor can they recall it.
- III. Even according to the *Sententia Communis*, authority once vested in the ruler ceases to depend on the consent of the people. They cannot validly repudiate the ruler at will.
- IV. Whether the people may actively resist an oppressor, as a last resort, and under specified conditions, is a free question amongst theologians.
- V. A usurping government may, by prescription, acquire legitimate authority and cease to be a usurper.

JOHN FITZPATRICK.

## Definability of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin.

THE definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin by Pius IX in 1854 marks a stage in the modern development of Mariology comparable to that reached by the Council of Ephesus in the 5th century. The whole secret to the opposition to the term *Theotokos* was a weak and wavering faith, or a veiled unbelief, in the true Divinity of Our Lord Jesus Christ. As soon as the two truths became firmly established by solemn definition—namely, that Christ was true God (Nicæa, 325) and that Mary was truly the virginal Mother of God—growth of devotion to her kept pace with that of devotion to Him wherever a fair opportunity of Catholic development was given. And wherever this opportunity was given, even subsequent persecution was unable in several cases to overcome the results. This may be illustrated in the case of Ireland. St. Patrick brought with him, together with a great spirit of loyalty to God, a sentiment of tender devotion to Our Blessed Lady, so that even in the darkest days of their misery, when they were hindered from meeting Our Lord Himself in the Sacraments except by stealth, the Irish people clung fervently to the protection of His Blessed Mother. And this, no doubt, is one of the reasons why as a nation they have been preserved from perversion. Other illustrations equally good might be given both in ancient and in recent times.

So much by way of introduction to the special subject of this article—viz., the definability as a doctrine of Catholic faith of the Assumption of Our Blessed Lady. The article will be brief, but the writer hopes that it may be useful by way of suggestion. It is intended in the first place to inspire theological speculation on the subject. As some contribution towards the not improbable final definition seems due from Ireland, perhaps some of our young theologians with facilities for scholarship at their disposal would undertake a treatise on the subject. In the second

place the article is intended to suggest a contribution to the same effect on the devotional side. The feast of the Assumption has long occupied a prominent place in Irish devotion, and now that the feast of the Immaculate Conception has also become a holiday of obligation one may perhaps be allowed to conjecture some mysterious providential relation between the two feasts.

Coming to the question itself—is the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin definable as a dogma of Catholic faith?—perhaps the best way of approaching it is: (1) to examine the conditions, both as regards evidence and belief, on which the Church would be justified in converting a long established pious belief into a revealed dogma; (2) to explain what a definition of the Assumption as a dogma would mean; (3) with a view to inform oneself with the spirit needed to deal with the evidence, (a) to emphasise all that is implied in *Theotokos* and (b) to point out the logical *nexus* between the Assumption and the Immaculate Divine Motherhood; and (4) to consider the *available explicit* evidence in combination with what on sufficient grounds may be treated inferentially as good *implicit* evidence, and under this section there might be a treatment of the devotional aspect.

(1) Under the first section it is enough to remark, what every theologian knows, that it would be necessary to go through a large part of the Church Tract in order to do full justice to the subject. But I will try to say in two sentences all that need be said by way of suggestion. (a) The fundamental condition is that the doctrine or belief should really belong to the Apostolic Deposit, at least implicitly; in other words, that at least one of the Apostles must sometime or other in the exercise of his office have announced the fact either as having been Divinely revealed in the first instance or as having been Divinely confirmed—it being a question of secondary importance whether the Apostle's knowledge of the fact came from Divine inspiration or from the ordinary means of human observation. (b) There is a strong implicit probability that St. John did this.

(2) A similar brevity may be attempted in regard to the second point. (a) Granted that Jesus was the Son of God, Himself true God, and that Mary was His virginal Immaculate Mother, are we reasonably entitled to place

any limitations to the supernatural prerogatives with which she might and should, as an exalted creature, be endowed, except such as clear and positive revelation would forbid us to ascribe to her? (b) The only facts a definition of the Assumption need embody are those contained in the 4th and 5th glorious mysteries of the Rosary; which are—(a) the exemption, after true death, of the body of the Blessed Virgin from the corruption of the grave; (b) the re-union of her glorified body with her soul; and (c) her being taken up body and soul to be crowned Queen of Heaven. Details as to when and how are not essential.

(3) Coming to the third point I can afford to be equally brief. (a) No theologian will ever be able to analyse adequately all that is implied in the sublime dignity of being Mother of God Incarnate. And there can be no doubt that it is from this starting point by the usual slow, prudent, inferential process of development characteristic of Catholic thought, rather than on the strength of explicit inspired or traditional testimony, that the definition of the Immaculate Conception was reached. (b) And what, when we analyse it, is the Immaculate Conception but the *anticipated beginning* of Redemption in Mary's individual case? And what again, is the Assumption but the *anticipated consummation* of Redemption? And, if, as Mother of God, Mary was privileged in the first way, why not also in the second?

(4) In the fourth point we come to what may at first sight appear to be the most difficult part of the subject. Superficial critics are in the habit of attributing the origin of the feast of the Assumption to the influence of certain well known apocryphal writings, although the feast itself is much older both in the East and West than that of the Immaculate Conception. But this does not seem to be a justifiable view. (a) Would apocryphal accounts of such an event ever have obtained sufficient currency to leave their trace in historical literature unless there had been *some well known basis of fact* behind them? This basis of fact, we may assume, was in those ages embodied in a sound conservative oral tradition. By way of illustration it would be worth while to compare St. Matthew's very brief and



simple statement of the fact of the Flight into Egypt<sup>1</sup> with the romantic embellishments of the same fact contained in the surviving Apocrypha. The Apocrypha as a whole represent early attempts at a pseudo-Christian Romanticism, inspired for the most part by heretical motives. Anyone who has made a study of modern propagandist methods will be able to deal authoritatively with such literature. Means may have changed, but motives and method have not altered much in the course of the centuries—except where a genuine Catholic Christian spirit has been imbibed. Except indirectly and implicitly we need not therefore look to the Apocrypha for help in our treatment of the early literary evidence. (b) As regards inspired surviving literary testimonies it is enough to remark that there are a few texts of the Old Testament which, judging from the way they have been applied by patristic and scholastic writers, seem to furnish as much *prophetic* evidence of the Assumption as do the similar texts usually appealed to in favour of the Immaculate Conception.<sup>2</sup> (2) There is the solid fact of the observance of the feast of the Assumption long before the feast of the Immaculate Conception was instituted, and in contrast to the course of development in regard to the latter, which met with opposition in more than one quarter, there never has been, so far as I know, any opposition to the former. This is significant and suggests, I believe, the right lines on which to arrive at a correct dogmatic appreciation of the value of the pious belief associated with the feast. Pious beliefs of this kind may be described as one of the auxiliary organs of ecclesiastical infallibility.

With these few brief suggestions which I hope to see taken up and improved upon, I leave the subject for the present.

P. J. TONER.

<sup>1</sup> II., 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> It would be easy to give a *catena* of patristic and scholastic authorities in which, for proof of the Assumption, appeal is made to prophetic types and texts in the O.T.—v.g., the Ark of the Covenant (made of incorruptible wood—cf. Ps. cxxxi., 8); Ps. xlii., 10; several texts in the Canticle of Canticles, ii., 10; iii., 6; iv., 7-8; vi., 9; vii., 1; viii., 5, etc. Sometimes also Apoc. xi., 19, and xii., 1 are appealed to.

## Faith Versus Freethinking.

### §1. FAITH A CAPTIVITY OF THE INTELLECT.

THE *Summa contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas Aquinas, which I have translated under the title *Of God and His Creatures*, is also known as the *Summa Philosophica*, because in arguing with Gentiles and other than Christian people it is necessary to fetch arguments from reason and philosophy, the opponent recognising no other sources. It is then a philosophical work, but from the outset the author avows that his philosophy is checked by faith, and that he is no votary of free thought. See Book I., cc. 4-7; III., cc. 118, 153; IV., I. And the whole of Book IV. is an exposition of revealed religion and truths of faith. Consequently *Of God and His Creatures* stands in contrast with the favourite philosophical compositions of our day. In no respect is the contrast stronger than in this, that the modern philosopher thinks as he pleases, his conscience never interferes with his thought, thought with him is no matter of morality or obligation or law, in thinking he stands in no awe of any authority against whose prescription it would be wrong for him to form a judgment; while St. Thomas thought, and made it a duty to think, within the bounds allowed by the definitions of Catholic faith, and to those limiting and defining lines he often appeals in confirmation of his speculations. Either St. Thomas's self-suppression was uncalled for, and crippled his philosophy, or the license of modern speculation is flagrantly wrong. One side or the other must have missed the truth, because it has been using a wrong method.

There is this to be said for St. Thomas's method, that it is the method of St. Paul, of the Four Gospels, of Christianity from the first. Free thinking has never been allowed in the Christian Church. The Gospel is a rule of thinking as well as a rule of conduct. From Apostolic times, besides the Commandments there has been a Creed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See a Creed, gathered from the New Testament, in Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, Vol. II., 202-5.



St. Paul thus describes his own procedure against free thought: 'For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God to the destruction of strongholds, putting down arguments and every high conceit that lifteth up against the knowledge [obedience] of God, and bringing into captivity every thought [αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα] to the obedience of Christ' (2 Cor. x. 4, 5). There are then, according to St. Paul, two lines of thought: travel as far as you will, unless you at last arrive at a point at which you agree, as St. John Chrysostom says (on 1 Cor. I. 22) to 'quell arguments and give yourself over to your master,' you will never find God and His Christ. To be a Christian, a man must admit some authority in religious speculation, an authority which it is a sin to question, challenge, doubt, disbelieve, or disobey. In this most important particular, religion differs from the subject-matter of any physical science, as chemistry. No chemical theory can ever be tendered to any one on chemical grounds, as something which it is wicked and immoral to reject: nor is there such a thing as chemical revelation, to be believed on authority under pain of damnation (cf. Mark XVI., 16; Gal. I., 8, 9). And therefore the methods of physical science are not the methods of religious truth. Such at least has been the persistent teaching of the Catholic Church from the days of St. Paul.

Having quoted St. John Chrysostom once, I will add three more quotations from him, premising that for explanation the reader should consult Cardinal Newman's *Loss and Gain*, part II., chap. VI., 'Now it cannot be denied, etc.' I quote them here only to show how peremptorily the captivity of intellect in matters of faith was insisted upon in the fourth century, and that by one of the most faithful expositors of St. Paul. On I. Cor. II. 29 he writes: 'It was then lawful to handle arguments and use the wisdom of the Gentiles, when we were being led by the hand through the evidence of creation; but now, unless you 'become a fool,' that is, unless you empty out all argument and all wisdom, and give yourself over to faith, it is impossible to be saved.' Again on Rom. IV. 20: 'Such is faith, clearer than proof from reason and more persuasive, for there is no room left in future for another reason to come atop of the first and shake the proof. He

that is persuaded by reasons may be unpersuaded again : but he that rests on the assurance of faith has fortified his reason for all time to come against the ravages of argument.<sup>2</sup> And lastly, on I Tim. I. 4 : ' It is God's wish to bestow great things upon us, but reason cannot take in the greatness of His dispensations. That must be done by faith, the grand medicine of souls. Enquiry therefore is contrary to the dispensation of God. For what is the dispensation according to faith ? To receive God's benefits and profit by them, to doubt of nothing, to question nothing, but simply to acquiesce. The edifice that faith has completed, enquiry overthrows, raising questions and casting out faith. . . . The best proof of our knowing God is our believing in whatever He says, independently of proofs and demonstrations.' On this last passage I may observe that what the Saint deprecates is not the enquiry of elucidation, of which the *Contra Gentiles* and much of St. John Chrysostom's own writing affords splendid examples, but the enquiry of doubt. Also, as Newman points out in the passage referred to, though the believer is cut off from the enquiry of doubt, yet not so the man who has not yet found faith. What can he who has not yet found do but seek ? Still he sins who goes on seeking, when he has the truth at his feet and ought to embrace it.

The attitude then of the Christian man,—all the more if he be a man of high education,—is what Newman has described as ' smiting hard and throwing back the immense energy of the aggressive, capricious, and untrustworthy intellect ' (*History of my Religious Opinions*, ch. VII.). ' This is a hard thing to do ; nay, as I shall show later, it is a thing impossible to do without special help from on high. And it is a hard thing to see the reasonableness of behaving in such a way towards reason. This difficulty more than any other keeps educated men from the faith : they will not suffer their intellect to be led into captivity, they will brook no authority dictating to their thought. Yet captivity of thought is the quintessence of Christianity. In the Church's estimate, free thought is as disastrous as free love, or any other form of free passion. Nay, it is even more fundamentally unchristian. The man who gives the rein to his passions may be a Christian, although a bad one ; but the freethinker, if he were once a Christian, has ' made ship-

wreck of the faith ' (1 Tim. i., 19) : and if the faith were never his, he has that about him which, so long as he keeps it, will for ever exclude him from the fold of Christ. ' Whoever receiveth not the Kingdom of God as a little child shall never enter into it ' (Luke xviii. 17).

Says St. Thomas : ' God is not offended by us except by what we do against our own good ' (*C. Gent.* iii., 122 : *Of God and His Creatures*, p. 283). He is not offended then by freethinking except in so far as freethinking is bad for man. That freethinking is bad for Christian man is evident, for it subverts that very basis of Christianity, which is discipleship, being ' taught of God ' (John vi., 45). Is it bad for man simply as man ? To answer, we must examine what manner of commodity we have got under the label ' free thought.' The term apparently does not always mean one and the same thing. As ' free speech ' may mean ' saying whatever comes into your head,' and ' free living ' ' gratifying your appetite as far as it will go,' so ' freethinking ' may mean ' thinking, or judging, whatever you like to think and judge.' Thus taken, the three terms mean severally ' rash thinking,' ' rash speech,' and ' licentious living.' It is evident that none of these things is good for man without reserve, or good in any way except accidentally for a time, as ' rash riding ' might be good in a beginner. It may turn out well to have ridden rashly some time. The man who has never ridden rashly will probably never make a bold and skilful rider at all. But in proportion as he becomes skilful, he loathes rashness and recklessness : it is the riding of a novice in the saddle, a hopeful novice perhaps, but not a trained horseman. Rash riding after all is clumsy riding. Rash speech is unwise speech. And rash thinking is wild, foolish thinking and hasty judgment. Now a hasty judgment may readily be a wrong judgment ; and, even where it turns out right, it is not a scientific judgment, because it is not rightly and by due process of reason arrived at, but is a mere lucky hit. Freethinking, in the sense of thinking as you please, may be better than not thinking at all—for a time ; but in time it must be brought under a curb. The curb is truth, fact, reality. I must learn to give over thinking as I please, when I find the facts against me. If I will not, I degenerate into a romancer. Romancing has its place ; but to say of any-

thing that it has its place is to say likewise that there are regions in which it has no place. We must not fall to romancing whenever we set to thinking; we must think at times, and indeed at most times, soberly, seriously, and according to fact—in other words, within the bounds of truth, or at least of probability. There is place and scope for free thought, yet thought must not run riot in freedom; it cannot be absolutely and everywhere free, but must go into captivity before the face of fact. In this the historian differs from the novelist: the scientific man, including the true philosopher, from the poet. Many a finely written page of narrative has had to be broken up, in consideration of new documents brought to light by historical research. Many a soaring theory has been brought to the ground by sober fact. So far is thought from being free, so constraining is the force of truth.

But another sense may be given to 'freethinking,' that of 'finding out truth by your own personal observation, and judging of the results found for yourself, without respect to any authority.' And this, it must be confessed, is the ordinary sense of the term. In this sense, however, again it must be said, mankind can afford very little of the commodity of freethinking. Usually, when a man is in any need and is at all in earnest about finding out any particular truth, so far from having recourse to personal observation and resting upon what that seems to disclose, he flies to the authority of some other man, a lawyer, a physician, or one who is in that department an expert. And though the expert's decision is not plain to him on its own merits, he acquiesces in it on authority. There is then not only a captivity of all intellect to truth, but of uninstructed intellect to the instructed, of the ignorant to the wise. This is the *rationale* of the consulting-room.

However, it may be said, this captivity affects the individual, the *ιδιώτης* but not the race. The race is free. The experts rule their own several provinces. The proconsul of the province of religion is the philosopher. Unfortunately, in that province of religion there are many proconsuls, and they do not agree. Thus poor *ιδιώτης* the 'plain man,' who has not time to look into these things, but would gladly take his religion from his philosopher, is at a loss to what philosopher he shall adhere. Now it might have

been in the providence of God to have sent us for our religion to the philosophers, as we resort to our medical man for matters of health. Only in that case, it has been shrewdly observed, Providence might have been expected to have arranged for a greater harmony among philosophers on religious topics than at present obtains. A heavy responsibility in that case would have devolved upon philosophers, similar to that which falls upon a commander-in-chief appointed in an hour of national peril. The ruling philosopher, or council of philosophers, would prescribe to mankind their duties towards the Deity, what to think of Him, how to serve Him, and the way that would best lead their souls to find everlasting happiness in Him after death. The disposition which one not unfrequently notices in philosophic circles, not to take the universe and human life at all seriously so far as any everlasting issues are concerned, but to treat philosophy as a game in which the play of speculation is more valuable than the result found—any such disposition, I say, would have to be sternly suppressed. Philosophy, whenever it touched upon divine things, would be as serious a game as war. Philosophic thought under these circumstances could scarcely have been called *free*, simply and absolutely *free*. In the multitude of plain men there would have been an obligation to be docile in religious topics to the thought of their guiding philosophers. In those guides themselves there would have been an obligation to explore with reverence such things of God as are accessible to natural reason, to teach them faithfully to the best of their careful understanding of the same, and to be ready to adore in spite of difficulties with which their understanding could not adequately deal, for instance, the presence of evil in creation.

*O vitæ philosophia dux!* exclaims Cicero. In his age, and for four centuries succeeding, Philosophy did guide the lives of educated Romans. Stoic and Epicurean, Academic and Neo-Platonist, formed hearts and consciences.<sup>2</sup> In those same centuries Christianity appeared. It appealed to some minds, not to others. On consideration we see that it appealed exactly to those minds that were perplexed with

<sup>2</sup>It was the practice of wealthy Roman families in the third century to keep a philosopher for spiritual guide, as we keep a chaplain.

a question for which they had found no authentic answer in philosophy, the question of life after death, and punishments and rewards in a world to come. To men of this cast of mind, to men afraid of hell and anxious after some vision of Deity, Christianity appealed not unsuccessfully. To such she still appeals, and offers her guidance, which they accept. The rest of men do not want guides, and must go their own way to such place as they shall find hereafter. Eliminate Deity, eliminate the future life, and man requires only such guidance as the wiser man will afford to the less wise who is willing to listen to him, such guidance again as the guiding constraint of civil authority will exert on behalf of peace. Life under that elimination may be likened to unadventurous travelling in the two counties of Oxon and Bucks. No grown male needs guidance there. The way is easily made out by the map; there are plenty of people on the roads to tell you; the railway is never far off, and from the most sequestered corner of either county the train will bring you into town before midnight. But the admission of Deity and of personal immortality imports infinity into human life, and perplexity into human calculations. You travel no longer in Oxon or Bucks, but on Alps, Himalayas, Andes. You are offered the guidance of the philosopher, who "has never been up," but has "prospected the glaciers" with his telescope from the balcony of his hotel, and "can readily conceive" that there might be an ascent here, and "holds it for a working hypothesis" that you might not break your neck there. No better guidance than that? Yes, 'no man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared' (John i., 18; cf. Heb. i., 1). And this declaration is continually kept fresh in the living tradition of the Church. Spoken through the Church, the word of God must be received with all docility, as the inexperienced mountaineer, high up on a steep slope, must be docile to his guide, especially to a divine guide, if such be given. This is the theory of captivity of thought in the Catholic Church. All that is argued here is that the position is not intrinsically absurd.

This captivity of thought under the guidance of the Church obtains only in matters of faith and morals. No small part of theology, large regions of philosophy, the



whole of physical science, of fine art, of statesmanship as such, of the military art, of the expediencies of political economy, of the useful arts of life,<sup>3</sup>—all this wide area of thought lies beyond revelation. It is such an area as Oxon and Bucks: you may get lost in it, it is true, but you will not lose your immortal soul for going astray in those regions: your loss will be a temporal loss, and the night of death closing in upon you may still see you safe in your heavenly home. Heaven does not much mind your mistaken theory of totems, your delusion of the wage fund, your bad taste in art. The Church has no commission to guide you in that flat midland country, but only out on the immensities and eternities, where your soul is at stake.<sup>4</sup>

Yet it would be incorrect to infer that because the results of docility to Church guidance are promised for the unseen world of the future, therefore that guidance must go wholly unvouched for by any experience in this life. We may assume that a sane habit of mind goes with sane thinking, and that sane thinking is true thinking in the main. We had better drop philosophising, if contact with philosophic truth is calculated to turn a man's head and unseat his reason. Also we may assume that, though dreamers do not know that they are dreaming, and mad people take themselves for sane, nevertheless men awake and in their sound senses are accurately conscious of being awake and of sound mind.<sup>5</sup> The Catholic then, dwelling in captivity of thought, and marching under the guidance of the Church on his way to heaven, while in the transient interests of this life he follows his own judgment like other men, has the experience of present consciousness of being in a sound and wholesome frame of mind, a good indication that on vital questions he has got hold of the truth. Nay further, he has a sense, waxing and waning in distinctness, of something higher far than mental sanity,—even of a union of his whole nature, soul and body, with Christ and with God. That is why he consents to be a captive,—for a time. That sense of divine union, joined to a lively desire and apprehension of the great issues of the world to come, keeps him

<sup>3</sup> 'Experiences,' where there is no question of right and wrong.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Newman on the *Social State of Catholic Countries*, § 4: (*Anglican Difficulties*, I., 239).

<sup>5</sup> ὁ φρονῶντι νόσκει ὅτι φρονεῖ, Aristotle, *Ethics*, IX.

a Catholic. Out of captivity, wandering in the mazes of free thought, man finds no God to unite himself with : for God is approachable only by way of self-surrender and submission.

## §2. FAITH AS DESCRIBED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

In the gospels we see faith growing from its first rudiments. The most rudimentary form of faith is belief in Christ as a wonder-worker, a belief which He commonly demanded before He would work any miracles. Thus we read of Him at Nazareth, 'And he wrought not many miracles there because of their unbelief' (Matt. xiii., 58). When two blind men asked for their cure, He said to them : 'Do ye believe that I can do this thing?' Upon their answering yes, He touched their eyes, saying, 'According to your faith be it done to you' (Matt. ix., 28, 29). To the woman with the issue of blood, He said, 'Thy faith hath saved thee' (Matt. ix., 22). To the Chananæan woman, 'Great is thy faith'; and her daughter was healed forthwith (Matt. xv., 28). In the storm on the lake the disciples are reproached as men of little faith, for not realising that the winds and the sea obey their Master (Matt. viii., 26, 27). This meaning of faith is most apparent in the incident of the boy with the dumb spirit. 'If thou canst do anything, help us.' To which Jesus replies, 'All things are possible to him that believeth.' Whereupon the boy's father cries aloud, 'I believe, help my unbelief' (Mark ix., 22-24). See also Acts iii., 16. But not only as a worker of miracles did Jesus call for faith in Himself, but likewise as one endowed with power to forgive sins, a power which the Jews took to be proper to God alone (Mark ii., 7). Thus He said to the sinful woman, who asked for no bodily cure : 'Thy sins are forgiven thee, thy faith hath saved thee' (Luke vii., 48, 50).

A cognate meaning of faith is 'the assurance of being able to work miracles oneself in the power of Christ and His Holy Spirit.' This is the faith mentioned as a gift of the Holy Ghost in I. Cor. xii., 9; and is known to divines as '*fides miraculorum*.' It is not given to all Christians,



indeed it is a gift peculiar to few, but it was more generally distributed in apostolic times. The Apostles themselves were filled with it after Pentecost, and our Lord looked for it in them even before they had received the Holy Ghost. Thus in reference to that same dumb idiot boy, when the disciples asked why they could not cast the spirit out of him, they were told: 'Because of your want of faith; amen I say unto you, if ye have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, ye shall say unto this mountain,' etc. (Matt. xvii., 19, 20). Allied to this *fides miraculorum* is faith in prayer; and this is a more general, nay should be a universal, gift even in our time: we do not usually pray for miracles. Of faith in prayer our Saviour says: 'All things whatsoever that ye pray for and ask, believe in your getting them and they shall be unto you' (Mark xv., 24).

Elias might have called upon the men of his generation to have faith in his miraculous power: John the Baptist might have asked his hearers to believe him as a 'man sent from' God (John i., 6), or as a 'prophet.' Jesus too prayed to His Father, 'that the world may believe that thou hast sent me' (John xvii., 21); and He was pleased to be spoken of as 'Jesus the prophet from Nazareth of Galilee' (Matt. xxi., 11; cf. John iv., 19; vi., 14). But Jesus called for faith in Himself much greater than that. Why was John the Baptist 'a prophet and more than a prophet' except because He was the forerunner of Him concerning whom it was said, 'Lo, I send my angel before thy face' (Matt. xi., 9, 10; Malach. iii., 1)? Much more than John the Baptist was Jesus 'more than a prophet': He was the supreme object of prophecy (Luke xxiv., 27; John i., 45; v. 46). He was 'the Christ, Messiah' (John iv., 27; ix., 35-38), 'Son of man' (Matt. viii., 20; John i., 51; Dan. vii., 13; Acts vii., 56). The word that He spoke was the word of God (John xii., 44-50). In the Fourth Gospel the substantive 'faith,' and the corresponding verb 'believe,' is used some forty-two times of faith in the word and person of Jesus, over and above belief in His miraculous power. So in Matt. xviii., 6, 'these little ones who believe in me.' Faith in the person of Jesus grew gradually as well in intensity as in objective extent. His chosen disciples saw more and more in Him. He was sent from God, He was a prophet, He was 'King of Israel' (John i.,

49; xii., 13), He was 'the holy one of God' (Luke iv., 34; John vi., 70, according to the best reading, cf. John x., 36); finally He was 'the Christ, the Son of the living God,' and that not by adoption but by nature, 'very God of very God' (Matt. xvi., 16). In Him the title 'Son of God' is a 'more excellent name' (Heb. i., 4). St. Peter was the first man who saluted Him with this name in its fullest and highest sense.<sup>5</sup> Peter's confession of Christ was taken up by Christ Himself, who declared His own divinity when interrogated by the spiritual chief of his nation. 'Art thou the Christ, the son of the Blessed God?' 'I am.' (Mark xiv., 61, 62.) That Jesus spoke of no adopted sonship is evident, as well as from the words that follow, 'ye shall see the Son of man seated on the right hand of the Power and coming in the clouds of heaven' (the cloud being in Scriptural language the visible manifestation of Deity, e.g., 2 Chron. v., 14) as also from the fact that Caiphas so understood Him to speak, and cried aloud, 'Ye hear the blasphemy' (cf. John xix., 7). This was the culminating point of Christ's public teaching. His office of Teacher was now over: there remained that of Redeemer: His teaching must be sealed with His blood.

The most noteworthy use of the word 'faith' in the Epistles is in the doctrine of justification by faith (Gal. iii.; Rom. iii., iv.; cf. James ii., 14-26). 'Justification' means the forgiveness of sins, and the moral restoration of the sinner to the position of one who is 'just,' i.e., conformable to law. In the present order of things, justification means also 'sanctification,' or the making of the sinner 'holy,' which is putting him in the 'state of grace' (C.G. iii., 151, 152; pp. 321-323). Writing to the Romans and Galatians St. Paul develops the argument that all men are sinners and have fallen from the grace of God (Rom. iii., 9, 23). All men are born in original sin (C.G. iv., 50, 51, 52; 378-383), and actual sin has abounded. From sin they cannot be justified by works of the Jewish law, nor by all the observances of the Pharisees. No good works done in mortal sin can merit the forgiveness of that sin (C.G. iii., 158, 160; pp. 328, 330). Justification then is

<sup>5</sup> See *Scripture Manuals for Catholic Schools*, St. Matthew, notes on XIV., 33; XVI. 16.

ever gratuitous, we are 'freely justified' (Rom. iii., 24). The first step, or, as the Council of Trent calls it, 'the root of all justification,' is faith in Jesus Christ, by whose blood alone we attain forgiveness of our sins (C.G. iii., 153; pp. 323, 324). A further condition is sorrow for sin and resolution to avoid it (C.G. iii., 159; p. 328), dispositions which we cannot suppose to have been wanting in Abraham (Rom. iv.). Beyond that, in the New Law, justification supposes baptism. The justification by faith upon which St. Paul insists is, under the New Law, a sacramental justification. Hence he passes straight from faith to baptism (Gal. iii., 26, 27; Rom. vi.). 'Not by works of justice that we have done, but according to his mercy, he hath saved is by the laver of regeneration' (Titus iii., 5). Such a justification by faith and baptism, without good works, does not dispense with the need of good works after baptism. St. Paul was not the man to issue baptised Christians licenses to sin.

I come now to the most formal treatment of faith that we find in the whole of the New Testament, Hebrews xi., xii., 1, 2. And first we have something that looks like a definition, but which will prove on inspection to be rather a generic description. I give the Greek, the Latin Vulgate, and what I take to be the best English translation:—

*ἔστιν δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων.*

'Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium.'

'Faith is a firm assurance of things looked for, an indicator of things unseen.'

The important words here are *ὑπόστασις* (substantia), and *ἔλεγχος* (argumentum). 'Substance of things looked for' in this context makes nonsense. In its popular sense, 'substance' means 'the main portion of,' as we speak of 'the substance of a discourse.' Faith is not the main portion of things hoped for. In its philosophical sense, 'substance' stands opposed to 'accident,' and so we speak of 'transsubstantiation.' The distinction of substance and accident is wholly irrelevant here. The key to the meaning may be found in an opening verse of Psalm lxviii.: 'Infixus sum in limo profundi et non est substantia'

(οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις, lxx), which means 'I am stuck fast in the mire of the deep, and there is nothing 'under' to 'stand' upon,' i.e., 'there is no footing.' Faith is a 'footing' in things not yet seen and possessed, but looked for to appear in the future. Now a mental 'footing' means a 'firm assurance,' as appears by the following texts:—In Psalm xxxviii., 7, we read, ἡ ὑπόστασις μου παρά σοί ἐστιν, 'substantia mea apud te est' (Vulg.), which means 'my firm assurance is with thee.' In Ezechiel xix., 5, we read of the lioness that had lost her cub, ἀπώλετο ἡ ὑπόστασις αὐτῆς, 'periit expectatio ejus' (Vulg.), 'her support is gone.' Lastly, in this same Epistle to the Hebrews, we read (iii. 14): 'we are made partakers of Christ, if only we hold fast our first assurance (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως), 'initium substantiae ejus') firm unto the end,' where the translation of ὑποστάσεως by 'assurance' is warranted by the repeated mention of 'disbelief,' or 'disobedience,' in the context (vv. 12, 18, 19) and of 'faith' (iv. 2, 3).

The word ἔλεγχος, 'argumentum,' is the English word 'test,' in the sense in which the chemist speaks of 'the test of mercury,' meaning that which 'argues the presence' of mercury, or that which 'indicates' mercury in some mixture or combination. Therefore I translate ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων, 'indicator of things unseen.' Thus in the mystery of the Altar faith *indicates* the flesh of Christ in what to the eye is bread.

The 'cloud of witnesses,' whose names fill the eleventh chapter, were not ocular witnesses of what they had seen; they were witnesses to the depth and intensity of a tradition of the unseen, in the faith of which tradition sundry of them laid down their lives and died martyrs. The gist of the whole chapter appears in the third verse: 'so that the visible world has come to be, not out of visible elements.' This world that meets our senses, and flaunts itself before the eye as the only reality, has after all been raised into being by divine power out of unseen depths of nothingness—an argument that there is a further world, as yet unseen, still most real, which the same power of God shall reveal some day. Like Moses, the Saints have 'endured as seeing invisible' (ver. 27) with the eye of faith. These men of faith, these men with a future before them, can never be otherwise than 'strangers and pilgrims upon earth' (ver.

13). They follow in spirit a better leader than Moses, even Jesus the author and finisher of our 'faith' (xii. 2), either 'seeing' Him and stretching 'out their hands' to Him 'from afar' (ver. 13), as the patriarchs did, or adoring Him now that He is come. To believe in Israel and in the great destiny of Israel, and in the teeth of appearance to throw in your lot with the Israelites, as Rahab did (ver. 31), was implicitly to believe in this Saviour. Of those who thus believed in Him, some were triumphant on earth, working miracles and overturning kingdoms: others 'met with mockery and stripes and imprisonment, and were cudgelled to death without deliverance, in the hope of a better resurrection' (vv. 33-38). Such is faith, the mental realisation of coming events looked for, but not yet evident; the indicator of things unseen, remaining unseen and embraced nevertheless as eternal realities, in preference to the visible appearances of this transient world.

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In a future issue I hope to say something on the grace of faith and its relations to will and intuition.

J. RICKABY.

## **An Injustice of the Capitalist System: Its Monopoly of Financial Credit.**

It is beginning to be recognised that Capitalism as an economic system cannot last unchanged. The uprising of the propertyless and mere wage-earning masses against its growing inequity is widespread, and seems to gather force year by year. They see that their efforts to better their condition by securing increased wages have been largely futile; that rise in wages has been usually followed by rise in prices. But while they are vaguely conscious of the vicious circle in which they are moving, they have no clear conceptions as to why the circle is there, or how they are ever to get out of it. In a general way, however, they have got hold of the idea that the root-cause of the evils of Capitalism lies in the monopolisation of the world's productive wealth by the comparative few, and the consequent economic enslavement of the masses. Granting for the moment that this commonly prevailing view is sound as far as it goes, we find a large variety of remedies suggested. Economic Socialism, or the all-round socialisation of all productive wealth (land and capital)—whether by the State, the Municipality, or National Guilds—is one main suggestion. It would take all ownership of productive wealth out of the hands of individuals, and make all the citizens dependent on wages or salaries. Another line of suggestion—the very antithesis of Socialism—is what is known as the “Co-operative” or “Associative” or “Distributive” State or Commonwealth. It would aim not at the total elimination of private ownership, but rather at its wider diffusion among the present propertyless masses; it would arrest the accumulation of productive wealth in the hands of a small minority, and divert it gradually among the great majority. This we believe to be an economically sounder suggestion than the former, besides being more in keeping with men's natural instincts, and being approved and encouraged by the Catholic



Church. It is not, however, our purpose just now to discuss the relative merits or demerits of those suggestions, but rather to point out the one enormous practical difficulty which faces both alike, and to suggest a consideration which has not yet received the attention it deserves as offering what may possibly be an easier and more equitable way of solving the difficulty than any hitherto suggested.

The practical difficulty is, of course, to determine how, especially in the face of Capitalist opposition, the great accumulations of productive wealth are to be diverted from the over-wealthy minority who at present hold them, without inflicting injustice and precipitating a disastrous economic crisis. We will assume that it is to be achieved by State policy, not by revolution. A sudden expropriation, or transfer of ownership, would involve a chaotic paralysis of the whole process of production, distribution and exchange. Therefore the expropriation must be gradual if it is to take place at all. Moreover it cannot possibly be accompanied by *adequate compensation*, i.e., such as would secure to the present capitalists and their heirs for all time their present returns from capital in the shape of rents, royalties, dividends and interest. Reformers have suggested a variety of ways in which the capitalists could be given a certain number of years' purchase of the actual value of the amount of capital diverted from them. Such schemes could, no doubt, be put into operation without any injustice; but in so far as they would have to interfere with the *personnel* at present directing and administering the processes of production, distribution and exchange, they might involve serious dislocation and stoppage of the whole machinery of industry; and they would moreover have to face the very real and deep-rooted prejudice which attaches suspicion of injustice to all expropriation or compulsory transfer of ownership.

Perhaps the problem could be solved by *operating on the power and privileges at present attaching to private ownership of productive wealth, while leaving intact the ownership itself*. It has been suggested by many recent students of the whole economic problem<sup>1</sup> that the State could, without compulsory expropriation or transfer of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. DOUGLAS, *Economic Democracy and Credit-Power and Democracy*. (London, Cecil Palmer, Oakley House, Bloomsbury St., W.C., 1.)

capital-ownership, and without interfering with the present direction and working of industrial enterprises, so regulate financial *credit*, and the financial returns to the capitalist (in the shape of rents, interest and dividends) *on the sole title of ownership*, as gradually to make the mere ownership of productive wealth comparatively unremunerative and thereby lessen the incentive to its amassment.<sup>2</sup> This would automatically bring about a widespread diffusion of capital-ownership among the masses who are now propertyless wage-earners, thereby transforming these into small and moderate working-owners. The suggestion is a fascinating one. But, what is more, it seems feasible. Doubtless, it would really involve a most fundamental change both of policy and of principle in the whole economic process whereby human labour is applied to nature's sources for the production of the things needed to sustain human life. That, however, is no objection, provided the new policy and principles give some fair promise of amelioration, where those of the Capitalist system have proved so bankrupt and disastrous; for human well-being must be the criterion of all economic principles and policies. The financial rings of Capitalism would of course oppose all State interference with the present monopoly of *credit* and *interest* by the capital-holders, but the opposition would not be so serious as if the attack were delivered on capital-ownership itself. We could outline the suggested solution either by considering the broad principles underlying the present credit system, or by analysing what is involved in the payment of interest on capital loans. Leaving the latter for subsequent treatment, let us attempt here a brief analysis of the credit system.

While the process of production and distribution goes on over a certain period of time the wage-working population must be fed and housed and clothed. These own neither capital nor the consumers' wealth necessary to support them during that period. This amount of consumers' wealth, or (what is the same) the purchasing power to procure it, must therefore be advanced to them on credit during the period

<sup>2</sup> The capitalist objection that it would necessarily also lessen the incentive to production, to conserving and increasing the means of exploiting productive wealth, is based on the unproven assumption that it is only the non-working owner, as distinct from the worker, who can have any interest in providing those means of exploitation.



by the capitalist holders of purchasing power. Let the amount be represented by A. And let the total amount of new purchasing power in the shape of output produced by the application of labour to capital during this same period be represented by B. If under the capitalist system the process is to continue, B must exceed A not merely by the amount necessary to make good the wear and tear of plant ("overhead charges," say C.), but also by an amount, say D, which will go (in the form of "rent," "interest," or "dividends") to the capitalist financier or owner, presumably as a "reward" for his allowing the labour of others to be applied to the natural sources of wealth, the productive land or capital,<sup>3</sup> of which he is "owner," and as an "inducement" to him to continue this—shall we say, beneficent?—policy. In virtue, therefore, of his ownership of productive wealth, the capitalist who advanced A at the beginning of the period gets back at the end of it A<sup>4</sup> plus C (while the deterioration of capital is made good for the capitalist by B). Now all this suggests both an observation and a question.

The observation is that in the present system the capitalist has such absolute control of the whole process that he can determine the dimensions of A absolutely: he can keep it at such a level that it will just barely support the wage-earning masses; and he can do so because he can nullify any *rise in wages* by diminishing the real purchasing power of the raised wage. This in turn he can do by causing a corresponding *rise in prices*; for he has absolute control of prices also, inasmuch as he has ownership of

<sup>3</sup> It is unnecessary, and would be misleading, to distinguish here, as land-nationalisers would, between the world's ultimate raw materials and natural sources of wealth—under the title of "land," and factories, machinery, plant, etc.—under the title of "capital." Money is equivalent to either, as well as to consumer's wealth, inasmuch as it can purchase any of these three forms of wealth. "Whatever the system of ownership," writes Prof. Bowley in *The Division of the Product of Industry* (pp38-9), "the capital used in an industry was not in general created by the present workers in the industry" [but neither was it in general created by the present capitalists]; "buildings, plant, and machinery are provided for them as the result of past industrial activity, and each industry must bear the expense of its own capital. If the State provided the capital, it would still have to be paid sooner or later out of the product of industry before it was worn out. Provision for depreciation merely keeps the capital intact without paying for it."

<sup>4</sup> He lent A in advance in the form of wages and is gradually paid it back in the output during the period, leaving the wage-workers alive but propertyless as before. What kind of purchasing power A really is, and how and why the capitalist commands it, will appear below.

the whole product of industry, for which therefore he can demand such prices as will keep A at the bare subsistence level, thus enabling him to pocket the whole surplus, D (as dividend, rent or interest). The total output, B, is equal to A *plus* C *plus* D. While A is the reward of labour,<sup>5</sup> C and D are owned by the capitalist. There will, of course, be real fluctuation in D; but its average will be what is known as the current rate of financial interest in commerce and industry, *i.e.*, the amount he can obtain *in his capacity as owner* for allowing his capital to be exploited by the labour and brains of others.

The obvious question suggested is, Why should the whole product of industry, with the exception of A which barely supports the worker, go to the capitalist? Why should his "ownership" give him this absolute power to keep the working masses of the world on the verge of destitution? The monopoly of ownership of the world's productive wealth by the capitalist class does indeed give this class an absolute power which makes it the sole arbiter of the division of the product of industry. Naturally, the capitalist so divides the product that the worker's portion will be so small as not only to keep the working masses propertyless and dependent, but also to keep in existence a reserve army of unemployed who will tend to bring down wages by their competitive struggle for employment among their fellows. The power is undoubtedly there, and *the power will remain there despite all strikes and rises in wages, as long as the wage-system prevails*, or, in other words, as long as the purchasing power of prices remains in the exclusive control of the capitalist. Undeniably, "ownership" gives the capitalist *the physical power* to do all this, but what about *the moral right*?

Let us look at the matter again from a slightly different angle. *Productive wealth*—land and capital—nature's sources of raw materials, and all the plant and machinery used as means in the production and distribution of the ultimate products which satisfy human needs and constitute *consumers' wealth*—have of themselves economic *value* only in so far as they can be converted into, or made pro-

<sup>5</sup> For the sake of simplicity it may be understood to include reward of brains, *i.e.*, salaries of directors, etc.—all that is *earned*, as distinct from C and B which go to the capitalist as owner.

ductive of, *ultimate products*; and so far only can they be equated with, and considered exchangeable for, these latter.<sup>6</sup> But it takes both *time* and *labour* to effect the transformation. *Without labour, land and capital are economically valueless.*<sup>7</sup> This is a profoundly important consideration from the ethical standpoint, no less than from the economic. Next let it be noted that the purchasing power which is placed at the disposal of the proletariat, the absolutely propertyless wage-earning masses, from day to day and from week to week during the transformation period, is all *credit purchasing power*, supplied in advance by the capitalist. That is to say, the capitalist owner finances the whole productive process, supplies credit purchasing power to support all the brains and labour actively contributing to the process, *on the strength or credit of the consumers' wealth or value* to be produced by brains and labour through the process. His capital is *of itself* valueless.<sup>8</sup> The credit he commands depends upon the value of the consumers' wealth to be produced from it or by it. This value depends on the application, to his capital, of *labour-energy*, a factor which is certainly a more intrinsic, intimate and personal "property" of the labourer than capital is of the capitalist. The credit commanded and monopolised by the capitalist is simply a *reliance on the labour-energy* which is being applied to his capital. If his capital without labour is valueless, it is clear that the reliability of his credit is based on the labour-factor, which *prima facie* at all events appears to be the "property" of the labourer rather than his. There is no denying the fact that the capitalist, in virtue of his exclusive ownership and control of productive wealth, his effective withholding of this from the propertyless wage-workers, and his con-

<sup>6</sup> And money, which is the medium of exchange, is primarily a measure of the value of *ultimate products* or *consumers' wealth*; only secondarily and indirectly is it a measure of the value of *productive wealth*; for it is only in so far as the latter is translatable into terms of the former that it has economic value at all.

<sup>7</sup> Doubtless, without land and capital, without the raw materials of nature, labour too is economically valueless. This we merely note here as equally obvious. It, also, has its implications; but they are not germane to the context just at present.

<sup>8</sup> *i.e.*, apart from the labour to be applied to it by himself or others. Even if he works it himself it is his work, and his work only, that gives it *actual* value. If he allows it to lie idle its *potential* value lies there; but it has no *actual* value for himself or anyone else. In its potential, unworked state, it will not save either its owner or others from starving.

sequent economic mastery over the latter, has also got exclusive ownership and control of *the credit* which derives its worth or reliability from a value to be produced by the *application of the labourers' energy* to a capital that *would otherwise remain valueless as a source of credit*. We are taught to regard capital as the source of credit. That is not accurate. The source of credit is labour-energy. Or—because and in so far as capital has subjugated labour-energy and tied it helplessly to the wheels of its own chariot—we may say that capital *as fructifiable by labour*, but not otherwise, is the source of credit. In the Capitalist system, then, it comes to this, that the capitalist in controlling industrial credit is really *mortgaging a thing which does not appear rightly to belong to him*, namely, the labour-energy of the working masses.<sup>9</sup>

It may well be asked, What *moral* right or title has he to do so? The question is a very grave one, especially if we reflect that the capitalist uses that credit (1) to keep the capital which he owns unimpaired (by the productive process) in its power or potential value; and (2) to keep on appropriating continually (on his mere title of "ownership") such a portion<sup>10</sup> of the total economic output as will leave the remainder barely sufficient to keep the working masses in permanent propertyless penury.

<sup>9</sup> We may illustrate *industrial credit* by the analogy of *national credit* and the National Debt. When a government borrows "purchasing power" from those of its citizens who can command and loan it, the government undertakes to pay them back that "purchasing power" at some future time, *plus* an additional annual amount of "purchasing power" in the form of government stock dividends. How will the government get both principle and interest to pay back? By a periodic levy ("taxes") on consumers' wealth *not yet produced*, but to be produced by the labour-energy of the present and future workers of the nation. The lenders rely on the government to collect and repay the future values to them; otherwise they would not lend to it. This is what *national public credit* means. What the government really does is to make a *lien* or *mortgage* on the labour-energy of the present and future generations of workers. Of course the government takes both capitalist and proletariat. But the capitalist (whether government stockholder or industrial investor) is the sleeping partner in the process by which *all* the future value or purchasing power is produced. The government stockholder has the value he lent secured to him; and he receives besides (less income tax), in the form of his dividend, an annual piece of value produced by the nation's workers and passed through the hands of the industrial capitalist to the government tax-gatherer. It is the workers all the time who produce the values out of which the capitalist pays his taxes; and they have to pay taxes also out of the share of purchasing power that falls to them as wages. See DOUGLAS, *Economic Democracy*. (London: Cecil Palmer, Oakley House, Bloomsbury Street, W.C.1), pp. 121-4.

<sup>10</sup> The portion has been variously estimated. One-third would seem to be certainly the lowest reliable estimate. See BOWLEY, *op. cit.* p. 73; also pp. 15 and 16.

Industrial credit is simply a *reliance* on all who are actively engaged in exploiting, by labour of hand or brain, the world's natural sources of consumers' wealth—a reliance on their capacity to produce actual values. And this very capacity is given to men that men may live by the fruit of their labour. Without labour, *all* would perish—even the capitalists, the minority who “own” those natural sources. Surely, then, this “credit,” this “reliance” on the capacity of labour, is an attribute that belongs by right to labour; or to men in so far as they labour; or to the community, to the public, to Society, exactly because and in so far as it carries out the inevitable law of conserving its existence on earth by labour. How then can it square with natural equity that any group or section of the citizens in any community should appropriate to their own private use, and barter and buy and sell for their own private profit, and trade with it as if it were their exclusive property, this communal attribute of the labour-energy of society? And that they should do so in such a way and to such an extent that they may, if they choose, lead absolutely idle lives—like the lilies of the field which “labour not, neither do they spin,” or at least like the birds of the air, “for they neither sow nor do they reap, nor gather into barns”? If reliance on the labour-capacity of society is the essential meaning of financial credit, then surely it is to the economically active and productive nine-tenths of Society (or at the very least to the *public*, to Society as a whole) rather than to the idle, non-productive tenth, that the utilisation and control and benefit of this credit ought rightly to belong. And yet *it has been completely monopolised, and is being exclusively exploited for their own private profit, by the capitalists.*

But are we losing sight of their “title” of “ownership”? No; we are not losing sight of it. On the contrary, we are thinking only of their “ownership.” For in so far as capitalists *work* themselves, as directors, managers, *entrepreneurs*, etc., what we have been saying does not apply to them. It applies to them only considered as “owners” of capital, and precisely in so far as, by virtue of their “ownership,” they have been able to become the financial magnates, bankers, credit manipulators, of all industry and commerce. For it is only as such, *i.e.*, because

they have usurped industrial credit and attached it for private profit to their "ownership," that they can levy from the product of industry, in the prevailing Capitalist system, the periodic rents, royalties, dividends or interest on which they can live in idleness (if they care to), and keep intact for their descendants the capital-cum-credit power of continuing the levy indefinitely. Let them by all means keep their ownership of capital; we should not be disposed in the least to interfere with it. But we are concerned to discover whether it is really in the nature of things, or whether on the contrary it is a violation of natural equity, besides being economically disastrous, that mere idle ownership of capital should carry with it the power of making an indefinite levy on the working-energy of those who labour.

Is it to be alleged that "ownership" of capital in the nature of things confers upon its owner the moral right to sit down idle and be supported out of the fruits of others' toil, which they must apply to his capital or else starve? But this is a pure assumption: it is not self-evidently true, and if it be true at all its truth has got to be proved. Or, is it rather alleged that such moral right does not indeed attach to "ownership" in the nature of things, but is annexed to it by the free consent of the non-owning workers to the arrangement? But it is notorious that neither explicitly nor implicitly has this free consent ever been given. The *force majeure* of the owning class, and the forced consent of the non-owning class who are compelled by dire necessity to accept the arrangement or starve—these factors indeed account for the *fact* of the arrangement, for the fact that the non-working owner makes the non-owning worker support *both* by his labour; but then these factors are not exactly of the sort to establish a *moral right*—except indeed on the assumption that *might gives right*. Or, would the capitalist's claim to such moral right be rather this—that the arrangement which thus enables him as owner to live without working, from the toil of his non-owning workers, has at all events been accepted and sanctioned by social usage, by the approval, or recognition, or at least the toleration, of States and governments and laws the whole world over; and that precisely because the arrangement has this sanction, precisely because Society



has agreed to accord this power to mere ownership, the exercise of this power is *morally lawful*, so that its extinction or limitation would be morally wrong and indefensible? This is a more plausible plea, and there may be something in it. Let us see.

First, as to the contention that the arrangement has the social sanction, or at least the toleration, claimed for it. It has indeed always enjoyed the sanction and approval of those who have profited by it, of those who, in so far as they own productive wealth have been thereby enabled to live without working. These classes, though always a minority, have exercised political predominance in Society, have had control of the organs of State and Government, have shaped legislation, and so have been able to pass off on Society *their* approval of the arrangement as *social sanction*. But capitalists do not constitute Society; nor is their sanction, even though embodied in State policy and legislation, to be accepted as if it were the real approval of Society for the arrangement. Has the arrangement ever had the free sanction or approval of the vast non-owning majority, or even of the owning *workers*, or therefore of Society as a whole—its morally universal sanction? Who will dare to assert that it has? But perhaps it has at least *social toleration*? Well, yes; the masses have tolerated it for the very simple reason that they had no alternative. The Catholic Church also had to “tolerate” it simply because she has been powerless to change the capitalist State policy.

Next, as to the inference drawn by capitalists from such presumed toleration or sanction. The forced toleration of the arrangement by the powerless non-owning majority is certainly of no avail to give moral rectitude to the arrangement. And the “toleration” of the Church rather shows that she regards the arrangement as an evil, to which she regrets that the propertyless masses have had to submit, and which she has always but vainly counselled the rich to remove. The practice by which the idle owners of capital have been able to usurp and monopolise, and attach to their “ownership,” the advantages of a credit which belongs to the labour-energy of the working masses, derives no moral quality whatsoever from the fact that the poor have had to bear it while the Church has been powerless to pre-



vent it. The State of course has sanctioned it, and we have seen why. But does the sanction of the State always suffice to make an economic arrangement morally lawful? Not always, by any means. Certainly not, if the arrangement is found to favour unduly a particular class at the expense of the common good, and if the State, knowing that this is how the arrangement works out in practice, nevertheless sanctions it and imposes it on Society. And this we believe to have been the case when modern States erected Capitalism on the ruins of the system of widely-diffused moderate ownership which prevailed in the Middle Ages. But even if the State, in sanctioning the Capitalist credit monopoly, acted *bona fide* in what it believed to be the interests of the common good of Society, the effect of such sanction would merely be (1) to make the practice of Capitalist credit legal; and (2) to create a presumption of its being morally lawful provisionally on its not proving really detrimental to the common good; but not to make it *eo ipso*, morally lawful irrespective of whether or not the practice involved the infliction of a grievous wrong upon the labouring masses of Society. The State is neither impeccable nor infallible; it can inflict a wrong knowingly or unwittingly. It is bound to right this wrong immediately in the former case; and in the latter as soon as it discovers its mistake.

Now labour credit, as we have seen, does not attach to capital ownership in the nature of things. The attachment was made in the first instance by the absolute power of capital ownership, and has been continued by State sanction and social usage. It is therefore an arrangement which lies wholly within the competence of the State, as the organ of social authority, to modify or to terminate. The question whether it is a morally lawful economic institution cannot be decided by merely observing that it prevails *de facto* and has the sanction of the State. The conduct of the State in regard to an economic practice is by no means the ultimate test of the economic morality of such practice. The question is a much deeper one, in the solution of which the morality of State policy itself may have to be arraigned. And the experience of the working of a few hundred years of the Capitalist system must not be ignored in solving it.

With the consequences of the Capitalist system before us we are in a much better position to judge of the natural equity or inequity of the practice of exacting from the product of industry rents, royalties, dividends and interest, on the title of mere ownership, than the medieval moralists were when they discussed the question. In the campaign which they waged for centuries against the practice of usury those medieval Catholic writers admitted the lawfulness of receiving, on the title of capital-ownership, unearned income in the form of rent for land or other natural sources, or of dividends from a sleeping partnership in industry. From this it is wrongly inferred that they admitted by implication the lawfulness of all the claims which modern capitalists make to control the credit and monopolise the products of industry in virtue of their title of "ownership." The inference is as unwarranted as it is mischievous. For those writers could not have foreseen that the widely diffused capital-ownership of their days would develop into a class monopoly which, having expropriated the masses, would effectively exclude them from all reasonable opportunity of ever recovering such ownership, and would keep them in a state of propertyless pauperism. They could not have foreseen that this Capitalist class would completely ignore the Christian social obligations attaching to capital-ownership, and would arrogate to itself and claim as its exclusive property the credit-advantages which they accorded to it merely as a stewardship or trust to be administered for the common good. Doubtless, had they foreseen these sinister developments they would have emphasised even more fully than they did the fundamental truth that while it is lawful for the owner of capital to take *some* unearned income on the title of ownership, he has no moral right whatsoever either to live in idleness on that income, or to use it *except as a common patrimony to be shared with others in need when his own reasonable needs have been satisfied.* This fundamental truth has been so eclipsed by the pagan conception of ownership which Capitalism has fostered in modern society that its bare enunciation disturbs us not a little. But it caused no scandal in the days of St. Thomas Aquinas. The traditional Catholic teaching on capital ownership, on ownership of consumers' wealth, and on the morality of

unearned income, is not only helpful towards reform of the Capitalist system, but decidedly encouraging in the scope it gives for very drastic and apparently revolutionary schemes of economic and industrial reconstruction. We hope to deal with some aspects of it in a subsequent article.

The work of social and economic reform involves not only understanding and criticism of the Capitalist system, but also and especially constructive proposals. The former is the easier portion of the task, and a good deal of it has been already achieved. The latter is much more difficult; but tentative proposals on Catholic lines have begun to appear occasionally of late.<sup>11</sup> The difficulty of securing for such constructive proposals anything like impartial consideration on their merits is more than an economic difficulty; it is also psychological. It is not merely that they have to meet the strongly entrenched opposition of Capitalism. It is that they have likewise to encounter the danger of being prejudged by the unconsciously Capitalist mentality of even Catholic readers as being excessively and unjustly subversive of Capitalist privileges which have come to be regarded unquestioningly as vested interests and moral rights. However anxious, therefore, we may be to have Catholic social writers put forth definite and positive schemes of economic reconstruction, we must, if we would have them considered, prepare the social soil for them by removing the weeds that have choked and overgrown in modern society the traditional Catholic and Christian teaching about ownership of property—its nature and purpose, its rights, its obligations and its limitations.

P. COFFEY.

<sup>11</sup> We may be permitted to mention as an instance the proposals outlined by Rev. Dr. Moran in the concluding article of a series on *Social Reconstruction in an Irish State*. IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. XV. No. 59. (July, 1920).

## The Lawfulness of the Hunger Strike.

I HAVE long hesitated about taking part in the discussion on the morality of the Hunger Strike which, for over two years, has been occupying so large a space in theological literature. To me it seems a hard thing even to appear to sit in moral judgment on some of the most noble, religious and high-souled characters amongst the many devoted sons who have sacrificed their lives for our common country. On the whole the discussion has been carried on with commendable restraint. Never, so far as I am aware, has the sincerity or good faith of the Hunger Strikers themselves been called in question. Still it does go against one's feeling to find it coolly argued that a man whom one is compelled to honour, and whose motives he applauds, can be excused from grave sin in the very act which wins his admiration only on the supposition that he is not alive to its moral wickedness. It is all very well to protest that we do not wish to judge anybody, that we leave that to each one's conscience. When we proclaim that an act is against the natural law, we are proclaiming in effect that the person who does that act is deliberately sinning, or is saved from deliberate sin simply because he is possessed of a warped conscience, which has not the normal Christian's perception of right and wrong. That is how the matter appears to the ordinary Catholic Irishman at all events, and that is why the discussion has made such a painful impression on the most sensitively conscientious of our countrymen. They are not able to appreciate the value of the various points raised, and so they are shocked and grieved that suspicion remains attached to those whom they are naturally inclined to regard as the most nearly perfect in the long list of their nation's martyred patriots. It is mainly in the hope that I may be able to say something which will help towards dissipating such suspicions that I am induced to undertake this article just now. The theological points involved are indeed worthy of the closest study on their own account. But they have been practically all discussed already, and if I raise them again it is not because I am dissatisfied with the theological defence of the Hunger Strike which has been made up to this, but because, now

that the subject has been discussed at some length, it is my experience that the ordinary interested Catholic, while convinced that the Hunger Strike is not immoral, has still an uncomfortable feeling that he has not found satisfactory answers to certain difficulties which he has heard or seen raised against it. As usually happens in controversies of this nature, the protagonists of the opposing views approach the question from totally different angles. One following a particular line of thought proves a certain conclusion to his own satisfaction, another selecting an altogether different course proves the opposite. Rarely do they meet one another's arguments directly, so that the reader who is not a theological expert himself is left bewildered. The plan which I propose to follow here will give me an opportunity of showing as convincingly as I can the lawfulness of the Hunger Strike, as undertaken recently by a number of Irish prisoners, and of replying, I hope satisfactorily, to every serious argument which has been urged against it.

I think we shall be able to meet all the moral points raised in connection with the Hunger Strike most orderly if we follow the method commonly adopted by modern theologians for determining the moral quality of acts which produce good and bad effects. That an act of such a nature be lawful certain conditions require to be fulfilled, about the substance of which theologians are practically unanimous. They are to be found in Lehmkuhl as follows :—(1) The act in itself must be morally good or at least indifferent; (2) The bad effect must not be intended but only the good; (3) The good effect must follow from the act at least as immediately as the bad, i.e., the good effect must not follow through the bad; (4) There must be a proportionately grave cause for permitting the bad effect.<sup>1</sup> On practically every one of these four conditions the Hunger Strike has been pronounced immoral by one or other of the writers who have condemned it.

The act in itself must be good or at least indifferent. Canon Waters holds that in case of the Hunger Strike the act is bad in itself. "The conclusion, therefore, stands that the Hunger Strike is suicide, both because its chief act—self-starvation—is suicide and because the personal

<sup>1</sup> Lehmkuhl. *Theol. Mor.*, V.I., n. 72

intention of the strikers was to sacrifice their lives as a means to an end."<sup>2</sup> I am devoting a good deal of space to this article by Canon Waters, because, if it does not appear presumptuous for me to say so, I consider it by far the most formidable presentation of the case against the Hunger Strike which I have seen. It seems to have supplied the substance of all the arguments of weight which one hears and reads so often from persons who wish to make the Hunger Strike appear immoral. I take the liberty of inverting his order and dealing with his second point first.

"The Hunger Strike is suicide . . . because the personal intention of the strikers was to sacrifice or imperil their lives as a means to an end." There are few, I imagine, who would be prepared to accept the full consequences of such a proposition. We are told, and I suppose we may believe it, that a military officer sometimes faces unnecessary danger in order to raise the sinking courage of his men, and sometimes even places himself in a desperate position in order that the men seeing his danger may be inspired to rescue him and thereby perhaps win an important victory. Such an officer would undoubtedly be imperilling his life as a means to an end, and surely no one would venture to say that he was committing suicide. On the contrary, he would receive universal commendation, and precisely because he was self-sacrificing enough to imperil his life in what he regarded as a worthy cause. We can appeal to higher examples still to illustrate the intention to sacrifice one's life as a means to an end. What are we to think of the many early Christians who sought out occasions of martyrdom, who freely professed the faith when they could have kept silent, and when to do so meant certain death? Did they not intend to sacrifice their lives? Would they not be disappointed if their lives were spared? And, in fine, did they not wish and intend to sacrifice their lives as a means to an end, viz., God's greater glory and the eternal reward which awaited their act of martyrdom?

What Canon Waters must mean is that the Hunger Strikers, by persisting in the refusal of food, intended thereby to procure their own death as a means to some end such as the forwarding of their country's struggle. In this

<sup>2</sup> *I.E. Record*, Aug., 1916, p. 106.



he must surely be mistaken, although he is supported by the finding of the military inquest in Cork prison. Even the doctor who attended the late Lord Mayor in Brixton Jail, and the coroner's jury which considered the cause of his death, were explicit that he did not intend to procure his own death, although these could certainly not be suspected of any undue desire to vindicate his name from the stigma of suicide. In that they were only giving expression to the view of nine out of every ten who took the trouble to consider the matter at all. Is it not strange to be told that the Hunger Strikers in Mountjoy and Wormwood Scrubbs intended or aimed at their own death, when their professed object was to secure release or better treatment, an object which would not only not be secured, but would be rendered impossible by their own death?

Canon Waters claims to have special knowledge of the mentality of the Hunger Strikers. As far as I can see there is no need for special knowledge in the matter at all, for there is really no kind of mystery about it. I have discussed the point myself with Hunger Strikers, and from what I have been able to gather I am perfectly satisfied that the Brixton prison doctor was correct in his opinion. Their mentality was just what their actions would lead one to expect it to be. Their intention in refusing food was to bring pressure to bear on the Government to stay its unjust persecution. Nor is there any need to suppose that they were not sincere in their professed intention to continue the fast to the death if need be. They understood perfectly well that they were adopting a course fraught with grave danger to themselves, and they fully expected that some of their number would lose their lives. None of them, however, aimed at his own death as a means to anything else, although each one of them was quite prepared to continue the exacting struggle to the end, even if it should cost him his life to do so.

But, Canon Waters argues, the Hunger Strikers must aim at their own death because it is through the consequences of their death that they expect to bring moral pressure to bear on the Government. "The whole strike was organised to put pressure on the Government to make certain concessions. Now, the only thing in the strike that had any power to force the authorities to comply with



the terms of the strikers was the death or the danger of death to which the men on strike exposed themselves. . . . This moral pressure was the only efficacious means in the whole contrivance and the sole reason why the strike was chosen as a method of resistance."<sup>3</sup> This is a sufficiently accurate explanation of the mind of the Hunger Strikers, if instead of "to put pressure on the Government to make certain concessions," we substitute "to put pressure on the Government to cease from committing outrages," and for "death or the danger of death" we substitute "fear on the part of the Government of the death or danger of death." It is essential to a true appreciation of the Hunger Strike to be clear that it is not undertaken for the purpose of winning mere concessions which the Government is morally free to grant or withhold. The second qualification which I have made is of more importance to my present purpose. If the object which the Hunger Strikers aimed at could be attained only through their actual death, then indeed it might be said that they were procuring their own death as a means to the attainment of that object. But, as a matter of fact, they hoped, with what good reason the story of the different strikes show, that their object could be attained through the fears of the Government. In effect they were placing their own lives as a barrier to the unjust action of the Government, and saying, "if you wish to continue in your tyrannical course you must face the responsibility of causing our death." It is true that the pressure through fear or reluctance is exercised on the Government only through its belief that the Hunger Strikers have deliberately placed themselves in a position in which death is inevitable unless it gives way. That only means that the Hunger Strikers were determined to endure death if necessary in the trial of strength which they had invoked, not that they were aiming at their own death.

Fortunately it is not difficult to conceive a case of moral pressure of the kind exercised by the Hunger Strikers on the Government of which everyone will be ready to approve. Suppose that a maiden is pursued by a man in a motor car, and the father of the maiden convinced that nothing else can save his daughter's virtue steps before the car and says

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

to the pursuer, "if you are determined to take my daughter you must reach her over my dead body." If the father had good reason to hope that the pursuer would be deterred by such an action from continuing the pursuit, would he not be perfectly justified in what he did? Or would anyone say that he intended to procure his own death as a means to saving his daughter? Yet the whole action was organised to put pressure on the pursuer to "make certain concessions"—to desist from an outrage. Now, the only thing in the action that had any power to force the pursuer to comply with the terms of the father was the death or danger of death (the fear on the part of the pursuer of the death or danger of death?) to which the father exposed himself. This moral pressure was "the only efficacious means in the whole contrivance," and the sole reason why that action was "chosen as a method of resistance." From the point of view of the attitude of both parties towards their own death the parallel seems to be perfectly complete. That to my mind is a most important point, for Canon Waters is not the only one who seems to find in the means by which Hunger Strikers bring pressure on the Government a proof that they must be really aiming at bringing about their own death. If it has been shown that there is no validity in that proof we shall have got over one of the most fundamental difficulties which is urged against the morality of the Hunger Strike.

But it is claimed that there is a great difference between the two cases in another respect. In the case of the man trying to stop the motor car, if he is killed he will be killed by another, while, if a Hunger Striker dies, his death will have been caused by himself. Let us see whether even in this respect there is any substantial difference between the two cases. In precisely the same way the father in question and the Hunger Strikers deliberately expose themselves to death which will be inevitable unless the will of an outside party is deflected from an unjust course. Suppose that in neither case the outside party gives way, then both will die but neither by his own positive act, the father by being crushed under the wheels of a motor car, and the Hunger Strikers by natural dissolution. Both, however, may be considered negative causes of their own death inasmuch as they fail to adopt the natural means of preserving life, the

father because he will not use his limbs to get out of the way of a moving car, the Hunger Strikers because they will not take food to resist the natural wear and tear of the vital organs. The practical bearing of this distinction between positive and negative causes in this connection is fully recognised by theologians of unexceptional authority, as may be seen from the quotations which Fr. Gannon has given from Suarez and Lessius.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps here also for the sake of fulness I ought to refer to another objection, or rather the same objection in another form, which is sometimes urged with a great show of finality. By their protest the Hunger Strikers are simply saying to the Government, "unless you give us what we want, we will kill ourselves by starvation." They are just in the same, and only in the same, sense as the father might be taken as saying to the man in the motor, "unless you do what I ask you I will kill myself by getting run over by your car."

Apart from the personal intention of the Strikers, Canon Waters undertakes to show that the Hunger Strike in itself is suicide, therefore essentially bad and such as no motive however good and no concomitant advantages however great can justify. Accepting the common definition of suicide, the intentional killing (*directa occisio*) of oneself, he sets out to prove by a process of extremely subtle argumentation that the Hunger Strike, no matter what the mind of the strikers themselves may be, comes under that definition. As he rightly remarks, the critical word in the definition is "intentional." But that, he contends, will be verified if the act of its own nature is directed towards the death of the agent. "Whenever nature makes and ordains any organ or faculty or act to a certain end, there is in that organ, faculty, or act an intention of nature. This natural intention or purpose is inherent in the act or subject to which it belongs, is inseparable from it, and is, in fact, nothing but the nature of such a subject as inclined to an end. If . . . it (the end to which natural intention directs an act) be bad, the act is always intrinsically bad."<sup>5</sup> That is an argument which calls for very careful examination.

<sup>4</sup> *The Ethical Aspect of the Hunger Strike*. *Studies*, Sept., 1920, pp. 451-452.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

When we speak of an act which of its own nature produces a bad effect as necessarily bad, we must have in mind a morally bad effect. All our moral notions would be upset, if we were to assume it of effects merely bad in the physical order. We should have to say, for instance, that the execution of a convicted criminal is bad, because the hanging or beheading of its own nature produces a bad effect, viz., the destruction of human life. But, of course, Canon Waters is speaking of a morally bad effect. His point, if I may take the liberty of expressing it in a form slightly different, is this: The Hunger Strikers by their determined abstention from food are doing an act which of its own nature causes their death, the natural end of the act therefore is self-destruction, and that being so the act itself must be pronounced morally bad.

It seems to me that Canon Waters is straining the meaning of the natural intention of acts to an altogether unwarrantable extent. All theologians, as far as I am aware, require for suicide in the technical moral sense two things, (1) on the part of the act, it must be death producing, (2) on the part of the agent, he must have the intention of causing his own death. This is clearly set forth by Noldin.<sup>5</sup> "One directly slays himself or another, when he places an act which is death producing with the intention of causing death to himself or another; indirectly when he does not intend his own or the other's death, but knowingly does something from which he foresees that his own or the other's death will follow. That one be said to slay himself or another directly, it is required that the action and intention be immediately and directly death producing. But the intention is necessarily immediately death producing, when the act has only one immediate effect and that death producing. But if neither the act nor the intention is immediately death producing, or the act only, and not the intention, one is not considered to slay himself or another directly."

The fact, therefore, that a certain act of its own nature brings about the agent's death is no proof that the agent commits suicide, unless it can be shown in addition that he intends his own death. This intention may be explicit: or

<sup>5</sup> *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol II. n. 327.

it may be implied in the act, as would be the case if the act could not be performed unless the agent had the intention of causing his own death, or, as Noldin puts it, if the act had only one immediate effect and that death producing. That the Hunger Strikers have not the formal intention of producing their own death, I hope I have made sufficiently clear already. Have they the implicit intention? In other words, has the abstention from food only one immediate effect, viz., the death of those who abstain? By no means. One other immediate effect it has, perhaps the most immediate of all, viz., the moral pressure brought to bear on the superior physical power which, if left to itself, is determined on perpetrating a grave injustice.

Evidently Canon Waters himself must be alive to the awkward implications of the principle he invokes against the Hunger Strike. If the Hunger Strike is condemned as suicide, because a natural effect of it is the death of the strikers themselves, then a number of acts which everyone regards as lawful, and some which would be considered heroic, should be set down as suicidal also. He has tried, therefore, to isolate the Hunger Strike, and show that the principle on which it is to be condemned does not apply to a number of other acts which apparently should come under it. The results of this effort give us the strongest proof we could wish for against the validity of the principle itself. The heroic act of the man who jumps out of an overladen boat in mid-ocean he justifies on the ground that such a man does not kill himself—"he gives the waves a chance of doing that." Perhaps, but is not the natural intention of his act to produce his own death? What would he say of the suicide who jumps into the sea? Does he kill himself, or does he give the waves a chance of doing that? The natural intention of the act is the same in both cases. Each act of its own nature is death producing. The reason why one is suicide, while the other is not, is nothing in the acts themselves, but the personal intention which in one case is self-destruction, in the other greater hope of safety for his companions in the boat.

Similarly of a woman who, to save her virtue, jumps from a window a hundred feet from the ground, it is said that "she may be killed, not by the jump but by the fall." Moreover, "this fall is no part of her action in going

through the window, nor does the fall prove fatal of itself, but only by reason of the distance and the hardness of the ground."<sup>7</sup> It is all the more strange to find Canon Waters attributing death in this case to force of gravity and the hardness of the earth, when only a few pages further on he writes: "Cutting a man's throat is per se fatal, so is firing a bullet into his head, and it would be no defence to a charge of murder to plead that death was due to the constitution of the human body which placed so many important blood-vessels in the neck or which did not make a man's skull bullet proof."<sup>8</sup> It is surely just as little a defence to a charge of suicide to plead that a woman's death was the distance and hardness of the ground. I wonder, had the woman jumped from the window for the purpose of putting an end to her own life, would Canon Waters still say that her death was not caused by the jump, but by the distance and hardness of the ground. I doubt it, yet the natural intention of the act is the same in both cases. Whether it is suicidal or not depends on the personal intention.

Similar comments might be made on the other examples adduced in this connection by Canon Waters. Particularly pertinent, however, to the Hunger Strike is the case of the Carthusian monk who refuses to eat meat when meat is necessary for the preservation of life.<sup>9</sup> Of him it is said that it is only by an accident that abstention from meat leads to his death, the accident, viz., that he is suffering from a certain disease which makes the eating of meat necessary for the preservation of his life. But, accident or not, the disease brings it about that in this particular instance meat is the only form of food which will maintain life, and if abstention from food is to be pronounced immoral, on the ground that it naturally leads to death, so also should abstention from meat in the case of this particular Carthusian be pronounced immoral, because in his case it naturally leads to death also. Surely it is not to sustain life in general that an individual is obliged to take food, but to sustain his own life, and the food he is bound to take is the food which will sustain his own individual life.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93



The second condition, that the bad effect be not intended, has been examined sufficiently in connection with the personal intention.

In a brief article in the *Catholic Times*,<sup>10</sup> Father McNabb pronounces the Hunger Strike immoral as opposed to the third condition, that the good effect should be at least as immediate as the bad. Although that article has been much appealed to by persons who believe that it gives support to a conclusion which for some reason they wish to propagate, it is clear that it does not express a measured theological judgment. It is only to haste and excessive zeal that we must attribute his unwarrantable appeal to the *Doctrine of St. Thomas*. It would be a difficult task to find out what the teaching of St. Thomas on the Hunger Strike would be, and probably not altogether fruitless for the patient investigator. But surely it is not enough to pick out such a commonplace opinion as this: "If a man did not nourish himself with food he would sin," label it the doctrine of St. Thomas, and pass on with a "therefore" to say that self-inflicted death flows immediately from hunger striking. Yet that is not the point he wishes to establish, but rather that the good effect is less immediate. That he tries to show by pointing out that the good effect, viz., some good to one's native country, etc., flows only mediately from the hunger striking, because into the series of causes through which it is produced, there enters a free will. In reply to which two things have to be noted. This third condition as more accurately defined by Lehmkuhl means only that the good effect must not be procured through the bad.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, the essential good effect which justifies hunger striking is the moral pressure which through it is brought to bear against the injustice of the government. That good effect is produced immediately once the Hunger Strike is proclaimed, or at least as soon as it becomes publicly known, and is not produced through the actual death of the strikers, which is only contingent and will not take place at all if the Government is moved to stay its oppression.

<sup>10</sup> Sept., 11, 1920.

<sup>11</sup> "Effectus bonus saltem æque immediate atque effectus malus, i.e., non mediante effectu malo, sequatur." *Ibid.*



But once granted that the Hunger Strike is justified through its immediate good effect, then all the other good effects—the reward of self-sacrifice for justice' sake, the inspiring example of such a supreme act of patriotism, and the public unmasking of official tyranny, etc., even those which follow through the actual death in case death does actually intervene, combine to exalt the act and enhance its value, just e.g., as the eternal crown and the magnificent constancy in death exalt an act of martyrdom, and are lawfully looked forward to by the Christian who lays down his life for the faith.

The fourth condition, that there must be a proportionately grave cause for permitting the bad effect, is one which cannot be applied with mathematical accuracy, so much depends on the relative value one attaches to the preservation of individual life and the vindication of moral principles in our public relationships. As far as the Hunger Strikes of the last few years are concerned, anyone who is satisfied about the other three conditions will not be likely to raise difficulties on the score of the balance of good and evil. Father McNabb has no wish to compare the bad effect with the good. And, although Canon Waters does decide against the Hunger Strike even here, it is evident that he is under the influence of his own arguments in the earlier preceding sections of his article. In point of fact it is almost impossible to compare them, the good and evil effects are so different in character. But this much we may safely assume: whoever believes in the sacredness of human liberty, the hatefulness of tyranny and the superiority of right to might, will not consider that the evils following from the recent Hunger Strikes, great as they have been through the loss of some of the noblest of our countrymen, outweigh the good effects. In a country which a short time ago was posted over with moral appeals to young men to go in their thousands to foreign battlefields where human blood was poured out like water, to sacrifice their lives in a problematical struggle for moral principles and liberty for oppressed peoples, it is strange to hear it said now that a few lives are too precious to be sacrificed in a struggle against undoubted tyranny at home.

I have heard or seen somewhere that an overwhelming evil of the Hunger Strike is its tendency to destroy the

authority of governments altogether. If one class of prisoners can dictate the conditions and length of their incarceration, others, even the most degraded criminals, are entitled to adopt their tactics with similar success. An obvious reply is that the Hunger Strike is a form of protest which does not make much appeal to degraded natures, nor is it ever likely to do so. Besides, what has made the Hunger Strike justifiable, and as successful as it has been, is the fact that the prison treatment or the imprisonment itself against which it was adopted was unjust. If there were no such injustice, the Hunger Strike would be immoral, nor could the Government legitimately do otherwise than allow the prisoners to die. The great virtue of a moral protest such as the legitimate Hunger Strike is that it brings the issue back to first principles, the justice or injustice of the Government's course of action.

Although, as has been said, it is not easy to balance the good and evil effects of the Hunger Strike, it is nevertheless true that, if the strike is to be justified, the good effects must outweigh the bad. Up to the death of the Lord Mayor of Cork there was scarcely room for doubt on this score. His death, however, has marked an epoch in the present struggle of the Irish nation. It has profoundly impressed the moral feeling of the entire civilised world, and won support and sympathy for the Irish cause in lands where hitherto the name of Ireland had scarcely been known. The effects of the sacrifice are complete and cannot be repeated. And of course, in the present blind fury of the British Cabinet, it would be foolish to expect that it could be moved by a sense of justice or shame to accede to legitimate demands of Irish prisoners. I think, therefore, that it might well be contended that for the present at all events, simply on the balance of its good and evil effects, the Hunger Strike could not be justified.

So far I have endeavoured to find out the moral quality of the Hunger Strike. The conclusion I have arrived at is that it is in perfect accord with moral principles, a conclusion accepted by many whose opinions carry more weight than mine. At the same time I am not blind to the fact that others whose views I am bound to respect disagree with me. There must, therefore, be error on some side. I have no desire to force my views on others. But I claim

that these others have no right to force their views on me or on anyone else who does not see his way to accept them. At most the speculative question is doubtful, and in *dubius libertas*. Unless so much is admitted, everyone who wishes to set up as a public censor becomes not so much a law to himself as a law to his neighbours. If ever there was a question on which opinions differ it is this very question of the Hunger Strike, and, that being so, the practical conclusion ought to be evident on the ordinary principles of Theology and Moral Philosophy. There is no law proved, and therefore no obligation in practice.

Most of the opponents of the Hunger Strike are quite willing to admit the *bona fides* of the strikers: and some of them would be prepared to allow them remain in that *bona fides*, when they realised that they are determined to persevere in their resolution. With an expression of wide toleration they declare that there is no penetrating the mystery of the human conscience, since men appear to be able to convince themselves of the lawfulness of anything. It is just in this that those who have written publicly against the Hunger Strike have been unjust to the strikers and their friends. The point is, not that there may be *bona fide* ignorance of the law, but that in the circumstances there is strictly speaking no law at all. Thus the first direct argument by which Lehmkuhl sets out to establish the principle of Probabilism runs thus: "A law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not bind, or is not a law in the full and true sense. And when a truly probable reason goes to show that an obligation in a certain matter does not exist, about that matter or its obligation the law is not sufficiently promulgated. Therefore the obligation or law about it does not exist. . . . And in truth this reason, that, when on account of different probable opinions a matter, about the obligation of which there is question, is doubtful, in these circumstances the law is not sufficiently promulgated and does not impose an obligation, is the principal reason on which St. Alphonsus insisted for rejecting the severer views."<sup>12</sup>

I am sure that most of those who have condemned the Hunger Strike would be willing to admit the entirely

<sup>12</sup> *Mor. Theol.*, Vol. I., n. 176.

reasonable principle of Probabilism, or at least would not think of casting any reflection on anyone who accepted and applied it in ordinary cases. There is a fairly familiar case in connection with the moral effect of bankruptcy laws which will illustrate my point. It is debatable whether a discharge justly obtained in the bankruptcy court liberates a debtor from the obligation to discharge the debts from which he was liberated by the action of the court in case he afterwards becomes possessed of wealth. Now would anyone who held the opinion that the obligation to pay the debts remained, consider himself at liberty to force his view on a discharged bankrupt who was convinced of the other? Or would anyone insinuate that such a man was suffering from a warped conscience? Or, above all, suppose the man was dying in tragic circumstances, would anyone be so heartless as well as so unjust as to torture him still further and add new pangs to the natural grief of his friends and relatives by trying to persuade him that he is endangering his salvation, unless he consents to discharge debts from which he was liberated by the bankruptcy court and which now for reasons overwhelming to himself he is unwilling to pay?

If those who wrote publicly against the morality of the Hunger Strike did not do this, it was what their contentions naturally tended to do. Even in the more impersonal atmosphere in which the question can be discussed by persons who have no particular reason to believe that they shall ever be called on to consider effective protests against unjust prison treatment, I have noticed the effect of subtle undermining of security of conscience. A person will sometimes say, "I believe myself that the Hunger Strike is not wrong, but, all the same, see what these other writers hold, and I for my part would not care to risk eternal salvation on a probability however strong." Very likely these people do not advert that they are simply giving expression to the objection which has been urged again and again against Probabilism and as often answered. There is no question of risking anything on a probability. If the matter remains really doubtful on consideration, there is *certainly* no obligation in practice, and the person who follows what he believes to be correct, is *certainly* not acting wrongly, and *certainly* not risking his salvation on a mere probability.

Where a doubt of the kind I have been describing exists, those who for whatever reason take the strict view have no right to regard those who differ from them as possessed of a moral sensibility less acute than their own. Somehow there is a tendency to look on strict views as a sign of moral superiority, but without the slightest shadow of justification. On the contrary, the narrow spirit of Jansenism is most abhorrent to the tolerant spirit of the Gospel. The Jansenists were scandalised at bishops, priests and everyone else who did not accept their rigid moral views. Those best understand the true liberty of the Christian dispensation who are able to accept with strong but humble confidence its approved liberal principles, and, when occasion requires, put them in practice without the pusillanimous scruples that mark the weak of faith.

Two amazing contentions have been put forward against the application of the principle of Probabilism to the Hunger Strike. In the first place, it has been said that Probabilism does not hold where there is question of the natural law. I cannot possibly understand that position. If Probabilism is to be of any practical use at all, or if it is to be logically defended at all, it must apply to the natural as well as to the positive law. The authority of Lehmkuhl appears to carry weight with all parties to the discussions on the Hunger Strike. In developing the argument which I have quoted from him a few paragraphs back, he says that the minor (that, when there is a truly probable reason against an obligation, the law is not sufficiently promulgated) holds not only for the positive law but also for the natural law, and for that especially. Again, in explaining the principle of Probabilism he says: "It is said, 'in all doubtful matters,' to indicate that whether they have reference to the natural law, or to the divine positive, or human law, there is no difference in regard to the application of Probabilism, unless perhaps a probable reason for doubting can be more easily admitted in a human than in a divine or natural law."<sup>13</sup>

It is said in the second place that the opinion in favour of the Hunger Strike is not probable. The reason advanced for this modest assertion is that the intrinsic arguments

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

against the Hunger Strike admit no reasonable doubt, and the extrinsic arguments in its favour are not sufficient to make an opinion probable. I can quite understand that people should find it hard to appreciate the value of arguments for a view with which they disagree. Each party to a controversy will naturally feel satisfied that he sees the fallacy in his opponent's arguments, otherwise he could not be convinced of his own position. But it is not so easy to understand the intellectual self-sufficiency of the man who, when a question has been argued at length, says to his opponent: "Well, we cannot agree about the conclusion, neither can we agree to differ, for my arguments are certain and yours are fallacious." Such would be a cool assumption of superior intellectual ability or honesty which would not be tolerated in ordinary intercourse. As far as internal arguments go, when parties of apparently equal competency fail to come to an agreement, each should be entitled to follow his own view, and neither has any right to attempt to make his own view a law for his opponent or for anyone who agrees with his opponent.

As regards extrinsic authority, it is said that no standard work on Theology can be quoted in favour of the Hunger Strike. But neither can a standard work on Theology be quoted against it, for the very good reason that standard works on Theology have not yet touched the question at all. Instead of saying that the opinion in favour of liberty cannot be safely followed in practice, since no standard work on Theology supports it, it would be far more reasonable to say that there can be no obligation in the matter, since no standard work on Theology imposes it. But surely it is not from the theological authorities who are silent on a subject that the weight of an opinion is to be calculated. And the fairly competent theologians who have discussed the subject in periodicals leave the conclusion in doubt, with, as it appears to me, a decided preponderance of opinion in favour of the morality of the Hunger Strike. For instance, Archbishop Mannix has given his view definitely that the Hunger Strike is not suicide, which is equivalent to saying that in certain circumstances at least it is not immoral; Mr. O'Rahilly, whose theological qualifications are generally admitted, has vigorously defended the Hunger Strike; opinions for and against have



appeared in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, the *Tablet* and the *Catholic Times*; *Studies* had one article on the subject professedly justifying the Hunger Strike; *America* editorially took up the same position and replied to critics; the only foreign periodical<sup>14</sup> in which I have seen the subject discussed, and which may be reasonably presumed to be free from the bias by which articles written in English may be supposed to be influenced on one side or the other, elaborately contends against the suggestion of immorality in the Hunger Strike. In the light of all that, I cannot conceive how anyone can have the hardihood to insist that the immorality of the Hunger Strike has been so conclusively established that the opposite view cannot be said to be even probable.

J. KELLEHER.

<sup>14</sup> *Revue du Clergé Français*, Oct., 1920.

## Notes.

### THE CATHOLIC CHARITIES REVIEW.

FOR some years past, especially since the publication of the American bishops' social programme, great strides have been made in U.S.A. in the organisation and extension of Catholic charitable associations such as welfare societies, social service unions and Vincent de Paul conferences. These various activities have all been linked up in a "National Conference of Catholic Charities," which is responsible for the publication of *The Catholic Charities Review*. This monthly magazine serves at once as a medium for the dissemination of practical knowledge on all kinds of social questions, as a record of work done, and as a stimulus to Catholic social action. Its articles, which are short and business-like, are written by experienced social workers, and are usually grouped under four headings—"Principles and Methods," "Social Questions," "Societies and Institutions," and "The Society of St. Vincent De Paul." The editor is Dr. John A. Ryan, of the Catholic University of Washington. It is a most interesting and instructive little magazine, and deserves to be much more widely known in these countries.

### CREDIT AS A FACTOR IN THE ECONOMICO- SOCIAL PROBLEM.

We recommend to those of our readers who are interested in social problems two books reviewed in our present issue—*Economic Democracy* and *Credit-Power and Democracy*. They contain promising suggestions for breaking the vicious circle of rising prices and rising wages, and for easing generally the situation between Capital and Labour. These suggestions run on lines which have hitherto received very little attention, but which appear to us to be worthy of serious consideration. From a keen analysis of the whole machinery for distributing wealth in a capitalistically organised community, the author (Major Douglas) concludes that an equitable distribution need not be expected while the lords of finance are allowed to monopolise the financial credit of the community. Owing to the great expenses incurred for rent, machinery, power, raw materials, wages and salaries before the manufactured article can be placed on the market, control of credit carries with it control of the policy of production—that is, it gives those who control credit an effective veto on the initiation (and generally on the continuation as well) of productive processes. Now the policy of production, the decision as to what goods shall be produced and in what quantities, is too important a matter for the community to be left in the hands of a small minority whose sole object is, not to see that the needs of the community are satisfied, but to advance credits for a profit, on the basis of the borrower's power to extract from the public still greater profits through the medium of prices. Indeed it is seldom good policy, from the view-point of mere profits, to provide for the community an ample supply of highly useful or necessary commodities; it "pays" better to restrict the supply, and put up the price accordingly. Hence the frequent deliberate sabotage, which

wantonly deprives the community of the satisfaction of its needs, in order that a few may profit from the privations of the many.

But our present system has another serious drawback, which is also traceable to the aforesaid monopoly of credit. The full power of the community to produce and distribute ultimate commodities (consumer's wealth) to its members can never be brought into effective operation, because effective demand (i.e., demand backed by purchasing power) for the whole output is impossible. In other words, under the financial arrangements at present prevailing, the community as consumers can never afford to buy the full product of the industry of the community as producers. The reason for this extraordinary state of affairs is to be found in a combination of two facts—(a) that all purchasing power distributed to individuals under the present system, whether as wages, salaries or unearned income, is directly taken back from them in prices; and (b) the sum of prices always exceeds the sum of purchasing power distributed in view of the goods (or services) produced. The truth of the latter statement will be grasped if it be remembered that the prices of ultimate commodities always take back not merely all the purchasing power, including dividends, distributed in the process of their production, but also (and frequently many times over) a sum equal to the amount distributed in the production of the machinery, etc., used in their manufacture. The result of this impasse is that a bad policy of production is forced on the community. Its productive activity is of economic necessity devoted more and more to the production of goods for export, or else to the production of capital to be paid for by further advances of credit. As Mr. Keynes put it (*Economic Consequences of the Peace*), the cake is continually growing, but no one dare eat it.

Major Douglas's solution of the whole difficulty is to vest the control of credit in the community, and then regulate (not fix) prices on the basis of production-cost multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is to be a figure representing total national consumption, and the denominator a corresponding figure representing total national production. The practical result of this arrangement would be that, in a community of normal industrial efficiency, the selling price of ultimate commodities would be less than the nominal cost of production. This conclusion appears at first sight to be absurd, but it is not really so. Space will not allow us to describe in detail the scheme by which the author proposes to socialise credit. The intelligent reader will master it for himself, when he studies the two short volumes referred to. We use the word "studies" advisedly, as the arguments all through are condensed, and require to be read slowly and carefully.

Major Douglas's diagnosis of the maldistribution of wealth is certainly very suggestive. He underestimates, we think, the importance of concentrated ownership, specially ownership of land (in the economic sense), as a contributory cause; still, his main contention appears to be substantially correct. We see one practical difficulty to the realisation of his suggestions—apart from the opposition to be expected from the financial magnates—namely, that in large departments of economic activity it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to get reliable returns on which to base the fractional multiplier already explained.

W. M.

# NONCONFORMITY IN WALES.

In a previous number (April, 1920) we took occasion to refer to the decline and almost total extinction of Catholicism in Wales in the early part of the seventeenth century. The lapse of the old religion was due to severe persecution, and to the suppression of Catholic priestly ministrations in the counties which lay beyond the English border. The Church of England bishops and parsons entered to seize on the dioceses, parishes and livings which before had been in the hands of the old clergy, but, unlike the latter, they were quite out of sympathy with the religious views of the great bulk of the Welsh people. They were mostly English outsiders, and, when not outsiders, were drawn from an indifferent semi-anglicised upper class. In either case their zeal for the moral and spiritual advancement of the people was not remarkable. The discipline of the clergy was lax; the bishops were often pluralists and non-resident; there was a general neglect of the churches and of divine worship; and the population, speaking a language unknown to their superiors, sank into a condition of great ignorance and irreligion.

There was, then, in Wales a field open for the labours of Nonconformist preachers. The Catholic clergy were absolutely suppressed, and the ministers who replaced them had not the zeal or the enthusiasm which might have made their mission a success, and won the country to Anglicanism. The beginning of Nonconformity is associated with the name of William Wroth, who in 1639 started the first Independent cause at Llanvaches in Monmouthshire. Another of its apostles was William Erbery, who was deprived of a Church living in 1638, and formed an Independent sect at Cardiff shortly afterwards. Walter Cradock was suspended from office by the Anglican authorities in 1633, and spent the next six years of his life preaching in various parts of Wales and the border counties. But the labours of these men and many others (such as Vasavour Powell, Morgan Llwyd, Hugh Owen, and James Owen) during the seventeenth century was largely confined to the English side of Welsh life, to the towns, and more anglicised portions of the Principality. It was only in the beginning of the eighteenth century that Nonconformity found its way into the heart of Wales.

# CATHOLICISM DIES HARD.

THERE is abundant evidence that the Catholic clergy suffered terribly before the old faith died out. Nor were the new sectaries more tolerant than the English Privy Council. The writings of Morgan Llwyd (619-59) betray the deep hatred that preacher entertained for the Catholic religion. "In political and religious matters he aims his shafts at the Parliament, Presbyterians, Scotch, Dutch, Church of England, and Pope in turns. Perhaps his most bitter invective is employed against the last-named." In consequence of the Civil War in England, Llwyd looked forward to a re-union of the scattered members of Christendom, but in such a reconstruction he had no place for the Roman Church, unless the latter were willing to be *cured*. He claims that Rome had gone astray because she put the letter before the spirit:

Papists the letter of God's word  
Above the meaning prize.

So that to the new preachers the ancient faith had as little reason to be grateful as to the government persecutors. Nevertheless, a Catholic Bishop of Llandaf, named Lewis, was condemned as late as 1679; and even in 1700 an occasional priest was to be found in Wales; for example, in Carmarthenshire, in that year, a certain Samuel Davies was prosecuted at the Great Sessions for saying Mass at Llandilo Vawr, and administering the Sacrament to Mary Lloyd and Mary Price "according to the Roman use, against the statute." In 1684 no less than three Welsh versions of the Imitation of Christ had already been made, all of them executed by Catholic priests.

THE REVIVAL. The origin of the Methodist revival is principally attributed to the labours of Howel Harris (born 1714) and Daniel Rowlands of Llangetho. Harris, after a term at Oxford, began to exhort and teach in his native parish of Trevecca, and gained the acquaintance of several Dissenters. In 1737 he heard Rowlands for the first time, then a famous preacher. The two young men became fast friends, and were strongly encouraged by two Methodist leaders in England. They enlisted numerous recruits, among them the celebrated William Williams of Panyceilyn, the greatest of Welsh hymn-writers. The chief instruments in the hands of these preachers, and of the scores who carried on the movement with them and after them, were, first the Welsh language, and second, the Welsh Bible. Through the length and breadth of the country they preached in Welsh, and endeavoured in the face of violent opposition to give the people some of the spiritual food they clamoured for. Nonconformist bodies rose up everywhere, and in connexion with them also a number of remarkable men whose eloquence and style of oratory set an example that was copied with success in after generations. An efficient clergy took the place of the negligent Anglican body which preceded them, and the organisation of each denomination was perfected on a Welsh-speaking basis. The latter was an essential condition for success, for Wales was then, in the main, non-English-speaking. Among the people who, as a whole, threw themselves into the movement, intellectual powers hitherto imperfectly utilised were developed. They began to raise and discuss religious problems, and not only that, but to raise them and discuss them in Welsh. The attention of men was turned to the art of pulpit oratory, to hymn-writing, and to the literary capabilities of the Welsh language. The Bible lay at their hands as a specimen of Welsh pure and undefiled, and everybody became familiar with the text of the Scriptures. The chief results of the Revival were (1) an increased reverence for the language of Wales; (2) a greater literary activity, indicated by the increase of the number of books published from time to time, and by the rise of a Welsh periodical literature; (3) a demand for education through the medium of theological seminaries and colleges, and afterwards of schools of a more general character.

The Revival movement never lost the thoroughly Welsh character which was stamped on it in the beginning. As it was in the eighteenth century, so it remained in the nineteenth, and so it is in the twentieth. At the present moment the Welsh chapels are the back-bone of the power behind the Welsh language. The great bulk of the chapels in the Welsh-speaking districts have their services in Welsh, and

have services in no other language. Even in other lands, in towns outside Wales, in Liverpool, London, and a score of English cities, and in the city of Dublin, there are Welsh chapels whose services are conducted solely in the language of Wales.

**EDUCATION.** BUT perhaps the greatest boon conferred on the Welsh people by Nonconformity was the system of education which was organised in connexion with the independent chapels. The first state school system was not introduced till 1846, but for more than half-a-century prior to that date the Sunday schools were at work throughout the country. The latter institution was introduced from England about 1785 by Thomas Charles, a minister of Bala, in Merionethshire. The chief object of these schools was to teach the people to read the Scriptures in Welsh. The system was part of a general scheme of evangelisation, and was conducted in the beginning by teachers who preached and instructed for a period in a particular district, and then moved on to another. In the course of time these perambulatory teachers were dispensed with, and the work was carried on by the people themselves. Soon secular as well as religious instruction was provided for, and people of all ages acquired an elementary education. So that for more than a generation before a general system of elementary instruction was available in Ireland, the Welsh people enjoyed the benefits of a primary education altogether of their own making. The enormous advantage Nonconformity so conferred is obvious. The new religious denominations found Wales ignorant, but they so stimulated her energies that at the present day Welshmen have provided for themselves a system of education not inferior to that of any other country in Europe.

P. W.



**THE CATHOLIC  
PHILOSOPHY  
OF HISTORY.**

THE title of Mr. Belloc's recent work, *Europe and the Faith*, makes us think of the needs of a Catholic philosophy of history. History has been written in accordance with varying philosophical assumptions. In our youth we were burdened with history written from the dynastic standpoint; ruling families and their petty squabbles seemed to be the only thing that mattered; no account was taken of the social life of those who are the salt of a corrupt world, the workers. There was an extreme reaction from this type of history. It took the ordinary people into account. But in Socialist hands it offered a materialistic and fatalistic interpretation of history. The lie was made widespread that man lives on bread alone, that all the world's battles have been fought for economic reasons alone, that man's cry in every age has been for *panem et circenses*. This interpretation shut out altruistic motives, idealistic strivings, patriotic aspirations, and religion itself; it lowered man to the level of the brute. But, even when history was written by Christians, a false form of Christianity often warped its conclusions. Mr. Belloc has at various times rendered signal service to the truth by exposing the groundlessness of that long-continued Protestant tradition of history which has misrepresented, or ignored, Catholicism as a factor in the events of the world. But the danger at present arises not so much from a Protestant, as from an atheistic, interpretation of history.



THE HIDDEN  
HAND IN  
THE WORLD.

MR. BELLOC has never hesitated to lend the strong influence of his pen to the view that there is a Divinity shaping the ends of nations as of individuals. The idea may seem merely superstitious to superficial modern minds, but its propounder is too able and forceful a writer to allow it to be lightly brushed aside. He throws down a challenge which may irritate, but which cannot be ignored. "There stands, side by side with the activity of mortal life, a silent thing commonly unseen and, even if seen, despised. It has no name unless its name be religion: its form is the ritual of the altar; its philosophy is despised under the title of Theology. This thing and its influence should least of all appear in the controversies of a high civilization. With an irony that every historian of whatever period must have noted a hundred times, this thing and its influence perpetually intervene, when society is most rational and when most it is bent upon positive things. . . . This thing, this influence, entered unnoticed by a side door, it was weak and almost dumb. It, and it alone, halted and still halts all the revolutionary work, for it should have been recognized and it was not. It demanded its place and no place was given it. There is a divine pride about it, and, as it were, a divine necessity of vengeance. Religion, if it be slighted, if it be misunderstood, will implacably destroy."<sup>\*</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that Mr. Belloc holds that the true causes for such a great catastrophe as the Reformation were spiritual and hidden. How these unseen intelligences must laugh at cob-web explanations of such an event offered by rationalists with much display of learning and the historical sense! Mr. Belloc says simply that "wills other than mortal were in combat for the soul of Europe."

THE SUCCESSION  
OF CATHOLIC  
UNIVERSAL  
HISTORIES.

In endeavouring to supply an introduction to a truly Catholic philosophy of history, Mr. Belloc finds himself in a right noble succession. The universal genius of Augustine took a sweeping glance at human history in the *De Civitate Dei*. He was concerned with an explanation of a subject which also exercises Mr. Belloc—the Roman Empire. To Augustine Roman Emperors were, in spite of their self-declared Divinities, mere flies on the wheel of the Divine chariot.

The great Spaniard, J. Balmes, later continued the tradition of a Catholic philosophy of history in his *Catholicism and Protestantism Compared in their Effects on Civilisation*. And in the nineteenth century he found a worthy successor in the great German writer, Frederick Schlegel. Robertson, the English translator of the latter's great work, *The Philosophy of History*, said: "I thought there was in Frederick Schlegel stuff enough to produce two or three geniuses." Schlegel traces through all history a reflex of the Triune God, a golden thread of Creative Power and Light and Love; and his query concerning historical events is whether they promoted Light and Love, or otherwise. In conformity with this principle he shows the integrating power of Catholicism, and the disintegrating forces in the Scholastic sects of the Middle Ages, in the Reformation, in the French

<sup>\*</sup>Mary Antoinette, pp. 313, 314.

Enlightenment, in Masonry, and in political Cæsarism. He finds the solution in a truly Catholic science and system of politics. In this he was followed by Soloviev in Russia. For Mr. Belloc, also, Catholicism is the only remedy for a torn Europe. His consideration of Europe revolves around what a reviewer in the *Tablet* calls the three R's, the Roman Empire, the Roman Church, and the Reformation. The Roman Empire, in spite of all its crimes, acted as a road-builder for expanding Catholicism. But the Reformation, which according to a widely-spread Protestant myth inspired freedom of thought and of political action, threw back European civilisation by centuries. The cultural forces let loose by the Renaissance were impeded by the Reformation which yet obtained credit for originating them. Luther favoured his own freedom of thought, but was intolerant of that of others. His movement led to an absolutism of the State and to enslavement of religion through Erastianism. On the other hand, the Magna Charta was the fruit of a Catholic England, and the idea of representative parliaments was born in the despised system of Monastic Chapters.

CORRECTIVES OF  
MR. BELLOC'S  
THEORIES.

It is because we admire the service rendered by Mr. Belloc to Catholic truth that we are anxious that his views should not suffer from any drawback in their method of presentation. There seems to be, as an Irish critic, Mr. A. de Blacam, has already pointed out in an Irish weekly, too aggressive a tone in Mr. Belloc's style. A militant manner is excellent if he intends merely to produce a stronger conviction in himself and his Catholic friends. The controversial style and polemics have undoubtedly this effect. And it is natural that a distinguished ex-soldier, seeing how long Catholics have too tamely endured poisonous calumnies, should adopt a method which will at any rate startle, and, perhaps, awaken those who have quietly assumed that Catholicism is an effete system unworthy of serious note. But such a method will not make ready converts to the Catholic view; it would hardly be adopted by the praiseworthy preachers of the Catholic Evidence Guild in Hyde Park. The really deadly tracts are those that instil their views quietly, almost by a species of innuendo. Far different is the militant, superior tone of Mr. Belloc. 'All those, whether aliens or guests or parasites, who are not of our civilisation are naturally its (the Church's) enemies.' Is that really true of the Chinese infidels, and of the Africans? With truer insight does Tertullian speak of the *anima naturaliter Christiana*.

Is there not a suggestion of Chauvinism about these paradoxes. "It (Spain) did not enjoy the religious wars which revived France. . . . Spain "lost the chance of combat." "The sword fits the hand of the Church, and Catholicism is never more alive than when in arms." Even the late war, which has left its victors quarrelling over the oil-wells of Mesopotamia, is dragged into the vortex of the Faith. The Germans were not on the side of the Faith, but the English and the Americans were. Is it seriously contended that M. Clemenceau was fighting the battle of Christianity? Instead of the old cult of Teutonism Mr. Belloc, as might be expected, is trying to introduce a new cult of Gallicism. "And therefore the new world when it arose was to be a Gallic thing."

G. P.

## Book Reviews.

*Leabhar Chlainne Suibhne.* By REV. PAUL WALSH, M.A. Dollard  
Printinghouse, Limited, Dublin. Price 7/6 net.

UNDER the title of "MacSweeney's Book," Rev. Paul Walsh, of Maynooth, has edited, translated and annotated an early sixteenth century family history—the MS. original of which is preserved in the Royal Irish Academy Library. Father Walsh's work is always and above all things thorough and scholarly, and the present instalment is not less excellent than anything else its author has done. The text here edited is made, so to speak, a peg or line on which to hang a series of notes and observations—historical, genealogical and archaeological—more valuable perhaps in the aggregate than the actual text itself. As family history, this MacSweeney tract is very important; as a contribution to national history it is hardly less important; but possibly its chief value is archaeological. It abounds, after the manner of such documents, in references to obscure usages and ancient laws of the Gael, the only key to which is furnished by these repeated allusions in different contexts. Among the peculiar social and legal customs illustrated in the tract now edited are forcible occupation and appropriation of alien tribe land, obligations of hospitality and bestowal of gifts, mutual relations of overlord and tributaries, the position of constable or captain of gallow-glasses, the method of inaugurating a chieftain, etc., etc. The head of the MacSweeneys Fánad was inaugurated in a church—the Church of Kilmacrennan. In one instance conflicting claims to a vacant chieftaincy are described as decided by a wrestling match between the claimants. Some such method of settling international disputes might with profit to their subjects be adopted by modern rulers; what it lacks in dignity it would more than make up for by the gain to humanity. To the MacSweeney tract proper its editor appends MacSweeney pedigrees from the Book of Ballymote and from the genealogies of Mac Firis and O'Clery.

Though the name Suibhne (Sweeney) is itself undoubtedly Irish (it occurs on a seventh or eighth century grave-slab in Lismore Cathedral), the family came from Scotland to Ireland, where it appears to have been well-known and established by second half of the thirteenth century. The MacSweeneys, sweeping across the familiar sound from Cantire, took possession—presumably, by the sword—of the rugged if picturesque territory of Fánad, which corresponds approximately to the present Barony of Kilmacrennan, Co. Donegal. The O'Breslins, the ancient owners, were dispossessed, but unfortunately the tract does not make clear to us—what, doubtless, was common knowledge when the work was written—the provision made in Gaelic legal economy for dispossessed tribesmen. It is from the Fánad, or senior, branch that all the other MacSweeney families in Ireland draw their descent. We may enumerate as four the families so derived—MacSweeney na dTuath (Donegal), Mac SweeneyConnachtach (Sligo), Mac Sweeney Baghuineach (Donegal), and the Munster MacSweeneys (Cork). It

is extremely likely that the Clann Suibhne, like their compeers, the MacDonnells, are of ultimate Scandinavian origin and blood. Like the MacDonnells, too, the MacSweeneys came to Ireland as professional fighting men—gallow-glasses and captains of soldiery—to the chiefs of Tírconnell. It is, in fact, as hereditary and professional swordsmen that we find the Clann Suibhne retaining their territory and acquiring additional lands and castles, now in Connacht, and again in Munster. To the MacSweeney's profession of arms it is, presumably, owing that the epithet "Na dTuath" (the sobriquet of a particular branch) has come to be mistranslated "of the Battle Axes." By the battle-axe, to be sure, as O'Grady remarks, the MacSweeneys lived and by the battle-axe many of them died, but in the epithet there is no allusion to a battle-axe; "na dTuath" refers simply to the territory opposite Tory Island in which one branch of the family held sway, and from which it got its title. Of the Munster offshoot, though their Castle of Castlemore, near Macroom, is a mighty pile of great extent and strength, the MS. has little to tell. These Southern MacSweeneys were fighting-men to the MacCarthys, under whom they rose to considerable position and power.

The MS. from which Father Walsh has worked is numbered 24, P., 25, in the Academy's collection. Its contents naturally divide it into three parts, of which the first is a long series of devotional items, spiritual tracts and lives of Saints, made for Maire, the wife of Mac Sweeney Fanad, c. 1513. Part II. of the MS. is the Book of MacSweeney here presented in the Irish original and in an English translation. It was written by one Tadhg, son of Fitheal, some time between the years 1532 and 1544. The third part consists largely of metrical pieces, including some poems on the MacSweeneys. It is, of course, the second part (pp. 125-136 of the MS.) that has been made the groundwork of our present book.

The work is furnished—as so valuable a work requires and deserves to be—with an excellent index, but it has not what it would be still better if it had—a map or maps to help the student.

P. POWER.

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*Hints on Reading and Public Speaking: with Literary Notes and Appendix dealing with Cardinal Newman's Prose.* By REV. P. A. BEECHER, D.D., M.A., Professor of Sacred Eloquence and Pastoral Theology, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Fallon Brothers, Limited, Dublin and Belfast. Pp. viii. + 174. Price 3/6.

OF the men who have adopted a public career, or perhaps been forced into it by having some form of greatness thrust upon them, there are few who have not at one time or another felt the need, and entertained the hope, of swaying large audiences through the spoken word. That the hope remains unrealised in the majority of cases is not a matter for surprise. An extended course of elocution under a master of the art is a blessing not granted to many. And, though we have books without number claiming to give the theoretical principles and the practical advice that will ensure success, their study is rarely followed by the happy results so confidently promised by the compilers.

The reason would seem to lie mainly in the artificiality that charac-

terised so many of the manuals. The writers, as a rule, were not orators in any true sense of the word: they were mere teachers of elocution, men who had rarely stood on public platforms and still more rarely found their way to the heart and mind of an audience; and their want of experience led to their giving us rules without number that had little or nothing to do with actual life. On the other hand, the really efficient speakers, not being as a rule teachers of elocution, were not in a position to give us the secrets of their success—in fact, were almost incapable of analysing their art, because it largely came to them by instinct. Both teachers and speakers had something valuable to contribute: and, seeing how seldom both capacities are combined in the same individual, the defective character of the books was only what might have been expected.

From that point of view, Dr. Beecher is well qualified to inaugurate a new departure. He has proved himself in pulpit and on platform, has been professor of Sacred Eloquence in Maynooth College for the last sixteen years, and had previously occupied a similar position in New York. The results of his experience in both departments are combined in his little book. He quite recognises the difficulties of the situation. Students, he says, "take up a book on the subject and see there bewildering rules about rising and falling inflexions, not to speak of the 'compound rise and compound fall,' as well as the 'double wave': they lose heart and say, 'Such is not for me, and, even if I tried, I should only make myself singular, for no one speaks like that in the ordinary intercourse of life.' Let me state frankly (he continues) that these pages have been written to combat the artificiality so prevalent in books." This thought is dominant throughout: he trusts largely to nature, which "has taught us to use our tongues without our knowing how." His chapters on breathing, articulation, emphasis, gesture, pausing, thought-colouring, and dramatic recitation in its several varieties, are all inspired by this same principle; and his treatment of "conversational delivery" (pp. 60-106) is a new and refreshing experience for anyone who has been troubled in the past by the conventional rules that were once accepted as the last word in oratorical art. Passages like the following, for instance, suggest possibilities even for the least gifted: "The highest achievement in public speaking is the power to preserve the fine, natural, flexible tones of ordinary conversational speech, while, at the same time, one pitches the voice so as to be heard in every part of a church or hall." Of course, the reader is warned that "ordinary conversation will not do: it would seem too trivial: it would be heard by but few: it would be what the French so aptly describe as 'speaking into one's waist-coat.'" But hints are given how to raise the rippling tones of conversation into the higher register demanded by the purpose in view.

We should be sorry, though, to convey the idea that the book is merely a treatise on elocution. The author's aim has been to make it a treatise on literature as well; and the success he has attained justifies us in recommending it even to those who take no interest in elocution. The best masters of English prose and verse are laid under contribution, and notes are added calling attention to the beauty, force or other special characteristic of the extracts selected. Dr. Beecher's own style, we may add, is clear and pleasing: it preserves its rhythm from first to last and carries the reader on almost uncon-

sciously—perhaps the most exacting test we can apply to a didactic work. He gives evidence of having followed his own advice—by making a special study of Cardinal Newman, whose sermon on “The Second Spring” he reprints and analyses. “The student,” he tells us, “who wishes to acquire a style that will be free from the mannerisms so often caught from imitation, who would attune his ear to rhythmic prose, who desires to cultivate his mind by contact with thought that comes unrefracted through transparent words, is advised to become a literary disciple of the Cardinal, whose place as a prose-writer, even amongst the greatest, is detached and alone.”

The book, we feel confident, will do a great amount of good. It not only removes the obstacles that used to dishearten so many: it supplies the light and encouragement that will guide students, young and old, along the more natural and more attractive path the author would have them follow. To hope to make orators of us all would perhaps be too high an ideal: possibly it would be more correct to say that it would not be ideal at all. But, if a respectable minority of our public speakers of the future reach the higher plane, and if the general body attain ease and fluency enough to make their efforts a pleasure to themselves and to their audience, the result will be due in no small degree to the methods advocated by Dr. Beecher.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

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*The Catholic Doctrine of Grace.* By REV. G. H. JOYCE, S.J. Pp. 267. Price 6/- net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

THIS is a work that is likely to prove of much greater practical utility than its title would suggest. It is not addressed to the clergy, nor is it meant to fill the place of a text-book for ecclesiastical students. It is a book for the laity—for the non-Catholic seeker after truth, who sees every religious organisation except the Catholic Church disintegrating around him; and for the Catholic, who now-a-days so often finds himself called on to give an account of the faith that is in him. One has only to consider the atmosphere into which Catholic young men preparing for the professions are plunged in many of the centres of higher education in these countries, or, again, the immense output of rationalistic and sceptical literature that issues from the press of Great Britain, to realise how necessary it is to provide the educated laity with a work, or series of works, that will give them a clear knowledge of what the Church teaches, without the technical and linguistic difficulties of our ordinary theological text-books. Father Joyce has set himself to supply this well-defined and very real want in one large department of theology, and we congratulate him on the result of his labours.

The order adopted in this volume differs very considerably from that with which we are familiar in the theological text-books, but otherwise the author follows the “common teaching,” omitting as far as possible all domestic controversies. We regret that space will not allow us to give more than the briefest outline of the contents of the volume. The first two chapters deal with sanctifying grace. The author explains at considerable length the meaning of divine sonship,



divine adoption, regeneration, participation of divine nature, etc., with a view to showing what exactly our elevation to the supernatural order implies. His treatment of these points is particularly good. Having shown what man is, when raised to the supernatural life of grace, he goes on in the next chapter to point out what man is apart from grace. He concludes this chapter with a very appropriate reference to "modern Pelagianism." The next two chapters are devoted to certain corollaries of the state of grace, chiefly the supernatural virtues and the gifts and indwelling of the Holy Ghost. Chapters VI and VII. deal with justification (acquisition of grace) and perseverance respectively. Next in order come two chapters on "Growth in Grace"—the first dealing with merit, and the second with the sacraments. Three chapters on "The Loss and Recovery of Grace," "The Church the Home of Grace," and "Grace and Glory" completes the volume.

The author has handled a difficult subject with great judgment, and in our opinion has achieved a decided success. There are some points here and there, the treatment of which might perhaps be clearer—though the want of clearness is sometimes the fault of the "common opinion" expounded rather than of our author himself. If, for instance, man "retained the full complement of his natural powers" after the fall, the reader may well ask how he can be "worse off by far" now than he would be in the state of pure nature. The "natural helps" mentioned in this context are either due or undue to man as such, and in neither case do they seem to offer an explanation of the difficulty. Again, the use of the words "inclination" and "tendency" in connection with the supernatural virtues savours of a compromise between the *facility* given by acquired virtues and the *capacity* given by infused virtues. The author's treatment of the distribution of grace appears to be a little incomplete without a reference either to the *Epistle to the Romans*, x., 14, or the Vatican Council's definition of "faith." In this connection the reader will also notice that, while he admits a *limbus infantium* for children who die unbaptised, Father Joyce rejects the idea of a *limbus adultorum* on the ground that "Scripture would appear to teach with sufficient plainness that there are but two alternatives for men—heaven and hell." But do not infants come under the term "men" for the purposes of eternal destiny? We mention these points merely by way of suggestions for the author's consideration, when he comes to prepare a second edition. We heartily recommend Father Joyce's book, not merely to the laity to whom it is primarily addressed, but to the missionary clergy as well. The latter will find in it matter for many useful and interesting instructions to their people. The book is well printed and neatly turned out.

W. MORAN.

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*Science and Theology.* By T. W. WESTAWAY. Blackie and Son, 50 Old Bailey, London; Glasgow and Bombay. Pp. 346.

THE purpose of the present work is excellent. It strives to effect an *entente* between modern science and theology. The author usefully suggests that certain concessions must be made by scientists. Certain

hypotheses must not be considered for all practical purposes as demonstrated truths; of such is the hypothesis of evolution. Also, scientists must not quietly assume that there is no room or use for a discussion of ultimate questions, for metaphysics and theology. Mr. Westaway well says that even primitive men were men enough to turn their thoughts towards a future life. His book will, then, serve a useful purpose in making modern investigators more sympathetic towards the really fundamental questions of life and destiny. But he suggests, also, that concessions must be made by theology; indeed the prophet, Jonah, is practically to be swallowed by the whale of science.

No one reading this book will fail to recognise that its author has the merit of thinking for himself. It may not always display a safe or great power of inference, but it is something to have given to us the author's fresh and first-hand views of reality. Sometimes he applies a delicate needle of criticism to probe the superficialities of present-day politics. He believes that the party system is an enemy to the scientific quest for truth; all the more so because it is sometimes controlled by lawyers who have a facility in making the worse appear the better cause. He well says that pure logic consists in drawing conclusions from premises, whereas political logic (and sometimes lawyers' and school-men's logic) means searching for premises to fit foregone conclusions. Thus the mind becomes twisted, and its views distorted.

It is, also, a pleasure to read the author's analysis of the reasons for the profound differences of opinion that prevail amongst men on even the most vital questions. It is a pleasure that is akin to reading a subtle analysis of motives in modern psychological novels, such as those of Henry James. True, the author in this case seems to have been considerably helped by the subtle mind of Mr. Balfour in penetrating to the very roots of beliefs, scientific, theological, and commonplace. "We asked why," says Mr. Westaway, "with precisely the same objective facts before them, different thinkers draw different inferences and build up such fundamentally different systems of opinion and beliefs. . . . Our reasons are in part due to temperament, in part due to the opinions and beliefs already stored away in the mind. Temperament is a virtually unchangeable factor: a pessimist, for example, will never see things with the eyes of an optimist. But the existing content of the mind at any time is very largely an affair of accident. In no small measure it is due to the particular environment of childhood. The mind of the pre-adolescent is readily susceptible to impressions and receives opinions uncritically. Its content will therefore depend upon the society in which the child has moved and the education it has received. A parent or a teacher who desires a child to grow up with definite political, social or religious leanings, takes in hand a very easy task; the clay is readily moulded, and into it ineradicable prejudices are readily wrought. Each adult mind's stock of ideas, opinions, beliefs, convictions, doubts and prejudices has, then, come to it, often unconsciously, through early environment and education, through language, from friends and acquaintances, from books and newspapers, and from other sources almost innumerable. . . . Thus, whilst it is true that the content is due to experience, the greater part of the experience has been unconsciously acquired; and when in later life the mind attempts to bring this content under critical review it not only fails to trace the greater part of it

to its origin, but all unsuspectingly is apt to accept it as something which has come to it from outside experience, as innate, and perhaps as inspired. . . . It is not a question of insincerity of conviction or of even analysable personal prejudice. . . . We ask which is the more probable of two hypotheses, and we allow our intuitions to decide, but our intuitions are coloured by our prejudices."

The foregoing explanation will, also, explain many of the grave defects of the present volume. The author is unduly influenced by his age and environment, by the modern mania of doubt. With him nearly everything in heaven and earth, in theology and science, is a subject of doubt, of mere intuitive probability; even the existence of God and the uniformity of the laws of nature. We suggest that this is against nature, against common-sense. The undoubting beggar-wife is nearer to nature and God than the ultra-modern philosopher. That philosophy is doomed which fights against common-sense (a common-sense that unhesitatingly recognises a Great Intelligence behind the world) and against nature whose tendency is towards certitude.

If the existence of God is not a matter of demonstrative certainty (but of faith) to the author, it is no wonder that he questions also the physical resurrection and the virgin-birth. But is it playing fair to call all this a restatement of the old belief, as does Mr. Westaway following Mr. Streeter and the other authors of *Foundations*?

Would that all this reserve and doubt were diverted to the author's alleged matters of fact, such as, that St. John Chrysostom defended lying (no reference is given), that a German in affairs of self-interest does not hesitate to lie to a non-German, that the Romanist is taught that in religious knowledge no progress is possible (Shades of St. Vincent of Lerins and of the bishops of the Vatican Council be still!), that it is the duty of the Roman priest to hold that the Scriptures are final in questions of science. These contain misrepresentations and blunders which place blots, not on Catholicism, but on the work of the author.

G. PIERSE.

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*Mother of Divine Grace: A Chapter on the Theology of the Immaculate.*

By REV. STANISLAUS M. HOGAN, O.P., Pp. 174. Price 6/- net.  
London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

IN this volume we have a discussion of the prerogatives and privileges of the Blessed Virgin, covering the whole ground of Mariology. The author tells us in his preface that "it is not a 'pious' book: it is frankly theological." He leads us, therefore, to expect a strictly scientific treatment of the subject. Most of the questions discussed are naturally of a speculative character, and involve a considerable amount of *a priori* reasoning. The author draws to the fullest extent on the evidence deducible from revelation for the solution of these questions; and, as he appears to be quite a master of the *a priori* method, his arguments are frequently very keen. So far he is "frankly theological." But he goes a step farther. Having exhausted, so to speak, the sources of positive information, he appears to have turned for light to another source, that is not strictly scientific. Without

expressly stating it, he tacitly assumes as a working principle that every conceivable perfection is to be predicated of the Blessed Virgin except such as are positively excluded by revelation or reason. We have the gravest doubts about the theological value of that principle and the conclusions based on it. Both the principle and the conclusions may indeed be true; but they can hardly be regarded as having any greater authority than that of pious beliefs. They appear to us to be outside the scope of a strictly theological work. For this reason some of Father Hogan's most far-reaching conclusions appear to rest on very shaky premises. He tells us, for instance, that Our Blessed Lady enjoyed the use of reason from the first moment of her conception, that she received from God at the same time a vast store of infused knowledge, that in the use of these gifts her soul through life was independent of the co-operation of her brain and bodily organs, and that consequently her life was one of active, uninterrupted union with God, unbroken even by sleep. Again, her "knowledge must have been as great as the knowledge possessed by angels . . . as extensive as the knowledge which Adam possessed as head of the race . . . she must in her knowledge of creation, of the universe and of history have excelled the greatest of philosophers, and in her theological knowledge the greatest of theologians." She even enjoyed the Beatific Vision, though "not permanently, but in a transient way." While these and many similar statements may possibly be true, and while the author does not put them forward as being beyond dispute, nevertheless we think that they contain much that might reasonably be considered extravagant in a book that purports to be "frankly theological" as opposed to merely "pious." Although we are inclined to find fault with Father Hogan's book on the grounds just mentioned, we do not wish to suggest that it is not well worthy of study. The reader will find in it not only a very full exposition and a keen appreciation of the glories of Mary, but also a formidable array of authorities and arguments in defence of the same. The volume is well printed and bound.

W. MORAN.

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*The Mystical Knowledge of God.* By SAVINIEN LOUISMET, O.S.B. Pp. 84. Price 2/6 cloth. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Orchard Street, London, W.

*The Mystical Life.* Pp. 128. Price 3/6 cloth. Same Author and Publishers.

*Divine Contemplation for All.* Pp. 195. Price 5/6 cloth. Same Author and Publishers.

THE title of the last-mentioned of these little volumes excellently describes their laudable purpose. We know of no other works that make mysticism more attractive. The effect is produced by the format, by the easy-flowing excellent English, by the simple and popular language. The author rightly insists that mysticism is nothing remote from life; many will be surprised—like M. Jourdain when he learned that he used prose—to hear from the author that they have been mystics all their lives. With the development of this thought of the easiness of mysticism there has, perhaps, grown in the author's

mind the tendency to discard the unfortunate word, mysticism, for a more intelligible, though still somewhat unhappy, term, "Contemplation." At any rate, when the author comes to explain those big words in his simple style, he tells us of a child-like love of God. But, while admitting that mysticism is essentially no extraordinary phenomenon, the author sadly confesses that through carelessness, or want of proper direction, an immense number do not advance beyond the preliminary stages. Incidentally, one sees how much handicapped are those confessors who have not such a ready knowledge of the advanced stages of the Spiritual life as to be able to direct not only themselves but others. Indeed they run the risk of becoming like those Pharisees, who not only did not enter the Kingdom themselves but caused others not to enter.

As an illustration of the real mystical life, the author in the last page of his last book refers to an incident of childhood when formal letters and words are thrown aside in addressing parents. "Tossing away the silly paper we threw ourselves into the arms lovingly outstretched to us, and kissed and were kissed to our heart's content. Ah! that was the real thing."

The author not merely describes the three ascending degrees of mystical life, which are not, however, mutually exclusive, but he gives the tests by which we are enabled to know them. As to the initial stage of Purification from sin, one must have, 1st, against sloth, alacrity; 2nd, against concupiscence, self-control; 3rd, against ill-will, kindliness. For the second degree, or Heroic Practice of Virtues, there must be possession of one's soul in quiet, displeasure with the world, love of solitude, thirst for perfection, contempt of the opinions of men. For the third degree, or Habitual Mental Prayer, one must have the gift of the Presence of God and of the Beatitudes and Fruits of the Holy Ghost; also complete self-surrender to the action of the Holy Spirit.

The author gives this piquant definition of Mystical Life: It consists in a man's working with God at his own making, every day of his life. For the purpose of the present life is to give each man time to make of himself, with the help of God, that exquisite masterpiece, a saint.

G. PIERSE.

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*St. Bernard's Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles.* Translated by a Priest of Mount Melleray. Vol. I.; xxiii.+497 pp. 9/- net. Dublin: Browne and Nolan.

As the translator reminds us in the preface, the writings of St. Bernard were more universally read, and republished more frequently, than the work of any other of the Fathers. He was one of the greatest figures of his age, and had powerful influence on the religion and on the literature of the succeeding centuries. Like all the Fathers, his worth is now appreciated by the few, for the simple reason that few have the energy or the inclination to read him in the Latin original. The new taste which has recently developed for the works of the old masters has stimulated writers in many lands to present selections from the Fathers in the vernacular; as, for example, the excellent

series published by S.P.C.K. The present work well deserves to become one of the most popular. Though entitled Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles, they are by no means allegorical expositions of that book like—e.g., Chrysostom's Sermons on Genesis. The connection with Canticles is of the slightest. He quotes a text, and after a few sentences gives himself free rein and rarely returns to Canticles—in other words, the text serves merely as a title to the Sermon. The beautiful discourse on the death of his brother (Sermon xxvi.) is developed from the text, "As the tents of Cedar, as the curtains of Solomon"; a sermon on Detraction from the words, "The righteous love thee." Thus the preacher discusses every aspect of the spiritual life, while the slender thread of texts from Canticles gives the collection a kind of unity. The present volume is to be followed by two similar ones containing selected discourses, and we trust that the enterprise of translator and publisher will be rewarded with the success which it deserves.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*Two Centuries of Life in Down, 1600-1800..* By JOHN STEVENSON.  
Belfast: McCaw, Stevenson and Orr, Ltd. Price 21/.

WE are fortunate in possessing abundant materials describing the circumstances under which the famous Scottish settlement in Co. Down was effected in the early years of the seventeenth century. The two prime movers in this new colonization were James Hamilton and Hugh Montgomery, both of them Scotsmen and friends at the court of James I., and both later elevated to the peerage as, respectively, Viscount Clanneboy and Viscount Montgomery of the Ards. The documents now embodied in the Hamilton Manuscripts and in the Montgomery Manuscripts were put together about the year 1700, and they supply not only narratives of the careers of the founders of these Irish families, but also illustrate the episodes in which they and their descendants were important actors. The present volume recounts the same story in less ponderous and far more attractive form. It deals with the great personages responsible for the Presbyterian settlement in Down, and likewise discusses the character of the first colonists, their common life, the new religious establishment they brought with them, their schools and education, reading and travels—in a word, all the surroundings of these people, high and low, whose coming marks an era in the history of north-east Ulster. The whole is presented without the bitterness one often finds in works dealing with such a subject, with a rare modesty too, and with a wealth of illustration, documentary and graphic, culled from the archives of northern families, and from the usual public repositories of such material.

The story of the enrichment of Hamilton and Montgomery with the lands of the O'Neills of Clanneboy is certainly an extraordinary one. The last Irish chief of that country, Sir Conn O'Neill, was imprisoned at the end of Elizabeth's reign in Carrickfergus, but his escape was compassed by the enterprise of Sir Hugh Montgomery, then residing at Braidstane in Scotland. The two noblemen proceeded to London. O'Neill, probably foreseeing the loss of all his broad acres, was induced to make a surrender of his estate to Hamilton,



and Hamilton contracted to share the whole property with his Scottish friend, and with the original owner. In 1605 the bargain was confirmed by a King's Letter, and all three came to Ireland. In the course of years O'Neill was gradually relieved of the remaining portion of his estate, and his son, Daniel O'Neill, well-known at the English Court, did not possess an acre of the ancient inheritance of Clann Aodha Bhuidhe.

These proceedings have drawn severe censure on the parties engaged therein, and on Sir Arthur Chichester, who aided and abetted them. Mr. T. M. Healy discusses them in *Stolen Waters*, and in *The Great Fraud of Ulster*, nor does the present writer take pains to justify the wholesale robbery of the O'Neills and their clansmen. It is a pity, however, that the term "wild Irish" has been used in the book before us, as if the ancient inhabitants were quite properly cleared from the newly colonised district.

The most serious drawback in Mr. Stevenson's work is the want of an adequate description of the Gaelic background in the scene upon which the Scots entered. A few remarks about ancient Bangor is the only prelude to the story the book unfolds. It is quite clear Mr. Stevenson is very mixed as to events prior to the year 1600. In his opening chapter he mentions two of the three last chiefs of southern Clannaboy (one by a wrong name), while the third seems to have escaped his notice altogether. Conn, son of Niall Og, claimed the country, and spent the years 1567-1575 in the hands of the English. In 1584 he had a grant of the territory from Sir John Perrot, and he died at Castlreagh without heir on April 7, 1589. His successor was Niall, son of Brian Fertagh, who was married to Earl Hugh O'Neill's first (divorced) wife. This chief Mr. Stevenson altogether ignores. Niall died prior to April 12, 1601, "a good subject," says Chichester. His son was Sir Conn, who bartered away Clanneboy to Hamilton. Mr. Stevenson refers to him as "Conn mac Brian Fertagh." He is not altogether to blame for this error, as the published patents of Hamilton often wrongly style him in this manner. But the proper designation is "Conn mac Neill mac Brian Fertagh," as will be found, for example, in Erck's *Repertory*, page 245. I may add that his son Conn Og was slain at the battle of Clones on May 13, 1643.

The printing and illustrations in Mr. Stevenson's volume are a real credit to the firm which publishes it.

PAUL WALSH.

*Le Néo-Réalisme Américain.* Par RENE KREMER, C.S.S.R., Docteur en Philosophie; Agrégé de l'Ecole Saint-Thomas. Louvain: Institut de Philosophie. Paris: Alcan. Pp. x.+310. 8vo.

WE welcome this volume as an evidence that Cardinal Mercier's well-known Philosophical Institute has survived the shock of the war and still upholds its high traditions. The author tells us he commenced his researches into contemporary American Philosophy prior to 1914, and continued them under great difficulties, partly at Oxford, until he at length achieved his task. It was a laborious one, for it entailed consulting a multitude of sources—not only books, but numerous

philosophical periodicals. He has apparently spared no pains to produce a thoroughly well documented historical and critical study. The volume bears the date 1920, and is dedicated to Mgr. Deploige, Mercier's distinguished successor as President of the Institute.

A present-day movement towards realism in philosophy has a special interest for the scholastic—who still found the truth in a form of realism even when this was a term of reproach. Such a movement can be discerned in the writings of a growing group of American thinkers in very recent years. Apparently Pragmatism will soon prove to have been but a fleeting fashion. Whether the "New Realism" will fare better it is hard to say. For America is still young in philosophic thought, and has found no safe anchorage so far in exploring the ocean of human experience with the help of such scattered lights as it has borrowed from the Old World. In the opening chapter of the present volume the gradual evolution of the realist tendency is traced through the opposing currents of Idealism and Pragmatism. The expressions of this tendency are naturally very tentative and uncertain, though never wanting in vigour and militancy. There is no outstanding name, but a growing group with fairly definite fundamental lines of thought in common. The attitude of the new group towards Idealism and Pragmatism is set forth in separate chapters. We have next an attempt to map out the programme of the New Realism. After which three chapters are devoted to (1) its theory of knowledge; (2) its treatment of the problem of truth and error; and (3) its ethics or theory of values. A concluding chapter discusses the immediate origins of the new tendency, its shortcomings and limitations, and incidentally its points of approximation to Scholastic Realism. The author's exposition throughout is objective and historical rather than critical; but his own definite philosophical standpoint enables him to pierce the vague and floating terminology of the new realist writers, to dispel the mist of words which half conceals their hesitations and failures, and so inform the reader of the precise value and promise of their contribution to current philosophical literature. His book will help to make American philosophy better known in Europe, and will be widely and deservedly appreciated.

P. COFFEY.

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*A Manual of the Ceremonies of Low Mass.* By the REV. L. KUENZEL. F. Pustet Co. (Inc.), New York and Cincinnati: and B. Herder, London. 1920. Pp. 191. 12/6 net.

THE subject matter of this volume is more extensive than its title implies. After treating of the various kinds of Churches and Oratories and the time when Mass can be celebrated, the author discusses in the light of the New Code and recent decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites the Altar and its ornaments, the vestments and the sacred vessels, the bread and wine required for the Sacrifice of the Mass, and finally the Ceremonies of the Mass. Writing of the blessings and consecrations of the various vestments and vessels he quotes a decree of the S.C.R. dealing with the reconsecration of the chalice and paten. He says (par 157, § 2) that the chalice and paten lose their consecration when they have been re-plated. This state-

ment is, according to the New Code, incorrect. Canon 1305, § 2, is: "Calix et patena non amittunt consecrationem ob . . . renovationem auraturae . . ." It is surely an inadvertence also of the writer to state (in par. 496) that the Offertory is to be read in the *secret* voice.

The greater portion of the book is devoted to the Ceremonies of Low Mass. We have sections dealing with the actions common to the different parts of the Mass, such as the movements of the head and shoulders, the positions of the hands, and the making of the Sign of the Cross. This is followed by a detailed treatment of the Ceremonies of Low Mass familiar to Irish priests from O'Callaghan's "Ceremonies." The matter is the same, but the manner of exposition is different. For the discussion of the Mass from the beginning to the Canon, and from the Purification of the Chalice to the end, each double page is divided into five sections, in one of which the author gives the part of the Mass; in two others the ceremonies and the tone of the voice for that part; and in the two remaining sections the ceremonies peculiar to a Requiem Mass, and to a Mass said before the Blessed Sacrament exposed. For the Canon of the Mass there are two sections, one for the different parts of the Canon and the other for the Ceremonies.

This arrangement makes for clearness, and renders the revision of his Rubrics easy to the seminarian before his Ordination. It will be found equally convenient by the priest in revising his Ceremonies at the annual retreat. A notable feature of the book is that the author supports every statement by quoting his authorities, and there are copious and definite references to the New Code, to the Decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, to the General Rubrics of the Mass, to the *Ritus celebrandi*, to the *Rituale Romanum* and *Pontificale Romanum*, and to a number of writers of recognised authority.

D. MAGEEAN.

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*Domicile and Quasi-Domicile: An Historical and Practical Study in Canon Law.* By REV. NEIL FARREN, B.A., B.D., D.C.L. Pp. viii.+127. Dublin: Gill and Son, Ltd. 1920. Price 8/6.

IN the universal revival of interest in Canon Law, due to the publication of the Code, it is pleasing to find that Ireland is not backward. It is now a good many years since the establishment of a Faculty of Canon Law in Maynooth, with power to confer degrees, but while the minor degrees have been conferred on very many students, none hitherto had elected to continue his studies for the further necessary period. Our congratulations, then, are due to Dr. Farren on being the first to secure the *Laurea* from the Maynooth Faculty, as the result of a brilliant examination, and the approval of the thesis which is now published.

Nobody needs to be told of the importance of the subject of Dr. Farren's dissertation. He says in his preface: "The ramifications of this institution are manifold. Its influence in subjecting one to local laws and local superiors is almost exclusive; it is the most important factor in determining judicial competence; the right of

administering and receiving the sacraments is in very many cases dependent upon it; it is usually the deciding consideration on the question of funeral and other offerings."

The history of Domicile is highly interesting. Dr. Farren begins with the germ of the idea, contained in the *origo* of Roman Civil Law. This *origo* was the source of citizen rights and duties, and was acquired in various ways. In the next chapter, the author goes on to show how the real meaning of *origo* was perverted by the jurists of Bologna, and made into a species of domicile. From these beginnings the Domicile grew and developed, the different views in regard to its constituent elements affording a most interesting example of the evolution of an institution.

In Chapter III. the rise and development of Quasi-domicile are similarly fully explained. The Quasi-domicile, it is well known, is a purely ecclesiastical institution, originating at the time of the Council of Trent. Here, too, it is only as the result of a slow development that the modern, well-defined institution has emerged.

In Chapter IV. the author deals with the legislation of the Code, which, as everyone is aware, has made matters much simpler by the recognition of alternative means by which both domicile and quasi-domicile may be secured. In his final Chapter, he explains the principal effects of domicile and quasi-domicile, in regard to laws, sacraments, and funeral rites.

This brief summary will suffice to show that Dr. Farren has given a valuable contribution to Canonical Science. No one book covered the same ground before. Our only regret is that the author could not, in the circumstances, give a much more extended treatment of the subject. His work, we think, could with profit be extended to double the size. But, alas! young authors have no inexhaustible bank accounts to fall back upon, and Dr. Farren has shown his courage in venturing to publish at all. We can only express the sincere hope that the past *alumni* of Maynooth, in particular, will now rally to his aid. For a modest amount they can provide themselves with an admirable study of an important subject, well and clearly written, copiously documented, and turned out in a style that can challenge comparison.

P. O'NEILL.

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*Sunday School Sermonettes.* By CANON J. S. RICHTER. Pp. 420.  
Price 10/6 net.

*Short Sermons for the Sundays of the Year.* By REV. J. R. NEWELL,  
O.P., P.G. Pp. 167. Price 7/- net. New York: Joseph F.  
Wagner; London: B. Herder.

I. THE aim of this work is to provide for Catholic children a course of instruction in Christian doctrine that will give them a solid grounding in the truths of faith, and thereby fortify them against the dangers that will confront them when they go out into the irreligious atmosphere of the world of to-day. As these instructions are primarily

arranged for delivery at a children's Mass or children's "Sunday School," the individual discourses are of necessity brief. Some of them may appear to readers in this country unnecessarily so. We have no doubt, however, that if there be any fault in this respect, it is a fault on the right side; children are not usually capable of prolonged concentration of serious attention on a particular subject. On the basis of one lecture per week Canon Richter's course of instructions will cover a period of three years, which after all is not an unduly protracted period where there is question of school-going children. The work is divided into three approximately equal divisions. The first deals with faith, the creed, the nature and attributes of God, the creation, fall and redemption, the natures and personality of Christ, the Church and the last things. The second portion deals with the commandments of God and of the Church, the seven deadly sins and the virtues. In the last division the author treats of grace, the sacraments, prayer and certain religious ceremonies and customs. While the individual discourses are brief, they contain in their *ensemble* a very sound exposition of Catholic belief, quite full enough for any ordinary lay Catholic. They are carefully prepared with a view to the capacity of youthful audiences, and dispense as far as possible with technical and other difficult expressions likely to prove unintelligible to the minds of children. Most of the discourses contain some little admonition by way of application of the doctrines discussed. The author draws on Scripture very freely throughout, and he takes the precaution of preparing his hearers for a proper appreciation of it, by devoting a couple of instructions at the very beginning of the work to "God's Divine Revelation" and "Holy Scripture." We recommend Canon Richter's book to all who are charged with the religious instruction of the young. It should prove useful in Ireland not merely to the missionary clergy, but also to the lay teachers who take such a large part in the religious education of the children in the Irish primary schools.

II. This volume is a reprint of a series of sermons already published in the *Homiletic Monthly and Pastoral Review*. We do not feel called on, therefore, to say more than a few words about Father Newell's work. The author remarks in a foreword that "There is to-day a widespread tendency to make religion merely a matter of sentiment and of conduct, and to ignore entirely the dogmatic truths upon which religion is founded. It is to counteract this dangerous tendency that the Church more and more insists on dogmatic preaching, and it is to conform to the mind and wishes of the Church . . . that subjects almost exclusively dogmatic were chosen for these sermons." These words explain sufficiently the purpose of the sermons. In working out his plan the author wastes no words; he goes at once *in medias res*. There is neither padding nor striving after effect in his discourses; he gives a plain, practical statement of the doctrine, with a suitable exhortation by way of peroration. The sermons are all short—about three pages on an average—but they are suggestive, and contain matter enough for development, if development be deemed advisable by the clerical reader for whose use they appear to be primarily intended.

Both volumes are well printed and bound.

W. MORAN.

*Tertullian Against Praxeas.* Translated by A. SOULTER, D.Litt. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 6 St. Martin's Place, London, W.C.2. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. 125. Price 5/-

*The Treatise of Novation on the Trinity.* Translated by HERBERT MOORE, M.A. Same Publishers. Pp. 147. Price 6/-.

THE aim of this series of translations is to provide handy and cheap text-books for students, either working for themselves or in colleges. The texts are unencumbered by commentaries or elaborate notes. The editors deserve every congratulation we can give them on their high desire to spread a knowledge of the early Christian writers. The translations have been entrusted to expert scholars. The two present works deal with the doctrine of the Trinity.

Mr. Moore shows the connection between Novatian and Tertullian. "Novatian adopted an impossible ideal of a perfectly pure Church, and his sect received the name Cathari, or Puritans; and like modern Puritans, who have left the Church as falling short of their ideals of a community composed only of holy persons, they took a severe view of what constitutes sinfulness, condemning many things which the Church regarded as being inevitable and innocent accompaniments of our life on earth. This was in part due to the influence of the African writer Tertullian. The characteristic of the African Church was a certain gloomy severity; Tertullian's legal training had predisposed him in this direction, and he used his great powers of argument, sarcasm and invective to urge his views. . . . Novatian emphasises the derivative and the subordinate nature of the Godhead of the Son, in his anxiety to avoid the suggestion that there are two Gods, and the alternative that the Son is less than God, and only the Son of Man." It is interesting to note that Tertullian uses the formula that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father through the Son.

G. PIERSE.

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*A Commentary on Canon Law.* By the REV. P. CHAS. AUGUSTINE, O.S.B., D.D. Vol. IV.: on the Sacraments (except Matrimony) and Sacramentals. 1920. B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis; 68 Great Russell Street, London. Pp. x.+572. Price 12/6 net.

THE fourth volume of Fr. Augustine's commentary—fifth, really, in order of publication—has just come to hand. It covers over 300 canons—all those on Baptism, Confirmation, Penance, Extreme Unction and Holy Orders, and the few on Ordination Procedure (1993-8) and on the Sacramentals (1144-53). From many points of view it calls for praise and commendation. Nearly every problem that can arise in connexion with the subjects mentioned is discussed somewhere or other in the book, though, of course, not every conclusion



arrived at will command all-round approval and acceptance. The author dispenses more or less with the efforts of his brother-commentators, but refers us at every stage to the decrees of Popes, Councils, Tribunals and Congregations that form the basis of canonical legislation. From beginning to end there is evidence of deep reading and extensive research.

But we cannot help feeling sometimes that there is perhaps too much importance laid on the ancient sources to the detriment of the Code itself. The sources, we admit, are cited in Cardinal Gasparri's annotated edition, but not as if they harmonised completely with the new legislation; in fact, we are warned in his Preface that the very opposite is not unfrequently the case. So, when we read over the liberal terms of canon 809 in reference to the lawfulness of saying Mass for all on earth or in Purgatory, we think it a pity that doubt should be thrown on the Church's generosity by the citation of comparatively rigid replies of nearly a century ago. When canon 882 assures us that non-approved priests may validly and lawfully hear the confession of dying persons, even in the presence of approved confessors, we think it rather invidious to repeat old exceptions on the strength of a decision of the year 1864. And so of a number of other cases.

In many portions of the work, too, we find mistakes and careless expressions. To give a few examples. Excommunicates are declared "incapable" of receiving the Sacraments (20). On page 28 we get the unnecessary assurance that a "Greek priest may validly baptise his subjects with water blessed according to the Greek rite"; on page 49 that one "essential" condition for the administration of Baptism is that the subject be born; on p. 71 that a priest or deacon is obliged, in case of danger of death, to employ (not merely the ceremonies that follow the baptism, but) "the prescribed ceremonies and rites." The Roman Court, it is said, will not tolerate, except for reasons of "strict necessity," that one man stand for all the *confirmandi* (119): a defence is attempted of the author's previous interpretation of canon 33, by which he allowed the use of "sidereal" time (142): those who order the cremation of their bodies after death "cannot" be given the last Sacraments, unless they "retract the order," but in certain cases "may be admitted" without any retraction (232): the "secret of the Holy Office" is described as being the secret of confession (256), though a different meaning is immediately given in a note: the Pope is identified with the *magisterium ecclesiasticum* (316): foundlings are said to have a *locus originis* in the place where they were born (429), etc., etc.

So that the reader's estimate of this fifth volume will be the same as he has probably formed of its predecessors. It is full of learning, full of ancient and venerable citations, full of the thought and spirit and outlook of a man who formed his convictions, and formed them well, before the Code was published. But, on the details of any problem that arises under the new order, the budding casuist would be well-advised to accept its statements with a fair amount of caution.

The style is easy, free and straightforward: the publishers' work admirable.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

*Economic Democracy.* By MAJOR C. H. DOUGLAS. London. Cecil Palmer, Oakley House, Bloomsbury Street, W.C.1. 154 pp. 8vo. 5/- net.

*Credit-Power and Democracy.* With a Draft Scheme for the Mining Industry. Same Author and Publishers (with Commentary on Included Scheme, by A. R. ORAGE, Editor of "The New Age"). 212 pp. 8vo. 7/6 net.

If the sympathy of the Catholic priest and the Catholic social worker is on the side of the victims of economic oppression, this is a sufficient reason for directing attention in the *IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY* to what are undoubtedly thought-compelling studies of the root causes of the present world-wide industrial unrest and threatened revolt against the Capitalist system. Under the title of *Economic Democracy* we have an able analysis of the present economic structure of society—an analysis which aims at bringing to light as the fundamental iniquity of capitalism the usurpation and monopolisation of Financial Credit, which belongs of right to the community, by the world's big lords of finance, who are thus enabled to exploit indefinitely the mortgaged labour power of the present and future generations of the world's productive workers. The thesis is not exactly a new discovery, but it is, perhaps, not too much to say that it is novel and startling to the general public. The author's attempt to vindicate and illustrate it obliges him to grapple with the very fundamentals of economics—with the aim of production and distribution; the cost of production; labour and capital and wages and profits; the just price of commodities; the nature and function of credit; purchasing power, and the medium of exchange, and so on. This he does on the whole successfully, indeed so successfully that these remarkable books—which are reprints from *The New Age*—form a serious challenge to the whole financial credit system of Capitalism. He points out that financial credit in the Capitalist system is simply a mortgage or lien on the potential labour capacity of future generations of the world's workers; that it belongs of right to the workers, or rather to the community; that it should be drawn upon only by public authority; that its advantages, belonging to the community, should accrue only to the community; but that in defiance of natural equity it has been usurped by the world's finance magnates; that they operate it through the credit banking system to keep the real purchasing power of the medium of exchange ("money"—which is mostly paper, i.e., credit) so deflated that the worker is kept on the verge of starvation despite any rise in wages.

What, then, is the remedy? "There is no doubt whatever that the first step towards dealing with the problem is the recognition of the fact that what is commonly called credit by the banker is administered by him primarily for the purpose of private profit, whereas it is most definitely communal property. It is in its essence the estimated value of the only real capital . . . the potential capacity under a given set of conditions, including plant, etc., of a Society to do work" (E.D., p. 120). Recover that financial loan credit for the community. The author thinks that the remedy can be put into operation without a military or bloody revolution. On this point we confess to some

misgivings, as all the powers of capitalist finance will be mobilised against every effort to introduce the changes. The author would not nationalise or confiscate plant, or disturb the actual process of production. But, holding as he does that "Natural resources are common property" (p. 110), his restoration of all the advantages of financial credit to the community would have the effect of gradually extinguishing the real value both of these resources and of all existing credit or loan bonds and securities *to their present possessors*. It would mean the extinction of private credit by a certain number of years' purchase; accompanied by an increasing growth in the real purchasing power of labour. Decentralisation of economic power, and the direction of production towards real human needs, would mark the transition to the new economic system. The means of effecting the transition are suggested only in outline, and mainly in the volume on *Credit-Power*.

The author's analysis of the factors in the production process which determine the "just price" (E.D., ch. 5), is too condensed for the ordinary intelligent reader. Indeed, over-compression characterises the exposition and arguments throughout. Nevertheless, both books are profoundly suggestive, and will well repay the serious student of the social question both for the cost of procuring them and the labour of studying them. We have no hesitation in recommending them to the serious study of all Catholic students of the labour and capital problem. The economic system advocated in them, while recognising and approving private capital ownership, would effect a sweeping and radical reform of the Capitalist system. It is, moreover, quite in harmony with Catholic moral teaching. The Capitalist system is tending inevitably towards social and economic chaos. And if such chaos is to be averted peaceably it will be by the adoption of some such alternative as that propounded by Major Douglas.

P. COFFEY.

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*The Divine Office: A Study of the Roman Breviary.* By REV. E. J. QUIGLEY. Pp. xii.+288. Dublin: Gill and Son, Ltd. 1920. Price 7/6 net.

THE Breviary is the priest's constant companion. Not even for one whole day can he be separated from it. One hour out of the twenty-four he must allot to it. Hence the priest should *know* his Breviary.

But like every other study, the study of liturgy must grow on one. It is only after one has spent some laborious hours, or days, or months, at a subject that he really appreciates what interest it possesses. And it is to be feared that many priests, since the obligatory course of their College days, have paid little or no attention to the study of their daily friend, the Breviary. With the result that mention of the subject merely reminds them of disagreeable rules and calculations which are better forgotten, they say, except by the compiler of the *Ordo*. It was hard to blame them much. Learned lore there was, in many a tome of more or less repulsiveness, but useful information in a convenient and attractive form was not to be obtained.

Although the reform of Pius X. has prompted the production of several works on the Breviary, there is no one book, we think, which treats every phase of the subject except this work of Father Quigley's. Hence we speak in no hackneyed sense when we say that he has supplied "a long-felt want." In a modest preface he declares his purpose. "I hope," he writes, "that this book may serve as an introductory manual to the study of the Breviary. It may be useful to junior students in colleges, in giving them some knowledge of the Church's Hours, which they assist at in their college choirs. It may assist them to know and love the official prayers of the Church, and may help to form devout habits of recitation, so that when the obligation of the daily office is imposed on them, they may recite it *digne, attente, et devote*. . . . Perhaps this book may be a help to priests. It is an attempt to bring into one handy volume many matters found in several volumes of history, liturgy, theology, and ascetic literature."

Having read the book, we can assure the author that, in our opinion, he has conferred on those for whom he wrote a valuable service. From the *Aperi Domine*, to the *Sacrosanctae*, the reader will find in this compact volume all the information that he may reasonably require.

We can only briefly indicate the contents of the book. In Part I. "General Questions" are discussed, as to the idea of the Breviary; its origin and contents; the ecclesiastical year and its parts; the general rubrics of the Breviary. We confess we should like to see a fuller exposition of the matter dealing with the Calendar and the ecclesiastical year (pp.32 sqq.)

Part II, we think, is the most interesting part of the book, and contains the teaching of moral and ascetic theology on the recitation of the divine office. It would be hard to improve on Father Quigley's treatment of the many questions dealt with in this section. We do not remember that anything of importance has been unnoticed, and theologians and ascetic writers are freely quoted and referred to.

Part III. takes up the Hours of the Office separately, gives the history and development of each, minutely explains the various parts, and suggests texts and intentions as an aid to pious recitation. In Part IV. we have notes on certain feasts, "of the time" and of saints. At the end, a useful bibliography will be of great value to the interested reader, and we venture to predict that there will be many who will be stimulated to further study by the reading of this admirable book.

We would like to suggest to the author, when he is preparing his next edition, to consider whether his language is not sometimes scrappy and savouring of the guide-book. Whether, too, he is quite up-to-date in the matter of punctuation, particularly in his lavish use of the comma; and whether his *Table of Contents* is not a little confusing. But these are very small points indeed.

The publishers have turned out the book in a way worthy of a prominent Irish house. It is well printed on good paper, and is sold at a price which, under present conditions, nobody will consider unreasonable. We wish it a hearty God-speed to a host of readers.

P. O'NEILL.

*Life of the Venerable Anne Madeleine Remusat (1696-1730).* By the SISTERS OF THE VISITATION OF HARROW. Pp. 236, with 12 illustrations. Price 6/- net. Dublin: M. H. Gill.

THIS is an original biography, not merely in the sense that it is not a translation from the French, but also in its conception of what a saint's biography ought to be. It is an attempt to portray, as far as another human being can portray it, the inner spiritual life of a great servant of God. The external events of Sr. Remusat's life and times are not indeed passed over in silence—they are described with a sympathetic understanding that enhances their historical interest for the reader—but they occupy, nevertheless, quite a secondary place in the authors' plan. When we read the preface describing the biographers' purpose, we resigned ourselves to the task of plodding through a dull, good-goody document. To our surprise, however, we found it a most interesting book. It is full of interest for various reasons. It deals with the life of one of the apostles of devotion to the Sacred Heart; it gives us a good insight into the stirring events and circumstances amid which that life was spent; and incidentally it shows the great influence that even a cloistered nun can wield on the world outside her convent, by her prayers, conferences and correspondence. But the chief charm of the book lies in the wonderful interior life that it lays bare before us—a life of womanly grace in the natural order, and of love, tribulation and hidden suffering in the supernatural. It was no easy matter to do justice to such a theme; yet we think the biographers have succeeded. They have given us in a pleasing style not merely an edifying biography, but incidentally a beautiful and interesting study in saint-psychology. We recommend this book unreservedly to our readers.

W. MORAN.

*Roman Catholic Claims.* By RIGHT REV. CHARLES GORE, D.D. Eleventh edition; pp. 215. Price 4/- net. London: Longmans.

THIS volume is practically a reprint of the tenth edition, published in 1909. A few minor alterations have been made, but they do not call for special notice. Dr. Gore gives, in a convenient form, an able and lucid presentation of the Anglican position, and Catholics as well as the author's co-religionists will find in it many points that will interest them. When one has read Dr. Gore, on the one side, and Dom Chapman's reply on the other, one has before him the salient points of the Roman-Anglican controversy. As both these books have been before the public for many years, we do not think it necessary to review in detail the various chapters of Dr. Gore's work. The present edition is well printed and bound, and the price, in the circumstances, is moderate.

G. PIERSE.

*Sister Mary St. Philip (Frances Mary Lecher), 1825-1904.* By A Sister of Notre Dame: with an Introduction by His Grace the Archbishop of Liverpool. Illustrated. Pp. 12+342. Price 18/- net. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

THIS is a very remarkable volume, full of interest even for the man of the world. But it is more; it is one of those books that the reader lays down feeling that he is the better for having read it. "The

subject of this biography," we are informed, "was one of the most prominent figures in the world of Catholic education in England in the second half of the nineteenth century. For nearly fifty years she was engaged in the work of training teachers at Mount Pleasant College, Liverpool, which she founded in 1856. The story of her life is incidentally the history of Catholic education in this country (England) from the days of Catholic emancipation." As that story is unfolded before us, we become acquainted with a noble character, lovable, womanly, courageous, industrious, endowed with a wonderful influence over those who came in contact with her; and as her inner life is laid bare to our gaze, we see this gifted woman, under the influence of her deep religious convictions, inspired to a great and successful apostleship in the field of Catholic education. If we must distinguish two aspects in her life, that of the educationist and that of the religious, we must not push the distinction too far, for everything she did was motivated by love of God and zeal for the souls of the children of the poor. That same spirit she endeavoured to infuse into the teachers whom she trained. She never tired of telling them that theirs was no ordinary profession, but a great and noble Christian vocation. In the great work for which she was responsible her industry was indefatigable; yet she never allowed it to interfere with the full and faithful observance of her religious rule or her own personal sanctification. Prayer and work were inseparable in her busy life. For all that, Sister Mary of St. Philip was no kill-joy. On the contrary, she was the life of the college for forty years—a calm courage and a keen sense of humour enabling her to look on the bright side of things on all occasions. It is only one who measures things by the Christian standard of values, and who reposes complete confidence in God's Providence, that can afford to be courageous and light-hearted in face of difficulties that often seem almost insurmountable. Of the immense importance of her work for the Catholic Church in England we need not speak here; the reader of her biography will realise it for himself. We may, however, be permitted to quote the generous appreciation of the Archbishop of Liverpool: "To her—and with her we identify the Training College, Mount Pleasant, of which she was for nearly fifty years the life and soul—is due in large measure the present numerical strength of Catholics in England."

The biographer must likewise be commended for her work. She has traced the life and portrayed the character of her subject with the sympathetic touch and loving care of a sister. The reproduction of many letters written by or to Sister Mary of St. Philip, both before and after her entry into religion, gives an additional interest and additional value to her work. A good index completes this excellent book, which we heartily recommend to our readers.

W. MORAN.

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*Upon God's Holy Hills.* 1. *The Guides.* By C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Orchard Street, London, W. Pp. 158. Price 3/6 cloth.

CARLYLE turned Jesuit—it is suggested by the Carlylese power of the author's style, and it in turn suggests interesting possibilities. "The



Heroes and Hero-worship" would be put on the Index at the suggestion of the author himself; he would vigorously condemn its tendency, even as Tolstoy was brave enough to do in regard to one of his own earlier volumes. Or the Sage of Chelsea might have re-written that vigorous, often splendid, generally desolate work, which glorifies men of blood and iron, which raised Cromwell from a literary and well-deserved hell—Cromwell, the second Heród, the killer of the innocents. How Carlyle, if by the grace of God he had become a Jesuit, would have turned in disgust from the Gospel of Might (about which we heard so much during the European war as the exclusive gospel of a certain land) to the Gospel of Beneficence. He would not then have made the mistake which was avoided even by the agnostic and positivist Comte; he would not have extolled men who made a great noise and nothing more, men whose devious march struck a brilliant but fleeting flash on this planet; Comte, more wisely than he, does not mention destructive forces like Luther and Napoleon in his *Ordo* of great men to be worshipped. At any rate, Carlyle, if only he had the proud title S.J., might have prevented our wishing for some man that might do for our great men what Carlyle in unregenerate days did for his. That wished-for man has come in Father Martindale. If Carlyle did not become Jesuit, a Jesuit has usefully become like Carlyle. With a fresh, gripping, sometimes jerky and rough style, he has given us vivid snap-shots of the Guides in mysticism, St. Anthony, St. Bruno, St. John of the Cross. This treatment of great men is altogether fresh to Catholics; it would be altogether peerless if Carlyle had not lived. Father Martindale shows the tremendous influence exerted by those monastic guides on modern civilisation. "The work of St. Martin in Gaul and the movement in Ireland itself were in direct imitation of the Egyptian monks. . . . Without the monasteries, what would have been formed out of the chaotic elements of barbarism, and when? Not, anyhow, the Europe of to-day. Not Paris, not Oxford. Not Aquinas, not Dante." In connection with St. Bruno the author considers the next great monastic movement, Carthusianism. And he studies the culmination of monastic mysticism in St. John of the Cross, the master of those who *live*. In a single sentence he gives his thumb-nail sketch: "John of the Cross seems almost a pure spirit, best to be compared to the fierce radiation of his own Castilian rocks; a flame in the sky; a panting, quivering eddy in the air; a piercing hymn whose notes are lost for their utmost intensity of vibration." And to give the key-note for John's Positive Renunciation he turns to the familiar words of an Irish poet: "I blinded my eyes, and I closed my ears, I hardened my heart, and I smothered my desire. . . . And to this road before me I turned my face."

In one of the numerous "conceits" which the author owes to that best spirit of learning which thrives in Oxford and fastens on imagination or originality, Father Martindale speaks of those old monks giving themselves entirely, passionately, and often exaggeratedly, to a grinding in the grammar of the Spiritual life. This conceit, like so many others in the book, is suggestive; it calls to our minds the almost fanatical preoccupation of the "modern" man with the lesser grammars, with trifles. It suggests this final thought: If men were to give as much attention to their lives as they do to their grammar, they would be Simon Stylites of sanctity.

G. PIERSE.

## Books Received.

**The Other Life.** By Right Rev. W. Schneider. Revised and Edited by Rev. Herbert Thurston, S.J. Herder, London, Great Russell Street, and St. Louis (Mo.), South Broadway; Wagner, New York. Pp. 410. Price, 18s. net.

**The Christian Faith.** By Père Suan, S.J. London: Orchard Street, Burns, Oates and Washbourne. Pp. 158. Paper cover. [This book serves a distinct purpose. It does not bother about objections, or transitory problems, or refutation of views of opponents. It explains what is held by Catholics and why.]

**The Mother of Christ.** By V. R. Vassall-Phillips, C.S.S.R. London: Orchard Street, Burns, Oates and Washbourne. Pp. 524. Price, 7s. 6d. [The Blessed Virgin Mary in Catholic tradition and devotion.]

**The School of Love and Other Essays.** By A. Goodier, S.J. The Examiner Press, Meadows Street, Fort, Bombay. Pp. 148. [This little book contains essays on the practical virtues, attractively presented in Father Goodier's distinctive and excellent literary style. We strongly commend them to all.]

**The Lesson of the Catacombs.** By the Rev. A. Henderson. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

**Walter de Wenlok, Abbot of Westminster.** By Ernest Harold Pearce, Bishop of Worcester. London: S.P.C.K. Price, 12s. net.

**Christian Monasticism in Egypt to the close of the Fourth Century.** By the Rev. W. H. MacKean, D.D. London: S.P.C.K. Price, 8s. net.

**A History of the Diocese of Raphoe.** By the Very Rev. E. Canon Maguire, D.D. Part I., Ecclesiastical. Two volumes. Vol. I., pp. xxvi. + 527; vol. II., pp. 377. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, Limited. Price, 21s.

**God and the Supernatural.** By Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Price 15s. net.

**Le Catholicisme de St. Augustin.** By Pierre Batiffol. Paris: Librairie V. Lecoffre. Price (post free), 15 francs.

**Mélanges de Patrologie et d'Histoire des Dogmes.** By J. Tixeront. Paris: V. Lecoffre. Price, 7 francs.

**The Catholic Charities Review.** [A monthly review, and the organ of organised Catholic social work in U.S.A.] Edited by Rev. John A. Ryan, D.D., Catholic University, Washington. Price, 15 cents per copy (one dollar per annum), plus postage.

**A Spiritual Retreat.** By Father Alexander, O.F.M. 218 pp. 10s. net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**Jack, Jack, and the Corporal.** By C. C. Martindale. 221 pp. 3s. 6d. net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**Life of St. Nicholas of Tolentino, O.S.A.** By Rev. E. A. Foran, O.S.A. 143 pp. 7s. 6d. net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures.** The New Testament, Vol. III., Part III., The Second Epistle to the Corinthians; Part IV., Galatians and Romans. Paper, 3s. 9d. net; cloth boards, 4s. 9d. net. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

**Praelectiones Biblicae ad usum scholarum.** A. R. P. Hadriano Simon, C.S.S.R. Novum Testamentum, Vol. I. xxiv. + 560 pp. 10 pesetas. *Matriti: ex officinis 'El Perpetus Socorro,'* Barcinone; apud Ludovicum Gili.

**The Christian Mind.** By A. Vonier, O.S.B. 210 pp. 5s. net. London: Herder.

**Our Lord's Last Discourses.** By the Abbé Nouvelle. 178 pp. 6s. net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**Mental Prayer.** By Nicholas Redolfi, O.P. Translated by Raymond Devas, O.P. 135 pp. 3s. 6d. net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**St. Paul, his Life, Work, and Spirit.** By Philip Coughlan, C.P. 291 pp. 7s. 6d. net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**Three Hills, Ossory, Leix and Lancashire.** By Eoin Ua Morda. 63pp. C.T.S. of Ireland.

**Clontarf, an Irish National Drama.** By Rev. J. B. Dollard, Litt.D. 18pp. C.T.S. of Ireland.

**Nellie McMahon, B.A.** By Bessie O'Neill. 138 pp. Cloth, 21s. Dublin: The Veritas Press.

**The Psalms.** A study of the Vulgate Psalter in the light of the Hebrew Text. By Rev. P. Boylan, M.A. Vol. I. 17s. 6d. net. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd. [This important work reached us too late for review in this issue; a full review will be given in the April number.]

**Barnabas, Hermas and the Didache.** By J. Armitage Robinson, F.D. London: S.P.C.K. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920. Pp. viii. + 120. Price, 6s. net.

**De Jure Religiosorum: ad Normam Juris Canonici.** By Ludovicus Fanfani, O.P. Rome: P. Marietti. 1920. Pp. xx. + 238. Price, 8 frs.

**A Short Guide to Some MSS. in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin.** By Rev. R. H. Murray, Litt.D. London: S.P.C.K. New York: The MacMillan Company. 1920. Pp. 64. Price, 1s. 9d. net.

**Scripture Examples: Apostles' Creed.** By the Sisters of Notre Dame. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., London, Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow. 1920. Pp. 32. Price, 9d. net.

**Scripture Examples: Commandments of God and the Church.** Same authors, publishers, date, pages and price.

**The Presence of God.** A practical treatise by a Master of Novices. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, London, etc. 1920. Pp. viii. + 110. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

**Faith and Duty.** By Judith F. Smith. With a Preface by the Rev. S. St. John, S.J. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, London, etc. 1920. Pp. xvi. + 312. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

**Sermons: for all the Sundays and the Chief Feasts of the Year.** By the Right Rev. J. S. Vaughan, D.D., Bishop of Sebastopolis. With an Introduction by the Most Rev. J. J. Glennon, D.D., Archbishop of St. Louis, Mo. New York: Joseph F. Wagner. London: B. Herder. Two Volumes. Pp. xvi. + 302: vi. + 302. 1920. Price, 30s. net.

**St. Leonard of Port Maurice.** By Father Dominic Devas, O.F.M. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, London, etc. 1920. Pp. 124. Price, 5s. net.

**Excerpta E 'Rituale Parvo': in Usum Cleri extra Loca Sacra Ministrantis.** Cura Rev. J. B. O'Connell. Dublin: J. Duffy and Co. 1920. Pp. 136 + vi.

**Jus Religiosorum.** By A. M. Micheletti. Rome: P. Marietti. 1920. Pp. xii. + 484. Price, 11 frs.

**Summarium Theologiae Moralis.** By N. Sebastiani. Rome: P. Marietti. 1919. Pp. 658. Price, 11 frs.

**Commentarium Codicis Iuris Canonici, Liber IV. De Processibus.** Part I. —De Judiciis. Auctore P. Josepho Noval, Ord. Praed. Frs. 14. Augustae Taurinorum—Romae.

**Psychology and Mystical Experience.** By Professor John Howley, M.A. London: Kegan Paul; St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Company. 1920. Pp. 275. Price, 10s. 6d. net. [An exceedingly valuable critical contribution to the study of the psychic phenomena of religious life in seven chapters on *The Psychology of a Retreat—The Theory of William James—The Psychology of a Revival—A Theory of Integral Conversion—Mystical Experience and Quietism—Mystical Experience—Varieties of Mystical Experience.*]

**Sermons and Notes of Sermons.** By Henry Ignatius Dudley Ryder. Edited by Fathers of the Birmingham Oratory. London and Edinburgh: Sands and Company. 1920. Pp. 280.

**Commentarium in Codicem Juris Canonici ad usum Scholarum....Liber I. Normae Generales.** Lectiones quas aluminis Collegii Brignole-Sale pro Missionibus exteris habuit. Sac Guidus Cocchi. Taurinorum Augustae. 1920. Pp. 205. Fr. 6.50.

**Victoire de Saint-Luc. A Martyr under The Terror.** By Mother St. Patrick of La Retraite du Sacré-Coeur. With foreword by Rev. C. E. Martindale, S.J. Longmans, Green and Co., Paternoster Row, London. Pp. 120. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

**An Awakening.** By James Kent Stone, S.T.D., LL.D. Notre Dame, Indiana, U.S.A.: The Cve Maria. Pp. 321. Price, \$1.50.

**The Tangle of Good and Evil.** By Ernest J. Glint. London: Stock, 7 Paternoster Row, E.C. Pp. 38. Price, 1s. 6d. net.

**The Divine Soliloquies of Gerlac Petersen,** Canon Regular of Deventer. Translated from the Latin by Monialis. Longmans, Green and Co., Paternoster Row, London, 1920. Pp. 106. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

**The Christ Child.** The story of our Lord's coming and life on earth simply told for children. By M. C. Olivia Keiley. With a preface by His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons. Browne and Nolan, Ltd. Dublin and Belfast 1920. Pp. 104. Price 1s.

**Praeparationes ad Sanctam Communionem** ex S. Scriptura, SS. Patribus et Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus excerptae a Missionario quodam. Augustae Taurinorum. Price, Frs. 6.

[Owing to pressure of space, our 'Roman Documents' must be discontinued for the present.]

## Theological Articles in the Reviews.

**THE CATHOLIC WORLD** (November, 1920.)—**Dawson**, 'Woman Suffrage.' [The day when we can say that women do not need the vote, that they are well enough represented by the men, has passed.] **Scheiffley**, 'Leon Daudet, Defender of Church and State.' [Shows the multifarious activities of this influential present-day French publicist.] **Lucas**, 'The Life's Work of J. H. Newman.' [A popular account.] **Prendergast**, 'The Theory of Evolution.' [There is absolutely no evidence for it within the limits of historic knowledge—quite the contrary.] **Bateman**, 'An American Catholic's Apostolate.' [Tells how an American Catholic suggested the great idea of the Bexhill free lending library. The writer contradictorily speaks of 'deserving the grace of faith.'] **Palmeiri**, 'Catholic Influence on Early Hungarian Literature.'

**REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THEOLOGIQUES.** (Octobre, 1920.)—**Blizuet**, 'L'unité de l'acte de foi.' [Gives the elements of the act of faith. These elements are, as it were, phases in the movement characterising faith.] **Martin**, 'Quelques premiers Maîtres dominicains de Paris et d'Oxford et la soi-disant école dominicaine augustinienne (1229-1279).' [The early Dominican professors had, generally speaking, a common method and they attached themselves more or less to Augustinism.] **Lemonnyer**, 'La Déesse Anath.' [Elephantine.] [This Goddess, styled Saviour, Protector, Victory-bringer, had merely an accidental relationship with the cult of Yahweh. Her cult showed a lapse on the part of the Jewish military colony at Elephantine.]

**THEOLOGISCHE QUARTALSHRIFT** (2 und 3 Quartalheft, 1920.)—**Adam**, 'Glaube und Glaubensurschenschaft im Katholicismus.' [Only that which is deeper than human thought and higher than human will can make man transcend himself. Not ethics, nor dialectics, nor criticism, but mysticism and dogma are the creative forces.] **Baur**, 'Untersuchungen über die Vergöttlichungslehre.' [Not in the mystery-religions but in the Bible (e.g., Ephes., I. 10, Coloss. I. 19, etc.), lie the roots of the doctrine of St. Irenaeus concerning the divinising of the Christian.] **Grabmann**, 'Der Benediktinermystiker Johannes von Kastl, der Verfasser des Büchleins De Adhaerendo Deo.' **Barth**, 'Ein neues Dokument zur Geschichte der früh-scholastischen Christologie (Schluss).' [Appropos of the discovery of a student's letter the writer discusses various Christological theories.] **Haase**, 'Zurur ältesten syrischen Evangelienübersetzung.' **Rohr**, 'Der Aufbau des Markusevangeliums.'

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE** (4 Quartalheft, 1920.)—**Stuffer**, 'Num S. Thomas praedeterminationem physicam docerit' (III.) [Maintains that St. Thomas does not favour those who hold that God immediately pre-moves the creature to individual acts.] **Lutz**, 'Über die Notwendigkeit der hl. Eucharistie' (II.) [Maintains against Nicolussi that his opinion concerning the absolute necessity [necessitate medi] of the Eucharist has not a sufficient foundation.] **Stippy**, 'Die Trinitätslehre des byzantinischen Patriarchen Photios.'

**THEOLOGIE UND GLAUBE** (3 Heft, 1920.)—**Waldmann**, 'Sittliche Verpflichtung des formlosen Eheversprechens.' **Brauer**, 'Soziale Wiedergeburt.' **Peters**, 'Friedrich Delitzschs Lästerschrift gegen die Bibel des Alten Testaments unter ihren Gott.' **Brinktrine**, 'Christus als die dritte Person in der Trinität.' **Liese**, 'Christlicher Sozialismus?'

**THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW** (September, 1920.)—**Rev. Hugh Pope**, 'Spiritualism, Occultism, and the Catholic Church.' [Gives reasons for the Church's condemnation of Occultism.] **Rev. Joseph Rickaby**, 'The Future Life.' [History of the doctrine and answers to questions appertaining thereto.] **Rev. T. J. Kelly**, 'The Spirituality of Plain Song.' [The solemnity and sanctity of Plain Song above all other considerations make it most appropriate to accompany the Liturgy.] **Rev. Paul J. Laudalgi**, 'Oriental Origin of the Sign and Cultus of the Cross.' [Gives an interesting historical summary of the devotion.] (October, 1920.)—'Establishment of Canonical Parishes in the United States.' [Deals with interesting questions arising out of the recent legislation.] **Rev. A. B. Wood**, 'New conditions in Church Finance': [the problem of ways and means]. **Rev. J. McMahon**, 'The Organisation of a City Parish': [a practical statement of the problems]. **Mgr. Hassett**, 'Organising a parish in Central Pennsylvania': [a study in development]. **Rev. W. Wehrle**, 'Parishes in a North-Western Diocese.'

[Administration of North Dakota.] **Rev. W. Schaefer**, 'The Parish Priest and Mexican Settlements' [a ripe field for the missionary]. November, 1920.)—**Rev. J. B. Culemans**, 'Catholic Missionary Literature.' [It can be made very effective if organised and made more interesting.] **Rev. T. Slaus**, 'The New Code and Civil Law.' [The New Code canonizes the law of the country on many points without reference to Roman (Civil) Law.] **Rev. V. F. Kunberger**, 'The Mass and the Priest's Personal Sanctification.' [If we celebrate Mass with that faith and devotion which a worthy preparation can secure for us, we have a simple, all-embracing formula which will secure unity with Christ and make us good priests.] 'The Archbishop of Arns of St. Charles Borromeo' [an interesting question in Heraldry.] **Rev. T. J. Agius**, 'Some Pathological States of Conscience.' [Examines some morbid types of temperament which affect character.] **Rev. Paul J. Sandalgi**, 'A Franciscan Friar as Papal Legate to the Golden Horde.' [Takes us back to Eastern Europe in the thirteenth century.] **Analecta. Studies and Conferences. Library Table. Criticisms and Notes. Literary Chats. Books Received.**

**HOMILETIC AND PASTORAL REVIEW** (October, 1920).—**J. Husslein**, 'Outlines on Capital and Labour.' [Legal Minimum Wage a social necessity.] **Thomas P. Phelan**, 'The Country Priest.' ['The priest in the rural district has many pleasures and consolations, both spiritual and temporal.'] **Walter Drum**, 'Biblical Studies.' [Historical discussion of the interpretation of Philippians II., 6 esp. re. meaning of the expression *συναγῆς*.] **S. Woywood**, 'The Legislation of the Code on Baptism.' [Ceremonies, Forms and Sponsors.] **J. A. McHugh**, 'Casus Moralis.' [A Marriage valid even though no priest present.] (November, 1920.)—**Walter Drum**, 'Biblical Studies.' [Gives various Protestant interpretations of the *συναγῆς* in Philippians ii. 6.] **C. M. Thuente**, 'The Protestant Priest.' [Interesting discussion on relations between Catholics and Protestants.] **S. Woywood**, 'The Legislation of the Code on Confirmation.' [Covers Bk. III. Pars I. Tit. II. Cans. 780-800.] **J. McHugh, O.P.**, 'Casus Moralis.' [Interesting Case on Matrimony, involving Clandestinity, Disparity of Worship, Pauline Privilege, and Dispensation.] **Liturgical Notes. Roman Documents. Queries. Sermons and Conferences.**

**THE MONTH** (October, 1920).—**C. C. Martindale**, 'Hermann the Cripple.' [Review of life of saintly German scholar of the eleventh century.] **E. M. Wilmo-Buxton**, 'An Episode of the Gordon Riots.' [Suggestions based on a coincidence of names.] **C. Plater**, 'An Irish Diary. I. Inishbofin.' [Writer's personal experiences recently.] **R. H. J. Stuart**, 'A Point of Mystical Theology.' [Discusses a difficulty in Graces d'Oraison of Père Poulain, S.J.] **R. Downey**, 'The Chronicles of Mr. H. G. Wells.' III. [Instalment of criticism of Mr. Wells' History.] **W. H. Atherton**, 'The Leakage amongst Catholic Merchant Seamen.' [Plea for establishing an International Chair of Catholic sailor missions.] **H. Thurston**, 'Limpas and the Problem of Collective Hallucination.' III. [Considers some instances of these manifestations.] (November, 1920.)—**H. Thurston**, 'Limpas and the Problem of Collective Hallucination.' IV. [Consideration of further manifestations.] **S. Keable**, 'Two Spoiled Christians.' [Short study of character of Keeling and Hankey, a Cambridge and an Oxford man, who were killed in the war. Their religious views.] **C. Plater**, 'An Irish Diary. II. Inishbofin.' [Recent experiences of the writer.] **H. Lucas**, 'Democracy in Theory and in Practice.' [Dangers of Democracy rule in England at present.] **S. F. Smith**, 'Presbyter or Priest?' [Reordination the obstacle to Protestant Reunion.] **T. J. Agius**, 'St. Paul's Witness to Papal Infallibility.' [Argument from Epistle to the Galatians.] Verse. (December 1920.)—**W. Randolph**, 'Belgium Revisited.' [Description of damage as seen to-day.] **C. Plater**, 'An Irish Diary. III. The Aran Islands.' [Experiences last spring.] **C. Bolger**, 'Asceticism and the Gospel.' [Defence of Catholic Asceticism.] **The Editor**, 'The Making of Europe' [Mr. Hilaire Belloc's Europe and the Faith is of great Catholic value.] **H. Lucas**, 'Can Revolution be Averted?' [Points out the only remedy.] **D. F. Martin**, 'The Pillar of Cloud.' [An interesting story.] **H. Thurston**, 'Limpas and the Problem of Collective Hallucination. V.' [Consideration of some apparitions.] Verse. **Miscellanea. Critical and Historical Notes. Topics of the Month. Notes on the Press. Reviews. Short Notices. Books Received.**



REVUE BIBLIQUE (October, 1920).—**R. P. Dhorme**, 'L'emploi métaphorique des noms de parties du corps en hébreu et en akkadien.' [Various metaphorical uses of 'head,' 'heart,' 'flesh,' etc., in these languages.] **R. P. Vincent**, 'La Sepulture des Patriarches d'après la Bible.' [Critical study of Genesis xxiii in light of archaeological research.] **L. Dieu**, 'Marc source des Actes I-XV.' [Brings forward interesting data showing that Luke derived his information from John Mark.]

BRELIKA Fasciculus 4. The articles deal almost exclusively with St. Jerome. **L. Murillo**, 'S. Jerónimo el "Doctor Máximo."' **A. Naccari**, 'I fattori dell' esepegi geronimiana.' **L. Fonck**, 'Hieronymi scientia naturalis exemplis illustratur.' **A. Feder**, 'Zusätze zum Schriftsteller Katalog des Hl. Hieronymus.' **A. Vaccari**, 'Frammento di un perduto "Tractatus" di S. Girolamo.' There is likewise the conclusion of Bollettino Geronimiani by **Vaccari**, an exhaustive review of recent works on St. Jerome.

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW (October, 1920).—**B. B. Warfield**, 'Miserable Sinner Christianity' in the hands of the Rationalists.' **J. Van Baalen**, 'The Ritschlians and the Préexistence of Christ.' **O. T. Allies**, 'The Name Joseph.' [Discussion of the alleged Babylonian origin of the name.]

JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES (October, 1920).—**T. Stephenson**, 'Our Lord's Teaching in St. Mark's Gospel.' [Analysis of doctrinal portion of St. Mark and comparison with teaching usually assigned to Q.] **St. J. D. Seymour**, 'The Bringing Forth of the Soul in Irish Literature.' [Compares it with certain statements in Apocryphal writings of the Old and New Testaments.] **E. C. Butler**, 'Palladiana: The Lausiac History—Questions of Text.'

IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD (September).—**Rev. R. P. Devas**, 'On the History of Mental Prayer in the Order of St. Dominic.' **Rev. E. J. Quigley**, 'Dr. Murray of Maynooth' (continued). **A Missionary Priest**, 'Perfect contrition' [a resumé of the received teaching on nature and effects of perfect contrition, with hints as to how it may be elicited most easily.] **H. Concanon**, 'The Woman of the Piercing Wail' [Lady Nuala O'Donnell—historical.] **Rev. W. Gumbley**, 'A Friar at Court' [Thomas Rushook, O.P., Bishop of Llandaff, Chichester and Kilmore, 1383-1393—historical.] (October).—**Rev. M. V. Ronan**, 'Blessed Oliver Plunkett (biographical). **Rev. M. H. Molnerry**, 'Recent Impressions of Portugal.' [From a churchman's point of view the state of affairs in Portugal is bad, but shows some signs of improvement.] **Rev. E. J. Quigley**, 'Dr. Murray of Maynooth' (continued). **Rev. B. V. Miller**, 'Mr. T. A. Lacey, St. Cyprian and Cathedra Petri.' [A refutation of Mr. Lacey's theory that cathedra Petri is a synonym for the whole episcopate.] (November).—**Rev. R. Hull**, 'The Date of the Octavius of Minucius Felix' (215-246). **Rev. E. A. Foran**, 'The Catholic Church and Art.' [The sacred art of Spain.] **Rev. E. J. Quigley**, 'Dr. Murray of Maynooth' (continued). **Rev. E. R. James**, 'The Holy Eucharist in St. Irenaeus.' [The latter's doctrine concerning the Real Presence and sacrificial character of the Eucharist vindicated against a recent attack by a Protestant scholar.] December).—**Dom. P. Nolan**, 'The Three Scots-Irish Hermits of Griesstetten (historical). **Rev. H. V. Gill**, 'X-rays: their Silver-jubilee.' **Rev. J. Brodie Brosnan**, 'Mental Restriction and Equivocation.' [A study of the conditions governing the lawfulness of these acts.] **Rev. S. J. Roche**, 'The Debt the World owes to the Church.' [Deals chiefly with the social and economic betterment effected under the auspices of the Church.] **Rev. P. Callary**, 'The Abbey of SS. Peter and Paul, Newtown, Trim' (historical). Each number also contains Documents, Book Reviews, and Notes and Queries in Theology, Canon Law and Liturgy.

*Nihil Obstat:*

JOANNES CANONICUS WATERS, Censor Theol. Deput.

*Imprimi Potest:*

✠ GULIELMUS,

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Dublini, die 21<sup>o</sup> Decembris, 1920.

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## The Origin of Civil Authority.

### HAS SUAREZ BEEN CONDEMNED BY THE CHURCH?

#### I. INTRODUCTORY.

REFERRING to the teaching of Suarez on the origin of Civil Authority, Dr. Fitzpatrick<sup>1</sup> assures us with great forcibleness of language that "during the last century the reasons which satisfied Suarez have been riddled." He confronts the teaching with a condemnation of Pope Leo XIII. Comparing the teaching of Suarez with the teaching of the Pope he says:—"It is manifestly impossible to reconcile these two statements, and consequently the Suaresian theory, at one time very probable owing to the extrinsic authority on which it rested, must now yield to the official teaching of the Church." This is a very definite and intelligible proposition. Let it serve as my *apologia* for the appearance of this article.

The term "Suaresian theory" is somewhat misleading; but I do not impute any blame to Dr. Fitzpatrick. It is often called by that name, but it is so called only because Suarez is its most distinguished protagonist. It is the doctrine taught by all the Schoolmen down to the beginning of the nineteenth century. And the Schoolmen merely continued the teaching of the Fathers of the Church. This point is not controverted. Not even by Dr. Fitzpatrick. In at least seven different places he calls the teaching of Suarez the *sententia communis*. Let us then set it down in our tables that the doctrine of Suarez was the doctrine taught in Catholic Schools down to the beginning of the nineteenth century.

This being so, it seems, even at this stage of my argument, in the highest degree improbable that the doctrine has been condemned by the Church. It startles me to be told that it has. And there is yet another startling thing. In the passage just cited by me from Dr. Fitzpatrick's

<sup>1</sup> cf. "Irish Theological Quarterly," January, 1921.

article he refers to the "extrinsic authority" of a doctrine which he himself so often calls the *sententia communis*. To suggest that what was the *sententia communis* for so many centuries has only extrinsic authority to support it sounds to my unaccustomed ears quite a new departure in theological composition. Elsewhere Dr. Fitzpatrick says:—"Suarez, therefore, admits prescription, and, without the support of his great authority, other names carry little weight." Later I shall have something to say on Suarez' theory of prescription. Here I merely say that if Suarez had never been born, the *sententia communis* would still be the *sententia communis*. Does Dr. Fitzpatrick seriously expect his readers to believe that, if you remove Suarez from the theological hierarchy, all the other members of that hierarchy dwindle into insignificance? Does he believe it himself?

As I discuss Dr. Fitzpatrick's points I shall have a good deal to say about the Scholastic theory. Briefly stated it teaches that authority comes to rulers from God mediately, or through the people. On the other hand, many of the neo-scholastics teach that it not only comes from God, but that it comes from God directly, and not through the people. With this short description of the two theories, I will now proceed to tell something about their genesis.

## II. GENESIS OF THE TWO THEORIES.

I have already given compendiously the genesis of the Scholastic theory: I have said that it was taught by the Fathers of the Church, and that the teaching of the Fathers was carried on by the Schoolmen. In confirmation of this I will give here a few short sentences from Suarez.<sup>1</sup> They will show what he thought of the doctrine which he has so ably defended. His first statement is that supreme civil power is given immediately by God to the civil community as a whole, and that this doctrine is the common teaching both of theologians and jurists—"Communis est, non solum Theologorum, sed etiam jurisperitorum." His next statement is that supreme political power is conferred on rulers not immediately by God, but mediately, or through the people—"mediante humana voluntate et insti-

<sup>1</sup> De Defensione Fidei, lib. III, cap. 2.

tutione.' It is a surpassingly excellent theological axiom—'Hoc est egregium Theologiae axioma'; most true—'verissimum'; most necessary for understanding the boundaries and limits of civil authority—'ad intelligendos fines et limites civilis potestatis maxime necessarium.' He says that it is not a new doctrine invented by Bellarmine, but taught long before his time; that it was taught not merely by the theologians, but that it was the common teaching of men learned in the law. And he confirms his proofs from the teaching of the Fathers. So much for the genesis of the scholastic or Suarezian theory.

Let us now trace the genesis of the neo-scholastic theory, which teaches that civil authority is given immediately by God to the supreme ruler. The following is the account of its pedigree given by Father Macksey, S.J., in his treatise on Ethics:—The first to assert the divine right of kings was the Emperor, Louis of Bavaria, who was excommunicated for holding that a king gets his power immediately from God by divine positive ordinance, that is, from God as Author of the supernatural order. I need hardly say I do not suggest that the neo-scholastics come under this or any other excommunication. The next, whom Father Macksey calls the standard-bearer ("antesignanus"), is James I., King of England. The doctrine was defended for a long time in the Protestant University of Oxford, and by the German Protestants after the Reformation ("excepto Grotio et Puffendorf"). In the time of Louis XIV. it was held in France; in the beginning, principally by the Gallicans; but, later, more or less, by Catholics generally. In the beginning of the 19th century it was adopted by De Haller; and, after him, with various modifications, by Taparelli and a number of the neo-scholastics. It was held by Fénélon, De Maistre, De Bonald; and, in Germany, by many Catholic jurists.

As I contemplate the genesis of the neo-scholastic theory my former bewilderment increases infinitely, and I am very curious to learn how this heretical bantling, begotten in heresy, born in heresy, "swaddled, and rocked, and dandled" in heresy, has come, if we are to accept Dr. Fitzpatrick's account, to be canonized, and so placed within the sanctuaries of the Catholic Church. I cannot help recording my wonder that the *egregium Theologiae axioma*,



the axiom most true and most necessary, the axiom taught by all the theologians and all the jurists, the axiom inculcated by such eminent Fathers as St. Ambrose, St. Gregory, and St. Augustine, after eighteen centuries of undisputed and undisturbed possession, should have been deprived of its place of honour by two Popes; and that these two Popes should have bestowed the place of honour on a doctrine of such equivocal origin. The thing seems to be nothing short of a portent.

### III. ALL POWER COMES FROM GOD.

Under this heading, several useful and interesting essays might be written. But, for the end I have in view, a very few words will suffice. All power—and therefore supreme civil power—comes from God. About this there is not, and cannot be, any dispute or controversy between Catholics. But does this supreme civil power or civil authority come to the ruler immediately from God, without the interposition of the will of the community, or only mediately, through the free consent of the people? The neo-scholastics say it comes immediately; the Schoolmen and the Suarezians, mediately. The intrinsic reason, as given by Suarez<sup>3</sup> comes to this:—Supreme civil authority is not a thing of positive, divine institution; nor a gift quite distinct from the creation of human society; but naturally and necessarily attendant on, or following that creation. Neither supernatural revelation nor the teaching of the Church tells us who is the first recipient of supreme civil authority. We have, therefore, no other means, by the use of which we may solve the question, except our natural reason. Now our natural reason tells us that civil authority, as being necessary for the end and the stability of civil society, must, whenever it is actually held, necessarily inhere in some person, physical or moral, within the commonwealth; it tells us, moreover, that God does not place it in the hands of any individual man, nor in the hands of any section of the body politic, because no man and no section of the body politic has any right, whether congenital or acquired, to hold such jurisdiction over other men. But the supreme ruler, the

<sup>3</sup> De Defensione Fidei, lib. III., cap. 2.

king, say, must actually hold it : otherwise he could not do his duty as ruler. He has not got it immediately from God. Therefore he can have it only through the free consent of the people.

It is abundantly evident from what I have been saying that it is labour in vain to show that Popes have again and again asserted that the authority of the ruler comes from God. All Catholics assert the same. What would be to the purpose would be to show that the Popes have ever said that authority is given to temporal rulers independently of the free consent of the people. Dr. Fitzpatrick claims that this latter is clearly contained in certain extracts which he has produced from the writings of Leo XIII. and Pius X. By applying a very simple test I hope to show, in the course of this article, that such an interpretation must be a mistaken interpretation. But, for the present, I leave the matter just where it is.

#### IV. THE TITLES TO SOVEREIGNTY.

By title is meant, in this connection, the legitimate method by which civil sovereignty may be acquired. The Suarezians distinguish between proximate and radical titles. Proximate titles are either original or derivative. The original titles are (a) the tacit and successive consent of families, which gradually coalesce into one perfect society ; (b) the express and simultaneous consent of families already constituted into a body politic or civil state ; (c) victory achieved in a just war. The derivative titles are heredity and prescription. But, whilst proximate titles are many, the radical title is always one and the same, to wit, the free consent of the people.

Nearly allied to the distinction between proximate and radical titles is the distinction which the Suarezians make between disposing and juridical causes. The disposing causes of supreme civil authority may be manifold ; but the juridical cause is always the free consent of the community. This distinction may be illustrated by a reference to marriage. Many are the ways by which a man may have won his wife. He may have become possessed of her by force or fraud. He may have bought her from her parents. He may have bribed her maiden aunt. He may have proved

himself a veritable "young Lochinvar" in the daring gallantry of his courtship, and rescued his "fair Ellen" from "a laggard in love and a dastard in war." But if, in the end, "fair Ellen" is really his wedded wife, she can have become his wedded wife only by virtue of her free consent. All duress must have ceased, and every circumstance, which would make such a free consent impossible. It is the same in the case of civil authority. It may have many disposing causes; but they do not produce it. Not any one of them, nor all of them together. The primary efficient cause of civil authority is the natural law. The secondary efficient cause is the free consent of the people.

Dr. Fitzpatrick says:—"Suarez admits prescription." I reply: Suarez admits prescription, when it is united with the free consent of the people. He does not say that prescription, apart from the free consent of the people, is a valid title to civil authority. And no one knows this better than Dr. Fitzpatrick. On pages 11 and 12 he gives a translation from Suarez; but, quite unfairly, as I think, he stops short just when he comes to the words which I give here in the original Latin:—*Atque ita semper potestas haec aliquo humano titulo, seu per voluntatem humanam immediate obtinetur.*

Neither have Dr. Fitzpatrick's historical references anything to do with the question. There is no question of the historical origin of civil authority, but of its juridical origin. What is the juridical origin or cause of the civil bond in any given concrete case? What cause confers the rights and imposes the duties that are the very essence of the civil bond? The ruler has rights against the people, and duties towards them. The people have duties to the ruler, and rights against him. What is the true cause of these mutual rights and duties? That is the whole question.

Again, Dr. Fitzpatrick (pages 12, 13, 14) confounds the obligation to submit to the civil yoke or civil bond in a given concrete case with the obligations and other results consequent upon such submission. And yet they are quite distinct obligations. Suarez and those who hold with him assert as clearly as any of the Popes can assert that a people may be, and often are bound, and bound under pain of very grave sin, to submit their necks, in a given case, to the civil yoke of a determinate, individual ruler; but they

would emphatically deny the truth of the opinion cited by Dr. Fitzpatrick (p. 13), and made his own by adoption :—  
“ As soon as the old government has disappeared or is completely subdued, the natural law must be regarded as proceeding forthwith to legitimise the new government and to regularise its position in relation to the community.” Even if the people, in the case contemplated, are guilty of the gravest sin in not bending their necks to the civil yoke or bond, it by no manner of means follows that the natural law will step in and impose that yoke upon them. It is true, of course, that, as the precept of the natural law, which commands us to form civil societies, binds the human race only collectively, not individually ; so the precept of the natural law, which commands men and women to marry, binds the human race only collectively, not individually ; and consequently, in the run of ordinary cases, there is no obligation on an individual man or an individual woman to marry ; much less a grave obligation. But let us suppose a state of things in which there is only one man and one woman on all the earth. They are under the very gravest obligation to enter into the marriage contract. By no other means under heaven can God’s design of preserving the human species be accomplished. Suppose they transgress the grave obligation. Suppose they refuse to get married. Suppose they refuse to give that free consent, in which the essence of the matrimonial contract consists, will anyone say “ that the natural law must be regarded as proceeding forthwith ” to confer conjugal rights upon these two people, and to impose conjugal duties ? Surely not. And if not, why not ? If the natural law so implicates itself, if it so interposes its authority in the case of the people who refuse freely to submit to the civil ruler, why does it not do the same in the case of the two who refuse freely to enter into the marriage state ? It cannot be said :—“ On account of the graver obligation in the former case ; and on account of the more lamentable results that will ensue.” The obligation in the latter case is, in reality, indefinitely greater than in the former ; and the result that ensues is indefinitely more lamentable : the result is the extinction of the human race.

The scholastic or Suarezian theory is, that, in such upheavals, the civil authority reverts to the people, and that

it is their right and duty to place it in other hands. In the beginning the usurper rules without title; his immediate successor may be without title; but, in course of time, what is called a prescriptive title is acquired, but it is acquired by the consent of the community. And all this is easily understood, if we remember that the consent of the people need not be either simultaneous or explicit; it may be given gradually, and it may be given tacitly. Also we can now more clearly see what Suarez<sup>4</sup> means when he ends what he has to say about prescriptive titles with the words already cited:—‘*Atque ita semper potestas haec aliquo humano titulo, seu per voluntatem humanam obtinetur.*’

#### V. THE STABILITY OF CIVIL AUTHORITY.

Dr. Fitzpatrick (p. 6) says:—“We might sum up the pronouncements of the Popes in four main propositions:—

- (1) Authority comes from God Himself; it does not depend on the will of the people.
- (2) Authority does not vest in the first instance in the people, who afterwards pass it on to the ruler.
- (3) In certain cases (e.g., under a democratic constitution) the people designate the person who shall be invested with power. They do not confer authority or delegate power.
- (4) Since the power has not come from the people they cannot recall it.”<sup>2</sup>

Then he asks:—“What then of Suarez and the other theologians whom Prof. O’Rahilly quotes? Is their opinion completely discarded?”

My answer to his question is: No, indeed, their opinion is not discarded; for the simple reason that the Popes are not discussing their opinion at all, but the impious nonsense of Rousseau, as expressed by himself, and adopted by *Le Sillon*. As Dr. Fitzpatrick gives no intelligible explanation of the sense in which all authority is from God, nor of the Scholastic teaching, that it has its first concrete existence in the people, as a whole, and is transferred by them to the ruler, I must supply the omission, and I must show that there is nothing in the theory of Suarez and

<sup>4</sup> De Defensione Fidei, lib. III, cap. 2. n. 20.

the Schoolmen that is prejudicial to the stability of civil authority.

Civil society is a natural society. This means that the duty of forming civil societies has been imposed upon men by the natural law. Therefore, through the medium of the natural law, God is the immediate efficient cause of all its essential constituents, and of all its necessary properties or attributes. Civil authority is, at the very least, such an attribute. Therefore civil authority has God for its immediate efficient cause. Which being interpreted means that the rights and duties, which are the essence of civil authority, have God for their immediate and only efficient cause. God, then, and God alone is the one and only efficient cause of all that is essential to civil society, and of its necessary, concomitant attribute, civil authority. Man has had no hand in their production. Neither can he change or modify them in any of their essentials, any more than he can change or modify the essentials of the marriage bond. He is ordinarily free to form a conjugal society or not, to put on the marriage yoke or not; but if he marries, he must accept conjugal society and the marriage yoke or bond, as they were instituted by God through the medium of the natural law. And, when men form civil societies, they must accept civil society and civil authority as they were instituted by God through the medium of the natural law. In this sense all authority is immediately from God.

According to the Schoolmen, the community or people as a whole are the first recipients of civil authority. In them it has its first concrete existence. They are the first subject in which it inheres. In this sense, too, it comes immediately from God. God is the proximate efficient cause of it. He is the only efficient cause of it. If it did not come to the people immediately from God, they could never transfer to the ruler the right to punish criminals at all, much less, to inflict on them the death penalty. No individual, as such; no number of individuals, as such, have any right to inflict punishment, unless that right has been given them by God; the people cannot confer on their ruler a right which they don't possess. Not only in the abstract, then, is civil authority from God. In the concrete, too, it is immediately from God, in the case of the community, its first recipient.



To the actual ruler authority is from God ; but it is not given immediately by God, but mediately, or through the people. In the two cases which I have discussed the only efficient cause was God. But in conferring authority on the ruler two efficient causes are at work, God, acting through the natural law ; and the people. Let me illustrate and explain this. In the generation of any man born into the world, the resultant of marital intercourse demands a human soul. God immediately creates the human soul, and consequently the human will, for which the human soul makes an exigent demand. And yet the parents, although they have produced neither the soul nor the will, are said to be, and are the efficient causes of the child, to whom they give concrete existence in this world. In the same way, when men, by giving their consent, do all they can to form a civil society, there is an exigent demand for what is necessary for the completion of a civil society, namely the social bond, and civil authority, its necessary property or attribute. And as God, in the former case, created the human soul and the human will, so in the present case, through the natural law, He imposes the social bond, and grants authority. And as in the former case the parents, by giving concrete existence to the child, are real efficient causes, so the people, in forming a civil society, and placing power in the hands of the ruler, are real efficient causes : by their consent, they give concrete existence to the civil society, and concrete existence to this individual ruler. But just as that child, all through its life, continues to have a soul and a will that it received immediately from God, so the civil society, even as it is in concrete existence, continues always to have a social bond and an authority that was fashioned for it by the hand of God ; a social bond and an authority, which the people cannot change or modify in any of their essential constituents.

The fundamental constitution of the state, which is the expression of the will of the people, determines the form of government, provides for the permanency of authority, arranges, within the limits allowed to the people by the natural law, the conditions on which the authority is to be held, fixes the mode and title of succession. This fundamental constitution is at least natural prior to the appointment of a ruler. The ruler is appointed by the consent of

the people. They place the supreme power in his hands according to the provisions of the fundamental constitution; the power which, at least with priority of nature, resided in the people as a whole, not in the people taken distributively. It is not therefore the sum of their individual powers. Much less does it continue to abide in each individual. It abides formally in the ruler, and in him alone. In him alone it is expedite. or ready to be used. It is in him not as in a mandatory of the people, but as in a minister of God. And, though to be used for the good of all the people, it is his own. Moreover, with certain limitations, it is given to him permanently, because permanency is necessary for the common good of the community. Neither can it be curtailed or restricted by the people, once they have placed it in the hands of the ruler, except in as far as that curtailment or restriction has sanction in the fundamental constitution of the State. That fundamental constitution, as I have said, fixes the manner and the title of succession. Hence in kingdoms there need not be, and generally is not, a renewal of consent by the people in the case of the kings who succeed the first recipient. And so the proximate title of these kings need not be the consent of the people, as it was the proximate title of the first recipient of supreme power; but even in the case of succeeding kings, the consent of the people, as expressed in the fundamental constitution, is always their radical title.

Though supreme power is *per se* placed permanently in the hands of the supreme ruler, it can be withdrawn by the people, and placed in other hands, whenever, instead of being used for the good of the whole community, it is manifestly used for the private good of the ruler, or for the good of a section of the community, and not for the common good of all. There is no need of any sort or kind for puzzling over the expressions which the Schoolmen use:—"the people retain the power *radicaliter*," or "they retain it *in habitu*." In the first place, the Schoolmen say it is in the ruler *formally* and *quoad exercitium*, or ready for use; that it is his own; that in the use of it, he is not dependent on the will of the people, etc. In the second place they tell us what is meant by such expressions as *radicaliter*, *in habitu*. What is meant, as Suarez tells

us, is, that, if the king manifestly uses his power to the ruin of the state, the people can use their natural power of self-defence; for of this they have never despoiled themselves:—

‘Et eadem ratione, si rex justam suam potestatem in tyrannidem verteret, illa in manifestam civitatis perniciem abutendo, possit populus naturali potestate ad se defendendum uti, hac enim numquam se privavit.’

No Scholastic or Suarezian, whom I have met with in my reading, has ever said that the supreme power “can be withdrawn at will.” Just as no pope has ever said that it can never be withdrawn. The Schoolmen say that it can be withdrawn, whenever it is being manifestly abused.

This is a summary of the teaching of Suarez and the Schoolmen. Would Dr. Fitzpatrick point out in what one particular it resembles the teaching condemned by Leo XIII. and Pius X.?

As Dr. Fitzpatrick (p. 6) culls his condemnation of Suarez from the Encyclical *Diuturnum illud* of Leo XIII., it is very interesting to notice that Leo XIII., in the same Encyclical *Diuturnum illud*, teaches the very same doctrine as Suarez regarding the right of the people to withdraw their obedience, whenever authority is perverted from the end for which God intended it; because then the will of the ruler is in opposition to the will of God:—

‘Neque tamen est, cur abiecisce obedientiam, qui ita se gerant, arguantur; etenim si principum voluntas cum Dei pugnat voluntate et legibus, ipsi potestatis suae modum excedunt, justitiamque pervertunt; neque eorum tunc valere potest auctoritas, quae, ubi justitia non est, nulla est.’

It is comforting to find that Dr. Fitzpatrick’s “four main propositions,” as understood by him, do not sum up “the pronouncements of the Popes.” If they did they would convict the Popes of favouring tyranny, and of enslaving the nations. He hurled his four propositions at our heads, without explanation or distinction. I hope I have given such an explanation and suggested such distinctions as will enable us all duly to appraise the four propositions.

<sup>2</sup> *De Defensione Fidei*, lib. 111, cap. 3, n. 3.

Taking them in order :—" (1) Authority comes from God Himself; it does not depend on the will of the people." Considered in the abstract, it comes from God, and from God alone. Considered in the concrete, as it is possessed by the people who are the first subject in which it inheres, it comes from God, and from God alone. Considered in the concrete, as it is possessed by the ruler to whom the people have transferred it, it comes from both God and the people. The civil bond itself, the authority itself, all the rights and duties which constitute the civil bond, all the rights implied in authority, come from God and God alone, through the medium of the natural law; but the bond is not imposed by God, in any concrete case, until the people have given their consent, either simultaneously or gradually; either explicitly or implicitly. The man and woman who contract marriage are not the causes of conjugal society, nor of the rights and obligations which constitute the marriage bond, nor of conjugal authority. God, and God alone, through the activity of the natural law, is the cause of all these. But God does not impose the marriage bond nor confer conjugal authority until the man and woman have given their matrimonial consent. The man and woman are the real causes of their own concrete existing conjugal union, and they are the real causes of this existing, concrete conjugal authority. In the same way the people are the real causes of the concrete civil authority. And so it is not true to say, as Dr. Fitzpatrick says in the first of his four propositions: "Authority does not depend on the will of the people." It depends on their will to the extent I have explained, and in the way I have explained. Every effect must depend on its cause. The concrete effect in question has both God and the people as its cause: God is the primary cause of it; the people are the secondary cause of it; and it depends on both causes.

" (2) Authority does not vest in the first instance in the people who afterwards pass it on to the ruler." I am compelled to deny both members of this proposition. Authority is at least with priority of nature first in the people. It is transmitted by them to the ruler. It is not first in the people in the way Rousseau says it is; but it is first in the people as the Schoolmen and Suarezians say it is.

" (3) In certain cases (e.g. under a democratic consti-

tution) the people designate the person who shall be invested with power. They do not confer authority or delegate power." I reply: They do not confer authority in Rousseau's sense. They do confer authority, in the Scholastic and Suarezian sense, as I explained above. And they so confer it under every form of government whatever: not merely under a democratic constitution.

"(4) Since the power has not come from the people they cannot recall it." I reply: It comes from the people in the way explained; and they can recall it, under the circumstances explained. Whenever it is perverted from the end intended by God, which is that it should be used by the ruler for the common good of the whole community, the people have a perfect right to take it from him, and place it in other hands, provided this can be done without causing greater evils. And this is the teaching not only of the Schoolmen, but of Leo XIII. in the Encyclical *diuturnum illud*. These four propositions, understood as Dr. Fitzpatrick understands them, so stagger all credibility, that I should not see any necessity for dealing with them at all, were it not that they have afforded me an occasion of bringing out more clearly the Suarezian doctrine. Besides I could not forget that, according to him, "they sum up the pronouncements of the Popes." In the interest of truth, and in the interest of religion, that statement ought not to be let pass unchallenged.

I have shown, I hope, that there is nothing in the teaching of Suarez that is dangerous to the stability of civil authority. Suarez grants to civil authority all the stability it deserves; all that is given to it by Leo XIII.

## VI. "THE EASY TEST."

It is not my intention to enter into an exegetical controversy with Dr. Fitzpatrick. It would be wearisome and unprofitable; and it is quite unnecessary. I promised to give my readers an easy test, by which they may judge whether Suarez has been condemned or no. I now proceed to do so. Dr. Fitzpatrick (p. 7) says of his teaching that "it is no longer received in the schools in Rome." I know hardly anything about the curriculum of studies in the Roman schools; but I know quite enough for my purpose.

In the Gregorian University (the only Roman school of which I know even a little) the doctrine of Suarez has been taught for years. It was taught by Father Macksey, S.J., a distinguished American Jesuit, who died there only a couple of years ago. It was taught by Father Billot, S.J., who is now a Cardinal. Both have incorporated the teaching in their books, have explained it luminously, and have ably defended it. And this, after its "condemnation" by Leo XIII. and Pius X. The Jesuit Superiors have allowed this doctrine to be taught by Jesuit professors, and learned by Jesuit scholastics. Many other Religious Orders and Congregations, I have been told, send their scholastics for lectures to the Gregorian. Are we expected to believe that the Jesuit Superiors are so unconscionable as to allow a "condemned" doctrine to be taught in a University of which they have charge? Are we expected to believe that the Jesuit Superiors and the Superiors of so many other Religious Orders and Congregations are allowing their young scholastics to drink in a doctrine that has been condemned by the Church? Are we expected to believe that all this can be done within the very shadow of the Vatican, without any protest from the Holy See? If these are Dr. Fitzpatrick's expectations, he must be contemplating in his readers a charming simplicity of mind, to which, I confess, I myself can make no claim. Let us not forget it. It was Pius X., who "condemned" a teaching which happens to be Billot's own teaching, and who compelled Father Billot to accept a Cardinal's hat. As a professed Jesuit Father he was bound by a special vow not to accept any ecclesiastical dignity unless compelled to do so by a precept of obedience. And Pius X., just to punish the good father, as I must suppose, for teaching and publishing a doctrine, which Pius himself "condemned," imposed the precept upon him, and made him a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church. Quite a novel punishment for contumacy! So much for the "condemnation" of Suarez. I hope we shall hear of it no more. And, as the canonization of the heretical bantling was contingent on the condemnation of Suarez, by showing that the condemnation is a myth, I claim to have shown that the canonization was bogus.



## VII. EXPLANATIONS, PROPHECY AND OTHER THINGS.

Why did the teaching of the Schoolmen hold undisputed sway down to the beginning of the nineteenth century? That is a fact that requires explanation. And Dr. Fitzpatrick has his explanations prompt. I propose to examine them briefly. One explanation is, the comparative backwardness of historical studies in those bygone times. He says (p. 8) that "there has been a great advance in historical studies." Certainly there has; but there is no question here of any nice point in higher historical criticism, or the philosophy of history, but of broad, concrete, outstanding, historical facts; of such historical facts as were quite accessible to Suarez and the Schoolmen generally; of facts relating to the origin of dynasties, to the forms of government, to the mode and title of succession. Anyone who looks into the *Defensio Fidei* will discover that Suarez was indifferently well up in such facts. Moreover we must never forget that the primary question is not an historical question at all, but a judicial question: a question of rights and obligations. Knowing that civil society is a natural society and that civil authority is its natural attribute, the question is: What does natural reason teach us of the origin of civil society, and civil authority? At most, history is only a subsidiary study. We first consult our reason, to discover what are the precepts of the natural law regarding civil society and civil authority; and then we consult history, to ascertain how, and how far, the teachings of right reason have been carried out in actual life. That is how I view the matter. Though, of course, I admit that the experience of history may furnish an *a posteriori* argument. With this proviso, however, that we must not lightly suppose that the free consent of the people, explicit or implicit, simultaneous or gradual, was divorced from historical fact.

Another explanation, given on page 7, is that "no one thought it worth while to question" the teaching of Suarez and the other Schoolmen. This explanation is to me antecedently incredible, and I think I shall be able to show that it is not borne out by facts. And first of all, what about the Schoolmen themselves? Did not each of these eminent men question the teachings of his predecessors and

contemporaries, and carefully scrutinize and weigh their arguments? Surely we are not to suppose that such men were engaged in a game of "follow the leader." And after all, it is their meditations that count for most in such a question: the lay mind is not equal to the task of solving such deep problems. But it was not the Schoolmen alone that were interested in, and discussed the origin of supreme civil power. In proof of this, I need only recall what I have said about the genesis of the neo-scholastic system; how the divine right of kings was taught in the Protestant University of Oxford; how it was adopted by learned Protestants in Germany, and by the Gallicans in France. In its defence James I. wrote his famous book, or got someone to write it for him. In reply to James, Suarez wrote and published the *Defensio Fidei*. James had the *Defensio* publicly burned in London. By order of the Archbishop of Canterbury (in reality, by order of James) a memorable sermon was preached in the cemetery at St. Paul's Cross, on Sunday, the 1st of December, 1613. It was to be on Suarez and the Jesuits, and Protestant London flocked to hear it. The preacher showed to the people a copy of the *Defensio*. He discoursed eloquently on the enormities it contained. Then, from the lofty eminence of the pulpit, he flung the book into the flames; not one, but many copies. On that one day several copies of Suarez' newly published *Defensio* were reduced to ashes at St. Paul's Cross. A little later, in accordance with a decree of the Paris Parliament, the *Defensio* was burned in that city by the public hangman. A copy of the decree was sent to James I. English Protestants of every shade went frantic with joy. Orders were given to all preachers in England, Scotland, and Ireland, to give the widest possible publicity to the Paris condemnation. In England, in France, in Spain, in Rome, the *Defensio* was submitted to examination, and judgment was pronounced upon it. The Pope, and those who were on the side of the Pope, were also on the side of Suarez: their judgment was a panegyric of the *Defensio*. The Protestants of England, and the Gallicans of Paris furiously condemned the book. They were then, and they ever remained, Suarez' relentless foe.

A whole essay might be written on the hubbub and uproar occasioned by the *Defensio* amongst the enemies of the Holy

See. One day I may try my hand at such an essay. But, even in the light of such meagre hints as I have given, how can it be said that, before the beginning of the nineteenth century, no one thought it worth while to examine this question?

So far I have made no reference to the teaching Church. Dr. Fitzpatrick (p. 4) says:—"Surely the Church did not cease to teach about the year 1800." No. Of course not. That will be admitted by all. It is a question that admits of only one answer. But will Dr. Fitzpatrick allow me to put another question? It is, in my opinion, a very interesting practical question, and it touches Dr. Fitzpatrick very near. The question is this: How will he explain the fact that the Church began to teach only about the year 1800? Dr. Fitzpatrick (p. 7) tells us that "prior to the nineteenth century no official pronouncement had been made" by the Church. Yet, according to him, through the long course of centuries that preceded, the Schoolmen, one and all, were teaching a false doctrine on the origin of civil society and civil authority. At least seven times does he remind us that this false doctrine was, and remained, during all these long centuries, the *sententia communis*. The question regarding the origin of civil society and civil authority is a question that, in the absence of a supernatural revelation or of official ecclesiastical pronouncement, must be solved by a rational interpretation of the natural law. We have no supernatural revelation about the matter. This Dr. Fitzpatrick does not, and cannot deny; and he explicitly asserts that "prior to the nineteenth century no official pronouncement had been made" by the Church. So, linking up Dr. Fitzpatrick's various assertions, we derive from them this startling piece of information, that, during all the centuries that preceded the nineteenth century, Suarez and the other Schoolmen, *ad unum*, were grossly misinterpreting the natural law of God in a question of such surpassing importance as is the question touching the origin of civil society and civil authority: and the *Ecclesia docens* remained seated the while in slothful acquiescence. How does all this harmonise with the doctrine of the living *Magisterium*, which was instituted by Christ for the express purpose of preserving His doctrine pure and undefiled? So far as the origin of civil society and civil authority is con-

cerned, the living *Magisterium*, according to Dr. Fitzpatrick, was dormant during all these centuries. In reality, of course, the *Magisterium* was very wide awake, solicitously guiding and directing the schools and the Schoolmen. That last remark is so obvious as to be almost a platitude. For having made it I will offer this atonement at least: I shall not attempt to prove it. But, just to give an example of the solicitous interest of the Holy See, I may say that it was the Pope of the time, Paul V., who requested Suarez to write the *Defensio Fidei*, in refutation of James I. Poor Suarez! Little did he foresee that he and the book, which he had written at the request of one Pope, would afterwards be merged by two other Popes in the same damnation as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the Evolutionists.

Dr. Fitzpatrick thinks that the doctrine of Suarez is already "obsolescent," and he prophesies that it will soon become "obsolete." I am afraid that in this particular, as in other particulars, the facts are all against him. I have already said that it has been taught for years in the Gregorian University, Rome. This is not the only place where it is taught. It is being taught in other Catholic schools that I could name. But this is not all. It is not even the important consideration. The important consideration, to my mind, is this, that whilst formerly the doctrine of Suarez was confined to the sheltered seclusion of the philosophical lecture hall, it has of late years been diffused amongst the masses of the people. I venture to say that for the one who knew of the Suarezian doctrine before, tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands (I might safely say millions) have learned it within the past six or seven years. And the interesting fact is, that they have been taught it by their rulers. The masses do not know it by the name of the "Suarezian doctrine"; but they are well up in the thing for which the name stands. The new name is "Self-determination." Does not "Self-determination" include all that is included in the term "Suarezian teaching"? The thing, then, is very far from being "obsolescent," and it is yet very much farther from becoming "obsolete." The mention of self-determination suggests to my mind one more difficulty. If self-determination includes all that the Suarezian teaching includes (and

I think it does), and if the Suarezian teaching has been condemned by two Popes, as being opposed to the teaching of the natural law, it is very strange that his present Holiness should have never warned his faithful children, that he should have never told them that their rulers were preaching to them a doctrine that is utterly subversive of the natural law.

On page 6 Dr. Fitzpatrick cites a passage from an article by the late Archbishop Healy, and cites it to shift responsibility from himself, and to make Dr. Healy responsible for saying that Suarez and the Schoolmen have been utterly discarded:—"What then of Suarez and the other theologians whom Professor O'Rahilly quotes? Is their opinion completely discarded? I will answer in the words of a distinguished Irishman." Then he gives the quotation from Dr. Healy. But on the very page from which Dr. Fitzpatrick quotes, the Archbishop says:—"It must be borne in mind that neither Popes nor Councils, as a rule, intend to pronounce a final decision on free questions of theology, except the contrary is clearly expressed. And certainly the opinion which teaches that Civil Power is immediately from the people, although in the abstract and ultimately it is derived from God, has hitherto, and is still, we think, a perfectly free opinion." (*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, December, 1881, page 704.) Now considering that Dr. Fitzpatrick cites the testimony of Dr. Healy for the express purpose of proving that the opinion of Suarez has been utterly discarded, I think it would have been much fairer both to Dr. Healy and to the readers of the *Irish Theological Quarterly*, if he had either not quoted Dr. Healy at all, or had so quoted him, as to convey the Archbishop's real mind. In the passage I have cited Dr. Healy expressly says that he thinks the teaching of Suarez "is still a perfectly free opinion." And, suppose Dr. Healy were alive to-day, and he were told what I have told my readers in the course of this article, that the doctrine of Suarez is openly taught in the Roman Gregorian University, that Cardinal Billot, and other professors of name have printed and published it in their books, that the Holy See has made no protest—if he were told this, would he be likely to say:—"We do not see how it can henceforward be maintained amongst theologians

with any show of probability"? I am perfectly certain that he would pronounce no such judgment. His mind was far too capacious for that; too capacious, and too well balanced in matters theological.

This would be quite enough. The doctrine of Suarez is openly taught in Rome. The Holy See does not protest. With this testimony before him, no priest will be likely to believe that the doctrine of Suarez has been condemned. Originally, I did not intend to go beyond this easy, simple test, given in Section VI. of this article. Upon reflection, however, I have thought it better to add something about the extracts from the *Diuturnum illud* of Pope Leo XIII., and from the condemnation of *Le Sillon* by Pius X. I hope it will make the treatment of the question more complete and satisfactory.

Cardinal Billot, Father Macksey, and others put into their books, as objections, the extracts that are cited by Dr. Fitzpatrick. They explain them; they show that they harmonize perfectly with the teaching of Suarez, and the other Schoolmen; that they are a condemnation of Rousseau. According to Dr. Fitzpatrick they are a condemnation of all the Schoolmen that lived and wrote before the beginning of the nineteenth century. For, on his admission, the teaching of Suarez was the *sententia communis*.

Dr. Fitzpatrick quotes from one paragraph of the *Diuturnum illud*, to prove that Leo XIII. "completely discards Suarez." I quote from the paragraph immediately preceding, to show that there is no question of Suarez at all, but of certain modern philosophers who walked in the footsteps of the so-called philosophers of the eighteenth century. Also, the Pope says in this paragraph that Catholics dissent from them, and derive supreme authority from God. I may take it, I suppose, that Dr. Fitzpatrick will allow that Suarez and the Schoolmen were Catholics.

Immo recentiores perplures, eorum vestigiis ingredientibus qui sibi superiore saeculo philosophorum nomen inscripserunt. . . . Ab his vero dissentiunt catholici homines, qui jus imperandi a Deo repetunt, velut a naturali necessarioque principio. These are the words of Leo XIII.

Either, therefore, Dr. Fitzpatrick must deny that Suarez



and the other Schoolmen were Catholics, or he must admit that they were with Leo XIII., not against him. And, if with him, they cannot fall under his condemnation.

In the next place let us consider the points of doctrine condemned. They are (a) that the power comes from the people to the ruler in such a way that he cannot use it as his own, (b) that the ruler is the mere mandatory of the people, (c) that authority can be withdrawn from the ruler, whenever the people wish to withdraw it :—

Omnem iniquum potestatem a populo esse; quare qui eam in civitate gerunt, ab iis non uti suam geri, sed ut a populo sibi mandatam, et hac quidem lege, ut populi ipsius voluntate, a quo mandata est, revocari possit.

Now these are Rousseau's teachings, and they are contradictory of the teachings of Suarez. As I have said before, Suarez teaches (a) that the ruler uses authority as his own; (b) that he is not the mandatory of the people, but the Minister of God; (c) that the authority is *per se* placed in his hands permanently, and that the people cannot withdraw it whenever they wish.

In another paragraph Leo XIII. tells what is the civil society or social contract which he is condemning: (a) the civil society that is not natural, but purely conventional, that arises from the free consent of men; (b) its authority comes from the same source, the will of the people: in no sense does it come from God, nor is it any way dependent on Him; (c) the essential constituents of authority are the individual rights of the people, as ceded to the ruler; (d) authority, as it is in the ruler, is the sum of these individual rights :—

Qui civilem societatem a libero hominum consensu natam volunt, ipsius imperii ortum ex eodem fonte petentes, de jure suo iniquum aliquid unumquemque cessisse et voluntate singulos in ejus se contulisse potestatem, ad quem summa illorum jurium pervenisset.

This, as far as it goes, is an accurate presentation of Rousseau's *Social Contract*, and it is, in every single particular contradictory of the doctrine of Suarez. According to Suarez (a) civil society is a natural, not a conventional society: (b) its authority is not, considered in itself, from the people, but from God alone; considered in its first recipient, it is not from the people, but from God alone; considered in the

ruler, it comes from God, through the natural law, but the imposing of the civil bond, is contingent on the free consent of the people; (c) the essential constituents of the authority are not the individual rights of the people. They are distinct, natural, divine. They are an effect of which God is the immediate, the only cause; (d) therefore it necessarily follows that authority, as it exists in the ruler, is not, and cannot be, the sum of the people's individual rights.

Pius X. condemns the same errors as Leo XIII. In interpreting these condemnations we must ever bear in mind those against whom they were aimed, and we must interpret accordingly words and phrases susceptible of various meanings. It is absolutely certain that "authority does not exist primordially in the people," it is absolutely certain that "the people do not confer authority to govern," in the sense in which Rousseau and his followers understand these statements. Does authority exist in the people, in the Suarezian sense? Do the people confer authority to govern, in the Suarezian sense? To these questions the condemnations give no answer, whether affirmative or negative: they have nothing to do with Suarez or the Suarezians.

The Suarezians are at one on the main issue, that supreme authority does not come immediately from God to the ruler, but mediately, or through the people. On some of the more unimportant by-issues they are not quite unanimous. In this article I have thought it better to confine myself to the main issue, and to showing that Suarez has not been condemned by Leo XIII, Pius X, nor by any other Pope.

EDWARD MASTERSON, S.J.

## How the Mass is a Real Sacrifice.

People nowadays want to know the how and why of their religion. And who will blame them? "Nor do I consider those to blame," says St. Anselm, "who being duly grounded in faith desire to understand the reasons thereof." Some things there are,—and here indeed is *turpis curiositis*,—which we can't know, and which would not help us if we did. What St. Bernard says of knowledge in general we may say of the many branches of theological speculation: That which imports is the *modus sciendi*: Quo ordini, Quo studio, Quo fine. And as to the *quo studio*, we may answer with the great doctor: "That which most promotes love."

Now it seems to me not enough to say that when people are at Mass they should imagine themselves standing under the Cross; nor that the Mass is the renewal, repetition, and continuation of the Sacrifice of Calvary. They want to know how this is, and why the Church is so severe in the matter of Sunday Mass. That the Mass is a real sacrifice we all know, and that it is the same sacrifice as that of the Cross. But how and why this is we do not find it so easy to explain. The explanations of learned authors are not altogether satisfactory. In fact, I may say they are far from being so. Before it was explained to us we thought we understood something. But the more we read the less clear our ideas become. A mystic slaying, a death represented, a sword of words,—are all very unsatisfactory phrases; since in the Mass we have to do with a real sacrifice, and a real relation to the Sacrifice of the Cross; and a mystic phraseology and a mystic explanation will not suffice. Moreover, to say that for the essence of sacrifice it suffices to reduce the victim to a *status declivior* is to weaken the conception mankind has always held of sacrifice, and it does not square with the instances we know of in Scripture.

Now a sacrifice, I believe, is an offering made to and accepted by God. It is not a gift in the ordinary sense of the word. God has no need of our gifts. "Should I be

hungry I shall not tell you, for all the world is mine and the fulness thereof." And if He did require our gifts there would be no means of delivering them over. What then can man do to acknowledge God's supreme dominion, and make expiation for sin? All he can do is to deprive himself of the ownership and use of his offering, by pouring it out, slaying it, driving it into the wilderness, and thus deposit it beyond his own reach; or by burning, reduce it to its elements, and thus in a manner hand it back to its Creator, to be used again by Him in the formation of new substances. Hence in a sacrifice there must be three elements: A voluntary offering, the destruction of it, and its acceptance by God. The slaying of the firstborn of the Egyptians on the night of the Passover had no semblance of a sacrifice from the fact that there was no intention of offering. The offering of Isaac by Abraham was not a sacrifice since the victim not being slain, the sacrifice was not consummated. The holocaust offered by the prophets of Baal to prove that theirs was the true God was not a sacrifice, because it was not accepted. Nor are all these three parts,—offering, destruction, and acceptance,—of the essence of sacrifice, in such a way that in the absence of any one of them there is no sacrifice. All are agreed that destruction is not of the *essence* of sacrifice. Only the priest can offer sacrifice. But the slaying of the victim was not of the priestly office. Our Lord did not crucify Himself, but He *offered* Himself and poured out His Blood over the Cross. This was the proper office of the priest. Now, in an absolute sacrifice the same victim can be offered only once. But in the Mass, being a relative sacrifice, the same victim is offered as often as the sacrifice is renewed. But the slaying of the victim can take place only once. Hence it cannot be repeated in the Mass. This is a relative sacrifice referring to the sacrifice of the Cross, in which the victim was actually slain. But though relative, it is a real and true sacrifice, as complete in itself as a relative sacrifice can be. And being a real sacrifice, the Mass contains all the essentials of sacrifice. But the destruction of the victim, though not an essential part, belongs to the *integrity* of the sacrifice. It is a *sine qua non*, a part of sacrifice which must come in somewhere and at some time, not necessarily here and now, but a part which in this case of the Mass has already been duly con-

summed in the past. So much for the slaying; but the offering of the victim,—this is an essential part of every sacrifice. Hence it is, above all, the offering of the victim which goes to make the Mass a real sacrifice. This offering is renewed each time the sacrifice is offered; and it is offered that the sharers in the sacrifice may be present again and renew their offering, so that their children and their children's children from generation to generation may stand around the altar and share by their presence in the sacrifice. In the old sacrifices the victim was first offered and then slain. In the new it is offered again, because still alive after being slain. Hence in the Apocalypse the Lamb is seen standing as it were slain. Slain because the sacrifice is consummated; standing, because still alive.

It follows then that the *actio sacrificia* consists not in the slaying, but in the *offering* of a victim who will be, or who—in this case of the Mass,—has already been, actually slain. And the Mass is a real sacrifice not because the Victim assumes a *status declivior*, nor because it is reduced to the condition of food, nor yet because the destruction of it is mystically represented. Nor is it a sacrifice because the words of consecration, *vi verborum*, divide again the Blood from the Body, nor yet because the victim is partaken of by the offerers. But it is a real sacrifice because a real victim is really again offered; and that victim which was once for all really slain has been raised up that it might be offered anew. All the rest,—the double consecration, the state of food, the Communion,—admirably represent and express the action of sacrifice, as doubtless they are intended to do, but they do not constitute it in its essence of sacrifice.

Now evidently the offering of the Victim, which constitutes the sacrificial action in the Mass, is effected at the moment of consecration, and endures till the Communion. It is not the preliminary offering of the bread and wine. The offering is effected at the moment when the Priest and Victim comes upon the altar,—the Victim in the condition of a victim, in the sacrificial state of bread and wine. But what about our third element of sacrifice, God's acceptance of the offering? This, it would seem, is as much of the essence of sacrifice as the offering itself. If the offering can be renewed so can the acceptance, and each act of offering requires an act of acceptance. Now at which moment of

the Mass is this acceptance by God formally signified? Surely it is the same moment as that of the offering,—the moment of Consecration. As the fire from heaven came upon Elias' offering and consumed the holocaust, so now the Holy Spirit, the divine Fire from heaven, descends upon the Christian altar and consecrates the bread and wine, consuming their substance, changing them into the Body and Blood of our Victim, signifying at the same time God's acceptance of our offering by the changed condition to which the victim is reduced. The Mass then is a true sacrifice because it contains all the essentials of sacrifice. The slaying is not of the essence but of the integrity of the sacrifice. This has already taken place, and cannot be renewed. The essence of sacrifice consists in the Offering and Acceptance of the victim, and this is effected at the moment of Consecration. The state of food to which the victim is reduced does not make the essence of the sacrifice, but it admirably expresses both the condition of victim and the intention of the great High Priest who offers it. And whereas the accidents of bread and wine mark the act of offering, the change of substance beneath the species marks the acceptance by God of the sacrifice.

So far for what makes the essence of sacrifice in the Mass. What now establishes the identity of the Mass with the sacrifice of the Cross? The same Priest, yes; the same Victim, yes; and, the same Sacrificial Act. This last is the point we wish to emphasize: the *same* sacrificial act. If this is demonstrated it seems to me that nothing is wanting to prove the Mass the same identical sacrifice as that of the Cross. Now, the act of sacrifice consists not in the slaying, but in the *offering* of the victim. And the act of offering consists not in the mere devoting of the victim by the imposition of the priest's hands, nor yet in the ritual offering in the Mass of the bread and wine. In an absolute sacrifice it consists in the pouring out of the blood; in the sacrifice of the Mass, in the sacramental state of food and drink in which the victim is placed on the altar. It is this act of offering which constitutes the sacrificial act,—and it is this sacrificial act which is the same sacrificial act as that of the Cross. The Council of Trent tells us the two



sacrifices are the same, *only do they differ in the manner of offering*. Now it is just the offering, we have tried to show, that constitutes the sacrificial action. But the action of offering is something distinct from the *manner* of offering. The manner of offering in the two sacrifices is different. In the one it is the real effusion of blood, in the other it is under the sacramental species. But the action is the same in both. And how can we prove this? By the relation of both to the Last Supper. The same rite which institutes the sacrifice of the Mass establishes also its identity with that of the Cross. The act, as well as the manner, of offering in the Mass is the same as that of the Last Supper. "Do this in commemoration of me." From these words addressed to the Apostles, the priest derives both his commission and his power to do, through the laying on of their hands, what the Apostles were commissioned to do. By the words of Institution he consecrates as our Lord consecrated; he offers the same victim which our Lord offered; and this in the same manner, under the same species, as our Lord Himself. Now what our Lord did at the Last Supper undoubtedly had reference to the next day's sacrifice on the Cross. On Holy Thursday He offered indeed a complete sacrifice, since He offered Himself up sealed as a victim. But, like the Mass, this was a relative sacrifice. Like the Mass, it was so closely related to the Cross that from the Cross it drew all its efficacy, not perhaps as a sacrament, yet indeed as a sacrifice. The perfect identity then of the Mass with the sacrifice of the Cross is established by the relationship of both to the Last Supper. From the latter, as its conduit, it derives the *manner*, as well as the *efficacy*, of the offering; from the former, as from its source, it derives not indeed its essence, but its integrity and its consummation as a sacrifice.

Now the most direct proof of the equality of triangles is superposition. And if we can show that in the Mass there is not only the same Priest and the same Victim as in the sacrifice of Calvary, but also the same sacrificial action, we are placing as it were our triangles one over the other, and establishing,—not perhaps a mathematical demonstration, but something as near to it as any exacting intellect can desire,—of the identity of our Christian Rite with the Sacrifice of Calvary. I do not, however, claim

that all this argument need be placed before an intelligent laity not versed in theology. But it seems to me that if Catholics have a clear conception as to what it is that makes the Mass the same sacrifice as that of Calvary, they will not only find help for their own devotion, but will also be in a position to show enquirers why the Mass is the centre of all our worship, and why the Church is so insistent in requiring our presence at it. Do not, gentle Reader, ascribe to presumption this attempt to explain what theologians like Vasquez, Suarez, Lugo and Bellord have not altogether succeeded in doing. Theology, in so far as it is a science, is constructive and progressive. Who has not seen a spar carried along by a big wave, the wave roll over, spend itself in foam, and then withdraw exhausted with the effort? And as it recedes, a mere wavelet, carried along by the same swell, slips from underneath the foam, lifts the spar, and carries it yet further on towards the shore. What St. Anselm says of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church we may say of theologians of all time: "The days of man being short they were not able to say what they might have, had they lived longer. For the nature of truth is so full and deep that it cannot be exhausted by shortlived man. Hence our Lord from His Church, with which He has promised to abide till the end of the world, does not cease even now to supply the gifts of His grace." And if, Reader, you find somewhat to correct in this contribution to a venerable dispute, may I again appeal to St. Anselm: "When I seek to rise to the understanding of what we already hold by faith, and I seem to discover what hitherto I have not understood, I forthwith make it known to others, so that I may learn by their judgment what I may securely hold."

THOMAS CAMPBELL, O.S.B.

## The Lawfulness of the Hunger Strike.

### A REPLY.

THE futility of the discussion on the morality of the hunger-strike must by this time be evident to everyone who has watched its course during the past few years with any attention. I was myself very early convinced of it, and resolved for that and other reasons to take no further part in the debate. Through the kindness of the Editor of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* I was allowed to state my views and arguments on the subject at some length; and if they have failed to convince all, they have at least never been decisively refuted, and seldom systematically attacked. Recently, however, Father Kelleher, a distinguished professor and writer, of St. John's College, Waterford, has singled out my articles for special examination, and, while he has been invariably courteous and even complimentary to me, he has made so direct an attack upon my whole position, that I hope I may be excused for appearing once more in the rôle of a controversialist to defend it. I will, at the same time, avail of the opportunity to answer an argument stated by Father Gannon, S.J., in the September (1920) number of *Studies*, in favour of the hunger-strike, and I will criticise one or two arguments on the same side by writers in the *Tablet*, which seem to call for more notice than they have received. I will confine myself to the theory of the hunger-strike, without reference to any concrete instances. The past is past and cannot be undone; nor have I any intention of passing judgment on men, many of whom were warm friends of mine, and are now no more.

Father Kelleher groups his objections around the arguments to which they severally refer, and in replying to them I will adopt his order. Leisured readers will find the arguments excepted against stated at length in the *I.E.R.* (August, 1918); but for the convenience of those who have not copies of that Review, I will restate them here in the briefest possible terms:—

I. A. The first is this:—It is never lawful to kill oneself intentionally, and, since we may never directly will the risk

of that which we may not directly do, it is never lawful intentionally to create the risk of killing oneself. Now all hunger-strikers (it is argued) create a risk of killing themselves, and some will do what all profess themselves willing to do—some will actually kill themselves. They do this by their own act, that is, by self-starvation, and, whether we hold the operation of this cause to be direct or indirect, no one can deny that it is absolutely fatal. It is possible, however, to kill oneself, even by one's own act, without doing anything essentially unlawful. The man who blows up a bridge while he is himself standing on it, and is killed by the explosion, is killed by his own act—but if his intention is not to kill himself but to blow up the bridge, and if he is killed merely because he is not able to get off the bridge in time to save his life, his death, though due to his own act, is not intentional. But why do we say of the hunger-strikers that they risk their lives, or kill themselves, intentionally? Because risk to life, or actual death, is the only element of the hunger-strike that makes it serviceable for its purpose, which is to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear upon an unjust aggressor, to secure the release of his victims, and to advance a cause for which they might face certain death in the field. You cannot choose and shape a tool for a certain purpose, and, at the same time, disavow the only thing that makes it an effective tool for that purpose. What the Government fears is the scandal of the long agonies, the hourly increasing imminence of death, and, most of all, the death of the victim. Descriptions of all this, with comments, in the daily Press, arouse and array against the Government a very formidable force of public opinion. The hunger-strike is a very powerful weapon, but the source of all its power is the risk of death inherent in starvation, and those who choose such a weapon for such a purpose intentionally will that which alone makes it effective.

In order to judge of this argument, we must keep before our minds three possible, distinct acts: (a) the act of exposing oneself to probable, or even certain, death; (b) killing oneself incidentally; (c) killing oneself intentionally. The first two may be justified by a sufficient cause. The third is always unlawful. Now most of the criticisms made on this first argument confuse the case in which a man

merely exposes his life to danger from another with the case in which a man intentionally risks or even takes his own life. Criticism of this kind is valueless; its authors simply do not understand the point at issue. Father Kelleher, however, does not confuse the cases: but he denies that there is any intention on the part of the hunger-strikers to kill themselves. I must explain. What I have maintained is that they always intend to produce grave risk to their lives, not, of course, as an end, but as a means to an end; and those who intend death also, as distinct from mere risk, do so only in the last extremity, and therefore on condition—the condition, unfortunately, being one that does not take the malice out of the act. Father Kelleher does not, I think, give due prominence to these distinctions and qualifications, though they have an important bearing on the question at issue. I am sorry that space does not permit me to quote from Father Kelleher's article at any length: but I think he will be found to admit the purpose of the hunger-strike,<sup>1</sup> and that it can be achieved only through the fears of the Government—fears inspired by the risk to life of the hunger-strikers.<sup>2</sup> If he makes these admissions, I do not see how, in the face of them, he can still maintain his objection.

Father Kelleher, however, develops his thought in the three following illustrations:—

(a) "A military officer sometimes faces unnecessary danger, in order to raise the sinking courage of his men, and sometimes even places himself in a desperate position in order that the men seeing his danger may be inspired to rescue him and thereby perhaps win an important victory. Such an officer would undoubtedly be imperilling his life as a means to an end, and surely no one would venture to say he was committing suicide." (P. 49.)

(b) "What are we to think of the many early Christians who sought out occasions of martyrdom, who freely professed the faith when they could have kept silent, and when to do so meant certain death? . . . did they not wish

<sup>1</sup> "Their intention in refusing food was to bring pressure to bear on the Government to stay its unjust persecution." [I.T.Q., JAN., 1921, p. 50.]

<sup>2</sup> "They hoped . . . that their object could be attained through the fears of the Government." (ibid., p. 51).

and intend to sacrifice their lives as a means to an end? . . .'  
(*ibid.*)

(c) " Suppose that a maiden is pursued by a man in a motor car, and that the father of the maiden, convinced that nothing else can save his daughter's virtue, steps before the car and says to the pursuer, ' if you are determined to take my daughter, you must reach her over my dead body.' If the father had good reason to hope that the pursuer would be deterred by such an action from continuing the pursuit, would he not be perfectly justified in what he did? Or would anyone say that he intended to procure his own death as a means to saving his daughter? Yet the whole action was organised to put pressure on the pursuer. . . .'" (P. 51.)

The point of these illustrations is to show, on the authority of the popular verdict, that it is not suicide, that it is not even wrong, to ordain one's death, or danger of death, as a means to an end. Now I have never meant to say that it is. Is there not the highest authority possible for believing in the absolute goodness of such an ordination? What I have always assumed is that it is wrong to take or to risk one's own life intentionally. Now a man may, intentionally, kill himself, or create the risk of killing himself, in two ways—he may do the act with his own hand immediately, or he may use another person or thing to do it for him as his agent or instrument. Both methods are equally immoral. In the case of the hunger-strike, I did not imagine there could be much doubt as to whether self-starvation was a cause of death, or as to whose act it was. I felt obliged, however, to prove the intention, and I did so by showing that the hunger-strike is a means, and that the risk involved constituted the whole effectiveness of that means, and must therefore be intended. But, I repeat, I do not question the perfect morality of exposing oneself to death in a worthy cause; and if one's death is effected by the villainies of others, I agree that one may ordain his death as a means to any good end. It is, of course, a commonplace that a man may desire his own death, subject to his not violating the order of charity, provided he leaves the accomplishment of his wish to the good pleasure of God.

I will now show that the actions of the officer, the martyr and the father, described by Father Kelleher, when tested



by these principles, may be as innocent as common opinion declares them to be. The soldier exposes himself to danger, but the danger comes from the enemy. He does nothing himself that would cause his death. Does he use the enemy as his instrument to kill himself, or, at least, to put his life in hazard? Such a case is possible. Were the soldier simply to stand up to be shot at, something might be said for the contention; but such an action would stamp him as a fool rather than a hero, and would be condemned by all sensible men. If, however, the soldier were to do some daring act of military value, or to seize some important position, in spite of the danger, and if the example he gives of contempt of danger and devotion to his cause incites others to follow him, he would be universally praised; but in this case his principal aim is to attain some military objective by useful acts, and not by danger, which remains from first to last a drawback, or is, at any rate, only incidental to his action. In so far then as any general approbation can be claimed for his conduct, the officer does not imperil his life intentionally. But if such approbation be claimed for an officer who faces unnecessary danger simply in order to raise the sinking courage of his men, so that his action is a pure case of imperilling his life as a means to an end, then I have no hesitation in standing by my principles rather than by the alleged popular verdict.

The martyr's case is rather similar. Actual martyrdom condones all, but some martyrs have acted in ways that theologians have ever since felt the need of explaining and apologising for. Zealots for martyrdom, however, have not always been praised. "Brethren, we praise not those who delivered themselves up, since the Gospel doth not so teach us." (Letter of the Smyrnaeans on the martyrdom of St. Polycarp, 155 A.D.) But "do they not intend to sacrifice their lives?" They intend to make a glorious confession of Christian faith, not simply to be slain; and if they are put to death for the name of Christ by wicked men, they rejoice in the crown it brings to those who suffer for justice' sake; but there is no intention of procuring their own death. They do not hire or persuade the heathens to murder them. Their mind is to do their duty like heroes, and if men, under the influence of their own evil passions, slay them, then blessed are they who suffer.

They do not kill themselves either immediately or by agents.

Father Kelleher dwells particularly on the third case, bringing out various parallelisms between it and the hunger-strike. These seem to me to be largely the result of ingenious phrasing. They are, however, of no importance so long as the essential difference remains. The hunger-striker kills himself by his own act, viz., by the refusal of food, and he does this intentionally, as I have shown. The maiden's father, in facing the motor-car, does nothing to kill himself. His act undoubtedly exposes him to the danger of being killed by the driver of the motor, but it has no fatal tendency apart from the driver's voluntary act. If the father is killed, he is killed by being crushed under the wheels of the motor, and this is the cause of his danger also. Is the driver of the motor the father's agent or instrument to create danger? Does the father authorise or incite this villain to drive over him? Manifestly he does not. The car is not driven by the father, nor by his orders, nor in accordance with his wishes; he does not wish for danger at all. What he really wishes is that it should be impossible for the motorist to continue driving without creating danger by so continuing; but it is not the father's intention that he should then continue to drive and create the danger, but that he should prefer to cease driving rather than create the danger. And it is the motorist's conviction that he alone will be responsible for death or danger that is the sole deterrent in the case.

It is suggested that the hunger-striker does not cause the risk to his life, as this is said to arise, not from the privation of food, but from the wear and tear of the vital organs. I hold that the action of self-starvation is direct, as I will show in the second argument; ; but, as far as the present contention is concerned, it does not matter whether the causality attaching to starvation is direct or indirect. For it will not be denied that wear and tear have no evil effect unless the supplies of food are cut off, and I have given evidence to prove that the supplies are cut off precisely that the evil effect may follow. That is equivalent to saying that, at all events, the wear and tear are used as an instrument to produce the desired evil effect.—There is not parallelism, then, but difference on all essential points. The hunger-striker risks or takes his own life intentionally:

the father exposes his life to danger, but the danger does not follow from his own act, nor from the act of the driver as his agent; and if the danger is realised it is due to the man who drives the car, acting from his own wicked motives.

I.B. So far I have dealt with the hunger-strike on the assumption that it is a means to an end, and I have found in that fact convincing evidence that those who have recourse to such a strike have the intention of risking their lives directly. Few there are who would deny that this is a correct interpretation of political hunger-striking. It may, however, be reasonably asked whether it admits of any other construction. It must be allowed that hunger-striking admits of as many constructions as there are motives of human conduct. But there is only one that has sufficient prominence to call for notice here. It is claimed that the hunger-strike is a protest. The word is ambiguous, but the meaning of those who use it is clear. Food, they say, may be offered on conditions which necessarily involve a surrender of principle—some criminal act, or some degradation to which no honourable man need submit. It is specifically asserted that the eating of food by an innocent prisoner amounts to a confession of guilt, and this, of course, in the case of men imprisoned for politics or religion would clearly imply a sacrifice of principle.

In considering the merits of such a claim, a most fundamental question arises for examination, viz., the truth of the allegation that to eat in prison is to play the renegade to one's convictions. There are cases in which the refusal of food on such grounds is conceivable, e.g., if unclean meats alone were offered to a pious Jew, or if a Christian were offered food but only on condition of apostasy or of trampling on the Crucifix. There is no food in the first case that God allows the man to eat, and there is no food at all in the second case, because it is offered only on the performance of impossible conditions, and is therefore never given at all. But, I ask, are prisoners nowadays, whether innocent or guilty, offered food on such impossible conditions? Is it always implied in the mere fact of taking food in prison (as defenders of hunger-striking have argued) that a man thereby admits his guilt? The suggestion seems highly improbable. Martyrs and patriots without number

have been imprisoned, and have submitted to such imprisonment rather than deny their principles. Are we to suppose that every poor meal eaten by them while in prison was a surrender of those principles? Not one of them ever suspected such a dreadful implication. St. Eusebius himself had no doubts on the point. The revelation, apparently, was first made to Mrs. Pankhurst or to some still more recent prophet. If there be a surrender of principle in eating food in prison, it must be discoverable somewhere in the circumstances. Do the gaolers offer innocent prisoners food on the condition of their acknowledging guilt? Good food is laid at the bedside of the prisoners, and, if necessary, will be put into their mouths, but no terms of any kind are asked or accepted. The intention of the authorities is, I presume, not to inflict a sentence to which the prisoners are not condemned. They are not condemned to die of starvation, so the authorities do not starve them. What would the intention of the prisoners be? To serve their sentence in full? No, but to preserve their lives, and survive the sentence.—There is nothing suspicious about the food, the time, the place—there is no ground of suspicion about any circumstance of the case, as far as I can see, and no ground at all for asserting any surrender of principle in taking food in prison.

Let us, however, turn to some arguments that have been put forward to support the contention, I quote from a letter by "J.G.T." in the Tablet of Oct. 16, 1920:—

a) "To every obligation there must be a corresponding right. Therefore, all those who maintain that an innocent person . . . must accept his daily bread, even when obtainable only under conditions of a felon, must also admit that his jailers have the right to impose that condition."

b) "He who is not bound morally to submit to a given condition cannot be bound to whatsoever depends on it. But no innocent man is bound (morally) to submit to unjust imprisonment. Therefore he is not bound to accept food obtainable only while unjustly imprisoned, though it be grouse or turkey."

c) "Self-starvation to death may be either a) forbidden b) commanded or c) permissible: forbidden if the object is, e.g., to escape the sufferings of life by death; commanded

if undertaken rather than do something wrong in itself, e.g., blaspheme, lie, curse, or apostatize; permissible when it can only be avoided by submission to conditions which no law, human or Divine, binds us to."

On this argument I would make the following comments: I say that not every obligation implies a corresponding right—only obligations in justice do so, and the obligation to take food is principally an obligation in charity to oneself. Again, there is no evidence that this right, if it existed anywhere, would vest in the jailers. There are so many others with equal, if not better claims. Lastly the right would imply that the prisoners should not starve themselves in prison, but this might very well be in spite of the injustice of the imprisonment rather than on account of its justice. There is not a true statement in the paragraph.

As for the second argument: If submission to a given condition has no moral claim, I am not bound to perform any duty that depends entirely on that condition, that derives its whole authority from it. But I am bound to all duties that are prior to the condition, and have independent authority. There are scores of duties under natural, divine and human law that ought to be observed in prison as well as outside, since they do not derive from the unjust fact of imprisonment—and foremost amongst them is the duty of self-preservation.

Lastly, self-starvation is never commanded. God has indeed forbidden certain special kinds of food, and only He has authority to do this. But God has never forbidden all food as the hunger-striker does. Again, the illustration shows that the writer is confusing the act of taking means to obtain possession of food and the act of eating food already in one's possession. If I grant that not all means of obtaining food are lawful, and that some lawful means are not commanded, what light does that throw on the allegation that eating food implies an admission of guilt?—Self-starvation would be permissible only if eating were sin or dishonour. But a man can submit even to the conditions of a 'felon's' life without compromising any principle: he may acquiesce in them as the less of two evils, and this, so far from being an avowal of guilt, is rather an assertion of his innocence.

There is no surrender of principle implied in the con-

ditions under which food is given to prisoners in modern times; therefore there is no basis for any protest to rest on, and if a hunger-strike were started as a protest it would be, from the beginning, a mistake.—It may be of some interest, however, to see what tests should be applied to ascertain the true character of any particular strike that may be in operation. The declarations of the men themselves are evidence, but not decisive evidence. Many of them will not appreciate the difference between a weapon and a protest, and will sometimes give one answer, sometimes another. We must confront this evidence with evidence drawn from the facts of the case. A weapon is used on occasions on which it has a chance of success, and is laid aside as soon as success is despaired of; a surrender of principle can never be made. If then a policy of hunger-striking is adopted frequently while it is a success, and is laid aside as soon as it becomes a failure, we may be sure it is a weapon or means to an end, and not a protest.—Again a weapon may be used by some, not necessarily by all supporters of a cause; but surrender of principle is not lawful for any. If then we find some of the confederates abstaining from food, whilst others freely eat their meals, both acting with the approbation of their fellows, we can say with confidence that such a strike is a weapon, not a protest.—Lastly, a protest will be of obligation not alone in respect of food, but in respect of all other favours coming from the jailers. If food alone be objected to, such a proceeding is intelligible as a means to an end; but a protest can make no exceptions. If, therefore, we find food alone refused, while drink and medicine are freely taken, the care and attention of doctors and nurses accepted as well as the services of the prison staff, we see that the strike is a weapon rather than a protest.

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II. A. I now pass to the objections against the second argument in the original statement of my case. The point of the argument was that self-starvation is wrong in itself, and therefore always wrong, no matter what the intention or what the cause. It will be useful to state it in two forms for the convenience of meeting objections. First, then, I say that self-starvation is a direct killing of oneself. By direct I mean intentional, with the intention of nature.



Now it is scarcely deniable that total abstinence from food is, of its very nature, and always, and under all circumstances, fatal to organic life. Death is inevitable. Starvation, therefore, is a direct cause of death, because it is naturally ordained to kill.—If anyone has a difficulty in conceiving how an omission can be naturally ordained to an end, since an omission is a negation and has therefore no nature, all objections will vanish as soon as one reflects on what is meant by the phrase. When I say that animals and plants are naturally ordained to be the food of man, I do not mean that the ordination has any positive foundation in them—the positive foundation is in him, and in him alone. So, when I say that abstinence from food is, by its nature, ordained to kill, I mean that a man's nature is so framed that he will die of it. There is a direct opposition between the life of the organism and the refusal of all food.—Nor is there any special difficulty in seeing how an omission may be a cause of death. Death is not a positive effect, demanding a positive cause. Death is itself a negation, and may follow on negations. The union of soul and body depends on certain positive dispositions in the matter informed by the soul, and the mere disappearance of these dispositions would be a true and immediate cause of dissolution. It is the union of such diverse elements, not their separation, that requires a positive cause.—Again, organic life is preserved only by the mutual ministry of many organs, each of them rendering an essential service to all the rest. Now the mere privation of one of these essential functions would be a direct cause of death. Everyone is aware what fatal effects would immediately follow on such an omission as that of the beating of the heart or of the circulation of the blood.—There is then no objection to our receiving the doctrine that an omission may be naturally a cause of death, and if a cause, a direct cause.—Lastly, I wish to point out, by way of explaining the argument a little further, that there is no function in living beings that naturally leads to death. Waste of tissue does indeed attend on the exercise of all living functions, and waste unchecked leads to exhaustion. Organic waste, however, is taken up and given a purpose by nature, and that purpose is to provoke the appetite for food, and to stimulate and direct the powers of assimilation. The operation,

therefore, of waste in organic beings, under natural conditions, leads to repair and preservation, and not to exhaustion and death. The picture therefore of a man who abstains from food sitting idly by while the current of his life ebbs away, is a false one. Exhaustion is indeed an incidental effect of living waste, contrary to its natural intention; and if we are to look for the direct cause of such an effect, we shall find it in self-starvation.

To this argument Fr. Kelleher objects that there are acts indistinguishable from self-starvation which are recognised by me and by general consent as indirect causes of death. He gives three examples. First, he instances the case of a man who jumps out of an overladen boat in mid-ocean, and is drowned. Fr. Kelleher asks—is not the natural intention of his act to produce death? What would I say of the suicide who jumps into the sea? Is not the natural intention of the act the same in both cases? I answer—the act itself is not the same. The man leaves the boat and that is his whole act. The natural intention of it is to lift the man out of the boat and place him in space at a certain distance from the boat.—The rest is incidental consequence.—In the case of the suicide the jump is only the first part of the whole human act, the second part being the operation of the water acting as his instrument. The natural intention of the action of the water is to suffocate him, and as this is his action also, as principal, we say the natural intention of the whole act is self-killing.

The second case instanced is that of a girl who leaps from a window to escape her enemy in the room. The jump is certainly the girl's act, and its natural intention is to put her clear of the room. Whether her subsequent fall and its consequences are adopted by the girl as part of her own act is a question of fact, but the jump alone is not intrinsically evil.

The third case is that of the Carthusian. I am willing to admit that want of meat kills the Carthusian. But it is an omission that does not, of its own nature, kill. So many human beings survive it! What does not kill except in the rarest possible case, and by the aid of a very singular disease, cannot do so of its own nature—which I have taken as the very definition of direct killing.

Fr. Gannon, in the issue of *Studies* already referred to,

gives two examples, in which certain persons out of their depth in water do not save themselves by coming ashore. They are drowned by the water, but the water is not their instrument for the purpose; and both have good reasons for not saving themselves. Such people do not kill themselves at all, either directly or indirectly.

Fr. Kelleher quotes Noldin to prove that intention is of the essence of suicide. The passage cited is not very carefully written, but I agree that intention is essential to the voluntariness of an act, and no person can actually incur the guilt of suicide unless he intends to kill himself and believes it to be evil. The point of my present argument is not, however, to establish personal guilt, but to decide whether an act is objectively direct killing or not.

II. B. I will now state the same (second) argument in the alternative form referred to above. Self-starvation is intrinsically wrong, as being contrary to a precept, and even to a primary precept, of natural law. The act which I contend is contrary to natural law is the simple, unqualified refusal of food. Let us see how the duty of taking food stands under the law of nature. One of the most fundamental laws of nature is that of self-preservation, and the necessity that exists in all organic beings of taking food for the purpose of self-preservation is an absolutely universal and natural fact. The law of alimentation therefore may be regarded as an obvious, and immediate deduction from a fundamental law and fact of nature. It is descended on both sides from natural causes, and is itself therefore natural, *pur sang*. St. Thomas says of such conclusions that they are as unchangeable as the principles themselves of natural law.

But the law in question is much more than even this. It is no mere deduction from other laws. It is itself an authentic law of nature, attested by the independent evidence of its own organs, faculties, acts, inclinations and objects, and proved by its own proper entry in nature's code. Instead of resting therefore on the law of self-preservation, and being proved by it, this law could itself guarantee the existence and authority of the law of self-preservation. It is clear that a primary precept of this law of alimentation is the eating of food. Here we must cautiously distinguish the duty of eating from two other duties

that are sometimes conjoined with it in practice, and have been confused with it by some writers on this subject, but are, in point of moral obligation, in a totally different category from it. These two duties are, first, the duty of trying to get or obtain possession of food, and, second, the duty of not giving away to others food necessary to ourselves. Both of these are occasionally urgent duties, and very strong reasons would be required to release a man from them. But neither of them is a duty under the pure law of nature. Each rests on a contingent fact, and is thus, as a conclusion from natural law, somewhat remote. The observance of these two laws is not naturally necessary to organic life, simply because they are not founded on nature but on a rare combination of accidents. Refusal, therefore, to take means to obtain food, or to keep possession of food, is in no case intrinsically evil, nor is it forbidden in terms by any natural law, or by any pure deduction from natural law. Many human beings pass their whole lives, and all men pass some portion of their lives, without doing anything to obtain possession of food for themselves.—A duty of the second type (not to give away food) is possible only in such circumstances as suggest mere metaphysical possibilities, and this shows how remote from nature it is.—I am led to speak of these here, because quite a number of writers thought that in proving that the neglect of either of these duties is not intrinsically wrong, they had thereby proved the same conclusion of the totally different act—the refusal to take food. It is a great mistake to confuse either of those two laws with the law of taking nourishment: they are not in the same rank as natural laws, but are on a very much lower level of moral obligation. In neither case is neglect of the law naturally ordained to death, nor is such neglect intrinsically evil.

Again, laws, as everyone knows, are some of them affirmative, and some negative. Affirmative laws command acts, and sin against them is always by omission. Negative laws forbid acts, and sin against them is by commission. Now affirmative laws are prior to negative laws in existence and authority. As affirmation is prior to negation, as good is prior to evil, love to hatred, and virtue to vice, so affirmative law is prior to negative law. The whole original code of natural law is affirmative, and all negative

law is derivative and dependent on it. Apart from affirmative law negative law has not a shred of authority; and to claim for negative law therefore a sacredness and a sanction higher than what we grant to affirmative law is simply preposterous. This is the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the reasons are so clear that I doubt if any theologian has ever denied it. Some moral theologians by contrasting fundamental duties under negative laws with secondary duties under affirmative laws, have misled the unwary, but they have never set negative laws as a body above affirmative laws as a body.—There is a certain amount of difference in the methods of fulfilling the obligations imposed by these two kinds of law. Negative laws bind ever and always (*semper et pro semper*)—affirmative laws bind ever but not always, (*semper sed non pro semper*). As some do not seem to understand what this means, I will quote St. Thomas: “Affirmative precepts do not bind us to be always acting on them, though they bind us always; but they bind us to action according to time and place and other due circumstances, which are the necessary conditions of a human act that it may be an act of virtue. Thus then confessing the faith always and in every place is not necessary to salvation, but in a certain time and place, namely, when by the omission of such confession due honour would be withdrawn from God, or profit from our neighbour, as in the case when one, asked about the faith, holds his peace, and thereby it comes to be believed either that he has not the faith, or that his faith is not true, or others by such silence are turned away from the faith. In cases like these, confession of faith is necessary to salvation.” (S. Theol. II-II, Q. III, a. 2.)—Suarez agrees with this teaching, (cf. “*De Legibus*,” Lib. I. c. XV., 4.)—The duty of taking food is a duty under affirmative law, and, therefore, of course, we have no obligation to be always eating—three meals a day, or less, will suffice. But, as Suarez points out, this does not mean that affirmative laws change or lapse, but they are so framed from the beginning as to operate on certain occasions. And when those occasions arise, affirmative law is to be kept, on peril of our souls. Hunger-striking is a breach of affirmative law, because it is a neglect to keep the law when those occasions arise, and Suarez expressly lays down that omission of the act commanded,

on such occasions, is an intrinsic evil: "affirmative precepts of natural law bind only on those occasions on which the omission of such an act would be per se and intrinsically evil: therefore, as that omission cannot but be evil, neither can the obligation of the affirmative precept, commanding the act opposed to that omission, cease or change. per se: therefore such a precept, of necessity, always binds on the appropriate occasions. *De Legibus*, Lib. II, c. XIII, 4.) According to Suarez, therefore, natural affirmative law never gives way on those occasions for which it has been framed, nor can the omission to act according to it ever cease to be wrong. Nor should this cause us surprise. If omissions can be evil, they may surely be intrinsically evil. The law commanding the taking of food is an affirmative law, and the omission of its principal act on the critical occasion is intrinsically evil.

Fr. Gannon's whole justification of the hunger-strike rests on the fact that the taking of food is a duty under affirmative law—a mere bagatelle, therefore, which any reasonable cause will entitle us to omit. The distinction he draws between affirmative and negative laws and the methods in which they bind, is hailed by many as a learned discovery, as if it were not to be found in every elementary text book. From what I have said above, it will be clear that Fr. Gannon merely proves that we have no obligation to be always eating, whereas he thinks he has proved that we need never eat. He gives no evidence whatever to show that at the critical moment affirmative laws are less firm than negative laws.

There is one consequence of the defence of the hunger-strike that I do not remember having seen pointed out anywhere. If starvation be no murder, then neither is suffocation. A man can no more live without air than without food. Breathing is as necessary as eating: they resemble each other in all essentials; both are duties under affirmative law; failure to observe the law is, in both cases, an omission: if death in one case is indirect and therefore defensible, it is equally so in the other.

III. If we accept the validity of the two arguments expounded and defended above, we shall have no interest in discussing the third point, viz., whether such strikes have a sufficient cause—for no matter what cause may be



alleged, whatever is intrinsically wrong will always be wrong.—But, apart from the question of the intrinsic evil of hunger-striking, what would be required would be a just and sufficient cause. Some causes are sufficient, and some are not; some causes will also be just; and some will not. The examination of this question would lead us too far. No one, however, has, as yet, discussed the justice, as distinct from the sufficiency, of the cause.

Finally, the question is asked, whether there is a truly probable opinion, at least, in favour of the lawfulness of self-starvation. I do not think there is. No opinion, as a rule, is solidly probable unless it has the support of five or six grave and classic theologians. With all respect to the defenders of the hunger-strike, I do not think that men of this stamp have appeared in their ranks. The safe course then is to be followed. Moreover, the atmosphere in which the discussion has been carried on has not been such as to favour the formation of a really impartial and disinterested judgment on the subject. One is reminded of the ancient controversy, in which the disputants were partisans, "some defending the one for the love they bore Caesar, and others allowing the other for Cato's sake."

JOHN WATERS.

## Faith and Free-Thinking.

### § 3. THE GRACE OF FAITH.

ANY view of faith as described in the New Testament would be most imperfect without consideration of such texts as the following:—‘Flesh and blood [the natural working of the human mind] hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven’ (Matt. xvi., 17). ‘Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones’ (Matt. xi., 25),—which could not be said of points of philosophy, science, historical research and scholarship, or Biblical criticism. ‘See to your calling, brethren, that there are not many of you wise according to the flesh, but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the wise (1 Cor., I., 26, 27). ‘The natural man receiveth not the things that are of the spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he cannot know them, because they are examined spiritually’ (1 Cor. II., 14). ‘No man can come to me unless the Father that hath sent me draw him. None can come to me unless it be given him of the Father.’ (John vi., 44, 65). ‘Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep’ (John x., 26, the ‘sheep’ being ‘that which my Father hath given me,’ ib. 29, cf. vi. 37, 39 : xvii. 2, 11, 12, 24; xviii. 9).

Hence it appears that faith is not a mere intellectual assent to a reasoned conclusion, but is a gift of God; a gift of God, not in the general sense, in which ‘every good gift and every perfect gift is from above’ (James i., 17), for in that sense intellectual acumen is a gift of God, and faith is here distinctly marked off from intellectual acumen,—but faith is one of those special supernatural gifts called ‘graces’ (C. G. iii., 151, p. 321). I believe, not because I am a better hand than my neighbour at seeing a reasoned conclusion, but because God in His mercy has given me the grace of faith, and my neighbour has it not.<sup>1</sup> ‘He hath

<sup>1</sup> Why he has it not, it is not for me to say. I am not his judge, Matt. vii. 1; 1 Cor. iv. 5: Rom. xiv. 4, 10: James iv. 12.

not done such things for every nation, and his judgments he hath not made manifest to them' (Ps. cxlvii). 'They believed, as many as were ordained to life everlasting' (Acts xiii., 48).

We may distinguish three genetic elements of faith:—(1) the external evidences of the credibility of Christianity, evidences within the reach of all educated men in Christian lands; (2) the teaching authority of the Christian Church; (3) the inner light of grace vouchsafed to each individual believer. The Church values all three elements. Various dissenters from orthodoxy have essayed to dispense with one element or another. Lamennais and the Traditionalists took little account of any evidence adducible even for that fundamental article of the Creed, the existence of God, and preferred to rest the whole structure upon tradition and authority. Gregory XVI's condemnation of Traditionalism was solemnly re-enacted by the Fathers of the Vatican Council. Reason is not everything in faith, but it is a preliminary and a concurrent agency never to be lost sight of. Faith, after all, is for the reasonable. The Reformers of the sixteenth century set aside the living authority of the Church, and trusted to the inner light of the spirit guiding each individual Christian in his reading of the Bible. The Rationalist ignores all inner light of grace, refuses all appeal to authority whether living or dead, and treats religion like chemistry or medicine, as a mere matter of science and scientific method. He can have no faith, for by the way in which he goes about his researches from the first he assumes that he has no Master.

I find no better words to describe this inner light of grace than those which I write in 'The Month' many years ago, in an article headed 'St. John Chrysostom on Faith and Reason.' 'Actual grace, of which alone there is question here, is an impression made by God Himself directly upon the understanding and upon the will of man, moving him to will certain things in order to his eternal salvation, and supporting him in so willing. These impressions are not, strictly speaking, caused by any sensible object, as a picture, or a man speaking; nor have they a spontaneous birth within the mind according to any law of association. They are divine interferences, gratuitous, and uncaused except by the free will and bounty of God Himself stepping

in. Created agencies are occasions, but the prime mover and proper cause of grace is always God. Grace indeed is not miraculous, because it is part of God's ordinary providence in this world; but it is as little traceable to any natural cause as any miracle whatever. When the searcher after religious truth has arrived by prayerful reasoning at a moral certainty that a God who cannot deceive has revealed this or that doctrine, there ensues in his soul a movement of grace, called by theologians an "inner locution," confirmatory of his reasoned conclusion. It is not the faintest whisper audible to sense; it is "the word of God, reaching to the division of the soul and of the spirit, living and effectual" (Heb. iv., 12), if the man chooses to listen to it. This first locution is addressed to the intellect. The next appeal is to the will. Here the voice of grace is at once an authoritative command to submit and a fatherly invitation to trust. "Believe my child, it is I the very Truth who speak to thee." It is in fact the, "It is I, fear not," of the gospel; (Matt. xiv., 27; Mark v., 36; Luke xxiv., 36). If the soul corresponds to the grace that is given to it, there follows a movement of the will bidding the intellect to assent, and thereupon follows the assent itself of the intellect upon the one motive of God revealing, which assent of the intellect is the act of faith. The firmness of this assent is the certitude of faith, the "*plerophoria pisteos*" of Heb. x., 22; the "*hupostasis*" or "*firm foothold*" of Heb. xi., 1; iii. 14. It differs from all other certitude, first, in being "*supernatural*" the response of the soul to an inner locution of the Holy Ghost; secondly, it being paid as a bounden duty,—there is no other proposition but articles of faith, or akin to faith, to which we are bound to give an intellectual assent; thirdly, being paid as a duty, it is paid not by physical necessity, but freely,—in this agreeing with many natural assents and differing from others, namely, from those in which the proposition assented to is self-evident. . . . Innocent XI condemned this proposition: "The will cannot make the assent of faith to be in itself firmer than the weight of reasons moving to assent deserves." The proposition is rank Pelagianism. It entirely ignores the supernatural element which is of the essence of faith. We cannot indeed

dispense with external teaching. God will not take upon Himself the part of catechist: we must learn our catechism from our fellow-men. Nor can we dispense with arguments and motives of credibility proportioned to the capacity of the hearer, simple considerations for simple folk, elaborate inductions for the learned. But then on the top of that must come the inner locution direct from God, or there can be no faith.<sup>2</sup>

The need of grace supervening upon argument may be illustrated from this experience of daily life. Several persons call upon me to join in some undertaking. I hear all they have to say arguing why I should join, and am impressed by it, nevertheless I stand out against them and politely refuse. They can do nothing with me till they put up some one else to ask. That person somehow has got the key of my heart. He uses no new arguments, in fact hardly argues at all; he simply asks and I comply. I might not perhaps have complied with his asking if they had not argued the case before: nevertheless they might have argued without end and I should never have given in, but for the intercessor whom they were skilful enough to employ. Now God holds the key to every human heart 'He openeth and no man shutteth' (Apoc. III. 7). Only by the use of God's key is any man ever brought to believe any doctrine with divine faith. 'No man can say from his heart, Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Ghost' (1 Cor. XII. 3). And yet some preaching, some argumentation, some instruction, must go before his making that profession of faith in our Lord's divinity.

This brings us abreast of a great difficulty. If faith is a gift of God, if 'without faith it is impossible to please God' (Heb. XI. 6), how is it that the gift is not given to all men, how is it that 'not all men obey the gospel' (Rom. X. 16)? This difficulty racked St. Paul's heart. Loving his nation as he did, as one born a 'Hebrew of Hebrews' (Philip. III. 5), he could not understand the mass of his countrymen rejecting the salvation offered them by their true Messiah, Jesus. He wrestles with the difficulty throughout three arduous chapters (Rom. IX., X., XI.). He is comforted with the assurance of a better state of

<sup>2</sup> *Interiori instinctu Dei invitante*, St. Thomas, 2a-2ae, q. 2, art. 9, ad. 3.

mind to come about before the end of the world (XI. 25, 26). Finally he is compelled to throw his perplexity upon the 'inscrutable judgments and unsearchable ways' of God, and to cry out 'Who knoweth the mind of the Lord?' (XI. 33, 34). What St. Paul did not know, we know not either, and have no means of finding out. Dominican and Jesuit, Calvinist, Jansenist, Catholic, have wrangled over the distribution of grace that is 'efficacious' and is acted on, and grace again that is 'sufficient,' but is sinfully rejected. Many a heresy has been fallen into in the attempt to penetrate these mazes. Be it our humbler and safer method to mark off on the outskirts of this vast wilderness some little ground of fact, and some little more ground of conjecture. In the first place then it is certain, with the certainty of Catholic faith as defined against the Jansenists, that no grace, and consequently not the grace of faith, overpowers the will in such a way as to take away its freedom and render the rejection of the grace a physical impossibility. Faith is meritorious: now there is no merit in being simply overpowered. The educated man of the twentieth century, who still believes in the gospel, so believes as not to be without a workable capacity of disbelief. He believes by an effort of will, which he is by no means constrained to put forth. And as men can resist the grace and refuse the offer of faith, so some men do resist, as many of the Pharisees did in our Lord's time (John XII. 37-49), and their 'sin remains' (John IX. 41). But what particular men in our time commit this sin, it is not given to us to know: we are not as the Lord, 'who hath moulded their hearts one by one, who understandeth all their works' (Ps. XXXII. 15), and in our ignorance we are silenced by our Lord's precept, 'Judge not' (Matt. VII. 1).

We are forbidden the judgment of condemnation, but not that of charitable conjecture. In bygone days, Catholics, and especially Catholic priests, were not so prone to judge charitably of persons not belonging to the visible

<sup>3</sup> Neither does the man himself do nothing at all in receiving the inspiration, seeing that he can also reject it' (Council of Trent, Sess. 6, cap. 5). The second of the five celebrated propositions of Jansenius, that 'interior grace in the state of fallen nature is never resisted,' was 'declared and condemned as heretical.' Clement XI. in the 'Unigenitus' condemns this proposition of Quesnel, that 'grace is the work of the almighty hand of God, which nothing can hinder or retard.'



fold of the Church. Such persons in the sixteenth century were often apostate Catholics. In the seventeenth they were persecutors; and it is not easy to believe in the faith and charity of one who hunts you to death. In the age after that, they were still bigoted adversaries, and hard names were still called on both sides. Now, in many parts of the world, although not everywhere, the pelting shower is over, the sun has come out, and the traveller takes off his cloak. The amenities of social life are exchanged between men of the most opposite religious views; and religion is discussed, keenly at times, but without bitterness. You take your host or guest at table to be too good a man for hell-fire; and yet you hardly dare hope that he will ever become a Catholic. You begin to devise excuses for him, which perhaps God may accept,—ways of salvation for him which 'God our Saviour, who wishes all men to be saved' (1 Tim. II. 3), may approve, or haply improve upon. One such hypothesis of possible salvation would be this. God, it may be thought, draws all men in the same direction, that is, towards Himself, but does not draw them all equally far, nor purpose, as things actually stand, to draw them all equally far. He is satisfied with any man who walks in the way of God so far as God is pleased to draw him. To those who are drawn the whole way, and willingly follow, even to the fulness of Catholic truth, a greater reward is given. Why God does not draw all men all the way to the fulness of Catholicism, who shall answer? Who knows? Any answer of ours must be guess-work: let our guessing then take this form. Many theologians, to wit, Molina and his school, hold that God knows what any man would elect to do, even under circumstances in which that individual shall never be placed. On the Molinist view then God might see that if He were to offer to draw some particular man, Balbus, to the full light of Catholicism, Balbus would hang back, would never be a Catholic, and so resisting the grace of conversion would never save his soul, but be condemned to hell-fire. God thereupon may in mercy hold back from Balbus grace which Balbus never would follow, and give him only such grace as he will follow.

If any such hypothesis as this were true, one practical counsel follows; and indeed it is good counsel upon any

hypothesis and in all cases: that is, to encourage every good point of virtue and religion which you find in your non-Catholic neighbour, such as confidence in prayer and the providence of God, zeal for the honour of God and the due observance of the Lord's Day, respect for the Bible as the Word of God, charity to the unfortunate, sorrow for sin, confidence in Christ as Mediator. All these things make for Catholicism, and bring the man nearer to the true Church. They go to Christianise and Catholicise him. Whether he ever arrives or does not arrive to travel the whole distance that separates him from the Roman Obedience, one may at any rate hope that he will be faithful to the full end and measure of the grace given him, and go as far as that grace leads him.

Another illustration. I take a gas-jet and burn it full on. That represents the light of Christ as it shines in all its splendour upon the children of the Holy Catholic Church. To have that full light flashed upon you from heaven, and to turn away your eyes from its brightness, and refuse submission to the Catholic Church and the Holy See, is a deadly sin,—by whom committed, God only knows. I turn to the said gas-jet half down. I have there represented the light of an honest Anglican, who believes as much as God has revealed to him, all that God so far has given him grace to believe. He too is a well-loved child of God, although not so favoured as the Catholic. Again I turn the light down till it is reduced to one little burning bead. That is the figure of him who believes according to the minimum prescribed by St. Paul, that 'there is a God, and that he is a giver of reward to them that seek him' (Heb. XI. 6), and through no fault of his own does not see his way at present to hold any more dogma than that. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews does not exclude this man from "evaristesai," 'being well-pleasing' to God. What God will do with that man ultimately, we need not here conjecture: one thing is certain, that in his present frame of mind he is not liable to the penalty of hell-fire for defect of faith.

Venerable Bede speaks of the Church as being 'tuta intrantibus, laboriosa adeuntibus,' 'toilsome to approach, safe when you are within.' The habit of faith in a Catholic is very strong: it is the strongest of all his virtues, a fact

quite consistent with its being the one virtue against which he is most vehemently tempted. Storms do not make a vessel weak, but prove its strength. By every Sacrament received, by every hearty prayer, by every operation of grace within his soul,—and such operations in the Catholic are almost continuous,—his faith is strengthened, till it comes to be intertwined with the very fibres of his being. Anglicans, who come nearest to our position, sometimes think us arrogant, self-conceited, full of a sort of Pharisaic justice in our faith, and prone to despise others; and indeed we do sometimes forget that faith even in us is a gift of God, and none of our own deserving. We should carry our faith humbly. At the same time we should carry it proudly, with such holy pride as is professed in the *Magnificat*.

#### § 4. FAITH, INTUITION, WILL.

Intuition, or Insight, is called by St. Thomas 'intellectus,' 'nous,' and is distinguished from ratio, 'dianoia,' or discursive reason: cf. 'God and Creatures,' p. 44 note. Faith is a supernatural intuition, an intuition allied rather to the practical than to the speculative intellect,—having more in it of the resolve of the commander in the field, with the enemy before him, than of the leisurely play of thought proper to the philosopher. And, like other practical intuitions, faith requires a man to put his foot down and stand by what he sees, not to toy with it, hesitate over it, discuss contingencies and balance possibilities, till all opportunity of action has passed. For want of this readiness to put his foot down the philosopher is wont to prove what is called a 'visionary' in the field of statesmanship and war; and the same, without a vigorous effort of will to overcome his hesitations, can scarcely come to the Christian faith. Not only 'conscience doth make cowards of us all,' as Hamlet says (Act 3, sc. 1), but so also does the disposition, so characteristic of Hamlet himself, 'to consider too curiously,' as Horatio puts it (Act 5, sc. 1).

And thus the native hue of resolution  
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;  
And enterprises of great pith and moment<sup>4</sup>  
With this regard their currents turn awry  
And lose the name of action.

<sup>4</sup> To wit, the enterprise of eternal salvation.

‘ And now, dear Reader, time is short, eternity is long. Put not from you what you have here found ; regard it not as mere matter of present controversy ; set not out resolved to refute it,—nor determine that to be truth which you wish to be so. Time is short, eternity is long.’

Newman on ‘ Development,’ last words.

## The Ideal as Furnishing a Proof for the Existence of God.

In a preceding article an endeavour was made to show that evolution as such is far from being inconsistent with Theism and Creationism.\* It is only the materialistic interpretation of evolution that is opposed to them. On the other hand, an idealistic (in the good sense) and optimistic view of Evolution is of logical necessity connected with belief in the existence of God. In this paper I shall be concerned with showing how the ideal conceptions that men possess, and the striving after them, postulate an Absolute. Indeed, the idea of God is necessary for the due completion of an evolutionary theory. The trouble with materialistic evolutionists is that they cannot tell the goal towards which evolution is progressing. They do not know what the cosmos is striving for. If they say that things are tending towards the highest and the best, and if they hold that the highest and best does not exist, then the goal of much-praised evolution is a mirage; 'the caravan starts for the dawn of nothing,' and it is scarcely worth while to 'make haste.'

Nor is it entirely new in theology to start with the ideal in proving the existence of God. Others have done it with varying success. Where failure was present, success might have been attained by a new turn given to an old argument. Thus it may be admitted that the usual form of St. Anselm's argument from the idea, or ideal, of God is open to valid objection. But it would be presumptuous to say that it contains no element of truth. If this were so, it would be hard to account for its remarkable vitality. It has been often dashed to fragments by confident logicians, but the fragments have a habit of reassembling. The thought of Anselm has been also the thought of Duns Scotus and of Leibniz; and one may pause before saying light-heartedly that such thought has been entirely in vain.

\*I.T.Q., July, 1920. Vol. 15, p. 227.

The following is the usual way in which the argument is presented in the text-books—a way which serves to render it easy of refutation by setting up a thing of straw: By God all men understand a Being greater than whom cannot be conceived. But such a Being must exist in reality as well as in the mind. For otherwise a greater Being could be conceived, namely, one existing in reality. To this form of the argument, it is easy to reply at once that not all understand by 'God' what is said above. But the ordinary form which the argument takes in the manuals is not the form in which Anselm himself presented it, and few take the trouble of reading carefully his own words: so that he could still complain, as he did in his reply to a contemporary monk, Gaunilo, that his own thought had not been reproduced. It is well then to give the argument in St. Anselm's own words.<sup>1</sup>

Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari possit. An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia dixit insipiens in corde suo: *Non est Deus?* (Ps. xiii. i.) Sed certe idem ipse insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest; intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit, in intellectu ejus est; etiamsi non intelligat illud esse. Aliud est enim rem esse in intellectu: aliud intelligere rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae factururus est habet quidem in intellectu; sed nondum esse intelligit quod nondum fecit. Cum vero jam pinxit, et habet in intellectu, et intelligit esse quod jam fecit. Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu, idipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest; sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.

St. Anselm goes further and says that God is shown by this method not only to exist, but to necessarily exist:

<sup>1</sup>Prosalogion, Capita 2 et 3. Migne: Patr. Latina. 158. c. 228.



indeed, all the attributes of God are made to flow from this first concept of God, so that a complete and original system of Theodicy is formed. The argument which St. Anselm develops to prove the necessary existence of God has a special interest because it is like the form in which Scotus reproduces the proof; and the latter was followed by Leibniz. Scotus argues that God, a necessary Being, is possible (or thinkable). But *ex hypothesi* essence, or possibility, is necessarily identified with his being, or existence. Consequently He exists. *Deus est possibilis, ergo est.* Descartes put the proof in a slightly different form: Whatever is contained in a clear idea of a thing can be predicated of the thing. Now a clear idea of an absolutely perfect Being contains the notion of actual existence.

St. Anselm says: *Quod (id est, Deus) utique sic vere est, ut nec cogitari potest non esse. Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod majus est, quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id, quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: idipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, non est id quo majus cogitari nequit: quod convenire non potest.*

The argument of St. Anselm shows quite clearly that, if one thinks at all of God, the absolutely perfect, the necessary Being, or intelligently hears of such a Being, one must *think* of Him as existing. For *ex hypothesi* the perfection of existence is contained in the thought of an absolutely perfect Being. Similarly, if there were only one living being in the world, and if he thought of another living being, *ex hypothesi* he must *think* of that being as living. That does not mean, however, that the other being *is* living. For *ex hypothesi* also we supposed that only one being was living. And that being may think, but, unless He is God and wishes it, his thought will not of itself make things. In Euclidian geometry one may start off with certain assumptions and possibilities, such as that a straight line may be drawn from one point to another, and one may then show that a certain system of thought must hold. No fault need be found with the thought based on those possibilities and axioms of thought; only it must be emphasised that this unexceptionable thinking does not show that Euclidian points and lines exist objectively. It may be added that, strictly speaking, St. Anselm does not give an argu-

ment for the existence of God; he tries rather to show that the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident. St. Thomas concedes to the contention this important element of truth that the proposition mentioned is indeed self-evident in itself, but not to us, until we have through other means understood that God exists, and found out something about His necessary nature, and seen that the predicate, 'existence,' is thus necessarily contained in the subject, 'God.'<sup>2</sup>

Though St. Thomas refutes St. Anselm's argument, he gives us in the *quarta via* a proof which is reminiscent of it.<sup>3</sup> He points out that the 'best' and 'noblest' must be the thing that 'exists' in the most thorough fashion. 'The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is in the degree of "most" as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being. For the truer things are, the more truly do they exist, as is said (by Aristotle) in 2 Metaph (tex. 4). Now the greatest of any class is the cause of all the things of that class, as the fire which is hottest is the cause of all things possessing heat, as is said in the same place. There is, then, a Being that is the cause of the being, and perfection of all things, and we call such a Being God' (Summa Theol., 1a, Q.II., a3).

It is true that St. Thomas in his usual objective way has the distinction of commencing his argument with an appeal to things or facts, and of supposing that the relative supposes the absolute. But a few questions can be asked concerning the argument as it stands. The old physics on which the latter part of the argument is based can be questioned, namely, that there is in the universe some one hottest thing which is the cause of all heat. Further it may be said that the best, and truest, and noblest thing implied by the comparisons is only relatively, or finitely,

<sup>2</sup> Summa Theol., 1a, Q.2, A.1.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

best, and truest, and noblest; in the same way as comparisons about heat undoubtedly imply only the existence of a finitely hottest thing. If it is answered that the mind making such comparisons has a standard of the best in an absolute, or infinite, sense, we have again the same difficulty as is urged against the Anselmian argument: the *idea* of the absolutely best exists in our mind, but does its actual existence follow from this fact? I shall advance later on a modification of the Anselmian argument to show that it does. But before this can be done satisfactorily, it will be necessary to show the shortcomings of the materialistic theory of evolution, which discounted the value of all ideas, and was so extreme as to provoke a reaction among recent thinkers.

The most convenient summary of materialistic evolutionary theories and of their baneful sequels may be found in Frederic W. H. Myers' 'Science and a Future Life' (1893). The writer speaks chiefly of these theories when pushed to their ultimate conclusions by the logical French mind. 'We may say, then, that in 1888 France possesses everything except illusions; in 1788 she possessed illusions and nothing else. The Reign of Reason, the Return to Nature, the Social Contract, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—the whole air of that wild time buzzed with new-hatched Chimaeras, while at the same time the old traditions of Catholicism, Loyalty, Honour, were still living in many an ardent heart. What then is, in effect, the disenchantment which France has undergone? What are the illusions—the so-called, so-judged illusions—which are fading now before the influence of science? . . . We find them reducible to four main heads: the religious, the political, the sexual, and the personal illusions.

'By the "religious illusion"—speaking, it will be remembered, from the point of view of the Frenchman of the type now under discussion,—I mean a belief in the moral government of the world, generally involving a belief in man's future life; in which life we may suppose virtue victorious, and earth's injustices redressed. These cardinal beliefs, now everywhere on the defensive, are plainly losing ground in France more rapidly than elsewhere.

'Let us pass on to the second class of illusions from which France seems finally to have awakened. Under the title of

the "political illusion" we may include two divergent yet not wholly disparate emotions,—the enthusiasm of loyalty and the enthusiasm of equality. Each of these enthusiasms has done in old times great things for France; each in turn has seemed to offer a self-evident, nay, a Divine organization of the perplexed affairs of men. But each in turn has lost its efficacy. There is now scarcely even a Socialistic Utopia for which a man would care to die. The younger nations, accustomed to look to France for inspiration, feel the dryness of that ancient source. "*Ils ne croient á rien,*" said a Russian of the Nihilists, "*mais ils ont besoin du martyre.*" . . . These are the pupils of modern France; but in France herself the nihilistic disillusionment worked itself out unhindered by the old impulse to die for an idea. The French have died for too many ideas already, and just as they have ceased to idealize man's relationship to God, so have they ceased at last to idealize his relationship to his fellow-men.

‘ But the process of disillusionment can be traced deeper still. Closer to us, in one sense, than our relationship to the universe as a whole, more intimate than our relation to our fellow-citizens, is the mutual relationship between the sexes. An emotion such as love, at once vague, complex, and absorbing, is eminently open to fresh interpretation as the result of modern analysis. And on comparing what may be called the enchanted and disenchanted estimates of the passion,—the view of Plato, for instance, and the view of Schopenhauer,—we find that the discordance goes to the very root of the conception; that what in Plato's view is the accident, is in Schopenhauer's the essential; that what Plato esteemed as the very aim and essence is for Schopenhauer a delusive figment, a witchery cast over man's young inexperience, from which adult reason should shake itself wholly free. For Plato the act of idealization which constitutes love is closely akin to the act of idealization which constitutes worship. The sudden passion which carries the lover beyond all thought of self is the result of a memory and a yearning which the beloved one's presence stirs within him; a memory of antenatal visions, a yearning towards

the home of the soul.<sup>4</sup> The true end of love is mutual ennoblement; its fruition lies in the unseen. Or if we look to its earthly issue, it is not children only who are born from such unions as these, but from that fusion of earnest spirits, great thoughts, just laws, noble institutions spring,—‘a fairer progeny than any child of man.’ Not one of the speculations of antiquity outdid in lofty originality this theme of Plato’s . . . .

‘In recent years, however, a wholly different aspect of the passion of love has been raised into prominence. This new theory—for it is hardly less—is something much deeper than the mere satirical depreciation, the mere ascetic horror, of the female sex. It recognizes the mystery, the illusion, the potency of love; but it urges that this dominating illusion is no heaven-descended charm of life, but the result of terrene evolution, and that, so far from being salutary to the individual it is expressly designed to entrap him into subserving the ends of the race, even when death to himself (or herself) is the immediate consequence . . . . Human attractiveness has suffered something of the same loss of romance which has fallen upon the scent and colour of flowers, since we have realized that these have been developed as an attraction to moths and other insects, whose visits to the flowers are necessary to secure effective fertilization . . . . It is paralleled by elaborate and often grotesque asthetic allurements throughout the range of organized creatures of separate sex . . . . As man rises from the savage state, the form of the illusive witchery changes, but the witchery is still the same. Nature is still prompting us to subserve the advantage of the race,—an advantage which is not our own,—though she uses now such delicate baits as artistic admiration, spiritual sympathy, the union

<sup>4</sup> According to the thought which is put in the mouth of Aristophanes in Plato’s *Symposium* (191 B.) man in the beginning became divided, and the divided parts, man and woman, in the sexual yearning naturally seeks union. This suggestive thought, amounting almost to divination, will remind one of the Genesis account of the separation of the rib from Adam. It will also recall the account of sex given in the descriptions of Natural Science. Here, too, there is mention of the original fission of living things, plants and animals, and their subsequent fusion through the sexual impulse. This fission and fusion can, of course, be traced in the highest vertebrates; only in their case it is not any large portion of the organism that is broken off, as in the case of the lowest living things, but rather a tiny portion, the ovum and the spermatozoon. A process analogous to the method of reproduction is found in the development of the individual in the fission and combination of cells.

of kindred souls. Behind and beneath all these is still her old unconscious striving; but she can scarcely any longer outwit us; we now desire neither the pangs of passion, nor the restraints of marriage, nor the burden of offspring. . . .

'And thus we are brought by a natural transition, to the fourth and last illusion from which French thought is shaking itself free—the illusion which pervades man more profoundly than any other: the dream of his own free will, and of his psychical unity. It is in the analysis of this personal illusion that much of the acutest French work has lately been done'

I have quoted from this writer at some length as it would be difficult to find a clearer exposition of the paralysing results of the materialistic evolutionary theory when worked out to its ultimate conclusions. The loss of the belief in God inevitably led to a loss of faith in man, for the two thoughts are inextricably connected. When the Great Spirit was excluded from His own creation, the spirit of man was the next to be outlawed. Divine ideals were ruled out of consideration, and human thoughts—even the most natural and fundamental—were deemed to be 'such stuff as dreams are made of'; and—strange inconsistency—they were confidently regarded as such by other thoughts that were really narrow, transitory, and superficial. But these theories were so extreme and so baneful in results that a reaction was not long in setting in. Men began again to timidly believe first in man, and then, inevitably, in God. They preferred to be on the side of the angels than on the side of agnostics. Amongst the first to react against Agnostic Evolution as a satisfying theory of the universe was its chief philosopher, Herbert Spencer. When an admiring disciple visited him and expressed his indebtedness to 'First Principles' and expressed an intention of buying all the master's works, Spencer asked how many of the works had been already studied, and on receiving a reply said, 'You have read enough,' and then after some silence added, 'I feel that I have spent my life beating the air.' The reaction against the agnostic revolutionary philosophy of Spencer is voiced very clearly by a recent writer in the "Times," who suggests the alternative line of thought which is reminiscent of St. Anselm and the '*quarta via*' of St. Thomas. As the "Times" and St.



Anselm and St. Thomas form an unusual '*entente*,' a rare coalition, it is as well to quote the words of this eminently modern paper. 'We do not attack it (the philosophy of the materialistic evolutionist). We ignore it. It has gone out of fashion. It does not answer, it does not even ask the questions we ask. . . . Man (according to Spencer) in his thoughts, emotions, and conscience is entirely moulded by his surroundings, which means his material surroundings; and that reality which he is so intensely aware of within himself is less real than the reality outside himself of which his senses make him aware. Spencer in fact affirms, or rather implies, as if it needed no affirmation, that this external reality is the only reality, and that our values are a mere comment upon it, a theorizing about it which has become habitual and instinctive. For him the emotional part of those values, the passion which we have for truth, beauty, and righteousness is an illusion, even if a useful illusion. . . . The assumption is constant, and against it we rebel. . . . Rather we seek for an explanation of the nature of the universe in those values. They are to us more real than external reality. . . . There is still a surviving prejudice against the belief in God as something unscientific and superstitious; and it remains to be proved that it is neither; that it is a logical and inevitable result of belief in our own values and, more than that, the result of those values when they are obeyed by the whole will and the whole mind. That, we say, remains to be proved, but the intellect of the world is now turning to the proof of it. It is no longer possessed by the superstition that the belief in God must be superstitious.'

If then the modern world is disposed to consider an argument from intellectual values for God's existence, it may turn back and see if any use can be made of the underlying thought in St. Anselm's argument. We may begin with the *fact* that there is in human nature an ideal of the absolutely good. It is not a mere accidental fact which may come and go like a fashion. It is an essential fact present in every age. For men seek happiness unmixed with evil, however much they may be mistaken in identifying such happiness. They can form an idea of pure good, good without limit, and such is the human spirit that the will seeks, years after, this good presented by the mind.

If the true and the beautiful as such are sought, they are of course but forms of the good. Mistakes are made in identifying the good, the unmixed happiness, that is sought. For the Mysterious Figure that all men seek, the Desired of all the nations of the earth, is a veiled Figure, even as the representation of Isis was veiled; and, if men mistake the object of their search, instead of the hidden God they find a stone. And so in the age-long quest there can be illusions and disillusionments. Men idealize creatures into gods; there can arise hero-worship, or worse still, science-worship, or pleasure-worship, or gold-worship. The incommunicable glory of the idea of God one may still attempt, as of old, to give to a creature. Then the ideal becomes an idol.

But those cases of illusions do not discount the value of the ideals of the absolutely good. Rather they show that this ideal is so persistent in the human mind that it is apt to be applied to creatures. The imagination transfigures creatures and invests them with the colours of godhead.

There are, however, other so-called illusions which are not really such. The dreams, the visions, in which men look forward to supreme happiness and supreme beauty, are not vain. One cannot admire the 'hardening of the heart that brings irreverence for the dreams of youth.' But how is one to justify this idealism and optimism? How is one to strike at the root of a worldly cynicism, and show that the greatest of all illusions is this supreme disillusionment.

We can at once say that the quest of the ideal, of the absolutely good, being an essential fact of human nature, cannot be vain, unless nature itself is vain and false. We have to trust nature; even if we were to make a foolish effort to show the untrustworthy character of nature, we would have to use the tools of nature, and we could not be confident about our judgments dependent on those tools. But using analogy we know that nature can be trusted to satisfy her essential needs. The presence of wings argues the existence of an atmosphere in which they may expatiate. Correlative implies the existence of correlative. For every essential demand in nature there is a supply. Are we to say, then, that the only case of exception is the most important of all, the case in which the highest nature on earth, rational nature, seek its highest

ideal? If those scientists who respect the laws of nature believe this, they are contradicting themselves; they are holding that the law of nature by which essential desires of nature are satisfied is violated. We can then take our stand on the firm basis of nature's law in establishing the existence of God. Nor will it suffice to reply that the justification for this endless search of humanity for the absolutely perfect is to be found in the fact that it inspires earthly progress, that one is thereby ever dissatisfied, suffering from a divine discontent with the present, and proceeding from better to better in the pursuit of the absolutely good, the good without a flaw. For, even though the quest of the absolutely good has this useful secondary purpose, the argument still holds good that, unless the quest for the absolutely good is satisfied by the presence somewhere of the absolutely good, nature is a cheat holding out a delusive ideal like the carrot which is dangled before the cart-horse, and which ever recedes as the weary animal advances. But if nature cannot be trusted, no argument of rational nature to show its untrustworthiness can be trusted. Also progress itself in the theory contemplated by the objector would have an impossible goal.

GARRETT PIERSE.

## Notes.

**A QUERY.** It is a nice point to decide how far our acceptance, or condemnation, of a movement should be made to depend on its essential aims, and how far on the collateral, but extrinsic, developments with which it has as a matter of fact become identified. History presents us with examples, both in civil and religious life, of many a movement that was based at first on high ideals and encouraged by the men best qualified to judge, but—either through over-emphasis on some of its principles to the exclusion of the rest, or through undue deference to extrinsic influences brought to bear upon it in the course of its development—degenerated subsequently into a dangerous force that the exponents of law or religion or morality were obliged in conscience to denounce. It is open to anyone to claim that its subsequent history only brought out the tendencies latent in its conception—as the full-grown tree or the adult human being indicate the real character of the seed or embryo—and that, were a man gifted with sufficient knowledge, he could see the future in the present and condemn the movement in advance. But it is equally open to another to assert that the original conception was quite above reproach, and that subsequent aberrations were due to its having changed its real character under stress of influences with which it had no genuine affinity. It is the problem that has puzzled many a philosopher—whether a change in a living organism or living movement is a 'development' or only a 'corruption.' Cardinal Newman in his essay on Development faced the puzzle boldly, and suggested various tests that would help towards a solution. But as to whether, even when all these tests have been rigidly and impartially applied, the solution is easy and certain, many a *bona fide* enquirer may have serious and reasonable doubts.

THE difficulty confronts us in the case of Socialism.

**THE PRINCIPLE** Ask any competent authority for a definition and he

**OF SOCIALISM** will reply in these or similar words—the system that

**UNSOUND?** advocates common ownership of all the sources of production, distribution and exchange. Not a word about the recognition, or denial, of the existence of God, the soul, immortality, freedom, ethics, morality, religion. Go back, too, to the beginnings of the movement, and you will find, we think, that the real energising motive was one that commands your approval and respect—the freeing of the working classes from the intolerable conditions of the industrial system that prevailed. The ideal was correct. What of the principle—given above—in which it was formulated? Was it too extensive? And did it involve, in embryo, developments which a Catholic is bound to repudiate? Several of our experts have replied in the negative: if, on Catholic principles, a special industry can be nationalised—as, of course, many of them have been, in various places and with Catholic approval—why should there be any objection, on religious grounds, to having the process continued indefinitely? That there is no dogma or infallible definition to offer an obstacle, all will admit: the only trouble is that it

requires some ingenuity to reconcile the view with the official, but not definitive, declarations of Pope Leo XIII. We have no wish to express an opinion on the point, beyond saying that, while we reject the principle, we do so because, in our opinion, it would lead to national inefficiency and to an undue restriction of human freedom—and that, if Leo XIII did condemn it, his condemnation was based on no specifically Catholic principle, but on motives that are recognised by all fairly sensible men, whether they be Catholics, Protestants, or infidels.

WHAT we are concerned with just now is this. Apart from the implications that may be conceived as lying on the very surface of the principle, the movement has become bitterly antagonistic to free will, spirituality, and Christian, more especially Catholic, faith and morals. We need give no detailed proof—it is furnished *ad nauseam* in every Catholic manual. Some years ago the matter was made clear enough in a controversy between Dr. Ryan and Mr. Hillquit: for both parties, as prudence suggested, were careful not to overstate their position or to answer for any merely accidental activities of the respective systems. Dr. Ryan, in reply to the claim that Socialism was merely an economic movement, made a suggestion:

"Let the Socialist party in national convention formally repudiate all the printed works which contain teaching contrary to the doctrines and proposals advocated in the last four paragraphs (i.e., repudiate 'every element contrary to the traditional teaching on morals and religion, 'love-unions,' 'confiscation,' 'antagonism towards religion,' etc): or let it appoint a committee charged with the duty of relentlessly expurgating from the approved books and pamphlets everything but the economic arguments and proposals of Socialism. . . . Only through formal action of this kind can the Socialist movement purge itself of responsibility for anti-religious and immoral teaching, or become a purely economic organization and agency. When this has been done, and the new policy in good faith enforced, religious opposition to Socialism will probably cease. Until it has been done no such result can be expected by any intelligent man who is honest in his thinking."

To which Mr. Hillquit replied:

"I regret my inability to accept the friendly invitation on behalf of the Socialist movement. Socialism has succeeded exceedingly well with its present philosophy and methods. Since the days when the movement ceased to represent a mere pious and philanthropic sentiment, and became a militant organization of the working-class based on the radical social and economic philosophy of Karl Marx, it has grown from a handful of dreamers into a potent international army of many millions, a modern social factor more powerful than the powerful Catholic Church. It has grown in spite of political persecution and 'religious opposition,' perhaps even to a certain extent on account of them. It is therefore quite unlikely that the Socialist movement will at this time change its philosophy and tactics to suit my amiable opponent."

Is this a "development" or a "corruption"?

THE CAUSE. Opinions vary; but our vote would be cast decidedly in favour of the second suggestion. How the various schemes mentioned by Dr. Ryan, and advocated by every recognised Socialist leader in both hemispheres, could be ever legitimately developed, by logic or by fact, from the comparatively innocent principle that lies at the basis of the movement, is more than we can

comprehend. It is clearly, we think, the case of a movement "corrupted" by accidental and extraneous influences. And what they were history tells us. The men who gave this movement its science and philosophy were Atheists or Free-thinkers before they ever entered it. Taking advantage of the ideal proposed, and of whatever was true in its fundamental principle, they imported what they had learned from Hegel and Feuerbach, and changed the movement essentially. Their task was not difficult. The rank and file to whom they appealed were suffering from undoubted grievances, and were easily persuaded that *everything* associated with the existing system—morality and religion included—was somehow responsible for their deplorable condition and ought to be swept aside in preparation for the Heaven that was coming: and, we have no doubt, their conviction was strengthened by the ignorant abuse they encountered from many, even in the Church, who failed to realise the vices of the industrial system and stood for the old *regime* as a whole. And so a popular crusade that, under sympathetic intelligent guidance, might have been kept free from irreligious entanglements, has become a mighty force battling for the downfall of the Christian Faith.

PRACTICAL  
ISSUE.

WHETHER the movement, as it became entangled, may in course of time become disentangled—we may speculate and hope. The issue will depend on whether priests, by proclaiming and developing the Church's principles and by co-operating with legitimate labour schemes, make it clear to the workers themselves that only the *excesses* of Socialism are opposed to the Catholic policy. The more we incline to the view that the present phase is merely a "corruption," the more are we justified in entertaining hopes of a final re-adjustment. But in the meantime we have to deal with Socialism, not as it might have been or may be, but as the actual concrete scheme that its own followers recognise. And, on that basis, we think no Catholic should proclaim himself a Socialist. True, there is no central authority in Socialism that can excommunicate a member, or impose a doctrine as a test, or say with certainty who is or who is not a true believer. But the result is attained just the same by an evolutionary process: a man or his teaching is quietly ignored or dropped, when the general body disapproves—as many have already been dropped, and as some of its most prominent present-day leaders will certainly be dropped in the course of time. In dealing with a body like that—though its present form is a "corruption," and though a "regeneration" is possible in the distant future—the safest course is to take it as it proclaims itself, in our own time, through the statements of its accredited leaders and through its own world wide activities. We may sympathise with some of its principles and support the greater portion of its practical programme, but that gives us no better claim to call ourselves "Socialists" than the Anglicans have when they call themselves "Catholics." Unless we are prepared to adopt its *entire* policy, as it stands in history and is recognised to-day, we should follow the advice of Leo XIII. and call ourselves by some other name—"Social Reformers" will meet the case. "Too rigid" some will say: "you restrict overmuch the activities of Catholics." Quite untrue: the contrary would be just as near the mark. For, if an individual has no right



to call himself a "Socialist" unless he adopts the entire Socialist philosophy, neither has any club, union, or party—nor have their opponents a right to denounce them as "Socialists," nor to assert they have incurred the Pope's condemnation—unless on the same condition. And the manifest conclusion is that Catholics will be, and are, free to join these clubs and unions and parties, not because "Catholics may be, or call themselves, Socialists," but because the clubs and unions and parties, though they call themselves (or are called by their enemies) "Socialists," are, as a matter of cold fact, something very far different.

OTHER VIEW  
APPARENTLY  
ADVOCATED.

THE opposite view might seem to be expressed in a little volume published recently from the pen of the late Dr. McDonald:<sup>1</sup> in which the statement that "a Catholic may be a Socialist or a Syndicalist" occurs repeatedly. But, it will be noticed, always with a qualifying phrase—"of a kind," "in this respect," "to this extent." The difference is really only one of terminology. But, for the sake of accuracy, and in deference to the ordinary use of language, and to the Pope's repudiation of the title, it would be better to define our position in other terms. We are all Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Tories, Liberals, Nationalists, Sinn Feiners, "of a kind" and "to some extent"—but the assurance conveys little and is liable to be grossly abused.

EXAGGERATED  
CONDEMNATION.

BUT, when the author comes to more concrete issues, we find ourselves more in sympathy. On the lawfulness of joining clubs or unions—by whatever name they are called—his conditions are that one must (1) not do or profess anything of which one's conscience disapproves, though one may tolerate much error and crime in one's associates, (2) never accept a false principle as a test of membership, (3) never join a society condemned by the Church, (4) renounce a society when its principles or the doings of its members are so bad as to counterbalance any reason he may have for tolerating it (pp. 126-8). This would leave Catholics free to join many a so-called Socialistic Union against which solemn condemnations may be, and often actually have been, fulminated by the more conservative clerics: and would *a fortiori* justify an industrial or political *alliance* with a Union that really deserved the title. For, as Dr. McDonald puts it, in reference to exaggerated condemnations (pp. 123-4):

"Have we not heard something of the same kind of warning as regards republicanism, in France; that the founders of the Republic were Atheists, or at least hostile to religion; that their aims were destruction of society, and their methods in keeping with their aims? For which reason the pious clergy of France used to warn their flocks that to profess oneself a Republican or to vote for the Republic was to take the devil's side: till, notwithstanding, a Pope not only advised but commanded the French Catholics to rally to the Republic, begrimed and bedevilled though it was, in its originators, its aims, and its methods.

<sup>1</sup> See our Reviews.

"So, too, of Liberalism: whose protagonists were, and are, anti-Catholic, if not anti-Christian, or even Atheistic: which aims at the destruction of the family (by civil marriage and divorce), at the corruption of youth (by godless education), and at the ruin of the whole social fabric (by deriving all power from the people and making them all-powerful). How often has not Liberalism been denounced, in France, all over the continent of Europe, and even in the British Islands! How often have not Irish Nationalists—including the clergy, and even the Bishops—been admonished for allying themselves with English Liberals, thereby imperilling the Catholic cause! Yet in France, Montalembert and Lacordaire were Liberals: and, in the British Isles, there are Catholics of good repute in Church and State, who belong to the Liberal Party—are even Radicals: while there are in England many priests, mostly of Irish birth, who openly advise the people to vote for Liberal candidates: and the Irish Parliamentary party has been allied to the English radicals, with the sanction of the priests and even of the Bishops of Ireland. A few, no doubt, of the Irish clergy complain of this: or rather, perhaps, lament it, and predict evil consequences. But the great fact is, that, though Liberalism is of the devil,—almost worse than Socialism,—one may now profess oneself a Liberal or vote for a Liberal, without being supposed to imperil one's soul thereby. The complaints that were made about Montalembert, Lacordaire, and their followers, and the anathemas that were pronounced against them ought to make us think."

AN EXAMPLE OF the correct policy for priests he gives an illustration (pp. 142-3):

"The land movement in Ireland,—a veritable revolution—threatened, at its inception to become revolutionary: in the sense of being so unjust and violent as to merit condemnation by the Church. The movement was actually condemned by many elderly and high-placed churchmen—all animated by the best intentions. Had their example been followed generally, by their colleagues in the ministry, the movement would have either been stopped or made ineffectual: or it would have become not only revolutionary but anti-religious, as happened in the revolution in France and Italy. If Ireland has been saved from that calamity, the happy result is due to the courage and forbearance of the clergy, Bishops as well as priests; who were not frightened by isolated excesses, and did not allow themselves to be either cajoled or bullied into opposition to the great majority of their flocks. In this way they were able to guide the movement: not indeed, so as to make it quite irreprehensible, such as no great social movement ever was or will be; but so as to preserve the union between priests and people, and to keep their country as religious-minded and as Catholic as it was before the agitation began."

PRACTICAL LESSON. REMARKS like these—though they go too far, we think, in the way of identifying alliance and membership—give all of us food for thought. We are not threatened with extreme Socialistic ideas in these islands as yet. But there are other forces working some distance in the same direction, and, above all, there are groups of Catholic men and women whose temporal interests would be better served by an alliance with these forces than by a policy of isolation. Exaggerated denunciation and want of sympathy with reasonable aspirations are as dangerous now as when they did their part in making the Socialist movement what it is, and in driving Catholics into the extreme ranks. There are movements on foot, based on principles almost (if not wholly) correct, and inspired by ideals we should all respect, that may be forced by tactless treatment into courses that the founders never dreamt of—along the lines of "corruption," not of "development."

M. J. O'D.

# THE REVOLT OF FACTS.

*La Documentation Catholique* quotes an article with this striking title written by a socialist in the *Vague* (8/4/1920). As with most of the Socialistic works, it owes its chief force to the emphasis it places on the evils of the present system, and its weakness lies in the remedy suggested. While admitting the evils of the present system, one can show that the facts revolt as much against the socialistic formula of deliverance as against other panaceas. Yet the article has a special utility because it shows how the growth of facts should influence our theories and even our theologies. The writer of the article, M. Pierre Brizon, shows how the reign of fine words which glorified the revolution of 1872 was followed by a revolt of facts. Against the catch-cry, Fraternity, there were the facts of death, ruin, misery, suffering, caused by war. Against the word, Equality, there arose the profiteers of war-corpses, the new-rich, and the new-poor, scandalous fortunes, millionaires at one end of the see-saw of wealth and the starving at the other, the former classes inevitably producing the latter. Against the beautiful conception of 'Liberty' there arose conscription, the strikes of workmen, and employers' lock-outs. But the great capitalists, the makers of economic wars, had here a great advantage, for they were not conscripted—not even much of their wealth—and they could send the poor to fight their battles.

# AGAINST SOME FEUDALISTIC LAWS.

THE facts began to revolt not only against the panaceas, but against the old feudastic conception of law. The law used to be invoked as the sacred book of the wealthy. How many evil-doers have been sheltered through the abuse of its really august name! How many new truths, including Christianity, has it been evoked to suppress! According to the old conception of law made by the wealthy classes property was so much the sacred right of the owner that he could do what he liked with it, even destroy it, though thousands of his fellowmen may be hungry. But soon through the growth in class consciousness of the working classes there was a slight change effected. It began to be seen, as through a glass, darkly, that certain rights of property should not be tolerated if they became a social nuisance. And the Law began to stammer of compulsory sales of Landlords' estates—of the horror of compulsory expropriation. Even the name 'workman' began to be introduced as a sort of shy guest in the great digests of laws. Laws were made to enforce compensation for accidents incurred during employment; in the old days if a workman was guilty of an accident he might blame himself, and was regarded as having done an injury to his master. Thus has the fact of the growing consciousness of power and right on the part of the toiler influenced even that blind goddess who was supposed to always hold the scales in equilibrium, whereas, she was too often blind only to one party, the poor, who have no advocate.

# FACTS VERSUS FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.

SOMETIMES freedom of contract was upset by the altered facts of economic change. For a contract you require a measure of independence; otherwise it is not a human act. But in some cases owing to the growth of trusts, and combines, and 'rings,' the employer was the arbitrary master of his own workshop; he could dictate terms; he could see to it that the powerless poor should work in most insanitary rooms from

which God's light and air were carefully excluded, or else take the alternative of hunger. In extreme cases it is a blasphemy to speak of the freedom of a contract to commit indirect suicide.

Even in the case of many insurance companies, when a person tried to insure against an old age of poverty, there was not allowed great freedom in the contract. The freedom was sometimes chiefly visible on one side. For the insurance companies had power and wealth enough to come to an express or tacit understanding to give only a certain, practically fixed, modest return for the 'premium' received. They then got high interest on these contributions of the poor; gave their officials generous salaries; and let the average man reward them with a 'premium' which they dictated, or face a lean old age and a family in want.

#### MODERN USURY.

SOMETIMES the facts presented by the abuse of capitalism can strike the imagination of all. There are cases that are worse than that of the absentee landlords. Some hoard up millions through having shares in foreign mines.

A foreign millionaire grows rich on the mines of Penarroya of Spain. Governments send agents to prospect in the jungles of Africa; afterwards there follows civilization, and the exploitation of the natives. The Church condemned the amassing of fortunes through usury; there is still a similar process in the exploitation not only of the goods, but of the faces of the poor. For this reason we join, as heartily as any socialist, in the protest against wars resulting in appropriation, against one-sided, rich-made laws, against the miseries which the degenerate, idle rich have heaped on poor humanity. We can also welcome any attempt to show up, and scarify, the fine pretexts which have deceived men in the past, and, unless education improves, will deceive them in the future. Some of these fine words about Liberty and Equality and Civilisation have been coined to cover greed and have led their dupes to the cannon's mouth; and the dupes have marched gaily to the accompaniment of the fanfare of drums.

#### THE REVOLT OF FACTS AGAINST SOCIALISM.

BUT the real danger that we would wish the socialists could see is that they also are becoming the dupes of words, of fine theories, of panaceas. For, if facts revolt against certain theories, we believe that there is one fact that will revolt against the socialistic remedy of collectivism. That fact is the human weakness inseparable from long-continued public administration of resources. The socialists would benefit workers by placing them in a sublimated work-house where their wants will be satisfied after a fashion, but at the sacrifice of their personal liberty. Not in this way will the fine balance be preserved between individual initiative and social utility. Do the public men that we know in the exercise of government functions warrant us in the belief that all will be well, if, not a limited number of things, but everything, be handed over to the charge of officials? Will there be no waste when everything is pooled? Will the care of the public purse, which in the past has tended to make finished actors of public men, to corrupt them sooner or later,—will it transform human nature into angelic purity so that they will become ministering angels in human distress? Will workmen, by the very fact of control, rise superior to human nature as it has manifested itself in the

past? We have to think of this possibility of corrupt officials, and not convert the State into an idol. The states we know are not the ones on which we would shift *all* our burdens and responsibilities. It seems strange to try to remedy our distress by giving them still more power, power over all our resources. The remedy does not seem to lie in a plethoric State; the remedy for the abuses of private property is more private property, a fuller and more equal distribution of the fruits of the earth. We shall not find the remedy in making the State an ever-present nurse with humanity in a bath chair.

G. P.

PROFESSOR HARNACK is so often mentioned with disapproval by Catholic critics that it is but fair to recall the great work he has done in one department of the New Testament towards vindicating the orthodox position. In a series of works dealing with the Acts of the Apostles we come to see him, through the pure force of the facts, gradually throwing off the shackles of the Tübingen school and adopting the traditional view; and the three works mark three distinct stages in his emancipation. 'A revolution in New Testament criticism' is the description of this change given by a writer in *Expositor*, November, 1920. And indeed it is nothing less than revolution for one, the first article of whose creed was that the New Testament had its origin in the second century, to convince himself that St. Luke wrote some years before the destruction of Jerusalem and that he was an eye-witness, or in the closest touch with eye-witnesses, of the events which he narrates.

#### THE THREE STAGES.

THE first stage in Harnack's progress towards the truth was marked by the publication of *Lucas der Arzt*, a penetrating philological study of the Acts of the Apostles. He analyses the 'We passages,' verse by verse and word by word, comparing their language and style with the rest of the Acts and the Gospel of St. Luke, and his conclusion is that all have the same author, St. Luke, the companion of St. Paul. Though he still doubts the historical character of the work in certain particulars, yet it is a remarkable advance to admit that the Gospel and Acts are the work of one who was either an eye-witness himself or in close touch with the eye-witnesses of the events which he narrates. This was in 1906. Two years later he returned to the charge in the work *Die Apostelgeschichte*. In the introduction he points out a new proof for the unity of the Acts, viz.: the uniform plan. In the body of the work the trustworthiness of the narrative as a whole is tested as regards chronology, topography, and history, and in passing he points out further linguistic evidence for the thesis propounded in the former work. In the third work, *Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte*, the whole linguistic argument is resumed, and by the use of different forms of type the reader can see at a glance the expressions which are common in the 'We-passages' (and the rest of the Acts) with the Gospel and are not to be found elsewhere in the New Testament. The argument is absolutely convincing, and in this point at least there is no fear that Harnack will be obliged by new evidence to change his position.

DATE OF  
GOSPELS AND  
ACTS.

STILL more important perhaps in its general results is his change of view as regards the date of the Acts. It must be remembered that he started from the usual teaching of the Tübingen school that the Acts was written long before the events to which it refers, and that it is of little historical authority. In the first of these books Harnack gives the year 80 A.D. as the approximate date. In the second he argues for a date before 70 A.D.; while in the third he reconsiders the whole question and decides in favour of the year 62. "The concluding verses of the Acts of the Apostles, taken in conjunction with the absence of any reference in the book to the result of the trial of St. Paul and to his martyrdom, make it in the highest degree probable that the work was written at the time when St. Paul's trial in Rome had not yet come to an end." There could not be a more complete or more convincing vindication of the position always taken up by Catholic scholars.

This conclusion naturally affects in a most vital manner the critical view on the composition and date of the Synoptic Gospels. If the Acts were written in 62 the Gospel must have been written still earlier. St. Mark, which, in its present form or a more primitive form, is regarded by critics as one of the sources of St. Luke, must have been earlier still, i.e., before the year 60, while he admits that St. Matthew, though it may contain later additions, existed substantially before 70. With all these views traditional Catholic scholarship does not agree. It is rather inclined, on the evidence of Irenaeus, to place Mark after 64, while the original text of Matthew was the earliest of all. But the admission that the Gospels were written within such a short time after the events which they narrate makes their historical character much easier to defend. The only reason why Harnack does not go the whole way towards accepting the traditional view of the Gospels is that he regards miracles as impossible, and concludes that at least in the narrative dealing with miracles the legendary element is present. It was for this same reason that the Tübingen school dated the Gospels from the second century. Harnack having abandoned this as untenable, and having done so much to vindicate the historical character of Luke on other points, helps one in coming to the conclusion that Luke is equally worthy of credence when he narrates miraculous events.

SOURCES OF  
THE ACTS.

THE main result of Harnack's investigation receives confirmation in the work of Professor Torrey on the *Composition of the Acts*, though he adds the important modification that the first half of the Acts has been translated directly from an Aramaic document, the translator being the author of the 'We-passages' and of the rest of the work. This suggestion has been disputed on both sides of the Atlantic (cf. *American Journal of Theology* 1919, and *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1919). There is indeed a remarkable Semitic colouring in the language of the early chapters which is entirely absent in the rest of the book, and it has always been admitted that St. Luke may have made use of documents written in Aramaic for this portion of his work. But that a connected work on this period existed since 49-50 and that it was merely translated by St. Luke is a different matter, and the opinion of critics would seem to be unfavourable to Torrey's view. In any case the historical value of these chapters would not be affected by the new theory.

E.J.K.



AN IRISH  
CATHOLIC  
CONGRESS.

TOWARDS the end of February a meeting of delegates from various Catholic societies was held in Dublin to discuss the advisability of organising an Irish Catholic Congress. The project commended itself to those present; and a provisional committee was appointed to take the necessary steps, subject to the approval of the bishops, for the convening of the proposed Congress on a suitable date next year. The potential importance of this movement can hardly be exaggerated: its possibilities for good are enormous. At the same time, it is only the active support of the whole Catholic community that will enable these possibilities to materialise. When one considers the good results produced by Catholic Congresses in other countries, particularly in Germany, one wonders that some move in this direction was not made sooner in Ireland. Perhaps it was because, in a community predominantly Catholic, we did not feel so keenly the need of an organised medium for the expression of Catholic opinion, and the foundation of Catholic policy as such. Perhaps it was because the interests of faith and fatherland appeared to be so closely bound up in Ireland, that we did not consider it worth while making any such move, till the national struggle for self-government was brought to a successful issue. In any case the time is ripe now for the better organisation of Catholic opinion and Catholic forces throughout the country. It is not the want of general education, nor the lack of energy and good-will that is responsible for the almost complete absence of active lay co-operation in the advancement of Catholic interests in Ireland: it is simply want of organisation and opportunity. Yet everyone knows that at the present day there is plenty of room for such co-operation. There are innumerable ways in which the technical knowledge of professional men such as doctors and lawyers, as well as the energy, experience and organising ability of laymen in various walks of life can be of immense help to those officially responsible for the guardianship of Catholic interests. Education, public health and morality, commercialised amusements, Capital and Labour—to mention but a few matters of public interest—present problems, in the solution of which Catholic principles are seriously involved, and often in recent times seriously menaced. In these circumstances we cannot afford to waste our resources. We ought to have some means for bringing out and developing all the latent powers of the Catholic body, not merely for the defence of such principles as may be threatened, but also for the advancement of Catholic ideals, interests and good works generally. These were the ends proposed, and to a large extent attained by the Catholics of Germany during the last half century through their annual Catholic Congress. The time is particularly opportune for a similar movement in Ireland. The period of comparative peace and routine that the Church has enjoyed in Ireland for nearly a century is, in all human probability, drawing to a close. In a short time we shall be, to a greater or less extent, masters of our own destiny; and we shall have to face many questions that are bound to create trouble in Ireland, as they have created it in other countries, if we are not prepared beforehand. On the other hand, if we only utilise our resources to maintain an enlightened public opinion, which shall be voiced by a national organisation representing and interesting clergy and laity alike, we can assure our country an opportunity, such as nowhere else exists, of bringing about a Christian solution of some of the most difficult social

and socio-religious problems of modern times. We venture to hope, therefore, that the project above mentioned will have the active support of all who have at heart the interests of Catholic Ireland.

W.M.

AFTER the documents which the pen of St. Patrick himself has left us, namely, the Confession and the BIOGRAPHER. Letter to Coroticus, the most important, and one of the earliest, authorities for the saint's acts is the Life by Muirchu maccu Machtheni. A well-known passage in the Book of Armagh, referring to this work, runs as follows: *Hæc pauca de sancti Patricii peritia et uirtutibus Muirchu maccu Machtheni, dictante Aiduo Slebtienis ciuitatis episcopo, conscripsit.* The individuals mentioned in this sentence lived in the second half of the seventh century. Aiduus is Aedh, anchorite of Slately [sometimes wrongly named "Sletty"], a church in the modern Queen's County, and near the town of Carlow. This Aedh died, according to the Annals of Ulster, in the year 700, while Muirchu, who wrote Patrick's life at the dictation of Aedh, is one of the signatories to the acts of the Synod of Adamnan, held, according to the same authority, in 697. An obvious inference from the passage cited is, that the principal part (at least) of Muirchu's life, that is, Book I., was compiled while Aedh was alive, namely, in or before the year 700.

Now who was this Muirchu? Do we know anything of his parentage, or of the place where he compiled the Life of Patrick, and where he was, we may presume, himself worshipped in after ages? The purpose of this note is to indicate that, in regard to both these points, the evidence hitherto accepted is not at all conclusive. It is claimed that Muirchu was son of Cogitosus, who wrote the Life of St. Brigid, and that his church was at Kilmurchon, a place in county Wicklow. Bury sums up the current theories in reference to these matters in his Life of St. Patrick as follows:—

There can be no doubt that Muirchu lived in North Laigin, and perhaps he may be specially associated with Co. Wicklow. The evidence is (1) his close association with Bishop Aed of Slébté (on the borders of Co. Carlow), to whom he dedicated his book, addressing him *mi domine Aído*, and from whom he derived material from it; (2) the existence of Kilmurchon "church of Muirchu" in Co. Wicklow; and, we may add, (3) the connexion of Muirchu's "father" Cogitosus with this part of Ireland, a connexion fairly to be inferred from his writing a Life of Brigit of Kildare.

MUIRCHU'S  
PARENTAGE.

It was Graves who first suggested in the Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, volume viii. (1863), pages 269 seqq., that Muirchu, who wrote Patrick's Life, was son of him who compiled our earliest surviving Life of Brigit, and who styles himself Cogitosus. This important relationship he deduced from another passage in the Book of Armagh, into which he introduced a brilliant emendation, reading an expression of Muirchu as *patris mei Cogitosi* for the meaningless *cognito si* of the manuscript. The Irish word *maccu* was not understood in Graves' time, nor for very many years afterwards, and scholars for half a century thought that

Muirchu maccu Machtheni meant 'Muirchu, son of Machthene, or Cogitosus,' Machthene being supposed to have some relation to the verb *machtnaigim* 'I ponder over, I wonder at (=cogito).' The fact is that *maccu* does not mean 'son' at all; it is translated in Adamnan by the Latin word *gente*, and the formula in question here means 'Muirchu, of the race or tribe of Machthene.' The numerous instances in proof of this interpretation will be found collected in an article by Mac Neill in *Eriu*, volume iii., pages 42-49. The name Machthene has not been explained by comparison with any parallel passages, though the same scholar points to a possible equivalent in his *Early Irish Population Groups*, page 79. I shall return to the meaning of the word in a moment. It certainly is not the name of Muirchu's father. This is the same as to say that it is not the equivalent of *Cogitosus*. If an exact Irish synonym of this last name be sought, I would suggest at once the forename *Toimdenach*, derived from *toim* *ten* gen. sing. of *toim* *tiu* = 'thought, opinion, cogitatio' exactly. There are instances of its occurrence in Rawlinson B. 502, and in O'Clery's *Genealogies of Irish Saints*.

THE other suggestion made about Muirchu is that his church was at Kilmurchon, in the territory of *Ui Garrrchon*, near the town of Wicklow. Colgan makes this statement on the authority of "the Calendar of Cashel"; see Reeves, *Columba*, li, Bury, St. Patrick, 255, Esposito, *Proceedings R.I.A.* (1912), 324, etc. Now in opposition to the view adopted by these writers, it should be pointed out that Muirchu's church was in *Ui Faelain*, in North Kildare, according to the scholiast of LB., cited in the *Martyrology of Oengus*, page xcix. (edn. 1880), and that Muirchu of Kilmurchon's pedigree, as given by O Clery, has not any name with the faintest resemblance to Machthene or the Latin *Cogitosus*.

Gwynn, in his edition of the *Book of Armagh*, adopts the traditional view, equiparating the last-mentioned names. I think I have shown that they cannot be identical (that is, refer to the same person), inasmuch as *maccu* is not synonymous with the Latin *filius*. But even if it were, I should be slow to accept the association of *Machthene* with the verb *machtnaigim* 'I wonder.' This latter word has the appearance of a late analogical form. What is the earliest instance of it? Not certainly as far back as the seventh century. Thurneysen shows in his *Grammar* (314-5) that forms of the kind are late and analogical. Machthene, as Gwynn rightly says, should properly be Machtene, the *h* in this instance having no particular significance. The corrected form is, in my view, a derivative of *Mochta*, well known as a personal name. To *Mochta* is added the termination *-ene*, as in the case of a host of other names that do not require to be specified.

It may possibly be objected that the *Book of Armagh* form can have no connection with *Mochta*, inasmuch as the vocalism is different. Let it be recalled, however, that the name *Mochta* is represented at AU 534 by *Mauchteus*, and that *au* is transcribed in later ages sometimes as *o*, at others as *a* (Thurneysen 376). There cannot then, on philological grounds, be any objection to the derivation of *Machtene* which is here suggested.

## Book Reviews.

*The Psalms, A Study of the Vulgate Psalter in the Light of the Hebrew Text.* By REV. PATRICK BOYLAN, M.A. Vol. L. Psalms i-lxxi. Pp. lxix—299. 17/6 net. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son.

As indicated by the sub-title, this work concerns itself primarily with the text of the Vulgate, and is intended to supply those who recite the Divine Office daily with a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which may be met with in the Psalms. It is not the first time that an attempt has been made to meet this crying need; but from several points of view the present work is a great advance on works which have hitherto appeared on the same subject. To begin with the most outstanding feature, a large part of the Introduction is devoted to an examination of the peculiarities of the Vulgate. Strange as it may seem, this is an aspect of the question which has been overlooked even by those who have undertaken *ex professo* to write a commentary on the Vulgate Psalter. Yet when one considers the history of the Psalter one is bound to confess that nothing is more essential. The language is the popular Latin of the period, and is a literal translation of the Septuagint, which in turn is a literal translation of the Hebrew. As a result many of the peculiarities of the Vulgate are due either to the Low Latin usage, or to Greek influence. Instances of each may be found in practically every Psalm, and unless allowance is made for such influence the psalm is liable to degenerate into nonsense. Canon Sheehan has given notoriety to one of the most striking examples: *Herodii domus dux est eorum* (ps. 103<sup>17</sup>), but there are others which, if less familiar are much more difficult to understand. Father Boylan has compiled a most exhaustive list of these peculiarities under the three headings: a) 'Defects and Peculiarities due to literal reproduction of the Septuagint,' 2) 'Semitisms of the Vulgate Psalter,' and 3) 'Peculiarities of the Latin Psalter.' In addition each case is more fully explained in the notes. I have failed to notice any peculiarity which has escaped his attention.

Before I pass from the Introduction I should like to call attention to the beautifully clear account which the author gives of the history of the Psalter, first of the Hebrew text, then the Aramaic Targums, the Greek Versions and the Latin. It is a history of the Old Testament text in miniature, and the author has taken care to avoid the language of the schools—a difficult matter when one considers the subject treated. His treatment of the other questions usually discussed—Names, Titles, Classification of Psalms, &c.—is equally successful.

In the commentary we have an Introduction to each Psalm, a new translation together with the Vulgate text, and notes of varying length on the difficult passages. The introduction gives us the occasion of the Psalm, its date where possible, and in general everything which serves to give the psalm the proper background. Here there is ample room for diversity of opinion, and the most that one can do is to choose the most probable view. Father Boylan exercises a wise restraint and abstains from confusing the reader with abstruse discussions; at the same time he shows that he is perfectly in touch with the latest results of criticism, as e.g. when he

suggests in a note the possibility that Ps. vii. 7-12 may be an independent poem embedded in the main psalm. He does not look with favour on the view that some psalms are Maccabean, and, on the whole, his attitude is conservative.

From what has been said above it will be inferred that the translation is not strictly literal. The author applies the principle laid down in the Introduction and makes due allowance for the peculiarities derived from the Old Latin, from the Hebrew, and from the Greek. But with this exception the translation follows to the Vulgate closely. The language of the translation is dignified and poetical, and reproduces a good deal of the rhythm and balance of the original. In certain sections where the Vulgate is merely a guess at the meaning of the original, he falls back upon the Hebrew, and while keeping as close as possible to the Vulgate extorts a meaning from it through the help of the Hebrew. It is necessarily a compromise. A good example of his method is to be found in Ps. LXVII., which is notoriously obscure in the Vulgate. Let me quote one verse as a typical example :

Si dormiatis inter medios cleros  
pennae columbae deargentatae et  
posteriora dorsi ejus in pallore  
auri.

When ye rest amid your allotted  
    <sup>spoils</sup>  
(It is like) the silver wings of a  
    dove,  
Whose back is adorned with green-  
shimmering gold.

The notes as a rule are brief ; but in different passages like that referred to above, they are extensive enough to satisfy the most exacting critic. The real commentary is the Introduction and translation, and the notes are merely supplementary and are devoted to the explanation of words and passages of special difficulty. Peculiarities of the text are explained, divergences from the Hebrew are indicated, and interesting sidelights are thrown on the text from parallel passages in other books of the Old Testament. It was well that a work of such importance for the missionary priest should have been undertaken by a man of the competence of Father Boylan, and it is still more gratifying to know that he has accomplished his task with such success. I may add that the book is Irish throughout, and the print is not likely to fatigue those whose eyesight is not what it once was.

EDWARD J. KISSANE

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*Some Aspects of the Dogma of Extreme Unction.* By REV. AUSTIN QUINN, D.D., All Hallows College, Dublin. M. H. Gill & Son, Dublin. 1920. Pp. 144.

THIS is the latest thesis presented to the Maynooth Theological Faculty in connection with the doctorate. Combined with an able oral defence, of the book itself and of 75 theses covering the whole course of Theology, Scripture and Church History, it secured the author his degree. Owing, we presume, to some little trouble in the printing department, the publication was postponed for a time. But it was well worth waiting for : and we offer the young doctor our sincere congratulations.

He was happy in the selection of a subject, as well as in his method of treatment. The idea of development has been in the air for many years past: any theological discussion in which the historical aspect is neglected will prove very unsatisfactory to the modern student. And in the whole range of dogma it would be difficult to find a theme that indicates so well the wide divergence of practice, and even of belief, tolerated by the Church for centuries, or the slow historical process by which the confused ideas of the past gradually took form and shape and emerged in the comparatively well-defined teaching that now recommends itself to reason and authority. To give anything approaching a complete record of the facts would result in a book that only the very leisured could afford to study. To restrict enquiry to the questions usually discussed in the manuals, while offering a wide enough field, would leave the student unaware of the reasons why these questions have arisen, and of the principles on which they are really decided. So the author takes a middle line. Hypothesis and theory are allowed their due place: and enough history is given to enable us to appreciate the difficulties of the situation—without introducing the innumerable details that are of little real value and would only complicate the issue.

To summarise the contents. The New Testament texts are considered, and in their light alone the Protestant view—as represented, for instance, in Mr. Puller's *Anointing of the Sick*—is proved to be untenable. In the second and third chapters, the "Patristic evidence," ranging from the statements of Tertullian to those of the Venerable Bede, and the "Official Documents of the First Eight Centuries"—including the various Rituals and Sacramentaries, publications like the *Testamentum Domini*, and the Statutes of Councils and of Bishops (one of whom, Sonnatius, in the early seventh century, has the honour of having given the Sacrament its present name)—are put before us in considerable detail. In the treatment of the "Matter of the Sacrament," which occupies the fourth chapter, the modern evidence comes more into prominence: chiefly because it gives the author an opportunity of discussing the problems with which we are all familiar—the variety exhibited at one time or another in different places regarding the number of unctions (varying from one to twenty-seven), the position and power of the Eastern priests, and the validity of a single unction whether in the normal case or in a crisis. In the next section, in which the "Form" and "Minister" are discussed, the early records are again marshalled, and lead to the conclusion that the deprecatory form is not essential, that one minister is sufficient, and that, when several act, they constitute one moral person. On the basis of the same evidence, the author finds, in his concluding chapter on the "Subject," that an advanced stage of illness is not required—in which connection we are sorry to note that Scotus has laid himself open to well deserved criticism—and he claims, rightly we think, but in opposition to experts of high authority, that during the same stage of illness repetition of the Sacrament is not only prohibited but impossible.

Of course, in such a wide discussion, there are many points on which doubts and difficulties might be raised, not on his presentation of the facts—which are given as fairly and impartially as anyone could wish—but on the inferences drawn from the facts, and on the extent to which the analogy of the other Sacraments should be allowed to influence



the result. To discuss them, even in a brief way, would lead us too far a-field. Ours is the happier task of directing attention to the first book of a promising author, and of assuring our readers that it offers as faithful an exposition of facts and principles, and as well sustained a series of conclusions, as can be found in any other book in the English language.

M. J. O'D.

*Some Ethical Aspects of the Social Question: Suggestions for Priests.*

By REV. WALTER McDONALD, D.D., Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., London, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow. 1920. Price, 7/6 net.

FOR years past the world has been hearing quite an amount about social problems and social reconstruction. With results not always satisfactory. For in the multitude of counsellors there is little of the proverbial wisdom, and the predominant impression produced is one of despair and bewilderment. The schemes put forward are not merely mutually destructive: they are often self-contradictory, tacitly assuming a principle here and there that their advocates would be the first to question and denounce. It is a relief, therefore, to find a book like Dr. McDonald's, that attempts to evolve order out of chaos, to eliminate irrelevant recriminations, and, above all, to justify on a defensible principle the practical conclusions that the majority of earnest men have already justified by instinct. And our interest in the book is not lessened by the fact that it comes to us as a legacy from the dead.

To the most casual reader it will be perfectly evident that Dr. McDonald's sympathies all through are with the weak and the oppressed: his statements, in fact, are no unworthy expression of the rôle played by the Church from the beginning, and constitute in themselves a fitting reply to the charges so often made against her by Socialist orators and writers. But, like many other Catholics, he finds himself confronted with a difficulty. Practically every scheme of amelioration—whether put forward by Socialists, Syndicalists, Trades Unionists, or Social Reformers—aims ultimately at forcing the transfer of rights to which, in the vast majority of cases, the present holders are fully entitled in strict justice. If so, and if justice be inviolable, how can we conscientiously advocate such schemes at all? By a reference, the author thinks, to the principle of equity—a virtue that advocates what is fair and reasonable in business transactions, and holds in the calendar a position intermediate between charity and justice (p. 154). After much subtle reasoning and citation of apparently contradictory principles, and after distinguishing between “(1) taking what belongs to another, without his consent, and (2) pressing him to consent to your taking it,” he arrives at the maxim which, he believes, constitutes the essence of the “ethics of pressure”—and which certainly constitutes the essence of his own book—viz., that “An owner may be pressed to renounce his strict right by anyone who has an equitable right incompatible with the strict right in question: provided the pressure applied is proportionate to the equitable right that is jeopardised.” (P. 30).

Some critics may think the principle too liberal: the majority, we believe, will consider it too strict. For, they will say, if equity must be taken as the test, and if equity holds a position between justice and the other virtues, are we not allowed, then, to exert pressure on a man who sins (say) against religion or charity—one, for instance, who, in a Catholic district, distributes pamphlets subversive of Catholic morality and faith? And is the "strict" right *so* strict that its exercise may never be directly interfered with, or that, after persistent abuse, it may not disappear completely? Public authority should, of course, be invoked in the normal case. But, when the public authority cannot or will not interfere, Dr. McDonald himself, in his section on boycotting (pp. 151-168), has little trouble in establishing that a specially obnoxious individual may be deprived, partially at least, of his strict right to social intercourse by the united efforts of an outraged community. The new principle leads him to conclusions that he must have accepted with reluctance: on page 47, for example, he bids farewell, with a backward glance of resignation and regret, to a policy that made him famous in earlier days—the policy of the 'hazel-switch.'

But, if the principle is too strict, that is all for the better. For it gives us confidence that the conclusions it involves may be safely embraced by the most timorous. These conclusions are grouped under two main headings. One affects 'Catholics and Labour Associations' (111-150): we have said something on the subject in our 'Notes.' The other concerns the 'Strike' in its various aspects. From evidence drawn from the daily press of Ireland, England and America, he makes it clear that 'strikes are likely to arise in future over three main principles: employment of blacklegs or scabs, tainted goods and non-union labour' (60). As regards the first he finds the claim made by the masters—that the men should work amicably with all other hands—'harsh and inequitable' and 'too much to demand of any workman as a condition of employment' (69). As for 'tainted goods' and the sympathetic strike to which they give rise, the policy, when condemned at all, should be condemned, not as a principle, but 'for reasons peculiar to the strike in question: because, for instance, it is being used in this case to support an original strike which is unjustifiable: or because, perhaps, the connexion between those who strike in sympathy and those who struck originally is not close enough to justify a measure so serious' (81), and he replies very reasonably to the arguments generally urged in favour of a more sweeping condemnation (81-88). The third question he finds the most difficult. But, after examining the practices generally prevalent in the professions, and considering the problem in the light of his fundamental principle, he concludes that the refusal of unionists to work with non-union men is correct and defensible. 'Unions, as I suppose, are necessary for the welfare of the men. When, accordingly, a man is forced to join, he loses nothing, ultimately. In any case, the freedom of action which he is pressed to resign, is a small thing compared with the common weal of the labouring classes, which is the interest at stake on the other side' (99). With the arguments and illustrations with which he supports these deductions, it would take us too long to deal. They may be conjectured from the principle he advocates, and will repay a reading in the original. And they will secure, we believe, the consent of practically every serious student of the social problem.

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FOR years past the world has been hearing quite an amount about social problems and social reconstruction. With results not always satisfactory. For in the multitude of counsellors there is little of the proverbial wisdom, and the predominant impression produced is one of despair and bewilderment. The schemes put forward are not merely mutually destructive: they are often self-contradictory, tacitly assuming a principle here and there that their advocates would be the first to question and denounce. It is a relief, therefore, to find a book like Dr. McDonald's, that attempts to evolve order out of chaos, to eliminate irrelevant recriminations, and, above all, to justify on a defensible principle the practical conclusions that the majority of earnest men have already justified by instinct. And our interest in the book is not lessened by the fact that it comes to us as a legacy from the dead.

To the most casual reader it will be perfectly evident that Dr. McDonald's sympathies all through are with the weak and the oppressed: his statements, in fact, are no unworthy expression of the rôle played by the Church from the beginning, and constitute in themselves a fitting reply to the charges so often made against her by Socialist orators and writers. But, like many other Catholics, he finds himself confronted with a difficulty. Practically every scheme of amelioration—whether put forward by Socialists, Syndicalists, Trades Unionists, or Social Reformers—aims ultimately at forcing the transfer of rights to which, in the vast majority of cases, the present holders are fully entitled in strict justice. If so, and if justice be inviolable, how can we conscientiously advocate such schemes at all? By a reference, the author thinks, to the principle of equity—a virtue that advocates what is fair and reasonable in business transactions, and holds in the calendar a position intermediate between charity and justice (p. 154). After much subtle reasoning and citation of apparently contradictory principles, and after distinguishing between "(1) taking what belongs to another, without his consent, and (2) pressing him to consent to your taking it," he arrives at the maxim which, he believes, constitutes the essence of the "ethics of pressure"—and which certainly constitutes the essence of his own book—viz., that "An owner may be pressed to renounce his strict right by anyone who has an equitable right incompatible with the strict right in question: provided the pressure applied is proportionate to the equitable right that is jeopardised." (P. 30).

Some critics may think the principle too liberal: the majority, we believe, will consider it too strict. For, they will say, if equity must be taken as the test, and if equity holds a position between justice and the other virtues, are we not allowed, then, to exert pressure on a man who sins (say) against religion or charity—one, for instance, who, in a Catholic district, distributes pamphlets subversive of Catholic morality and faith? And is the "strict" right *so* strict that its exercise may never be directly interfered with, or that, after persistent abuse, it may not disappear completely? Public authority should, of course, be invoked in the normal case. But, when the public authority cannot or will not interfere, Dr. McDonald himself, in his section on boycotting (pp. 151-168), has little trouble in establishing that a specially obnoxious individual may be deprived, partially at least, of his strict right to social intercourse by the united efforts of an outraged community. The new principle leads him to conclusions that he must have accepted with reluctance: on page 47, for example, he bids farewell, with a backward glance of resignation and regret, to a policy that made him famous in earlier days—the policy of the 'hazel-switch.'

But, if the principle is too strict, that is all for the better. For it gives us confidence that the conclusions it involves may be safely embraced by the most timorous. These conclusions are grouped under two main headings. One affects 'Catholics and Labour Associations' (111-150): we have said something on the subject in our 'Notes.' The other concerns the 'Strike' in its various aspects. From evidence drawn from the daily press of Ireland, England and America, he makes it clear that 'strikes are likely to arise in future over three main principles: employment of blacklegs or scabs, tainted goods and non-union labour' (60). As regards the first he finds the claim made by the masters—that the men should work amicably with all other hands—'harsh and inequitable' and 'too much to demand of any workman as a condition of employment' (69). As for 'tainted goods' and the sympathetic strike to which they give rise, the policy, when condemned at all, should be condemned, not as a principle, but 'for reasons peculiar to the strike in question: because, for instance, it is being used in this case to support an original strike which is unjustifiable: or because, perhaps, the connexion between those who strike in sympathy and those who struck originally is not close enough to justify a measure so serious' (81), and he replies very reasonably to the arguments generally urged in favour of a more sweeping condemnation (81-88). The third question he finds the most difficult. But, after examining the practices generally prevalent in the professions, and considering the problem in the light of his fundamental principle, he concludes that the refusal of unionists to work with non-union men is correct and defensible. 'Unions, as I suppose, are necessary for the welfare of the men. When, accordingly, a man is forced to join, he loses nothing, ultimately. In any case, the freedom of action which he is pressed to resign, is a small thing compared with the common weal of the labouring classes, which is the interest at stake on the other side' (99). With the arguments and illustrations with which he supports these deductions, it would take us too long to deal. They may be conjectured from the principle he advocates, and will repay a reading in the original. And they will secure, we believe, the consent of practically every serious student of the social problem.

The question of wages figures, of course, very largely in Dr. McDonald's pages: and on most aspects of the subject—on the limits within which competition may be allowed to operate, on the justice of protecting one class of individuals while another is abandoned to its fate, on the proper course to adopt when the profits of a business are not sufficient to afford the master a reasonable return for his capital and the workman a living wage, etc.—his suggestions will prove of interest and value to everyone concerned in the problem. But on minor points his attitude is diffident or slightly inconsistent. He claims that the price of labour, like that of any other commodity, is based on 'common estimation,' not on the workman's duty to support himself and his family in frugal comfort: but his admission that this duty is the most potent factor in determining the 'common estimation' (189)—to such an extent that women may be refused men's wages (106), though manifestly their work may often be equal in quality and quantity—goes far to make the two theories one, and to rob the whole discussion (169-190) of any real practical importance. In spite of his teaching on 'tainted goods,' he denies that consumers are under any obligation when the price they pay results in sweated labour, and that they are in a position to make enquiries (178): yet what goods are more 'tainted' than those stained by suffering and torture, and have we not been told already (84-85) that, in many cases, workmen are well qualified to make enquiries when there is question of proclaiming a sympathetic strike? On the most important questions relating to wages, priests are advised repeatedly not to interfere: the question is one to be determined by 'business men' (101-108)—employers for the most part, we presume. The advice, we think, might be modified with advantage. There is very little use in preaching abstract principles, if we refuse to acquire the knowledge that will enable us to translate them into concrete terms. That, at least, is the view of the men—their number is growing daily—who would like to see the priest's training include a course in Social Science. It was the view, too, we have no doubt, of a class of men to whose initiative and guidance Dr. McDonald appeals so often—the Irish priests who, during the Land War, did interfere in the fixing of economic prices and refused to leave matters to the decision of 'business' landlords.

These defects, if they be defects, detract very little from the excellence of the book. And its excellence is undoubted. It discusses old controversies in a way that makes them live and interesting, and it treats new problems in the clearest light that the old supply. The fact that the final revision took place when the author was on his death-bed—one chapter, indeed, on the very latest development, had to be excluded because at the last moment there was no opportunity of verifying essential facts—indicates that the author estimated at their full value the problems that have been growing for years and that will claim the earnest attention of the experts in the troubled days that are ahead. His work in that direction remains incomplete, but the spirit in which he would have faced the trouble is indicated clearly in the book he has left. There is no desire for display or for an empty victory over opponents of the Christian system—the intention is to extract whatever good their theories offer, and, for their errors or even poisoned attacks, to make every allowance suggested by charity or by a full appreciation of the difficulties under which they laboured. If the book secures the attention it deserves, its

effect will be a lessening of bitterness and a growing desire for co-operation on matters on which there is really no essential difference of view. That in itself will be a welcome omen for the victims of injustice and oppression—who are starving while the combatants fight for the privilege of bringing them assistance. And it will not be the least of the services done us by the gifted professor and sympathetic adviser we have lost.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

*Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie.* VON JOSEPH FROBES, S.J. Zweiter (Schluss-) Band. Herder and Co., Freiburg im Breisgau; London, 68 Great Russell Street; St. Louis, Mo., 17 South Broadway. Pp. xix.+704. Large Octavo.

The first volume of the present work was published in 1917. It dealt with the lower activities of the soul, such as sight and its delusions; and naturally it was even more concerned with the experimental method than the present volume which treats of the higher faculties. Reading this volume one will see with pleasure that psychology is becoming more and more an exact science; it has almost become one of the natural sciences. The work of Father Fröbes is encyclopaedic in its range of information; it assembles the best thought of the modern writers. There is a symposium of views on the different departments considered. Indeed the only general criticism of the work arises from a defect almost inseparable from such a treatment. It is that the views are not reduced to a higher synthesis; the book is often not so much a scientific treatise as a history, or record, of opinions. Of course such a treatment is still very useful, but the advantage of a completely unified system of thought is sacrificed. In explanation of the author's method it must be added that the subjects dealt with in experimental psychology are so numerous that no individual could have made an independent and thorough investigation of each case; he has perforce to depend on the work of others.

The author deals very fully with Intellect, Memory, Imagination, Will, Emotion, Character and their pathological manifestations. In connection with Intellect, the author refers to various tests—such as the Biret-Simon method of grading intelligence according to age—that are employed to gauge mental capacity of various kinds. Experiments of the most exact and painstaking character have been carried out in schools; they have concerned boys and girls of various ages; they have indicated in what departments each sex excelled. Over and above this the author, on the basis of observation and experiments recently made, gives a detailed catalogue of the special psychic characteristics of either sex. Space does not allow us to enter into those details here, but mention is made of them to indicate the class of matter that may be found in the book of this thoroughly modern Jesuit.

In regard to Imagination a distinction is made by the author between the merely reproductive and the creative imagination. Dealing with the latter reference is naturally made to the various phenomena of genius. In the case of inventions and discoveries due to the creative imagination mention is made of the various stages of development, which, summarily treated, are the following: suggestion of an idea, conscious or unconscious



cerebration concerned with it, a *seemingly* intuitive flash of discovery, final elaboration of the idea. Apropos of the author's treatment of the various views of genius it may be said that here as elsewhere he gives a tolerant consideration to various views. But a more destructive criticism could have been applied to Lombroso's work, 'The Man of Genius,' which despite its utility in furnishing rich details has the demerit of identifying genius, the highest manifestation of mind, with a form of mental disease belonging to the epilepsy group. There is one fact that is damning in the case of Lombroso's theory, and it is that, although he mentions numerous names of genius, greater and less, there is one significant omission, the name of Shakespeare. The sanity of Shakespeare's incomparable genius could not be made to fit in with the theory. With true insight, another great genius, Charles Lamb, devotes one of his essays of Elia to 'The Sanity of True Genius,' and he points out that, no matter how imaginative true genius is, whether it takes its characters from Heaven above or from Hell below, whether it paints an Ariel or a Beelzebub, they always have a natural consistency which distinguishes them from the fantastic products of a disordered brain.

Dealing with dreams, a manifestation of the involuntary imagination, the author gives a full treatment of the various theories, especially that of Freud, who traces all dreaming to some desire, or, what is the same thing under a different aspect, some fear. The imagination visualises the object of desire or of fear; sometimes it uses symbols for the purpose. The book was finished too soon to introduce a more searching criticism of Freud's theory in so far as it connects those desires, almost entirely, with the sexual instinct. Freud was dealing with phenomena garnered during peace, and at an epoch occupied over-much with sex. But during the World War many further observations were made, and in numerous cases it was found that the desire or fear at the basis of the dream was naturally enough connected with personal existence, not the propagation of the race. It may be noted in this connection that Freud brings cases of hysteria within the same category of sexual manifestations. Hypnosis is employed to reconnoitre the source of the trouble. The new method of treatment is to bring the trouble into the air and light, and make the patient face it and see its futility, whereas the old method was to ignore the illusion. It has been employed in the case of shell-shock. Such a psychosis, or obsession, has some analogy with scruples, and is consequently not without interest to the theologian dealing with stubborn cases in the confessional.

Not the least interesting section of Father Fröbe's thorough work is the final part, dealing with various attempts to sum up the characteristics of the personality. One of the widest known and most popular of these is the Question-Sheet. A series of questions, scientifically arranged, is prepared for the purposes of investigating the traits of the particular individual—his degree of will-power, emotionality, imagination, intelligence, character. The author piquantly says that the results seem sometimes like an anticipation of the General Judgment.

Is there some mistake about writing down the price on the cover of the review copy as £1 6s. paper-bound? According to the present rate of exchange this would be 212 marks, whereas the first volume (606 pp.) is advertised on the cover for 21 marks.

G. PIERSE.

*The Undying Tragedy of the World.* By WILLIAM F. ROBISON, S.J.  
210 pp. 7/- net London: Herder.

SEVERAL of the works of Father Robison have been already reviewed in the IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, so that it is not necessary to dwell at great length on the merits of this latest volume. It consists of six discourses delivered as Lenten Lectures during the Lent of 1919 to the students of St. Francis Xavier's College. They are all studies on the Passion, but with a view to drawing lessons from it to be applied to modern social evils. Hence the titles: "Judas and Disloyalty," "The Sanhedrim and Duplicity," "Pilate and Time-serving," "Herod and Lust," "The Soldiers and Cruelty," "The People and Apostasy." The author combines accurate knowledge of the Scriptures with a thorough understanding of modern social conditions and an American directness and vigour which compel attention. The book might be read with interest at any time, but forms an appropriate book for spiritual reading during Lent.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

*Mariæ Corona:* Chapters on the Mother of God and Her Saints. By REV. P. A. SHEEHAN, D.D. 3rd edition. 200 pp. 3/6 net.  
Dublin: Browne and Nolan.

THIS little book has been so long before the public that it is not necessary to do more than mention this new edition. It consists of a series of essays or instructions written in the author's fascinating style. Like all his writings it contains nothing trite or hackneyed, but is the fruit of a mind enriched with varied learning and of a heart full of solid piety. The essays are twelve in number; five on the Blessed Virgin, one each on St. Augustine, St. Joseph, SS. Peter and Paul, St. Patrick, St. Dominic, St. Teresa, St. Alphonsus and St. Aloysius. The book is well printed and tastefully bound, and the price reasonable.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

*Sermons.* By P. A. CANON SHEEHAN, D.D. Edited by M. J. Phelan, S.J. 311 pp. 12/6 net. Dublin: Maunsel & Co., Ltd.

WE have often heard it said that the late Canon Sheehan was at his best in his Sunday sermons to his congregation at Doneraile. The outside world had but few opportunities of hearing him; his native shyness drove him to the work of the study rather than that of the lecture platform or the pulpit, and his many friends will be grateful to Father Phelan for placing at their disposal this selection from his sermons. There are thirty-one in all, arranged in four sections: Sermons on Our Lord, Sermons on the Blessed Virgin, Sermons on Saints, and Sermons on miscellaneous subjects. To judge from internal evidence, they were composed at widely different periods of his life, and a critic might distinguish traces of the stiffness of the novice as well as the perfection of the finished artist. To the former class I should assign the sermon on the Epiphany, and especially the first half, which contains a good deal of crude exegesis, and a few

statements which are almost puerile. For example, the Magi were Kings "because they came to adore the new-born King, which kings alone were accustomed to do": the Magi came from Persia "because the custom of making long journeys to visit kings is purely Persian, if not exclusively so." This, however, is most exceptional, and the reader will elsewhere easily recognise the Canon Sheehan with whom he is familiar. It is difficult to single out any sermon in particular, but for graphic description, fervid eloquence and passionate appeal, I think the Good Friday sermon deserves to be regarded as a masterpiece.

The editor states in the preface that "in this volume we meet him in a character entirely new: Canon Sheehan the preacher." This is not strictly accurate. Considerably more than one-fourth of the matter in the present volume is to be found in the little book mentioned elsewhere in this issue, *Mariae Corona*. All the sermons on the Blessed Virgin and all but one of those on the Saints are to be found there, in most cases without the change of a word, in a few cases with the change of a paragraph or two. The fact that in one case they are labelled "Papers" and in the other "Sermons" hardly justifies their repetition in the present volume.

I have noticed a large number of misprints (e.g., four glaring ones on p. 34), while several obvious slips of the pen have been allowed to remain unchanged. Jairus is called the High Priest (p. 64), Christ sat *two* nights in the hall of Pilate (p. 62), Herod is the *grandfather* of Antipas and *father* of Herod Agrippa I. (p. 33). Fortunately these are defects which can be corrected by the least observant reader.

The volume may be heartily recommended to the missionary priest, not only as presenting excellent models for imitation, but as a storehouse of thought on subjects which frequently form the theme of his Sunday sermon. He will find here new ideas, new illustrations, and above all a picturesque phrasing which will help him to freshen up a familiar theme and give new life to an old message.

The external form of the book leaves nothing to be desired.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*The Gospel according to Saint Mark*, with introduction, text, and notes. By ROBERT EATON, of the Birmingham Oratory. xv.+203 pp. 6/- net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

THIS book is evidently intended for the educated layman who wishes to read the Gospels with intelligence, and yet has not the time or inclination to plod through a commentary which presupposes in the reader a knowledge of Greek. The text is that of the Douay version, and in the notes no language but English is used. In the Introduction the barest essentials are given, and the author wisely passes over the purely critical problems. The notes on the whole are clear and appropriate, and throughout the writer adheres strictly to the scope of the book and endeavours to make St. Mark intelligible to the ordinary reader. While the writer's judgment on the whole is sound, there are a number of instances of loose if not inaccurate statements which demand modification, while some necessary explanations are

omitted. Let me first point out a defect of method. The text is taken up verse by verse without any reference to natural breaks in the sense. It would have been unquestionably better to divide up the notes into sections according to subject matter. These sections would be preceded by references to the corresponding portions of Matthew and Luke which would encourage the reader to study the parallel narratives. In the method followed the reader is but rarely reminded that the narrative which he is studying should be compared with the other two. I think, likewise, that a short explanation should have been given of the nature of a parable, and especially directions as to its interpretation. The mischief of not being guided by strict rules in this matter is well illustrated by the author's interpretation of the parable of the fig-tree in c. xiii., 28; three distinct lessons are derived from a parable that is obviously intended to convey only one.

The author has a special fondness for citing passages of the Old Testament. Within certain limits this is to be highly commended; but it can be overdone. For instance, on xii., 1, we find quoted in full no less than twenty verses from different parts of the Old Testament. A reference in most cases would have been quite sufficient. Sometimes a quotation is introduced when a few words of explanation would have been more appropriate. Thus on iii., 12, in explanation of Our Lord's charge to the devils that they should not make him known, he says: "Mt. here quotes a passage from *Isaia*s which beautifully gives Our Lord's reason for this"—then follows a quotation from *Isaia*s xlii. To the ordinary reader I fear this would be *ignotum per ignotius*. He will naturally ask how this policy on the part of Our Lord is a fulfilment of the prophecy.

The Sea of Galilee is not 680 feet above the sea level (p. 3); Philip, the first husband of Herodias, was not Philip the Tetrarch (p. 53), but another Philip, son of Herod and Mariame. It is not true that the temple stood at the southern end of the temple-area, nor that the loaves of proposition, golden candlestick and altar of incense stood in the Court of the Priests (p. 118). Why is it stated that camel's hair was the "traditional dress of a prophet," when we have no evidence except for Elias? Mary Magdalen is identified with the "sinner of the city" and with Mary, the sister of Lazarus, a view, which to say the least, is not certain. It is surely an exaggeration to say that "every Jew expected that the Messiah would enter Jerusalem riding on an ass" (p. 114); and in the verse, "whoever shall do the will of God, he is my brother, and my sister and my mother" (iii., 35), is it not forcing the meaning to say that "the emphatic position of the word 'mother' at the very end of the passage gives at least a faint glimpse of how Our Lord loved and revered his Holy Mother" (p. 28).

There is no discussion of the date of the Passion, but the writer appears to assume that Our Lord was crucified on the 15th Nisan, and that the Last Supper was held in conjunction with the Jewish Paschal meal. With this we have no quarrel; but the author makes a statement on p. 176 which is inconsistent with it. If he admits that Simon had been working in the fields he gives away the whole case.

In the Appendix the author gives us a brief account of the different Jewish sects, of the Herodians, and of the Synagogue.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

*The Holy Scriptures according to the Massoretic Text: a new translation with the aid of previous versions and with constant consultation of Jewish authorities.* xv.+1136 pp. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America.

THE long descriptive title indicates fairly well the character of this translation of the Scriptures. Its object is to provide English-speaking Jews with a translation which represents in every particular the traditional text as fixed by the Massoretes and as interpreted by traditional Jewish exegesis. Thus the liberty of the translators was limited in two directions, in the lines of textual criticism and as regards translation. We know that in countless passages the Hebrew text is corrupt, while the true text can be restored, in some cases with certainty, in others with greater or less probability, from the Septuagint and other versions. In the new translation all these external aids are disregarded and the Massoretic text with all its faults rigidly adhered to. When the corrupt text makes sense the task is easy; when, as often, it makes no sense, the translator does his best. The traditional corrections (known as *Qere*) as usually followed except in a few cases in which the *Ketib* or consonantal text is preferred.

In regard to interpretation the same rule is observed. Whatever Gentile scholarship says has no influence, the guide is the traditional Jewish teaching as represented by the Talmud, Midrashim and later Jewish writings. This hard and fast rule has obvious inconveniences. The translator must very often be conscious that he is translating a text which is certainly not original and rejecting a reading which is critically certain; and again he must be conscious that the progress of historical and philological studies has in many cases proved the traditional Jewish interpretation to be false. Still the method has its advantages; and non-Jewish as well as Jewish readers will appreciate the convenience of having at their disposal a guide to Jewish interpretation, a compendium, as it were, of the teaching of the Rabbis.

Proper names are an exact transcription of the Hebrew, and some of them will on that account look strange to English readers. How is one expected to understand "And his name shall be called Pelejoez-el-gibbor-abi-ad-sar-shalom"? Fortunately the margin supplies a translation. The translators have otherwise taken full advantage of previous English versions, with the result that, though adhering so rigidly to the traditional text, the translation is never lacking in smoothness.

A few details in the printing calls for special commendation. *Oratio recta* is in every case clearly indicated by inverted commas; all poetical passages are written in verse form, and a small space indicates a break in the sense or the beginning of a new strophe.

*Commentarium in Codicem Juris Canonici.* Liber IV. De Processibus. Auctore P. Josepho Noval, Ord. Praed. Philos. ac Juris Canonici Doctore. Professore Textus Canonici in Pontificio Collegio Internationali "Angelico." Augustae Taurinorum.—Romae Sumptibus et typis Petri Marietti. Pp. xii.+624. Price 18 frs.

THE modifications of the old discipline, not merely in regard to matter,

but also in regard to the order followed, are nowhere so marked as in the fourth book of the Code. The various processes which form its subject matter were hitherto scattered over the entire field of Canon Law. In the Decretal collections, contentious judicial procedure was dealt with mainly in the Second Book, criminal judicial procedure in the Fifth Book, transaction and arbitration in the First; whilst other extra-judicial processes were scarcely touched upon at all. These latter, as a rule, had their origin in, and were governed by, subsequent legislation; and they were treated by the text books, not in connexion with judicial procedure, but under various other headings: thus, for example, the tract on Parish Priests usually included a special section on their administrative removal, and that on ecclesiastical punishments was considered incomplete without an explanation of the procedure to be followed in the infliction of suspension *ex informata conscientia*. Nor are the differences in matter less serious, especially in the case of judicial processes. The Decretals recognised three forms of criminal procedure—*per viam accusationis, denunciationis, et inquisitionis*; whilst the decree *Sacra haec*, published in 1880, which in the days immediately preceding the Code had almost entirely supplanted the decretal legislation in this matter, consisted partly of "inquisition" and partly of "accusation." Contentious procedure was also rather complicated: amongst other things the distinction between summary and ordinary processes was a source of considerable trouble. In addition to all this, there were many points on which the judicial legislation was altogether defective, so that recourse had to be frequently had to the old Roman law or to modern civil codes to fill up the *lacunae*.

The task of the commentator on the Fourth Book, therefore, deprived to a considerable extent of the assistance to be derived from similar pre-code laws, involves special difficulties; and its successful accomplishment is correspondingly meritorious. Fr. Noval, in our opinion, has achieved a very large measure of success. Following exactly the order of the Code, he takes up each canon in turn and explains it where explanations are needed. These explanations, as a rule, are full, lucid, and to the point, and they cannot fail to be of the greatest service to those who, through duty or inclination, take up the study of the subject. In addition to his analysis of the text and his commentary on it, the author usually gives a summary of the old discipline on the particular matter under discussion, and draws attention to the differences between it and the Code when the point is of special importance; in regard to the origin and development of particular institutions, however, he, as a rule, says very little.

Authors have been almost unanimous in saying that procedure, especially judicial procedure, is the most difficult portion of Canon Law. The difficulties, it seems to us, arise not so much from the theoretical understanding of the laws, as from their practical application; and this, we think, is especially true of the new legislation. A person who studies the fourth book pretty closely has little difficulty in grasping the meaning of each individual canon; and yet, if he were dependent on his theoretical knowledge alone, he would shrink from having to conduct a trial. Such being the case, practical examples



illustrating particular parts of procedure, such as the *libellus introductionis*, the citation, the *contestatio litis*, the examination of witnesses, etc., would be a great aid to professors, students, and others not engaged in the practical work of the ecclesiastical courts, and we regret exceedingly that Fr. Noval did not embody them in his valuable commentary. It is true that the author's principal work is professorial, yet, as he resides in Rome, we feel sure that he has an acquaintance with the law courts, and could give every practical assistance in the way indicated to those not so favourably situated. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that in future editions this suggestion of ours may be, to some extent at least, adopted.

J. KINANE.

*Modern Irish Trade and Industry.* By E. J. RIORDAN. With an historical introduction by GEORGE O'BRIEN. Pp. 335. Price 7/6 net. London: Methuen & Co.

"THE aim of the present work," writes the author, "is to supply the reader with (as far as it is possible to do so) a connected record showing the main factors which constitute the history of the subject from (about) the period 1850 to our own day." We may say at once that he has achieved his purpose in a very satisfactory manner. We regret that space will not allow us to review the work in detail; for it is a book that should prove useful to many, and interesting to all, who have at heart the material prosperity of the people of Ireland. In the introductory chapter Dr. O'Brien gives an excellent account of the ups and downs of Irish industry during the period 1600—1850. He traces not merely the actual progress or decline, but explains very clearly the forces that made for and against development. The Act of Union in particular is shown to have had disastrous effects; and some of these effects appear to be still with us. Mr. Riordan gives a very orderly and detailed account of the different Irish industries in more recent times, especially during the last quarter of a century. The facts and statistics that must form a large and essential part of such a work have been collected from all kinds of Government records and reports. In a few instances the author has been able to supplement these from his own researches. One conclusion, at all events emerges clearly from the facts marshalled in this volume, namely, that the deplorably backward condition of Ireland's industry is not due to any fault of the Irish themselves, but to calculated repression by a jealous rival. The prospects for the future are summed up by Mr. Riordan as follows:—"We have in Ireland all the resources necessary to build up a thriving community; endless proof is available of the ability of Irishmen to cope successfully with economic problems; our workpeople are comparable with those of any other nation, both as regard to skill and intelligence; all that we lack to enable us to take our proper place among the prosperous nations of the world is the power to determine our own economic policy."

The book contains a good index, and is well printed and bound.

W. MORAN.

*St. Bernard's Treatise on Grace and Free Will.* Translated by WATKIN W. WILLIAMS, M.A. Price 7/6. London: S.P.C.K.

THIS is a companion volume to the Society's well-known series of "Translations of Christian Literature." The translator, in a brief introduction, reviews the circumstances in which the treatise was written. He also calls attention to two important MSS. which show some variations from the present *textus receptus*. The introduction is followed by a very full and detailed synopsis of the whole argument of the text. The synopsis is partly in English and partly in Latin. The combination, though perhaps unavoidable, looks strange in a translation. The English version of the text comes next, with notes at the foot of each page. Beyond the translator's predilection for such forms as "thou," "hath," "willeth," etc., there is nothing in the translation to call for special comment. The foot-notes are mostly short and well chosen. An index of subjects and an index of authors complete the volume. The book is excellently turned out, and makes a worthy addition to a good series.

W. MORAN.

*Mélanges De Patrologie et d'Histoire Des Dogmes* By J. TIXERONT. Price (wrappers) 7 francs. Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 90 Rue Bonaparte.

IN this volume the author has brought together a number of independent essays. The first eight are conferences given to the Catholic faculties of Lyons, and are now published for the first time; the remainder are articles reprinted from various magazines. The subjects treated are as follows: "I. S. Ignace d'Antioche; II. *Le Pasteur* d'Hermas; III. La lettre de l'Eglise de Lyon et de Vienne sur les martyres de 177; IV. *L'apologie* d'Athénagore; V. *Le Pédagogue* de Clément d'Alexandrie; VI. Tertullien moraliste; VII. et VIII. S. Cyprien; IX. Les concepts de *Nature et Personne* dans les Pères des V<sup>e</sup> et VI<sup>e</sup> siècles; X. La lettre de Philoxène à Abou-Niphr; XI. La doctrine pénitentielle de S. Grégoire le Grand; XII. Le rite du Matal." Each chapter or essay is about the length of one of the longer articles in the present number of this magazine. We need not comment on the chapters already published. In the conferences the author discusses his subject in a broad general way, without going into any minutiae of scholarship. He emphasises, however, certain points which he considers pertinent to controversies between Catholics and non-Catholics in modern times. There is no need to recommend the work of Dr. Tixeront. He is already widely and favourably known for his studies in the domain of early Christian literature. We wish his book a wide circulation.

W. MORAN.

*An Awakening and What Followed.* By JAMES KENT STONE, S.T.D., LL.D. Pp. 321. Price \$1.50. Indiana, U.S.A.: The Ave Maria, Notre Dame.

THE author of this book was brought up in the bosom of the Anglican Church. The "awakening," to which he alludes in the title, refers to his conversion to Catholicity; and "what follows" to his subsequent

life as a Passionist Father. The greater portion of the book is a record of the mental struggle, the arguments, the doubts and difficulties that led up to the final "awakening." In this part of the work (more than three quarters of the whole), the author gives an excellent presentation of the issues at stake in the Roman-Anglican controversy: and as he proceeds he lays bare with a sure, but withal a sympathetic pen the weaknesses of the Anglican position. The writer is not destructive nor violently controversial in his method. He proceeds rather on constructive lines, and works out a positive solution of the ecclesiological problems that presented themselves to his mind during the year or more of mental anguish, during which he was groping towards the truth. We can almost imagine ourselves working at a treatise *De Ecclesia*, as we pass from chapter to chapter, considering in turn—"The World's Testimony—The Unchangeable Church—Reformed Religion—The Church and Progress—Persecution—Faith and Authority—Infallibility—Holy Scripture—The Primitive Church—Four Tests—The Primacy—The Roman Pontiff—Jurisdiction—Papal Infallibility." The personal element is kept very much in the background all through these discussions, and when it does come forward occasionally, it is mostly in the shape of a gentle appeal to the author's former fellow-Anglicans to weigh well some consideration that has powerfully influenced the writer himself. It is unnecessary to comment on the main lines of argument in the book. They are for the most part those with which students of the Anglican question are familiar. We may remark, however, that the author uses with effect the testimony of a number of non-Catholic writers in dealing with such questions as the attitude of the Church towards progress and enlightenment.

The second portion of the book opens with the rather unexpected statement:—"Fifty years have passed since the foregoing chapters were written." This portion of the work is short and does not call for special comment. It consists of a collection of fragmentary sketches of the author's missionary life in various parts of the world. These reminiscences, while not of any theological value, are touching in their simplicity, coming from one who feels that his life's work is done, and who is confidently yet humbly awaiting the crown in store for him.

The book is very interesting and readable throughout; and we recommend it to our readers. The printing and binding are very good.

W. MORAN.

## Books Received.

George G. Harrap and Co., 2 and 3 Portsmouth Street, Kingsway, London, W.C.:—

**Jack and Me.** A Story for Children. By Maude S. Forsey. Illustrated by Helena Jacobs. 1/9.

**The Story-Teller.** By Maud Lindsay. Illustrated by Florence Liley Young. 1/4 nett.

**A Story Garden.** By Maud Lindsay. Illustrated by Florence Liley Young.

**Wonder Tales from Many Lands.** Written and Illustrated by Katharine Pyle. 1/6.

**First Story Primer.** By S. E. Gadsby. 8d.

**An Introductory Reader in Civics.** By E. E. Houseley, B.A., B.Sc. 2/3.

**Playtime Games for Boys and Girls.** By Emma C. Dowd. 5/- nett.

**The Supervision of Instruction.** By H. M. Nutt. 7/6 nett.

The University Tutorial Press, Ltd., High Street, New Oxford Street, W.C.:—

**Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet.** Edited by B. J. Evans, B.A.

Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, London, E.C.:—  
**Selected Short Stories.** Second Series. 2/6 nett.

W. and R. Chambers, Ltd., 339 High Street, Edinburgh:—

**Ivanhoe.** By Sir Walter Scott. Edited with Notes and Explanations.

**The Incorporated Association of Kinematograph Manufacturers, Ltd.,** 167 and 169 Wardour Street, London, W.1.

**A Short History of the Lord Jesus, The Last Resurrection and the Future of the World.** By The Promised Comforter. Bombay (India), J. R. Lantán, Gogaha Street, Fort. [For us whose promised Comforter has come long since there is no need of another.]

**The Tree of Life, and Other Poems.** By A. V. Phillips. Harding and More, The Ambrosden Press, 119 High Holborn, London, W.C.1.

**Introductionis in Sacros Utriusque Testamenti Libros Compendium,** auctore P. Hildebrande Hoepfl, O.S.B. Vol II. Introductio specialis in Libros V.T. 327pp. Roma. Libreria Alfieri and Lacroix.

**Novum Testamentum Græce.** Henricus Jos. Vogels. 661 pp. Düsseldorf. L. Schwann —

**The Catholic Charities Review.** (Catholic University, Washington, U.S.A.)

**The Other Life.** By the Right Rev. W. Schneider, D.D. Translated by Rev. H. Thurston, S.J. London: Great Russell St., Herder. New York: Joseph Wagner. Pp. 410. Price 18/-.

**Collectio ex Rituali Romano.** 1921. M. H. Gill and Son, Dublin. Pp. viii.+292. Price 6/- net. [Gives the prayers and Ritual observances in connection with Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, Matrimony, various blessings, scapular-enrolment, etc. Ably edited and beautifully printed. An Irish version is given where advisable: and the prescriptions of the Code are kept carefully in view throughout. A little volume to be highly recommended.]

**Henry Edward Manning: His Life and Labours.** By Shane Leslie, M.A., King's College, Cambridge. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd.: London, 28 Orchard Street, 8-10 Paternoster Row; Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow. 1921. Pp. xxxiv. + 516. Price 25/- net. [Review in our next issue.]

**Marriage and Parenthood.** By Alice Lady Lovat. With Preface by His Eminence Cardinal Bourne. Same publishers as last mentioned. 1921. Pp. xxviii. + 172. Price 6/- net. [Sets down—as the result of experience, and in the light of Catholic principles—the rights, duties, and physical facts of motherhood. Written in a restrained, but straightforward style; and with a wealth of helpful suggestion.]

**Some Errors of H. G. Wells.** By Richard Downey, D.D. Same publishers. 1921. Pp. 58. Price 1/- net. [A reprint of articles from *The Month*. The errors cover a wide field—Anthropology, Old Testament criticism, Christian origins, the Crusades, Monasticism, the Reformation, Galileo, etc.]

**In Touch with God.** By Rev. Joseph Sunn. Same publishers. 1921. Pp. 58. Price 1/- net. [A little treatise on the duty of mental prayer and realization of the presence of God.]

**Ethics General and Special.** By Owen A. Hill, S.J., Ph.D., Fordham University. Harding and Moore, Ltd., The Ambrosden Press, 119 High Holborn, London. Pp. xiv. + 414. Price 21/- net. [Review in next issue.]

**La Vie Catholique.** By A. D. Sertillanges, Catholic Institute, Paris. 1921. Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre; J. Gabalda, Éditeurs, Rue Bonaparte, 90. Pp. 298. Price by post, 8.75 fr. [Studies, in the light of Christian teaching, of the various kinds of life one may be called on to lead—of joy, suffering, poverty, wealth, professional work, prayer, etc. A second volume is promised.]

**Officium Majoris Hebdomadae.** Published (1921) by P. Marietti, Rome. Price 10.25 fr. [In two parts, one the Office, the second the Mass. Done in convenient form and in very clear type.]

**Idols.** By John Toriel Williams. 1921. Western Mail, Ltd., Cardiff. Pp. 72. Price not indicated—probably about 1/6. [Verses—indicating discontent with all that has satisfied mankind hitherto.]

**Tractatus De Deo Creante.** Auctore Blasio Beraza, S.J. Bilboa, Alameda de Mazarredo, apartado 223, Editores Elxpuru Hermanos. Pp. 774. Large octavo. [Though written from a very conservative standpoint, the book always discusses the most recent literature as well as copious quotations from the Fathers.]

**La Philosophie Moderne Depuis Bacon jusqu'à Leibniz.** Tome I. Par Gaston Sortais, S.J. Paris, P. Lethielleux, 10 Rue Cassette. Pp. 592. Prix franco 21-30. [The present volume deals very fully with Bacon, and his great influence on the Continent. For a history of philosophy it, perhaps, deals too fully with his non-literary activities.]

**The New Rubaiyat and Other Poems.** By Condé B. Pallen. Harding and More, The Ambrosden Press, 119 High Holborn, London, W.C.1. Pp. 261. Price 21/-. [Omar's wine leaves a bad taste in the mouth. This book will remove it.]

**The Song of Lourdes.** By Rev. John Fitzpatrick. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 28 Orchard Street. Pp. 201. Price 5/-. [Clients of Mary will in this little volume find in verse the full story of Lourdes. They will surely profit by reading about her whom the author well styles "God's miracle of womanhood."]

**Meditations for Every Day in the Year.** By Bishop Challoner. Aforesaid publishers. Pp. 906. Small octavo. [No need to recommend the classical work of Challoner. This is a serviceable quaint edition in the fel! type and with the old-time illustrations.]

**Catholic Thought and Thinkers.** Introductory. By C. C. Martindale, S.J., M.A. Harding and More, The Ambrosden Press, 119 High Holborn, London, W.C.1. Pp. 160. [The introduction to a series intended for the ordinary reader and for sermonists. The object of the series will be to positively counter the objection that the Church in the past and the present is the foe to the advancement of thought. This introductory volume is a summary of thought-movements.]

**The Mother of Christ.** By O. R. Vassall-Phillips, C.S.S.R. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Orchard Street. Pp. 524. Price 7/6. [The Blessed Virgin in tradition, theology, and devotion. Not written in a rigidly scientific style, but in a manner accessible to all, with quotations from the poets.]

## Theological Articles in the Reviews.

IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD (January).—**Rev. G. O'Nolan**, 'A New Era in Irish Literature.' **Rev. E. Stephens**, 'Has the Roman Canon been Dislocated?' [It has not been established that there ever was an *epiclesis* in the Roman Mass.] **Rev. E. Cahill**, 'The Oldest Nation in Europe.' [An interesting statement of Ireland's claims, from various points of view.] **J. B. Cullen**, 'The Early Franciscans in Ireland—Convent of New Ross' [historical]. **Claude Williamson**, 'Democracy and Revolution.' [Dips into various questions touching modern movements towards popular liberty.] (February).—**Right Rev. J. S. Vaughan**, 'Eternal Life.' [The reward of the elect, with special reference to resurrection of the body.] **Rev. P. Coffey**, 'Two Views of Ownership.' [An interesting comparison between the modern (pagan) and the Christian theories of property.] **Rev. P. J. Gannon**, 'A Study of Religious Statistics in Ireland.' [Reveals the surprising fact that the Catholic population has steadily dwindled both absolutely and relatively during the last 70 years. The author also discusses the causes.] **Rev. J. B. O'Connell**, 'The Memoriale Rituum' [a review of its contents and recent modifications in same]. **Rev. E. R. James**, 'The Blessed Virgin in St. Irenaeus.' [His testimony to virginity, divine maternity and position as second Eve.] **Rev. St. G. Hyland**, 'The Papal Supremacy during the first three centuries.' [The arguments from scripture and tradition.] (March).—**Rev. Paul Walsh**, 'The learned family of O'Duigenan' [historical]. **Rev. B. V. Miller**, 'Mortal and Venial Sin in the Early Church.' [Works backward from St. Augustine, and shows the principle of distinction was admitted from the beginning.] **M. McDonagh**, 'Electioneering under the Irish Parliament.' [The situation about 1760.] **Rev. J. Flynn**, 'The Nature of Old Testament Prophecy.' [An interesting discussion of the psychological problem involved in inspiration, and a brief review of some recent theories concerning same.] **Rev. E. J. Galvin**, 'The Irish Missionaries on the River Han.' [A trip through the new Irish vicariate in China.] Each number also contains Documents, Book Reviews, and Notes and Queries in Theology, Canon Law and Liturgy.

THE CATHOLIC WORLD (January, 1921).—**Lucas**, 'The Life's Work of J. H. Newman.' [Deals at some length with Newman's work in the Catholic University in Dublin.] (February, 1921).—**Klein**, 'Breaking and Renewing Diplomatic Relations between France and the Holy See.' **Moynihan**, 'The Poet of the Supernatural' [Dante.] **Lucas**, 'The Life's Work of J. H. Newman.' [An account of the writing which was his work, particularly, his lectures.]

REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THEOLOGIQUES.—**Sertillanges**, 'La Science et les Sciences spéculatives d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin.' [St. Thomas praises this pedagogic order of sciences: 1<sup>o</sup>, Logic, which gives method; 2<sup>o</sup>, Mathematics, which in a measure can be taught to infants; 3<sup>o</sup>, Natural Philosophy; 4<sup>o</sup>, Moral Philosophy; 5<sup>o</sup>, Metaphysics.] **Blanche**, 'Sur le sens de quelques locutions concernant l'analogie dans la langue de S. Thomas d'Aquin.'



**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE** (1 Quart., 1921).—**Brewer**, 'Die kirchliche Privatbuße im Christlichen Altertum.' [With the public form of penance there co-existed private penance for ordinary mortal sins.] **Rimm**, 'Das Furchtproblem in der lehre des hl. Augustin(1).' [Augustine expresses one aspect in his portemanteau style: 'Deum timete ne deficiatis; amate ut proficiatis.'] **Slipyi**, 'Die Trinitätslehre des byzantinischen Patriarchen Photios (II.)'

"**GREGORIANUM**."—**Billot**, 'A propos d'un livre récent de theologie historique.' [Refers to the work by M. Jules Lebreton, *Les origines du dogme de la Trinite*. Discusses the question of the method to be employed in historical theology.] **Marchetti**, 'La sfera di attività della carità.' [All the virtuous acts of a just man are acts of charity, either directly elicited or commanded.] **Kramp**, 'Des Wilhelm von Auvergne "Magisterium Divinale" II.' **Schaaf**, 'De Philosophiae recentis conceptu et caractere.' [No possibility of reconciling it with scholastic philosophy.]

**STUDIES** (March, 1921).—**Thurston**, 'Blood Prodigies.' [Mentions many cases of alleged preternatural flowing of blood. Shows that in some cases the evidence is very unsatisfactory.] **O'Rahilly**, 'The Sovereignty of the People.' [Attacks recent departures from the Suarezian theory that the God-given authority resides, mostly at least, in the people.] **Power**, 'Palestinian Customs in Illustrating the Bible.' **Plater**, 'Retreats for Working-men.'

**BIBLICA**. Vol 2. Fasc. I.—**A. Kleber**, 'The Chronology of 3 and 4 Kings and 2 Paralipomenon.' [Claims to have discovered the system on which the writers based their chronology.] **L. Fenck**, 'Paralyticus per tectum demissus.' [Elaborate discussion of the nature of the 'house.' Concludes that it was built entirely of stone with an arched roof.] **P. Jouon**, 'Sur le nom de Qoheleth.' [Signifies 'l'homme de l'assemblée populaire, le predicateur par excellence.'] **E. Power**, 'Writing on the Ground.' [Cites numerous parallels from Arabic sources]

**REVUE BIBLIQUE** (January, 1921).—**R. P. Lagrange**, 'L'ancienne version syriaque des Evangiles' (suite). [The Old Syriac version made its appearance probably in Egypt shortly before the time of Eusebins of Caesarea.] **R. P. D. Buzy**, 'Les symboles prophétiques d'Ezéchiel.' **L. Dieu**, 'Marc source des Actes?' [Continues his comparison between Acts I.-XV. and Mark and concludes that Luke had before him a narrative composed by St. Mark.]

**PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW** (January, 1921).—**E. M. Wilson**, 'The Anointing of the Sick in the Epistle of James.' [Denies the sacramental character of the anointing, but though there is question of restoring bodily health, the anointing is merely symbolical.] **S. T. Lowrie**, I. Cor. xi. and the Ordination of Women as Ruling Elders.' [Paul's object was to repress certain abuses He implies that it is an 'ordinance of God' that man, not woman, should rule.]

**THE MONTH**. (January, 1921)—**Theodore Maynard**, 'Catholics in Literature.' [An appreciation of the poetry of Hilaire Belloc and Alice Meynell.] **C. W. O'Hara**, 'Aspects of the Theory of Relativity.' [Seeks to discriminate between what is certain and what is probable in Professor Eddington's exposition of the theory.] **P. D. Devas**, 'A Poor-Clare of Yesterday.' [Mother Mary Dominic (1799-1871).] **H. E. G. Repe**, 'Viscount Morley's Memoirs.'

[They illustrate the courage and integrity of the 'Saint of Agnosticism,' but offer no trace of any progress towards the supernatural.] **C. Piater**, 'An Irish Diary—IV.' [Experiences on the Galway Coast.] **H. Thurston**, 'An Anglican History of Confession.' [A favourable review of Mr. O. D. Watkins' book: it is well-documented, and its conclusions differ only very slightly from those already reached by Catholic enquirers.] (February, 1921.)—**E. Boyd-Barrett**, 'Psycho-Analysis and Christian Morality.' [Though the exponents of the 'Science of the unconscious' have collected and analysed many facts of great importance, their claims are exaggerated, their methods dangerous from the moral point of view, and their literature tainted with the sex-obsession.] **A. H. Atteridge**, 'The Student and the Press.' [A plea for allowing students to read the leading newspapers under expert guidance, and for instructing them on the origin and value of Press-pronouncements.] **J. H. Pollen**, 'Henry VIII. and St. Thomas Becket.' [The question discussed in the light of the *Calendar of Stat Papers* for 1538.] **M. C. D'Aroy**, 'Philosophers in Congress.' [The Oxford Conference of last September: from the Catholic point of view, the discussion on Relativity, Nationality, and Religion in relation to Ethics, were suggestive and satisfactory.] **J. Ayscough**, 'Pages from the Past—XI.' [Thoughts on the post-war outlook, suggested by memories of Armistice Day.] **H. Thurston**, 'Some Physical Phenomena of Mysticism. The Mystic as a Hunger-Striker—I.' [Some of the marvellous, but well-established, facts recorded of Saints and Mystics: their abstinence from food and drink extended sometimes over years.] (March, 1921.)—**J. Britten**, 'The Shamrock.' [The story of St. Patrick's use of it not recorded till the 18th century.] **J. Rickaby**, 'Remarks on Augustinianism.' [The system indefensible.] **H. Thurston**, 'Some Physical Phenomena of Mysticism: The Mystic as a Hunger-Striker—II.' [Additional examples. Natural causes supply no explanation, if long-continued abstinence is 'maintained concomitantly with the continual discharge of ordinary duties.'] *Miscellanea: Critical and Historical Notes: Topics of the Month: Notes on the Press. Reviews. Short Notices. Books Received.*

**THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.** (December, 1920.)—**Benedict XV. and the Sacred Scriptures.** [Explanation and synopsis of the Encyclical of last September.] **H. B. Loughnan**, 'A Plea for the Study of Mysticism.' [Exposition of the reasons mentioned in the Pope's recent letter in connexion with the establishment of a Chair of Mystical Theology in the Gregorian University at Rome.] 'St. Anastasia in the Second Mass on Christmas Day.' [Historical explanation of the fact.] **Fra Arminio**, 'Deterioration Within the Sanctuary.' [In the way of substitutes for beeswax.] (January, 1921.)—**B. M. Thuento**, 'The Liturgical Office of the Feast of the Holy Name.' [St. Bernardine's influence. Analysis of the Office.] **R. MacEachen**, 'The Priest and the Teaching of Religion.' [Love should be made the central motive.] **Fr. Galin**, 'Father Hilary's Legacy.' [Formulation of a scheme for providing English readers with Bible commentaries.] 'A Medieval Priest-Poet of the Sacred Heart.' [Blessed Hermann Joseph of Steinfeld.] (February, 1921.)—'The Ancient Rite of Candlemas.' [Goes back to the fourth century.] **J. Simon**, 'The Canticle of Mary.' [A commentary on the *Magnificat*.] **J. A. O'Brien**, 'The Priest, the School, and Modern Pedagogy.' [The teaching-methods that have been found effective in the public schools should be adopted by Catholic teachers also. Practical suggestions.] **M. V. Kelly**, 'Languages in Preparatory Seminaries.' [An uncompromising attack on the

'classical' curriculum: modern languages, English especially, and grammar-study recommended instead.] **J. C. Conroy**, 'Father Coffey at Mingo.' [The methods and success of an American parish-priest.] *Analecta. Studies and Conferences. Ecclesiastical Library Table. Criticism and Notes. Literary Chat. Books Received.*

THE HOMILETIC AND PASTORAL REVIEW. (December, 1920.)—**J. H. Healy**, 'The Need of Missions to Parishes.' [Reasons of success and failure. The writer thinks a yearly mission in city parishes, a triennial one in country districts, sufficient.] **S. Weywood**, 'The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass in the New Code.' [Commentary on canons 801-6.] **W. Drum**, 'Leading Ideas in John and the Synoptics.' [The difference in the treatment of 'eternal life' is less than some commentators have supposed.] **J. Husslein**, 'Outlines on Capital and Labour—III.' [The class struggle, the right to strike, and Christian peace.] **F. J. Kelly**, 'Christmas Carols in the Catholic Church.' [The practice is of Catholic origin and ought to be encouraged.] (January, 1921.)—**A. Rung**, 'St. Paul the Priest.' [Short article suggested by Fr. Cohausz' recent book.] **W. Drum**, 'The Encyclical of Pope Benedict XV on the Fifteenth Centenary of St. Jerome.' [A useful and satisfactory summary.] **J. Husslein**, 'Outlines on Capital and Labour—IV.' [The position of the woman-worker.] **S. Weywood**, 'Summary of Roman Documents' (Nov., 1919—Nov., 1920). [Synopsis and short explanation.] *Answers to Questions. Sermons for the period. Book Reviews.*

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*Imprimatur*

*Nihil Obstat:*

MICHAEL HICKEY, S.T.D., Censor Theol. Deput.

*Imprimi Potest:*

✠ GULIELMUS,

Archiep. Dublinen, Hiberniae Primas.

Dublino, die 31<sup>o</sup> Martii, 1921.



3



## Interest and Unearned Income.

BY REV. P. COFFEY, Ph. D., Maynooth College.

See Canon 1543 (New Code).

While it is generally admitted that the Capitalist system of producing and distributing the output of human industry has worked out very inequitably in practice, all remedial proposals which would go deep enough to promise permanent amelioration are liable to be regarded with suspicion and alarm. For even though their ultimate aim be the more widespread diffusion of moderate ownership, advocated by all Catholic writers on economics, they can be put into practice only by interfering more or less either with capital-ownership itself, or with the unearned income appropriated on the mere title of such ownership in the form of rents, royalties, dividends or interest. People take alarm nowadays at the bare suggestion of the lawfulness of such interference because, owing to the unconscious influence of a couple of hundred years' capitalism on our economic outlook and conceptions, the views which prevail nowadays even among catholics, in regard both to capital-ownership and to unearned income accruing from industrial credit, deviate very widely from the traditional Christian attitude and Catholic teaching on these institutions. And it is all the more unfortunate that this deviation is mostly unconscious: for when catholics criticize and condemn positive proposals of reconstruction by applying to these the current capitalistic conceptions of 'ownership' and its 'rights,' they think they are making use of orthodox and unquestionable standards and tests of economic morality. It is therefore desirable to get rid of this capitalist accretion by glancing at the current of Catholic tradition on such topics as 'interest' and 'ownership' at a time when it was as yet unclouded by the impurities of Capitalism. The task of restating these traditional Catholic conceptions demands a good deal of labour and study.



The brief observations we propose to make in these pages on the subject of Interest are meant to be merely more or less helpful suggestions towards the formulation of that much-needed restatement.

The notion of Usury is as familiar nowadays as the practice itself has ever been held to be odious—the charging of an exorbitant rate of interest<sup>1</sup> for money lent. Few, however, even among conscientious Catholics have any scruple of conscience nowadays at taking, for money lent, the current commercial rate of interest, i.e. the average rate which capital in the present system is able to command. Such a rate is apparently considered not ‘exorbitant,’ i.e. not such as to constitute the transaction ‘usurious’ in the sense in which usury is still understood to be reprobated as immoral by the Catholic Church. There is reason for doubting whether the criterion used is a morally safe one; nor do we believe that the conscience of Catholic capitalists, investors and money lenders, would be quite so tranquil if they really understood the traditional attitude and teaching of the Church on the matter. The history of the Church’s teaching on the morality of money-lending is in reality among the brightest and noblest pages in all her annals. In that story she stands forth, down through the centuries, as the guardian and champion of the defenceless poor against the greed and rapacity of the powerful rich. And yet her attitude is commonly misunderstood, and misrepresented as inconsistent and vacillating. There are reasons for this misunderstanding; but even her bitterest enemies cannot deny that one motive stands out clearly as the driving force which ever prompted and sustained her in her age-long opposition to usury,—the motive of solicitude and concern for the oppressed and helpless masses. It is true indeed that she fought a losing fight: but it is certainly not true to say that when, after eighteen centuries, she began to give the provisional disciplinary direction that Catholics who lent money at the current legal rates of interest were not to be troubled in conscience—“non esse

<sup>1</sup> The observations we have to make on interest apply substantially to *rents and royalties*; also to such *profits* as are claimed on the title of *ownership* (as distinct from the portion claimed for the owner’s services), e.g. *dividends* on ordinary shares in industrial, commercial or trading concerns; while dividends on debenture and preference shares come nearer still to the notion of interest taken on money lent.

inquietandos,"—she thereby changed her teaching and implicitly admitted the moral lawfulness of a practice which she had been denouncing as immoral for centuries.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, she has never revoked her traditional teaching on the necessity of "extrinsic titles" to justify the taking of interest on a money loan; nor has she ever given a definitive verdict on the sufficiency of the title of "civil law" or State sanction as furnishing adequate moral justification for the prevailing practice. She is therefore quite free to examine the whole credit system of Capitalism at any time, to examine it in its actual working and in the light of the principles of natural equity. And it is not only possible but probable that were she to do so the owning classes would be made to realise—what they have so utterly lost sight of—that the credit power which they have annexed to ownership does not belong there by the nature of things, but is a distinct and separable social trust, which they have so maladministered by appropriating it to their own class-interest that it might prove desirable and necessary to seek a means of restoring it to the working masses who have been so long deprived of their natural right to its advantages.

The story of the Church's traditional teaching on usury is naturally as intricate as the ever-changing economic conditions to which she has been obliged to apply it. The principles propounded by her theologians and moralists on the subject of money loans, down through the Middle Ages and into the Capitalist epoch, are highly interesting and illuminative when studied with a right understanding of their historical and economic context.<sup>3</sup> But they have often been taken out of their context, and consequently misrepresented. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to fix attention on a few special and suggestive aspects of the whole traditional treatment of the usury question.

The main drift of this teaching has been that money is not productive wealth, not capital, not a *res fructifera* that rather it is like consumer's wealth, a thing whose *use* cannot be separated from *itself*, from its *substance*, a thing which (like a loaf of bread) is consumed by use,

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Cleary, *The Church and Usury* (Gill and Son, 1914), pp. 174-7.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. George O'Brien, *An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching* (Longmans).

'*primo usu consumptibilis*'; that therefore a sum of money lent is repaid in full by the return of an equal sum: that he who demands, over and above, an additional sum in payment for the use of the money is selling the same thing twice over (which is unjust), inasmuch as the use of the money is inseparable and indistinguishable from the money itself; that therefore the exaction of such additional sum can be morally justified only on some other ground or title *extrinsic* to the loan. The existence and sufficiency of such extrinsic titles furnished a fertile theme for controversy down through the centuries: gain foregone ('*lucrum cessans*') or loss sustained ('*damnum emergens*') by the lender; compensation for risk incurred by him ('*periculum sortis*'); conventional fine for postponement of repayment beyond a stipulated date ('*poena conventionalis*'); and, later, the title of the 'civil law' ('*lex civilis*') sanctioning the usage of exacting a certain rate of interest. From all of which controversy a few interesting and suggestive points emerge.

What appears most strange to the modern mind is the contention that money cannot be regarded as productive wealth; that its sole use consists in the exchange process whereby ownership of itself is transferred in return for some presumably equal value. The owner of £100 in cash could if he wished buy £100 worth of productive wealth or capital; and, having done so, could either work this capital himself or loan it to another to work with, on condition of receiving from the latter (say) £5 a year out of the product, as remuneration for the use of the capital as long as this was retained for use by the borrower, and of having the capital itself returned finally as well. For the lawfulness of the transaction by which an owner of *productive wealth* charged a reasonable sum, *on the title of ownership*, for the use of his *productive wealth* by the borrower who exploited it, was always admitted in principle by Catholic writers on economics, and was never seriously called into question by them. But you can only let or loan, and charge a sum for the temporary use of, a thing which is not consumed or destroyed in the use of it. Money is not such a thing. You cannot use it and retain the ownership of it, or—what is the same thing—hire its use for a separate and additional sum, retaining ownership of the principal itself.

For its only use is to pass in exchange for a presumably equivalent value (in either productive or consumer's wealth), and in this transaction ownership of the money itself necessarily passes. From this the inference was drawn that a 'loan' of money is necessarily different from a loan of really productive wealth; that in fact *a loan of money is necessarily a sale transaction*, in which ownership is transferred, and in which the price to be paid in return must, if it is to be a 'just price,' be an exactly equivalent sum and no more; while in a true loan—of really productive wealth—*ownership is not transferred*, and a price may be justly charged for the 'use' which the borrower enjoys and which does not destroy or lessen the value of the capital lent.<sup>4</sup>

The owner of £100 may therefore lawfully buy £100 worth of capital (land, raw material, machinery, etc.) and, retaining the ownership of this capital, hire its use to another for say £5 a year, thus realising £105 in value at the end of the year; but he may not lawfully 'loan' the £100 cash to the other to be returned at the end of the year with £5 additional for the 'use' which the latter will only 'use' the borrower can make of the money is, by transferring the ownership of it (which must have already passed to him from the lender) to some third party in exchange for £100 worth either of consumer's wealth (which has no use separable from its consumption) or of productive wealth, through the exploitation of which by his labour he may realise perhaps £105 or £120 or £150 worth of value at the end of the year; in which case the increase is exclusively his own because both the capital and the labour were his own,<sup>5</sup> whereas the lender is entitled only to the exact equivalent of the original sum 'lent'—£100—which, being merely money, had only the exchange use inseparable from itself, and did not and could not 'fractify.' Of course the original owner was not morally bound to 'lend' his money at all (or, let us at all events assume that he was not), but if he did choose to 'lend' it, he could not

<sup>4</sup> If the capital does deteriorate by use, it is understood that a second and distinct additional charge may be justly made to cover such 'deterioration of plant.'

<sup>5</sup> The maxim, '*res fructificat domino*,' was sometimes invoked in this connexion.

'*primo usu consumptibilis*'; that therefore a sum of money lent is repaid in full by the return of an equal sum: that he who demands, over and above, an additional sum in payment for the use of the money is selling the same thing twice over (which is unjust), inasmuch as the use of the money is inseparable and indistinguishable from the money itself; that therefore the exaction of such additional sum can be morally justified only on some other ground or title *extrinsic* to the loan. The existence and sufficiency of such extrinsic titles furnished a fertile theme for controversy down through the centuries: gain foregone ('*lucrum cessans*') or loss sustained ('*damnum emergens*') by the lender; compensation for risk incurred by him ('*periculum sortis*'); conventional fine for postponement of repayment beyond a stipulated date ('*poena conventionalis*'); and, later, the title of the 'civil law' ('*lex civilis*') sanctioning the usage of exacting a certain rate of interest. From all of which controversy a few interesting and suggestive points emerge.

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justly demand in repayment, over and above its 'just price' or 'exact equivalent' (£100), an additional sum *for the 'use' of it*. He might lawfully demand something additional on extrinsic titles if such could be shown to exist; but that is another matter.

Now there is much in all this that seems very paradoxical to the modern mind. The business man of the present day will say offhand that the exact equivalent or just price *receivable a year hence for capital of the present value of £100* is really £105 or £108 (or whatever the current rate of industrial credit indicates); and that inasmuch as £100 cash can buy capital of the present value of £100, the cash too, no less than the capital purchasable by it, has as its just price or exact equivalent £105 or £108 payable a year hence. Now we may admit the asserted equivalence of cash to capital; we may admit too, that the business man is giving expression to the universally prevailing belief and practice; but his assertion as to the justice of the transaction, though very natural, is based upon a huge and very questionable assumption. Let us review the matter a little.

The main reason why the mediaeval moralists treated money as non-productive or consumers' wealth was probably because it is *primarily* a measure of the value of the consumer's wealth; because it was used in their days mainly in exchange for consumers' wealth; and because the value of capital, to be measurable in terms of money, must first be translated itself into terms of the consumers' wealth which *time and labour* can produce through its instrumentality. It is commonly thought that according as money came to be more and more extensively used in exchange for productive wealth—with the gradual growth of the world's industry, commerce, and trade—Catholic moralists began to see and to admit that it was just as lawful for the *owner of money* to charge the borrower of money a price for using it to purchase capital for exploitation by his labour, as it was for the *owner of capital* to charge the borrower of capital a price for the privilege of using it. And so they have come to admit that the charging of interest on *money* lent is in practice morally on all fours with drawing rents, royalties, or dividends from mere ownership of *capital* by charging a levy on the output pro-

duced by those who are allowed by the capitalist to exploit his capital. But the reason for this admission is because they consider that nowadays some or all of the *extrinsic* titles for interest may be presumed to be always forthcoming. And indeed it is hard to conceive a case in which they would *all* be absent. It is commonly assumed that when a man 'lends' money to another, to be repaid at some stipulated future date, the lender runs a *greater risk* of losing it,—of never getting repaid owing to ordinary trade risks, to danger of the borrower's financial failure, incapacity, dishonesty, etc.,—than if he declined to 'lend,' and kept the money *idle* in his own possession. If this assumption is universally true, and if it be also assumed that the lender is entitled to some reasonable financial remuneration for running this risk (in doing a thing which it is likewise assumed that he is not morally bound to do), then the extrinsic title, '*periculum sortis*,' is always present. If the money perishes in the hands of the borrower, i.e. while he owns it, he as owner of it, must bear the loss; similarly if the capital he purchases in exchange for it perishes with him, he as owner of the capital must bear the loss; for in either case he is bound to repay the original lender the sum lent. But he may not be able, or may for some reason or other fail to do so. Therein lies the lender's risk: for exposing himself to which he may claim a reasonable remuneration.<sup>6</sup>

We may therefore infer that if the mediaeval schoolmen contemplated industrial and commercial conditions such as prevail in modern times when money is extensively used

<sup>6</sup> At the same time the borrower's risk is in a way greater than the lender's. For the productive wealth or capital which the borrower purchases for the borrowed money, and which he exploits by his labour, is subject to all the commercial and industrial risks which the money, if it lay unborrowed, would escape. And if the borrower's capital is really lost in the venture, he has to repay out of his remaining property, to the lender, both the capital and the price of the lender's risk. Now if the borrower must bear the loss according to the maxim *res perit domino*—"a thing perishes for its owner,"—it is only equitable that he too should have the gain, according to the maxim *res fructificat domino*—"a thing fructifies for its owner." Hence to those who objected that, money being equivalently a *res fructifera*, the money-lender is entitled to the "fruit" of the money lent, the Schoolmen rightly replied that even if it were equivalently a *res fructifera* (which they denied) it is *the borrower rather than the lender* who should enjoy the fruit: for the lender had *lost ownership* of the money, and the borrower had, by using the money to purchase capital (thereby also losing ownership of it) acquired ownership of the *equivalent thing* which really "fructified," i.e., the capital which the borrower owned.

to purchase *productive wealth* or *capital*, and when the individual possessed of it may always so employ it, they would recognise it as universally lawful for the money-lender or investor to receive, control and administer *SOME additional value* or *unearned income* in the form of interest, just as they always recognised that the owner of really productive wealth or capital (land, mines, raw material, factories, etc.), could lawfully receive and control and administer *SOME* of the output of the industrial process, as *unearned income* in the form of rents, royalties or dividends. But in the first place would they thereby recognise the lawfulness of exacting the 'current rate' of interest which the capitalist system is able to exact? By no means; any more than they would recognise the lawfulness of the levies of unearned income which this system is able to extort from the output of industry in the form of rents royalties and dividends. We shall seek presently to indicate some principles by which they would endeavour to determine the proportion of this output which might be allowed to pass in both cases alike into the hands of the owners or investors as unearned income on the title of mere capital-ownership. In the second place,—and this is a vastly more important question,—whatever the magnitude of the unearned income, or its proportion to the total output of industry, would they admit that this income, on passing into the hands of the private 'owners' or 'investors,' thereby became their 'private property' to consume or use exclusively for their own benefit and interest, irrespective of any needs or claim of the rest of the community,—in other words, their 'private property,' in the modern sense of the expression? Again, by no means: but this time even *quite the contrary*. For, according to their teaching, which is the genuine traditional Catholic teaching, the 'unearned income' which remains in the hands of the owner or investor—after due provision has been made for the continuance of industry on a scale which will secure adequate output to meet the ordinary needs of the whole community—is not 'his own' at all in the sense of his having a moral right to consume or use it as he pleases, but is by *moral right available for the satisfaction of the natural human needs of the whole community*, and is only 'his own' in the very definite sense of being

entrusted to him to be equitably shared among such others, besides himself, as may be in real need. How profoundly different this the Catholic view of 'ownership' is from the commonly prevailing view of 'ownership,' whether of capital or of consumer's wealth, needs no elaboration.<sup>7</sup> But it is equally undeniable that they did in fact defend as morally justifiable the capital-owner's claim to some unearned income in the form of rent or royalties or dividends, and that they would adopt the same attitude towards unearned income in the form of interest in modern conditions. If we ask why did they, or how could they, defend the individual's claim to *any* unearned income as morally justifiable, we must not lose sight of these other points in their teaching: (1) It is desirable that many should be exempt from the necessity of labouring in the production or distribution of consumers' wealth so as to be free to engage in socially useful services; and unearned income on the title of ownership enables men to do this. (2) Men have natural obligations, prior to all claims of the community upon them, to provide for the support of those who are naturally dependent on them and unable to support themselves, such as children, aged parents, invalid relatives: unearned income enables them to discharge this obligation. And (3) anyhow the individuals into whose hands this unearned income passes *are not its absolute owners* in the sense of their having a moral right to do what they like with it: on the contrary, it is part of the common fund available by moral right for the satisfaction of the needs of all, a part which society has given them in trust to distribute equitably for the fulfilment of this fundamental purpose of all material goods. If we bear these points in mind we can hardly deny that the economic arrangement which allows private individuals to control and distribute for the common good a *certain amount* of the total output of industry, as unearned income from the capital which they 'owned' or 'held in trust' to be exploited by the labour of others, is morally defensible just precisely because and in so far as experience proves it to be a 'good' economic arrangement. This is the final test for the lawfulness of unearned income, just as it is for the lawfulness

<sup>7</sup> cf. S. Thomas's Theory of Property, by Professor A. O'Rahilly, in *Studies*, Vol. IX., No. 25 (September, 1920).

of capital-ownership. And if this test condemns the monopoly of capital-ownership by a small class, it may also condemn an analogous abuse of the power of levying unearned income. To allow *some* unearned income to owners of capital may be conducive to the realisation of the fundamental purpose for which men have access to the sources of human sustenance, namely, the securing an adequate output and equitable distribution of the necessities of life, and may therefore be wise and morally justifiable. To allow ten times as much, or twice as much, may prove subversive of that fundamental purpose, and may therefore be wrong and morally indefensible.<sup>8</sup> In the capitalist system owners have been able to extort far too great a proportion of the output of industry as unearned income; and what is worse, they have practically repudiated the Christian and Catholic view of what 'ownership' means in regard to income no less than in regard to capital, and have substituted therefor the essentially pagan notion of ownership as meaning the *might* (which they prefer to dignify with the title of 'right') to use both the world's sources of wealth and the labour-energy of their fellow-men for their own sole use and benefit.

Since there is no prospect of their voluntarily discontinuing this abuse of economic power, the amount of it which they have actually in their hands must be gradually and progressively curtailed. Yet not to such a degree nor in such a manner that men generally would neglect to conserve and even to increase the artificial capital (machinery, plant, factories, means of transport, etc.), required to secure a continuous and adequate output of the necessities of life. We are constantly reminded by capitalists that any attempt on the part of the State to limit compulsorily the current rates of interest or other forms of unearned income would 'frighten away' capital from industry, would lead to the dissipation of savings which at present go to the conservation and extension of capital, and would thus precipitate a disastrous industrial crisis. But they forget or ignore some very pertinent considerations. One is that if they (capitalists) had less to save and apply

<sup>8</sup> In his book on *Distributive Justice*, Dr. J. A. Ryan discusses the possible economic consequences of reducing the legal rate of interest gradually to two per cent. or even less (sect. II., ch. 13).

to 'capital,' the labouring masses would have more to save from their larger share of the output. Another is that those masses, according as they become moderate owners (individually, or in co-operative groups) would be no less keen to preserve and extend the capital on which their output depended than the present 'lords of industry' are. Yet another is that in the present system proletarian labour, because it is discontented, is terribly inefficient; whereas if it were given the opportunity, the dignity, and the responsibility of ownership, control and direction of its industry, it would not only become steady and self-reliant and efficient, but would quickly realise that its own best interests would be served by intelligent outlay of its savings upon capital. Nothing could be more fatal to any reasonable prospect of improving industrial output and distribution than the absolute indifference of the labouring masses to the effect of their immediate policy (of "higher wage, less labour, and shorter hours") on economic output—an indifference necessarily bred by the Capitalist system which has excluded labour from any voice in the control of industrial policy. Only when the working masses see plainly that the better use they make of capital the more they will have in ultimate products as the reward of their industry, will they settle down to work contentedly and efficiently, and that will never be except in the measure in which they become owners as well as exploiters of capital. If the unearned income of the sleeping partner be lessened, a way will be cleared for this much needed transformation. Finally capitalists forget that decrease of unearned income will not deprive industry of the best brains and ability which the community can command. All the intellectual energy which is being *usefully* applied to industry in the present system will continue to have its reward no matter what happens to unearned income. And what is more, an immense amount of the talent which the present system has prostituted to the parasitic and anti-social occupations of stock-exchange gambling and speculation, of cornering markets, floating bubble companies and perpetrating financial frauds on a gigantic scale, will be largely deprived of its present uncontrolled field of operation, and will be probably diverted into less ignoble and more useful channels.



The purpose of these remarks is merely to show that serious proposals for gradual legislative restriction of interest and other forms of unearned income are both ethically sound and economically desirable. The fact that such proposals run counter to our capitalist outlook on the process of wealth-production does not prove them to be far-fetched or fanciful. The theory of the principles underlying such proposals has often been discussed by Catholic writers.<sup>9</sup> The mode of their application in detail is rather a question for statesmen and economists. These, however, are unlikely to introduce any such proposals into the domain of practical politics until the public have been familiarised with them by persistent propaganda and discussion. For this reason studies like those of Major Douglas on *Economic Democracy*, and on *Credit Power and Democracy*,<sup>10</sup> in the "New Age," should prove as helpful as they are original and suggestive: while readers of the IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY will have had ample room for reflection in a series of suggestions which appeared in Vol. XV., No. 59 (July, 1920, pp. 256-60) of this magazine, and which, being mere skeleton outlines, call for further development and amplification.

P. COFFEY.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. RYAN, *Distributive Justice*, Sect. II., ch. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Reprinted in separate volumes. London: Cecil Palmer, Oakley House, Bloomsbury Square, London, W.C.1.

## The Origin of Civil Authority.

A REPLY TO FR. MASTERSON.

In an article for the January number of the *IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY*, I reviewed certain opinions put forward by Prof. O'Rahilly of Cork, on the subjects of Tyranny and Usurpation. My purpose in doing so was to establish, in opposition to an extreme and exaggerated form of the old Suarezian doctrine, certain principles which I consider necessary for the stability of Civil Government. My main theses were, (a) that the people could not at will validly overthrow an existing government, (b) that, even where the government was tyrannical, they could not by a mere formal repudiation destroy its title to legitimacy, (c) that a government, which began in usurpation might through long possession by prescription (and *à fortiori* by the pacific adherence of the community), acquire a legitimate title. However, in the course of my article I had occasion to consider the whole Suarezian doctrine of consent in the light of certain pronouncements made by Popes Leo XIII. and Pius X., and my conclusion, expressed in the words of the late Archbishop of Tuam, was that the opinion of Suarez could no longer be maintained amongst theologians with any degree of probability. In the April number of the *IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY*, Fr. Masterson contests this conclusion, but in doing so, he assigns to me positions which I never held and assertions which I never made. Throughout he assumes, and wishes his readers to assume (for he puts the word 'condemned' in quotation marks) that I declared Suarez to be condemned. Now, there is not one word or phrase in my article which could justify such an assumption. My position was and still is that the teaching of the Popes on the origin of Civil Authority is in sharp conflict with that of Suarez; in fact, that Leo XIII., writing, not only with the opinion, but with the very language of Suarez before his mind, flatly contradicts Suarez. Positive or explicit condemnation there is none. This is not the only misinterpretation of which I might

justly complain, but to avoid the appearance of wrangling I will pass others by without comment.

Freed, then, from all side issues, the fundamental question remains—Is it true that the Suarezian System cannot be reconciled with the teaching of the Popes? For many *a priori* reasons Fr. Masterson thinks it impossible that the Popes should have rejected it, and consequently he affirms dogmatically that the repudiated doctrines are those of Rousseau, and bear no essential resemblance to the teaching of Suarez. Having summarized that teaching he adds—“Would Dr. Fitzpatrick point in what one particular it resembles the teaching condemned by Leo XIII. and Pius X.” In answer to this challenge I cannot do better than set out in order the teachings of Rousseau, Suarez and the Popes.

(a) Rousseau as explained by Leo XIII.

“They who would have it that the State springs from the free consent of men, seek the origin of the supreme authority itself in the same cause. They say that each one yields up something of his right, and that each and all voluntarily place themselves in the power of him in whom the sum total of such rights has vested.”

“Civil power is nothing but the will of the people, and the people, being under the power of itself alone, is its own sole ruler. It does indeed select those to whom it shall commit itself, but in such a way that it makes over to them rather the duty than the right of ruling—to be exercised, however, in its name. The divine overlordship is passed by in silence, as if God were non-existent or had no care for human society, or as if men, whether singly or in the state, owed nothing to God, or as if any government could be thought of whose whole origin, power and authority did not reside in God himself. On such a theory, as is evident, the state is nothing more than a multitude master and ruler of itself.” (*Ency. : ‘Immortale Dei.’*) . . .

(b) Suarez :

“It follows from what we have said that civil power, when it is found in one man or prince, by legitimate and ordinary right, has emanated from the people and the community, nor can it be obtained otherwise if

just . . . . . from the nature of things this power is in the community. Therefore, that it may justly begin to exist in any other person as in a supreme ruler, it must be handed over to him by the consent of the community." (De legibus III. 4.2.)

"God is said to give this power mediately to kings because he gives it immediately to the people who transfer it to the king." (Def. III. 2.12.)

"It is impossible to understand that power should be granted immediately by God through the medium of generation, election, or similar human designation, except where the succession is of divine positive institution. Now kingly power is not of divine positive institution, but draws its origin from natural law through the medium of free will, and therefore, of necessity it comes from man as immediately conferring it and not from man as merely designating the person. Def. III. 2.17.)

(c) Popes :—

1. "Those who rule the state may in certain cases be chosen by the will and judgment of the people, and herein Catholic doctrine offers neither dissent nor opposition, but that choice marks out the person who shall govern it does not confer on him authority to govern; it does not entrust power, it designates the person who shall be invested with power." (Leo XIII. *Diuturnum illud*).

2. Sillonist principles condemned by Pius X. :—

"Authority it is true comes from God but it resides primordially in the people and emanates from them by way of election or rather selection, yet not so as to leave the people or become independent of them; it shall be external but only in appearance, in reality it shall be internal because it shall be an authority based on consent."

"No doubt the Sillon holds that the authority which it attributes to the people descends from God, but in such a way that it remounts from below upwards, whereas in the organization of the Church it descends from above downwards."

In commenting on these quotations, let me remark in the first place that it is most unjust to accuse *le Sillon* of adopting the 'impious nonsense of Rousseau.' Rousseau was impious because he refused to recognise the supreme dominion of God and to attribute to him the origin of all power. Civil authority, according to the *Contrat Social*, did not come from God by natural or any other law, it was merely the sum total of ceded individual rights, administered in the name of the people by their nominee. On the other hand the Sillonists, though claiming that authority resided in the first instance in the people, derived its origin from God. Marc Segnier and his companions were always Catholics, as indeed the event proved.

I shall now set out point by point the resemblances between the theory of Suarez and the theories repudiated by the Popes.

*Sillonist theory condemned by Pius X. :—*

- (a) Authority it is true, comes from God but it resides primordially in the people.
- (b) It is transferred to rulers by way of election or selection; it remounts from below upwards.
- (c) It continues to reside in some sense in the people.
- (d) It shall be an authority based on consent.

*Suarez :—*

- (a) Authority comes from God by natural law. It resides primarily and immediately in the people.
- (b) It is transferred to the rulers by the people.
- (c) The people retain power radically or habitually.
- (d) Authority is given to the ruler by the consent of the community.

*Leo XIII. :—*

Quo sane delectu designatur princeps non conferuntur iura principatus.

*Suarez :—*

Potestas regia necessario est ab homine immediate conferente et non tantum personam designante.

Quid plura? The resemblances I have indicated are so very striking and concern such very essential points that they are inexplicable unless the Popes wished to set aside the Suarezian theory. It is impossible that they were

ignorant of it. It is equally impossible that, knowing it and believing it to be in harmony with Catholic philosophy, they used, without explanation, a formula of words gravely prejudicial to it. The Popes have, indeed, condemned Rousseau and demolished his impious social edifice; but I hold that simultaneously they have damaged beyond repair the whole Suarezian position.

Referring to my quotation from the late Archbishop of Tuam, Fr. Masterson complains that I omitted some sentences which declared the question to be still a free one amongst theologians. Further, with a knowledge of futurabilia to which I can lay no claim, he predicts that Dr. Healy would have drawn a different conclusion had he been as well-informed as some modern Suarezians. I did indeed presume, and I think justly, that my readers were not wholly ignorant of theology. Now anyone who has even a passing acquaintance with Gury knows that probability and improbability have reference only to free questions. What Dr. Healy would have said to-day I cannot guess; neither can I guess what Suarez would have said, had he known modern conditions and read the Papal Encyclicals.

#### OBJECTIONS.

A Latin proverb says that in face of fact argument is of no value. Apparently Fr. Masterson does not believe the proverb, for, instead of addressing himself to the quotations adduced in my first article, he raises a number of *à priori* objections tending to show that the Popes could not have contradicted Suarez. To these I shall now reply.

*1st Objection:* The only alternative to the Suarezian system is the theory of 'Neoscholastics.'<sup>1</sup> Now that theory was swaddled, rocked and dandled in heresy, for it is none other than the theory of divine right first propounded by Louis of Bavaria, and vigorously defended by the royal pedant James I.

*Reply:*—Fr. Masterson evidently understands the old maxim, 'Give a dog a bad name and hang him.' Now I believe that the dog in question is a very respectable animal, and not at all the mongrel of doubtful breeding

<sup>1</sup> The term 'Neoscholastic' is here misapplied. Properly it belongs to the Louvain school with which none of the philosophers referred to were connected.



his calumniators would make him out. To quit metaphor, the charge against the Neoscholastics is unfounded. Let us examine the question historically.

Broadly speaking, there have been four opinions on the origin of civil society. Two of them are heretical or worse, and two have been defended by Catholic writers. Of each of these four opinions there have been several variant forms, but for the present we shall confine ourselves to the broad issue.

"The old fanatics of arbitrary power dogmatised as if hereditary monarchy were the only lawful government in the world, just as our new fanatics of popular arbitrary power maintain that a popular election is the only lawful source of authority."—Commenting on these words of Burke, Fr. Rickaby adds: "We stand here between two idols of the tribe of politicians. We may call them Gog and Magog: Gog, the divine right of kings; Magog, the inalienable sovereignty of the people" (*Moral Philos.* p. 326). The worshippers of Gog had as their aim, according to Suarez, to exaggerate the temporal and diminish the spiritual power. They maintained that the King, like the Pope, received his power directly from God on a divine title and by divine positive law, that his prerogatives were all-embracing and inalienable, that, in fact, kingship was a political Popedom. The votaries of Magog, on the other hand, proclaimed the inalienable sovereignty of the people in the Rousseauvian sense which I have already explained. Catholics at all times have refused to identify themselves with either of these two sets of idolators. On the one side, they declare that political power is not the sum of ceded individual rights, but an attribute superior to them all, coming directly from the hand of God. On the other, they hold that the ruler receives power, not by divine positive law, but by natural law known to natural reason, and that he holds it, not on a divine title, but on one of human making. Differences, however, arise between them when they attempt further explanation. Suarezians say that power comes to its possessor only through the medium of the people who are its first repositories, while the 'Neoscholastics' hold that, once a just title to power exists, the power itself is given directly by God through natural law, and that, in the words of Pope Leo, though the people may

in certain cases designate the ruler they do not confer power. Thus I am as remote from the worship of Gog as Fr. Masterson is from that of Magog.

*2nd Objection:* Suarez cannot possibly be wrong, because his '*Defensio*' was undertaken at the instance of Pope Paul V., received his approbation, and met with violent hostility from James I and the regalists.

*Reply:* From this objection one might conclude that the whole '*Defensio*' of Suarez concerned the point we are now discussing, and that, therefore, the theory of Suarez had received special approbation from the Pope. The truth is that Suarez' work is a magnificent and complete refutation of the fundamental errors of Anglicanism. It consists of six books comprising 730 pages, of which only 14 pages, forming a kind of introduction to the third book, deal with the origin of civil authority. Even in these fourteen pages, the main contention is perfectly true and admitted by all Catholics. No sane man doubts that civil power comes by natural not by divine positive law, or that the title of a ruler is a thing of human invention. Only in the explanation of these ideas do we consider Suarez to have erred. Does it follow that, because a book has received a certain amount of approval from the Church, its infallibility on every point is guaranteed? No work of merely human hands has received such honour from Popes and Councils as the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, yet the Immaculate Conception which is there denied has since become an article of faith. Fr. Masterson asks me, Is Saurez a Catholic? Taking an Irishman's privilege, I ask him in turn, Is St. Thomas a heretic?

*3rd Objection:* The Suarezian theory must be in thorough harmony with the teaching of the Popes because Fr. Billot who defends Suarez was created Cardinal by Pius X.\*

*Reply:* The supposition here seems to be that no man who has made a mistake in theology or philosophy has ever been made a Cardinal. Somehow I seem to remember that Thomas de Vio was not only a Cardinal but one of the greatest theologians of his day, yet some of his opinions on Sacred Scripture were so notoriously false that they were

\* This argument derived its chief force from the assumption that I had declared Suarez to be condemned. I have already pointed out that such is not the case.

expunged from his works by order of the Pope. But, such argument apart, does Billot defend Suarez? It may surprise some of my readers to learn that instead of defending him, he explicitly rejects him. The following is a translation of the passage: "When it is said that political power comes immediately from the people, the phrase may be understood in two ways—either from the people, in the sense that they in the first instance, by force of simple natural law, possess political power itself, and then, through a kind of abdication, transfer it by donation or contract to the rulers of the state. Or, from the people, in the sense that they only constitute the law by force of which the ruling authority . . . is determined to such a form and derives to such a subject. Many theologians seem to have understood the matter in the first way." The Cardinal then quotes Suarez and adds: "According to this formula the relation of the people to their ruler would be that of one who deprives himself of what is his, and transfers its ownership to another. *This conception, however, seems to be altogether inadmissible.*" The Cardinal's reasons for rejecting Suarez are, in the main, identical with those of Meyer, Schiffini and the 'Neoscholastics.' I shall explain them under another heading. However, though I am glad to have Cardinal Billot's support against Suarez, I cannot claim him as an adherent of the 'Neoscholastics.' The natural bent of his mind impels him, when he finds opinion sharply divided, to attempt a reconciliation, to discover in some golden mean the truth of which each opinion is a one-sided exaggeration. This tendency leads him at times to conclusions which will scarcely be approved by subsequent theologians, and his teaching on some disputed questions—e.g. the casuality of the sacraments—will hardly stand the test of time.

*4th Objection:* Leo XIII says that the people may recall authority in certain cases, thus teaching the very same doctrine as Suarez.

*Reply:* This is certainly the most interesting statement made by Fr. Masterson. In support of it, he cites from the Encyclical '*Diuturnum illud*' a passage which merely asserts that subjects are not bound to obey a law which is at variance with the law of God, because no ruler can bind us to commit sin. In attempting to do so, he exceeds his

authority and perverts justice. Fr. Masterson fails to distinguish between the refusal to obey an iniquitous law and the general repudiation of a tyrannical ruler. The following passage from the Encyclical '*Quod Apostolici muneris*' will make the distinction clear.

(a) "Should it happen at any time that, in the public exercise of authority, rulers act rashly or arbitrarily, the teaching of the Catholic Church does not allow subjects to rise against them without further warrant, lest thereby peace be disturbed more and more, and society take greater hurt. And when things have come to such a pass that no other hope of safety is discernible, she teaches that a remedy must be found in the merits of Christian patience and in urgent prayer to God. But (b) if it should please legislators and rulers to enjoin or sanction anything repugnant to the divine and natural law, the dignity and duty of the name of Christian, and the Apostolic injunction proclaim that one ought to *obey God rather than men*."

*5th Objection:* The Suarezian theory was for eighteen centuries the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians of the Church. Were it false, the fact would be irreconcilable with the *vivens magisterium* of the Church.

*Reply:* This objection is the only serious one I have to consider. My opponent has overstated his case. The Fathers, as far as I can ascertain, make no reference whatsoever to the present question. Suarez<sup>2</sup> himself says that there is nothing about it in Scripture or the tradition of the Fathers, and even Fr. Masterson in another context declares that 'neither supernatural revelation nor the teaching of the Church tells us who is the first recipient of Civil Authority.' I have examined the few quotations hesitatingly made by various writers, and I find that not one of them has any bearing on the present issue. At a single blow therefore we may lop off twelve of the eighteen centuries. Professor O'Rahilly, who in general is much more accurate than Fr. Masterson, speaks of only six centuries, and to these six we must now turn our attention.

The part which the schools play in the *vivens magisterium*

<sup>2</sup> Def. III., 2, 2.

of the Church is explained exactly by Franzelin.<sup>4</sup> His conclusions are:—

1. If any doctrine is declared by the unanimous and constant teaching of the schools to belong to Catholic faith, that doctrine is of divine revelation.

2. If the truth and legitimacy of a theological conclusion is affirmed by the unanimous opinion of the schools, we cannot deny that conclusion without incurring the note of rashness and error. In this case, however, four qualifications are to be observed.

- (a) It is the truth of the conclusion, not its explanations, which must be accepted.
- (b) The doctrine must be a theological, not a merely philosophical one.
- (c) The principle is true only of settled and firm teaching, cohering with Scripture or the Fathers.
- (d) There must be a constant and general consent of theologians, a consent which has not ceased in the course of time.

Franzelin adds: "Certainly it is not repugnant that an opinion at one time general (*communis*) amongst theologians should afterwards, on a better examination of arguments and evidence, cease to be general and even grow obsolete. Such a change is in itself an argument that the previous unanimity was not settled and firm teaching, but only an opinion probable in the preceding state of the question." Franzelin gives examples from theology, and if such a case may arise in theology, *à fortiori*, it may arise in philosophy. Now the doctrine in question is a philosophic one, for its subject matter belongs to natural ethics; it concerns the explanation of a principle rather than the principal itself; it is unsupported by Scripture or the Fathers; and it has ceased in the course of time to be general amongst theologians. Therefore the *vivens magisterium* is not involved. Prof. O'Rahilly very candidly admits this. "No doubt," he says, "in matters philosophical we must not argue solely or chiefly from authority, the scholastic democratic theory does not become true because it was held by practically all Catholic philosophers and theologians for six centuries." [*Studies* March, 1921, p. 41.]

<sup>4</sup> Scripture and Tradition. Thesis XVII.

Whether all Catholic philosophers and theologians during six centuries did really hold such an opinion is not a matter of overwhelming moment, if what I have already said about the teaching of the Popes and the extent of the *vivens magisterium* be admitted. Yet it may be well to enter certain caveats. Limited opportunities have not allowed me to examine in detail the long list of Scholastic writers mentioned by Prof. O'Rahilly, but from the authors whom I have seen, I gather that the real doctrine of the Scholastics, affirmed without possibility of misunderstanding and persisting under every variety of explanation, is that in the concrete all government exists *jure humano* not *jure divino*.<sup>5</sup> It is this principle which Suarez calls the '*egregium theologiae axioma*.' Fr. Masterson, however (p. 103) confuses the principle itself with an explanation of it which only became really widespread during the decline of Scholasticism from the sixteenth century onwards. Two circumstances probably conditioned the acceptance of this explanation. The jurists had taken over the whole body of Roman law as the basis of their own system. Now the theory of the Roman empire founded on the political necessities of Augustus, was that the Emperor received his power from the people. The theory was a transparent fiction, but it was duly set down in the Codex of Justinian, whence the 'pagan bantling' passed into the guardianship of the jurists and was baptized into the services of the Church.<sup>6</sup> It remained practically unnoticed and uncriticised until the exigencies of a later time called it into prominence. The constant practice of Regalists and Reformers was to exaggerate the authority of temporal princes until their position became as sacrosanct as that of the Pope. On the other hand, Catholic writers, in order to defend the pre-eminent rights of the Supreme Pontiff, depreciated the temporal ruler and over-emphasised his dependence on the people. The advent of Rousseau and the Revolution corrected this second exaggeration.

<sup>5</sup> The assertion that St. Thomas supports Suarez arises from a superficial reading of the text. A reference to Cajetan's commentary would have corrected the error.

<sup>6</sup> Thus the idea of *jus gentium* has been taken over from Roman Law and retained, although it has been the parent of much confusion between human positive law and the secondary precepts of Natural Law.



*6th Objection:* In a philosophic matter the final court of appeal is reason, and reason is on the side of Suarez. His opinion, therefore, cannot have been rejected by the Popes.

*Reply:* When I said in my first article that the arguments of Suarez had been riddled, I was not using the language of hyperbole, but merely stating a plain fact. A complete exposition of the whole case would take too long, but perhaps I may be permitted to explain and criticise as briefly as I can the argument of Suarez (for in reality he has only one), adding some of the common objections to his system.

Civil power, it is argued, exists by natural law in the state, but it does not immediately and by natural law, exist in any individual or group of individuals. Therefore it exists immediately and by natural law in the people as a whole.

The argument really begs the question, but perhaps it is better to answer formally. (a) Civil power exists by natural law in the state—as soon as the state is perfectly constituted and furnished with the organs essential to the actual functioning of the state—*Concedo*. Prior to such perfect constitution—*Nego*. (b) Civil power does not exist immediately in any determinate individual—considered apart from or prior to his possessing the position of ruler—*Concedo*. Considered as possessing the position of ruler—*Nego*. Suarez wishes to prove that power resides naturally and immediately in the people, and in order to do so, he assumes that civil authority exists before any determinate government exists. Thereby he assumes the whole question at issue.

Perhaps, however, some proof is meant to be conveyed in the distinction which he makes between the community as a mass of individuals and the community as united by its consent to form a state. The argument would read as follows: 'Civil authority exists in every fully constituted state, but once the people consent to form a state, the state is fully constituted.' Here the minor premiss is manifestly false. Civil authority begins to exist when there is a subject capable of exercising it, and there is no such subject until there is a definite ruling power. Nature does not do things without a purpose, and authority in a subject which of its own nature cannot use it, is purposeless. Now Suarezians themselves admit that the people, at that stage of their

development when according to Suarez' theory power comes to them, are incapable of using the power, and this confession of itself refutes the argument.<sup>7</sup> "It is difficult," says Billot, "to understand that by natural law a power should exist which as a general rule cannot be used."

In addition to this argument Suarez uses certain analogies to confirm his theory, but analogies at best explain, they do not prove. Fr. Masterson, in his "intelligible explanation" of the Scholastic teaching, takes over these analogies, but so little does he understand them that in one instance (p. 110) he applies the illustration to the wrong matter in such a way as to refute himself.

There are many objections which to me seem fatal to the whole position of Suarez. They can be found in Schiffrini, Meyer or other such authors. I subjoin two of them here, using in the first case the words of Cardinal Billot, and in the second those of Fr. Rickaby:

(a) "This conception," says Billot, "destroys the principles on which the whole present doctrine is founded. The foundation of this doctrine is that natural law does not determine any form of government in particular, or give power to govern to any determinate subject. Hence it follows immediately that human institution is always necessary as proximate determining cause both of the constitution and the subject of authority. But if you say that the power which is transferred to princes or magistrates is in the people primarily and immediately by force of natural law, you destroy the principle and construct for yourself an arbitrary system, for, by that fact, the democratic form is the primary and natural form directly instituted by God in every civil society." (*De Ecclesia* pp. 501-2.)

In short, the divine right of Demos can no more be defended than the divine right of kings. Indeed, it seems that Suarez' state is like Gonzalo's—"The latter end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning."

(b) "Suarez," says Fr. Rickaby, "speaks as though the getting together of a people and consequent development

<sup>7</sup> To avoid this difficulty, Prof. O'Rahilly would divide the world into small direct democracies. His ideal seems to be a non-imperial Athens where the local Cleon could offer the incense of flattery to divine Demos in some unhallowed Pnyx.

of authority, was the work of an instant. . . . Again, in the sentence 'by the mere fact of men being gathered together into the body of one commonwealth, authority results in that commonwealth without the intervention of any created will,' hardly enough is made of the truth, which the writer well knew, that men are not gathered together into the organic unity of a commonwealth without the intervention of some very determined human will or wills; and that the will which gathers and organises is apt to rule. . . . As Aristotle shows, societies frequently start from great inequality of their constituent members, one order, or house, or individual being preponderant above the rest, and engrossing the nascent political power whether the rest will have it so or not. This leads Suarez himself to admit that in certain cases 'the royal power and the perfect community may have sprung into existence together.' In such cases civil authority never rested with the whole people; and instead of the people making the king, the king made the people, much as the queen bee makes the swarm." (*Political Essays* p. 109-111).

Fr. Masterson, in his zeal for reason, objects to arguments from history. Aristotle, on the contrary, thought that "the best system of examination will be to begin at the beginning and observe things in their growth."\* Father Rickaby believes in the Aristotelian method.

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#### PRESCRIPTION.

Dealing with the question of prescription in my former article, I used the words, "Suarez, therefore, admits prescription and without the support of his great authority, other names carry little weight." On this sentence Fr. Masterson makes two comments—(a) That Suarez is only one member of the theological hierarchy whose opinion does not cease to be *communis* by his defection. (b) That Suarez admits prescription only when it is united with the consent of the people; and that, in order to read my own meaning into the text quoted, I omitted an all-important sentence at the end.

\* Politics, Bk. I., Ch. 2.

*Reply*: One of these comments is misleading and the other is untrue. In the first place, there is no question of the 'theological hierarchy.' Very few theologians of note discuss prescription at all, and of these few by far the greatest is Suarez. If, then, Suarez admits prescription—and he is not alone in admitting it—there is, to say the least, no *sententia communis* against it. With regard to the second comment, I fear Fr. Masterson has read the text very hastily. Suarez begins the paragraph thus: "*Besides this voluntary method*, provinces and free peoples are often subjected to kings *involuntarily* by war, and this may happen either justly or unjustly." Surely the word '*involuntarily*' excludes consent. Again in the sentence where he speaks of prescription he says, "In the course of time it happens that the people give their free consent or that supreme power is got by the successors through bona fide prescription." If prescription here implies consent, I cannot see how we are to explain the disjunctive. But, it will be objected, an all-important sentence has been omitted at the end: "*atque ita semper potestas haec aliquo humano titulo seu per voluntatem humanam immediate obtinetur.*" Fr. Masterson did not translate the sentence, and I fear he has not quite caught its drift. The words mean—"Thus this power is always obtained immediately on some human title, or through the agency of human will." The significance of the sentence becomes clear in the light of what I have already said about the divine right of kings. It merely asserts that every title to power is a human title, the result of human acts; and on that point all Catholics are agreed. I omitted the words deliberately because they had no bearing on the present question.

Referring to my citations from Pope Leo XIII, Father Masterson says that I confuse obligation to obey a usurper in a given case with the legitimation of the usurper. Were I to refute singly every gratuitous assertion of this kind made by my opponent, I should exceed all due limits. Therefore I will content myself with denying categorically any such confusion. Fr. Masterson can hardly have examined the passage (pp. 13-14) in which I sum up the Pope's statements on the position of new governments.

To conclude, then, the Popes declare that authority does not depend on the consent of the people, that it does not

rest primordially with the people who afterwards transfer it to rulers, that the people, though they may designate the ruler do not thereby confer power. Rousseau undoubtedly asserts the contradictory of all this. So too does Suarez, and the Popes give no indication that the Suarezian sense of the words is any more acceptable than the Rousseauvian.<sup>9</sup> Nay more, the Sillonist doctrine condemned by Pius X is not that of Rousseau at all, but in every essential feature it is practically identical with the opinion of Suarez. That opinion, therefore, though still free from any censure, is no longer supported by authority. At no time did it rest on really sound arguments. Consequently, I must adhere to my original conclusion that it cannot be defended with any degree of probability.<sup>10</sup>

JOHN FITZPATRICK.

<sup>9</sup> In the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. it is the paragraph beginning 'Interest autem attendere' which militates against Suarez. The sentence 'Immo recentiores perplures,' etc., is directed solely against Rousseau and his followers. I quoted it in my first article in order to point out that Prof. O'Rahilly was sailing too close to the reefs of condemned doctrine.

<sup>10</sup> The principle of self-determination should not be confused with the opinion of Suarez. Even when a nation has 'determined' itself, we may ask the question—Did power come from the people or did it first begin to exist when a definite ruling power was established?

## The Church and the Sacraments.

THE Council of Trent has defined<sup>1</sup> that all the Sacraments of the New Law were instituted by Christ: "Si quis dixerit sacramenta novae legis non fuisse omnia a Jesu Christo Domino nostro instituta, aut esse plura vel pauciora quam septem. . . . A.S." Only the fact, not the manner of divine institution is defined; hence we need not be surprised to find considerable diversity of opinion among theologians as to how far Christ definitely determined the sacramental sign in the various sacraments. Some teach that while Christ instituted the spiritual effect in every case, He allowed the apostles, in at least some of the sacraments, a certain amount of discretion in choosing an appropriate rite, and constituting it the sacramental sign. Others maintain that Christ not only instituted the spiritual effect, but determined the precise rite to be used as a sacramental sign in each case. That He determined the matter of the sacraments of baptism and the blessed Eucharist in this manner is now admitted by all Catholic writers; hence the Church has always maintained the necessity of water in the one case, and of bread and wine in the other. There is an obvious argument from analogy to the rest of the sacraments—an argument that has appealed to a great number of theologians in the past. Nevertheless there are serious considerations to be taken into account on the other side. If Christ determined all the sacraments immediately *in specie*, i.e., if he definitively fixed the precise matter and form to be used, it follows that the matter and form of the sacraments must remain the same for ever. The Catholic theologian who binds himself to the theory of specific determination all round, and consequently to the unchangeableness of the matter and form which obtain in the sacraments at the present day, has tremendous difficulties to face, if he is to defend his teaching

<sup>1</sup> Can. 1, session vii.



against the attacks of Liberal Protestantism. The reformed churches have discarded most of the sacraments; they regard them as mere human institutions. We must be prepared to meet the difficulties adduced from history by these unbelievers. If it can be shown from history that the Church has changed the matter and form of any sacrament during the course of time, we cannot maintain the theory of specific determination in regard to such sacrament. Now, there is some evidence that the Church has considerably modified the sacramental rites of confirmation, penance and holy orders since the beginning of the Christian era. The question remains—do these modifications amount to a change in the matter and form required for validity? In the present article we shall endeavour to answer this question in regard to the sacrament of Holy Orders.

The Council of Trent has defined that there exists in the Church a divinely instituted hierarchy, consisting of bishops, priests and ministers.<sup>2</sup> Each of the major orders of this hierarchy imprints a *character* or expands a *character* already received. There seems to be little doubt that Christ personally ordained only the apostles, and that He conferred on all of these (except Judas) the plenitude of orders. When did the apostles receive the sacramental character? The constant tradition of the Church teaches that they were ordained priests at the last supper, and consequently received the priestly character then. But that character was not yet complete; for according to the best tradition they received power to forgive sins in penance only after the resurrection. The Council of Trent<sup>3</sup> says, "*Dominus autem sacramentum penitentiae tunc praecipue instituit cum a mortuis excitatus insufflavisset in discipulos suos dicens 'Accipite Spiritum Sanctum, etc.'* Quo tam insigni facto et verbis perspicuis potestatem remittendi et retinendi peccata apostolis et eorum legitimis successoribus fuisse communicatum universorum patrum consensus intellexit." As the sacrament of penance requires for its administration the power of orders as well as jurisdiction, the apostles must have got an expansion of their priestly character on the occasion here referred to by the Council

<sup>2</sup> Can. 6, session xxiii

<sup>3</sup> Cap. 1, sess. xiv.

of Trent. It follows that priesthood was conferred in two parts or instalments<sup>4</sup> by its institutor, Christ Himself.

The first ordination after that of the apostles is described in the sixth chapter of the *Acts*. The community chose seven men, whom the apostles then ordained deacons by the rite of imposition of hands with prayer. A little later we find Paul and Barnabas ordaining presbyters or *episcopi* by a similar rite. Apart from the apostles themselves, these are the only grades of the hierarchy distinguished in the New Testament; for the *episcopi* and presbyters are too often indented to allow us to suppose that there were presbyters who were not also *episcopi*. How did the limited orders of priesthood and deaconship<sup>5</sup> come into existence? Was deaconship, for instance, directly and specifically instituted by Christ as a separate order? The record in the *Acts* does not leave that impression; it rather suggests that when the necessity arose the apostles decided to share a certain amount of their spiritual power with seven assistants. The text does not even imply that they were inspired by the Holy Ghost to do so, as certain people were afterwards inspired at Antioch to impose hands on Paul and Barnabas. We are left to infer that the apostles took this step by virtue of the ordinary constitutional authority they had received from Christ. We also learn from various passages in the New Testament that it was the practice of the apostles to ordain in each of their foundations a body of clerics referred to indiscriminately as "presbyters" and "*episcopi*." These held a higher degree of order than the deacons; they were in fact priests, and probably bishops, though the latter point is not quite certain.<sup>6</sup> All these ordinations must be presumed to have imprinted a character; for they were all sacramental, giving more or less of the power of orders, according to the varying degrees in which the apostles

<sup>4</sup> Over and above these powers, which are enjoyed by priests in our own day, the apostles also received the episcopal power of ordaining others—and with it a further expansion of their priestly character.

<sup>5</sup> Canon 6, session xxiii of Trent (referred to above) is quoted by certain writers to prove that not merely the Christian hierarchy but the division of it into three grades is of divine institution. If such were the meaning of the fathers of Trent, it is altogether inexplicable why they used the indeterminate word "*ministri*" instead of "*diaconi*." Cfr. the present writer's *The Government of the Church in the First Century*, p. 248.

<sup>6</sup> See work mentioned in last note, chapters iv and v.

communicated their own spiritual powers to those whom they ordained. If, as the Gospel leads us to suppose, Christ personally ordained to one grade only—the fullness of sacerdotal power—it is interesting to note that the apostles divided that power at first between two grades, and afterwards between three, giving the two lowest of these only a greater or less participation. On the other hand it is no less interesting to note that while Christ conferred what we now call priesthood in two distinct parts and on two separate occasions, the apostles, while they lived, and the Church for many centuries afterwards, gave it by a single symbolic act, the imposition of hands. All this raises an important question as to how far, if at all, the apostles were given discretionary power in connection with the sacrament of orders. Had they specific instructions from Christ for every step they took in this matter? Or did our Lord, while giving them certain general instructions as to the transmission of their priestly powers, leave them more or less free as to the precise manner of transmitting it? In particular, did Christ's instructions include the determination and promulgation of the imposition of hands with certain prescribed formulæ as the divinely-appointed rite of ordination to each of the three major orders? A brief examination of the subsequent history of ordination will help us to find a solution of these questions.

The references to ordination in the writings that have come down from the first two centuries after the close of the apostolic age are too vague and scanty to render a discussion of them worth while in a short article. With the triumph of Christianity in the fourth century, however, an era of great literary activity opened for the Church; and from that time forward we have an ever-increasing library of liturgical books to guide us. Some of the earliest of these works have reached us only in the revised form given them by editors in the fifth or perhaps the sixth century; nevertheless they may be taken as substantially correct accounts of the primitive rights of ordination in their respective countries of origin.<sup>7</sup> We shall first consider one or two of the Eastern documents.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the origin and literary relationships of *The Apostolic Constitutions* and *Canons of Hippolytus* see *Bardenhewer's Patrology*.

The *Apostolic Constitutions*<sup>8</sup> gives the following instructions concerning ordination to priesthood:—"When thou ordainest a presbyter, lay thy hand upon his head in the presence of the presbyters and deacons, and pray saying 'O Lord Almighty . . . do Thou now also look down on Thy servant, who is put into the presbytery by the vote and determination of the whole clergy, and replenish him with the Spirit of grace and counsel, to assist and govern Thy people with a pure heart, as Thou didst look down on Thy chosen people, and didst command Moses to choose elders whom Thou didst fill with Thy Spirit. Grant this, O Lord, and preserve in us the Spirit of Thy grace, that this person being filled with the gifts of healing and the word of teaching, may in meekness instruct Thy people and sincerely serve Thee with a pure mind and a willing soul, and may fully discharge the holy ministrations for Thy people; through Christ, etc.'" Here we have no specific mention of power to offer sacrifice or forgive sins. The ritual of Dionysius, the pseudo-Areopagite, is practically the same, but adds some minor details.

In the so-called *Canons of Hippolytus* the form is somewhat more specific. In the case of episcopal consecration the people elect the candidate, and a bishop is chosen to consecrate him. The sacrament is given by imposition of hands with the following<sup>9</sup> prayer: "Deus . . . respice super N. servum tuum, tribuens virtutem tuam et spiritum efficacem quam tribuisti sanctis apostolis . . . concede illi ut ipse sine peccata videat populum tuum, ut mereatur pascere gregem tuam magnum sacrum . . . accipe orationes ejus et oblationes ejus quas tibi offeret . . . tribue illi episcopatum et Spiritum clementem et potestatem ad remittenda peccata, et tribue illi facultatem ad dissolvenda omnia vincula iniquitatis daemonum et ad sanandos omnes morbos, et contere Satanam sub pedibus ejus velociter. Per dominum." If a priest is to be ordained, the same ceremony is employed, the only difference being that the word "presbyteratum" is substituted for "episcopatum" in the form—"Etiam eadem oratio super eo oretur tota ut

<sup>8</sup> viii. 16. The English version here given is from the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (T. & T. Clark).

<sup>9</sup> The Latin version here given is from Duchesne's *Christian Worship* (Eng. translation. S.P.C.K.)

super episcopo cum sola exceptione nominis episcopatus." From this it would appear that a man might be raised from deaconship to the episcopate by a single ordination; as it is altogether unlikely, that if a deacon were elected bishop, he would be twice ordained with the self-same ceremony.

In the Western sacramentaries also the rite of ordination to the major orders consists of an imposition of hands with appropriate prayers. The oldest extant sacramentary of the Church of Rome (i.e. the city) gives the following prayers for ordination to priesthood.<sup>10</sup> The first runs:—"Exaudi nos Deus salutaris noster, et super hos famulos tuos benedictionem Sancti Spiritus et gratiae sacerdotalis effunde virtutem, ut quos tuae pietatis aspectibus offerimus consecrandos, perpetua muneris tui largitate prosequaris." The consecratory canon runs "Vere dignum . . . Deus honorum omnium (distributor) . . . da quaesumus Pater in hos famulos tuos presbyterii dignitatem; innova in visceribus eorum Spiritum sanctitatis; acceptum a te Deus secundi meriti munus obtineant, censuramque morum exemplo suae conversationis insinuent. Sint probi co-operatores ordinis nostri, eluceat in eis totius forma iustitiae ut bonam nationem dispensationis sibi creditae reddituri aeternae beatitudinis praemia consequantur." As this prayer uses the plural number throughout, it appears to have been said only once, even when several candidates were ordained. It is worthy of notice also, that it contains no specific mention of the chief powers of a priest, celebration of Mass and forgiveness of sin.

In the oldest Gallican rite an unction of hands was added, just as at present. The form for ordination of priests was also different. It runs thus:—"Sanctificationum omnium auctor . . . Domine super hunc famulum tuum N., quem presbyterii honore dedicamus manum tuae benedictionis infunde, ut gravitate actuum . . . purum atque immaculatum ministerii tui donum custodiat et per obsequium plebis tuae, corpus et sanguinem Filii tui immaculata benedictione transformet, etc." Here

<sup>10</sup> The prayers in this and the following paragraph are taken from Duchesne op. cit. The same writer touches on the relationship of the so-called Leonine, Ardian and Gelasian sacramentaries. Cfr. Catholic Encycl. "Liturgical books," also Migne's *Patres Latini* opud S. Gregory.

the form is more explicit, mentioning the celebration of Mass. Notice also the singular number, which implies that the form was repeated over each candidate.

From the sixth to the tenth century<sup>11</sup> there were some unimportant developments in the rite of ordination to priesthood in the West. The Roman and Gallican rites were more or less fused, and the vesting with stole and chasuble and the benediction of the ordinands by the bishop were introduced. But these modifications were of minor importance. The matter of the sacrament still consisted in a single imposition of the hands; and the form expressed only in the most general terms the priestly power conferred. The Eastern rite about this time differed little from the Western. The Euchologion Barberini (representing Greek practice about the eighth and ninth centuries) gives the following instructions in connection with ordination to priesthood. After the offertory the ordinand is brought to the archbishop, who makes the sign of the cross three times over his head, and then holding his hand on the head says<sup>12</sup>:—"Deus qui es . . . ipse omnium domine complaceat tibi hunc quem a me propter politiam irreprehensibilem, modumque agendi inculpatam et fidem constantem promoveri probasti, magnam illam gratiam S. spiritus tui suscipere. Perfectum redde servum tuum, ut tibi in omnibus placeat, et pro data sibi a providente virtute tua magno illo sacerdotali honore digne sese gerat et conversetur, quia tua est potentia, etc." Then one of the priests asks the prayers of the congregation, after which the archbishop still holding his hand on the head of the ordinand says:—"Deus . . . ipse domine et hunc, quem presbyterii gradum subire et adipisci voluisti, reple dono S. tui Spiritus ut dignus sit sine crimine et querela assistere altari tuo, praedicare evangelium veritatis tuae, *offerre tibi dona et sacrificia spiritualia*, renovare populum tuum per lavacrum regenerationis, ut ipse occurrens in secundo adventu magni Dei et Salvatoris nostri, J.C. unigeniti filii tui, administrationis proprii gradus et officii bene gesti secundum multitudinem bonitatis tuae mercedem recipiat.

<sup>11</sup> A great number of MS. pontificals from this period, representing various provinces of Western Europe, have been collected and published. Those quoted below will all be found either in Morinus *De Ordinationibus* (edition 1605, Antwerp), or Martene *De Antiquis Ritibus* (edition 1730, Venice).

<sup>12</sup> The Latin version here given is from Morinus, *op. cit.*



Quia benedictum, etc.” The vesting with stole completes the ordination.

The matter of the sacrament consisted, so far, in the imposition of hands; and the form, especially in the oldest Roman sacramentary, expressed only in very general terms the powers conferred by ordination to priesthood. The first reference to the *traditio instrumentorum* in the ordination of priests occurs in a MS. dating from about the end of the tenth century.<sup>13</sup> After the unction of hands it proceeds:—“Hoc facto accipiat patenam cum oblatiis et calicem cum vino et dicat ‘Accipe potestatem, etc.’” This ceremony was at first a local peculiarity, for there are many contemporary and later manuscripts that know nothing of it. Of two MSS. preserved in Beauvais, one dating from about the year 1000 and the other from about the year 1100 A.D., the former does not mention it at all, while the second has the words (added by a later hand<sup>14</sup>) “postea dat eis episcopus calicem ita dicens ‘Accipite calicem et habetote potestatem atque licentiam offerre sacrificium Deo tam pro vivis quam et pro defunctis fidelibus.’” From the plural form here given it may be inferred that the words were pronounced only once, even where there were several ordinands. A still more interesting passage occurs in a pontifical belonging to the church of Mayence, written<sup>15</sup> between 1148 and 1251 A.D.—“Post haec episcopus offert calicem cum patena, praeparata cum hostia et vino, duobus vel pluribus ad tangendum dicens ‘Accipite potestatem offerre sacrificium Deo missamque celebrare tam pro vivis quam pro defunctis in nomine Domini.’” The ceremony of *traditio instrumentorum* had apparently become widespread by this time, but was not yet regarded as essential for valid ordination.

The last imposition of hands in our present rite of ordination to priesthood likewise found its way into the

<sup>13</sup> MS. of abbot Constantine Cajetan. There is one earlier reference to the *traditio instrumentorum*. It is found in a MS. in the Vatican library dating from the tenth century. Having given the usual ritual (of the period) for ordination of priests, the MS. goes on to say:—“Episcopus cum ordinatur, duo episcopi ponant et teneant evangeliorum codicem super caput ejus . . . Hoc facto accipiat patenam cum oblatiis et calicem cum vino et det ei dicens ‘Accipe potestatem offerre sacrificium Deo missamque celebrare tam pro vivis quam pro defunctis.’” This strange instruction appears to be unsupported by any other authority.

<sup>14</sup> Morinus, op. cit.

<sup>15</sup> Morinus dates it 1150–1250; Martene 1249–1251.

pontifical by degrees, but at a much later date. A MS. from the college of Toulouse,<sup>16</sup> dating from the thirteenth century, gives us the following information :—" The bishop imposes hands on the head of each in silence according to the Roman custom. According to the custom of some churches, however, the imposition of hands is accompanied by the words ' Accipe Spiritum Sanctum, quorum remiseris peccata, etc.' " Although the form here given is the same as that which at present accompanies the second imposition of hands, the writer just quoted is referring to the first imposition of hands. He immediately proceeds to give the rest of the rite of ordination as found in the older MSS., making no further reference to the power of forgiving sins, or to any second imposition of hands, though he expressly mentions the *traditio instrumentorum*. This second imposition of hands, with its accompanying form " Accipe Spiritum Sanctum, etc.," appears to have come into use first in the thirteenth century; but it did not become universal till a much later date. For a long time, however, it has been of universal observation in the Latin Church, and like the *traditio instrumentorum* forms at present a very important part of the rite of ordination, as we shall see presently.

Our present pontifical combines in the ordination of a priest all the ceremonies of the ancient and medieval Latin rituals. It has the invitation to the congregation to pray, the official resumé of that prayer, the ancient imposition of hands, the Roman consecratory prayer (or sacramental form), the Gallican consecratory prayer, the vesting with priestly vestments, the unction of hands, the *traditio instrumentorum*, the second imposition of hands with the form " Accipe Spiritum Sanctum, etc.," and the blessing (sometimes called " consummatio presbyterii " in the medieval pontificals). Which of all these ceremonies gives the sacerdotal character? All are agreed that the sacrament is valid, if the two impositions of hands and the *traditio instrumentorum* (with their respective forms) are observed. The question remains whether each of these three symbolical

<sup>16</sup> Morinus, op. cit. supplement, exer. vii. In the same context the author quotes another writer to show that even as late as the year 1516 there were pontificals in use, which did not contain the formula " Accipe Spiritum Sanctum, etc." On the other hand the *Gemma Animæ*, attributed to Honorius of Autun (about A.D. 1120), mentions this form, but implies that it accompanied the first imposition of hands.

actions is essential. The first imposition of hands undoubtedly represents the ancient ceremony by which the sacrament was conferred. While this part of the ordination rite is somewhat overshadowed at present by the more impressive ceremonies that come after it, we can hardly maintain nevertheless that the Church, so long as it retains this ancient symbolical act, wishes to divest it of its former sacramental character. If the Church has made a change at all, it must have made it by adding one or both of the other two ceremonies—*traditio instrumentorum* and the second imposition of hands—to the matter of the sacrament. Has the Church *de facto* done this?

Speaking of the matter of ordination, the *Decree for the Armenians* specifies *traditio instrumentorum*, omitting the imposition of hands which was common to both churches. To understand the full significance of this fact, we must bear in mind that the decree had just mentioned that “omnia sacramenta tribus perficiuntur, rebus tanquam materia, verbis tanquam forma et persona ministri conferentis sacramentum cum intentione faciendi quod facit ecclesia: quorum si aliquod desit, non perficitur sacramentum.” It then goes on to specify the matter, form and minister required for the various sacraments. The matter in baptism is water, in confirmation consecrated chrism, in the Eucharist bread and wine, in penance (the “quasi-materia” is) the acts of the penitent, in Extreme Unction oil of olives, in orders “*traditio instrumentorum*.” In view of this context we are at a loss to know how certain writers can maintain that the Pope (Eugene IV) meant nothing more than that *traditio instrumentorum* is an accidental unessential ceremony in the rite of ordination. But the question is placed beyond possibility of doubt by the words which follow in the decree—“*Forma sacerdotii talis est: ‘Accipe potestatem offerendi sacrificium, etc.’*” the very words which accompany the *traditio instrumentorum*. It was clearly the teaching of Eugene IV and, we may safely add, of the Council of Florence that *traditio instrumentorum* with its appropriate form is an essential part of the sacramental rite. The *Decree for the Armenians* may not perhaps be an infallible document; but at all events it expressed, if not the definitive, at least the official teaching of the Latin Church in the middle of the fifteenth century.

The second imposition of hands, introduced much later than the *traditio instrumentorum*, had not attained to the importance of an essential element in the ordination rite at the time of the Council of Florence. But once the necessity of conferring specifically the power to offer sacrifice was recognised, the necessity of a similar specific collation of the power to forgive sins was only a matter of time. Just a little over a century elapsed before the Council of Trent<sup>17</sup> defined “*Si quis dixerit per sacram ordinationem non dari Spiritum Sanctum, ac frustra episcopos dicere ‘Accipe Spiritum Sanctum’ . . . anathema sit.*” The parallelism between the two statements of the error condemned—“the Holy Ghost is not given by ordination” and “it is in vain that bishops pronounce the form ‘Accipe Spiritum Sanctum’”—shows clearly enough that the said form, and consequently the imposition of hands which it informs, is no mere accidental ceremony, but an efficient sign of the giving of the Holy Ghost, and therefore an essential part of the sacrament.

It is not merely the *traditio instrumentorum* and the second imposition of hands that we have to consider in this connection, but also the forms that accompany these symbolical acts. These forms are:—“*Accipe potestatem offerre sacrificium Deo, missasque celebrare tam pro vivis quam pro defunctis in nomine Domini,*” and “*Accipe Spiritum Sanctum; quorum remisieris peccata remittuntur illis, et quorum retinueris retenta sunt.*” What can the Church have meant by introducing into her ordination ritual such pointed and solemn formulae? The only reasonable explanation, so far as we can see, is that she meant to give by them the power of celebrating Mass and of forgiving sins respectively. The Church is not accused to use in vain—as the Council of Trent hints—such expressions as “*Accipe potestatem*” and “*Accipe Spiritum Sanctum.*” It is by forms just like these that she confers the Sacrament on bishops and deacons. Why should we interpret her action otherwise in the case of ordination to priesthood? This appears to be the Roman view in modern times, for if a bishop now omits any of the three ceremonies we have discussed—the two impositions of

<sup>17</sup> Can. 4. sess. xxiii.

hands and the *traditio instrumentorum*—he must repeat the ordination, or at least supply the missing portion of the rite, according to several decisions<sup>18</sup> of the Holy Office.

As the sacerdotal character is expanded when a priest is consecrated bishop, so in the view here put forward the priestly character is (probably) conferred partially by the first imposition of hands, and expanded when the ordinand receives the instruments, and again when he receives the second imposition of hands. We have seen that the apostles from the beginning divided the full power of orders, ordaining men at first to two, and afterwards to three different grades, bishops, priests and deacons. We have seen that in the case of priesthood the apostles, and their successors for several centuries, transmitted by a single sign—imposition of hands with a consecratory prayer—the sacerdotal powers given by Christ in two distinct instalments. We have adduced evidence to show that the Church, in her rite of ordination to priesthood, has returned to the example set by Christ Himself by again dividing the ordination rite into two, and still later into three parts, each of which is sacramental. With each of these developments the Church has made a substantial change (by addition) in the matter and form of the Sacrament. If an infallible Church has made such a change, she must have authority to do so. Consequently Christ did not definitively determine *in specie* the matter and form of the sacrament of orders.

Writers who advocate the theory of specific determination usually appeal, in support of their views, to the teaching of the Council of Trent. The Council declares<sup>19</sup> that the Church has power to make changes in the dispensation of the Sacraments, "*salva eorum substantia*." From this it is inferred that the Church has no power to alter the substance of the sacramental rite. We do not think that the inference is at all logical. In the first place there is no evidence that the word "*substantia*" is here used in the technical sense required by the argument, *i.e.*, as the equivalent of the matter and form that constitute the external sacramental sign. On the contrary, the con-

<sup>18</sup> A number of such decisions may be found in Lehmkühl's *Theologia Moralis* in the chapter on orders.

<sup>19</sup> Cap. 2. sess. XXI.

text suggests a much wider meaning. The fathers are not speaking of the external sign as such at all; they have in mind the Sacraments in all their bearings—their administration and reception even more than their consecration—and they seem to be using the word “*substantia*” in a broad general sense, to cover everything definitively settled by Christ in connection with the sacramental system. This is clear from the fact that the whole clause, in which the words “*salva eorum substantia*” occur, is but a preamble to the assertion of the Church’s right to substitute communion under one kind for communion under two—a change which has nothing whatever to do, either substantially or accidentally, with the consecration of the Sacrament.

But even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that “*substantia*” stands for the essential matter and form of the Sacraments, the inference mentioned above is still illogical. There was no question at this stage of the Council’s deliberations as to how far Christ had determined the matter and form. This point had already been discussed,<sup>20</sup> and the Council was satisfied with declaring in general terms that Christ was the institutor of all the Sacraments. The scope of the present chapter can be gauged, as in most other cases, from the nature of the Lutheran errors under consideration. Now, on the present occasion the Council was concerned with vindicating against the Reformers the Church’s power to add ceremonial and solemnity to the administration of the Sacraments, or to provide otherwise for their more fitting dispensation. As the issue with the Reformers was confined to accidental ceremonies, the Council had no occasion to make any pronouncement, and did not mean to make any, concerning the Church’s power over the constituent elements of the sacramental sign. The words “*salva eorum substantia*” were inserted, not to settle a controversy, but to avoid raising a new issue, about which there was a domestic controversy in the Catholic Schools. The Council was discussing the Sacrament of the Eucharist in particular, and it was vindicating a rather important power in connection with Communion under one kind. If,

<sup>20</sup> Session vii.



in these circumstances, it failed to draw any distinction between substantial and accidental ceremonies, in laying down a general principle applicable to all the Sacraments, one of the parties to the domestic controversy just mentioned might be depended on to see in the definition an official confirmation of the theory, that the Church has power, not merely over matter and form, but over the matter and form of *all* the Sacraments. The fathers did not wish to leave their teaching open to such interpretation; hence the saving clause "*salva eorum substantia.*" As the vindication of a power over accidentals does not necessarily imply the absence of power over essentials, we find nothing in this definition to call for a modification of the view put forward above.

W. MORAN.

## Some Tendencies of Modern Rationalist Criticism.

"IN the study of Christian origins," says M. Loisy, "knowledge of the texts is not everything: an entire independence of judgment has its importance. The texts have long been known and studied: but criticism is scarcely freed from the faith of which these texts are the earliest documents. It is an indispensable condition for an historically correct understanding of them that they should be approached without any theological or polemical interest."<sup>1</sup> M. Loisy does not in so many words state his contention that "criticism" is incompatible with belief in the Catholic faith: but in the work from which the remarks above are quoted he is quite as definite as he usually is in setting forth the verdict of "criticism"—this time, on the whole question of the origin of Christianity—and he allows it to be seen that, in his opinion, only downright prejudice can prevent that verdict from being accepted.

And yet the matter is not so easily dealt with as an uninformed reader of M. Loisy's work might imagine. The conclusions which the learned professor of the College de France set forth are doubtless inevitable for one who sets out on his investigation with philosophical convictions like those of M. Loisy: but the student who has not the theological detachment which that writer possesses will hardly be convinced by this latest exposition of the modern rationalist account of the rise of the Faith.

A less ambitious attempt to write a natural history of Christianity has been made lately by Mr. H. G. Wells in his "Outline of History" (p. 353 ff); and the same conviction is apparent in it that the question of the origin of the Church is a *res iudicata*. The belief has penetrated into the newspapers: the *Times Literary Supplement* gave M. Loisy's book a most enthusiastic review: and an analogous

<sup>1</sup> Les mystères païens et le mystère chrétien (1919), p. 6.

work on the "Beginnings of Christianity," by Drs. Lake and Jackson, was hailed as being as representative of all that is best in modern scholarship as Lightfoot was for his own day. One may even find in the correspondence columns of the daily press the conviction that "criticism" has definitely made belief in the dogmas of the Christian faith impossible for men of impartial minds: and "criticism" is spoken of as if it were an institution like the French Academy, pronouncing on some point in a perfectly definite manner.

Now, as a matter of fact, the trend of New Testament study, even among scholars who do not believe in miracles or in the supernatural, is not, so far as it is really scientific, towards explaining away the supernatural nature of Christianity: it is making the difficulties involved in such an explanation greater and more obvious every year. In exegesis, that is to say in the interpretation of the meaning of the texts, and in criticism, or the estimation of the relations of the texts to each other and of their historical value and authenticity, the traditional Catholic position is being adopted by men whose reputation for scholarship is undoubted, and who are not open to the suspicion of being led by dogmatic bias, since they are, one and all of them, completely rationalistic in their outlook.

Although they deny that Christianity is a supernatural religion, the writers in question do not wish to be called "rationalists": they do not hesitate to dissociate themselves from the position of the "Old Rationalists" of a century ago, who identified Christianity with the moral ideal or the rational truths which it contained, and regarded Christ merely as the symbol of the ethical perfection, or the pioneer of the attitude to life which was supposed to be the real essence of religion, and which might be realised out of all relation to the person of Christ. The modern theologian is generally more than nominally Christian. Rationalism—in the German sense—was practically driven out of the Universities by the efforts of Tholuck, Schleiermacher and Ritschl. The Via Media which Schleiermacher pointed out between Rationalism and Pietism became the classical position: it provided a Christianity which, without necessitating the least acceptance of the supernatural,

satisfied in some way the wish to have Christ as the basis of religious feeling. Jesus was regarded as the Redeemer,<sup>2</sup> the revealer of God, the origin and the normative type of the new life which is the privilege of the Christian. He was the central figure of religion, and—although not Son of God in the metaphysical sense—mediated salvation to men, and so might be called, in a broad sense, divine, since “God was in Him.”

The exegesis of the “Liberal” school, as it came to be called, was naturally in accordance with its religious outlook: it is the “non-dogmatic” explanation of Christianity which “Robert Elsmere” made familiar to the English-speaking public. H. J. Holtzmann may be taken as its best exponent, and Adolf Harnack’s *History of Dogma* as the most thorough statement of the way in which the dogmatic church is conceived to have grown out of this non-dogmatic primitive Christianity.

The synoptic gospels are taken by these writers as being a substantially accurate account of the life of Christ, except where “legendary” (i.e., miraculous) events are narrated. In the synoptics, they hold, in Mark especially, is found the portrait of one Who was the greatest teacher, the most inspired prophet, the most perfect son of God that the world has ever known. Religion in its truest essence is seen in Him, and only in Him: His message of the love of God for men, and of the duty of men to base their religion solely and trustfully on the love of God, is guaranteed by the perfection of His personality. He alone has truly known God: and no man can know God except through the revelation of God which was made in Jesus. He did not claim to be God, nor to be supernatural in any way: but He had to express His knowledge of Himself in some way: if he adopted the thought forms of Messianism or of Apocalyptic, it was because no others were available. He was a man of His time: it was inevitable that the distinction between the husk and the kernel of His beliefs should fail of being clear to Him: and “in His prophecy of the second coming, Jesus yields its due to the faith of His age.” “Expressed in simple terms, what Jesus promises in the

<sup>2</sup> In a purely subjective sense: He made it possible for men to love God, by giving them an example of love and trust.

Kingdom of God is eternal life, man's entrance into unbroken communion with God."<sup>3</sup>

The desire to fix the place of Christ in the scheme of things, to explain His death, the application to Him of the Messianic prophecies, led the earliest disciples, it is held, to work out some rudimentary scheme of Christology and soteriology. In Paul's letters we see this tendency carried still further: but even in Paul the distinction between dogma and religion, which may be applied to the eschatological teaching of Christ, still holds good. The apostle's theology was but the effort of his mind, trained as it was in the rabbinical scholasticism, to make clear the great central truths that he had found in the teaching of Jesus—the gospel of trust and love. Everything else in his thought is taken as secondary: the doctrine of the Redemption and of the nature of Christ and of the Law are regarded as having been merely the attempt of Paul's mind to make clear to itself what Christ was and what He had done for men. The doctrines, it is held, must be put down to Paul's environment and to the thought of his time, and kept apart from that which was essential in his religion and in his teaching. They may be set aside, and yet Paul will remain the great exponent to the Gentile world of the God of Jesus, and of the love and trust by which through Jesus, men may enter into union with that God.

This position is indeed an advance on that of the Aufklärung period: but it is not any longer unquestioned. A further advance towards the Catholic interpretation has been made in recent years by scholars who see that the Liberal theory is not in accord with the facts: and it is scarcely too much to say that it is being discredited as surely as the old Lutheran theology and the old Rationalism were discredited.

The Liberals had made a distinction between *dogma* and *religion*. Dogma, they held, was merely an accessory of religion: and the religion of the New Testament was in no way based on dogma. Christianity was for them a spiritual movement, an impulse towards religious life. But that conception was not shared by the New Testament writers: and in 1892 a young professor of theology,

<sup>3</sup> Wernle. *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. I, page 51.

Johannes Weiss,<sup>4</sup> pointed out this in a pamphlet which caused quite a sensation among the Liberals. He showed that no merely ethical explanation of the mission of Jesus could meet all the facts. In the pamphlet, "*The Preaching of Jesus Concerning the Kingdom of God*," he urged that the mission which Jesus was conscious of possessing was a perfectly definite one, and one which was understood by His contemporaries: to be the herald first, and afterwards the Vice-gerent, of God, in the kingdom of God. Now the *Kingdom (or Reign) of God* was not an ethical ideal, or a phase of the world's history made new by the announcing of a truth; it was substantially what was expected by the Apocalyptic writers of the time, and which we find described in the books of Enoch, iv. Esdras, etc., that is to say, the intervention of God, and the setting up of a new order on earth. Jesus was perfectly certain that this intervention of God was about to take place: and all His efforts, His words, His prayers, His hopes were concerned with it. Apart from the kingdom of God He cannot be understood as a historical individual. If He taught a code of morals, it was in relation to the Kingdom. If He set up a spiritual ideal, the Kingdom, and conditions in the Kingdom, were the ultimate point of reference. The Kingdom was not secondary, nor a matter of deduction and inference, in His religion: it was the basis of His religious teaching. He knew that His mission was entirely taken up with it: and He gave His life "for the ransom of many"—to gain entrance into the Kingdom for "the many" who needed a ransom. And when the day of the consummation of the Kingdom should come, He knew that He would judge the world as God's Vice-gerent and Messiah.

Of course Weiss's own conception of the person and work of Christ was absolutely inadequate, and based on an arbitrary process of text-splitting: but at any rate it showed that the Liberal system had no basis in historical reality.

Weiss returned to the subject in a second and enlarged edition of his work, in 1900: and in the following year there appeared another study which went still farther to discredit the Liberal position. Dr. William Wrede, pro-

<sup>4</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that M. Loisy's notorious brochure, "*L'Evangile et l'Eglise*" was largely based on Weiss's work in its scriptural conclusions.



fessor in Göttingen, in a work on "*The Messianic Secret in the Gospels*,"<sup>5</sup> took away the last prop of the "professorial theology." The Liberals used to rely on St. Mark: it was supposed to be the most historical of the Gospels, and to contain the history of a prophet, whose psychological development could be traced, and whose utter humanity was evident. But Wrede showed that it was not the Jesus of St. Mark that the critics cherished, but a lay figure of their own construction—one got by picking and choosing out of the Gospel whatever could be worked into a synthesis which should be in accordance with what the critics' philosophy allowed them to conceive of as metaphysically or psychologically possible and likely, and simply neglecting the rest on purely *a priori* grounds.

Wrede had no difficulty in proving that according to St. Mark, Jesus is no mere man, but an altogether supernatural being, with a divine mission: that in His mind there is no progress or development as to His purpose, which is to save the world by dying for it, and so bringing to men the blessings of the Messianic age: that the Christology of St. Mark is not far removed from that of St. John: and that all the miraculous and supernatural elements in the Gospel are put forward quite definitely as dogmatic beliefs, which must be recognised as such. Scholars might take that tradition or leave it: but if they took it they could not, consistently with the principles of historical science, extract from it the modern psychological conception of the "Liberal" Christ.

The Lutheran interpretation of sanctification in St. Paul, which, *mutatis mutandis*, had been taken over by the Liberals, had been questioned as far back as the year 1853, when Lipsius, in a monograph on the subject,<sup>6</sup> argued that justification is not a purely legal forensic act, but includes the idea of sanctification—of a *real* ethical new creation which takes place by the communication of the Spirit. The same view was put forward by Lüdemann,<sup>7</sup> who called the new creation an *ethico-physical* reality; and by Pfleiderer<sup>8</sup> and others, and became commonly accepted even among the

<sup>5</sup> Das Messiah-geheimniss in den Evangelien.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Lipsius, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre.

<sup>7</sup> Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus. 1872.

<sup>8</sup> Paulinismus, 1873.

Liberals. But it was not quickly recognised that this "new creation" regarded as "physical" (or, as a Catholic would say, supernatural) had a central place in the apostle's thought. In Holtzmann's<sup>9</sup> exposition of Paulinism for instance, it is "a simple generalisation of the personal experience (of Christ as the vital centre of His individual life) to cover all analagous cases." In so far as it was recognised as having an organic connection with the general scheme of the apostle's theology, the old distinction between *theology* and *religion* was invoked to render Paul's piety independent of his doctrines.

That such a distinction was not applicable was made clear with the progress in knowledge of the Jewish character of St. Paul's teaching. The monumental work of Emil Schürer<sup>10</sup> on the "History of the Jewish people in the time of Jesus Christ," presenting as it did a conspectus of the religious as well as of the political outlook of the different schools of thought in Judaism, made it possible to appreciate the extent of the Jewish roots of the apostles doctrines, and stimulated the effort to determine precisely how much of his theology was brought with him from Judaism, and how much was new. It began to be seen that Saul the Pharisee had already, besides the doctrines of the Fall, and Original Sin in some sense, the doctrines of Predestination and of the Messianic hope: and Richard Kabisch<sup>11</sup> began a new era in non-Catholic Pauline studies when, in 1893 (just a year after J. Weiss's work on the teaching of Jesus) he showed how all these concepts were linked together by the idea of the coming of the Kingdom of God: and that the doctrine of the spirit, being organically connected with the coming of the Kingdom, cannot be regarded as secondary in comparison with the apostle's ethics. Paul Wernle<sup>12</sup> put forward the same idea, laying stress on the fact that the theory of the Redemption in St. Paul is not purely subjective, but is an objective mystical doctrine of salvation. In neither case, however, did the writers draw the logical conclusions from their investigations—they kept

<sup>9</sup> H. J. Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie*, 1897, vol. II. (quoted by A. Schweitzer, *Paul and his Interpreters*, p. 106).

<sup>10</sup> *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (first ed. 1873, English tr. 1885).

<sup>11</sup> *Die Eschatologie des Paulus*.

<sup>12</sup> *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus*, 1897.

on applying the old distinction of religion and dogma, in spite of the facts they had brought to light.

Another stage in the progress towards the traditional interpretation is marked by the publication in 1903 of a collection of lectures delivered by W. Heitmüller on "*Baptism and the Eucharist in St. Paul.*"<sup>13</sup> The lectures had been delivered before the "Scientific Association of Pastors," who heard to their amazement that it was the teaching of St. Paul that in Baptism there occurs a "hyperphysical" (supernatural) action which produces, *ex opere operato*, a real intrinsic salvation and sanctification. Baptism must, in the Apostle's mind, accompany faith: sanctification is produced not by faith but by the sacrament. In the Eucharist also, there was a real, not a symbolical communion with Christ: the body and blood of Christ were really partaken of by the Christian, and the sacrament also was a real sanctification. These results were linked up by Wrede<sup>14</sup> and Hans Windisch<sup>15</sup> with the conclusions of Kabisch and Wernle, and the connection between sacrament, sanctification and membership of the Kingdom of God was made clear. The essence of Christianity, for St. Paul, was union with Christ. This union was effected by the sacraments: it produced real sanctification in the Christian: and it brought him into the position of possessing, in germ now, and fully hereafter, the new life which is distinctive of the Kingdom of God. Thus the whole Lutheran doctrine of justification was demolished by Luther's own spiritual descendents.

The next point to be taken up was the Christology of St. Paul. It used to be held that Christ was, in St. Paul's thought, supernatural, exalted, in the closest relation to God, but not divine. The critics were slow to attribute to St. Paul what they conceived to be polytheism. But now that the doctrine of the Apostle about incorporation with Christ, about faith in Christ, and the life of the Christian in Christ was admitted, it became evident that the divinity of Christ is implied all through the Epistles. Christ is a divine being. Paul believes in Him as he does in God: his conception of Christ is such that he can apply to Him the

<sup>13</sup> *Taufe und Abendmahl beim Paulus.*

<sup>14</sup> *Paulus*, 1904.

<sup>15</sup> *Taufe und Sünde im ältesten Christentum*, 1908.

same predicates, and give him the same religious worship that he gave to God. Though St. Paul does not often use the term "God" in reference to Christ, the reality that lies behind the term is implied in his use of the title "Lord," and in the whole of his theology. It is true that this is still questioned by some of the Liberals: but it is the position of the "comparativo-historical" school, and is becoming more widely admitted every year. W. Wrede<sup>16</sup> J. Weiss,<sup>17</sup> W. Bousset,<sup>18</sup> W. Heitmüller,<sup>19</sup> H. Leitzmann<sup>20</sup>, and H. Windisch<sup>21</sup>, might be taken as representative of those who admit the divinity of Christ in St. Paul.

The theology of St. Paul, then, is not that of Luther or of the Liberals, but that of the Catholic Church; and "The religion of the Apostle is theological through and through: *his theology is his religion* . . . the idea is false that the *piety* of Paul can be described apart from the *concepts* (*gedanken*) through which he comprehended Christ's person, His death and His resurrection."<sup>22</sup> The key to the understanding of Pauline Christianity is not according to Bousset,<sup>23</sup> the classical scheme of Reformation theology: the fundamental and central idea is that of the new creation, of the new life given to the Christian in the sacraments which unite him to Christ, and fill him with the Spirit.<sup>24</sup>

It is commonly stated by writers who, like Mr. Wells, take their theology at second hand, that St. Paul "built the doctrine of Jesus into a theological system . . . the faith of the Nazarenes, which he found as a doctrine of motive and a way of living, he made into a doctrine of belief."<sup>25</sup> It is a pity that Mr. Wells did not take the trouble to be up-to-date in his rationalism: he would have known then that it is becoming a commonplace that "in only one point is Paul really original, in this point namely that he brings the significance of the death of Christ into

<sup>16</sup> Paulus, p. 54 "ein substantiell göttliches Wesen."

<sup>17</sup> Christus p. 33, etc.; Das Urchristentum (1914) p. 340ff, 363ff.

<sup>18</sup> Kyrios Christos (1913), p. 123 and passim; Jesus der Herr (1916) p. 90, etc.

<sup>19</sup> Zeitschrift für Neutest. Wissenschaft, 1912, p. 320ff.

<sup>20</sup> Handbuch zum neuen Testament, comm. on Romans IX, 5 (1906).

<sup>21</sup> Same series comm. on Hebrews, passim, (1913).

<sup>22</sup> Wrede, Paulus, p. 43.

<sup>23</sup> Jesus der Herr, p. 46.

<sup>24</sup> cf. ib., p. 48.

<sup>25</sup> Outline of History, vol I., p. 367.

relation with the death of the Law." So says Bousset<sup>26</sup>: his statement would be subscribed to by M. Loisy, Weiss, Heitmüller, Wernle, Harnack and many others. "If even in the first generation the religion of Jesus underwent a change, it was not Paul who was responsible for it, but the primitive Christian community."<sup>27</sup> Paul's part in the shaping of Christian dogma is stated by these writers to be that of systematising, clarifying, and fitting together the dogmas which he found existing in the Church when he became a Christian. A distinction is made indeed by Heitmüller and Bousset between the Palestinian and the Hellenistic or Greek-speaking communities before Paul; they believe that the doctrines of the divinity of Christ and of the new life in the Spirit do not go back to the original disciples of Christ, but arose on Gentile soil. But, as Heitmüller<sup>28</sup> himself understands, "the author of Acts is convinced that the triumphant progress of the Gospel from Jerusalem to Rome, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, took place under the leadership of the Jerusalem community and especially of the College of Apostles." Dr. Morgan,<sup>29</sup> who accepts Bousset's view that St. Paul's theology is Hellenistic, has to admit that "everywhere the apostle assumes that his conception of Christ is that of the Church in general. While we hear of a conflict of opinion regarding the Law we read of none regarding the person of Christ and the homage to be rendered to Him. In this matter James, Peter and Barnabas—all Jewish Christians seem to have been at one with Paul." J. Weiss<sup>30</sup> speaks of the manner in which the primitive disciples "did homage to Jesus the Lord as to a divine Being (als einem göttlichen Wesen)": Bousset<sup>31</sup> allows that the idea of Christ's death having a redemptive value goes back to the Palestinian community.

Now the religion of the Palestinian community was "in substance the Christianity of Jesus," according to M. Loisy;<sup>32</sup> and according to him also the religion of the

<sup>26</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 161.

<sup>27</sup> Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* vol. I, p. 107.

<sup>28</sup> *Zeitschrift für Neutest Wissenschaft*, 1912, p. 327.

<sup>29</sup> *Religion and Theology of Paul*, p. 50.

<sup>30</sup> *Das Urchristentum*, p. 27.

<sup>31</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 161.

<sup>32</sup> *Les mystères païens et le mystère chrétien*, p. 327.

Gospels is that of the Pauline communities.<sup>33</sup> And Harnack tells us that "we can now assert that during the years 30-70 A.D., and on the soil of Palestine—more particularly in Jerusalem—the tradition (which we read in the Gospels) as a whole took the essential form which it presents in its later developments."<sup>34</sup> And again, "The horizon of 'St. Matthew' is bounded by Palestine, and this Gospel is the work of the Church of Palestine. The whole synoptic tradition belongs to Palestine and Jerusalem, and has no connection with Gentile Christian circles except in the redaction of St. Luke."<sup>35</sup> St. Matthew's gospel "may be called the first liturgical book of the Christian Church, in the first place of the Church of Palestine."<sup>36</sup> When the statements of M. Loisy and Professor Harnack are taken in connection, one comes to this conclusion: that in the Palestinian communities there were no pagan infiltrations (such as Loisy, following Bousset, etc., postulates in the communities whose mother-church was Antioch), but that the Gospel was preached in accordance with the teaching of Jesus. And in these very communities the Gospel tradition, *which agrees with the teaching of St. Paul*, took shape and became stereotyped. So that the teaching of St. Paul agrees with the "primitive gospel about Jesus."

M. Loisy makes it possible to distinguish between the religion of the Hellenistic communities and that of the Palestinian Church, by making some perfectly gratuitous assumptions. St. Paul and St. Peter, for instance, were together in Jerusalem for fourteen days, when St. Paul had come there "to visit Peter"; and M. Loisy will have it that "their attitude to one another was one of reserve."<sup>37</sup> He glosses over the fact that St. Paul, if he was not a fool—M. Loisy thinks he was one<sup>38</sup>—must have learned enough about Jesus in that time, from the men who had known Him and lived with Him but a few years before, to prevent him from indulging in the sort of theologising with which M. Loisy credits him. Then M. Loisy quietly rejects as "devoid of all historical value" every passage in the Acts

<sup>33</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 234 and *passim*; cf. *Evangile selon Marc* (1912) introduction.

<sup>34</sup> *Luke the Physician*, p. VI.

<sup>35</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>36</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>37</sup> *Mystères*, p. 308.

<sup>38</sup> *La Religion* (1917) p. 135—"illuminé de génie."



of the Apostles which conflicts with his own views : all the references<sup>39</sup> to Barnabas being sent by the Apostles to Antioch, for instance. As a contrast to this consistent scepticism of M. Loisy one may set down Harnack's conviction that the Acts were written by Luke the Physician, the companion of Paul and of Mark : that Luke knew personally Mark and Barnabas and Silas : that Luke in his gospel incorporated almost the whole of the gospel written by his friend, Mark, in whose mother's house in Jerusalem St. Peter used to lodge. Harnack believes that the Acts were written while St. Paul was alive : and so he puts down the date of Mark's gospel as about 60 A.D. He believes further that neither Mark nor Luke were at all disposed towards that habit of deliberate and calculated lying which, though he may call it "tendencious redaction," M. Loisy has to attribute to the Evangelists in order to write a natural history of Christianity.

The position, then, in rationalist New Testament studies, is this : where they really apply scientific methods, rationalists agree with the traditional Catholic position. Where they differ from Catholics they do so, not on scientific grounds, but because their conclusions are dictated by their philosophical convictions. M. Loisy, for instance, had ceased to believe in the Catholic doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity while he was yet a student in a French seminary ; he had lost belief in God while he was teaching in the Catholic Institute in Paris. Dr. Harnack makes it clear that he does not believe in miracles : he accuses Zahn of "dogmatic bias," because Zahn is ready to admit the intervention of God when it is demanded by the evidence. And yet, in spite of prejudice, the rationalists are being forced, according as New Testament science is becoming more accurate and more objective, to come around to the Catholic position. Bousset evades it by holding that in the space of about five years (from the time of the Crucifixion to that of the conversion of St. Paul) an elaborate legend of the Resurrection grew up, and Christianity changed into a form which would be quite unintelligible to St. Peter. Harnack thinks the legend and the changing took a longer time, but that both took shape in the Gospels in Palestine,

<sup>39</sup> *Mystères*, p. 309 ; Acts V. 36 ; IX. 27 ; XI. 22.

under the eyes of men who had spent two and a half years in company with Jesus. Wrede writes down Paul as an epileptic: and M. Loisy thinks Paul was a "brilliant madman."

It is not historical science that is responsible for such aberrations: its conclusions cannot be urged against the divine origin of the Catholic Church. It is bearing an increasingly clearer testimony, even in the hands of unbelievers, to the impossibility of any "natural" explanation of the rise of Christianity. Where students of the New Testament have an "entirely independent judgment" they agree with the Catholic position. If they refuse to admit that Christ rose from the dead, that He was divine, and that He founded the Church, it is because they regard these things as philosophically impossible. In fairness to their readers therefore they ought to admit, as Renan admitted it, that these convictions of theirs are not based on criticism, but precede it: and that the ultimate point of divergence is to be found not in the realm of historical investigation, but in that of philosophy.

M. B. LANGFORD.

## The Episcopal Succession of Raphoe from 1200 to 1547.

IN a recent review in *Studies* by Father John MacErlean, S.J., of Canon Maguire's excellent *History of the Diocese of Raphoe* (1920), attention is mainly directed to the confusion of the episcopal succession of Raphoe in the 13th and 14th centuries. No doubt Canon Maguire has made a laudable attempt to rectify the errors of previous writers, but his success is not very pronounced, and he did not sufficiently utilise Father Costelloe's *De Annatis Hiberniae* nor the Calendars of Papal Registers.

With all its imperfections the Catalogue of the Bishops, transcribed by Dr. Reeves from the British Museum MS., written in the first decade of the 17th century, cannot be lightly brushed aside. However, it may be more convenient to follow, as far as possible, the Roman documents.

Let us begin with Maclise O'Deirg, who seems to have been Bishop in 1203. Nothing, however, is known of his administration, and we can only conjecture that he was succeeded by Donal O'Garvey and Felim O'Syda between the years 1230—1253. Then came Patrick O'Scannell, O.P.—whom Canon Maguire regards as "O'Scanlon"—a saintly Dominican Friar, who was consecrated Bishop of Raphoe, by the Primate, in the Franciscan Church, Dundalk, on November 30, 1253. A good biography of this prelate will be found in Father MacInerny's *History of the Irish Dominicans* (Vol. I., pp. 167-270).

John de l'Aunay (di Alneto), O.F.M., was Bishop-elect from 1263 to 1265. Canon Maguire<sup>1</sup> includes him in the list of prelates of Raphoe, but the fact is that the holy Franciscan, owing to various causes, resigned the See on April 28, 1265, and was never consecrated.

Cairbre O'Scoby, O.P., was consecrated Bishop in 1266, at Armagh, and died at Lyons. on April 9, 1274. Canon

<sup>1</sup> The learned Canon gives "1261" as the date of the appointment of Bishop de l'Aunay, but the correct date is December 3, 1263.

Maguire gives the date of his death as "1275," and he quotes Archdeacon Lynch, who rightly gives "the Vigil of the Ascension, 1274." I can again cordially recommend Father MacInerny's valuable book for a detailed account of Bishop O'Scoby.

Florence O'Freel ruled from 1275 to 1299, but the particulars of his rule are scanty.

Canon Maguire gives Thomas O'Nathain (O'Naan) as the successor of Bishop O'Freel, but the fact is that Dr. O'Nathain was merely Bishop-elect, and was never consecrated. He died as Archdeacon of Raphoe in 1306.<sup>2</sup>

Henry MacCrossan ruled Raphoe from 1306 till his death in 1319. No particulars of his rule are furnished by Canon Maguire, save that, in 1306, the Bishop was forced to give up 1,000 acres of pasture land in Derry which Donal O'Donnell had wrested from Bishop Godfrey MacLaughlin of Derry and had bestowed on the Bishop of Raphoe. However, a reference to the printed *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, under date of December 16, 1310, which evidently escaped the vigilance of Canon Maguire, throws new light on this transaction, for we read that the King pardoned Richard de Burgh, Earl of Ulster, for having acquired, without royal licence, 3 townlands in Derry and Loughlaffan from Henry, Bishop of Raphoe. (*Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1307—1313, p. 292).

Thomas O'Donnell, O.Cist., Abbot of Assaroe, was Bishop from 1319 to 1337, and receives a high panegyric from the *Four Masters*.

Patrick MacMonagle (Conwell) ruled Raphoe from 1340 to 1366, and was succeeded by Conor MacCormac O'Donnell. Canon Maguire includes Richard McCrossan (1366-67), and adds Ware's note: "I know not how long he sat in this See." It is tolerably certain that MacCrossan was not Bishop of Raphoe, because on Oct. 1, 1367, Archbishop Sweetman, of Armagh, appointed Peter O'Carolan, Dean of Derry, "to exercise jurisdiction in the diocese of Raphoe, vacant by the death of Patrick MacMonigal." Moreover, a similar letter was sent by the Primate on the same day to the Archdeacon of Raphoe, "empowering

<sup>2</sup> Canon Maguire makes the surprising statement that this Thomas was "the solitary ecclesiastic of the name known to history," but the 'Annals' gives other eminent men of the O'Naan family.

him to act jointly or severally with the said Dean in Raphoe." (Calendar of the Register of Archbishop Sweetman, ed. by Lawlor, R.I.A., 1911). But, more convincing still, it is very significant that on August 30, 1365, Patrick, Dean of Armagh, and Hugh, Prior of the Culdees of Armagh, were given a commission by the Primate "to hold a visitation of the diocese of Raphoe."

Conor MacCormac O'Donnell was Bishop from 1367 to 1397. Canon Maguire gives the date of his resignation as 1398, but this event took place in 1397, or at the end of 1396. One thing is certain, that Bishop O'Donnell's resignation was accepted by the Pope on February 21, 1397, and on the same day the Pope provided John MacMenamin O'Donnell, O.Cist., to the See of Raphoe.

The *Calendar of Papal Registers* supplies us with many references to Bishop O'Donnell between the years 1397 and 1409. Strange to say, Canon Maguire sheds no light on the career of this prelate after the year 1402, and he wrongly inserts a certain "Anthony" as Bishop from 1399 to 1413. The fact is, as pointed out by Father John MacErlean, S.J., that Anthony was never Bishop of Raphoe, but was Bishop of Raphanensis in Syria. The same error obtains in the case of Anthony's successor, "Robert Mubire," copied by Canon Maguire from Wadding and Ware, who is given as Bishop from 1413 to 1414.

Archbishop Fleming's Register (edited by Canon Lawlor, for the R.I.A., 1912) throws new light on the after career of Bishop O'Donnell. We learn that on May 9, 1410, the Primate ordered the Bishop of Raphoe to formally excommunicate certain heretics in said diocese, "casting three stones towards their dwellings, as a sign of the eternal malediction of God upon Datan and Abiron." O'Donnell, Prince of Tirconnell, was also threatened with excommunication for having detained some lands and tithes belonging to the Church of Derry, and the letter, dated in the Autumn of 1410, is addressed to the "Bishop of Raphoe." The same Register contains a citation of the Bishop of Raphoe to attend a Provincial Council in St. Peter's Church, Drogheda, dated August 20, 1411—to be held on October 12—but the Bishop failed to appear, either in person or

by proxy, and, in consequence, was ordered to present himself in Armagh Cathedral on December 14.

It would seem that the Bishop was compelled to resign in 1413, and, in 1415, John MacCormac McMenamin O.Cist., was appointed to the See of Raphoe. Canon Maguire gives the date of his profession of obedience to the Primate as "2nd March, 1415," but the correct date, as given in Archbishop Fleming's Register, is March 2, 1416. His death occurred in 1419, according to the Four Masters.

Laughlin O'Gallagher, Dean of Raphoe, was elected by the Chapter of Raphoe as Bishop, in December, 1419, and was confirmed by the Pope on February 27, 1420. According to the Four Masters he died in 1438, and his successor was Cornelius MacBride, who had been Dean of Raphoe from 1420 to 1439. His bull is dated July 20, 1440, and, of course, Ware's introduction of "John MacGilbride" as Bishop from "1438 to 1440" is an error. Canon Maguire has failed to notice that Bishop Cornelius actually did exercise episcopal administration in Raphoe, and moreover, the prelate had been dispensed by the Pope as "the son of unmarried parents." His rule was brief, as he died in 1442, and he was succeeded by Laurence O'Gallagher, Canon and Vicar General, whose bull of provision is dated June 18, 1442. This Laurence was also dispensed *ex defectu natalium*. His unsavoury character has been amply recorded by Canon Maguire, but it is satisfactory to add that the Bishop retired to Rome in 1470, and was formally absolved by the Pope on October 7, 1476.

It is incorrect to include a certain Donogh O'Gallagher as Bishop of Raphoe, although Canon Maguire says: "It is absolutely certain that Bishop Donatus O'Gallagher occupied the See of St. Adamnan as successor to Laurence, and was himself succeeded by John Gilbride." The Vatican Records sufficiently disprove this statement, and it is tolerably clear that Laurence O'Gallagher continued as Bishop till his death in 1479, that is, from 1442 to 1477.

The successor of Bishop O'Gallagher was a Roman cleric, John de Rogerü, who was provided to the See by the Pope on November 12, 1479. His rule was short, as his death occurred late in 1483. Probably he is "the Italian Bishop George," who fulminated sentence of excommunication against Prince O'Donnell for detaining certain church



lands, namely, Kilmackeeran and Lough Ross in Boylagh.

According to Canon Maguire a certain John MacBride was Bishop of Raphoe from 1450 to 1484, but as has been seen, John de Rogerü immediately succeeded Laurence O'Gallagher. According to the Vatican Records Menelaus MacCormac, Dean of Raphoe since 1469, was provided to the See on November 4, 1483. (Ware and Brady give the date as "1484").

Bishop Menelaus, or Menmain, had read a brilliant course at Oxford University. His name appears as "Carmagan Hibernicus," and he ruled Raphoe from 1484 till 1513. Canon Maguire gives his episcopate as from 1484 to 1515, but he adds that "he retired to the Donegal Monastery in 1514, and died in the habit of a Franciscan Friar on the 9th of May in the following year." This saintly prelate must have retired early in 1513—not in 1514—because in the Papal Bull of provision of his successor, he is described as "senio confectus et viribus sui corporis destitutus." This Bull is dated February 6, 1513, and consequently the Bishop must have signified his wish to resign at the close of the year 1512.

Cornelius O'Cahan was provided to the See of Raphoe by Pope Leo X. on February 6, 1513, and is described as a clerk of the diocese of Derry, a bachelor in *decretis* of legitimate age, and endowed with many virtues. His appointment had been made on the nomination of King Henry VIII., whom the Pope describes as "his dearest son." This Bishop ruled from 1513 to 1534, and was replaced by Edmund O'Gallaher, on May 11, of the latter year.

It is singular that in the Bull of Provision of Bishop O'Gallagher—who was a grandson of Bishop Laurence O'Gallagher—the See is described as "vacant for about 17 years by the death of Menelaus," ignoring the appointment of Bishop O'Cahan. Now, if it be true that O'Gallagher was appointed because O'Cahan "became a schismatical supporter of Henry," as Canon Maguire would have us believe, how then comes it that O'Cahan was appointed on the nomination of the English King, as is expressly stated in the Vatican and Barberini MSS.? The only answer would seem to be that Bishop O'Cahan was

really the legitimate Bishop, and that O'Gallagher's appointment was obtained by some misrepresentation. And, the Four Masters, in chronicling the death of the latter prelate, on February 26, 1543, take care to note that he "had experienced great opposition regarding the bishopric."

But, more important still, the author of the Catalogue of the Bishops of Raphoe, in the British Museum, who wrote in the first decade of the 17th century, and whose recollection of events must have gone back to 1550, tells us definitely that O'Gallagher "had procured the Bishopric of Raphoe for himself in Conor O'Cahan's time, but he died before the controversy was ended, so that Conor was Bishop both before and after him." Curiously enough, the self same thing happened in the case of Hugh O'Carolan,<sup>3</sup> who was Bishop of Clogher from 1535-1567, but who had been temporarily ousted by Raymond MacMahon (1546-1560).

In regard to this disputed succession of prelates Canon Maguire falls into a singular blunder in impeaching the orthodoxy of Rory O'Donnell, Bishop of Derry, by quoting the appointment of William Hogeson to the See of Derry on August 8, 1520—seven months after the Papal appointment of Rory O'Donnell to the same See! The fact is, that the promotion of William Hogeson, O.P., was to Kildare (Daren) not to Derry (Deren), and never came off, while it is equally certain that Rory O'Donnell, Bishop of Derry, was permitted to retain the Deanery of Raphoe by the Pope, lived and died orthodox; and, above all, is styled *bonae memoriae* in the Papal Bull of Provision of his successor, Eugene O'Doherty, O.S.A., on June 25, 1554 (Barberini M.S.)

"Quentin O'Higgins, O.P." (1533), is given as Bishop-elect of Raphoe by Canon Maguire, but no doubt, this is an error. Probably this is the same prelate who was appointed Bishop of Clonmacnoise on November 10, 1515 and who ruled that diocese till 1538. However, he was a Franciscan Friar, not a Dominican, and surely Canon Maguire might have paused before making the definite statement that Bishop O'Higgins, "a Dominican Friar of

<sup>3</sup> See my article in the I.T.Q. in January, 1919.

the Convent of Sligo," was sent on "an official tour of inspection to the religious of the Franciscan Friary of Killybegs."

From the above summary it is safe to assume that Conon O'Cahan was Bishop of Raphoe from 1513 to 1547, and on December 5, 1847, he was succeeded by Art O'Gallagher, Dean of Derry, with permission to retain his deanery with the See of Raphoe.

Apropos of this bishop, who is described by the almost contemporary British Museum MS. as "a spirited gentleman who went always with a troop of horsemen under his colours," Canon Maguire adds:—"Had his Lordship forfeited the Deanship of Derry, it is unlikely we should ever have heard anything about his costly retinue." This gloss is intended, of course, to belittle the value of this Catalogue, which, notwithstanding its limitations, is really the expression of views current at the close of the 16th century. But Canon Maguire has failed to notice that on May 29, 1555, under Queen Mary, the good Bishop was ordered by Pope Julius III. to resign the Deanery of Derry in favour of Cornelius O'Doherty, Rector of Moville (Reg. Jul. III., No. 1758).

It only remains to add that Bishop O'Gallagher died as an orthodox Catholic prelate at Kinaweer (Courtmac Crauford) on August 16, 1651, and, according to the Four Masters, "was greatly lamented in Tironaill." An additional testimony to his orthodoxy is furnished by the reference to him in the Bull of provision by his successor, wherein he is described as "*bonae memoriae*."

W. H. GRATTAN FLOOD.

## The Lawfulness of the Hunger Strike.

IN fairness either to themselves or to their readers, I do not think I could ask the Editors of the IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY to allow me space for a detailed reply to Canon Waters' latest article on the Hunger Strike. Nevertheless seeing that, while the article purported to be a reply to a direct attack made by me, it was mainly devoted to extraneous points, and that even where it did profess to deal with my objections it was simply a repetition of the original arguments and distinctions against which the objections were directed, it does not appear proper that the discussion should close without at least a brief summary which will enable readers to form their own judgment on the chief points at issue between us.

I. The longer the discussion goes on the more clear it becomes that the solution centres round the point: Did the Hunger Strikers aim at procuring their own death? Now how are we to find out whether they did or not? Most naturally by asking themselves and those who best understand their minds. The reply will be emphatic that they did not. Canon Waters, however, maintains that they did, no matter what they said or believed themselves. From a careful perusal of all he has so far written on the subject I have been able to discover just this one argument for a position on the face of it most extraordinary. The prospect of death at the end of the hunger strike is the only thing which gives it any efficacy for the purpose for which it is undertaken. That may be true, but it does not by any means follow that the hunger strikers aimed at their own death, as I tried to make clear in my previous article by the perfectly parallel example of the father getting before the motor car in the hope of so saving his daughter. Canon Waters retorted that the parallel was only a matter of ingenious phrasing. The phrases, ingenious or otherwise, were not mine. I simply took Canon Waters' own words about the hunger strikers and showed that they could be applied phrase by phrase to the action of the father trying to save his daughter.

II. Apart from their personal intention, Canon Waters holds that the hunger strikers are guilty of suicide because they deliberately do an act which of its very nature brings about their own death. But therein he goes against the very definition of suicide, which, no matter how deadly the act may be, requires in addition the intention, purpose, or aim of causing one's own death. If we try to improve on the current theology on the subject so as to dispense with the personal intention we shall make it impossible to understand the nature and malice of suicide, and shall find it necessary to have recourse to such fanciful distinctions as that between the jump and the fall and the action of the water acting naturally and acting as the instrument of the will of the suicide.

With charming detachment Canon Waters deplores the futility of the discussion and the partisanship which accompanied it, as if he himself were not chiefly responsible for both. What else could he expect when he undertook to impose on the public disagreeable views from which he knew that others just as qualified to pronounce as he was, disagreed? When both sides had expressed their views and failed to come to an agreement, it might be reasonably expected that they could agree to differ. But no; Canon Waters does not think they can. He not only disagrees with his opponents; he contemptuously dismisses them as unworthy of consideration in comparison with himself. As being personally involved, I do not like to express an opinion on this reflection on the theologians who have written in defence of the hunger strike. But, even apart from this, his position is the most amazing I have ever seen adopted by a well-read experienced theologian. He adverts to the want of authority in defence of the hunger strike, but he appears not to advert to the more telling want of authority in support of the obligation? He seems not to remember that the *onus probandi* is on the side which undertakes to establish an obligation. He argues as if an obligation were to be presumed to exist until it had been conclusively disproved, which is just about as reasonable as to say that a man is presumed to be guilty until he proves his innocence. The safe course is to be followed, he says. That principle, as every theological manual is careful to note, has only a very restricted, well-defined, application.

No one else, as far as I am aware, has ever thought of applying it as Canon Waters applies it here. And, if it is to be admitted absolutely as it is applied by Canon Waters, where will it lead us? At one stroke it will destroy Probabilism, Equiprobabilism, Probabiliorism, will bring us directly against the Church's condemnation by making us hold that it is not lawful to follow even a most probable opinion.

J. KELLEHER.

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As an indication of the intense interest with which this controversy has been followed by readers outside Ireland, and also to show that opinion is as sharply divided abroad as at home, we reproduce the following letter from a Milan correspondent.—[EDITORS.]

Via Monterosa 14,  
Milan, Italy,  
21st May, 1921.

Editors "*Irish Theological Quarterly*," Maynooth.

I beg to be allowed to draw your attention to an erroneous statement made in the present number of your Review in the article on Hunger Strikes; the author declares that *no theologian of any renown* has written in defence of Hunger Strikes. . . . In the "*Revista del Clero Italiano*" for November, 1920, an article appeared penned by the renowned Father Gemelli, O.F.M., whose fame is widespread, not only in Italy, but in other countries, as a philosopher and one of the greatest living Italian Psychologists. . . .

I beg to remain,

Yours very truly,

N. PORCELLI.



## Notes.

### A POLISH MYSTIC.

Now that Poland has regained the right of self-determination it is of interest to recall the life of the mystic patriot who almost a century before prophesied the dawn. It was Count Sigismund Krasinski, one of the ablest and most original Polish writers. His story is an extraordinary one, just as the case of his country is exceptional. Here was a man who fused patriotism with mysticism, who steeped political thought in religious ideas, and who wished that everything, individual and national and international life, should be fermented with active Christianity. Through all his work there is the stamp of genius, of an originality that is startling. For his intense thought is everywhere working out the parallel between the suffering and resurrection of Christ and the sufferings and recoveries of men and nations.

A very few biographical details may be useful as a setting for his thought. He was the son of a Polish general and was born at Paris, 19 February, 1812, where also he died, 23 February, 1859. As a student in Warsaw he was an admirer of the Romantic movement in literature; intensely patriotic he sympathised with the patriotic ardour of his Polish fellow-students, but when, against the prompting of his own heart, he obeyed his father's order not to take part in political manifestations, he became unpopular with his former comrades and left for Geneva. When forced to return and present himself at Tsar Nicholas's court, his health gave way. Withdrawing to Vienna he published his first really great work in 1833, a drama, *The Undivine Comedy*. It was the bitter fruit of his own suffering and of the suffering of Poland, appearing as it did soon after the unsuccessful rising of 1831. It is, unlike his later works, pessimistic; both the old order and new are represented as having each its champion who is faithless and self-seeking. In 1836 the drama *Iridion* appeared and to escape the censor, the Russian rationer of truth, it represented the soul of the Polish struggle under the form of a young Greek's insurrection against the Roman Empire. In it Krasinski pleads with his countrymen that the hatred of a persecuted nation for its persecutor leads to death, that love is the only constructive force, and that it alone can save. It was but an aspect, a fragment of the later teaching which was to be welded into an original system; but it was a most important and easily forgotten doctrine that nations, exactly like individuals, are bound by the Christian law of loving their enemy nations. The young patriot of the play is in the end condemned by Christ, his judge, for his evil deeds and for his want of trust in Providence. But not for his patriotism: for the drama closes thus in the Coliseum: 'And the sun rose above the ruins of Rome, and there was none to tell me where were the traces of my Thought. But I know that it lasts and lives.'

THE PROBLEM  
OF A CRUCIFIED  
NATION.

BUT the great problem before Krasinski, which his life-work was to solve, was the problem of the crucifixion of Poland. It was a country that was faithful to Catholic Christianity in a special way; were it not for the existence of Ireland, we might say in a unique degree. It was suffering from partition administered for their own ends by its enemies; a partition not into two parts, but even into three. The world was looking heedlessly on; that world which by a supreme mockery is said to have marshalled in it the conscience of mankind; it is so said by gilt-tongued politicians whose short memories naturally forget that it killed Christ. The world was neutral at the spectacle of the flogging of a nation. That was sad enough; but there appeared to be something more tragic; God appeared to be neutral also. It was the problem of evil in a concrete example. And Krasinski always studied the living example of flesh and blood.

BEFORE DAWN.

THE *dénouement* of that great drama of evil, enacted in Christ, in His world, in His faithful member, Poland, came to Krasinski with a flash of insight in his poem *Before Dawn*. The poet sailing on a mystic sea with Beatrice, the loved source of his inspiration, has a vision of the heroes of old Poland; Czarniecki unfolds to him the destiny of Poland; it will be great through suffering because it preserved in a singular way the spirit of Christianity; it casts the solemn shadow of the Master among the olives: *factus est pro nobis obediens usque ad mortem. mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen.*

Death in the case of the individual, or the group, is the condition of life; shame is the prelude to glory; spending precedes receiving. To illustrate the laws here below Krasinski seeks his parallels in the doctrine of Christ and of the Trinity. In the Trinity there is the self-impartation; something similar takes place in the Incarnation and Eucharist: the ideal is that all may be one. 'In humanity the social state, the sanctification and uplifting of which is the aim of humanity, is of itself that very reciprocal self-impartation of human spirits. Everywhere and always who gives receives back: who loves grows: who creates something external is in that same moment himself created higher . . . By the very nature of the spirit the more it creates the more creative it becomes . . . Christ poured himself into humanity by the most laborious life and most painful death. But then there was at once manifested the truth of the law which is the law of life, because before human vision He rose again from the dead and before human vision ascended into Heaven.' Thus Krasinski in *The Treatise on the Trinity* which deals with the Trinity in God and man and time and space.

The example of his doctrine is Poland. It is a chosen people, another servant of Jahveh. Its dismemberment is not a mere political crime. For men make different forms of government, but God makes a nation. The nations are necessary units in the humanity that must be unified and wedded to Christ. They are the living strings in the mighty harp of the universe: 'over them the Spirit wanders, on them the Spirit

plays, in that song alone it resteth.' To destroy a nation is a violence against the Divine idea, is a sacrilege. That sacrilege had to be redressed in the case of Poland before the Christ-like realization of humanity on earth could proceed. And when restored Poland would inaugurate a new reign of justice and truth and love for humanity. It was expedient that one nation should die for the people. Poland often died for the ideals of human liberty.

VIA  
DOLOROSA.

To Krasinski's mind facts alone like this could save the people. He did not believe in mere abstract doctrines, in a formulation of fourteen points, but in a living example with a beating heart 'whose crimson life-blood should shed itself on all.' He pointed to the rugged road, the *via dolorosa*, the Way that is Christ. 'No one without deliberation and strong resolve, without a thousand vacillations, investigations, searchings, painful deceptions, sinkings of the powers of thought and their alternate uprisings, shall reach the self-inebriation of their own Christ-likeness, awakened in them by the manifestation of the Son of God. The collective spirit of a nation must pass through precisely the same cycle as individuals if she is to rise from the dead and once more stand in the circle of living creative nations, ruling by political deed: and if moreover she is to become the historical pattern of their earthly immortality, her soul divorced from government must in her very death be inebriated with the very Christ-ness of collective spirits, such as hitherto on earth there has not been and which depends on the incarnation of the love-law of Christ in all internal and international forms in the world. Such an incarnation, being the new shedding forth of the Spirit of Christ from the narrow bounds in which till now the world has kept it, to all the limits of the world, tends of necessity to the creation of an organization higher, more rational, and more holy than that which hitherto existing on earth has everywhere crippled the law of love, and, by that same, universal nature also.'

Thus he had his dreams of a Poland working out the new era of economic equality instead of unjust exploitation, of obligatory arbitration instead of the sword, of freedom of men and of the world's highways. By another appeal to the parallel of the Trinity he traced the march of the world's progress. There was the age of Jahveh or Power, the age of Christ or Knowledge, the age of the Holy Ghost or Love. Caesar was unwittingly an angel of the Lord in making a road for Christianity. So was even Napoleon's career a Divine ordering in the preparation for the reign of Love. But, as in Pagan times, there must be first an anarchy, a doubt, a denial, for which there is necessarily no hope except in the cry 'Our Father who art in Heaven.' In the future of his country and of humanity, a future lit with love and liberty, Krasinski believed—because he believed in God. To him the reign of the Holy Ghost of love was not something to be reserved till after the General Judgment. The striving of Christ for one fold for all humanity was not in vain. *Before the Dawn* is exultant in its close. 'And that new world all rejoicing as a church shall flower to God. The Polish land, the Polish Eden, is desolate no more nor mourning. Nor behind me nor before me is there darkness any more. All is light and all is

justice. Clear our purgatorial anguish and our sorrows and our bondage. Long the terror of our sleep. We believed it. We believed in eternal pain and toil. They were but the sanctuary's entrance, but one step upon the stairway: they were but the night of merit.'

In this sketch I have once unconsciously written the name, Ireland, for Poland. Reader, you also may sometimes think of that name.

G. P.



RE-UNION  
OR SOCIAL  
CRUSADE?

FOR some years past a good deal of energy has been expended by certain non-Catholic bodies, especially by the Episcopal Church of America, in an endeavour to bring about some kind of re-union of Christianity.

The undertaking never looked very hopeful. It is almost impossible to imagine a Church, based on belief in a divinely instituted authority competent to deal with the dogmas of faith and the means of sanctification, coming to terms with another religious body based largely on the rejection of such authority. Yet such is the position as between the Anglican and Greek Churches, on the one hand, and the dissentient Protestant bodies on the other. Even the latter would appear to have little chance of uniting among themselves on any positive dogmatic platform, except the most meagre and attenuated; for the fundamental principle of Protestantism, private judgment, however it be camouflaged by a vague respect for traditional creeds or historic confessions, is of its very nature a disruptive force. As for the Catholic Church, she could not unite with any of them, except on terms that must involve a surrender of principle on one side or the other. The experience of the most zealous workers for re-union has borne out these *a priori* probabilities; for the whole movement, of which the Geneva conference last year might be regarded as a typical expression, has shown how impossible it is to secure anything like a corporate *rapprochement* between bodies whose fundamental principles are really different.

But if canonical re-union be, for the present at all events, an unattainable ideal, there is another direction in which joint action appears to be not merely feasible but highly desirable. There is probably no Christian body that does not accept the two great commandments laid down by Christ:—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . and the second is like unto this:—thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The second of these commandments implies a wide sphere of Christian duties. Yet a visitor from another planet might infer from present-day conditions that Christianity takes little or no cognizance of social obligations. Great masses of men—and men who call themselves Christians—are conscious of no tangible obligations towards their less fortunate fellow-men, except such as the State, for reasons of expediency, chooses to impose on them. The high-sounding humanitarian principles, preached by insincere politicians during the war, having served their purpose have been forgotten; and nations, classes and individuals are everywhere struggling for mastery, swayed almost entirely by motives of worldly self-interest. As usually happens in case of a struggle, it is the weak and the poor who come to the wall. We have an example of this in the process recently adopted in England

and America to bring down the cost of living. A complicated industrial system required that a saving be effected; and the saving is forthwith effected by cutting down wages, particularly the wages of the worst-paid grades of labour. It was the obvious solution of the problem—obvious to the worldly mind. The dignity of human nature, the claims of Christian charity, the demands even of natural justice—well, these have nothing to do with business. Modern business would appear to be outside the purview of Christian morality. We mention the point merely to illustrate the degree to which the mentality of a large part of the world to-day is divorced from the spirit of the gospel.

The selfishness of the individual is mirrored in the lust for blood and power and spoil, that shapes the policy of some of the greatest states at the present time. We hear regret expressed by religious men on all sides that things are not as they should be. We hear fears expressed for the safety of Society itself. Western civilisation and democracy, reared on the principles of Christianity, have been allowed to become, not merely forgetful of, but hostile to the mother that bore them. Yet Christian ministers of every Church and Sect profess to believe that the Gospel of Christ contains the best remedies for the social ills around us.

Here is a field worthy of the combined labours of the various Churches. To proclaim boldly the social teaching of Christ, to point out to a selfish generation man's duties towards his neighbour, to emphasise the fact that the world's goods were not created for one class of Society only, that the stewards of power and wealth and patronage are only stewards and not masters of the common inheritance—to do this and much else in the same line, and to do it effectively would require, in the present circumstances, a combined effort of the magnitude of something like a crusade. We do not expect to witness an interdenominational crusade on behalf of any cause, however good; but we do think that, with the same amount of zeal, energy and good-will that have been displayed in other directions, the Churches could accomplish in this matter an immense amount of good.

ONE of the most serious social problems of to-day is UNEMPLOYMENT, that of unemployment. Several causes have contributed to the dislocation of industry—the change from war work to peace work, the scantiness of purchasing power due to the impoverishment of the belligerent nations, the industrial strife caused by the efforts to bring down wages, and indirectly the drain imposed upon industry to meet the costs of the great war and of the military adventures that have succeeded it. There was an unemployment problem, of course, before the war; but it has become much more acute since the declaration of peace. Certain palliative measures have been introduced in England, to tide over the present crisis; but no real solution of the problem has been found, or even seriously aimed at. While the cause of trouble remains untouched, there is little use in patching up its effects. In this connection it is worth recalling a principle laid down by the American Catholic bishops in their reconstruction programme three years ago. "The general level of wages attained during the war," they say, "should not be lowered . . . . After all, a living wage is not necessarily the full measure of justice.

All the Catholic authorities on the subject declare that this is only the minimum of justice . . . . Since our resources and instrumentalities are sufficient to provide more than a living wage for a very large proportion of the workers, why should we acquiesce in a theory that denies them this measure of the comforts of life? Such a policy is not only of very questionable morality, but it is unsound economically. The large demand for goods, which is created by high rates of wages and high purchasing power by the masses, is the surest guarantee of a continuous and general operation of industrial establishments. It is the most effective instrument of prosperity for labour and capital alike." Precisely; the chief cause of unemployment is the contraction of the market, and this in turn is due to the want of purchasing power. But the community as a whole does not control the policy of production and the fixing of prices, and that section which does control these matters is not always willing to forego the prospect of an immediate gain for a greater advantage in the future. The result is that thousands of people are obliged to go without the conveniences or the necessities of life, which they could and would provide by their labour, if they were only allowed to do so. The position would be ludicrous, if it were not so serious. Goods are wanted, the labour required to produce them is available, the men are anxious to give their labour and the employer to hire it, yet the workers have to stand idle at the street corner, while their children are destitute at home. An unfortunate system, in which certain class interests are paramount, blocks the way. As purchasing power falls the market contracts still farther, a slump in trade sets in, and deliberate destruction of large quantities of goods is not infrequently found to be the easiest way out of the impasse.

There is not much of the spirit of Christian charity about this whole process: there is very little worldly wisdom even. It has something of the proverbial "penny wise and pound foolish" policy about it. If those, whose privileged position gives them control over the nation's economic policy, can not or will not take a patriotic, to say nothing of a Christian, view of their social obligations, the duty of controlling their activities in the public interests devolves on the State. There is room for discussion as to the best method of doing so; but the general statement is undeniable on the principles of Christian morality and democracy alike, and was accepted as such during the war. Unfortunately the machinery of State is only too often the tool of those who are the worst offenders. It is in such circumstances that revolutionary propaganda thrives best.

W. M.



#### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CANON LAW.

TWELVE months ago we made some remarks on 'the development in canonical principles since the publication of the Code,' and on the special replies and decrees in which the development found expression.<sup>1</sup> It may be as well to keep matters up-to-date by giving a brief résumé of the main documents that have since appeared in the same department. They may be conveniently summarized under four headings.

<sup>1</sup> I T. Q., July, 1920, pp. 215-26.



*Parishes.*—The first and second, issued by the Propaganda, do not affect us directly, but they throw a little side-light on a point of interest. One gives extensive directions regarding the erection of quasi-parishes, and declares, among other things, that a decree of the Ordinary is required<sup>2</sup>: the other supplements the directions, and states that 'the portions already marked off come under the category of parishes.'<sup>3</sup> So that, in regard to missionary countries, we are still left in almost the same state of doubt as the apparently conflicting pronouncements of the Consistorial and of the Council had already aroused in connection with countries under the general law—do the well-defined sections already in existence become parishes *ipso facto* (216, § 2) or is a new degree required?<sup>4</sup> For localities subject to the Propaganda, at least, the former hypothesis would now seem to be the more correct.

In the matter of conferring parishes little new has been decided. The appointment to a parish vacant for over half a year does not devolve on the Holy See when the delay has been due to other causes than the Ordinary's negligence<sup>5</sup>: the reply may seem an extension of canon 1432, but is certainly in harmony with the unanimous pre-Code teaching. The replies given on the same date in regard to the examination of parish-priests, contemplated in canon 459, § 3, do not apply to countries like our own in which a concursus-policy, general or special, has been adopted. We can therefore afford to feel indifferent, for the present at least, when we are told, 1°, that, in case of transference, the examination is necessary when the initiative has come from the parish-priest himself, 2°, that the contrary is true when the priest is removed in administrative fashion, 3°, that, when the men deemed suitable by the Ordinary refuse to submit to examination, the Congregation of the Council must be approached, 4°, that the examinations prescribed in canon 996—not, though, those of canon 130—sometimes fulfil the requirements.<sup>6</sup>

Not has anything new transpired in regard to the removal of a parish-priest from his parish. The case did come under review in which the intended victim avoided the 'invitation' by concealing his address. Was a notice in the newspaper enough? The affirmative answer is so clearly in accordance with canon 2143, § 3, that the Commission's reference to the canon<sup>7</sup> adds nothing to our knowledge.

Attention, though, may be directed to an allied matter—the appointment of curates. Canon 476 §3, prescribes that 'the right of appointing curates from the secular clergy belongs, not to the parish-priest, but to the local Ordinary—when the parish-priest has been heard.' Suppose, however, that, according to long-standing practice, the bishop has been accustomed to make the appointments without being under any obligation of consulting anyone. Does the last clause just quoted impose the obligation of consulting the parish-priest? The

<sup>2</sup> July 25th, 1920, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Dec. 9th, 1920, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> I. T. Q., *ib.*, p. 223.

<sup>5</sup> Commission, Nov. 24th, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

question was raised last November by the Archbishop of Agram. He represented to the Congregation of the Council that 'owing to the dearth of priests and the need for [more expedite] administration' a centennial custom prevailed in his diocese of having the curates appointed *inaudito parrocho*. Could it still be maintained? The consultor inclined to the affirmative view. He admitted that, till the end of the eighteenth century, it was the parish-priest that made the appointment, and he gave the historical reasons for the practice. But the revolutionary movement in France and elsewhere suggested a change, and the result was that in the great majority of places the right of appointment passed to the bishops without the intervention of the parish-priest. For this he was able to cite the leading authorities in the Old World and the New, and authoritative enactments from many sources—including the Maynooth Statutes of 1875. The New Code, he continued, legalised the principle. It added '*audito parrocho*,' but only as a solace to the comparatively few parish-priests whose rights had remained all along unaffected. To apply the clause all round would run counter to the intention of the Code—which is to preserve 'acquired rights' and, in this particular matter, to extend episcopal powers rather than restrict them. No harm had resulted from the exercise of unrestricted power by the bishops: a reversal of policy would now only retard administration, especially in the larger dioceses. Therefore, he concluded, the Code raises no bar to the bishop's making the appointment without consultation with the parish priest.

But the Council took a different view. The custom, it stated, is not 'reprobated': on the other hand it is certainly 'opposed' to the Code: therefore, the matter is simply one of fact—does the Ordinary think the custom can be prudently abolished (can. 5)? The fact that the Ordinary in the case doubted whether it could be 'maintained' was sufficient proof of his conviction that it could be 'abolished': it was difficult to see what harm could result from the obligation to consult a parish-priest, when there was no obligation to follow his advice: and, as for the bishop's 'acquired rights,' the consultor had already met the difficulty by showing that, on the point in question, there had never until now been any universal law and consequently no opportunity of acquiring rights against it by prescription. The decision, therefore, given was 'Stand by the regulation of the Code, canon 476, § 3.'<sup>8</sup>

It establishes no universal law. But it points to the correct conclusion for all dioceses similarly situated.

*The Sacraments.*—There are three replies of some little interest. Confessionals, furnished with a fixed grate perforated with small openings, must be erected in all churches or public oratories, whether the penitents be men or women<sup>9</sup>—quite in harmony with the Code and with all previous law and custom. *Peregrini* are bound by the reservations of the place where the confessions are heard: the reply has been officially embodied,<sup>10</sup> but had been given, more than a year before, to His

<sup>8</sup> Aot. Apost. Sed., xiii., p. 46.

<sup>9</sup> Commission, Nov. 24th, 1920.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

Eminence Cardinal Logue.<sup>11</sup> The faculties granted in canon 1045, §1, may be exercised when the impediment, though previously known to others, only now becomes known to the parish-priest or Ordinary<sup>12</sup>: but the interpretation covers only a portion of the field laid open by a previous private reply—also to His Eminence.<sup>13</sup>

The most welcome development, though, has been in the direction of restoring the *Formulae* that were swept away by the Consistorial decree of April 25th, 1918. Discussing the matter twelve months ago, we came to the conclusion that the withdrawal was hardly in conformity with the spirit of canon 4, and that it introduced an element of disproportion by lessening episcopal powers in one department of the matrimonial sphere while the Code itself had done so much to strengthen them in others.<sup>14</sup> Whether the conclusion was right or wrong, the indications are that the ideal we indicated is in the way of being realized. The Consistorial announced a few months ago that, in response to repeated demands for a renewal of the *Formulae*, 'a definite rule would be established and notified as soon as possible.'<sup>15</sup> So far as the Irish bishops are concerned, the promise had been kept by anticipation, in the matrimonial line at least, by the grant of very generous concessions on February 1st—and we presume that the bishops of other countries have been, or soon will be, allowed to share in the same privilege. The Irish faculties extend to, 1°, dispensations to be granted for a 'just and reasonable' cause from all minor impediments (1042) and from the simple vows (1058), 2°, dispensations 'for a grave and urgent cause' from nearly every major impediment of consanguinity, affinity, and public propriety, 3°, special provisions for times of Missions and Visitation, 4°, power of granting a 'sanatio' in case of the minor impediments, when some elementary conditions have been fulfilled. There is even a promise of authority to deal with the carefully-guarded regulations governing mixed marriage and difference of worship.<sup>16</sup> So that, if other departments keep pace with the matrimonial, the Bishops of the Catholic world are likely to find themselves endowed in the future with more extensive powers than their most privileged brethren in the past.

*Religious Orders and Congregations.*—The replies under this heading, though very important in themselves, make little appeal to the general reader. We may therefore, confine ourselves to noting that the prohibition against repeated appointment of a nun to the position of Mother General or Mother Superioress has been re-affirmed by a Circular Letter<sup>17</sup>: that the permission granted to nuns (522) to make their confessions in 'any church or oratory, even semi-public' has been extended to embrace 'any place legitimately appointed for the confession of women'<sup>18</sup>: that, notwithstanding canon 10, the law against

<sup>11</sup> I. T. Q., Oct., 1919, pp. 391-2; July, 1920, p. 224.

<sup>12</sup> Commission, 1st March, 1921.

<sup>13</sup> See 'I. E. Record,' Nov., 1920.

<sup>14</sup> I. T. Q., July, 1920, p. 218-9.

<sup>15</sup> March 7th, 1921.

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion of these faculties see, e.g., 'I. E. Record,' May, 1921, pp. 516-524.

<sup>17</sup> March 9th, 1920; published in September.

<sup>18</sup> Commission, Nov. 24th, 1920.

the holding of offices or benefices by secularized Religious (642) applies even to those who had left before 1918<sup>19</sup>; and that the rules regarding the dismissal of Religious have been more clearly defined.<sup>20</sup>

*Miscellaneous.*—The remaining decisions are of slight importance or affect only particular localities. For instance, a number of replies have been given in regard to Fast and Abstinence,<sup>21</sup> but without conveying anything that the canons themselves would not have told us. The regulations that have been in force for some time in America and Newfoundland in connexion with episcopal appointments have been extended, in all essential points, to Scotland also.<sup>22</sup> And perhaps we should not forget the condemnation of the *Y.M.C.A.*,<sup>23</sup> that aroused so much indignation in circles where a misguided enthusiasm does duty for fact and principle.

The development, it will be seen, is neither rapid nor extensive. That perhaps is the best indication we could have that the Code has satisfied the expectations of the Catholic world by providing in advance a fitting solution of nearly every ecclesiastical problem that can arise in practical life.

M. J. O'D.



THE SHAMROCK dealing with the acts of Saint Patrick there is not a  
IN LITERATURE. single reference to the incident which popular belief  
now so generally associates with the shamrock. Indeed  
the Irish word *seamrog* itself does not appear in the written language until, perhaps, the seventeenth century, though it must have existed as a spoken form centuries prior to that age. *Seamrog*, as readers of Gaelic know, is a diminutive of *seamar*, a generic term for trefoil or clover, which also gives an adjectival derivative *seamrack* meaning 'flowery' or 'clovery.' The last-mentioned word occurs in mediaeval literature, for example in the oldest Irish life of Columcille where the Curragh of Kildare is described as a *magh aluinn scoith-sheamrack*, 'a delightful plain covered with clover blossom.' In all probability the other derivative is not less ancient, and it is only by chance it is not recorded in writing. Be that as it may, it is certain that the word first appears in literature in English, and in a peculiar English orthography. Edmond Campion completed a History of Ireland in 1571, in which, speaking of the habits of the Irish, he says:—

Proud are they of long, crisped glibbes and do nourish the same with all their cunning: to crop the front thereof they take it for a notable piece of villainy. *Shamroites*, water cresses, and other herbes they feed upon: oatemele and butter they cramme together.

It will be noted that the shamrock is here referred to as an article of food, not as a badge or emblem. This custom of eating shamrocks is well illustrated in a Latin botanical work published in 1570 by a Fleming named Lobel, who settled in London and dedicated his book to Queen Elizabeth. I give the passage in English. The writer speaks of the

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Commission, 1st March, 1921.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., Nov. 24th, 1920.

<sup>22</sup> Consistorial, Nov. 20th, 1920.

<sup>23</sup> Holy Office, Nov. 5th, 1920.

Purple and White Trefoil as being useful as a food for animals, and then goes on:

Nor is it from any other than this that the mere Irish, scorning all the delights and spurs of the palate, grind [the meal for] their cakes and loaves, which they knead with butter, and thrust into their groaning bellies.

Some such practice among the Irish soldiers surely suggested the following remark of John Derricke, who wrote an account in verse of the "wilde Irishe" in 1578: "in verie trothe my harte abhorreth their dealynges and my soul dooeth deteste their wilde *shamrocke* manners."

There are references to the shamrock also in Stanihurst (1586) and in Spenser (1595), in both cases as an article of food. The first wrongly identifies the plant with water-cress, and possibly Spenser makes the same mistake. As, however, Spenser ought to have had observation of the facts he writes about, we need not interpret him in this sense. He is describing the frightfulness of the Munster wars, particularly under his patron, Lord Grey of Wilton. He says of the country-people: "they did eate of the dead carrions . . . and yf they founde a plotte of watercresses or *sham-rokes*, there they flocked as to a feast for the time."

#### AN ARTICLE OF FOOD.

As to the identity of the plant then used as an article of food, we learn from a botanist named John Gerrard, who published a "Herball, or General Historie of Plantes" in 1597, that "there be divers sortes of three-leaflet grasses, some greater, others lesser . . . and first, of the common meadow trefoiles, which are called in Irish *shamrockes*." This author illustrates and describes the Purple Clover and the White Clover, recognised as different species in modern times under the names of *Trifolium pratense* and *Trifolium repens*, respectively. We are still, however, in the dark, as to which was used at the period as a foodstuff. It is only in 1680, as we shall see in a moment, that an Oxfordman definitely asserts that the shamrock used for food and the Purple Clover were identical.

Meanwhile we have interesting references to the practice of eating shamrock in the course of the seventeenth century. Fynes Moryson, who was secretary to Lord Mountjoy, came to Ireland in 1599. He has a puzzling passage in his "Itinerary" to the effect that the Irish "willingly eat the herbe *Schamrock*, being of a sharp taste, which, as they run and are chased to and fro, they snatch like beasts out of the ditches." John Speed, who wrote in 1611, says of the Irish that "their diet in necessity was slender, feeding upon water-cresses, roots, mushrcmes, *shamrogh*, butter tempered with oatmeal, whey, yea and raw flesh"; while George Wither, who published "Abuses Stript and Whipt, or Satirical Essays" in 1613, points with approbation to their simple fare:

But see whereto this dainty time hath brought us

Were we not in our townes kept in by 'th foe  
The woods and fields hath yielded us enough  
To content nature: and then in our needs  
Had we found either leaves or grasse, or weeds,  
We could have lived as now at this day can  
Many a fellow subject Irish-man.

There is, further, an amusing passage in the "Workes" of John Taylor (1630) under the heading "A most learned Lye and Illiterate oration in lame galloping Rime." It runs thus:

Avernus' musicke 'gan to rore  
Inthroned upon a seat of three-leaved grass  
Whilst all the Hibernian kernes in multitudes  
Did feast with *shamerags* stewed in usquebagh.

Sir James Ware (1654) notes that Strabo calls the Irish herb-eaters, and then adds: "of herbs they especially made use of the meadow trefoil, the water-cress, the common sorrel and the cochlearea."

**A STRONG  
ADVOCATE.**

Henry Mundy, an Oxford doctor, published a work on diet in 1680. He was a strong vegetarian. He observes: "men constrained to use this food alone are noted to be no less vigorous and brawny than others that fare sumptuously. Thus the Irish that nourish themselves with their shamrock (which is the purple clover) are swift of foot and of nimble strength." Further references to shamrock-food occur in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they cannot be now quoted. The use of the herb for purposes of food appears to have declined with the introduction of potatoes; at least, that was the view of John Rutty, a Dublin man, who wrote in 1772. The question cannot be discussed here, but in a later note I hope to deal with the use of the shamrock as a badge or emblem of nationality.

P. W.



**BIBLICAL  
CONGRESS  
AND THE  
CATHOLIC  
BIBLE.**

English Catholics propose to hold a Biblical Congress in Cambridge this Summer to commemorate the fifteenth centenary of St. Jerome. It was almost inevitable, when the work of St. Jerome, who translated the Scriptures into the vernacular of his day, was recalled, that attention should once more be called to the necessity of a new English translation of the Bible. Wiseman felt the need in 1836, and at one time it seemed likely that Cardinal Newman would undertake the task. But the golden opportunity was allowed to pass. The question has been reopened by an anonymous writer in a recent issue of the *Tablet*, who makes the bold suggestion that the Authorised Version be adopted as the standard Catholic Bible. In doing so he merely repeats the proposal made long ago by Canon Barry in the *Dublin Review*, and the latter now warmly endorses the suggestion. Though the point is not made very clear, the suggestion seems to be that the Authorised Version be adopted just as it stands; if any corrections are deemed necessary "a modest margin would furnish them without doing violence to the text" (*Tablet*, May 21, p. 663).



SHOULD WE  
ADOPT THE  
AUTHORISED  
VERSION

THE arguments in favour of the Authorised Version as formulated by Canon Barry and his supporters are the following. In the first place

"It is impossible to supplant the Authorised version by any new translation, however excellent. We cannot unmake history. Whatever we might in such ways attempt would remain provincial, by no fault of ours. There is only one English Bible; there never can be another . . . Does any man ever dream that in some future age the Douay Bible, revised ever so much, or a brand new translation made to-morrow, will supersede the ancient text of which innumerable traces are everywhere discernible, not only in preachers, but in poets, historians, novelists, in essays and journalism, and in common speech?" *Tablet*, May 21st, p. 663.)

In the second place the use of the Authorised Version would make matters less difficult for converts, and, "in the problem of conversion, so momentous a fact demands more notice than it has received" (*Ibid.* May 14, p. 631). One is reminded of the sacrifice which Cardinal Manning felt he was making when he gave up the Authorised Version on his conversion.

Naturally, the proposal has been variously received: but Canon Barry's opinion in matters of this nature is of great weight, and he has already won many supporters. It is not unlikely that much more will be heard of the proposal both before and during the Congress. It might seem impertinent on our part to interfere in a matter of purely domestic interest to English Catholics. But, as the need for a new translation is felt by the millions of Catholics who are neither English nor converts they are necessarily interested in a project which aims at meeting their wants. They are not likely to be impressed by the arguments for the new proposal, and would continue to use the Catholic Versions already in existence. It is quite possible that, if accepted, the Authorised Version might be a "sympathic link" between Catholics and other Christians; but it would be much preferable to establish this 'sympathic link' between English-speaking Catholics throughout the world. This would be effected if there existed a translation of the Scriptures which was accepted by all as the standard and official text. But if a change is to be made, and no one doubts its urgency, the matter must be approached in no provincial spirit, and unless common action is taken, and the co-operation or approval of English-speaking Catholics in other countries obtained, we are merely adding to the confusion which already exists.

THE SO-CALLED  
DOUAY BIBLE.

FOR, strange as it may seem, though we are accustomed to look upon our Catholic Bible as the Douay or Reims Version, it is in reality something very different. In most cases it is Challoner's revision in some one of its forms; sometimes it is neither Douay nor Challoner. Yet in all cases it is entitled either "Douay Version diligently revised," or "Accurate Reprint of Douay Version." An interesting article on this subject from one of our contributors appeared in the *Irish*

*Theological Quarterly* for October, 1911. The writer (Rev. Dr. O'Gorman of Ottawa) takes up some of the most familiar editions of the New Testament and shows clearly that each is apparently a distinct revision made by "some person or persons unknown," differing in countless passages from the three revisions of Challoner. One of the latter appears to have been taken as basis; but in each case some changes are made, some necessary, some otherwise. Now the writer of the article referred to claims that Challoner's three revisions—or at least the first and third—differ from each other so considerably that they deserve almost to be called distinct revisions. So that if we take up a Catholic New Testament, it is impossible to tell when or by whom it was translated, or what is its relation to the Douay Bible. If to all these 'Versions' in common use among Catholics we now add a new revision of the Authorised Version, it is difficult to see how the situation will be improved. The only hope is that all these may be superseded by a translation or revision which would have the approval of all English-speaking Catholics throughout the world.

It seems not to have occurred to those in favour of adopting the Authorised Version that the same argument which appeals to them was once used against the new translation made by St. Jerome and now known as the Vulgate. The Old Latin was the 'classic' of his day, it was familiar to the Christians of the fourth century to a much greater extent than is the Authorised Version to English people, its traces are discernible in all the ecclesiastical literature of that time, yet St. Jerome had his way, and his translation superseded the old. He gave us a correct translation while preserving some of the familiar 'flavour' of the ancient version; why should it not be possible to do something similar in English without adopting wholesale what is, for all its beauty, an imperfect translation, which brings with it a history which is far from Catholic? Of the defects of the Authorised Version it is not necessary to speak. The fact that the Protestants themselves in 1881 considered a new translation necessary ought to be sufficient; and Father Lattey who is well qualified to speak on this matter bears testimony to its want of accuracy even in translating the New Testament. Surely a "modest margin" would not be sufficient to include the corrections which would be rendered necessary by the progress of Biblical study in the translation of the Old Testament.

E. J. K.

## Book Reviews.

*Le Catholicisme de Saint Augustin.* By PIERRE BATIFFOL. In two volumes (pp. 276 + 279) Price 14 francs net. Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 90 Rue Bonaparte.

THIS is the third instalment of Mgr. Batiffol's history of the origins of Catholicism. By Catholicism in this connection the author means the Church in so far as it is a visible, universal society, built upon the framework of a rule of faith and a hierarchy. In the first volume, *L'Eglise Naissante*, he studied the origins of this formation from the foundation of Christianity to the year 250 A.D. In the *La Paix Constantinienne* he pursues the subject, devoting special attention to the relations between Church and State, and the vindication of its spiritual independence by the Church against the meddlesome interference of the Roman emperors. The part played by the Apostolic See, as a centre of Catholic unity, in the struggle against Cesarism will be considered in a separate volume, which is not yet ready. The volume under review brings the series to a close with a study of the place to be assigned to the great bishop of Hippo in the development of Catholicism.

The work is divided into eight chapters under the following headings:—I. *L'Eglise règle de foi*; II. *La controverse Donatiste avant Augustin*; III. *Augustin et le Donatisme*; IV. *Synthèse anti-Donatiste d'Augustin*; V. *Conférence de 411: L'Eglise et L'Etat*; VI. *Augustin Pélage et le Siège Apostolique*; VII. *Rome et Carthage*; VIII. *Derniers traits de l'ecclésiologie d'Augustin*. There are also two short excursions headed respectively—*Ecclésiologie de S. Ambroise* and *La Cathedra Petri dans la controverse anti-Donatiste d'Augustin*. The author does not concern himself with the biography or general theology of St. Augustine, except in so far as is necessary to trace successive phases or developments in Augustine's thought in one particular department. That department is ecclesiology. It is on this aspect of his doctrine that our author concentrates; and he makes an exhaustive and scholarly inquiry into it. As we are taken through the various works of the Saint, it soon becomes evident that Augustine was a giant in the matter of ecclesiology, as he was in that of grace. We follow him from Manichean rationalism through scepticism to the Catholic Church. There he finds a great peace in a rule of faith based on Scripture and Tradition, but postulating an immediate, living, teaching authority, which does not stifle human intelligence, but guides and directs it on the basis of revealed truth. The visible unity of the Church and the unlawfulness of schism are really corollaries of this fundamental principle; and only the external circumstance of the Donatist schism is required to bring into full light St. Augustine's powerful exposition of these doctrines. Whatever his previous opinions may have been, the reader who follows Mgr. Batiffol's masterly analysis can hardly escape the conclusion that, to St. Augustine's mind, Christianity, Catholicism and what Protestants are pleased to call Romanism mean one and the same thing. Indeed some Protestant scholars already recognising that fact have set Augustine down as the father of Roman

Catholicism. While our author has refuted that contention implicitly in his earlier volumes, he meets it more directly in this one, by showing that St. Augustine was not the inventor of the tests of Catholicity which he applied to the Donatist schism.

Of our author's method we need not say much. He is a master of the historical method. He does not indulge in *a priori* speculation: he confines himself to the facts in their historical and chronological setting; and from these facts, sifted with the greatest patience and care, he draws his conclusions. His studies on primitive Catholicism are a contribution of first class importance to historical theology; and the present volume is worthy of its predecessors.

W. MORAN.

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*God and the Supernatural* Edited by FATHER CUTHBERT, O.S.F.C. Pp. 346. Price 15/- net. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

THIS book is the work of no less than six writers, all graduates of Oxford University. The point of view from which they approach their task is this:—Christianity “as a substantive and intelligent faith” has been lost by the people of England at large: it has become “an unknown quantity in their religious experience.” Yet the English people are not irreligious: their character demands a religious creed. If the historic creed of the Catholic Church is put before them in a manner suited to their temperament, many who are casting about for a reasonable religion will find in it what they are seeking. The writers have endeavoured accordingly to set forth the Catholic presentation of the fundamental truths of Christianity in a manner that will appeal to the educated Englishman.

The book contains ten chapters. I. Introduction—The necessity of a standard to live and think by. This implies a sanction prescribed by authority. Catholicism, a revealed and systematic religion, claims to provide a solution. II. The Supernatural. Catholicism based on the supernatural. We are all acquainted with various grades of life culminating in natural human life. There is yet another grade, a super-human life, beyond the power of even philosophy to attain to. Man originally possessed this life, but lost it by the fall. III. God. Reason can prove the existence of God: it can also know something about His nature, and His relation to the world. Reason thus prepares the way for the revelation of Himself made by God to mankind. IV. Nature and destiny of man. Man neither mere animal nor pure spirit, but a compound of both. He is conscious of another good, the spiritual, besides that of instinct and self-interest. He requires accordingly a spiritualising force. Catholicism offers a solution in the reformation of nature by the operation of the Holy Spirit. V. The problem of evil. Modern pessimism about evil in the world. Inadmissible solutions of the problem. Implications of free-will. “Through struggle we must attain to victory.” VI. The Person of Christ. The dogma of the God-Man vital to Christianity. The divine and the human in Christ. VII. Atonement. Christ became man to redeem the world. The postulates that make this doctrine reasonable. Man can still refuse salvation. VIII. The Church. Individuality and social unity. Solidarity as members of Christ's mystical body. The

Visible Church and the Invisible. IX. The sacramental system—in keeping with the Incarnation; and with the supernaturalising of mankind. X. Life after death. Modern theories fail to explain the universal belief in a "survival." The Catholic doctrine about the future life.

As we do not profess to understand the mentality and temperament of the class of readers for whom the book is specially intended, we feel diffident about venturing an opinion as to how far the writers have achieved their purpose. From the point of view of material there is hardly any important question that is not touched on; but then, some very important questions are only touched on. The doctrine of grace, for instance, is an essential part of any discussion of the supernatural from the Catholic standpoint, and yet it is passed over with the scantest consideration. The reader is referred indeed to Father Joyce's book on the subject, but that hardly justifies the omission. From the point of view of form the writers evidently set themselves a high standard—perhaps a little too high. They avoid the technical terms of Catholic theology, on the ground that their book is written for the ordinary educated layman. We doubt if their language is on that account more intelligible to the ordinary reader than that of an author like, let us say, Fr. Joyce, who proceeds more or less on traditional lines. We do not say our authors are obscure: but they are a little too "learned" for the ordinary man—so learned as to be vague at times. We have no doubt that there is in England a large circle of readers to whom this style of writing appeals; and it is for these, we presume, that the work is chiefly intended. In any case this book breaks new ground and we wish it every success. We may remark that there is a useful synopsis at the head of each chapter, and an index at the end of the volume. Printing and binding leave nothing to be desired.

W. MORAN.

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*Psychology and Mystical Experience.* By JOHN HOWLEY M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Galway. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.: St. Louis, M.O.: B. Herder Co. Pp. 275. Price 10/6.

It is with a certain feeling of pride that we refer to this work, an honest attempt at a psychological interpretation of mystical experience. It is written by a fellow-Irishman and by a professor of the National University. It is, too, the work of a fellow-Catholic who shows a regard for theology. It is something unusual to find a Catholic work on mysticism amidst the array of productions turned out by Rationalists and Agnostics, blind leaders of the blind on such matters as the Dark Night of the Soul. And yet a member of that Church which has produced the greatest mystics has the greatest right to interpret mysticism.

We will give our readers some idea of the contents by referring to the attractive titles of some of the chapters, 'Psychology of a Retreat,' 'Psychology of a Revival,' 'Integral Conversion,' 'Mystical Experience and Quietism,' 'Varieties of Mystical Experience.' The book improves very much as one proceeds. There seems to have been progress in the author's thought and style as he advanced towards a solution of the biggest problems. Indeed it is regrettable that this attempt at a scientific account of

mysticism is somewhat marred in its early chapters by a superficial smartness of style, by epigrams that are too clever and that forget one of the really great epigrams—the greatest of all art is the concealment of art. He somewhat flippantly speaks of the Christian world being convulsed by a controversy about a dipthong when in sober truth it was a struggle concerning the greatest of all realities, the Divinity of Christ. For the author's own sake I regret these literary efforts that are a pale reflex of Chesterton and that would be in place in the 'light' column of the *Daily Independent*. The author abundantly proves in his last chapters, written in a style that becomes his grave scientific subject, that he has no need of such adventitious aids. In a second edition, to which the reviewer looks forward in all sincerity, the book will be much improved if in its entirety it is made of a piece with the later chapters.

Another defect that clamours for removal in a second edition is the multiplicity of printer's errors and slips in punctuation. It would be doing the work of a proof-reader to refer to all of them, but in support of my statement I may refer to 'the ordinary spirituality' (p. 40) and the semi-colon that interferes with the sense of the Latin quotation at the foot of page 132.

After candidly referring to secondary matters which are capable of improvement it is a pleasure to turn to the many merits of the present volume. It will be of assistance to the priest who wants a very readable presentation of the chief manifestations of mysticism, as well as an original and consistent theory of interpretation. Not the least valuable of the chapters is the notable one dealing at some length with Ulster Revivals; the author by his marshalling of the facts has made an interesting contribution to his subject, and he points out incidentally that these Ulster Revivals, while responsible for some insanity, had two very remarkable effects in the diminution of drinking and bigotry.

The last and most important service of the author which may be mentioned is that he gives a clear idea of what mysticism really is, as well as a theory of its phases. We congratulate him on the fact that he, unlike others, does not flatter his average Christian readers by telling them that they are all mystics without knowing it. This has been done to our confusion by those who give the too facile definition of mysticism as the love of God. This, of course, is playing with the ordinary usage of speech. For no one in his senses would describe as a mystic the average Catholic who is too good for hell and too bad for Heaven. Yet even he has love of God of a certain kind. Wisely, then, does the author describe mysticism as a feeling of the Divine presence. In this connection he discusses, very thoroughly and with a reference to the best authorities, whether there is an intellectual intuition of God. And he very ably supports the view that the 'sensing' of God in mysticism is an affective act, an act of the will. This includes a certain cognition, just as a cognition of a kind is included in the fact of enjoyment. There is then no immediate act which might be called intellectual intuition of God. Such an admission would be open to grave theological difficulties; but there can be present an intellectual inference concerning God's presence. Also in the fact that the will directly feels the touch of God, there seems to be implied, according to the author's principles, cognition of God; what he calls the negative idea of God. This idea of God is just as obscure and



negative in its way as the abstract idea which the philosopher has of God; but it is suggested by the author that it has a kinship with the faith-idea; also it has tremendous dynamic power in the moral life. The author interestingly speaks of the following steps in the mystical ladder,—the prayer of quiet, union, ecstasy, spiritual marriage. He gives, also, one of the clearest interpretations of the mystical doctrines of St. John of the Cross concerning the Night of Sense, the Night of the Soul, the Night of the Spirit. Furthermore he shows the difference between Catholic mysticism, and the Buddhistic varieties. The coming of the mystical state is regarded in the former system as occasional like the flashes of genius—a fact recognised even by Plotinus who, the author well says, may have learned from Christianity; whereas in Buddhistic and other systems it is believed to be determined uniformly and definitely by initial ascetic practices of mind and body. What the Buddhist gains with this regularity of a law of nature may then be a purely natural effect; compare what William James says in his 'Talks to Teachers' about securing the effects of those false ecstasies by means of a drug, the prescription for which he gives. But James generally takes too agnostic a view of mysticism, regarding it as a monoideistic hallucination.

In explaining conversion, so far as the natural element is concerned, the author elaborates his theory of a nascent idea touching the proper spot in the field of consciousness, at first disintegrating it, and afterwards leading to a re-formation of the whole field. But enough has been said to indicate the interesting and stimulating character of the volume.

G. PIERSE.

*The Other Life.* By the RIGHT REV. W. SCHNEIDER, D.D. Translated by REV. H. THURSTON, S.J. London: Great Russell St., Herder. New York: Joseph Wagner. Pp. 410. Price 18/-.

THE fact that Father Thurston took the trouble of translating the German work of the late Bishop of Paderborn is a guarantee that it is no ordinary work. It is written in the grand style. It represents the way in which we fancy Bossuet, or Balmes, would treat the subject if they thought of writing a monograph on eschatology. Sound arguments and beliefs are presented in attractive, rhetorical language. Nor are the contributions of Science forgotten. Anthropology is made to yield up its rich stores of information concerning the universality of belief in immortality. The chapter, dealing with this subject, will alone repay study and will be found exceedingly interesting. The reader will meet with quaint accounts of savages in Oceania taking their own live mothers in the funeral procession, and making them corpses at the end of the journey; all this out of a perverted notion of kindness to parents. But through all these perversions there is a persistent belief in the survival of human personality.

In regard to the fate of unbaptised infants the author brushes aside far-fetched and anomalous views concerning the quasi-miraculous illumination of their minds at the time of death. And he is content to show that there is no need of supposing that they endure natural misery, as was held by those who were called the *Tortores Infantium* in an age that was not given to the amenities of controversial courtesy.

G. PIERSE.

*Henry Edward Manning: His Life and Labours.* By SHANE LESLIE, M.A., King's College, Cambridge. With six illustrations. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., 28 Orchard Street, W.1.: Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow. 1921. Pp. xxiv.+512. Price 25/- net.

When a storm has passed the sea is not stilled in a moment. Nor, when a great man of action dies, can the world be expected to go back at once to its ways and let him sleep in peace. He has been too closely associated with movements that affect its vital interests, and his friends and foes will clamour in loud approval or condemnation of the forces he let loose. So it was with Manning. He was a man of action, and a great one too, virile, dominant, dogged, and uncompromising. In the cause of policy and principle he could give up the pleasant things of life and forget the friendships of a lifetime. He influenced the political life of Ireland, Great Britain, Europe, to some extent of the civilised world. He voiced the claims of democracy and challenged the tradition of centuries. In the spiritual sphere he left the Church of his birth, grappled with some of the strongest forces in the Church of his adoption, and carried his flag in triumph through one of the greatest Councils of the Church. The result was what we might expect. Had he been a man of thought merely, the world would have remained quiet when he passed, and his place in history would have been settled peacefully when years or centuries had given men time to carry out in practice the principles he taught. But he was cast in a different mould: his best friends and bitterest enemies he met in his own lifetime; the effects he produced were striking and immediate, and so was the chorus of praise and blame that accompanied him all through life and has followed him beyond the grave.

To say that, in the circumstances, the speeches, articles, pamphlets, books even, that have gathered round his name convey, each in its own way, a distorted impression of his personality, is only to state a truism. To form a just estimate of even the simplest character we require time and a dispassionate outlook: to the friends and foes of a man of action both are denied. If blows are to be struck at all, for or against, they must be struck at once: and it is hard to guide the arm aright when we are blinded by the light of interest and enthusiasm. In Manning's case, it was thought for a time by some that Purcell's *Life* had done justice to all sides and silenced controversy. It was well-documented and seemed to cover every phase of the Cardinal's activity: and even Gladstone, who knew Manning well, could congratulate the author on 'leaving not only 'the history of a soul, a dividing of marrow and bone,' but little to disclose on the last day.' But time has shown, what the Cardinal's friends knew from the beginning, that the *Life* was almost as one-sided as a partisan pamphlet. It dwelt too closely on the human side, neglected the supernatural motive that nearly always operated, and dragged into the white light of noon, without a hint of better things behind, every rugged curve that nature had given or conflict emphasised. The memory of a great man stood in need of vindication. Mr. Leslie heard the call, and has answered in a work that will live. He has

come forward, not to deny the facts of history or erase any furrow that existed, but to set things in true perspective and add the little touch of truth that almost transforms into a thing of beauty what the less generous artist had painted as a blemish.

He has done it well. The book is delightful: from beginning to end there is not a page that is not full of life and human interest. For the most part the story is told in the memoranda, diaries, speeches and correspondence of Manning himself and of the men who figured prominently in the movements he championed: but the skilful touch of the biographer never allows it to become dull or monotonous. The portrait of the Cardinal is vivid and lifelike—whether at Harrow, Oxford, Lavington and Chichester, or later, as a Catholic, in the 'wars of Westminster,' in the troubles with Dr. Newman and the Religious Orders, and in the anxious days of the Vatican Council, of the London strikes and of the Irish struggle for freedom. We are given for the first time his own record of his Retreat with the Passionists after his appointment as Archbishop. It is a valuable document. The entries reveal a man fully conscious of his own powers and defects, and determined to turn both to good account in a noble service: they throw light on many things that would be otherwise obscure, sweeten not a little that would otherwise be bitter, and give a unity to the manifold, and sometimes apparently contradictory, details of a long and varied life.

But, of course, there are defects. One was inevitable. The book is 'a supplement rather than a supplanter' to Purcell's work. With the result that many things are omitted on which the average reader would like to have some information. It must have been rather a trial to the author to find so many fields cut off in which he could have done splendid and lasting work.

Another is due to Mr. Leslie's own outlook and temperament. He is ill-fitted for the part of a commonplace, careful biographer, anxious to gather up every detail and present it uncoloured by fancy or enthusiasm. His gifts lie in another direction. He reveals in artistic contrasts, in brilliant 'asides,' in the polished, or even punning, phrase that appeals to the ear though the facts lag behind. The dramatist, not the historian, is his model. He delights in magnificent scenery and beautiful stage effects, while he leaves the plot to be unravelled in the clever comments and witty innuendos of men and women who have the latest gossip but never mention, though perhaps they understand, the principles that lie underneath. And so, in connection with the Religious Orders trouble, we are given a charming narrative, but little indication of the principles on which the Orders acted—though much might be said in their favour—and not a single quotation from the *Romanos Pontifices* that settled the controversy. In the matter of the Labour struggle and Leo's Encyclical, we have the dramatic scenes at the conferences and a few verbal similarities between the Pope's statements and the Cardinal's, but little allusion to the principles that will shape the Church's policy for the next half century. The chapters on the Irish question are beautifully done, but we question whether, without outside information, anyone could possibly know how the whole trouble originated. We might go on almost indefinitely.

After studying the full account, the ordinary reader will probably wonder why men should have staked their lives and reputations on such misty causes when a well-turned phrase would have settled the fight and left everyone jubilant.

But, with these reservations, we say again that the book is delightful. A quotation perhaps is better than any description we could give. This is how Mr. Leslie sums up Manning's character and policy:

We may deplore the traces of the personal element in his administration or the intensity of his dislikes, even when justified, or the survivals of Puritan harshness in his character: but it remains to say that he stands well and nobly in the distinguished group of Englishmen who have worn the Cardinal's hat . . . . What seemed to many of his own flock defects really led him towards the great world policies of the future. His Ultramontaniam led him into opposition to Bismarck and Prussianism. His apparent Socialism led him into the policy by which the Church has since struggled to win and influence labour. As his democratic policy has proved the only safeguard against the developments of Bolshevism, so his Irish views, if they had been adopted when they were expressed, would have prevented the British Empire being divided on the Irish rock, and his attempts to initiate union and understanding between the Hierarchies of England, Ireland, and the United States would have supplied that corner-stone, without which there can never be peace or trust in the English-speaking world. Time and perhaps centuries will be needed to estimate his share in the dogmatic history of the Christian Church; but the present years will have shown England how unwise it was to reject a prophet, whether he spoke warningly of Prussia or sympathetically of Ireland. No doubt the middle classes in England and the governing oligarchies rejected him both in religion and politics, but his funeral showed that it was upon the working classes that he had chiefly made his impression. Englishman and Ultramontane, he may not have qualified for the blessing promised to the meek, but by his social and international action at least he earned the Beatitude which is promised to the Peacemaker.

Rather an able statement, we think. And there are hundreds of others quite as good.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

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*Etudes de Critique et de Philologie du Nouveau Testament*, par E. JACQUIER. 515 pp. Paris: Gabalda. 10 frs. net.

Those who are already familiar with Jacquier's valuable work, *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament*, will welcome this little volume which brings the discussion of New Testament problems up-to-date. Every work of importance—including even articles in periodicals—which has appeared since the last edition of the larger work, is briefly summarised, so that the student is able with little labour to see at a glance the tending of criticism in the various departments of New Testament study. Following the analysis of the various works the author gives us a useful résumé in which he briefly summarises the results which have been reached in the discussion of the different problems. The cases in which a definite solution has been reached are very few; and as a general rule the author sees no reason for departing from the positions which he had already established in his earlier work. The book forms an essential complement to the larger work, and even taken independently it gives us a useful review of New Testament literature which has appeared during the past ten or fifteen years.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

*Saint Jean: L'Apocalypse*, par LE PERE, E.B., ALLO, O.P., Professor à l'Université de Fribourg (Suisse). 8vo. Pp. cclviii—373. 45 frs. net. Paris: Gabalda.

Some idea of the value of this important work, not alone for the student of the Apocalypse, but for all those interested in the study of Christian origins, may be gained from a brief statement of its contents.

The Introduction contains fifteen chapters, and deals with: the religious background and the aim of the Apocalypse; the personal characteristics and theology of the author; the destination of the book; the apocalyptic form of the Johannine message; the sources of the apocalyptic symbols, especially the apocryphal Apocalypses; a comparison of the symbolism of the Apocalypse with that of traditional apocalyptic and with that of the books of the Old and New Testaments. The mutual relation of the symbols of the Apocalypse is next dealt with, then the principles which govern the literary composition of the book, with a brief analysis and plan, showing the unity and synthetic character of the Apocalypse. The next section treats of the eschatology of the Apocalypse, and compares it with that of the other New Testament writings (except the Synoptic Gospels). The language, unity and authenticity of the visions, and the question of the alleged use of pre-existing documents by the author is taken up in a following section.

The question of the authorship and date of the Apocalypse is very thoroughly examined. The external evidence is brought together and examined, then, in a very remarkable chapter, the internal evidence. The Apocalypse is compared with the other Johannine writings from the point of view of language, doctrine, general spirit and outlook, style, and literary method; finally some personal traits, common to the author of the Apocalypse and that of the other Johannine writings, are set forth. The date is then fixed—the last years of Domitian. The whole body of evidence is seen to point most distinctly to John the Son of Zebedee as author of the Apocalypse and of the other Johannine writings.

A history of the interpretation of the Apocalypse, and a study of the text and ancient versions, complete the Introduction.

In the commentary proper, the Greek text is given, with critical and philological notes; a translation, and the exegetical commentary, which is kept distinct from the philological and other such matter. Points which need more discussion than could be given without disturbing the connected sequence of the exposition are dealt with in detached notes. There is hardly a matter of any consequence which is not fully treated of: we may instance as being of the first importance the note on Emperor-worship in Asia, p. 201 ff, and that on the "42 months," "three years and a half," "1260 days," p. 142 ff.

The general principles of interpretation adopted by Pere Allo are the basis of his success in understanding the Apocalypse. He has steeped himself in the Apocalyptic literature, and has acquired a thorough appreciation of its methods and symbolism. He knows the Old Testament perfectly; and he knows the Graeco-Oriental background of the Apocalypse as few know it. He is in a position, therefore, to interpret the Apocalypse in the way that the people for whom it was originally written would have done: he knows the problems which the Apocalypse sets itself to answer, and the dangers against which it seeks to warn the Christian Church. The way in which St. John uses the Old Testament

gives the clue to his use of the Apocalypses: he uses the ideas and symbols which he finds in them, but he gives them a new context, impresses his own meaning upon them, and generally abstracts from all but one idea in each symbol. Père Allo avoids the mistake of Dr. Charles, who in his recent commentary on the Apocalypse takes each symbol in isolation, and interprets it rather on the basis of its origin than in view of its context: the farrago of conflicting opinions which Dr. Charles finds in the Apocalypse is indeed due, according to that writer, to an extraordinarily foolish "redactor" who has again and again falsified the teaching of the original writer, but Dr. Charles himself in attributing to the author the weird theories about the Millenium does not allow for the freedom with which St. John used the apocalyptic symbolism, and for the fact that the estimate of the teaching of the book must be got, not by pressing out the meaning which each individual symbol might contain, but by taking the whole book as a unit and interpreting each symbol in the light of the others. The result of this mutual correction is shown admirably by Père Allo: the recapitulation theory is the key to the difficulty.

The comparison of the theology of the Apocalypse with that of the Fourth Gospel makes one wish that Père Allo would write a commentary on the Gospel: certainly he has opened up new avenues in the interpretation of the Gospel as well as of the Apocalypse.

Probably the most interesting part of the work is the comparison of the eschatology of the Apocalypse with that of the New Testament generally. Père Allo does not deal with the Synoptic Gospels; but his conclusions will be found to be in agreement with the interpretation of the "Coming" in the synoptics which Dr. Shanahan has given in the *Catholic World*, in 1919, and which Dr. Pope has summarised in the *Dublin Review*.

A summary of his conclusions would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that he finds the same ideas recurring in the Epistles of St. Paul and the other New Testament writings, and so we get a consistent eschatology in the whole of the New Testament. It is perhaps too much to hope that the question of the "Parousia" has been finally settled by these researches of Père Allo, but the general conclusion that the "Coming" is an indefinite term, somewhat as is the "Day of Jahweh" in the Old Testament, will go far to meet some of the most serious difficulties which are brought against the Catholic position.

Père Allo's work is a worthy addition to the series of *Études Bibliques* to which it belongs; it is no exaggeration to say that it occupies a place apart in the criticism of the Apocalypse.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*Novum Testamentum Græce*, textum recensuit, apparatus criticum ex editionibus et codicibus manuscriptis collectum, addidit HENRICUS JOS. VOGELS. 676 pp. Düsseldorf: L. Schwann 20 Mks.

For many years one had to admit that there was no critical edition of the Greek text of the New Testament compiled by Catholics which could be unreservedly recommended to the Catholic student. The text of Brandscheid is indeed most convenient for class-work, especially in the edition which combines the Greek text and the



Vulgate, but, with the best of good will, no one can pretend that it is a critical text based on scientific principles. The result is that Nestle's text has been very largely used in Catholic schools. This text has so many admirable qualities that its popularity is not surprising; but, after all, it is not strictly a critical text, but a compromise derived from three critical texts. Dr. Vogels has given us a Catholic Nestle but with the important difference that it is not a compromise, but a text compiled on strictly scientific principles. Nestle's text is arrived at by comparing Westcott-Hort, Tischendorf, Weymouth and Weiss and accepting the reading of the majority. The rejected readings are inserted in the critical apparatus at the foot of the page. Vogels proceeds independently and establishes his text on the evidence of the MSS. and Versions directly; while in his critical apparatus he gives us selected readings from the various authorities. The critical apparatus is not, of course, on the same scale as Westcott-Hort or Tischendorf, for it contains merely alternative readings which Vogels regards as less strongly supported. If we desire to have the evidence for the reading which he accepts we must have recourse to the editions referred to above. This may be regarded as a defect in his method. But it is difficult to see how he could do otherwise without overloading the critical apparatus; and it must likewise be borne in mind that his object was to prepare a handbook for students. It is probably for the same reason that he has omitted to give us a statement of the principles on which he proceeds.

A few of the most familiar passages may be cited as an indication both of the critic's independence and of the soundness of his judgment. The section on the Woman taken in Adultery (John 8, 1-11) is admitted, but marked with square brackets, the meaning of which is not explained in the Introduction; I presume they indicate that the Johannine authorship of the verses is questioned. The Johannine Comma is excluded from the text, while the conclusion of Mark is admitted, the authorities for the opposite view being noted in the critical apparatus in each case. The reference to the angel at the pool of Bethesda (John 5, 3b-4), notwithstanding the strong evidence of X P C D, is accepted as an integral part of the text.

The beautiful clear type on thin opaque paper, and the handy size of the page commend this text as a most suitable manual for Scripture students. A combined Latin and Greek text with Vogels' text and Vulgate (with Wordsworth-white readings) on opposite pages would be little short of ideal.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*Das Gedächtnis des Herrn in der altchristlichen Liturgie.* O. CASEL, O.S.B. *Die Liturgie als Erlebnis.* A. HAMMENSTEDT, O.S.B. Herder and Co.

The two booklets belong to a series called "Ecclesia Orans," the purpose of which is to give even to the laity a thorough knowledge of the liturgy. The contributors explain its meaning, and describe its beauty in clear, concise popular language. It would be hard to give too high

praise to the erudition and devotion which the above mentioned parts of the series exhibit. The note on the Epiklesis which the first one contains (pp. 35, 36) is admirable, so too is the remark on the Roman Canon (p. 38). The second one is made up of three lectures delivered to the Catholic students at Bonn. We hope that the forthcoming volumes of the series will maintain the same degree of excellence.

R. WALSH.

*Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik.* C. M. KAUFMANN. Herder and Co.

Between the two works mentioned above and this one, a striking contrast exists. They are suitable to the general reader; it is written for specialists. To those who know a good deal about early Christian inscriptions and who take a scholarly interest in the progress of archaeological study, Kaufmann's book will prove a veritable treasure. Scarcely another savant at the present day has produced anything equal to it. It is better even than his own *Handbuch der christlichen Archaeologie*, which six or seven years ago was so highly praised in the learned periodicals of Germany.

Many persons are acquainted with the results of De Rossi's epoch-making discoveries, but comparatively few can tell what is being done by De Rossi's successors. Nevertheless, in some spot or other, year after year, most valuable finds are being made, not in Rome only, but in Proconsular Africa, France, Germany, Egypt, Greece, Asia Minor, and other places. In Western Asia more than ten thousand inscriptions have been brought to light. While the researches in Rome begun by De Rossi are continued by Armellini, Wilpert, De Waal, Marucchi and others; Cumont, Ramsay, Le Bas, Kirchoff, Kaufmann, Waddington, Kraus, Delattre and others have extended the sphere of investigation, so much so that at the present day countries far apart are by their monuments bearing irrefragable witness to the unity and antiquity of Catholic belief. Many more than fifty thousand such inscriptions are extant.

Kaufmann, who is himself a first-rate archaeologist, has in this his latest work given us a masterly summary of all that has been accomplished up to the present. To it he prefixes some chapters of a purely technical nature, but since they are written for students of epigraphy we pass over them in silence. What will be of interest to our readers are the chapters which treat of the inestimable services rendered by the inscriptions to ecclesiastical history and to dogmatic theology. As regards history, the Roman catacombs contain a commentary in stone on the words of St. Paul about those of Cesar's household, etc. Scarcely inferior in value to it are the forty inscriptions composed by Pope St. Damasus, and the inscriptions written soon after his death in honour of other Popes and Saints. All these are made the subject of learned annotations by Kaufmann. And a special feature of his work is that by their side he puts the important inscriptions that have been recently discovered in Greece and other parts of the East.

But unquestionably the most valuable portion (pp. 132-294) of his erudite volume, is that which exhibits the contributions made in aid of dogmatic theology. For instance, as regards the Blessed Trinity, the Sacraments, Purgatory, the Communion of Saints, the Blessed Virgin, etc.,

etc., there is a wealth of evidence that would surprise non-Catholic readers. Equally abundant and convincing is the testimony of the monuments to the different degrees in the hierarchy, etc. We have purposely refrained from describing any inscription in particular, and think it enough to say that Kaufmann utilizes more than two thousand inscriptions, and does so in the best possible way.

R. WALSH.

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*Prælectiones Biblicae ad usum Scholarum* a R. P. HADRIANO SIMON, C.S.S.R. Novum Testamentum. Vol. I. Evangelia. xxiv.—560 Pp. 8vo. Matriti: ex officinis "El Perpetuo Socorro." 10 pesetas.

This is the first instalment of a work which is intended to cover the whole of the Old and New Testament and to be completed in five volumes. The author, who is himself a Professor of Sacred Scripture, aims at meeting the wishes of students who need something more developed than they can find in such works as Vigouroux-Brassac, and who have no time for such diffuse works as the commentaries in the *Cursus Scripturae Sacrae*. The intention is admirable, and to judge from this first volume, the author's efforts are likely to be crowned with success.

The present volume is devoted to the Gospels, 63 pages to Introduction and the rest, nearly 500 pages, to exegesis. In the preface the author moderately declares that he has striven for brevity, clearness and soundness of doctrine, rather than novelty, and that he has drawn largely from the standard authorities. But while this is what one should expect in a work intended for students, the author knows how to select the wheat from the chaff, and does not hesitate on occasion to show his preference for modern opinion, no matter how venerable the history of the discarded view. For example he holds that St. John in Ch. III. inserts fragments of discourses which were delivered on other occasions (p. 376). Besides, he gives us some material which, though not new, is too often neglected by those who write handbooks for New Testament students. The chapter on "The Political and Religious Condition of Palestine in the time of Christ" is just as essential as the special Introduction to the Gospels; while the 'Homiletic Notes' given at the end of certain sections will certainly be found helpful.

On the Introduction I have only a few remarks to make.

(a) A few paragraphs on the arrangement of St. Matthew's Gospels are desirable. I refer to the system of grouping together discourses, miracles, etc., which is the most characteristic feature of his gospel. The brief reference in p. 136 is hardly sufficient.

(b) The author's treatment of the authenticity of John 8, i ii, and the Conclusion of Mark is somewhat too conservative. In regard to the former he makes use of the distinction *authentia dogmatic considerata* and *authentia critice considerata*. It would be less confusing if the terms 'authentia' and 'canonicitas' were used as in the discussion of the Conclusion of Mark. There is less excuse for regarding 'Benedicta tu in mulieribus' as part of St. Luke. In other respects the Introduction is admirable; the different problems are discussed briefly but lucidly and the common Catholic view is usually given preference, though every side of the question is impartially presented.

In the Commentary the author is to be congratulated on having attained the goal of brevity and clearness which he aimed at. In more senses than one it is Maldonatus brought up to date. The author follows the only satisfactory method of explaining the Synoptics, i.e., by taking all three together. The Gospel of St. John is treated separately, except in the narrative of the Passion and Resurrection which is treated with the Synoptics. An introductory section contains discussions on the Duration of Public Life, Harmony of the Gospels, Preaching of Our Lord, Parables and Miracles. That on the Parables is especially good, and the application of the principles of interpretation enunciated there is consistently carried out. The explanation of the Parable of the Unjust Steward occupies only a single page, yet the correct explanation of the parable is accurately and clearly presented without confusing the reader with fantastic theories which carry their own refutation.

There are, naturally, many views put forward by the author with which we do not agree; but, on the whole, he gives a fair show to the opinions which he does not accept and the reader is able to make his choice. We are surprised, however, that a critic, otherwise so alert, could come to the conclusion that Mary Magdalen is identical with Mary, sister of Lazarus, and with the "Sinner" in Luke vii. All the evidence points the other way; and there is no reason why we should regard the Latin tradition—the origin of which is easily explained—as sufficient to counterbalance the evidence of the Gospels.

There are but slight flaws in what promises to be, when complete, an admirable handbook to the Sacred Scriptures, and we heartily wish the author success in the remaining part of his work.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*Missale Romanum: editio juxta Typicam Vaticanam. Turonibus: typis Alfredi Mame et Filiorum. 1921.*

As our readers are aware, the 'typical' edition of the *Missal* has appeared. We may hope that its advent will mark a greater amount of stability than we have been allowed in the past, and that a reasonable time will elapse before new editions must be secured by priests who are neither artistic enough to affix fly-leaves carefully nor inartistic enough to insert them simply and trust to fate.

But indeed the indications are not favourable. A great amount of time and attention has been given to the production of the new edition, and still we find the Mass of St. Ephrem inserted in the end as an appendix. If this thing happens in the green wood, what may be expected in the dry? In the Irish Supplement, too—as supplied by Messrs. Mame, and it is one of the latest—we find no mention of the Mass of Blessed Oliver Plunkett, though we hear from well-informed sources that it has been officially sanctioned. These unnecessary delays make matters rather awkward.

But, after all, these things are no concern of the publishers. *They* have only to reproduce, in as convenient and artistic style as they are able, the edition as it comes from the liturgical authorities. And, so far as we can judge or have been able to ascertain, the firm of

Messrs. Mame of Tours has done its work as perfectly as can be expected in an imperfect world. The large and small quarto editions with which we have been favoured mark an advance on anything we have had hitherto. The paper is good: the print clear and accurate and not overcrowded: and the general arrangement distinctly an improvement. In this last connection, for instance, the Introit is never carried over from one page to another: neither is the Prayer, Secret or Post-communion—an arrangement that priests will easily appreciate. To obviate the necessity of turning back on certain Feasts for the proper 'Communicantes,' the opening portion of the Canon has been printed after the special Prefaces: and, for convenience in Low Masses, the Preface 'sine cantu' is added immediately after the other. The prayers 'pro diversitate temporum' are always on the same page or on two pages facing: the three prayers 'De Spiritu Sancto' are given after the Feast of the Immaculate Conception: italicized headings distinguish the commemorations from the principal prayers, etc. These represent only a few of the new devices adopted for the convenience of the celebrant. And when we see how useful they are, and how easily they might have been introduced at any time, our wonder is that some enterprising firm did not long ago compete for the laurels that now fall to Messrs. Mame.

The price, of course, varies with the binding. In Morocco, the copies will vary, so far as we can see, from £3 to £6 15s. In our humble opinion, a good investment.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

## Shorter Notices.

*Matters of Moment.* By REV. JOHN McCABE. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 28 Orchard Street. Pp. 157. Price 6/.

A series of numerous sermons on the great Christian subjects. What makes this work individual is that the sermons are condensed. The meat is pressed and is yet fresh. Those having part of the happy gift of Lord Fisher who found his recreation in "sermons and dancing," will enjoy this book of suggestive discourses.

*De la Mort à la Vie.* Resurrection d'une âme d'Anarchiste, par J. SALSMANS, S.J. 150 pp. 3.50 frs. and 2.25 frs. Anvers: "Veritas," Rue des Tanneurs.

A most fascinating story of the gradual conversion of an anarchist. Albert, having migrated to Belgium from Paris, is sentenced to fourteen years penal servitude for robbery. The story is given as much as possible in his own words, written down from day to day in his prison-cell. Thus we can trace the gradual awakening of faith in his soul, and its evolution till his edifying death as a devoted son of the Church. It gives us valuable insight into the mentality of the extreme labour agitator, and altogether forms a most readable and interesting book.

*A Short Method of Mental Prayer*, by NICHOLAS RIDOLFI, O.P., translated by Fr. Raymund Devas, O.P. 135 pp. 3/6 net. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne.

The author who prepared this method for Dominican novices takes up the different parts of Mental Prayer, and gives a short but clear explanation of each, with examples.

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*St. Leonard of Port-maurice*. By REV. D. DEVAS, O.F.M. Pp. 123. Price (cloth) 5/- net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

This is a short, simple account of a life that was remarkable for solid work and edification rather than anything in the way of spiritual romance. The book gives a good idea of St. Leonard as preacher, missionary, spiritual director and religious idealist. An appendix contains a stirring sermon delivered by St. Leonard in the Coliseum at Rome.

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*The Divine Soliloquies of Gerlac Petersen*. Translated from the Latin by a nun. Pp. 106. Price (paper), 2/6; cloth, 3/6 net. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

The soliloquies in this little book (numbering 39 in all) might be described as something between a chapter from the "Imitation of Christ" and a chapter from a modern book of meditations. Intended solely for the author's own use, they are written in the first person, mostly in the form of good resolutions. For that reason they are particularly easy to follow, and should prove useful especially to those who are novices in the art of meditation. The book also contains a very brief sketch of the author's life.

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*The Blessed Sacrament Guild Book*. Price 2/- net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

This is a manual designed for the use of members of the Archconfraternity and Guild of the Blessed Sacrament. It contains a short account of the origin of the Archconfraternity, the usual Guild service (with music), an explanation of same, and a number of other useful items, such as the Stations of the Cross, hymns, etc., all arranged for the use of the Guild.



## Books Received.

**The Tangle of God and Evil.** By Ernest J. Glint. London: Elliot Stock, 7 Paternoster Row, E.C. Pp. 38. Unbound. Price 1/6 net. [Written by one who unloosed the tangle to his own satisfaction, and thus became a Christian. A review will appear in our next issue, if possible.]

**La Vie Intellectuelle.** Par A. D. Sertillanges. Editions de La Revue des Jeunes, 3 Rue de Luynes, Paris. Pp. 254. [A stimulating work describing in original fashion the spirit and method of intellectual culture.]

**La Vie Catholique.** Par A. D. Sertillanges. Paris, J. Gabalda, Editeur, Rue Bonaparte 90. Pp. 296. Prix net, 8fr. [Reserved for review in our next issue.]

**The Christian's Ideal.** From the French. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 28 Orchard Street, W.1. Pp. 125. Price 2/. [An excellent little manual, teaching in aptest language the greatest of lessons, how to make God known and loved.]

**In Touch With God.** By Rev. Joseph Sunn. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 28 Orchard Street, W.1. Pp. 57. Unbound, 1/-. [A simple, but effective little guide to meditation and the presence of God.]

**The Letters of St. Teresa.** Translated from the Spanish by the Benedictines of Stanbrook. Vol. II. London, W. Baker, 72 Newman Street. Pp. 325.

**La Mauvaise Presse.** [A booklet of 20 pages dealing with the Canon Law and with the duties of the priest on the subject of bad literature.] Paris: La Bonne Presse, 5 Rue Bayard.

**A Practical Philosophy of Life.** By Ernest R. Hull, S.J. 257 pp. London: Herder.

**Collapses in Adult Life.** By Ernest R. Hull, S.J. 109 pp. London: Herder.

**Scripture Examples.** I.—Apostles' Creed. II.—Commandments of God and the Church. 32 pp. and 32 pp. 9d. each net. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

**Commentarius in Epistolam and Ephesios,** a Fr. Jacobo-Maria Nosté, O.P. 318 pp. 30 lire. Rome: Libreria del Collegio Angelico. Paris: Gabalda.

## Theological Articles in the Reviews.

THE HOMILETIC AND PASTORAL REVIEW (April, 1921).—**A. B. Sharpe**, 'Methods of Controversy.' [A few hints on making religious discussions profitable.] **S. Weywod**, 'The Changes in the New Roman Missal.' [A helpful comment on a few of the more important.] **W. Drum**, 'Historicity of the Johannine Discourses of Jesus.' [The articles written by Baron von Hügel for the 'Encyclopædia Britannica' are opposed to the teaching of Pius X., of the Holy Office, and of the Biblical Commission.] **C. Donovan**, 'Is the Motu Proprio Practicable?' [The regulations of Pius X. in regard to ecclesiastical music may be successfully carried out, but earnest effort is required.] **J. Husslein**, 'The Story of Shorter Working Hours.' [Historical. France and Switzerland were the pioneers.] (May, 1921).—**J. Simon**, 'Syrian Eucharistica.' [The testimony of the Early Syrian Church to the dogma of the Real Presence.] **T. P. Phelan**, 'Degradars of the Christian Pulpit.' [The Catholic priest's faith and training save him from adopting the sensational methods that mark some non-Catholic preaching.] **S. Weywod**, 'The New Code on the Celebration of Holy Mass.' [The time and place of celebration. Some interesting historical details.] **J. Husslein**, 'The Strain of Overwork.' [The demoralizing effect of the twelve-hour system in American steel works.] **W. Drum**, 'Johannine Thought Forms in the Discourses of Jesus.' [Unfavourable criticism of the theories favoured by Fathers Lebreton and Martindale.] Each issue also contains 'Liturgical Notes for the Month,' 'Roman Documents for the Month,' Answers to Queries, and Sermons appropriate to the period.

THE MONTH (April, 1921).—**H. Lucas**, 'A Great Cardinal.' [An appreciation of Cardinal Manning, based partially on Mr. Leslie's biography.] **G. Byrns**, 'Right and Wrong Notions of Prayer.' [The distinction between mental and vocal prayer has been made too acute: the difference is really one of attention.] **J. H. Pollen**, 'Henry VIII. and St. Thomas Becket—II.' [Discusses the historical sources of the legend favouring the king.] **H. Thurston**, 'Some Physical Phenomena of Mysticism: Incorruption—I.' [Many remarkable instances in the last few centuries. Natural causes can hardly explain them all.] (May, 1921).—**A. Fortescue**, 'The Orthodox Church and Schismatical Ordination.' [The writer corrects some misstatements by the Rev. A. J. Douglas in a former controversy, and maintains once more that the Orthodox Church does hold views 'as to the validity of ordination outside her own communion,' and that her view on Anglican Ordinations is not favourable.] **L. Vincent**, 'The Faith and the Cinema.' [There is room, and need, in England for a Catholic firm.] **E. Roulin**, 'The Fish Symbol of Early Christianity.' [Gives the chief meanings, statements by Fathers and others, and an account of a special Eucharistic monument discovered by the writer in a Castilian village.] **R. Lucas**, 'The Call to Perfection.' [Perfection possible outside the special 'state of perfection'—the Religious.] **H. Thurston**, 'Some Physical Phenomena of Mysticism: Incorruption—II.' [The remarkable facts connected with the saints in the Roman Calendar who lived between 1400 and 1900 offer problems that medical science is incapable of

solving.] (June, 1921.)—**J. H. Pollen**, 'Cardinal Manning and the Jesuits.' [A sober and unimpassioned reply to the main charges against the Order implied in the Cardinal's indictment—as revealed in Mr. Leslie's biography.] **A. H. Atteridge**, 'A Moral Estimate of Napoleon the Great.' ['The faith of his fathers showed him the safe way home.'] **G. Byrne**, 'Right and Wrong Notions of Prayer—II.' [Exposition of the idea implied in the previous article.] **P. M. Waterton**, '"Peripatetic" Philosophy.' [General principles illustrated in such common-place things as 'walking' and 'golf.'] **H. Thurston**, 'Some Physical Phenomena of Mysticism: Incorruption—III.' [Additional examples strengthen the conviction that medical science cannot explain all the phenomena.] *Miscellanea; Critical and Historical Notes; Topics of the Month; Notes on the Press Reviews; Short Notices; Books Received.*

**THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW** (March, 1921.)—**L. Semler**, 'When did Christ die?' [The writer claims that the death occurred on Friday, the 15th Nisan (9th April), 30 A.D. This leads to a suggestion that, if Easter be fixed, the 9th April or the nearest Sunday should be selected, and that the year 1930 should be celebrated as our greatest centenary.] 'The Bishops and the Y.M.C.A.' [A comment on the recent condemnation.] **A. Gauthier**, 'The Catechist as an Adjunct to the Priest in the Foreign Mission.' [Useful and practical suggestions for successful work, in China especially.] **T. Slater**, 'Sacramental Ministration to Non-Catholics.' [Canon 731 does not really prohibit it when there is danger of death and no scandal.] **J. F. Noll**, 'The Clergy and the Press Month.' [Catholics in America must learn much from other bodies—in the matter of system, organisation, and the appreciation of business methods. Detailed suggestions.] (April, 1921.)—**Fra Arminio**, 'The Priestly Dignity of St. Joseph.' [Good reasons in the old traditions for regarding him as the model for a Catholic Priest.] **F. E. Tourscher**, 'The Bible School of St. Jerome.' [Mostly historical.] **H. Woods**, 'Spiritism, Thomism and Kantism.' [The theory of the subconscious self and of multiple personality is quite in harmony with Kantian doctrine, but is a stranger to Catholic philosophy.] **C. J. Kirkfleet**, 'The Eighth Centenary of the Premonstratensian Order.' [Historical.] **A. MacDonald**, 'How to Preach the Mass.' [Advocates less of the Post-Tridentine theorizing, and more insistence on Scripture and Tradition, in explaining the essential unity of the Last Supper, the Crucifixion and the Mass.] **H. T. Henry**, 'Office Hymns of St. Jeanne d'Arc.' [The Abbé Dabin's view that the four hymns have been changed for the worse may be modified when account is taken of theological requirements.] **H. Pope**, 'The Teaching of Scripture in Seminaries.' [The main aim is to make students love the Bible, and the means to that end is to make them acquainted in their earlier years with the Bible itself, and to relegate 'exegesis' to a secondary place.] *Analecta. Studies and Conferences. Ecclesiastical Library Table. Criticisms and Notes. Literary Chat. Books Received.*

**REVUE BIBLIQUE** (April). **R. P. D. Buzy**, 'Les symboles prophetiques d'Ezechiel (fin).' [Conclusion of interesting series of studies on the 'symbols' or symbolic acts of Ezechiel.] **W. S. O'Reilly**, 'Le Canon du Nouveau Testament et le critere de la canonicité.' [Discusses some non-Catholic theories of Inspiration. Put forwards the theory that the books of the New Testament were regarded as inspired because written by

apostles or by writers whose gift of inspiration was guaranteed by apostles]. **L. H. Vincent**, 'Decouverte de la "Synagogue des Affranchis" a Jerusalem. [Favours identification of ruins recently discovered with the Synagogue 'Libertinorum' of Acts].

**BIBLICA** (Vol. 2., fasc. 2). **A. Médebielle**, 'Le symbolisme du sacrifice expiatoire en Israel. [On essence of sacrifice according to the Jews. Refutes various false views, and discusses the nature of bloody sacrifices in general. In a subsequent article he proposes to take up expiatory sacrifices.]. **A. M. Kiebar**, 'The Chronology of 3 and 4 Kings and 2 Paralipomenon, II. [Proposes a theory for the solution of all chronological difficulties]. **A. Fernandez**, 'El Profeta Ageo 2, 15-18 y la fundación del segundo templo.' [Rejects the view of Van Hoonacher and Nikel.] **E. Zorrell**, 'Vaticinium messianum Is. 9, 1-6. [Metrical and strophic rearrangement of the text.] **A. Vaccari**, '"Lacto" nel Vulgato.' [In certain passages it means 'entice'.]

**PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW** (April).—**W. L. Baxter**, 'Smoot's Stories out of the Book.' [A scathing indictment of the methods of modern critics who disregard all writers who defend orthodox views on the Bible.] **P. W. Crannell**, 'The Bible in Shakespeare.' [Quotes passages which contain echoes of the Scripture narrative.]

**PALESTINE EXPLORATION FUND QUARTERLY STATEMENT** (April).—'The Excavation of Askalon, 1920-1921.' [A preliminary report on the results obtained.] **W. J. Pythian-Adams**, 'History of Askalon.' **E. W. G. Masterman**, 'The Pool of Bethesda.' [Discusses various suggested sites and concludes in favour of the Virgin's Fountain.]

**EXPOSITORY TIMES** (May).—**B. B. Warfield**, 'Antichrist.' [The Antichrist of the Epistles of St. John is not an individual, but the opposition which Christianity meets in its development.] **E. Koenig**, 'The Problem of Suffering in the light of the Book of Job.' [What answer does the Book of Job give to the question, what is the purpose of human suffering?] **R. Harris**, 'Traces of Targumism in the New Testament.' [Discusses certain texts which he contends are based not on the Old Testament directly but on the text as modified by the Jewish Targum.] (June).—**S. Langdon**, 'The Dynasties of Sumer and Akkad.' [The results of recent research on the earlier history of Babylonia.]

**IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD** (April).—**Rev. J. B. O'Connell**, 'The Ceremonies of Holy Week in Smaller Churches.' [Have such churches an obligations of carrying out the ceremonies? If so, according to what rite?] **Rev. D. Barry**, 'The Application of the Mass.' [Some practical questions touching the *fructus specialis*.] **Rev. E. A. Feran**, 'Robert De Waldobry, O.S.A., Archbishop of Dublin, 1390-1395.' [Historical.] **J. B. Cullen**, 'The Early Jesuits in Ireland.' [Historical.] **Rev. E. J. Quigley**, 'The Clones Missal.' [Traces of liturgical reform in Ireland in Middle Ages.] **Rev. M. H. Molnery**, 'Social Ireland, 1295-1303.' [An interesting account of the effects of English influence in matters civil and religious.] Notes and Queries in Theology, Canon Law and Liturgy; Roman Documents; Reviews. (May).—**Bishop of Sebastopolis**, 'Eternal Life—II.' [The resurrection of the body.] **Rev. T. Gavan Duffy**, 'An Irish Missionary Episode.' [Fennelly brothers, Bishops of Madras.] **Rev. H. V. Gill**, 'The Atom in Recent Science.' [Scientific, suggesting comparisons with medieval notions.] **Rev. E. J.**

**Quigley**, 'The Clones Missal.' [Continued from April.] **Rev. H. J. Farrell**, 'The Spirit of the Liturgy.' [A plea for better instruction of the faithful regarding the symbolism of the liturgy.] Notes and Queries, etc., as in April.

**THEOLOGIE UND GLAUBE** (2 Heft, 1921.)—**Schnürer**, 'Petrus Canisius.' [A sixteenth century 'second apostle' of Germany.] **Hartle**, 'Der trinitarische Charakter des Vaterunsers.' [An original speculation. Divides the Our Father into a half dealing with God, and a second half dealing with man. In each three distinct prayers are found; and these prayers of each half refer in order to appropriated qualities of the three Divine Persons.] **Hehn**, 'Die Entstehung des Alphabets, die neuentdeckten Sinaitischen Inschriften und das Alte Testament. [This new discovery of Sinaitic inscriptions makes a bridge between Egyptian hieroglyphics and the Semitic alphabet.] **Reinold**: Helfsmittel Zum Dantestudium.

**STUDIES** (June, 1921.)—**MacInerney**, 'Archbishop Walsh and the Irish Martyrs.' [The story of the Ordinary Process in connection with the Irish martyrs; Dr. Walsh's lion's share in the work.] **Leslie**, 'The Passing of Woodrow Wilson.' [His name will live on account of his effort to civilise civilization.] **Ryan**, 'The Principle of Non-Intervention in relation to Ireland. [Unless America is recreant to her traditions and moral obligations, she will peacefully intervene.] **McKenna**, 'The Bolsheviks.' [Both Bolsheviks and rulers of capitalistic states are using the same means to enslave people, namely, the destruction of private property, the universal distribution of which alone can give democracy a real meaning.] **Thurston**, 'Blood Prodigies.' [Discusses various blood prodigies, well-founded and baseless. Holds that in other cases besides that of Templemore the same ill-regulated impulse to over-do things through several statues seems to have been present.] **O'Rahilly**, 'The Sovereignty of the People.' [Holds that the people do not merely designate rulers, but transfer to them the authority which in the last resort comes from God.] **Clery**, 'Shakespeare and Christianity.' [The critics never mention now the principal thing about Shakespeare, his Christianity, and his aversion for the foes of Christianity, whether Jew, Moor, or Lollard.]

*Nihil Obstat:*

JOANNES CANONICUS WATERS, Censor. Theol. Deput.

*Imprimi Potest:*

✠ **EDUARDUS J. BYRNE**,

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4



## The Religious Origin of Civilization.

THE belief in God ennobles the status of man. For it involves the idea of a God giving a sanction to right order, founding the moral obligation of observing it, and living through eternity to reward or punish. And there springs from this notion of moral obligation the great concept of man's personal and national liberty, for there is no speaking of opportunities and responsibilities of machines subject to iron laws. Further, it can be maintained that, so far from the concepts of God and of religion being illusive, the most real and valuable things in civilization are founded upon them. Accepting even the worldly and pragmatic test, the test of the practical man, we cannot well say that all these results are founded on a falsehood; men do not gather figs from thistles, or grapes from thorns.

If we begin by taking such a central factor in civilization as architecture—according to Lethaby it is the matrix of civilization—we find that, as an art, it had its origin in religion, in the cult of something higher than man. For man's quest was for a building worthy of God and of the immortal soul rather than for one worthy of himself. In Egypt, the cradle of many forms of civilization, we find abundant proof of the inspiring force of religion in the domain of architecture. The pyramids still exist, creeds in stone. They are awe-inspiring proofs of the efficacy of belief in immortality. Not only in Egypt, but in Greece, her cultural disciple, entering into the rich harvest of ancient ideas, religion inspired the noblest buildings known to man. Through the inspiring force of religion, which raised man above himself, the builders wrought for eternity. These are not isolated instances of the influence of religion on the chief work and sign of civilization. In more ancient times the same inspiration was found in Assyria. And if we carry our inquiry further back to the old agricultural cults, to the beliefs in the gods of fertility, we may venture the same theory concerning those obscure days. We may well suppose that the Eastern round tower, the form of which

was used in Christian times, though the precise original spirit that prompted it was lost, was religious in origin and symbolism; was, that is, a phallic symbol dedicated to the fructifying god. Similarly, the triangular figure in architecture, found in ancient obelisks and stone monuments, had presumably a religious significance, symbolising the female source of productiveness. As we trace back this religious inspiration of architecture, it is not surprising that it should be found abused by superstitions; nevertheless there was a germ of truth amid all the corruptions, just as, we need not hesitate to say with Newman, primitive revelation was often found distorted in pagan myth and legend. For one thing, there was truth in the aspiration to worship the Principle of the earth's productiveness, though mistakes were made in identifying and describing that august Source. But, if we pass to a pure religion, there is no need to emphasise its cultural value in the case of Christian architecture; the inspiration of religion is writ broad on basilica and cathedral.

And when man sought in ancient and in modern times for a building worthy of God, he incidentally secured buildings worthy of himself. Even when men lived in hovels or in caves, they strove to worship in temples. But, aiming at buildings worthy of the gods, they thought of fitting homes for themselves. In this, as in most cases in the development of civilization, the discovery was apparently accidental; it was here a by-product of religion. Men aimed at one result, and stumbled on an alien, but fruitful, discovery. But this stumbling was only apparent; it was guided by a Providence, for these men sought first the Kingdom of God and all the other things were thrown in.

Amongst these gifts showered on civilization by religion we may reckon various forms of poetry, such as tragedy and comedy. They, too, had their origin in the cult of the agricultural gods. They were related to the Divine Source of the earth's productiveness, to the Principle of gladdening wine and corn—symbols which still survive in our religion, that came not altogether to destroy but to fulfil. The death of vegetation could well inspire the tragic note; whereas the birth and garnering of the fruits of the Earth, like Christian harvest merry-makings, could give a soul to comedy. It is remarkable, too, that

the re-birth of drama in Christian times, of the tragic as well as the comic note, should be not altogether unconnected with religion; witness the miracle plays.

Strabo even says that 'the whole art of poetry is the praise of the gods.'<sup>1</sup> In pagan times worship was the inspirer of song. There were dithyrambs in honour of Bacchus and paeans in thanksgiving to Apollo for deliverance. As there are Christian hymns, so there was their less worthy precursor the *hymenaeus* in honour of Hymen or Bacchus. The ancient poetry was either entirely about the Higher Power, or, if it dealt with secular subjects, it began at least with an invocation. There was grace before poetry as well as before the sacrificial meals. Virgil, even when he harnessed the Pegasus of poetry to a plough, began his Georgics with a prayer to Bacchus, to Ceres, and to Pan. The husk of the old custom was long afterwards preserved even by Christian poets in the introductory soulless invocation of the Muses. There is a cloud of witnesses in support of the religious connection of poetry. One will recall Homer, to whom the gods were no mere poetic machinery; his reflex, Virgil; Hesiod, who amongst other works wrote a Theogony; Pindar, who ennobled even athletics by constantly associating them with the gods.

The closely connected art of instrumental music, we may expect, had the same connection with religion, whether there was question of 'the sounding brass' of Cybele's Phrygian worship, or the more refined instruments dedicated to Orpheus and to Pan, or the nobler harp of the royal psalmist. There was the accompaniment of dance as well in the Corybantic worship of Cybele as in the case of David who danced before the Ark. Indeed the religious dances of ancient Hellas, which were of a mimic character, imitating the supposed suffering or gladness of such deities as Ceres, Proserpine, and Bacchus, were the beginnings of the drama.

Thus religion is the source of poetry. It inspires the noblest songs, as witness the Psalms and the Canticle of Canticles; it gladdens the heart of men. Whereas atheism and materialism do not inspire epics; they are sterile and soulless; their heart is dead. Amongst agnostics one thinks

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Donaldson, Theatre of the Greeks: Bohn, Publisher, p. 2.

of only one poet of any marked distinction, Matthew Arnold; but, then, he believed in pantheism, and pantheism has an element of theism.

The thesis that the belief in God, or religion, is most fruitful in results, and can be justified by even the modern pragmatic test, can be also enforced by an appeal to other arts of civilization, for example, to the fine arts, those outward signs of an inward beauty. It is more than doubtful if even Greece could have reached the height she attained in sculpture and painting, had not her Pheidias and Praxiteles been inspired by the religious idea. Not a merely human representation did they aim to produce, but a divine one; they shot their arrows at the sun. If they had merely the idea of humanity before their minds they would not have raised themselves above themselves, and produced an Apollo, whose hair had the glory of the rising sun. Nor did Christianity fail to continue the tradition of the inspiring force of religion in the fine arts, as Michelangelo and Raphael bear witness.

But even the humbler arts and crafts of civilization were advanced by religion, and faded in modern materialistic days with its decay. If it is true that building, as an art, was promoted by the need of worship, and that architecture is the rallying ground of the arts of civilization, we may expect that the work of the weaver and the tapestry designer, the craft of the carpenter, the skill of the metal worker, were commandeered in the service of the temple of God. Even the art of writing, which is essentially not distinct from drawing, had its inspiration in religion. Scholars carefully trace back the modern forms of writing to the hieroglyphics, the sacred writing of an Egyptian priesthood. Similarly, such a distinctive mark of civilization as clothing received its development as a fine art, and made rapid strides from its primitive crudeness through the effort that was made by priests and worshippers to have a more ornamental dress worthy of their religious feasts, for in the beginning, it need hardly be said, all feasts had a religious import.

If in this manner almost everything worth while in civilization can be connected with religion, we see the reason why

the priest in olden times had such multifarious activities; we can understand why the Celtic druidic priest was the man of universal learning and craft; we can guess why the pontiff was also a bridge-maker. We do not assert that every art had its birth in religion; we admit that the art of weaving, for example, seems to have originated in the need of enduring clothes to cover and adorn the body. But we suspect that instead of priestly clothes being derived from the lay dress, as is ordinarily supposed, lay dress in its more artistic forms was suggested by priestly clothes. In this connection, too, it need not be emphasized that religion has continued its inspiring force in the development of the crafts; reference need only be made to the development of manuscript illumination and bronze work in Christian Ireland.

With the development of the various arts there went hand in hand an increase of knowledge. For the development of knowledge is due to practical needs. The idea promotes the action, and the action in turn promotes the idea. Thus with the development of metal work there was a growth of metallurgical knowledge, and there were laid the foundations of chemistry; with the development of architecture there was a need, and a consequent supply, of mathematical knowledge.

Science is, also, the offspring of religious speculations. When men's minds were less critical and more subject to imagination, they sought a palpable cause for all events. And this they often fashioned according to their own image; they represented the various causes of natural phenomena as personal agents. Thus the function of the myth was to give such an account of things as would suit the popular childlike mind. There were, accordingly, various fantastic explanations; imagination often ran riot in extravagant dreams. Every function of nature had a separate cause that was exalted into a god or goddess; a pantheon of dryads and naiads, of agricultural and commercial gods, was created. Imagination being kaleidoscopic in its views, these gods had varying fortunes; their forms fluctuated, or they melted into one another, as might happen in ordinary dreams; Dionysus, the lover of Venus, sometimes became



Priapus, her son.<sup>2</sup> But amid all these fantasies, often beautiful as a poem, often corrupt and degrading, there was nevertheless embedded a tendency of paramount importance to the race, the quest of the causes of reality. Pioneer work is generally full of difficulties and errors. But even the mistakes found in an honest search after causes contain hints which can be afterwards improved upon. Thus science is in a sense born of superstition. It is the child of the good element, or tendency, in mythological speculations. Mythology, with its personal causes appealing to popular imagination, gave rise to philosophy and science, with their abstract causes, that are taboo to the less cultured peoples.

It may be objected, then, that religion has been the cause of as much evil, or perhaps, more evil than good; the words of Lucretius may spring to the mind: *religio quantum potuit suadere malorum*. There have, indeed, been degrading intellectual errors connected with religion, and naturally these errors have often been translated into a corrupt practice. Religion, like every good thing, can be connected with abuses; the same gift of eloquence, which in Massillon's lips was an incalculable power for good, in the mouth of a demagogue is a devastating influence. And the greater the good, the greater the evil abuses connected with its perversion. The virtues run wild are the most dangerous of all; the worst of all madmen is the fanatic. But is it pure religion—that religion spoken of by St. James—which can be held responsible for these evils? It certainly is not the true idea of God which is the cause of the corruption. There were, indeed, found in pagan worship consecrated drunkenness and consecrated prostitution. But this was due to the corrupt and degraded qualities attributed to Bacchus and Astarte. But even pagan religion in its purer moments of natural virtue was able to glimpse the higher things, as the institution of the vestal virgins witnesses. The pure ideas of God led to a purification of man; and in turn purified man was able to form clearer notions of God. For only the pure of heart see Him, and only a revealed religion could well bring about the vision—a vision which went on increasing in the course of time; from the early revelation of God as the mighty One thundering on Mount Sinai, which was given to a rude people

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Donaldson, *Theatre of the Greeks*, Bohn's Edition, 1879, p. 18.

glorying in physical force, to Christ's supreme manifestation of God as Love incarnate.

It was this wholeness of view introduced by Catholic Christianity which gave the best and fullest results in civilization. Whereas the abuses can be traced to corrupt ideas of God, the good things in civilisation can be traced to the same idea of God, as the Author of the beautiful and the true; of song, of dance, and of art. This integral idea of God leaves room for the cultivation of the imagination and senses as well as of the intellect and will. Accordingly it ennobles human nature in its entirety. Other religions that were merely partial may have had their own restricted forms of culture, but these were, at most, but noble torsos, and they left the human faculties, also, in a truncated state of development. Puritanism would have killed off the drama, the fine arts, and the innocent joys of life. Even Judaism and Islam could not appeal to the whole man, for they, too, were iconoclastic. They discouraged not only idols but images in their austere, even if sublime, worship of the one God. They cultivated some of the arts as poetry and architecture, but not being Catholic they excluded many others.

We cannot, then, suppose that civilization in any integral form can exist apart from true religion. Even though some of the arts, as for example, the drama and literature, have become secularized, they should never forget their origin; least of all should they glory in their parent's defeat. Though they have attained their majority, they can never be entirely independent of religion. For the soul of literature is a passionate truthfulness. When truth, the central element in religion, is forgotten, art becomes eccentric and decadent; its death-sentence is already passed. People sometimes speak of the fight for the arts of civilisation. Religion is their true champion. It civilised men in the past; it alone can fully restore a decayed culture, the lost image of God in man. The war for civilization must always be a religious crusade. The supreme tragedy is that many of the champions of civilisation fight religion as an enemy. They know not what they do. Oftentimes soldiers engaged in the same cause mistake their comrades, and fight them to the death. The champions of religion and the cultivators of science and art war in the same cause. For, the world must

not be allowed to forget, religion has resulted in the drama, poetry, music, dance, sculpture, painting, architecture, and whatever else is most beautiful in art.

Thus religious idealism is connected with practical life. It is the most efficient form of pragmatism. We here suggest that the argument adduced for the existence of God from the ideal, as it goes on developing, coincides with that argument for His existence which is drawn from the practical needs of men.<sup>3</sup> Men have need of God. The idea of God works. It works in such a multitude of ways; its ramifications so extend to every form of human activity and civilization; it is so omnipresent that he who denies that certain things have a religious bearing knows little of human nature and of the deepest roots of reality; it is so efficacious that he who believes that such a universal and permanent idea is a hallucination can as easily believe that a cathedral can be supported by a vacuum, or that sanity can be built on insanity, or health on disease, or reality on unreality.

GARRETT PIERSE.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also I.T.Q. April, 1921.)

## Suarez on the Origin of Civil Authority.

### I. DR. FITZPATRICK'S OLD POSITION.

My April (1921) article ended with the words:—" Suarez has not been condemned by Leo XIII., Pius X., nor by any other Pope." In his July article, Dr. Fitzpatrick not only grants the one thing I contended for, but vehemently denies ever having said that Suarez was condemned. It is Rousseau that was condemned by Leo XIII.; not Suarez. And this, it seems, was very plainly contained in his article of the previous January.

Now, from the beginning to the end of his January article Dr. Fitzpatrick never so much as once mentions Rousseau's name. No, not so much as once. It is Suarez, not Rousseau, whom "all the Popes, in one way or another, reject" (page 4). It is the teaching of Suarez, not of Rousseau, which, as being identical with the teaching of *Le Sillon*, was condemned by Pius X., as 'a theory contrary to Catholic truth' (page 5). It is the statement of Suarez, not that of Rousseau, that "it is manifestly impossible to reconcile with the statement of Leo XIII." (page 7). It is Suarez, not Rosseau, that has imperilled "a revealed dogma"; that "has been regarded rather as a help to the enemy than as a defence against him"; that "has been weighed in the balance and found wanting."

But, notwithstanding all this ardent rhetoric uttered by Dr. Fitzpatrick in January, he thus complains of me in the following July:—" Throughout he assumes, and he wishes his readers to assume (for he puts the word "condemned" in quotation marks) that I declared Suarez to be condemned. Now there is not one word or phrase in my article which could justify such an assumption . . . . Positive or explicit condemnation there is none" (page 213). Again:—" The Popes have, indeed, condemned Rousseau and demolished his impious social edifice" (page 217).

Now I am beginning to see, Dr. Fitzpatrick meant to teach us in his January article that "the Popes have,

indeed, condemned Rousseau and demolished his impious social edifice," but that "positive or explicit condemnation of Suarez there is none." And yet Rousseau is never once mentioned in the January article. It is Suarez that is always "in conflict" with the Popes; always "irreconcilable" with the Popes; always "completely discarded" by the Popes; always "rejected" by the Popes. It is Suarez that "has been weighed in the balance and found wanting." What mischievous Puck was it that held Dr. Fitzpatrick's pen, and made him say the opposite to what he had so beneficently intended? I can recall no other such instance of opposition between words and the ideas which the words were meant to express. His readers and I are guilty of no "assumption" whatever. There is therefore no call on us to put in any plea of justification. Dr. Fitzpatrick's article amply justifies us. Several passages in it, taken singly, inevitably convey condemnation of Suarez by the Popes. Taken collectively or in the mass, they fill the mind and imagination with a reiterated sense of condemnation. I did not put the word "condemned" in quotation marks, in order to make my readers "assume" that Dr. Fitzpatrick "declared Suarez to be condemned." There was no necessity for that. The word "condemned" was written in large capitals on every page of Dr. Fitzpatrick's paper. My prevalent intention was to avert from myself all responsibility for the word, in its application to Suarez.

## II. DR. FITZPATRICK'S NEW POSITION.

The following passages from Dr. Fitzpatrick's July article define his new position:—

"The Popes have, indeed, condemned Rousseau and demolished his impious social edifice; but I hold that simultaneously they have damaged beyond repair the whole Suarezian position" (page 217).

"That opinion (i.e., of Suarez), therefore, is no longer supported by authority. At no time did it rest on really sound arguments. Consequently, I must adhere to my original conclusion that it cannot be defended with any degree of probability" (page 228).

The new position is not one whit more tenable than the old. I propose to examine it, first in the light of common sense, and then in the light of authority.

### III. SUAREZ AND ROUSSEAU.

If the condemnation of Rousseau has so irreparably damaged the teaching of Suarez as that it can never in future be defended with any degree of probability, it can only be because the teaching of Rousseau and the teaching of Suarez are identical, or, at least, strikingly similar. In my April article I gave from the *Diuturnum illud* of Leo XIII. the chief heads of Rousseau's teaching, and I showed that it is diametrically opposed to the teaching of Suarez. Rousseau's civil society is not a natural, but a purely conventional society, into which men are not only physically, but morally free to enter or not. Suarez's civil society is not a conventional, but a natural society, into which men, by precept of the natural law, are bound to enter. According to Rousseau man is not subject to any law, nor bound by any obligation, before his entrance into the *Contrat Social*. According to Suarez man is born a subject of the natural law, and bound by manifold obligations. According to Rousseau civil authority comes not from God, but from the will of the people: God has nothing to do with civil authority; it is no way dependent on Him; the will of the people is the only fount of civil authority. According to Suarez civil authority comes from God, through the natural law; but the imposing of the civil bond is contingent on the will of the people. According to Rousseau civil authority is the sum of the people's individual rights, as ceded to the ruler. According to Suarez civil authority is not the sum of the people's individual rights. According to Rousseau civil authority continues to remain in the people, even after it has been conferred on the ruler. According to Suarez civil authority is really transferred to the ruler, and inheres formally in the ruler alone. According to Rousseau the ruler is the mandatory or instrument of the people: he cannot use the civil power as his own; his use of it is dependent on the consent of the people. According to Suarez the ruler is



not the mandatory or instrument of the people, but the minister of God, in things temporal. The civil power is conferred on him by the consent of the people; but, when it has been conferred upon him, it is his own; he can use it as his own; his use of it is not dependent on the consent of the people. According to Rousseau civil authority can be withdrawn from the ruler, whenever the people wish to withdraw it. According to Suarez civil authority is placed permanently in the hands of the ruler, and may be withdrawn, only when the people's supreme temporal interests demand its withdrawal.

These points of contrast between the teaching of Rousseau and the teaching of Suarez are not far to seek, nor hard to find. They may be studied in our ordinary handbooks. The two theories are as opposite as light and darkness. How, then, can "the condemnation of Rousseau and the demolishing of his impious social edifice have simultaneously damaged beyond repair the whole Suarezian position"? With quite as much truth might Dr. Fitzpatrick tell us that a denial and condemnation of the proposition "Two and two make five," damage beyond repair the proposition "Two and two make four."

Speaking of the teaching that "authority depends on the consent of the people," Dr. Fitzpatrick says (July article, page 228):—"The Popes give no indication that the Suarezian sense of the words is any more acceptable than the Rousseauvian." No statement can be more remote from fact. The Popes make it quite clear that their condemnations have nothing whatever to do with the teaching of Suarez:—1) Leo XIII. tells us explicitly, in the Encyclical *Diaturnum illud*, the men he is condemning, "the many moderns who walked in the footsteps of the self-styled philosophers of the 18th century, from whom Catholics differ." Did Suarez belong to the 18th century? Was Suarez not a Catholic? If he was, he was opposed to these philosophers, "from whom Catholics differ" (*Ab his vero dissentiant Catholici homines*). 2) Leo XIII. describes the contract he condemns; it is the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau. 3) Leo XIII. enumerates the doctrines which he condemns. They are the doctrines of Rousseau; every one of them, as I have shown, is diametrically contradictory of the doctrines of Suarez.

Pius X. is equally explicit, as I shall show in its proper place.

#### IV. SUAREZ AND LE SILLON.

In his July article (page 228) Dr. Fitzpatrick writes:—  
 "Nay more, the Sillonist doctrine condemned by Pius X. is not that of Rousseau at all, but in every essential feature it is practically identical with the opinion of Suarez."

The letter of Pius X. condemning *Le Sillon* is found in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* for the year 1910 (pages 607-633). From this letter, composed in French, we learn what were the errors of *Le Sillon* on the nature of civil authority. They may be expressed in the two following propositions:—  
 1). Civil authority, after it has been conferred on the ruler, continues to reside in the people, so that each individual citizen is a sort of king. 2). The ruler is the mere mandatory or instrument of the people; he cannot use the power conferred on him, without the consent of the people.

The following passages, taken from the letter of Pius X., will bear out the accuracy of my presentation of the teaching of *Le Sillon*:—

"D'abord, en politique, le *Sillon* n'abolit pas l'autorité; il l'estime, au contraire, nécessaire; mais il veut la partager, ou, pour mieux dire, la multiplier de telle façon, que chaque citoyen deviendra une sorte de roi. L'autorité, il est vrai, émane de Dieu, mais elle réside primordialement dans le peuple et s'en dégage par voie d'élection ou, mieux encore, de sélection, sans pour cela quitter le peuple et devenir indépendante de lui" (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, page 613).

Again: "Elle (l'autorité) sera extérieure, mais en apparence seulement; en réalité elle sera intérieure, parce que ce sera une autorité consentie" (*Acta Ap. Sed.*, page 614).

And again: "Au reste, si le peuple demeure le détenteur du pouvoir, que devient l'autorité? une ombre, un mythe" (*Acta Ap. Sed.*, page 617).

Finally: "Peut-on enseigner que l'obéissance est contraire à la dignité humaine et que l'idéal serait de la remplacer par l'autorité consentie?" (*Acta Ap. Sed.*, page 617).

These are also the tenets of Rousseau condemned by Leo XIII. I said in my April article :—" Pius X. condemns the same errors as Leo XIII." Dr. Fitzpatrick contradicts this statement in his July article, for the reason that "*Le Sillon* admits that authority comes from God, whilst Rousseau denies that authority comes from God." But my statement is not therefore false; any more than it would be false, if *Le Sillon* had said: "The moon is made of green cheese," and Rousseau had said: "The moon is not made of green cheese." The one and only condition necessary for the truth of my statement is, that certain errors should be common to Rousseau and *Le Sillon*, and that these common errors should have been condemned by both Leo XIII. and Pius X. It is by no means necessary for the truth of my statement that all the errors of Rousseau should have been published by *Le Sillon*. The one necessary condition is verified. Therefore my statement is literally and strictly true:—" Pius X. condemns the same errors as Leo XIII."

In his July article Dr. Fitzpatrick compares four propositions from the condemnation of *Le Sillon* by Pius X. with four propositions taken from Suarez, and continues thus:—" Quid plura? The resemblances I have indicated are so very striking and concern such very essential points that they are inexplicable unless the Popes wished to set aside the Suarezian theory."

I will now set down and examine these propositions.

#### " SILLONIST THEORY CONDEMNED BY PIUS X.

- (a) Authority, it is true, comes from God, but it resides primordially in the people.
- (b) It is transferred to rulers by way of election or selection; it remounts from below upwards.
- (c) It continues to reside in some sense in the people.
- (d) It shall be an authority based on consent.

#### SUAREZ.

- (a) Authority comes from God by natural law. It resides primarily and immediately in the people.

- (b) It is transferred by the people to the ruler.
- (c) The people retain power radically or habitually.
- (d) Authority is given to the ruler by the consent of the community."

In order to see the vast difference between these two sets of propositions, we have only to bear in mind what is the teaching of *Le Sillon*, as sketched for us by Pius X., and what the teaching of Suarez. According to *Le Sillon* authority continues to reside in the people, after it has been transferred to the ruler; and so to reside in the people, that every individual citizen is a sort of king. According to Suarez the people are the first recipient of authority. They transfer it to the ruler; and, after they have transferred it to the ruler, it is no longer *formally* in the people, but only *radically* or *habitually*. He explains what is meant by *radically* or *habitually*: If the ruler uses his authority tyrannically, the people can deprive him of it, and place it in other hands. According to *Le Sillon* the ruler is the mere mandatory or instrument of the people. He is therefore wholly dependent on the will of the people in the use or exercise of his authority. It is not his own. He cannot use it as his own. He can do nothing without the consent of the people. According to Suarez authority is, indeed, conferred on the ruler by the consent of the people. But he is not the mere mandatory or instrument of the people. He is the Minister of God in things temporal. In the use or exercise of authority he is not dependent on the will of the people. The authority is his own. He can use it as his own. He can use it independently of, and in opposition to, the will of the people.

Let us now apply these distinctions to Dr. Fitzpatrick's propositions.

(a) According to *Le Sillon* authority continues to reside formally in the people, even after they have transferred it to the ruler. According to Suarez authority does not continue formally in the people, after they have transferred it to the ruler.

(b) According to *Le Sillon* authority remounts from below upwards, but it still continues to remain below; and so to

remain below, that each individual citizen is a sort of king. According to Suarez when authority mounts upwards it ceases to remain below: each individual citizen is not a king, but a subject.

(c) Pius X. defines the "certain sense" of Dr. Fitzpatrick, in which, according to *Le Sillon*, authority continues to reside in the people; in the sense that each individual citizen is a sort of king. Suarez himself tells the sense in which authority remains in the people "radically" or "habitually." In this sense: If the ruler uses his power tyrannically, the people can deprive him of it.

(d) According to *Le Sillon* the ruler is the mere mandatory or instrument of the people; the ruler, in the exercise or use of the authority conferred upon him, is dependent on the consent of the people; he can do nothing without the people's consent. According to Suarez the ruler is not the mere mandatory or instrument of the people. He is the Minister of God. The authority conferred on him is his own. He uses it as his own. In the use or exercise of it he is no way dependent on the people's consent. It is only the conferring of authority (not the use or exercise of it) that is dependent on the consent of the people.

These distinctions are no inventions of mine. In making them I have drawn the teaching of *Le Sillon* from the letter *Notre charge apostolique* of Pius X. I have given the teaching of Suarez as it is given by himself. In the application of these distinctions we see that Suarez is just as little involved in the condemnation of *Le Sillon* as he is in the condemnation of Rousseau.

#### V. DR. FITZPATRICK'S NEW POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF AUTHORITY.

I will now consider Dr. Fitzpatrick's new position in the light of authority. He confesses again and again that he can see no difference between the condemnations I have considered and the teaching of Suarez; but he has introduced us to no author, famous or obscure, who makes a like confession. He has cited no author in support of his contention that the condemnation by the Popes "has damaged beyond repair the whole Suarezian position," or

in favour of his contention that "the teaching of Suarez cannot be defended with any degree of probability." But it is not merely that the authors make no such confession. They actually say that they see all the difference in the world between the condemned doctrines and the teaching of Suarez. Of course all the modern Suarezians, such as Macksey, say it. But the remarkable thing is, that authors opposed to Suarez also say it. For example, Father Cathrein, S.J. (*Philosophia Moralis*), says that the Suarezian doctrine is the doctrine of nearly all the Scholastics; that it is often traduced as being "jesuitical"; that the enemies of the Church make it a handle for calumniating Catholic theologians, as having been the fore-runners of Rousseau and his followers; but that it is very different from the teaching of Rosseau. This last Cathrein sets out in the following words as a formal thesis:—

"DOCTRINA VETERUM DE ORIGINE CIVITATIS ET POTESTATIS POLITICAE PLURIMUM DIFFERT AB EA QUAM ROUSSEAU ALIÛQUE DE EADEM RE PROPONUNT." Let not the word "VETERUM" suggest any doubt as to whose the doctrine is. In his explanation and proof of the thesis Cathrein five times refers to the doctrine as the doctrine of Suarez; he mentions in detail many points of difference between it and the doctrine of Rousseau. And all this, although Cathrein is an opponent of Suarez, on the origin of civil authority. In the very next thesis he states and defends the Neo-scholastic doctrine. The edition from which I am quoting was published, with a preface by the author himself, in the year 1915; therefore, after the condemnations of Leo XIII. and Pius X. According to Cathrein, then, it is not the Popes that are the backers of Dr. Fitzpatrick: his backers are "THE ENEMIES OF THE CHURCH; THE SLANDERERS OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS."

Again, Cardinal Billot, who, if we are to believe Dr. Fitzpatrick, "explicitly rejects Suarez," tells us that the doctrine of Rousseau and the doctrine of Suarez are as different as day and night; that they differ "TOTO COELO." Later I will examine Dr. Fitzpatrick's statement that "Billot explicitly rejects Suarez"; but in this place I propose merely to tell what relation, according to Cardinal Billot, the teaching of Rousseau and his followers bears to



the teaching of Suarez. I have already stated the difference in brief; but let me give Billot's words:—"Hoc IGITUR MODO EXPLICATA NATURA POLITICAE POTESTATIS, NULLA JAM OPINIO EST INTER SCHOLASTICOS LIBERE AGITATA, QUAE TOTO COELO NON DIFFERAT A PLACITIS NOVATORUM." He had told us already, in the words of Leo XIII., who the "NOVATORES" are; the many moderns who walk in the footsteps of the self-styled philosophers of the 18th century. Like Cathrein, Cardinal Billot draws out several points of difference between the teaching of Suarez and the teaching of Rousseau and his crew. Dr. Fitzpatrick quoted from Billot's *De Ecclesia Christi*. I am quoting from the same work. It will be interesting to the reader to hear that my edition was published this present year, 1921; and that the illustrious Cardinal adheres to his old teaching on the nature and origin of civil authority. He has the doctrine condemned by Leo XIII. and Pius X. before him. He quotes more than one passage from the *Diuturnum illud*. But he gives a very different interpretation of the condemnation from that given by Dr. Fitzpatrick.

In his January article Dr. Fitzpatrick says of the Suarezian teaching:—"Certainly it is no longer received in the schools in Rome." He appeals, not to any books, as we have just seen, but to the living voices of the Roman Professors. He has chosen Rome as his venue. So to Rome let us go. I was able to tell him in my April article that the Suarezian doctrine is received and taught in the Gregorian University. In his July article Dr. Fitzpatrick gives us no intelligible explanation of the phenomenon that a doctrine "completely discarded" by Leo XIII., a doctrine condemned by Pius X. as 'a theory contrary to Catholic truth,' a doctrine "weighed in the balance and found wanting," a doctrine "rejected, in one way or another, by all the Popes," should continue to be taught within the shadow of the Vatican, without protest by the Holy See. No explanation, intelligible or unintelligible. Professor O'Rahilly, in the March issue of *Studies*, names two other Roman Colleges in which the Suarezian doctrine is taught, "The Carmelite International College," and "The Benedictine Scholasticate of S. Anselmo." As Dr. Fitzpatrick thinks so slightly of my poor attempt in the April issue of THE IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, and as

he is so very sure that all Rome is on his side, I hope the reader will not deem me egotistical if I put in evidence a letter I have received from Rome, written by Father Edmond Power, S.J., Professor at the Biblical Institute :—

Dear Father Masterson,

Allow me to congratulate you on your article in *THE IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY*, on the origin of civil authority. The article was very highly appreciated by, and gave much pleasure to the Irish Colony in Rome. It will interest you to hear that I was recently asked by a friend to find out the views held on the origin of civil power at the various ecclesiastical colleges here. I did not find anybody who did not admit the probability of the common scholastic doctrine as expounded by Suarez, or who considered that any pontifical pronouncements were directed against it, or rendered it untenable. The Suarezian doctrine is taught by the Professor of Ethics at the Benedictine International College (Dom Gredt, whose manual on Philosophy is very highly appreciated elsewhere in the Eternal City), by Dr. Ronayne, Professor of Ethics at the Carmelite International College, and by the five Professors who form the entire staff of the Faculty of Canon Law at the Gregorian University. The doctrine more generally admitted at the Collegio Angelico, according to an Irish Dominican friend, is practically equivalent to, if not identical with, that of Suarez. The Taparelli-Zigliara doctrine is taught at the Propaganda, Lateran and Franciscan International Colleges. One professor of Ethics explained to me that he taught the latter doctrine as safer. Another considered it better supported by authority. A professor, who held the Suarezian view, said, when I asked his opinion :—"Why everybody holds the Suarezian doctrine now," alluding to the influence of the world war, which has turned the tide again in favour of Suarez. But the doctrine of Suarez was far from being obsolescent at Rome even before the war, as the published works of Cardinal Billot, S.J., Father Macksey, S.J., Dom Gredt,

O.S.B., to mention no others, plainly show. I do not think there can be said to be any Roman view on this subject; but if one is determined to find a Roman view, the Suarezian theory, so far from being obsolescent at Rome, has at least as good claims to that honourable title as has any rival opinion. This is evident from the facts stated above, and from the relative number and standing of the Colleges in which the Suarezian doctrine is taught, and of the professors who teach it.

Yours sincerely in Xt.,

E. POWER, S.J.

That is how Dr. Fitzpatrick fares in the venue chosen by himself, and at the hands of the jury to whom he appealed for a verdict.

I have said that Dr. Fitzpatrick's new position is not one whit more tenable than the old. I think I have made good that assertion. For let us just consider two very simple obvious facts: By the shores of the Tiber you have many professors actually teaching the Suarezian doctrine; you have all the professors willingly proclaiming its probability. By the shores of the Tolka you have Dr. Fitzpatrick lifting up his lone and lonely voice, and crying in the wilderness:—"That opinion, therefore, though still free from any censure, is no longer supported by authority. At no time did it rest on really sound arguments. Consequently, I must adhere to my original conclusion that it cannot be defended with any degree of probability."

I wonder will Dr. Fitzpatrick still adhere to his "original" conclusion. At any rate, I adhere very tenaciously to my conclusion, that the teaching of Suarez on the nature and origin of civil authority is a perfectly safe teaching; safe in theory, and safe in practice.

#### VI. SUAREZ AND CARDINAL BILLOT.

The following paragraph ended my April article:—"The Suarezians are at one on the main issue, that authority does not come immediately from God to the ruler, but mediately, or through the people. On some of the more unimportant by-issues, they are not quite unanimous.

In this article I have thought it better to confine myself to the main issue, and to showing that Suarez has not been condemned by Leo XIII., Pius X., nor by any other Pope." I held, and I still hold, that all this is as true of Billot as it is of any other Suarezian.

In his July article (page 220) Dr. Fitzpatrick writes:—  
 "But does Billot defend Suarez? It may surprise some of my readers to learn that instead of defending him, he explicitly rejects him."

I will give here the chief heads of Billot's teaching; and I ask the reader to bear in mind that I am taking them from the very work from which Dr. Fitzpatrick quoted, the *De Ecclesia Christi*:—

1) Within the limits of utility and justice the people are free to choose their form of government (monarchy, republic) just as they please. Their choice must be useful with reference to the end in view, which is the temporal peace and prosperity of the people. Their choice must be just; that is, it may not violate the rights of others. The illustrious Cardinal proves his statement, and confirms it by the following passage, taken from the Encyclical *Diuturnum illud* of Leo XIII.:—

"There is no question here of forms of government, because there is no reason why the Church should not approve of the rule of one or of many, if only it be just, and conducive (*intentus*) to the common weal. Consequently, within the limits of justice, the people are not forbidden to choose the form of government that is more in keeping with their natural character, with the customs and manners of their forefathers."

The Pope, you see, is very far from teaching that it is either the mission or the claim of the Church to frame civil constitutions for the nations. It is the right of the people themselves to choose their own form of government. Within the limits of justice, the people may choose "the rule of one" (e.g., a monarchy), or "the rule of many" (e.g., a republic). If only justice and utility are observed, there is no reason why the Church should not give its approval.

2) According to Billot, civil authority comes to the ruler, not immediately from God; but mediately, through the consent of the people.

3) According to Billot the people always hold the indefeasible right to change their form of government (e.g. from a monarchy to a republic, or *vice versa*) and to dismiss their ruler, whenever the supreme interests of the people demand such a change or such a dismissal. Supreme civil power is given by God for the public good; that is, for the good of the subject, not for the private good or emolument of the ruler. Therefore every change, whether of government or of ruler, ought to be regulated by a regard for the common good, and by no other consideration. He gives a fine passage from Bellarmine (*De Laicis*, c. 7.) describing the difference between slavery and political subjection, between a slave-master and a political ruler: "The slave exists and works for sake of another, the citizen exists and works for sake of himself; the slave is governed, not with a view to his own interests, but to the interest of his master, the citizen is governed with a view to his own interest, not to that of his ruler; the political ruler seeks not his own advantage but that of the people, the tyrant seeks his own advantage not the advantage of the people. Therefore, as St. Augustine teaches, if there is any real service, as between the ruler and the ruled, it is the ruler, not the subject, who is the servant. This is our Lord's meaning when he says (Matt. xx. 27):—'He that will be first among you shall be the servant of all.' It is in this spirit that Bishops call themselves the servants of their people; and the Sovereign Pontiff, Servant of the servants of God."

My translation is uncouth and halting; so I give the reader Bellarmine's rhythmical antitheses:—"Differt politica subjectio a civili, quod subjectus serviliter, est et operatur propter alium; subjectus politice, est et operatur propter se. Servus regitur non in sui, sed in domini sui commodum; civis regitur in commodum suum, non in commodum magistratus. Sicut e contrario princeps politicus, dum regit populum, non suam, sed populi utilitatem quaerit: tyrannus autem et dominus non populi, sed suam quaerit. Itaque revera, si ulla est servitus in politico principatu, magis proprie servus dici debet qui praeest quam qui subjectus est, ut docet Augustinus, et hoc ad litteram significat illud Domini Matth. xx.: *Qui voluerit inter vos primus fieri, erit omnium servus.* Quo modo episcopi

*servos se plebium suarum, et Summus Pontifex servum servorum Dei se nominat.*"

So far, the teaching of Billot is identical with the teaching of Suarez. According to both the people can select their form of government. According to both civil authority comes to the ruler, not immediately from God, but mediately, through the consent of the people. According to both the people may change their form of government or their ruler, whenever the supreme interests of the people demand such a change.

In what, then, do Suarez and Billot differ? In this: According to Suarez the people are the first recipient of civil authority. It is transferred by them to the ruler. According to Billot the people are not the first recipient of civil authority, and therefore they do not transfer it to the ruler. What the people hold, according to Billot, is not civil authority, but the right to make the ruler. Not merely to designate him in the way in which the Cardinals designate a new Pope. The Cardinals merely place or verify a condition; and, when the condition is verified, the Pope receives immediately from God the plenitude of spiritual power. The Cardinals are in no sense the cause of Papal jurisdiction. They merely place or verify a condition. But when the people exercise their right of appointing a ruler, they are the real cause of his authority; not of his authority considered in itself, which comes immediately from God, but the cause of his authority, as it exists in him. They are the cause why the authority is placed in the hands of this particular ruler.

This slight difference is the mole-hill, out of which Dr. Fitzpatrick makes such a mountain. On this difference alone does he base his assertion: "Billot explicitly rejects Suarez." Dr. Fitzpatrick expected it would "surprise" his readers to be told that "Billot explicitly rejects Suarez." Unquestionably, it surprised me immensely. I rather think it will surprise Dr. Fitzpatrick's other readers just as much, now that they have before them an accurate synopsis of Billot's teaching. They will be yet more surprised when I tell them what Billot himself thinks of the difference between him and Suarez. Cardinal Billot says it would seem to be a dispute about words rather than about things, because, as he adds, whichever explanation



one adopts (his or that of Suarez) the chief points are secured: The form of government, the title to political power or authority, the power or authority itself come not immediately from God, but mediately, that is, through the consent of the people:—"Sed haec ad penitiorem tantum doctrinae expositionem spectant, et forte lis esset magis de verbis quam de re, quia in hoc tandem summa rei reponitur, quod gubernii formae, et tituli exercendae potestatis, et potestas ipsa prout in determinatis subjectis existens, non sunt a Deo immediate, sed solum mediante consensu humano, id est consensu communitatis." (Billot, *De Ecclesia Christi*, quaest. XII., par. 1).

In this short passage Cardinal Billot affirms the chief points of the Suarezian teaching:—1) The form of government (e.g., monarchy; republic) depends on the consent of the people. 2) The ruler's radical or ultimate title to power is the consent of the people. 3) The power itself, as it exists in this or that individual ruler, is acquired by the consent of the people. The passage sums up and explains the unimportance of the difference between Cardinal Billot and Suarez. Dr. Fitzpatrick had the passage under his eye. Why did he withhold it from his readers?

#### VII. AN OBJECTION CONSIDERED.

In both his articles Dr. Fitzpatrick gives prominence to the following passage from the *Diuturnum illud*:

"Those who rule the state may in certain cases be chosen by the will and judgment of the people, and herein Catholic doctrine offers neither dissent nor opposition, but that choice marks out the person who shall govern, it does not confer on him authority to govern; it does not entrust power, it designates the person who shall be invested with power."

Cardinal Billot gives the Latin of the same passage as a difficulty; and then gives his solution of the difficulty. I will first give the passage which immediately precedes the one just quoted; then the passage quoted; and lastly the passage which immediately follows it. It will be a help to those priests who may not have the text of the *Diuturnum illud*. It is a long cry to the year 1881.

- 1) "Immo recentiores perplures, eorum vestigiis ingredientes qui sibi superiore saeculo philosophorum nomen inscripserunt, omnem, inquit potestatem a populo esse; quare qui eam in civitate gerunt, ab iis non uti suam geri, sed ut a populo sibi mandatam, et hac quidem lege, ut populi ipsius voluntate, a quo mandata est, revocari possit. Ab his vero dissentiunt catholici homines, qui jus imperandi a Deo repetunt, velut a naturali necessarioque principio."
- 2) "Interest autem attendere hoc loco, eos, qui reipublicae praefuturi sint, posse in quibusdam causis voluntate iudicioque deligi multitudinis, non adversante neque repugnante doctrina catholica. Quo sane delectu designatur princeps, non conferuntur jura principatus; neque mandatur imperium, sed statuitur a quo sit gerendum."
- 3) Neque hic quaeritur de rerum publicarum modis; nihil enim est cur non Ecclesiae probetur aut unius aut plurium principatus, si modo justus sit et in communem utilitatem intentus. Quamobrem, salva justitia, non prohibentur populi illud sibi genus comparare reipublicae, quod aut ipsorum ingenio, aut majorum institutis moribusque magis apte conveniat."

The first passage makes it evident that the Pope is not referring to Suarez, but to Rousseau and his followers. He is referring to those who walk in the footsteps of the philosophers of the preceding century, from whom Catholics dissent: Suarez did not belong to the preceding century; Suarez was a Catholic. The errors enumerated are the errors of Rousseau: all power comes from the people, in the sense in which the philosophers referred to by the Pope held that it comes from the people; it in no way comes to the people from God; the rulers are the mandatories of the people; they cannot use the power as their own; the people can recall it at will. These several doctrines are contradictory of Suarez. Cardinal Billot and Father Macksey, S.J., give, as an objection, the passage cited by Dr. Fitzpatrick, and prove by the preceding passage that the Pope is condemning Rousseau and his followers; not Suarez, since he teaches a doctrine contradictory of theirs: *Ab his vero dissentiunt catholici homines.*

Cardinal Billot explains in detail what it is that, in this place, Leo XIII. denies:—1) The Pope denies that authority considered in itself (*"secundum se"*) is conferred on the ruler by the choice or consent of the people; that is, he denies the teaching of Rousseau. The teaching of Suarez is that authority considered in itself (*"secundum se"*) does not depend on the choice of the people: it comes immediately from God. It is only the form of government, the ultimate or radical title to authority, the authority itself, as it exists in this or that ruler, that, according to Suarez, depends on the choice or consent of the people. 2) The Pope denies that by the choice of the people there is conferred on the ruler an authority which does not come from God, in the first instance, but which comes from the will of the people as its primal source or fount; an authority, of which the ruler is made the mere instrument or mandatory. In one word, says the illustrious Cardinal, the Pope denies what has been denied in all times by the unanimous consent of Catholic theologians:—"Uno demum verbo negatur illud omne quod omni tempore consensu unanimi a catholicis theologis negatum est."

"The choice of the people designates the ruler."

On this statement Cardinal Billot comments as follows: Since authority, considered in itself, comes immediately from God, there is nothing left to the people but to designate the ruler. But we must distinguish between designation and designation. There is a designation which is designation and nothing more. Such is the designation of a new Pope by the Cardinals. The Cardinals merely place a condition. The pontifical jurisdiction, power, authority is conferred immediately by God, not mediately, through the consent of the Cardinals. That is, the consent of the Cardinals is not the cause of the new Pope's power. The second kind of designation does not merely place a condition. It is the real proximate cause of the authority conferred. Not of the authority considered in itself, which comes immediately from God; but of the authority considered as existing in this particular person; the cause why the authority is placed in the hands of this or that ruler. In the words of Cardinal Billot, "*auctor designationis eo ipso causa est proxima, non quidem potestatis ut sic, sed tamen conjunctionis potestatis cum tali persona.*"

When the people designate a temporal ruler, their designation is of the second kind, not the first. They do not merely place a condition. They are the real proximate cause of the authority as it exists in the ruler.

This distinction between designation which merely places a condition and designation which is a real cause of authority is not peculiar to Billot. By no one is it drawn out more clearly than by Suarez himself (*Defens. Fidei*, 1. III. c. 2, n. 16). Nor is it a fanciful distinction. We know from the teaching of our Faith, that it is the first kind of designation that obtains in the election of a Pope. But, as Cardinal Billot says, in the case of civil rulers we have no like assurance. God has not determined any form of government in particular, nor linked investiture with authority to any title. It is the free consent of the people that must determine both:—"At in civilibus nihil tale reperitur, cum nec certam potestatis formam, nec determinatum aliquem titulum cui alligetur investitura ejus, ordinaverit Deus. Unde quoad utrumque supervenire debet institutio humana, quae eo ipso efficitur vera et proxima investiturae causa in omnibus supremis rerum-publicarum capitibus (*De Ecclesia Christi*, quaest. XII. Par 1).

Suarez (*Defens. Fidei*, 1. III, c. 2, nn. 16, 17) explains in the same way the distinction between the two kinds of designation, and teaches that *it is the second kind that obtains in the appointment of civil rulers.*

#### VIII. DR. FITZPATRICK'S EXPLANATIONS.

In the light of the distinction between designation which merely places a condition and designation which is a real cause of authority the futility of Dr. Fitzpatrick's ambiguous rendering of Suarez becomes at once apparent. In his January article he told us that, according to Suarez, prescription, apart from the consent of the people, is a valid and sufficient title to civil power. In proof of this he translated quite a long passage from Suarez' *Defensio Fidei*, but, oddly enough, he left the last two lines of the paragraph untranslated:—"Atque ita semper potestas haec aliq̃ue humano titulo, seu per voluntatem humanam immediate obtinetur." I very naturally and very justly complained. The following is Dr. Fitzpatrick's defence:—

" Father Masterson did not translate the sentence, and I fear he has not quite caught its drift. The words mean—' Thus this power is always obtained on some human title, or through the agency of human will.' The significance of the sentence becomes clear in the light of what I have already said about the divine right of kings. It merely asserts that every title to power is a human title, the result of human acts; and on that point all Catholics are agreed. I omitted the words deliberately because they had no bearing on the present question."

Upon this explanation I remark as follows:—1) That Dr. Fitzpatrick " omitted the words deliberately " I never had the least doubt; but the reason he gives for having omitted them surprises me profoundly. He omitted them " because (as he thought) they had no bearing on the present question." But it is not a question of what Dr. Fitzpatrick thought, but of what Suarez thought and said. 2) To one, who knows the teaching of Suarez on the origin of civil authority, " the significance of the sentence becomes clear " at once, without any explanation from Dr. Fitzpatrick. 3) I did, indeed, commit the error of not translating the sentence. Dr. Fitzpatrick has supplied my omission. He has executed that very necessary piece of work out of " kind thoughtfulness " to the Irish priests. I wonder are our priests anything the wiser for the trouble Dr. Fitzpatrick has gone to in their behalf. 4) My own objection to Dr. Fitzpatrick's translation is, that it is ambiguous, and therefore misleading. The sentence, " Thus this power is always obtained immediately on some human title, or through the agency of human will," may mean that the consent of the people is a *condition*, but not a *cause* of civil authority; or it may mean that the consent of the people is the real *cause* of civil authority. It cannot be said that "all Catholics are agreed on either meaning." The Neo-scholastics (they are Catholics) assert the first meaning, and deny the second. Suarez and the Suarezians (they, too, are Catholics) assert the second meaning, and deny the first. In the mouth of Suarez, whenever the words have reference to civil authority, they always mean that the consent of the people is the real *cause* of the

ruler's power. Dr. Fitzpatrick's translation does not clear up Suarez' meaning. On the contrary, it obscures Suarez' obviously clear meaning.

Dr. Healy admits that "the Suarezian teaching is still a perfectly free opinion." Dr. Fitzpatrick suppressed the admission in his January article. I complained of the suppression. Dr. Fitzpatrick defends it as follows:—

"I did indeed presume, and I think justly, that my readers were not wholly ignorant of theology. Now anyone who has even a passing acquaintance with Gury knows that probability and improbability have reference only to free questions."

This passage is so cryptic and obscure, that I cannot clearly grasp its meaning. Is it an answer to my complaint? or is it meant as an affront to Dr. Healy's consistency? As an answer to my complaint, what is its appositeness? What is its meaning? Its meaning seems to be this:— "Every opinion that is perfectly free is probable. But I was determined to deny that the opinion of Suarez is probable. Therefore I could not afford to tell my readers that Dr. Healy says it is a perfectly free opinion." Dr. Fitzpatrick evidently misunderstood my difficulty. It had no reference to probability and improbability. My whole difficulty was about finding a justification of Dr. Fitzpatrick's suppression of passages of vital importance. The most perfect knowledge of my Gury could not help me in my pursuit of a justification of his suppression of such passages in his quotations from Dr. Healy, Suarez, Leo XIII., and Pius X. I rather think that "even a passing acquaintance with Gury" would beget in me the conviction that such suppression is wholly unjustifiable. I rather think that every little new accession to my knowledge of Gury could serve only to deepen that conviction. I know of no principle in Gury or in any other moral theologian, that justifies such mutilation. Does Dr. Fitzpatrick? Can he urge any principle in defence of his mutilation of Billot, which so far, is Dr. Fitzpatrick's masterpiece in that line?

If, on the other hand, Dr. Fitzpatrick thinks Dr. Healy inconsistent: if he thinks that the passage which he quoted



from Dr. Healy and the passage which I quoted from Dr. Healy are mutually destructive, that is Dr. Fitzpatrick's affair. But if he really thinks Dr. Healy inconsistent, is he not himself, on that account, tenfold more inexcusable? In that hypothesis, in his zeal to prove that Leo XIII. had "completely discarded" Suarez, he chose (and it was his one and only proof) a passage from Dr. Healy which he thought completely neutralised by a contiguous passage from Dr. Healy. That is, in a matter of such grave importance, in a matter in which the fair fame of Suarez was so deeply involved, he chose a medium of proof that he thought of no value whatever. And, I repeat it, his quotation from Dr. Healy was, and so far is, his only proof from authority that Leo XIII. had "completely discarded" Suarez.

These are my guesses at Dr. Fitzpatrick's meaning. If they do not give his true meaning, I can only leave my more intelligent readers to find it out for themselves.

#### IX. CONCLUSION.

Originally my only part in this controversy was to show that Suarez was not condemned by the Popes.

I tried to do that in my April article. Next I had to meet the assertion that the Popes, when they condemned Rousseau, "damaged beyond repair the whole Suarezian position," and the assertion that "the doctrine of Suarez cannot be defended with any degree of probability." I leave it to the reader to say with what success I have achieved my object.

In the Suarezian theory, which is the time-honoured theory of the Schoolmen, the free consent of the people is the contingent fact which places authority in the hands of the ruler. The reasons for that theory deserve to be stated at length and explained. The theory itself deserves to be compared and contrasted with its rivals. That I hope to do on a future suitable occasion; but whenever I may write, and in whatever medium I may publish, it will be done in a serenity of atmosphere which controversy with Dr. Fitzpatrick would not be likely to offer.

EDWARD MASTERSON, S.J.

# The Unity of the Church and the Forty Years of the Rival Popes.

1378—1417.

## PART I.

ONE of the fundamental grounds for the severance of Anglicans from Rome is that Anglicans reject the Catholic doctrine of the unity of the Church. In their recitation of the Nicene Creed they affirm it, but in practice and in the defence of their own position they deny it.

1. The Catholic doctrine is that there is one, only one, visibly and indivisibly one, Holy Catholic Church, founded by our Lord, and continuously built by Him, on Peter, and his successors in the Petrine Office, for its unity, and on the Apostles and their successors in the Episcopate in communion with Peter, for its extension. This unity of the Church is expressed by the threefold unity of Faith, Sacrifice and Sacraments, and of Government. It is doctrinal, liturgical, hierarchical.

People and local Churches abide in the one Church by adhering to this threefold unity; by holding the one Faith; by offering the Holy Sacrifice and receiving the Sacraments with proper dispositions; and by submitting to the Hierarchy—the Pope (the successor of St. Peter) and the Bishops (the successors of the Apostles) in communion with him.

Every person, whether ecclesiastical or lay, every Church, every nation, really abiding in this unity is and must be in communion with the Bishop of Rome and with every other Bishop in the world in communion with him, and with every other member of the Catholic Church. The notion that persons can be in communion with the Church but out of communion with the Bishop of Rome and the Catholic Episcopate is a contradiction in terms. To be in communion with the Bishop of Rome and the Catholic Episcopate, for they form the Hierarchy, is one of the three necessary ways of abiding in the unity of the Church; if it is lost or rejected by persons or Churches hierarchical

unity is lost, and they are fallen from Catholic unity. There can be no such distinction drawn between organic unity and moral unity as Anglicans suggest—or unity with the Church by receiving its sacraments, or some of them, but differing from other parts and members of the Church in doctrine or in government. There is but one Faith and one Hierarchy respectively revealed and instituted by our Lord, which, equally with the Holy Sacrifice and the Sacraments, are essential expressions and constituents of the visible unity. If either of them is rejected, those who reject them fall from Catholic Unity. Moral Unity is precisely the mutual adherence of the members of the Church to the threefold expression of the organic unity. It is that which continues them in the Church. If the moral adhesion to the threefold expression is not present, the person, in whom there is that defect, does not adhere to or abide in the organic unity.

2. This doctrine does not prevent there being schisms. It is not shown to be untrue, or to have failed in its purpose, because in spite of it, schisms have arisen. Our Lord and His Apostles foretold that there would be schisms. St. John wrote of the Antichrists of his day: "They went out from us but they were not of us. For if they had been of us, they would no doubt have remained with us; but that they may be manifest, that they are not all of us" (1 St. John ii. 19). Compare also St. Jude 17, and many other warnings in the New Testament.

The truth of the doctrine, and its efficacy, are signally attested by the marvellous supernatural unity which the doctrine maintains among those Christians who adhere to it, of which there are at the present time about 300 millions; and this the more particularly when contrasted with the chaos, and ever-multiplying different doctrines, and forms of religion, which exist in the other half of Christendom the three hundred million Christians who have rejected it.

3. If people do not believe the Catholic Church to be the true Church, and think that its Doctrine, or its Sacrifice and Sacraments, or its Hierarchy—or perhaps all three—are wrong, it is in their power to reject it; and, as the Protestant Reformers in Germany under Luther, and in England under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, make

to themselves a fresh Church after their own liking. But having done so, and having rejected the Catholic Church and retained only what they liked of its teaching and drawn up fresh formularies of their own, they may not, and have no right, still to claim that they are in and are part of that Catholic Church from whose expressions of its unity they have broken. People like the advanced Anglicans may regret even profoundly that Henry VIII. and Elizabeth acted as they did. But their regret must find its true expression in returning to the Church which those sovereigns rejected, and not by merely saying that they repudiate and disapprove what those sovereigns did, and by borrowing the doctrine and copying the practices of that Church, and teaching them and using them in the Protestant Church, and thinking that so doing makes them to be Catholics. A person can only be a Catholic, as St. Augustine and St. Optatus taught, by being in communion with the "orbis terrarum and the Chair," i.e., with the Catholic Episcopate throughout the world and Rome.

4. The Church must be visibly one, because it has to represent Christ to the world and to speak and to teach in His Name so definitely, so surely, that it may be true of her as our Lord said, "He that heareth you heareth me." The Church teaching in Christ's name could not possibly teach to the world several different religions, different and antagonistic doctrines; nor could it teach within itself, or tolerate within itself, such very different doctrines about the Incarnation and the Resurrection of our Lord, of the Sacraments, of the Holy Sacrifice, or about itself, as are taught in and tolerated by the Church of England. The uncertainty of doctrine in the Church of England—and there being no one clear positive doctrinal system, and no recognised means whatever of arriving at one clear positive doctrinal system, which all the world can recognise, saying, "This is the religion of the Church of England," and of which that Church itself says authoritatively, "This is the religion of Jesus Christ"—is alone sufficient to show that the Church of England is not the one only Holy Catholic Church of Christ: the city set on a hill: the pillar and ground of the truth, which whoso heareth, heareth our Lord.

5. The Church must be indivisibly one—outwardly (since it must be visibly one) and inwardly. The Church is the mystical Body of Christ; and since Christ is one, His Body must be one also. Unity is its glory; that is, it is the token or mark by which it may be known, and was bestowed on it by our Lord (St. John xvii. 22), and can never pass away. It is a consequence of the gift of the Holy Ghost to the Church whereby the Holy Ghost dwells indissolubly in the Church holding it in unity. The Church is a very holy sacred institution of our Lord. It is the mystical Body of Christ of which He is the Head, because its members are baptised into Christ, into His Sacred Humanity. The Holy Ghost indwells the Sacred Humanity, and in consequence indwells those baptised into It. The Church is thus a mystical Person—Christ is the Head: the faithful are the Body: and the Holy Ghost is, as it were, the Soul. The essential, absolutely indivisible, unity of the Church is a necessary inevitable result. What the Church is in itself it must be in its visible manifestation. The Anglican Church, then, when it disclaims being the whole Church, but claims to be part of Christ's Church, is self-condemned. It is impossible to be a separated part of an indivisible whole. The Anglican Church, or any other Christian body, must either be alone the whole Church, or it is not the Catholic Church at all.

## PART II.

1. To the arguments which I have just stated, Anglicans often make answer by referring to the Forty years of the Rival Popes, during which there were for several years one, and towards the close of the period, two rival Popes or Anti-Popes beside the true Pope.

That we may have the rival successions clearly before us I will set them down here before I proceed.

### Roman Popes:

Urban VI., 1378—1389.  
Boniface IX., 1389—1404.  
Innocent VII., 1404—1406.  
Gregory XII., 1406—1415.

### Avignon Popes:

Clement VII., 1378—1394.  
Benedict XIII., 1394—1415.

## Pisan Popes:

Alexander V., 1409—1410.

John XXIII., 1410—1415.

With these rival successions before them, Anglicans say: "Your own theory of unity has broken down; the Church was split up into, at one time, two, and at another time three rival parties or obediences, the heads of which each claimed to be Pope and excommunicated his rivals. Either the unity of the Church was lost altogether, or if it survived it was only of such a kind as we contend holds us in the Catholic Church—organic unity maintained while moral unity was suspended."

2. First let me relate in outline the history of the origin of the dispute. It arose in consequence of the election of Urban VI. I copy the account given in the Catholic Dictionary. "On April 8th (1378) Bartholomew of Prignano Archbishop of Bari was elected (Pope) and he was crowned on Easter Sunday under the title of Urban VI. French contemporary writers with scarcely an exception represent the cardinals who elected him as constrained by violence. They were told by the populace that they must elect an Italian or die; nor were signs wanting that the Roman mob meant to keep their word. There are, however, very strong reasons for refusing belief to these French accounts. Dietrich of Niem, a German and an official in the Papal Court, at the time, assures us that the election was perfectly free, that the people did indeed beg the cardinals to promote an Italian, but used no force or threats, and that the tumult did not occur till the election was over. Dietrich must have known the truth, and there is every ground to think he told it, for he was by no means an enthusiastic admirer of Pope Urban. The testimony of St. Catherine of Sweden, given at length by Raynaldus (ad ann. 1379, n. 20) is to the same effect. She was present in Rome at the time, and talked over the matter with many of the cardinals. But the most conclusive document is the letter also given in full by Raynaldus (ad ann. 1378, n. 19), which the sixteen electors addressed on April 19 to their brother-cardinals at Avignon. They declare that they had chosen Urban freely and unanimously, and we know that they acknowledged him for several months without a protest." Pastor in his *History of the Popes* (vol.



1, p. 119 ff), relates how, "All the Cardinals then present in Rome took part in the ceremony [of his Coronation], and thereby publicly acknowledged Urban VI. as the rightful Pope. They assisted him in his ecclesiastical functions and asked him for spiritual favours. They announced his election and Coronation to the Emperor and to Christendom in general by letters signed with their own hands, and homage was universally rendered to the new Head of the Church. No member of the Sacred College thought of calling the election in question; on the contrary, in official documents as well as in private conversations, they all maintained its undoubted validity."

The change of opinion on the part of some of the cardinals and its development into the terrible revolt and consequent calamity which harassed the Church for forty years, arose, chiefly, through three causes: (i) The introduction of reforms, sorely needed and over-due, by Pope Urban VI., which he initiated in the highest circles, and so pressed at once upon the luxurious prelates, who in consequence went into revolt. (ii) The lack of Christian gentleness and charity, alas! with which Pope Urban VI. proceeded with the introduction of his reforms, which also led him into quarrels with political allies and supporters. (iii) The conduct of the French King, Charles V. Pope Urban's plans for reform, and his constant threat in the presence of the French cardinals to create a majority of Italian cardinals in the Sacred College, filled Charles with indignation. He saw that such a course, if successful, would preclude the return of the Holy See to its dependence on France, like to that which obtained when the Popes were at Avignon. "Charles V. (writes Pastor) therefore secretly encouraged the cardinals promising them armed assistance, even at the cost of a cessation of hostilities with England, if they would take the final step, about which they still hesitated. Confident in his powerful support, the thirteen cardinals assembled at Anagni on the 9th of August, 1378, published a manifesto, declaring Urban's election to have been invalid as resulting from the constraint exercised by the Roman populace who had risen in insurrection, and proclaiming as a consequence the vacancy of the Holy See.

"On the 20th of September (1378) they informed the astonished world that the true Pope had been chosen in

the person of Robert of Geneva, now Clement VII. The great Papal Schism (1378-1417), the most terrible of all imaginable calamities, thus burst upon the Church." (*History of the Popes*, vol. 1, pp. 126 ff.)

The conduct of the cardinals was most severely reprimanded by St. Catherine of Siena, who though not blind to the faults of Urban's character, which had given his enemies their opportunity, most earnestly upheld the validity of his election.

From the above recapitulation of the history it seems that, as generally held, Pope Urban was the true Pope; that the schism was brought about by worldly causes—rebellion against reform on the part of the French cardinals and political intrigue on the part of the French King; the schism was favoured with an opportunity through want of gentleness and charity on the part of Pope Urban.

No authoritative pronouncement has as yet been given confirming the view generally held with regard to the validity of the election of Pope Urban, but the mind of the Church seems clearly indicated, at least as regards the rival Popes of the French succession, neither of whom is reckoned in the Papal lists, and the titles which they assumed, respectively, of Clement VII. and Benedict XIII., are borne by others who came later. The Clement VII. in the Papal lists, is the Clement who reigned from 1523-1534; and the Benedict XIII. in the Papal lists is the Benedict who reigned from 1729-1730.

It is noteworthy, too, how after the long forty years had nearly run their course the first real step towards the healing of the schism seems to have been the action of Pope Gregory XII., who, though his personal following had dwindled, was, according to the generally received opinion the true Pope, since he was in the Roman succession. Gregory XII., in 1415, by his legate resummoned the Council of Constance, thus rendering its position regular as a Council of the Church instead of (as it had more truly been) a Congress of the nations. Pope Gregory XII. then resigned the Papacy. From that time the work of the Council proceeded favourably and issued in the deposition of John XXIII. and of Benedict XIII., and in 1417 in the election of Pope Martin V., under whom the Papal schism was healed.

3. We must now examine how far this calamitous revolt corresponds with, or brought about, the results which Anglicans describe.

As regards the allegation that the unity of the Church was either lost, or, if it existed, was of that unreal kind which Anglicans claim for themselves with the Catholic Church, Catholics say at once and without hesitation that the Church, in spite of all superficial appearances, throughout the forty years, was not itself divided. Throughout those years there was one valid Pope, and, whether his following was great or small, all who adhered to him constituted with him the Church. There was no schism in the strict sense in the Church. The rival parties were not all equally the Church. One only was; and the members of the other sections were either *implicitly* and by desire and intention in communion with her, or, if culpably in the wrong obedience, were separated from and were outside of her. The only question at this stage is, What was the position of those who adhered to the wrong Popes? Were they in schism or not? For the most part they were not.

(a) No doctrine was denied. The occupancy of the Papacy was in dispute, not the Papacy itself. People did not withdraw from Urban because he was the Pope, but because they pretended, or were persuaded, that he was not the true Pope. All, in whichever obedience *they* were, confessed the necessity of the Papacy; the dispute was as to who was the rightful occupant of it. Thus Doctrinal Unity was preserved by all, both by those who adhered to the true Pope, and those who adhered to one or other of the rival Popes.

(b) There was no rejection of the Holy Sacrifice, no change made in, or about, the Sacraments, no new Service Books were introduced. The Holy Sacrifice was offered constantly, and precisely as before, by the priests in whichever obedience they were, and the people heard Mass and received the Sacraments. The question of jurisdiction whereby priests are empowered validly to absolve and exercise the cure of souls will be taken into consideration in the next section. Sufficient has been said to show that Liturgical Unity was maintained.

(c) Unity of Government was of course maintained within the obedience of the true Pope. It was unwittingly im-

paired but not maliciously broken by the vast majority of those, both clerical and lay, in the obedience of the rival Popes. The faithful of different countries, though in opposite camps as regards the rival Popes, and though in places where party spirit ran high rival Bishops were appointed, were not out of communion with one another. St. Vincent Ferrer, who for a long time followed Benedict XIII., passed from one obedience to another in his missionary journeys, without any form of reconciliation with or submission to the Popes of the Roman succession, when passing into dioceses which adhered to them, or *vice versa* when passing back into dioceses which adhered to Benedict.

Then, too, as regards jurisdiction, though at one time, towards the close of the unhappy period, the personal following of the true Pope had dwindled, yet his jurisdiction in reality extended over all three obediences; and only those who wilfully and for political or evil motives rejected his authority were excluded from its beneficent results. The rank and file and large majority of the faithful were the victims of a *communis error* for which in far the greatest number they were in no way responsible; and the priests, all validly ordained, who exercised their ministry in submission to him whom they believed to be the true Pope, had what is termed a *titulus coloratus* (a presumable or ostensible title), and were able validly to absolve and minister to their people. There was, as has been said, a true Pope all the while; and he gave jurisdiction *explicitly* to those in his obedience, and *implicitly* to all who were honestly desirous of being, and believed themselves actually to be, in communion with the true Pope, though actually not so. Unity of Government was therefore really maintained by all; explicitly by those in communion with the true Pope, and implicitly and in intention and desire by all the rest who retained their faith in the Papacy and believed themselves to be in communion with the true Pope.

What really happened during those terrible forty years, and what was the cause of all the calamities, was not that the Church itself was divided (which it cannot be), but that the Petrine Office, owing to the political and other passions of the time which gave rise to the controversies over Pope Urban's election, was hindered for a while in indicating the Church. In a sense it indicated it, inas-

much as each of the Popes, the true Pope and his rivals and the adherents of all three, upheld the doctrine of the Petrine Office; and every one recognised that there could not be the true Church without it; so that all were brought into the relations with the Church, either explicit or implicit, which have just been described. But owing to the rival Popes and the great difficulty in which so many of the people were in getting to know the facts, the real occupant of the Petrine Office was not easily and unmistakably to be recognised as in normal times. Hence grave disasters ensued. The seeds of further troubles were sown. Faith was weakened; and in despair wrong theological opinions were generated about the relative preponderance of power in the Church, as for instance the *new* theory (as Gerson, its chief promoter, admitted it to be) of the superiority of a general Council over the Pope, which led to Gallicanism. The nations weakened in their allegiance by the rivalry of the Anti-Popes were less able, or prepared, to resist the Lutheran Reformation. These were disasters indeed from which Christendom has not yet recovered. At the same time they serve to show of what supreme importance the Papacy or Petrine Office is, and how incomparable are the blessings which its institution by our Lord has bestowed upon the Church, and through her on the world, if the dimming of its glory, or even a temporary clouding of its clear light, had such dire results.

### PART III.

We are now in a position to examine and appraise the bearing of this incident on the Anglican position and on the Anglican contentions.

I have shown that the basic principle of the indivisibility of the Church was not violated. Had it been, the fundamental guarantee which our Lord gave to His Church that the gates of hell should never prevail against it would have failed; and the glory (of unity) which He bestowed on it as the abiding proof both of the truth of His Mission and of His Father's love for the world would have been lost. I would ask Anglicans to consider how grave would be the results of what they, in order to justify their position, seem so ardently to desire to establish. If the Church had been divided, and the Forty years of the Papal schism afforded

any real precedent or sanction for the Anglican severance from Rome, the whole basis of Catholic Christendom, the foundation of the Catholic Church, would have failed. But through God's merciful ever constant protection, it was not so. Sufficient disasters to make us mourn ensued, I have shown, as a result of even a temporary obscurity of the person of the true occupant of the Petrine Office, but he was there all the time, and our Lord's words, and our Lord's guarantee, never failed, or deserted His Church.

The Anglican severance from Rome was altogether different from the Papal schism. In the latter there was no change, no violation, of the Doctrinal or Liturgical Unity of the Church; nor any witting or culpable violation of the Hierarchical Unity by the vast majority of the adherents of the wrongful Popes. Throughout the obedience of the true Pope there was of course not even this unwitting impairing of the Hierarchical Unity. But in England it was the Papacy itself which was rejected. The crucial point of the English Reformation was precisely the rejection of the Papacy and the substitution in its place of the Royal Supremacy—a hitherto altogether unknown principle. "The King," writes the Protestant historian Dr. Gairdner (so justly esteemed by all students of history for his fairness, but to quote whom is made a grievous offence on our part by Anglicans)—"The King was now 'Supreme Head' of the Church of England. He had excluded all reference to Rome on matters of faith and doctrine as well as of Church discipline. He had taken the Pope's place, and with it he had taken upon himself responsibilities which no King of England had ever undertaken before" (*Lollardy and the Reformation*. Vol. ii p. 305). Again after quoting Henry's speech on charity, Dr. Gairdner writes, "We may well stand amazed at such a sermon preached to his bishops and clergy by one who claimed to be God's vicar in his own kingdom. The vicar of Christ recognised by other nations was at Rome; but Henry had displaced him so far as his dominions went, and had taken upon himself the full responsibilities of the situation" (ib. p. 425). So far from any desire to be in communion with the true Pope which actuated all parties during the Forty years, "No mercy," to quote Dr. Gairdner again, "was in store for any who professed obedience to Rome, and the clergy had either to



conform to the King's wishes or escape beyond sea, if they could manage it. Such a cruel persecution had never been known in England, and has hardly been equalled since. By these means was the Pope's authority in England extinguished. . . . It is simply a fact that a powerful sovereign, animated though he was by the basest of motives, was able to exclude England completely from the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope" (ib. Vol. i, 304, 5). Again, writing of Cranmer, Dr. Gairdner says, "At last when seated on the Archiepiscopal throne, and familiar with the conditions under which it seemed to him Religion must live in his day, he framed for himself a religion of Royal Supremacy—an ideal of Christianity subject to earthly power, which was his guiding principle even to the very end" (ib., vol. ii, p. 477). Thus, that which according to Catholic doctrine, and according to what each of the rival Popes and their adherents steadfastly maintained, is the fundamental basis on which Christ founded and continuously builds His Church, Peter and the Papacy or Petrine Office, was rejected. It was not a Pope, the validity of whose election was called in question who was set aside, but it was the Papacy itself which was rejected absolutely as a doctrine contrary to the revelation of Christ. The Hierarchical Unity of the Church was deliberately and consciously abandoned.

The Faith in many other respects (for the Petrine Office is part of the Catholic Faith) was subsequently rejected under Edward VI. and Elizabeth. The Sacrifice of the Mass in particular was vehemently denied and reprobated, and the Church's doctrine of the Sacraments was changed. The whole doctrinal life and tradition of the *post-Reformation* Church was different from that of the *pre-Reformation* Church. Altars were thrown down. Crucifixes and images were destroyed or defaced. The reserved Blessed Sacrament was removed. It was made penal to say Mass. The Service books were changed. The Missal (execrated, defamed, and, wherever possible, destroyed) was replaced by Edward's Prayer Books. A New Ordinal was made excluding all desire or pretence of ordaining sacrificing priests in the historic Catholic sense. The Apostolical succession, in consequence, was lost. The new Anglican Ordinal, which was held to be invalid by some of the English Bishops

at the time of its introduction, as Dr. Gairdner relates (*ib.*, vol. iii, p. 180), was *ab initio* condemned by the Catholic Church by reason of its defect of form and defect of intention. Doctrinal and Liturgical Unity were abandoned. The breach under Henry, and still more under Elizabeth, was the rejection of 'the old religion' (as it was habitually called) which had been received and cherished in England from the time of its re-introduction into England by St. Augustine sent by Pope Gregory the Great, and had grown and been nurtured to maturity in communion with the Holy See. In its place was brought in, and established, 'the new learning' (as Protestantism was called) and a new order of things altogether, a State arrangement of religion, retaining as far as was compatible with the purpose in hand the outward form of the old religion, but without any vital continuity with it—without its Government, without its Doctrine, and without its Liturgical system and life. This was altogether a different condition of affairs from that which took place during the Forty years of the Rival Popes. The English Protestant Bishops were in an absolutely different position from that in which the Catholic Bishops who adhered to the rival Popes were placed. St. Vincent Ferrer, as I have stated, though for long an adherent of Benedict XIII., could pass from the dioceses of one obedience to those of another, and be received, and officiate in both. Cranmer and Parker could not cross from England to France, and say Mass and be received as Catholic Bishops in Paris. English clergymen could hold inter-communion with Foreign Protestant ministers, and did so, but they could nowhere in the world have inter-communion with Catholic priests.

Hooker, the father of post-Reformation Anglican theology, admitted the ministration and received the Communion from the hands of Saravia, who was a Calvinist minister. Genevan ministers for a long time ministered in the Channel Islands, and administered the Sacraments according to the rite of the Church of England, under the Bishops of Winchester. Ussher was prepared to receive Communion at the hands of the French ministers if he were at Charenton; and Cosin, a very protagonist of high Church Anglicanism, asserted in his Will his "union of soul with the orthodox," "which I desire chiefly to be under-

stood of Protestants and the best Reformed Churches." (*England's Breach with Rome*, by Cardinal Gasquet, pp. 41, 42.) Just the same disposition is displayed in the Act of Uniformity in 1662 where, it is said, explicitly, Foreign Protestant ministers may be admitted to minister in the Church of England by the licence of the King.† It has been put into practice at the Keswick conventions, where members of all denominations receive Communion together. It explains how it has come about that the Archbishop of Canterbury, the chief member of the hierarchy of the Church of England with the pretensions to have the Apostolic Episcopate and to be 'Catholic,' is "President" of The French Protestant Church which meets in the Crypt of Canterbury. It was the cause of the Kik-yu-yu discussion. It has been received with favour, and proposals for its systematisation have been made, at the recent Lambeth Conference. The Elizabethan Church of England is congenitally Protestant and is drawn by natural affinity to all the religious bodies which are the same.

HERBERT EDWARD HALL, M.A.

†See Clauses xiv and xv of the Act of Uniformity of Charles II.

## The British Museum "Catalogue" of Raphoe Bishops.

A CURSORY perusal of an article in the July number of the *QUARTERLY* is obviously liable to produce on the reader's mind the impression that it is a serious and studied review of a recent historical work. The readiest process of disillusionment would be a bald reproduction of the most glaring blunders with corrective references. But it is at once more respectful to the self-reliant author, for whom the present writer retains a large residuum of esteem, and more enlightening to the truth-seeking reader, to submit the relevant statements to a dispassionate examination, and to allow the interlocutory comments to stand or fall with the results.

The above-described "Catalogue" furnishes the shaky but congenial foundation for this loose fabric of travesties, distortions, and irrelevancies. Its opening paragraphs were published for the first time by the discriminating author of the "Dominican Bishops," a few years ago; and a complete and unexpurgated transcription of the document was first printed in my "History of Raphoe," 1920. It was compiled during Nial O'Boyle's episcopacy, 1591—1611, as is evident from the concluding sentence: "Neile O'Boyle, who now liveth," or, is Bishop at the present moment. A careful collation of the minute details regarding Church revenues in Drumhome with the evidence furnished in the Lifford Inquisition of 1609, clearly and convincingly suggests that only a resident in that parish could have dictated the information. The obscure townland of Durnish and local family names are mentioned; and the O'Gallaghers of the Drumhome branch are roundly accused of dishonesty originating in simony. In view of the fact that the affairs of no other parish are thus microscopically examined, this conclusion is irresistible. The unique predominance of "Kill" in the Ardara topography was an outstanding subject of speculation.

One most material feature of the case is entirely overlooked by superficial critics. This mildewed list of bogus and genuine bishops, arranged in amazing confusion, was written out in the English language at a period when English was utterly unknown in Tironaill. The "Catalogue" specially eulogises Donal MacGonagle for his rare ability to speak and write Latin, Irish, and *English*; but, as all the herenachs, ecclesiastics, and educated Catholic laity, were possessed of a fluent acquaintance with Latin and Irish, according to the testimony of the Ulster Inquisitions, Donal enjoyed the unique distinction of being able to converse in English whenever he visited the metropolis. The State Papers (1580) inform us significantly that Nial O'Boyle was "better skilled in Irish than in English"; and Redmund O'Gallagher, his illustrious contemporary, in his last extant letter,<sup>1</sup> addressed to Clement VIII. from the Camp of Red Hugh, 15th June, 1600, assures his Holiness that no ecclesiastic could discharge the duty of preacher with profit or effectiveness in any other language than Irish, and that the appointment of non-natives to positions of dignity was antagonistic to the wishes and independence of the Irish people. "*Cum nullus expers prodesse possit. Supplicamus ut in ea re Hibernorum et voluntati et dignitati satisfaciat.*"

After the installation of Willis as Sheriff in 1590, Drumhome never ceased to be infested with Scotch prowlers, who knew little and cared less about the virtues that ought to adorn a Catholic Bishop. It is no far-fetched theory to suppose that some inquisitive scribe among these foreigners committed to paper a muddled account of the episcopal succession in Raphoe taken down from a Drumhome shanachy, and subsequently inserted a few dates borrowed from more reliable sources.

John Knox, son of Andrew Knox, Protestant Bishop of Raphoe, was inducted to the prebend of Drumhome on the 9th of March, 1619; and this rector's son, George, was Provost Marshal of Derry in 1689, during the Siege. Now, any document conversant with the history of the diocese would be specially interesting to any member of this family, and would escape destruction if it fell into such hands. However, this theory prefers no claim to be re-

<sup>1</sup> Archivium II. 293-4.

garded as an historical narrative; but it accounts satisfactorily for the preservation of the Catalogue on the well-grounded assumption that it was compiled in Drumhome; and an impartial study of its contents leaves no room for doubt that it was a product of a seasoned denizen of that parish.

As the document contains no allusion to the bouleversement of 1602, or to the intrusion of the Protestant bishop, Montgomery, in 1605, the date of its compilation was anterior to both these events. Casual and uncritical readers interpreted without warrant "Neile O'Boyle *now* liveth" as equivalent to "Neile O'Boyle *still* liveth," whereas the statement means simply that the then living occupant of the See was Neile O'Boyle, and nothing more.

"This list," says the judicious author of "Irish Dominicans,"<sup>2</sup> "despite its glaring omissions and wild inaccuracies, may still contain some elements of truth. The extract is here reproduced with all its enormities on its head." And, again: "I am willing to admit—indeed I am strongly inclined to believe—that there may be some grains of truth mixed in this preposterous narrative; but, the truth is mixed up with a farrago of inaccuracies and anachronisms."

Precisely the same conviction had stamped itself indelibly on my mind after deep study and minute collation of individual assertions with kindred accounts in recognised authorities. The early paragraphs are brief, and the reader shall be afforded a fair opportunity of promulgating sentence later on their claims to historical accuracy. Naturally, the events approaching his own time are recorded by the compiler with less obvious disregard of facts and sequence; and a few dates are unquestionably correct.

At the same time, no conscientious historian could withhold from his readers a document of such undoubted antiquity and so frequently quoted from; and the present writer did not shirk the responsibility of publishing it at full length for the first time, in the interests of truth and for the satisfaction of enquiring minds. And it must be further emphasised *in limine*, that no single instance occurs in the list of Bishops furnished in the History of Raphoe,

<sup>2</sup> 287, 289.



in which a prelate's name is indited without full and explicit authentication, with unmistakable references. Whimsical criticisms and fantastical hypotheses cannot dislodge from their honoured places in ecclesiastical history the distinguished names that have been enrolled there by eminent and painstaking writers like Ware, Lynch, etc.

- “ 1. The last Abbott and first Bishop that ever was in Rapho was Sean O Gairedan and Derry together with Innishogan and the side Loghfoile was his without controversie.
2. Donell O Garvan.
3. Felemy O Syda.

\* \* \* \*

The Bp. Henry Mac Hugh Seanchy died an.1319.

Thomas Mac Cormack O Donnell he did the Bishopric noe little hurte.

Lochlan More O Galloher. Sean Mac Ilbridg. He was Bp. but one year betwixt the father and the son. Loghlin oge son to Loghlan mor,

9. Bp. of Derry. Edmund O Galchar, and he procured the Bprk. of Rapho for himselfe in Connor O Chans time but he died before the controversie was ended so that Connor was Bp. both before and after.”

S. Adamnan (or Eunan), Maolbrighid Mac Diurnin, Maolduin Mac Kinnfaela, Gilbert O'Caran, etc are completely ignored, and, seeing that two at least of these bishops were elevated to the primacy, it is literally accurate to say that “a host of illustrious prelates” are relegated to oblivion. John Mac Menamin has disappeared in good company, and could hardly claim pre-eminence in the stately procession. Thomas O' Naan is accorded the position and description assigned him by the Four Masters, and by all accredited authors. But “this Catalogue,” pleads Father Mac Erlean, “supplies us with the names of three bishops otherwise unknown, but required to fill up the lacuna.” That these three bishops are unknown and imaginary few will deny; but a lacuna supposes that at least a decent beginning had been made, whereas, like eternity, this list has no defined starting-point at all. “The first Bishop was Sean O Gairedah,” is sheer rubbish. The

Bishops Anthony and Robert were never bishops of Raphoe," Father Mac Erlean proceeds, "but titular Bishops of the see called Raffanensis in Syria." "The Franciscan Province of Ireland" proves his thesis, but Ware and other reliable authors assign these two Franciscan prelates to the see of St. Ennan, and Lynch points to one very notable event in the episcopacy of Anthony. Primate Fitzralph had denounced the Friars in language so fierce that he was summoned by the Pope to Avignon to explain his unwarrantable attacks, and died there in 1360. A pronounced and general reaction in their favour resulted in the promotion of Dominican and Franciscan Fathers to many Irish sees and among them to Raphoe, where Anthony ruled from 1399 till 1413. Luke Wadding informs us in his *Annals* (page 88) that "Robert Mubire, a Franciscan Friar, succeeded by a Papal provision to the bishopric of Raphoe, after the death of Anthony."<sup>3</sup> Luke Wadding and Ware are properly quoted. They were wrong. As the cultured critic of the *History of Raphoe* in "*Studies*" evidently read the entire work with a much keener eye for its merits than for its deficiencies, it is no pleasure to traverse his statements however courteously. Only two of his conclusions remain to be dealt with, and the rebutting arguments shall be brief and well-authenticated.

First, he says: "The number of bishops incriminated is four. The explanations leave us unconvinced." Secondly: "The views of the author of the *Catalogue* are but the current traditions of the diocese. They are in harmony with the findings of the Jurors of 1609."

The alleged crimes all belong to the same abominable category; and the first prelate impeached is Thomas Mac Cormack O'Donnell, who gave Tyr-Mc-Kerren in pawne of a kiefte." In the next paragraph, we read that Patrick Mac Gonagle erected a manor at Portlyna or Banettaly Tire-Ker-ren, which was the Bishop's mensall." The Inquisition of 1609 assures us that "there are two quarters of lande, the one called Busshop's Court (still named Court), upon which the busshop ought to dwell himself and thother called Pontetenagh (Portleen) paying thereout to the busshop, etc." These mensal estates never passed out

<sup>3</sup> Vol. IX. Little, p. 177.

of the undisputed possession of the Catholic bishop till 1610, and Art Phelim O'Gallagher lived there during his whole episcopacy (1547-1561), and died in Bishop's Court, Kinaweer. It may be well to inform the reader that Portleen, Bunlinn, and Ballykeerin are townlands in Kilmacrenan parish near the eastern frontier of Mevagh. Now the lands that were actually mortgaged to Mac Swine embraced twelve gorts<sup>3a</sup> or townlands, here, belonging to the parish then named Tory, about 30 miles from Portleen, in a territory still unappropriated by the Mac Swines at the period in question, 1319-1337.

The Annals of Ulster and the Annals of Donegal might be expected to present a trustworthy reflex of the "current traditions of the diocese." Their panegyrics are here transcribed in order: "Thomas, son of Cormac O'Donnell, eminent in wisdom and in general benevolence in food and in cattle to the learned and the poets of the world, rested in Christ." "Thomas, Bishop of Raphoe, son of Cormac O'Donnell, a man eminent for wisdom and piety, died." Ware's account is equally eulogistic and sententious. "Thomas was consecrated in 1319; he governed the see for 18 years, and died in 1337: a man much celebrated for wisdom, liberality, and other virtues." If the anonymous scribe does not exhibit ignorance in aspersing the character of this saintly prelate, history may be abandoned.

The next prelate dragged into the dock is the venerable Conor or Cornelius Mac Cormac O'Donnell; but the trial is abruptly terminated, and a verdict of "Not Guilty" unanimously proclaimed after the unimpeachable evidence of the illustrious Primate Colton is heard. Not only does his rigorous Metropolitan honour this calumniated bishop with the title of "venerabilis pater" but invests him with unrestricted power to deal with the delinquent Archdeacon and Chapter of Derry—"Ut ipse auctoritate ipsius Primatis, etc."<sup>4</sup> And this authenticated seal of admiring friendship was affixed to Conor's life of sanctity less than two years before its lamented close. It is unnecessary to add that Conor received Papal Mandates, implying complete confidence; that he was an absolute stranger from Corca Vaskin in Clare, as the Four Masters attest, and

<sup>3a</sup> I. 32.

<sup>4</sup> Colton's Visitation, 33.

therefore unlikely to become entangled with any members of the native clans; and that Laurence O'Gallagher II had lived in Inniskeel among the O'Boyles. All these arguments may be seen in the History of Raphoe, but they are merely corroboratory and dispensable.

A third victim of infamous calumny is Lochlan or Laurence O'Gallagher, 1419-1438. This is the "Florence, Dean of Raphoe,"<sup>5</sup> who assisted as a witness during Primate Colton's Visitation of Derry in 1397, and must have attained a ripe age when he was advanced from the deanery to preside over the See by provision of Pope Martin V. in 1419. In the "Catalogue" he is credited with the parentage of Laurence II, seemingly on the flimsy ground that he was known as Laurence Mor, or Senior. Half a century ago, in Irish-speaking districts of Raphoe, the P.P. and Curate were denominated respectively "an sagart mor," and "an sagart beag," without any reference to their physical proportions and much less to lineal descent. But let us examine the few facts of which we possess documentary evidence. (1) This prelate had been Dean for a quarter of a century and enjoyed a reputation that procured for him his elevation to the episcopacy. (2) Neither Primate nor Pope found any fault in his character or conduct. (3) Both the Annals of Ulster and the Annals of Donegal record his death in 1338, while both these authorities significantly pass over in silence the death of his unworthy namesake. (4) In the genealogical table of the O'Gallagher chiefs, presented by O'Donovan in the Battle of Magh Ragh (336, Note F.), this Laurence is placed in the position of the eldest of three, and represented as childless. Had he been traditionally regarded as the progenitor of the Siol an Easbuic Ua Gallchobhain,<sup>7</sup> the author of the trenchant Ordnance Letters from Donegal would not have shrunk from publishing this fact. (5) Pope Eugene IV, in the Brief<sup>7a</sup> of Cornelius Mac Bride's dated 20th July, 1440, describes Laurence as "bonae memoriae"—of good memory. In regard to Laurence II, we feel no qualms of conscience in delivering him to the "reprobate sense" of our critics. Nial O'Boyle's case is

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Annals of Ulster*, III.

<sup>7</sup> *F.M. passim.*

<sup>7a</sup> *De Annatis* I. 233.

not free from difficulties; but the close student of contemporary local feuds will readily pronounce an acquittal on the main charge. However, there is ample room for divergence of judgment, but a mere sporadic dip into a laboriously sifted and expansive compilation does not warrant any critic in blurring its popularity by superficial flippancies and inane theories. Bad faith is out of the question. The article in the THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY opens the fusilade with a magnificent flourish of trumpets. "It may be more convenient to follow, as far as possible, the Roman documents. Let us begin with Maclise O'Deirg, who seems to have been Bishop in 1203. We can only conjecture that he was succeeded by Donal O'Garvey and Felim O Syda." It is pardonable to ask, where are the Roman documents? Why not commence with earlier prelates, say Brigidianus Mac Duirnin, Gilbertus O Cara etc., for whose existence as Bishops of Raphoe, such documents are available? The reader will remark that this iconoclastic commentator, at his first plunge, quite unconsciously submerges, with fatal effect, the premier grand idol of the "Catalogue"—"The first Bishop that ever was in Raphoe was Sean O Gairedan"! Father Mac Erlean considered three Bishops at least necessary to fill an arbitrarily created lacuna; while this critic regards two mythical phantoms as amply sufficient for the purpose. In 1203 a real live militant Bishop of Raphoe visited Iona on a punitive expedition. He bore a beautiful Christian name, Maoliosa (Tonsured, or cleric of Jesus), and took his surname, O'Deery, from a distinguished herenach family, wealthy and well-known in Raphoe and Derry.

"Archbishop Fleming's Register throws new light on the after career of Bishop O'Donnell. We learn that on May 9, 1410, etc." Fleming never mentions Bishop O'Donnell from beginning to end of his Register, by name or otherwise. That prelate was long dead; his death is recorded by the Four Masters at 1399; his abdication due to ill health had been accepted at Rome, and his successor, John MacMenamin duly appointed by the Pope on Feb. 2, 1398. The enormity of this blunder is so staggering that it is difficult to pursue the enforced task of exposure with patience or gravity. Archbishop Fleming's fulminations

against unnamed heretics are quite sufficiently adverted to in the History of Raphoe; but if the Register account (pages 131, 132) was to be reproduced at all, a garbled and silly truncation is indefensible. The usual parade with "cross erect, bells and candles, blessed water, chanting and recitation of psalms, etc.," is prescribed for the Bishop and clergy. But why is the incident overspread with ridicule? Bishop John and his priests paid no attention to threats of unauthorised censure for not subscribing to "funds for a war against the Irish"; and he—or it may have been John McCormack some years after—was cited before the Primate, who had no jurisdiction to interfere. There is not an iota of evidence to support the statement that either he or "Bishop O'Donnell"—the latter was 14 years dead as the Annals and the Papal Registers prove—was compelled to resign in 1413, but Dr. Lawlor inserts Mac Menamin in brackets at page 147, thus "Citation addressed to John (Mac Menamin) Bishop of Raphoe, 29 Nov. 1411." "Mac Menamin" is only a suggestion, but perhaps correct: if the date and "John" are correct (and this is very doubtful), John Mac Menamin must not have been removed by death or censure up to that time. As for "John Mac Cormac Mac Menamin O. Cist.," I think we may pass over this monstrous hybrid with undisguised contempt. The critic resurrected him, and then converted him into a Limited Liability Co.

The Annals of Donegal record the death of Donatus O'Gallagher at 1450, in the stereotyped phrase "Donnchadh O'Gallagher, coarb of Adamnan (and elsewhere Bishop O'Gallagher) died." They furnish no further particulars, and hence I have not devoted a separate chapter to his life. After him came Lughadh or Ludovicus (O'Gallagher), of whom I have said nothing as I knew nothing. In the Bull appointing John de Rogerii to the see of Raphoe, dated 2 Nov., 1479, the diocese is described as being "vacant owing to the death of Ludovicus, the last Bishop, outside the Roman Curia."<sup>3</sup> It is not inconceivable that we may be told that Ludovicus is Loughlan; but the Roman authorities were too intimately acquainted with the name of the notorious Laurence II. to make such a blunder. He went to Rome as a penitent

<sup>3</sup> Cal. Pap. Reg. VI. *ad locum*.



pilgrim immediately after he had secured absolution from the Primate in 1469, and it is almost certain that he died there, in curia Romana, some time in 1477. At all events, a Bull<sup>9</sup> of Sixtus IV., dated 27th March, 1473, represents him as residing there, and he received his Bull of absolution 7th Oct., 1476. It is unnecessary to say that had the see not been provided for already, a Bishop would have been appointed immediately after his death. These are plain facts; hypotheses are the panoply of critics, who are privileged to say that Kilmakeeran is in Boylagh, and that Edmund O'Gallagher was the grandson of Laurence: i.e., Laurence I., Laurence II., Edmund, in lineal succession! Perhaps the writer means that Edmund was grandson of Laurence II.; if so, has he a shred of evidence to produce? "If it be true that O'Gallagher was appointed because O'Cahan became a schismatical supporter of Henry, how then comes it that O'Cahan was appointed on the nomination of the English King?" As Oedipus the King is long dead, there is no living mind capable of divining the rationale of this enigmatical question. Possibly, the writer was possessed of some confused notion that O'Gallagher, too, was appointed on the nomination of the king!

"Quintin," Bishop of Clonmacnoise, was neither Con, nor Higgins, nor Dominican, and was consecrated in 1516. I cordially recommend a careful perusal of Lynch's MS., Trinity College Library. My transcript is verbally correct in every sentence. It is childish to suggest that a Dominican would not visit a Franciscan Friary, whether from social relations or by commission. Dr. Bonaventura O'Gallagher, Franciscan and Bishop of Raphoe, died at the Dominican Priory in Sligo. Archdeacon Lynch's minute account of the relations subsisting at that period between the chieftains of Tirconail and the Church is invaluable. Con O'Higgins was a member of a literary family, the O'Higgins of Doogmore. Many illustrious sons of the clan became brilliant poets, one Miler, an Archbishop of Tuam (1600), and another, Bernard, Bishop of Elphin (1550). This last-named prelate was also a Dominican.

<sup>9</sup> De Annatis, 288.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

To assert that Rory O'Donnell's orthodoxy is impeached by quoting the appointment of Hogeson, is a most unwarrantable contradiction of the obvious truth; the quotation from Brady is explicitly introduced to illustrate "the mystifying confusion in dates." Not Hogeson but John de Sancto Gelasio, nine years later, created the difficulty, and the profound discovery of the distinction between "Darensis," and "Derenis" is characteristic, even if it be not original. Rory's orthodoxy is nowhere impeached by me; not even in the sentence: "We may suspect the warmth of his orthodoxy." The verdict arrived at is:—That he was trimming in his attitude towards King Henry's schism in its initial stages; that he was superseded for a time; that "much clearer evidence would be demanded" to show that he was ever permanently set aside; and that "neither Rome nor the Four Masters considered it right to stain his memory by any note of censure." Since these words were written, we have gladly learned that there is still preserved a letter of Rory's which proves that he wholeheartedly supported the Holy See in discipline as in faith.

"It is equally certain that Rory O'Donnell was permitted to retain the Deanery of Raphoe by the Pope!" This a most glaring and amazing historical falsehood perpetrated by a carping critic, who had undoubtedly read, but as undoubtedly forgotten, we mercifully assume, the well-known Roman document that records his deprivation of the Raphoe deanery, with the accentuated force of the word, "Mandatur." Eugene or Owen O'Gallagher was duly appointed his successor by the Holy See on the 5th of February, 1537; and the decree is published in *De Annatis*, p. 271: "Eugenius Igallcubair, principalis, obligavit se pro annata rectoriae de Teachbeathain xxx necnon decanatus ecclesiae Rapotensis certo modo vacantium. Mandatur uniri ad vitam ipsius Eugenii." The numerous other inaccuracies and irrelevancies of this self-constituted critic we leave unnoticed, as serious students of history need no admonition to apply the maxim, "Crimine ex uno disce omnes."

E. MAGUIRE.

## A Forgotten Interpretation of Matthew XIX. 28.

The passage which I intend to discuss forms, in the present context of St. Matthew, a part of Our Lord's promise to those who have left all things and followed Him. The rich young man, who had piously kept all the commandments from his youth, received the invitation to attach himself to Our Lord as one of His disciples, but refused, and "went away sad, for he had great possessions." On his departure, Our Lord took advantage of the incident to point out to His disciples the danger of attachment to riches, "Amen I say to you, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; and again I say to you: It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." These words made a deep impression on the disciples; and so, as it were, to show us the bright side of the picture, Peter reminded Our Lord that he and the other disciples had accepted the invitation which the rich young man had refused; what reward are they to expect in return for their self-sacrifice? Then follows the answer:

"Amen I say to you, that you, who have followed Me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit on the seat of his majesty, you also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And everyone that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father or mother or wife or children or lands for my name's sake shall receive a hundred fold and shall possess life everlasting."

At first sight the meaning is perfectly clear; and, indeed, commentators are in perfect agreement in their view of the passage. In verse 28 there is reference to the special reward of the apostles, in verse 29 to the reward of all christians. The "regeneration" is the renewal of all things, the transformation of the universe which takes place at the end of the world. Christ sits enthroned on the seat of his majesty to judge mankind, and the apostles occupy an honoured

place as his assessors. Reference is usually made to the parallel passage in Luke xxii. 29. 30 : 'And I dispose to you, as my Father hath disposed to me a Kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdom; and may sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel'; both passages are interpreted in exactly the same sense. St. Jerome's homily on the passage, which is familiar to us from the Breviary, represents substantially the traditional interpretation: "In regeneratione, cum sederit Filius hominis in sede majestatis suae (quando et mortui de corruptione resurgent incorrupti), sedebitis et vos in soliiis judicantium, condemnantes duodecim tribus Israel: quia vobis credentibus, illi credere moluerunt." (Lib III in Matt. cap 9). There may be slight differences in detail, but this might be taken as the usual interpretation from the time of St. Jerome to the present day.

I have been able to find only one writer who dissents from this commonly accepted view, and, strange as it may appear, this solitary voice in the wilderness points out to us the true interpretation of the passage. The writer is Grotius; and I quote from the collected edition of his works, *Opera Theologica* Tome II, pars I, Amsterdam 1679. On the passage of St. Matthew in question he has the following note:

*Paligenisias voce hic puto ipsum Messiae Regnum inchoandum post resurrectionum Christi."*

And on the following words, "sedebitis et vos" etc.

*Proximum mihi Regi honorem occupabitis (krinein judicare, hic tantum vult quantum praeesse).*

The explanation is a model of conciseness and lucidity. The verses are taken to refer not to the renewal of all things at the end of the world, but to the renewal which takes place after the Ascension, when the spiritual mission of the Church begins to be realised. The apostles sit on twelve thrones not as the assessors of Christ as Judge, but as the representatives of Christ ruling the Church which he has founded. That such is the correct interpretation of the passage I propose to prove (a) from an examination of the passage taken in itself, (b) from a study of the literary characteristics of St. Matthew's Gospel and (c) from comparison with a similar passage in St. Luke XXII.

If we take the passage apart from its immediate context there is certainly no difficulty in interpreting it in the same sense at Grotius; the different expressions are perfectly appropriate, and in some cases they are much more naturally referred to the earthly history of the Church than to its consummation at the last Judgment.

*Paliggensia* "rebirth" in itself might refer, according to the context, to the renovation of human society at the foundation of the Church, or to the restoration of all things at the end of time. Commentators however, with one voice speak as if it could refer only to the renewal of all things at the Resurrection. Grimm-Thayer<sup>1</sup> defines it as "that signal and glorious change of all things (in heaven and earth) for the better, that restoration of the primal and perfect condition of things which existed before the fall of our first parents, which the Jews looked for in connection with the advent of the Messiah, and which the primitive Christians expected in connection with the visible return of Jesus from heaven." The only text cited in support of this long definition is Matt. xix. 28. The fact is that the word is found *only in one other passage* in the New Testament, Titus iii. 5, and there it certainly means the rebirth of the individual life following on Baptism.<sup>2</sup> The word is comparatively rare in profane literature, but in no case is it used in an eschatological sense. It means in general "rebirth" or "renewal" and the exact meaning is defined by the context. How far the context throws light upon its meaning here will be seen later on. The phrase "when the Son of Man shall sit on the seat of his Majesty," resembles one which is used in Matt. xxv. 31, "then shall He sit on the seat of his Majesty," where it certainly refers to the Last Judgment. But it is equally applicable to Christ reigning in glory in heaven, as in Mark xvi. 19, Eph. i. 20., Heb. i. 3, viii. 1, x. 12. Only the context can decide whether the reference is to Christ as King or to Christ as Judge. Similarly the word "judge" does not necessarily contain a reference to the Last Judgment. All admit that it is frequently used in the Book of Judges

<sup>1</sup>Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, sub. voc.

<sup>2</sup>The same meaning is assigned to it in Matt. by Hilary and the author of "Opus Imperfectum"; but they connect it closely with the preceding, i.e., "You who have followed Me by Baptism." They take the usual view of the rest of the passage.

in the sense of "ruling," "governing," and, as will be shown later on, this is the meaning demanded by the context in the parallel passage Luke xxii. 30. The passage taken in itself, therefore, does not necessarily bear the eschatological meaning. The current interpretation is due to the fact that this verse is taken too closely with the following which clearly refers to the rewards reserved for the disciples in the next life. Was this the original context in which the words were spoken by our Lord? I hope to be able to show that the context was altogether different, and that in the light of that context the verse must be interpreted as referring to the position which the apostles were to occupy in the government of the Church after the Ascension.

I must here remind the reader of a principle which is now generally received in regard to the interpretation of St. Matthew's Gospel. The arrangement is topical rather than chronological; discourses, miracles, parables, and detached sayings are grouped together without regard to chronological arrangement and merely because of their subject matter. In Chapters V.—VII. we have a number of discourses and fragments of discourses, delivered at different times, placed together as if they formed part of the Sermon on the Mount. Similarly, in VIII.—IX., we have a group of miracles; in X. a series of instructions to the apostles which obviously do not all belong to the same period; in Chapter XXIV. a great many of the difficulties of interpretation are due to the fact that it includes excerpts from other discourses than that provoked by the remarks of the apostles in the temple. What is true of discourses is true also of fragments of discourses and detached sayings. But while all are agreed in recognising the peculiar character of St. Matthew's Gospel, an important consequence of his method is unfortunately lost sight of. If St. Matthew groups discourses together because of their kindred subject matter, it would be erroneous to interpret them in strict accordance with their present context. A good part of the discourse in Chapter X. is quite inapplicable to the temporary mission of the Twelve in Galilee, and must have formed part of a later discourse delivered when the apostles were sent out into the world to preach the gospel to every creature. It



is obvious, therefore, that if we wish to interpret a passage aright our first task is to set it in its proper context and interpret it in the light of that context. This principle has been duly emphasised by Mgr. Batiffol in his *L'Enseignement de Jesus*, p. xvii.-xviii.: "La tradition rédactionnelle a recueilli ces sentences isolées et les a rattachées a celles avec qui elles avaient quelque analogie. Dans de telles conditions, la juxtaposition, loin de éclaircir la parole, l'obscurcit: le lecteur est tenté de voir une suite, là il n'y a qu'une rencontre . . . Il arrive ainsi qu'une parole de Jésus, pour être bien comprise, doit être isolée de son contexte et considérée en soi seule." It is frequently difficult to decide whether a particular passage is in its proper setting or not, or to find its original context. Sometimes St. Mark and St. Luke give the same saying in its original context, in other cases we are left to conjecture.

Now there are the grounds for thinking that the saying in Matt. xix. 28 is one of those detached from its original setting and, furthermore, that the words were delivered in the circumstances detailed by St. Luke in xxii.

(a) It is to be noted that in Peter's question to our Lord there is no reference to the special position of the apostles; he speaks in the name of all the disciples who had left all things and followed Christ. There was no reason therefore why Christ should refer to the special prerogatives of the apostles in the next life. and verse 28 is not appropriate as forming an answer to Peter's question. The real reply begins on verse 29: "Everyone that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands for my name's sake: shall receive an hundred-fold, and shall possess life everlasting."

This surely is one of the cases referred to by Batiffol in which "the juxtaposition so far from throwing light on the passage, obscures its meaning"; and the full force of the different expressions in the verse is to be seen only when the verse is considered apart from its present context.

(b) This hypothesis receives a striking confirmation if we compare the passage in Matthew with the parallel passage in Mark.

## ST. MATTHEW xix. 27-29.

27. Then Peter answering said to Him : Behold we have left all things and followed thee : what therefore shall we have ?

28. And Jesus said them : Amen I say to you, *that you who have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit on the seat of his majesty, you also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel,*

29. And everyone that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or lands for my name's sake shall receive an hundred fold, and shall possess life everlasting.

## ST. MARK x. 28-30.

28. And Peter began to say unto Him : Behold we have left all things and have followed thee.

29. Jesus answering, said : Amen I say to you, there is no man who hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or lands for my sake and for the Gospel,

30. Who shall not receive a hundred times as much, now in this time ; houses and brethren and sisters and mothers and children and lands with persecutions : and in the world to come life everlasting.

The passage is evidently derived from a common source ; but it is remarkable that verse 28 has no parallel in St. Mark. It is one of the passages which modern critics assign to Matthew's source, the Logia. But knowing as we do the peculiar character of St. Matthew's gospel the question ought to arise as to whether the two passages derived from different sources are to be interpreted in the same way. Their juxtaposition in the present text of St. Matthew is not an infallible guide. We must proceed here as we do in similar cases elsewhere in the Gospels and accept St. Luke as our guide to the correct interpretation. Now, a very close parallel to the passage under discussion is to be found in St. Luke xxii. 30. We have, therefore, the three elements present which are generally looked upon as essential to the correct interpretation of those detached sayings which St. Matthew so frequently groups together : the passage is wanting in St. Mark, it is inappropriate in its present position in St. Matthew ; and it is given a totally different setting in St. Luke.

We now proceed to examine more closely the passage in St. Luke. It occurs in the narrative of the Last Supper immediately after the institution of the Eucharist and a reference to the betrayal by Judas. The passage is as follows :

24. And there was also a strife among them, which of them should seem to be the greater.
25. And He said to them : the Kings of the Gentiles lord it over them ; and they that have power over them, are called beneficent.
26. But you not so ; but he that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger : and he that is leader as he that serveth.
27. For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth ? Is not he that sitteth at table ? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth.
28. And you are they who have continued with me in my temptations.
29. And I dispose to you, as my Father hath disposed to me ; a Kingdom.
30. *That you may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdom, and may sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.*
31. And the Lord said : Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you that he may sift you as wheat.
32. But I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not.

In this passage we must distinguish two sections, (a) 24—7 and (b) 28—31.

The former is found in St. Matthew xx. 25—28 and St. Mark x. 42—45, but in a different context. The mother of the sons of Zebedee came to him and asked that her two sons might sit one on His right hand, and the other on His left in His kingdom ; " and the ten hearing it were moved with indignation against the two brethren," Matt. xx. 24. Then followed the rebuke and the distinction between worldly greatness and spiritual greatness. It is quite likely that this represents the original setting of this passage and that St. Luke inserted them here out of their

proper place. This is the view favoured by Lagrange in his commentary on St. Luke and is probably correct. It would be unscientific therefore to use these verses to throw light on the subsequent passage. They do, however, contribute some help, inasmuch as their position here is an indication that St. Luke regarded them as having reference to the same subject matter, viz. : the place of the Apostles in the Church. In xv. 24—27 the whole topic of discussion among the apostles is not eternal life but the Kingdom which the Master was to found and their own place in it. The ambitions of each were aroused now that they felt that the time was near at hand and "there was a strife amongst them, which of them should seem to be the greater." Attached as they were to the prevailing Jewish conception of the Messianic Kingdom, they looked forward to a glorious Temporal Kingdom in which they should occupy the places of honour, and our Lord rebuked them by drawing a distinction between the Kingdom of the world and the Kingdom which He was to found. The greatness which they should ambition was a greatness in service, in ministering to the spiritual wants of their brethren. It is clear that he does not by these words exclude any form of primacy among them. That aspect of the question is left untouched. He proposes His own example as one to be imitated: "I am in the midst of you as he that serveth"; this service on His part does not involve His equality with the apostles, so neither does their service exclude their position of authority over the Church or the primacy of Peter. Indeed, both in St. Matthew and St. Mark it is expressly stated that while all are exhorted to ambition greatness of service, certain individuals have been designated by the Father as rulers of the Church: "to sit on my right hand, or on my left (*i.e.*, as superior in authority to the others) is not mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared" (Mark x. 40 = Matt. xx. 23).

The fact, then, that in Luke xxii. 24—27 there is reference to the place of the Apostles in the Church makes it antecedantly probable that in the following passage there is a question of the same subject matter.

With regard to verses 28—31 it may be remarked that the interpretation of the passage in Matthew in an escha-

logical sense seems to have influenced the views of commentators of these verses in St. Luke. The terms are so similar that they must necessarily be taken in the same sense, and since the eschatological sense appears to be demanded by the context in St. Matthew the same meaning is read in the text of St. Luke. As I have made it clear that Matt. xix. 28 does not belong to its present context this method of procedure is not satisfactory; and if we examine the text of St. Luke by itself we find that the eschatological sense is altogether improbable. Matthew must be interpreted in the light of the fuller statement in St. Luke and not *vice versa*.

Let us now examine the passage without prejudice in the light of its own context. Verse 29 is capable of being taken in two ways. Some, as Plummer,<sup>3</sup> take *basileian* with *diatithemai* and get the sense, "As the Father hath given me a Kingdom, so I give it to you." But, as Lagrange remarks,<sup>4</sup> in v. 30, the Kingdom is exclusively Christ's, and so it is better to connect *diatithemai* with the following clause: "I make disposition in your favour, as the Father hath disposed to me a Kingdom, that you eat and drink at my table in my Kingdom"; it is not the Kingdom that He gives, but the privilege of eating and drinking at His table. In each case the Kingdom is the same, that of which Christ is the Head, the Church. As Christ has received complete sovereignty over this Kingdom from the Father, He has power to choose His ministers who were to assist Him in governing the Kingdom, and in the exercise of this power He has chosen the apostles. There is no reference to the heavenly banquet; but to the oriental custom according to which the King's ministers sat at the King's table. It is true that the joys of heaven are frequently referred to in the Gospels under the symbol of a banquet, but the heavenly banquet is not reserved for the apostles alone, while here we have evidently reference to the peculiar prerogatives of the Twelve; these alone were present at the Last Supper, and it is they who are spoken of as having remained with Him in all His trials. A reference to the heavenly banquet is therefore out of place here. It is the special prerogative of the apostles as rulers

<sup>3</sup> Commentary on St. Luke in "International Critical Commentary."

<sup>4</sup> *Évangile selon Saint Luc*. ad loc.

of the Church and ministers of Christ's Kingdom that is in question.

If this is the meaning of the first part of verse 30, it must likewise be the meaning of the second; the two members are perfectly parallel, and the words "you shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel" must have reference to the jurisdiction of the apostles over the other members of the Church. I have already shown in connection with the parallel passage in St. Matthew that the word *krinein* may be used in that sense. With curious inconsistency Grimm-Thayer gives the meaning "to rule," "to govern," in this passage and in that of St. Matthew, though elsewhere, as already stated, he takes the passages as referring to the Last Judgment. He saw that the parallelism was decisively in favour of his interpretation. Commentators are somewhat puzzled by the use of the term "twelve tribes of Israel" to represent those over whom the apostles preside in judgment. They conclude that they are used in a symbolical sense for the new Israel; but how appropriate the expression is if we take *krinein* in the sense of "govern," as in the Book of Judges; the apostles, as the rulers of the Church, occupy a position analogous to that of the Judges who ruled the Twelve Tribes of Israel. The use of these words is a further proof that the interpretation which I have given of *krinein* is the correct one.

A further argument may be adduced in favour of this view. In the ordinary interpretation of the passage there is but a very loose connection between verse 30 and the following. The latter is one of the familiar texts quoted to prove the primacy of St. Peter; but the special reference to Simon is very abruptly introduced if in the previous verses our Lord were referring to the place of the apostles at the Last Judgment. We are not prepared for this sudden transition from the joys of heaven to the toils of earth. But how admirably it fits in if the previous verses refer to the normal position of the apostles as rulers of the Church! He first indicates the position which the Twelve are to occupy as rulers of His Kingdom, and next turns to Peter to point out his special role. He hints at his temporary lapse, but from him the Apostolic College will receive its strength and the Church its stability. The remarkable change from the plural (Satan hath desired to have *you*)



to the singular (I have prayed for *thee*) is not easily intelligible unless some reference to the apostles as a body liable to Satan's attacks had preceded. In fact the whole argument for the primacy of Peter derived from this passage gain strength if the text is interpreted as suggested above. On that solemn occasion when He instituted the Blessed Eucharist, and gave the Apostles His parting instructions, our Lord outlined the constitution of the Church which He was to found; the Apostles were to be its rulers, with Peter occupying a position of pre-eminence. How fittingly might this discourse serve as a background for the beautiful prayer of Christ for His apostles which St. John gives us in Chapter XVII. He has appointed them to carry on His work, and asks the Father to watch over them: "Keep them in Thy name whom Thou hast given me, that they may be one as We also are one." John xvii. 11.

Now, if this is the correct interpretation of St. Luke, St. Matthew ought to be interpreted in the same way. The different expressions in the text are capable of this meaning, and their true setting—that of the passage in St. Luke—should alone decide. The interpretation so concisely given by Grotius is therefore justified by all the principles of modern criticism.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

## Notes.

### RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS.

THOUGH the subject of the press has been worn almost threadbare, yet a few remarks may not be without interest in view of the present crisis in our country's history. It is not our purpose to criticise the nationalist press of the present time. Though it has shortcomings it is probably as good as the circumstances will permit. In the purveyance of news our papers are indeed very much at the mercy of foreign, often hostile, press agencies; they consequently give us highly coloured accounts of happenings abroad; they also treat us to pages of fashions from Paris, to lists of race-horses and betting prices from England, to graphic accounts of prize fights in America, and so on. While these items of information are seldom objectionable in themselves, they afford evidence of the extent to which undesirable foreign tendencies are creeping in amongst our young people—tendencies which we should like to see discouraged rather than catered for by the national press. All this suggests certain questions. Is our press tending to become better or worse? When we become our own masters will it stand for a cosmopolitan or for an Irish Ireland? As we grow in wealth and importance, will our papers approximate more closely to the English press of to-day? And if the international financier should find it worth his while to come in force amongst us, will the press play his game here (as it has done in most other countries) by blinding the people to their own exploitation? These are questions we cannot answer for the present; but they are questions that thinking Irishmen would do well to turn over in their minds.

We need not delay to consider the power of the press—and by press we mean here a country's newspapers and periodicals of all kinds. The press is a great force for good or evil. It can be made an important educational medium for the people at large; it can give then an intelligent grasp of the chief movements and incidents, political, civil and religious, at home and abroad; it can be made a powerful force to maintain cleanliness and integrity in all departments of public life—in short, the press can educate and elevate public opinion, defend the liberty of the citizen, approve and support every movement that is good, and condemn and protest against corruption in every shape and form. But the press unfortunately is equally capable of doing immense harm; and a considerable section of the press in most European countries is already unwholesome in its influence. We do not refer merely to those publications that are *ex professo* irreligious, that sneer and jibe at supernatural beliefs, or dish up moral filth and obscenity in their columns. A good deal of harm is done more or less incidentally by publications that are valued as purveyors of news, as advertising mediums or as exponents of current views on questions of political, social or physical science. Newspapers and periodicals are frequently very discriminating in their choice of news. There are certain things which they wish to keep before the public mind, to make it familiar with them: there are other things

about which they wish the public to remain in ignorance. Moreover news can be easily coloured. A word or insinuation here or a turn of expression there suffices to put a new complexion on the whole story. The opportunities for making mischief are far greater where there is question of theoretical discussions on social and scientific subjects, with which the public is not particularly conversant. We do not mean to say that the press is the only agency used to mislead people in these matters; it is but one of many. But the press has had a great deal to do with popularising the materialist philosophy of the nineteenth century, and with giving currency to the lax views in regard to personal morality, the loose principles in regard to authority and society, and the false theories of human life and action, that have now gone far to destroy the stability of family and social life throughout a great part of Europe. We have heard much of the power of "ideas" in connection with the Russian revolution. Trotsky was reported to have boasted, when things were going badly with his armies, that ideas could not be hemmed in by frontiers or armed forces. Doubtless the statement is true; but when the one force capable of dealing with really dangerous "ideas" is subjected to a continuous campaign of attrition, by attacks directed from various angles against authority and the administration of authority in Church and State, the chance that the ideas will "catch on" is vastly enhanced. And this is precisely how the ground was being prepared for a long time by, among other forces, a considerable section of the press. It is only when we think of the extent to which—as we now know—passions were inflamed, truth suppressed and lying propaganda sent broadcast among the people by the press of the belligerent countries during the late war, that we begin to realise how thoroughly peoples can be confused, blinded and demoralised by their newspapers and periodicals.

We do not at all wish to imply that there has been any widespread conspiracy on the part of the press to mislead or demoralise the people. A small section of it may have had such ends in view; but, apart from the deception to which the press was forced to lend itself in various countries since 1914, much of the harm was done, we may be sure, by men who thought they were enlightening public opinion, or at least catering for public needs. The harm was done nevertheless. In these islands the press enjoyed great privileges in the past. With the sole exception of responsibility for libel it had no serious obligations towards the public. Theoretically it was bound to respect public morality; but there was such difference of opinion, especially in recent years, about the standard permissible, that no publication of any repute was likely to offend so gravely as to be made amenable to law. The press might circulate false news, it might misrepresent social and popular movements, it might heap abuse on governments and political parties, it might do its worst to confuse and mislead public opinion, and the public had no means of bringing the offenders to justice. The press could have done much to stem the tide of demoralisation that is evident on all sides in the growing general craze for excitement, fashions, luxuries and pleasures of all sorts. A national press might be expected, if only for patriotic reasons, to steady its people when they showed signs of being carried away by a will-o'-the-wisp. Yet with few exceptions the press of these countries has made no attempt to do so: on the contrary it has encouraged and catered for the vitiated tastes of the crowd.

When the Irish become a free people, is this to be their conception of a national press? Will they allow the people who hold the ear of the country to shirk all responsibility to the public? Let it be understood that we are not putting forward a plea for a censorship of the press. A free press is, or ought to be, one of the chief safeguards of personal liberty in a free country. A tied press on the other hand is always a source of danger to the public. The reader will find abundant illustrations of both statements among the events of the last seven years. But liberty is not license. A man may have a right to drive a motor on the public road, but that does not entitle him to endanger the lives or limbs of others. It is not merely when he has killed or maimed somebody that the reckless motorist becomes amenable to law. He is prosecuted even though he have done no actual destruction; and everyone recognises that the law is reasonable. But why should the motorist alone be prosecuted when he becomes a danger to the public, and not the editor, writer or journalist also? The press belongs to that class of undertakings, which we call public utilities or services. When any other such service is started, for instance a railway or a gas company, the community insists on certain conditions calculated to protect the public, not merely from physical injury, but also from exploitation of every sort. Yet the agency capable of doing the greatest harm remains practically unregulated and irresponsible. If a railway charges me a penny in excess of the legal fare I can recover it at law. If a newspaper circulates false news about trade conditions abroad, or boosts a bubble company, the public may lose a fortune in consequence, and there is no redress. Yet this loss would be trifling compared with the injury that newspapers and periodicals have inflicted on other countries by popularising loose moral and social principles.

In matters of applied science and material organisation we are perhaps a little backward in Ireland; but in regard to our philosophy of life and our valuation of things from a Christian point of view, we have nothing to learn from the so-called progressive nations. Our Gaelic civilisation will bear comparison with that of any other country. We take it that our people, when they come into their own, will be anxious to maintain and strengthen that civilisation. If so, they must take care of their press. The hidden influences which have played such havoc on the continent, not merely with the faith and morals of the individual, but also with the stability of domestic and civil society, are pretty sure to make themselves felt in Ireland in the near future—if they are not at work already. The press has been one of the chief means used in the process of demoralisation elsewhere. We should prepare accordingly. But how is a good press to be insured? We should like to see the matter ventilated in public. Irish journalists in particular may be able to offer some useful suggestions. Personally we think some good could be done by putting the press on the same footing as other public utilities, that is to say, newspapers and periodicals, while not subject to censorship, could be made liable to prosecution for the publication of matter calculated to injure or endanger the common good. To mislead the public on an issue of general interest, to purvey matter calculated to lower the standard of morality accepted by the majority of the citizens, to publish libellous statements about a community or a class even though they do not affect any

particular individual—these are but a few illustrations of the kind of offences for which the editor might be prosecuted at the suit of, let us say, any citizen holding a position of trust in the political, social or religious organisation of the country.

There are certain problems and difficulties to be solved, if such regulation of the press should ever be deemed necessary. We must, however, hold over the consideration of these for another occasion.

W. M.

#### SOCIAL CORRUPTION.

ONE branch of justice has in recent years aroused unusual attention, distributive justice. It was inevitable that this should be. For the evil which it combats has become insufferable—that unequal division of wealth which turns society into a vacillating see-saw between millionaires and mendicants, between profiteers and paupers. But the evil, great as it was, diverted attention from another form of corruption. Distributive justice tended to overshadow commutative justice and, more especially, legislative justice. There was so much discussion about the rights of workers that their obligations began to be forgotten; there was such clamour about the equal division of the spoils of State that people began to forget the most important duty of all, the duty of service and self-sacrifice in behalf of the common weal. The Christian ethic was forgotten that man's lot is, primarily, to minister, and not to be ministered to. This was not surprising owing to the re-birth of paganism in most of the European States. It had many manifestations, this scramble for the flesh-pots of the State. It will be more profitable for us to turn our attention to the evil as it manifested itself in these islands. It will be useful to study the various symptoms which accompanied this atrophy of the public conscience. There would be room for a whole science concerning itself with this pathology of the State.

#### PROFITEERS.

THE naive belief was prevalent that 'graft' had its home in America. It was thought to be a rare exotic plant which thrived with difficulty in foreign soil. But the World War stimulated many strange growths; and one of them had to receive a new name from the social botanists; it was duly labelled the Profiteer. These grew overnight with the suddenness and exuberance of mushrooms. Their culture required the bodies of the nameless brave, who, many of the most, believed they were dying that men might live, that civilization might flourish, and not those who thrived on the carnage of war. It was in vain that the oppressed turned their thoughts for relief to the Government. For the governing classes sheltered the chief sinners. The munition-makers were not immaculate in the matter of profits. The public monies, voted, or rather demanded, with such ease, were fair spoils, and large fortunes were amassed, while righteous efforts were made to punish petty individual holders, and the public was hypnotised by the cry about winning the war. When the public recovered reason for a while and put forth a protest against waste, a show of economy was made until

the proverbially short memories of the volatile crowd gave a needed respite to their rulers. The offshoot of it all was the revival of usury. Not, indeed, such usury as in the 'dark' Middle Ages the Popes thundered against, but a usury which fleeced the poor to an extent that would make the mediæval usurer feel envious, or ashamed. It was not an interest of 20 per cent., but of 200 per cent on capital intended for the use of the people.

Lest this discussion of profiteering might seem remote from reality I shall quote items of news bearing on Irish prices from to-day's "Irish Independent" (Friday, Sept. 9th).

A Co. Kildare fruit grower says that apples bought in the market at 1½d. a dozen were actually sold as high as 4s. 6d. a dozen.

A bottle of mineral waters in some licensed premises cost 7d. and 8d.; in smaller shops, 4d.

Soap is sold in some shops at 1s., in others at 2s. a lb.

A pen-knife in one shop cost 6d., the same pattern in another 1s.

A farmer bringing cabbages into the market might be offered 1d. a head, while they are retailed at from 6d. to 8d. a head.

Mr. Paul (Chairman, Markets Committee) states that fruit and vegetable dealers paid wholesale from 100 to 200 per cent. profit on articles enumerated. He adds: 'The Richmond Asylum Committee bought potatoes direct from the factors at £6 a ton some weeks ago, and at the same time we were buying from the retailers at the rate of about £14 a ton.'

A correspondent writes that whereas bread is retailed at 3d. a lb. in London, purveyors obtain 3½d. in Dublin and in Cobh.

In face of these conditions consumers should not only compare prices, but form a Union and get into direct touch with the producers. The tragedy of the situation is that the suffering producer of one line is the fleeced consumer of another line of goods. The non-producer secures the most profit, for he has time to devote all his energy to living on his wits and not on the work of his hands.

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THE MODERN MAN BUT if capitalists showed a lack of a civic sense, the  
WITH THE HOE. workmen were not all without blame. If capitalists  
sometimes destroyed their manufactures, or let them  
perish in order to diminish supplies and stimulate prices, workers often  
showed an equal disregard for the rights of a too passive public. As  
an instance reference can be made to the institution of direct labour  
in Ireland. In the old arrangement farmers, or other contractors,  
undertook to repair roads. It was thought that it would be a useful  
economy as well as a boon to the workmen to give them direct manage-  
ment of this public utility. The indifference that many of them showed  
towards the needs of the community was extreme. They dawdled at  
their work, and drank the amount of their wages, which they had  
pocketed without any qualms about giving an equal return in labour.  
Some of them would show an acute sense of industrial justice, and would  
seek the reputation of being honest men; they would shrink from  
robbing the pocket of an individual. They did not so fully realize that  
in any sphere of activity to receive wages without giving an equal  
return is theft.



When in this way many public services are carried on, or rather neglected, by a host of public servants who receive wages for their negligence, it is not any wonder that the Irish farmer, on whom most of the burdens fall, should find fruitless taxes being multiplied in recent years. Instead of the former incubus of rent, there now falls on him an intolerable burden of taxes imposed for no very tangible results. At one time they are imposed as 'poor rates.' The amount paid would give to each inmate of the workhouse a far greater salary than that of a bank clerk, if it were not almost entirely absorbed by officialdom. It is sometimes said that a Socialist State would mean a glorified workhouse, a proposition which I am not inclined to question. But it should be remembered that the glorified workhouse is already existing in the Modern State. There numerous officials consume the lion's share of the public resources, while the inmates, for which the institution is alleged to exist, receive doles.

#### REMEDIES.

ONE of the chief remedies for all this public injustice is education. There is, first, the school. The day may come when some lessons on social obligations may be thought worthy to be instilled into the minds of children. Social economy may be esteemed as profitable as domestic economy. Along with figures giving the heights of mountains there may be figures showing the expenditures of modern States, figures which would form the best satire on their governments. For these figures, as seen in the backs of Income Tax sheets, contain colossal estimates for engines of destruction, armies, navies, aeroplanes, and pitifully inadequate doles for constructive and creative departments like education. They are comparable to Falstaff's bill disclosed by Prince Henry—one halfpenny for bread and five and eightpence for sack.

But before the Irish school can be used as an instrument of social reform it may be necessary, in some measure, to return to the old system of judging and paying the teacher according to results. There are schools which in the old system prepared brilliant pupils for the professions, and which, when left to their own honour and civic sense, have been lying fallow, producing not a single scholar of any mark.

The school, as an educator in civic duties, ought to have a powerful ally in the Press. But the latter is so much dependent on advertisements from the vested interests that it is no longer free to any considerable extent. Indeed it is one of the chief offenders so far as service of the public is concerned. While private quacks have been branded as mountebanks by the social sense, they still find their chief support in the advertising column of many newspapers. These newspapers act as agents of impostors, and should give up all pretence of being a civilising influence. A Press that subsists by offering straws to dying men, that batters on the sufferings of the sick, should have a worse reputation than the ghouls that are alleged to have preyed on the bodies of the insensible dead.

The last and supreme stronghold of social education is the pulpit. It contains the chair of truth. Not merely individual justice, the justice between man and man, but public or legislative justice, the right which

society has to man's service, must be fearlessly and insistently preached during this era of the Pagan State. After all, to insist on commutative justice, so far as it concerns private individuals, to make restitution in private matters the only concern of the confessional, to lose sight of the greater public corruption, is to use a net which catches only the little fishes. The pulpit could be aided by a diocesan journal. This could be effective while being of the smallest proportions. The secular Press has its compact Weekly Summaries. A few sheets which would be fearless and outspoken in regard to abuses and their remedies would be more effective than Catholic organs of the anæmic, namby-pamby variety.

G. P.

THE POET OF  
CHRISTENDOM.

THAT a Pope should write an Encyclical, setting forth a great poet's claims to the consideration of men of letters, and recommending young and old to study his works with love and reverence, is perhaps the last thing for which the reviler of the Catholic system would have been prepared. But it has occurred. In preparation for the event that took place on the 14th September last, the Pope issued, on April 30th, an Encyclical letter to his 'beloved sons, the professors and students of all the Catholic institutions for instruction in literature and higher culture, on the sixth centenary of the death of Dante Alighieri.' It goes far to raise the poet to a pedestal side by side with St. Thomas, as the co-patron of the highest studies to which the mind of man can be devoted.

To Catholics this is no surprise. They have always known Dante as the greatest Christian poet—the singer of incomparable power who felt the supernatural as keenly as the rest of us feel the very air we breathe. The Catholic faith was around him in his infancy; in his maturer years, it brought him comfort, and taught him the blessedness of suffering: in return he gave it the devotion of his genius, and set it forth in language that will never die till the world dies with it. To a poet of his age we might expect that the defined dogmas of the Church would be sacred and inviolable. But that was not enough for Dante. Every aspect of her teaching, philosophical and theological, her practices, liturgy and sacred emblems, everything connected with her inner or her outer life, was treated by him with a reverence and appreciation that theologists may have equalled but never surpassed. And, therefore, no one at a Catholic can understand him. His poetic qualities are there, of course, for everyone to appreciate: outsiders may even take pleasure in his scenes and speculations as they would in the mythology of Aeschylus or Homer: but it is only the Catholic faith that can attune our ears to the real music of his verse, or teach us the deeper meaning in everything he wrote. For Macaulay the poem deteriorated as it advanced: so it would for anyone who looked for striking incidents and had no appreciation of the mysticism that inspired Dante's finest efforts and carried him forward to the culmination. But to the Catholic things look different. His interest grows keener as he proceeds—for the poem represents the evolution of the soul, from its unregenerate state in the lowest depths of the *Inferno*, along the

purgative and illuminative way, till it stands face to face with the central dogma of faith, illumined by the light that shines from the very throne of the Eternal.

BUT NOT  
ALWAYS OF ALL  
CHRISTENDOM.

PERHAPS the best proof of the essentially Catholic spirit of Dante is furnished by his treatment in English literature. While England was still Catholic there was, of course, no reason why Dante should not be allowed all the honour his genius and merit warranted. And so, in fact, we find him referred to in terms of the highest praise by Chaucer in his *Canterbury Tales* and other works, by Gower in his *Confessio Amantis*, by Lydgate in his *Fall of Princes*, and—a last dying echo—by Sir Philip Sydney in his *Defence of Poesy*. But a change was coming over the spirit of the scene. England was gradually casting aside a great portion of the Catholic legacy, and with it her writers were obliged to repudiate all outward show of reverence for the poet whose every line was inspired by its spirit. Spenser borrowed from him copiously, but was too much the slave of his time to acknowledge his indebtedness. Shakespeare possibly refers to him in his 80th sonnet, but the name is never mentioned. Milton was as great a plagiarist in this respect as any of his predecessors—but, again, deep silence regarding the source of inspiration. After that things were even worse. For a century or more no one in England seems to have known anything about Dante beyond the mere fact of his existence. It was only a little over a hundred years ago, when the fires of bigotry were dying down, and the air beginning to be purified a little, that he was allowed to appear again before the English-speaking public. But in a guise that must have moved his indignation, if on the heights of his Paradiso he still takes thought of the puny happenings on this little sphere. Two renegade Italians began the transformation. Foscolo painted him as a precursor of the 'Reformation,' and Rossetti made him a member of a secret society aiming at the destruction of the Papacy. That calumny continued all through the century, and has not quite died away even yet. It represents the last despairing effort of men who, forced to admit a conqueror, would like to paint him as a friend: it makes one think of the men who tried to make the Bible Protestant.

But the days of the myth are numbered. The Popes know what is Catholic and what is not: and the present Encyclical settles the matter for all time. And, apart from that, the only Protestant writers worth considering have long given up the fable. Not to speak of Dean Church, Professor Caird, Russell Lowell, and a host of others, we may quote the following from Moore's *Studies in Dante*, as quite typical of educated Protestant opinion:—

It may be declared at once that there is not the very smallest ground for claiming Dante, in this respect, as a 'Reformer before the Reformation.' There is no trace in his writings of doubt or dissatisfaction respecting any part of the teaching of the Church in matters of doctrine authoritatively laid down. He would have probably considered any such feeling as most presumptuous, and, indeed, as little short of blasphemous. A great deal has been written about his supposed defence of the right of 'private judg-

ment,' of his alleged sympathy with 'free thinking,' or with 'philosophic doubt,' and so forth. Of this also it appears to me that no evidence can be found. There seems every reason to believe him to have been a firm, faithful and devoted son of the Church, without any misgiving as to her teaching or as to her indefeasible right to teach.

And, even if no Pope or impartial non-Catholic ever spoke, one broad fact would end the discussion. We know what Dante thought of heretics. In the sixth circle of hell, raised only above the lowest type of criminals, each enclosed in his tomb with the lid raised till the day of judgment closes it down for ever, are ranged the men who rebelled against the Church—Uberti, Cavalcanti, Frederick II., Cardinal Ubaldini, Pope Anastasius II., and a multitude of others. If the heretics of the present day are anxious to acknowledge their predecessors, they must at least admit that they have little in common with the man who consigned those predecessors to the depths.

#### HIS FAITH MALIGNED.

THE Protestant mentality explains how certain charges came to be made against the poet's orthodoxy. Non-Catholics have to a great extent lost the concept of the Church as a moral personality, the mystical body of Christ, pure, immutable, unspotted: they tend more and more to identify her with the members who compose her or who may be called upon to shape her destinies. In common with others they sometimes forget, also, that the higher idea one has of the Church, the more ready he is to detect and deplore any flaws in the character of those who represent her. And so when Dante denounces certain Religious Orders of his time, as he often does with vehemence, they welcome every attack as a foretaste of the 'Reformation.' When he pillories a few Cardinals and Popes and consigns them to perdition, the cry is 'A revolt against the Church,' though Dante revered their office as much as he detested their acts—witness the case of Boniface VIII.—and though no Catholic is bound by his faith to reckon all these men among the Saints. When he confounds an Emperor Anastasius with a Pope of the same name, and classifies the latter among the heretics, non-Catholics completely lose their balance. They do not know enough Catholic theology to be aware that a Pope did something similar without giving much trouble to the theologian, or that, as St. Thomas could deny the Immaculate Conception, so might Dante challenge in the fourteenth century a dogma not defined till 1870.

His political views have brought him sometimes into disrepute, even with Catholics. But the central idea of the *Monarchia* differs very little from the much-lauded concept of the League of Nations, and is qualified, moreover, by a statement—'this truth is not to be so strictly understood that the Roman prince is subject in nothing to the Roman Pontiff, since this mortal happiness is in some manner ordained for immortal happiness'—which the present Encyclical pronounces 'an excellent and wise principle which, if it were observed as it should be to-day, would bring to States the rich fruits of civil prosperity.' That his views on the Temporal Power gave offence to many we are quite prepared to believe: and it would be astonishing, indeed, if a

poet could have settled, so many centuries in advance, a question on which opinions have veered even in our own time, and for which the Church five hundred years hence may still have provided no solution.

These constitute the main charges, and they have only to be stated to refute themselves. On one of them—based on his treatment of certain Popes—which has given great joy to the Church's enemies and some concern to her friends, the statements of a Pope must be specially interesting. So we will let the Encyclical speak. After describing Dante's unique position among the great men of the Church, his deep knowledge of theology and other departments of learning, his essential independence of the defective physical science of his time, his poetic presentment of Catholic beliefs, his reverence for the infallible Church and for the successors of Peter, it proceeds:—

But it will be said that he attacked the Sovereign Pontiff of his time so bitterly and so contumaciously. Yes, but these were Popes who disagreed with him in politics and who, he believed, belonged to the party that banished him from his country. But we must extend pardon to a man so tossed about by fortune's terrible waves, if with a mind full of irritation he sometimes bursts into invectives which seem without measure; all the more because, to inflame his anger, there were not wanting evil reports, propagated, as is customary, by political adversaries, always inclined to put a bad interpretation on everything. Moreover, such is the weakness of mortals that even religious hearts must become stained with the grime of the world's dust; and who will deny that there were at that time amongst the clergy things to be reproved, at which a soul so devoted to the Church as that of Dante must have been quite disgusted, and we know that men distinguished for eminent sanctity then emphatically reproved them. But, however vehemently he rightly or rashly attacked ecclesiastical persons, not a whit less, however, was the respect which he felt due to the Church and the reverence for the Supreme Keys; wherefore, in politics he knew how to defend his own opinion with 'that homage which a pious son should employ towards his own father—pious towards his mother, pious towards Christ, pious towards the Church, pious towards the Pastor, pious towards all who profess the Christian religion for the protection of truth.'

' DANTE IS  
OURS.'

With the poem as a literary work we are not concerned just now: our purpose is to emphasise the words of the present Pope—'Aligherius noster est.'

No small claim it is—the claim to a man of whom even the rugged Carlyle could say 'One need not wonder if it were predicted that his poem were the most enduring thing that our Europe has yet made,' and whom Ruskin pronounced 'the central man of all the world, as representing in perfect balance the imaginative, moral and intellectual faculties, all at their highest.' But it is a claim that no one, except the wilfully blind, thinks of disputing now-a-days. It was the proud boast of his son—and the statement has been re-echoed by more than one critic since—that, were all the other books of the world destroyed, almost the whole Catholic system of morals and belief could be reconstructed from the *Divina Commedia* alone. That is why the late Pope Leo XIII., who could recite the poem from the first verse to the last and beside whose death-bed a copy of it lay side by side with the Bible and the crucifix, was able to write to Ravenna (1892):—

Who is more worthy of the homage of a grateful posterity? . . . . Personally, we are chiefly moved by the thought that he was an illustrious glory of Chistendom. And, although stung to wrath by the bitterness of exile and frequently led by party feelings to swerve from equity and sound judgment, yet did he never turn aside from the truth of Christian wisdom. Rather he derived from the depth of his religion purer and loftier sentiments, and fed the flame of his natural genius by the inspiration of Divine Faith.

It justifies the concluding words of the Encyclical :—

Love and hold dear this poet whom we do not hesitate to call the greatest extoller of Christian wisdom and the most eloquent of all singers. The more you advance in love of him, the more perfectly will you open your minds to the splendour of truth and the more will you remain constant in the study and pursuit of holy faith.

And it expresses the conviction of the Catholic world from the days when Raphael, in his 'Disputa,' painted, among the Popes and Bishops and Doctors, the sad-faced man without gown or cap, mitre or tiara, down to our own times when Cardinal Manning, voicing the opinion of all who have really studied his works, paid this tribute to his memory :—

It was said of St. Thomas, 'Post Summam Thomae nihil restat nisi lumen gloriæ.' It may be said of Dante, 'Post Dantis Paradisum nihil restat nisi visio Dei.'

M. J. O'D.

#### THE POLITICAL STATUS OF PALESTINE.

In discussing some time ago the future status of the Holy Places, as a result of the new international agreements, we gave expression to some misgivings. Promises were lavishly made during the period of the war without any thought as to how or when they were to be fulfilled; as long as the crisis of the moment was passed, the future could take care of itself. The most outstanding fact of those days of tension, was the now famous Balfour Declaration (2 Nov., 1917), which guaranteed the Jews a national home in Palestine. This promise was formally ratified by the allied Powers in the Conference of San Remo, 1920. The difficulties of the situation were but vaguely hinted at; and no one at the time seemed to realise that the fulfilment of this promise conflicted with the claims of the Arabs who form the vast majority of the population, and with the rights of the Christian community who have for centuries formed strong colonies about the Holy Places. Both of these bodies, however, are not likely to submit tamely to the new situation which is thus imposed upon them.

In the meantime a Jewish High Commissioner, with a staff composed in a large measure of members of the same race, is in charge of the fulfilment of the programme. Zionist propaganda throughout the world has spared neither money nor energy with a view to bringing about the cherished desire of Israel, with the result that Jewish colonists were pouring into Palestine at the rate of over 1,000 a month. (*Palestine*, July 9th, p. 136).



THE ARAB CLAIMS. THE Arab population at length became alarmed. According to the official estimate Palestine has at present about 500,000 Musulmans, 65,000 Christians, and 65,000 Jews. The Arabs naturally claimed that,

being in the majority, they had a right to govern the country and demanded an independent Arab State. Taking at their face value the hopes and intentions of the Zionists, and seeing the figure to which the immigration has already reached, they fancied that in the course of a few years they would be submerged by the cosmopolitan Jewish immigrants, dispossessed of their lands, and driven to join their Bedouin brethren in the eastern desert. The Arab Congress presented a long memorial to Mr. Churchill in March, 1921, giving a reasoned statement of their claims and a criticism of the Zionist movement. They demanded among other things: 1°. The abandonment of the principle of a national home for the Jews. 2°. The creation of a national government responsible to a parliament elected by those who inhabited Palestine before the war. 3°. The cessation of Jewish immigration pending the setting up of this government. 4°. The reunion of Palestine with Syria. The response was curt and unfavourable: It was neither within his power nor was it his intention to change the present arrangement. The reception of the Arab delegates in London was equally unfavourable.

#### CHANGE OF POLICY.

BUT popular passion could not await the result of these peaceful negotiations. The new immigrants were regarded as the real enemies, and on May 2nd a riot broke out at Jaffa in which 30 Israelites were killed and 142 wounded. This brought the whole question to a head; the British authorities were compelled to define their attitude, both as regards the Arab claims, and the Zionist hopes. The 'National Home' principle was defined to mean that 'a certain number of Jews would be permitted to come and contribute by their resources and by their industry to the development of the country in the interests of all its inhabitants.' The rights and privileges of the native population would be thoroughly safeguarded. In the meantime immigration was to cease absolutely for the present, and in future the number of immigrants would be strictly proportioned to the development of the country. Most important of all, the Arabs were told that 'His Majesty's Government was very seriously studying the means of permitting public opinion to express itself in a free and authoritative manner;' in the meantime an Advisory Council was to be set up to help the authorities in drafting the proposed constitution. These concessions brought down upon the High Commissioner the ire of his fellow-Zionists, and only a rigid censorship prevented them from expressing their feelings in their local press.

To an outsider it would seem that the difficulties of the situation are complicated by the fact that there are not two, but three, parties whose claims and ambitions are irreconcilable. It is easy to see that the Mandatory Power has but little concern for the ambitions of either Arabs or Jews; it has no sentimental attraction for the restoration of

the Kingdom of David and Solomon, nor for the creation of a new Arab Kingdom; it is content to regard the Holy Land as one of the links in the great chain which binds the Empire together, and it will suit its purpose perfectly if its presence is considered necessary to prevent civil strife between the rival claimants.

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WHAT ABOUT THE CHRISTIANS? BUT throughout the whole discussion no word has been breathed of the rights of the Christians in Palestine, though numerically they are at least equal to the Jews, and are, moreover, not colonists of yesterday, but the inhabitants of the country for centuries. Whoever governs, they have rights which must be safeguarded; and as these rights concern the places which have associations dear to the heart of all Christians, it is incumbent on all Christians to see that they do not suffer as a result of any new arrangement. Our Holy Father, Pope Benedict XV., in the allocution '*Causa Nobis*' (13 June, 1921), tells us with what anxiety he regards the present situation. He first speaks of the exploitation of the misery of the population by proselytising societies:

'For, the complaint which we made of the nefarious action of foreign non-Catholic sects, who boast the name of Christian, we must now renew, seeing that they persevere in their undertaking with daily increasing energy, abundantly provided with resources and skilfully exploiting the dreadful poverty of the population due to the great war.'

Then he goes on to deal with the present political situation in so far as it affects the Christians of the Holy Land:

'When the allied troops had once more restored the Holy Places to the power of the Christians, we shared heartily the general joy of the faithful; but beneath this joy there was a fear, which we expressed to you in the same discourse, lest following an event, in itself grand and joyful, the Israelites should obtain a preponderance in Palestine and enjoy a privileged position. That this fear was not vain the event itself has proved. For it is manifest that the condition of the Christians in the Holy Land, far from being improved, has become even worse than before; namely, by reason of the new civil laws and institutions which—if not in the intention of their authors, certainly *in fact*—tend to deprive the Christian name of the status which it always hitherto possessed, in favour of the Israelites. In addition to this, we see the intense efforts which many are making to deprive the Holy Places of their sacred character, transforming them into pleasure resorts with all the attractions of worldliness; which if deplorable everywhere, is much more so where at every step the most sacred monuments of religion are to be found. But, as the situation in Palestine has not been as yet definitely arranged, from this moment We raise

Our voice, in order that when the time comes to give it a definite settlement, the Catholic Church and all the Christians may be guaranteed the possession of their inalienable rights. We certainly do not wish the rights of the Jewish race to be lessened; but we claim that the just rights of the Christians should not be over-ridden by them. And on this matter We earnestly request all governors of Christian nations even non-Catholic to be unremittently insistent at the 'League of Nations,' which, it is said, is to consider the question of the British mandate in Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

The Holy Father evidently speaks from full knowledge, and the fact that he takes occasion to refer to the question in a consistorial Allocution shows that he considers the state of affairs to be grave.

MGR.  
BARLASSINA'S  
PASTORAL.

THE same anxiety as regards the future is apparent in the Pastoral letter in which the Patriarch of Jerusalem introduces the Pope's Allocution to the Catholics of the Holy Land. While the Pope speaks of the general political outlook, the Patriarch tells us of the evil results of the present state of affairs which are even now before his eyes. "Unbecoming modes of dress, unseemly behaviour, amusements that offend against morals; the absence of restraint in many ways, objectionable cinema films, etc., inevitably tend to efface that noble aspect of morality, modesty and loveable simplicity, which was a notable characteristic both of the Christian and Moslem women of Palestine." Is there some foundation for the charge made by the Arab delegation, that, the Turkish regime being abolished, and the Mandate not yet ratified, laws are made and withdrawn at the whim of a Jewish underling? In any case, it is significant enough that the censorship was invoked to exclude's the Pope's allocution from the newspapers, though the vilest attacks upon its author were permitted to appear in Zionist organs. That the Jews have already obtained a "privileged position" is evident. Though in number—even according to official figures—there are little more than 25 per cent. of the population, the Hebrew language is made one of the official languages on a par with English and Arabic. It is even doubtful if all the Jews themselves speak Hebrew. But all these things are overridden by the convenience of having an "Ulster" in Palestine. The Jews have to be imported to form a new Ascendancy, while the mere "natives" are to consider themselves happy if allowed to exist.

There are Catholics so wedded to the imperial idea as to think that sentimental considerations should not be allowed to stand in the way of its expansion, but in the hearts of all others the words of the Holy Father will find a sympathetic response. Let us hope that they will awake to the realities of the situation before it is too late, or the patient and devoted labours of those who have for centuries guarded the places made sacred by the footsteps of the Redeemer will have been in vain.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, August, 1921; p. 197f.

PALESTINIAN  
ARCHÆOLOGY.

TURNING from the political situation, we may note that the new régime have given an immense impetus to the scientific exploration of Palestine. One of the first acts of the High Commissioner was to set up a 'Department of Antiquities' which would supervise and co-ordinate the work of the various national societies, and thus do away with the slipshod methods which have led to the ruin of priceless monuments. The objects of the Department are threefold: 1°. The preservation of the ancient monuments both against robbers and amateur explorers; 2°. The formation of an archæological museum, and 3°. The systematic exploitation of the archæological sites by excavations conducted by experts. Already important works are in progress at Ascalon, where Professor Garstang hopes to find remains of the Philistine civilization as rich as those found at Gezer by Professor McAlister. The Jewish Society, under the guidance of Dr. Slusich, has made important discoveries at Tiberias. Of much greater interest for us is the discovery of the remains of the Church in the Garden of Gethsamene which was destroyed by the Persians in 614 and which is now undergoing reconstruction by the Franciscans. In the literary arena we learn of the formation of the 'Palestine Oriental Society,' which numbers among its members some of the leading scholars of all nations resident in Jerusalem. Its President is Père Lagrange, and in its discussions it takes account of all matters bearing on Palestinian archæology. Taking all things into account it would seem that the soil of Palestine will at last be forced to yield up its secrets and much light may be expected both on the Bible and on the early history of Christianity in Palestine.

E. J. K.

## Book Reviews.

*The Christ Child.* By Mr. C. OLIVIA KEILEY. Price 1/- (paper 8d.).  
Dublin: Browne & Nolan.

*Suivez Moi and La Meilleure Part.* (Both illustrated.) Price not marked.  
Paris: Bonne Presse, 5 Rue Bayard.

I. A brief presentation of the chief events chronicled in the ordinary bible history. The selection from the Old Testament is made with a view to explaining the reason for Christ's coming, and the preparation of mankind for that great event. The remaining (and longer) portion of the book is devoted to the life of Our Lord. The whole story is told in beautifully simple language, and should be very suitable for children from about six to nine years old. The book is illustrated profusely.

II. Two collections of edifying short stories, reprinted from various French Catholic magazines. Their chief purpose appears to be to educate the public to a better appreciation of the religious vocation.

W. MORAN.

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*Concilium Tridentinum: Diariorum, Epistularum, Tractatum Nova Collectio.* Editit Societas Goerresiana. Vols. VIII. and X.

THE Catholic world is under a deep debt of gratitude to the German Catholic Society, that undertook the publication of this monumental work on the Council of Trent. The war unfortunately increased immensely the difficulty of its production; and the ruinous terms of peace imposed on Germany have not made its completion easier. We offer our meed of praise and appreciation to those who are struggling against such difficulties to complete a great undertaking.

By way of introduction to the review of the two volumes before us, we may mention that the work when complete will consist of twelve parts—I. to III. dealing with diaries, IV. to IX. with the acts of the Council, X. and XI. with letters, and XII. with "tractatus." Volume VIII. is consequently a volume of "acts." It falls into two parts, *Acta ante Concilium*, covering the period September, 1559. to January, 1562, and *Acta Concilii*, from January to September, 1562 (i.e., sessions XVII. to XXII. inclusive). An appendix and an index complete this volume, making altogether a little over a thousand folio pages of print. The mere size of the tome will give some idea of the mass of matter that has had to be collected and edited. The preliminary preparations, the committees of theologians, the general congregations (or grand committees) and the sessions are dealt with in turn; and no pains have been spared to bring to light all records of the discussions, deliberations and even the votes recorded at every assembly. The volume is composed throughout of original documents, and consequently leaves nothing to be desired from the point of view of reliability. These records are not all equally full—or perhaps it would be more correct to say equally minute; necessarily

there are summaries of discourses and discussions. Even in these cases the reader is assured that the records before him are thoroughly reliable; for they are in nearly every case taken from the speaker's own notes or from the notes made by the secretary of the meeting. As in every exhaustive work, references have to be made from one volume of the present series to another. Owing, however, to the difficulties created by the war several volumes have been very much delayed, with the result that in the present number references to Pallavicini and others have had to be substituted for those originally intended.

We looked up, as a test case, the history of the parenthesis "*salva eorum substantia*," found in the second chapter of session XXII. and defined on July 16th, 1562. We obtained the following information. For several days before the actual session a general congregation was at work framing the drafts of the doctrine and canons to be defined. The final draft, just as we have it now except for the omission of the clause "*utcumque*" in chapter I. and of "*salva eorum substantia*" in chapter II., was presented for approval on July 14th. Of 140 Fathers present nearly half voted "*placet*" simply, i.e., they voted for the canons and chapters as they stood. About 70 speakers suggested various slight amendments here and there; and of these only four suggested the addition of the words "*salva eorum substantia*." The amendment ("*utcumque*") to chapter I. was put to a vote and carried. There is no record of any other division at the meeting. We are left to infer, therefore, that the other amendments proposed received such slight support that a formal vote was unnecessary, and we hear nothing more about them. There is just one exception; we hear again of the clause "*salva earum substantia*." We find it incorporated in the draft actually defined two days later; though how it came to be there the present volume does not tell us. Perhaps some other volume of the series will throw some light on the subject.

Vol. X.—This is a volume of letters. It is hardly necessary to emphasise the desirability of publishing all contemporary letters bearing on the work of the Council. A man will often speak out his mind much more freely in an informal letter to a friend than in the more studied phraseology of an official document. It has been the object of the editors of the present series to complete the work of Pallavicini, Druffel and others by getting together all the relevant letters that are extant. The mass of material, however, was so great that economy of space as well as the convenience of the student suggested some kind of classification. In the present volume the editor has made a distinction between the more important and the less important letters. The former, chiefly official, he has inserted in the text; the latter he has relegated to an appendix. Even with this arrangement the volume, which runs to a thousand pages, covers only the period January, 1545, to March, 1547. The arrangement adopted by the editor will be found convenient. In an introduction he deals with his sources (the archives and libraries he has drawn on for the letters), and with his method of treating the materials to hand. He then gives in tabulated form a *conspectus* that will greatly facilitate the work of the student. Following the chronological order, he gives in the first column the date of every letter in the volume, in the second column the names of author and recipient, in the third and fourth he says whether the letter is mentioned by Massarelli or Pallavicini, in the fifth, the page at which the letter



is found in the present edition, and in the sixth whether the original is still extant. In addition to this *conspectus* there is an "index nominum et rerum" at the end of the volume. The letters themselves (in the various languages in which they were written) are illustrated by a copious supply of notes and references at the foot of each page.

We extend a hearty welcome to both volumes, and look forward eagerly to the completion of the whole series.

W. MORAN.

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*Excursions in Thought.* By "IMAAL." Dublin: The Talbot Press, 85 Talbot Street, Dublin. London: Fisher Unwin. Pp. 170. Price 6/- net.

The author is as fortunate in his title as in the language of his work. For he gives us a true excursion. We are taken away from the trivial, the journalese, the banal, the daily grind of life. And we are made to see, as if for the first time, the great objects of thought. For this work deals in the grand manner with the great themes, Genius, Progress, Christianity. Like the material wonders of the world, these have been before the world for centuries; they have been described by myriad pens; and yet, when seen with fresh eyes, they still possess the old enchantment. True to his title, the author does not make incursions into the by-ways of thought, in search of the curious, the odd, the sensational. It is too stale a trick for attaining originality. There is higher merit in keeping to the high-ways and seeing many new things which are too obvious to attract examination like the sounds of a city which would compel attention only if they were suddenly to cease. It is only when the sun is in eclipse that it is universally observed. The author is careful to point out that, is the hurried tourist through life, is one of the qualities of genius. And this quality is the result of another quality which the author takes to be the central attribute of high mental power, namely, energy. It is a view with which we will not quarrel provided that it is understood that the author has the licence of an essayist and is permitted to give glimpses of his this power of seeing the many things that are missed in the obvious by subject rather than strict definitions. For example, his phrase, genius is energy, must not be taken too literally; otherwise Billingsgate would be the home of the highest genius; it would take the place of the Athenian agora and would be thronged by women greater than Hypatia. Yet energy is fundamental in genius. For the work of the genius is the cry of the heart. It often has a maniac-like intensity. There is an abyss placed between it and the merely clever, cunning, even brilliant time-server of life and letters. Though the man of genius is often in the matter of the world's goods a Lazarus clad in rags, he is at any rate saved from the hell of Dives and of all who are not true to their own inward souls; and because of this truth of his to his own original soul the world is afterwards compelled to gather even the crumbs that have fallen from his table.

One of the merits of the author's treatment of genius is that he corrects popular legendary views concerning the matter. To ignorance men of genius appear magnified into unreal proportions like mountains in a mist. Dangerous error! For these men are not moulded of a different clay. If we could but recognise that these have in a very great degree gifts which

are rudimentary in all, the native suggestions of the soul, education would not so often tended to crush all original genius beneath its load of learned lumber. As an instance of one of the popular delusions, the author mentions the belief that genius is always quick in its results. Against such a myth there is one decisive fact, and it is the existence of perhaps the greatest genius of all, Leonardo da Vinci, who was provokingly tedious with his masterpieces. What the author requires in the work of genius is not such an accident as a greater or less time of production, but native spontaneous growth. Some of the great men who have spoken candidly about their labours, and who have not tried to mystify their admirers have admitted the slow process in the elaboration of their thought. While we can point to a Nietzsche who confesses to storms of ideas and to flashes of insight, we can also refer to a Lessing who attributes his success to a painstaking literary criticism. But the author may do with Lessing as he somewhat arbitrarily did with Tennyson, and place him among the merely talented. Then why not do the same with Virgil, Schiller, and Darwin? Tennyson might reply with Lessing that if they did not produce works of genius they produced works that are such good counterfeits that they cannot be distinguished. The other essays deal with Catholic Christianity and its antithesis, false progress. We like the opposition that is set up between Rome and the hasty pursuers of a hectic progress. Rome is as slow as the action of God. God could wait for centuries before sending a Redeemer; Rome, the child of eternity, does not force the growths. Yet the author has no trouble in showing that the most enduring things in civilisation have come from Christian Rome. His treatment cannot be brushed aside by modernists as the work of a philistine; Bossuet and Brunetière cannot be lightly treated as the foes of culture, and, as a Catholic apologist, the author belongs to that noble succession. His work is one of the few really great books dealing with Catholic subjects in recent times. It is one that many of the Catholic workers he himself describes would not be ashamed to avow.

There are misprints in connection with *Aquin* and *De Civitate Dei*.

GARRETT PIERSE.

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*The Rubrics of the Roman Ritual.* By REV. JAMES O'KANE. Revised and Edited by Most Rev. Thomas O'Doherty, D.D., Bishop of Clonfert. Duffy and Co., Dublin.

His Lordship, the Bishop of Clonfert, has rendered a great service to the clergy by this revision of O'Kane. The need for such a revision had become more and more apparent as, year by year, decrees were multiplied. But the need became an absolute necessity in consequence of the many important changes introduced by the New Code of Canon Law. The Bishop of Clonfert undertook the revision when still Professor of Sacred Liturgy in Maynooth and Editor of the liturgical section of the "Irish Ecclesiastical Record." What time and labour he must have devoted to the task will be realized by those who take the trouble to make a detailed comparison between the earlier editions and the present one. Every statement of O'Kane has evidently been submitted to careful scrutiny; decisions of the Sacred Congregations and prescriptions of the last Maynooth Synod are given in the footnotes; and, when the former teaching or discipline has undergone an entire change,

the antiquated paragraphs have been in whole or in part excised, and new matter added or substituted. A reference to the chapter on Paschal Communion and to the notes on Matrimony will show even the casual reader what important changes have had to be made and how accurately those changes have been incorporated in the text. Moreover, in the Appendix of Decrees it will be observed that the old numbering of Gardellini has been replaced by the numbering of the *Decreta Authentica S.C.R.*, and that the Appendix has been supplemented by the insertion in full of the new decrees quoted by the Editor in the body of the work. The result is that O'Kane receives a new lease of life as a standard work—a work which the student may study and the clergy follow without fear of adopting obsolete opinions on either the theology or the rubrics of the sacraments.

Without desiring in any way to detract from the merit of the revision, we may be permitted briefly to refer to a few points by way rather of suggestion than of criticism. First, we remark that in the section on Custom no allusion is made to the New Code, which contains definite legislation on the subject. For this reason paragraph n. 51 might perhaps yield place to Canons 25—30 of the Code. Secondly, few priests have in their libraries Bouvier, Carrière, Collet, Tournely, etc. It would be an advantage if, in addition to, or in place of, those older authorities, references were given to modern text-books. Thirdly, the Appendix of "Works Consulted" (p. 514) has been reprinted as it stood in the previous edition. By the inclusion of the notable works published since O'Kane's time this Appendix would become a complete and valuable bibliography.

We have great pleasure in drawing the attention of the clergy to this new and revised edition of O'Kane, and we trust that a copy of it will soon be found on every priest's table. The price, indeed—14 shillings—seems rather high, still, no priest who is anxious for the exact administration of the Sacraments can afford to be without a standard treatise of such excellence and such practical importance as this is.

*Ethics: General and Special.* By OWEN A. HILL, S.J., Ph.D. 1921.  
Harding and Moore, Ltd., The Ambrosden Press, 119 High  
Holborn, London, W.C.1 Pp. xiv.+414. Price 21/- net.

As the title indicates, the book is in two parts. The first deals with man's end, the natural law, morality, human acts, Probabilism, virtues, character, rights, contracts, Utilitarianism and Kant's autonomy: the second with religion, right of ownership, suicide, lying, Socialism, labour questions, marriage, celibacy, divorce, authority, woman's suffrage, and the State's functions.

We have no doubt that for anyone who has not studied these matters systematically the book will be full of interest. The subjects discussed are numerous, and many of them make a very special appeal at the present moment. The author's thought, too, is expressed in very terse and emphatic language, and we are left in no doubt as to the meaning he wishes to convey.

But we question whether the work will contribute much to the development of Ethical Science. First of all, it does not impress one

as being the result of careful and accurate thinking. The very style is an indication. The sentences are short, sharp and nervous: the author jerks out a statement that is too short to convey his full meaning, and he has to return to the matter presently to jerk out another. This leaves the reader bewildered and unsatisfied, and leads to repetitions that could well be spared when so much has to be discussed within a small compass. Secondly, there is a want of perspective: comparatively unimportant matters are given considerable attention, and pressing problems are allowed to wait—for instance, 'strikes' are dismissed in a page (388), and the 'living wage' in another (142). Lastly, the author is too much prejudiced in favour of the older methods and of the established order: he gives up the old positions only under extreme pressure and not with a very good grace: he denounces his opponents in a manner that rather wins them our sympathy: and his exposition of his own principles commits him to extremes.

This may serve as an instance, though perhaps a little more jerky than the ordinary, of his argumentative method [he is answering an objection urged by the Hedonists]:—

The end is superior to the means. Pleasure is the end, activity is the means. Answer: This is in the order of intention, not in the order of being or reality. Redemption of man is the end; the tears and blood of God are the means. *Operis* and *operantis*. Priority in the order of being or reality settles dignity. Reversed in two orders of intention and being. End first in intention, last in being. Means last in intention, first in being. Ergo, activity is superior to pleasure, as cause is superior to effect (p. 159).

Some points of his teaching. Subjectivism 'accounts for all the atheism, all the materialism, all the socialism in the world' (vi). The Allies 'had a perfect moral right to impose on Germany and Austria all the terms of the Armistice' (ix). A necessary act is 'without its own proper morality' (78). St. Alphonsus 'is Probabilism's staunch defender' (102)—no proof offered of a much-debated thesis. Probabilism 'is available . . . in cases of law, never in cases of fact; because . . . a law binds only when known, a fact is a fact whether it is known or not' (108). The 'theological virtues as such would have no place in the natural order' (201)—not even as natural virtues? Suicides and duels are given many pages (201-224): but no word is said about Hunger Striking, and of a prize-fight we are told that it 'would not seem to be a duel' (213), and that 'on occasion it would seem to be against the law of nature' (223)—that is all. 'Man is quick to think, and rushes to conclusions; woman is slower, and by her deliberateness checks man's mistakes' (292)—we wonder if this is their respective rôles. But it is on 'woman suffrage' that he lets himself go with a vengeance. 'Children have as much right to claim the suffrage as women, and the average boy is a better politician than his mother' (390): 'not all individuals in the State are citizens, but only family heads' (392): 'In a man the right to vote is natural . . . in woman the same right is wholly unnatural' (393): 'the spirit of Catholicity revolts at the idea' (393): it is against custom, would hurt the family, destroy woman's native modesty: is 'unnatural and wrong,' etc., etc. (395-16). Weird doctrine?

There are very few exact quotations in the text, and there is not a single footnote from beginning to end. So we are left without an

anchor to steady us, or a light to point the way for further exploration. The book is useful, but there is ample room for improvement in a second edition.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

*Introductionis in Sacros Ultriusque Testamenti Libros Compendium*,  
auctore P. HILDEBRANDE HOEPFL, O.S.B., Vol. II. *Introductio*  
*Specialis in Libros V.T.* pp. 327. Sublaci, Typis Proto-Coenobii;  
Rome: Libreria Alfieri and Lacroix.

In passing judgment on this work it is essential to bear in mind the purpose which the author has in view. In such a vast field he cannot fail to give expression to views which might not find general acceptance. It is impossible to discuss the varied aspects of all the problems involved, and the author must be allowed to exercise his own discretion in placing the problems and their most probable solutions before the reader. This is especially true in the case of an introductory handbook intended for students. If the author confines himself to traditional and conservative opinions it is only what we should expect, provided the student obtains an intelligent grasp of the problems raised in connection with each book and of the main lines of the common Catholic teaching.

Judged according to this standard, the volume before us is, on the whole, satisfactory. The tone throughout is conservative, and where the decrees of the Biblical Commission apply the author follows them strictly. But though conservative, he is by no means extreme. He is careful to define exactly what is meant by historical tradition (p. 15), the argument from which is often abused by conservative scholars. He not only admits that Moses used documents; but that he sets down two distinct narratives of the Creation-story (p. 58); he likewise assumes that the writers of Judges, and Kings, and other books often incorporate extracts from their sources without change (p. 80, 99), and that we are not bound to accept the letters in the opening chapters of II. Maccabees as historical in every detail (p. 160). In many cases, too, though he gives us the conservative view, he is evidently impressed by the weight of the arguments on the other side, so that he leaves us under the impression that either view might be regarded as probable.

A few remarks may be made on details. In connection with the discussion of each book there is a very lengthy bibliography, together with copious notes on minor points. This is an admirable feature in one sense, but, considering the size of the book, it is perhaps too extensive. The Pentateuch naturally receives the longest treatment. After a brief exposition of the documentary theory, he gives the usual proofs of the Mosaic authorship and examines the arguments on the other side. Perhaps he does not give sufficient prominence to the argument from the differences between the codes of laws as given by the critics themselves. The question as to whether the Law discovered by Josias, or the Law introduced by Esdras were Deuteronomy and the Priestly Code is really secondary; the important point is that they claim that the laws fall into distinct groups, which presuppose three distinct stages of development, and that a comparison with the historical books shows that the code in JE lies at the background of the narrative

up to the reign of Josias, the D-code from Josias to the Exile, and the P-code from the time of Esdras. The author, indeed, examines this argument in so far as it refers to the Unity of the Sanctuary and the Priesthood, but it might have been stated in a more general form. The decree of the Biblical Commission belongs to the section on 'Authenticity,' not to that on the 'Authority of the Pentateuch,' p. 63 f.

In dealing with the authority of the other historical books he might have raised the question as to the manner in which they used their sources. If they incorporated documents without change, as he admits they did in some cases, do they accept responsibility for all the details? If they cite documents expressly for a didactic purpose, how far is the truth of the minor details necessarily implied? On Esdras-Nehemias the view of Van Hoonacher, now so commonly accepted, is regarded as not sufficiently established, and the traditional order of events is assumed as correct.

It is difficult to gather the author's opinion on the historical character of Tobias and Judith. It would seem to be in favour of the historicity of the former and against the latter, yet he says: 'In genere de libro Judith valet idem quoad superius dictum est de libro Tobiae.' On Esther his views are implied in the expression 'not incredible.' The Book of Jonah he regards as strictly historical. These examples will suffice to indicate the general trend of the book.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*Commentarius in Epistolam ad Ephesios*, auctore FR. JACABO-MARIA VOSTE, O.P. 319 pp. Rome: Libreria del Collegio Angelico. Paris: Gabalda. 30 lire.

The writer of this commentary has been already introduced to the readers of the IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY as the author of an excellent commentary on *Thessalonians*.<sup>1</sup> The character of the latter work marked him out as an interpreter of the first rank, who is able to give a clear exposition of the text without losing himself and the reader in abstruse discussions of philology. The present work maintains the same high level.

In the Introduction, which extends to 82 pages, the longest and most interesting section is that dealing with the destination of the Epistle. Students are familiar with the general details of the discussion arising from the absence of the words *en Epheso* in the introductory salutation, and have been content to leave it as one of the unsolved problems of criticism. If not addressed to the Ephesians exclusively, it must have been a circular letter addressed to several churches of Asia Minor. Father Vosté rejects both alternatives, and boldly decides in favour of the reading *en Laodokia* as the original. Possibly the association of Marcion with this reading has prevented it hitherto from having a fair hearing in the discussion. It has now come into its own. After an accurate statement of the facts of the case, Vosté takes up the two solutions which now hold the field, and has little difficulty in showing their weaknesses. The arguments in favour of

<sup>1</sup> I.T.Q., April, 1919, pp. 173-174.



his own view are then lucidly stated. This is the view now accepted by the best non-Catholic scholars, Holtzmann, Deissmann, Harnack, etc., and Fr. Vosté is to be congratulated in giving it currency among Catholics. I abstain from summarising the arguments which support his conclusion; they are clearly expressed, and, to my mind, convincing.

The section on the 'Time, Place, and Occasion' calls for little notice. Vosté dismisses with a word the supposed Causarean imprisonment as resting on no solid reason. The date assigned as the end of the Roman imprisonment—63—is probably too late.

The theme of the Epistle is the Church, and any work on the Epistle would be incomplete without a synthesis of St. Paul's teaching on this subject. Fr. Vosté provides us with just what is required under the two headings 'Natura Ecclesiae' and 'Notae Ecclesiae.' Under the former he treats of the Church as the Society of the Faithful, as the Mystic Body of Christ, as the Spiritual Building, and as the Spouse of Christ. On the question of Authorship the treatment is thoroughly up-to-date, and the most recent attacks are examined. Chapters on the Relation between Colossians and Ephesians, and Literary Character of Ephesians complete the Introduction.

The text followed in the commentary is that of Vogels except in a few cases where the author gives preference to a different reading. With regard to the Vulgate text of the Epistle, and Jerome's connection with it, Vosté comes to the conclusion, after a long and careful discussion, that Jerome revised the Epistle and that his revision corresponds with the Vulgate. The notes are brief, but no point of difficulty appears to have been passed over; while, for a few of the more difficult passages, we have a more thorough discussion in a series of supplementary notes at the end.

EDWARD J. KISSANE.

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*The Letters of St. Teresa.* Vol. II. Translated and annotated by the Benedictines of Stanbrook. Thomas Baker, 72 Newman Street, London, W. Pp. 325. Price 10/-.

—Although this is only one volume of St. Teresa's letters, it is sufficiently complete in itself, and gives a good idea of the Saint's character. The dominant quality which these letters disclose is practical sense. This will not be surprising to those who have a correct notion of the genuine mystics. Indeed St. Teresa herself tests prayer not by the sweetness it may produce, a mere selfish attribute, but by its practical results. 'As regards the interior things of the spirit, the most acceptable and effectual prayer is that which produces the best results. By this I do not mean a number of desires at a time which, although good, are not always what our self-love paints them, but effects manifested by deeds, and desires for the glory of God shown by the soul's seeking it sincerely, so that the memory and understanding are employed in pleasing Him and in proving our love for Him to the uttermost. Oh, what genuine prayer this is! But not so a sweetness which ends in enjoyment. When prayer is accompanied with such sweetness, it leaves the soul feeble and timid and sensitive to human respect. I wish for no prayer that does not make me grow in virtue.' (p. 96).

Another quality connected with St. Teresa's practical sense is her sense of humour. She writes to Fray Ambrosio Mariano: 'I was amused at your Reverence's declaring that you could see her (a postulant's) character at a glance. We women are not so easy to understand. A priest will hear our confessions for many a year and be astonished at the end to find how little he really knows of us. It is because we are too ignorant of our own nature to tell our faults, and our confessors judge us by what we say.' (p. 85.) Thus Teresa believed in the mystery of the eternal feminine, a mystery that is impenetrable to the subjects themselves. But it is not confined to one sex. For even the physical characteristics of each individual, to say nothing of his spiritual qualities, are not fully understood even by himself. Most people, if through a miracle of bilocation, they saw their own figures, or heard in the distance their own voices, would need an introduction to them. The matter was put to the test by two friends having a gramophone record taken of their voices, when each had difficulty in recognising his own voice, but none in recognising his friend's. That is the reason, too, why people generally apply the sermon to their neighbour's case.

St. Teresa, at any rate, showed a keen knowledge of human nature. According to Henri Joly's *Sainte Thérèse* she surpassed Charcot in her understanding of that plague of convents, melancholia, which includes hysteria and neurasthenia. She even prescribed the modern remedies: more sleep, food, and drink, open air, meat instead of fish, manual work, and little time for solitude. She recommended that sisters suffering from the disease should be occasionally kept from mental prayer.

It is because of her extraordinary discernment that we can attach much importance to her own account of revelations received from Joseph, her *sobriquet* for Our Lord. These familiar talks upheld her in the maze of misunderstandings and struggles between the various Carmelites, discalced, calced and mitigated.

G. PIERSE.

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*The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Second Part of the Second Part, QQ.CXLI.—CLXX. Literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 28 Orchard St., W.1. Benziger Bros., New York, Cincinnati, Chicago.

The present volume deals with Temperance, its integral, subjective, and potential parts, and contrary vices. The work of St. Thomas need not be criticised. It would be like reviewing the sun; one might indeed point to spots; but what are they amidst such splendour? It may be well, however, to give a specimen of the present treatise; it will illustrate the thoroughness and minuteness of the work of Aquinas as well as the fitting English that is used in the translation. Distinguishing between temperance and Puritanism, St. Thomas inquires 'Whether there is a Sin in Lack of Mirth.' He replies: 'In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca says: (*De Quat. Virt.*, Cap. *De Continentio*): Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude

or despise you as a cad. Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic. IV. 8.*)' (p. 302.) Again: 'There can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness, and a man is said to be witty through having a witty turn of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn' (p. 298).

*Cursus Theologicus Oniensis. Tractatus De Deo Creante.* Auctore BLASIO BERAZA, S.J. Bilbao, Alameda de Mazarredo, apartado 223. Editores Eléxpuru Hermanos. Pp. 774.

The present work is written from a thoroughly conservative standpoint. It castigates the views of writers like Father Lagrange. It displays in many pages a firm assurance which continues the tradition of the schoolmen. Not that modern literature is not mentioned; on the contrary it is dealt with very fully as in the case of evolution. But it is often cited to be rejected.

As the reviewer could hardly be expected to read every page of a large tome dealing for the most part with matters which he knows already, he selected some of the burning questions like the hexaëmeron and evolution. In connection with the former great issue the author has conferred a distinct service by bringing into clearer light the fact that Augustine was not the sole author of the idealistic interpretation. A similar explanation was furnished by Philo, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Procopius, and Athanasius. The author himself seems to have combined the periodistic and idealistic interpretations. He says that the 'days' are days of our week, to be taken, however, in a transferred sense to mean the six portions of time, into which the creation was distributed. Six were chosen to serve as a prototype of our working days.

In regard to evolution the author holds that animals always had the same form. He thus bids defiance to practically all the modern zoologists. He says that you can scarcely refrain from laughing when you consider the theory of Lamarck, a Catholic who at any rate made the gallant effort of a pioneer to enlarge our knowledge. Yet the author's theology in this point of immutability of animal forms may itself run perilously near to exposing our faith to the laughter of unbelievers, a consummation which in the view of St. Thomas is to be avoided by all theologians. And it must be mentioned that the author quotes Aquinas at length. He conserves the past. His work is a dictionary of the various opinions on the subjects treated, and every question is discussed with a generous fulness of detail. It is well-documented. It refers even to the recent article of Father Janssens in the *Gregorianum* concerning Olivi's doctrine of the soul as a substantial form.

*The Tangle of God and Evil.* By ERNEST J. GLINT. London: Elliot Stock, 7 Paternoster Row, E.C. Pp. 38. Price 1/6 paper.

This is written by one who straightened out the tangle to his own satisfaction. The work gives a solution with average ability and in living, gripping language. The author has not added anything substantial to Augustine's formula of solution: physical evil is either willed *per accidens* for the good attached, or it is a punishment for sin; sin

itself is permitted by God. The present work emphasizes, (1) that there is a solidarity of the race so that when one suffers others must suffer; (2) that evils, like war, are a salutary, soul-enriching punishment of the Fall. There is an interesting and novel confirmation of the doctrine of the Fall by an examination of the human body and its apparent unsuitability for heavy work. There are some expressions which may mislead and which seem to be the result of the indefinite teaching prevalent outside the Communion of Rome: for example, it is said that 'sin' must be completely wilful; and there is a reference to the 'human personality' of Jesus, though from other parts of this pamphlet I infer that the author holds conservative views concerning the Divine personality of Jesus and His virgin-birth.

*Praxis Theologiae Mysticae.* Auctore P. MICHAEL GODINEZ, S.J.  
Latine reddita a P.E. de la Reguera, S.J. Paris: P. Lethielleux,  
10 Rue Casette. Pp. 348. Price 7 francs. Paper cover.

You will ask yourself who was Godinez, and you will probably answer, a Spaniard. But you will be mistaken. Godinez, whom a French publisher now takes the trouble of reintroducing to the world, was an Irishman, a Waterford priest, Michael Wadding, whose mother was Walsh, called Valois in French. He was born in the end of the sixteenth century, and was introduced to the Spanish Jesuits as a result of his studies in Salamanca. The present book is an old Latin translation of the work he wrote in Spanish not so much for learned as for simple souls.

French Jesuits would not be likely to revive this work of a Spanish-Irish scholar if it had not much intrinsic value. They made no mistake in their venture. This is a personal work. Like St. Teresa, he avoids prolixity by eschewing all learned book-references. One can see immediately that this book is the fruitage of a rich spiritual experience. And the vigorous Irish personality often reveals itself in language that does not mince matters. For example he rarely misses an opportunity of attacking the devotions and 'revelations' of women with weak minds. He traces the decline of piety in religious houses to wealth, ambition, and idiocy in high places. Altogether it is a whiff of breezy theology wafted to us from the later Middle Ages.

But it is, also, full of solid instruction about the spiritual life. There is an introductory book about what would at present be called Ascetic Theology. The author discusses with much commonsense the mortification of the passions and of the intellect and will; this is chiefly accomplished through seeking the will of God. Afterwards there follows a vivid account of contemplation, its conditions, and its fruits. Also there is much practical instruction given to spiritual directors concerning the appropriate virtues of superiors and the different characters of subjects.

The value of the book is that it is written by a connoisseur of human nature as well as by one apparently experienced in the highest activity of the life of the spirit. His theory is that grace adapts itself to nature as water to the form of a vase. By the ordinary law, according to him, a fool could not become a remarkable saint. It is in these practical views that the author is at his best. Although he usefully founds his doctrine on the main lines of scholastic theology, he is not always exact in definition, for example, when he calls virtue an act. But we may

easily excuse this in one who led an apostolic life in the Spanish Missions in America. It may be hoped that misprints will be removed in a future edition.

*La Vie Intellectuelle.* Par A. D. SERTILLANGES. Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 3 Rue de Luynes, Paris—VIIe. Pp. 254.

*La Vie Catholique.* Par A. D. SERTILLANGES. J. Gabalda, 90 Rue Bonaparte. Pp. 296.

*L'Amour Chrétien.* Same Author and Publisher. Pp. 306.

In *La Vie Intellectuelle* Father Sertillanges, O.P., describes in vivid language the spirit, method, and conditions of fruitful intellectual work. It is written in popular language, and it everywhere exhales that delicate and distinctive perfume which is called style. Besides, it is founded on the soundest Thomistic thought; to be precise, on the letter to Brother John attributed to St. Thomas and entitled 'Sixteen Precepts for Acquiring the Treasure of Science.'

The author in dealing with creative thought discusses one of its chief conditions, namely, originality. He carefully excludes the false kinds of originality. When originality is everywhere sought after, when it ceases to be an inevitable quality resembling an appropriate figure of speech, it degenerates into eccentricity, and it dazzles without enlightening. True originality, on the other hand, is always present, if only one is true to oneself. For each one's self is unique. But a multitude of people have not the courage to be themselves; and many systems of education are entirely devoted to making people other than themselves, destroying the God-given quality of originality and standardizing minds like measures. If one has the luck to escape those systems, or to outgrow them, one may give of oneself; and thought is inevitably coloured by this tincture of self. For individual thought is like the cider that receives its colour from the sherry cask.

In *La Vie Chrétienne*, as in the others, the author illustrates in various ways the saying of Claude Bernard that life is death. Not only in nature, in its katabolisms and survivals of the fittest, but in Christianity is death the condition of life. This is the inner meaning of mortification, and of the girl victims of Carmel. This, also, is the meaning of 'I am the way, the truth, and the life.' Christ's life is the way. His life is the full truth, not the mere partial truth of the philosopher who forgets practice, but the truth that is lived to the death. What was His life? It was a death-in-life, the Cross. The Cross, then, is the truth; the cross is the way—to all achievement, whether of the highest or of the lowliest sort. Pessimism? No. For it does not mean death of the highest things, but of the vile things. In this Christian life there must be according to the author, the highest joy. For the words of a saint—Francis of Sales—concerning a saint are *un saint triste est un triste saint*.

*L'Amour Chrétien* is a fitting completion of all the author's thought. Unlike his countryman, Bergson, who speaks of creative evolution, the priestly author speaks of creative love. He follows the joyousness, the dash, the aggressiveness of love in all its spheres. And he makes the old philosophies and the old theologies live and pulsate once more in modern thought. The author will, we think, appeal to many who want a vivid popular account of his themes.

G. PIERSE.

## Books Received.

**The New Testament**, Vol. III. St. Paul's Epistles to the Churches. (Westminster Version). Lxiii.+258 pp. Cloth, 8/6 net. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

**The New Testament**, Vol III. Parts III. and IV. 2nd Corinthians, Galatians and Romans. 3/9 net. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

**The Life and Growth of Israel**. By Samuel A. B. Mercer, Ph.D., D.D. 170 pp. \$1.75 net. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co.

**Life of Dr. Patrick Duggan**. By Rev. Thomas Brett, C.C., with an Introduction by William O'Brien. xix.+200 pp. Dublin: Martin Lester, Limited.

**The Religion of the Scriptures**. Papers from the Catholic Bible Congress (1921). Edited by Rev. C. Lattey, S.J. 106 pp. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Limited.

**Arrows**. Poems by George Noble Plunkett. 64 pp. 5/- net. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son.

**Values of the Christian Life**. By A. D. Kelly, M.A. S.P.C.K., 68 Haymarket London, S.W. Pp. 282. Price, 7s. 6d. net. [A discussion of Christian beliefs from the pragmatic stand-point. It contrasts the useful Christian ideal with the materialistic ideal of Omar, namely, 'the eternal prodigal amid the eternal swine.']



## Theological Articles in the Reviews.

**THE MONTH** (July, 1921).—**The Editor**, 'Biblical Difficulties.' [Principles of solution.] **H. Browne**, 'Catholic Propaganda.' [Practical suggestions for the wider diffusion of the C.T.S. publications.] **J. B. Williams**, 'Nathaniel Thompson and the "Popish Plot."' [An account of the activities and troubles of the 'Popish printer.'] **E. Yurie**, 'The Catholic Church in Yugoslavia.' [A very full and interesting description of the religious condition of the people and of the ecclesiastical organization. Hopeful and optimistic.] **S. J. Brown**, 'Catholic Writers in Congress.' [The 'Writers' Week' in Paris last Whitsuntide. A considerable measure of success attained.] (August, 1921.)—**J. B. Reeves**, 'A Double Septcentenary.' [Of the death of St. Dominic and of the establishment of a Province of his Order in England.] **A. Fortescue**, 'How the Orthodox Church regards our Sacraments.' [Though many of the documents condemn them, the Church in practice—except during a popular outburst in the eighteenth century—has acknowledged them as valid.] **D. Devas**, 'Elias of Cortona.' [Story of a great fall.] **E. Beck**, 'Mr. G. G. Coulton and Monastic Morality.' [The facts—given here in great detail—prove Mr. Coulton's charges preposterous.] **G. C. Martindale**, 'The Last Hours of St. John Berchmans.—A Note.' [The final temptation.] **H. Thurston**, 'Bible Reading and Bible Prohibition.' [The medieval Catholic attitude approved by Protestant, as well as by Catholic, authorities.] (September, 1921).—**B. Jarret**, 'The Catholic Guild of Israel.' [An appeal for help for the society whose object is the conversion of the Jews. The writer expresses very reasonable surprise that Catholics take so little interest in the nation that founded their Church.] **H. P. Russell**, 'The Visible Unity of the Church.' [A critical examination by a convert of the various Anglican positions.] **H. Thurston**, 'The Problem of Catherine Emmerich—I.' [The stigmata, and some at least of the other wonderful phenomena, in her case were undoubtedly authentic. Whether they furnish a presumption in favour of her visions and revelations will be considered in a subsequent article.] **Miscellaneous**: Critical and Historical Notes; Topics of the Month; Notes on the Press. Reviews. Short Notices. Books Received.

**THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW** (June, 1921).—**T. Slater**, 'The Code and Faculties for Confession.' [Raises, in connexion with a recent decision, some interesting historical points in the history of 'approbation.'] **P. B. Vogt**, 'St. Thomas and Duns Scotus.' [The latter no mere demolisher of systems. He treated from the objective point of view what St. Thomas viewed from the subjective. Good description of the thirteenth century philosophy. The study of Scotus ought to be revived; and neo-Scholasticism kept from being mere neo-Thomism; that the Church's wish.] (July, 1921).—**J. H. Murphy**, 'Parish Records.' [Nine different classes: the ecclesiastical law regarding each.] **G. M. Stenz**, 'What's Wrong with the Chinese Missions.' [Schools too few, Catholic literature deficient, few conversions from the higher classes.] **H. B. Loughnan**, 'The Study of Mysticism.' [Three methods examined and compared.] **Fra Arminio**, 'St. Bernardine of Siena and His Courses of Doctrines and Moral Instruction.' [A study of

his works helpful in the writing and delivery of sermons.] **G. Motlake**, 'Early Medieval Mission Letters.' [The life and work of St. Boniface.] (August, 1921).—**Fra Arminio**, 'Blessed Peter Canisius and Robert Bellarmine.' [Both teach the need for catechizing and for simple sermons.] **J. S. Pitts**, 'The Priest and the Scientist.' [A dialogue on Faith.] **U. A. Hauber**, 'Facts and Theories of Modern Biology as viewed by a Catholic Priest.' [The theory of the evolution of man's body not condemned by the Church, but must be handled with caution.] **M. A. Schumacher**, 'Some Suggestions about the "Other Sheep".' [Zeal for conversion has grown less: five suggestions for improvement.] **E. J. Mannix**, 'Convert Movement in America.' [An historical review.] (September, 1921).—**J. T. Slattery**, 'Dante's Attitude towards the Church and the Clergy of His Time.' [His high ideal of the priestly character is the key to the whole situation—to his panegyrics as well as to his denunciations. His orthodoxy is unquestionable.] **E. J. Mannix**, 'The American Mind and the Convert Movement.' [The intending convert must be met on a democratic footing and with friendly sympathy: systematic exposition will come later.] **J. C. Harrington**, 'Importance of the "Cautiones" in Disparity of Worship.' [Recalls that they are required for validity, and claims that they must be sincere—also under pain of invalidity.] **J. S. Pitts**, 'The Priest and the Scientist.' [Dialogue on God's existence.] *Analecta. Studies and Conferences. Ecclesiastical Library Table. Criticisms and Notes. Library Chat. Books Received.*

**THE HOMILETIC AND PASTORAL REVIEW** (JUNE, 1921).—**T. M. Schwertner**, 'Laymen's Retreats.' [Their utility and necessity.] **S. Woywod**, 'Mass Stipends.' [Popular explanation of the pertinent canons of the Code.] **W. Drum**, 'The Words of Jesus and the Meditations of John.' [Attacks views propounded by Frs. Lebreton and Lagrange.] **J. Husslein**, 'The Limits of Labor.' [General considerations on the proper length of the labour-day.] (July, 1921).—**T. P. Phelan**, 'A Parochial Course of Doctrinal Instructions.' [An enthusiastic appreciation of the book published under that name.] **C. F. Curran**, 'The Celebration of Mass during Priests' Retreats.' [Omission deplored: suggested remedies for the abuse.] **W. Drum**, 'The Kernel of Fact and the Husk of Fancy in St. John.' [Uncompromising rejection of the theories of Frs. Calmes, Rose, Batiffol, Grandmaison and Lagrange.] **S. Woywod**, 'Mass Stipends.' [Continuation.] (September, 1921).—**J. Simon**, 'Syrian Dogmatic Selections.' [A considerable number of texts from the ancient Syrian Church on Confession, the Immaculate Conception, Extreme Unction, Prayers for the Dead, and Veneration of Saints.] **C. Bruchi**, 'Vocations to the Priesthood.' [A good summary of the texts.] **S. Woywod**, 'The Sacrament of Penance in the new Code.' [The earlier canons.] **J. Husslein**, 'The Medieval Guild in Action.' [A few remarks on their characteristics.] **W. Drum**, 'Biblical Studies.' [The writer continues his proof that the differences between St. John and the Synoptics are much less than they are represented by even some Catholic critics.] Each issue contains moreover 'Liturgical Notes for the Month,' 'Roman Documents for the Month,' 'Answers to Questions,' and appropriate Sermons.

**BIBLICA.** Vol. 2. Fasc. 3. **A. Médebielle**, 'Le symbolisme du sacrifice expiatoire on Israel,' II. [The victim is a vicarious offering for the sins of the offerer; there is likewise present the ardent desire of reconciliation

with God.] **L. Murillo**, 'El "Israel de las promesas," o Judaismo y Gentilismo en la concepción Paulina del Evangelio.' [How are the promises fulfilled if the Jews have not believed? Discussion of Romans, ix-xi.] **L. Fonck**, 'Die Echtheit von Justins Dialog gegen Trypho.' [Defends authenticity against Preuschen.] **C. Lattay**, 'A Note on the Mishna: Passover, 7, 9f.' [The passage presupposes the possibility of the Pasch falling on Friday.]

**VERBUM DOMINI** (Julio, 1921).—**L. Fonck**, 'Pharisaeus et Publicanus.' [Explanation of the parable.] **A. Fernandez**, 'Vetus Testamentum populo a concionatore propositum.' [A plea for use of the Old Testament in preaching.] **J. J. O'Rourke**, 'Census Quirinii.' [How far have recent discoveries gone to vindicate St. Luke?] **E. Power**, 'Praecoquas ficus desideravit anima mea.' [Interesting details about fig-trees and figs derived from personal experience in Palestine.]

**EXPOSITORY TIMES** (July, 1921).—**C. Cryer**, 'The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel.' [It embodies a poem of a Hebraic type on the Logos written by the author of the Gospel.] **A. Wotherspoon**, 'A Note on the Kingdom of God.' [In the mind of Christ the Church of God and the Kingdom of God are two things distinct and differing widely in nature.] (August, 1921).—**J. Moffatt**, 'Jesus and the Four Men.' [His relations with Pilate, Herod, Simon of Cyrene and the Thief.] **A. H. Sayce**, 'The Temple-Mount at Jerusalem.' [Brief resume of results of recent exploration.] **R. Mackintosh**, 'The Beatitudes.' [Some reasons for preferring the text of Matthew to that of Luke.]

**PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW** (July, 1921).—**R. D. Wilson**, 'The Names for God in the New Testament.' [An elaborate analysis of the names of God in N.T. with some deductions as regards the uniqueness of Christianity as compared with Judaism, Islamism, etc.] **W. M. Clow**, 'The Elements of Industrial Strife.' [Analyses the causes and affirms that only the principles of Christianity can bring peace.]

**GREGORIANUM** (Mense Julio, 1921).—**Reimbsbach**, 'Le Patronage de St. Joseph.' **Mueller**, 'Fuitne Nestorius revera Nestorianus?' **Peister**, 'Wann hat Petrus Lombardus die "Libri IV. Sententiarum" vollendet?'

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE** (II. Quartalheft, 1921).—**Schrörs**, 'Das Charakterbild des heiligen Benedikt von Nursia und seine Quellen.' **Poschmann**, 'Die kirchliche Vermittlung der Sündenvergebung nach Augustinus (I.).' [It is a master-thought of Augustine that the forgiveness of sin is possible only in the Church.] **Rimml**, 'Das Furchtproblem in der lehre des heiligen Augustin (II.).' [Augustine's doctrine shows us that fear of punishment, if it does not exclude the love of God and if it excludes the desire of sin, is morally good and a sufficient motive for attrition.]

**REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THEOLOGIQUES** (Avril, 1921).—**Bianche**, 'La notion d'analogie dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin.' [Proportion primarily signified the relationship of quantity to quantity and then it came to mean any relationship of anything to anything.] **Hugueny**, 'La doctrine mystique de Tauler.' **Reiland-Gosselin**, 'Sur la théorie thomiste de la vérité.' [The resemblance between mind and thing is elastic.]

**THE CATHOLIC WORLD** (May, 1921.)—**Ryan**, 'The Proper Functions of the State. [Discusses the limit of its functions in regard to education, public works, religion, morality, industrial life, etc.] (June, 1921.)—**Walker**, 'Why God became Man.' [The beginning of a series of articles dealing with fundamental dogmas from the stand-point of their value.] **Siedenburg**, 'Training for Social Work. [Discusses the curriculum required for training the social worker; it would include a study of constructive and preventive measures, and of the methods of medieval and modern charity.]

"**GREGORIANUM**" (Mense April, 1921)—**Vaccari**, 'L'Encyclica "Spiritus Paraclitus" per il centenario di S. Girolamo.' **Kramp**, 'Des Wilhelm von Auvergne "Magisterium divine" III.' [An analysis.] **André**, 'Les Quolibets de Bernard de Trilia. [Bernard never departs from the opinion of his old professor, St. Thomas.] **Mueller**, 'Fuitne Nestorius revera Nestorianus?' [Some of the things urged by Bethune-Baker to excuse Nestorius really accuse him.]

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE** (III. Quartalheft, 1921.)—**Wilpert**, 'Die altchristliche Kunst Roms und des Orients.' **Silpyl**, 'Die Trinitätslehre des byzantinischen Patriarchen Photios (III.)' [Discusses the views of Photius, and, incidentally, of Erigena concerning the procession of the Holy Ghost.] **Peschmann**, 'Die kirchliche Vermittlung der Sündenvergebung nach Augustinus (II.)' [The Church administers not merely a remission of punishment, but of fault.]

**IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD** (July). **T. Ronayne**, 'A tour through the Vicariate of Southern Nigeria,' **E. H. Calnan**, 'Catholics and the Bible' [How Catholics stand with regard to the problems raised by modern criticism.] **B. Barry**, 'Interrogating in the Confessional' [some practical maxims]. **Dom P. Nolan**, 'Studies in Irish Monetary History.' **E. F. Sutcliffe**, 'St. Peter's Patrimony in Sicily' [with appreciation of a recent book by E. Spearing on the subject]. **P. McKenna**, 'Anti-Christ in S. Scripture and Tradition' [Explains the various theories that have been put forward.]

(August). **M. McDonagh**, 'The Opening of the Old Irish Parliament.' **Right Reverend J. S. Vaughan**, 'Eternal Life' [continued]. **M. McInerney**, 'The Souper Problem in Ireland' [Deals with present proselytising methods, specially around Dublin, and makes some good suggestions]. **T. Ronayne**, 'A Tour through the Vicariate of S. Nigeria,' [continued]. **Dom. P. Nolan**, 'Studies in Irish Monetary History' [continued]. **D. Barry**, 'Care of the Insane' [when they should be given the Sacraments].

(September). **P. Joy**, 'The German Catholic Congress' [Historical; suggests similar movement in Ireland]. **B. Meleady**, 'Some Questions on Mystical Prayer.' **Canon Hyland**, 'Is there a God?' [A popular presentation of St. Thomas's proofs]. **J. Brodie-Brosnan**, 'Father Vermeersch on the malice of lying' [A criticism of Fr. Vermeersch's theory]. **Dom. P. Nolan**, 'Cantillon de Ballyheigue: the Franco-Irish Economist' [mostly biographical]. **J. B. Cullen**, 'Seville: its Characteristics and Catholic Associations.'

Correspondence, Documents, Reviews, Notes and Queries (in Theology, Canon Law and Liturgy) in each number.

**THEOLOGIE UND GLAUBE** (III. Heft.) **Dürr**, 'Die einzigartigkeit der israelitischen Religion im Lichte der heutigen vorderasiatischen Wissenschaft.' **Holstenstein**, 'Die Wiederwahl der Generaloberinnen in den religiösen Kongregationen und der Abtissinnen und Priorinnen in den Nonnenklöstern.'

**Stoffes**, 'Das metaphysisch Unbewusste in Sprache, Mystik und Geschichte. (An interesting critique of Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious. While the unconscious plays a more important rôle than was formerly admitted; its scope is exaggerated.) (IV. Heft.). **Feldmann**, 'Die moderne Religionspsychologie.' (Welcomes this new science and shows how modern theology can receive new blood through historical and psychological research.) **Eisenhut**, 'Religionsunterricht in der Grundschule.' (Discusses the character of the religious course of instructions, and its adaptation to the various ages of pupils.) **Eberle**, 'Zur Lehre über den Primat Petri.' (The doctrine of the primacy of Peter can be enforced by the evidence of the monuments which represent Peter as the Christian Moses, the chosen leader.) **Peter**, 'Primitivismus und Katholizismus.' (The fear in the religion of primitive man was unlike the fear admitted in the Catholic religion. The latter has a strong ethical accompaniment.) **Schmidt**, 'Der tatsächliche Primitivismus.' (A very severe criticism of the account of 'primitive people given in the preceding article. Although this corrective of a priori methods is useful, it is only fair to say that the preceding article seems to have chiefly in view the first men, not the present savage races. The present article gives very brief, but useful information about the mentality of the latter.)

THE CATHOLIC WORLD (Aug., 1921.) **Walker**, 'Why God became Man.' [Emphasises the fundamental impotence of pre-Christian philosophies notwithstanding their numerous good elements.] **Peregrine**, 'Disillusionment of a Convert.' [That is, the riddance of unpleasant illusions about life in the Catholic Church.] **Windle**, 'H. G. Wells on the origin of Christianity.' [Shows the great inaccuracy of Wells' impatient dictum that Christianity was one of the numerous 'blood' religions that infested the decaying Roman empire.] **Bandini**, 'A new Life of Christ.' [An able discussion of the sensational and literary Life of Christ, written by an ex-atheist, Papini, who now strenuously defends the divinity of Christ.] (Sept., 1921.)—Dante Centenary Number, [All the articles deal with various aspects of Dante's work. Dr Humphrey Moynihan, in a graceful tribute, shows how the chief value (forgotten by modern critics) of Dante's work lies in the fact that it is a poetic commentary on the words of the Master of Theologians.]

*Nihil Obstat:*

JOANNES CANONICUS WATERS, Censor. Theol. Deput.

*Imprimi Potest:*

✠ EDUARDUS J. BYRNE,  
Archiep. Dublinen.

Dublino, Oct., 1921.

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